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PLATO, AND THE OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

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PLATO

AND THE

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

BY

GEORGE GROTE,

AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.

A NEW EDITION.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. I.



LONDON:

JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

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IN the present Edition, with a view to the distribution into four volumes, there is a slight transposition of the author's arrangement. His concluding chapters (XXXVIII., XXXIX.), entitled "Other Companions of Sokrates," and "Xenophon," are placed in the First Volume, as chapters III. and IV. By this means each volume is made up of nearly related subjects, so as to possess a certain amount of unity.

Volume First contains the following subjects :— Speculative Philosophy in Greece before Sokrates ; Growth of Dialectic ; Other Companions of Sokrates ; Xenophon ; Life of Plato ; Platonic Canon ; Platonic Compositions generally ; Apology of Sokrates ; Kriton ; Euthyphron.

Volume Second comprises :— Alkibiades I. and II. ; Hippias Major - Hippias Minor ; Hipparchus—Minos ; Theages ; Erastæ or Anterastæ—Rivales ; Ion ; Laches ; Charmides ; Lysis ; Euthydemus ; Menon ; Protagoras ; Gorgias ; Phædon.

Volume Third :— Phædrus—Symposium ; Parmenides ; Theætetus ; Sophistes ; Politikus ; Kratylus ; Philebus ; Menexenus ; Kleitophon.

Volume Fourth :— Republic ; Timæus and Kritias ; Leges and Epinomis ; General Index.

The Volumes may be obtained separately.



PREFACE.

THE present work is intended as a sequel and supplement to my History of Greece. It describes a portion of Hellenic philosophy: it dwells upon eminent individuals, enquiring, theorising, reasoning, confuting, &c., as contrasted with those collective political and social manifestations which form the matter of history, and which the modern writer gathers from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon.

Both Sokrates and Plato, indeed, are interesting characters in history as well as in philosophy. Under the former aspect, they were described by me in my former work as copiously as its general purpose would allow. But it is impossible to do justice to either of them—above all, to Plato, with his extreme variety and abundance—except in a book of which philosophy is the principal subject, and history only the accessory.

The names of Plato and Aristotle tower above all others in Grecian philosophy. Many compositions from both have been preserved, though only a small proportion of the total number left by Aristotle. Such preservation must be accounted highly fortunate, when we read in Diogenes Laertius and others, the long list of works on various topics of philosophy, now irrecoverably lost, and known by little except their titles. Respecting a few of them, indeed, we obtain some partial indications from fragmentary extracts and comments of later critics. But none of these once celebrated philosophers, except Plato and Aristotle, can be fairly appreciated upon evidence furnished by themselves. The Platonic dialogues, besides the extraordinary genius which

they display as compositions, bear thus an increased price (like the Sibylline books) as the scanty remnants of a lost philosophical literature, once immense and diversified.

Under these two points of view, I trust that the copious analysis and commentary bestowed upon them in the present work will not be considered as unnecessarily lengthened. I maintain, full and undiminished, the catalogue of Plato's works as it was inherited from antiquity and recognised by all critics before the commencement of the present century. Yet since several subsequent critics have contested the canon, and set aside as spurious many of the dialogues contained in it,—I have devoted a chapter to this question, and to the vindication of the views on which I have proceeded.

The title of these volumes will sufficiently indicate that I intend to describe, as far as evidence permits, the condition of Hellenic philosophy at Athens during the half century immediately following the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C. My first two chapters do indeed furnish a brief sketch of Pre-Sokratic philosophy: but I profess to take my departure from Sokrates himself, and these chapters are inserted mainly in order that the theories by which he found himself surrounded may not be altogether unknown. Both here, and in the sixty-ninth chapter of my *History*, I have done my best to throw light on the impressive and eccentric personality of Sokrates: a character original and unique, to whose peculiar mode of working on other minds I scarcely know a parallel in history. He was the generator, indirectly and through others, of a new and abundant crop of compositions—the “Sokratic dialogues”: composed by many different authors, among whom Plato stands out as unquestionable coryphæus, yet amidst other names well deserving respectful mention as seconds, companions, or opponents.

It is these Sokratic dialogues, and the various companions of Sokrates from whom they proceeded, that the present work is intended to exhibit. They form the dramatic manifestation

of Hellenic philosophy—as contrasted with the formal and systematising, afterwards prominent in Aristotle.

But the dialogue is a process containing commonly a large intermixture, often a preponderance, of the negative vein: which was more abundant and powerful in Sokrates than in any one. In discussing the Platonic dialogues, I have brought this negative vein into the foreground. It reposes upon a view of the function and value of philosophy which is less dwelt upon than it ought to be, and for which I here briefly prepare the reader.

Philosophy is, or aims at becoming, reasoned truth: an aggregate of matters believed or disbelieved after conscious process of examination gone through by the mind, and capable of being explained to others: the beliefs being either primary, knowingly assumed as self-evident—or conclusions resting upon them, after comparison of all relevant reasons favourable and unfavourable. “Philosophia” (in the words of Cicero), “ex rationum collatione consistit.” This is not the form in which beliefs or disbeliefs exist with ordinary minds: there has been no conscious examination—there is no capacity of explaining to others—there is no distinct setting out of primary truths assumed—nor have any pains been taken to look out for the relevant reasons on both sides, and weigh them impartially. Yet the beliefs nevertheless exist as established facts generated by traditional or other authority. They are sincere and often earnest, governing men’s declarations and conduct. They represent a cause in which sentence has been pronounced, or a rule made absolute, without having previously heard the pleadings.¹

Now it is the purpose of the philosopher, first to bring this omission of the pleadings into conscious notice—next to discover, evolve, and bring under hearing the matters omitted,

¹ Napoléon, qui de temps en temps, au milieu de sa fortune et de sa puissance, songeait à Robespierre et à sa triste fin—interrogeait un jour son archi-chancelier Cambacérès sur le neuf Thermidor. “C’est un procès jugé et non plaidé,” répondait Cambacérès, avec la finesse d’un jurisconsulte courtisan.—(Hippolyte Carnot—Notice sur Barrère, p. 100; Paris, 1842.)

as far as they suggest themselves to his individual reason. He claims for himself, and he ought to claim for all others alike, the right of calling for proof where others believe without proof—of rejecting the received doctrines, if upon examination the proof given appears to his mind unsound or insufficient—and of enforcing instead of them any others which impress themselves upon his mind as true. But the truth which he tenders for acceptance must of necessity be *reasoned truth*; supported by proofs, defended by adequate replies against preconsidered objections from others. Only hereby does it properly belong to the history of philosophy: hardly even hereby has any such novelty a chance of being fairly weighed and appreciated.

When we thus advert to the vocation of philosophy, we see that (to use the phrase of an acute modern author¹) it is by necessity polemical: the assertion of independent reason by individual reasoners, who dissent from the unreasoning belief which reigns authoritative in the social atmosphere around them, and who recognise no correction or

¹ Professor Ferrier, in his instructive volume, 'The Institutes of Metaphysic,' has some valuable remarks on the scope and purpose of Philosophy. I transcribe some of them, in abridgment.

(Sections 1-8).—"A system of philosophy is bound by two main requisitions: it ought to be true—and it ought to be reasoned. Philosophy, in its ideal perfection, is a body of reasoned truth. Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent. It is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true: because, while truth may perhaps be unattainable by man, to reason is certainly his province and within his power. . . . A system is of the highest value only when it embraces both these requisitions—that is, when it is both true, and reasoned. But a system which is reasoned without being true, is always of higher value than a system which is true without being reasoned. The latter kind of system is of no value: because philosophy is the attainment of truth

by the way of reason. That is its definition. A system, therefore, which reaches the truth but not by the way of reason, is not philosophy at all, and has therefore no scientific worth. Again, an unreasoned philosophy, even though true, carries no guarantee of its truth. It may be true, but it cannot be certain. On the other hand, a system, which is reasoned without being true, has always some value. It creates reason by exercising it. It is employing the proper means to reach truth, though it may fail to reach it." (Sections 33-41).—"The student will find that the system here submitted to his attention is of a very polemical character. Why! Because philosophy exists only to correct the inadvertencies of man's ordinary thinking. She has no other mission to fulfil. If man naturally thinks aright, he need not be taught to think aright. If he is already in possession of the truth, he does not require to be put in possession of it. The occupation of philosophy is gone: her office is superfluous. Therefore philosophy assumes

refutation except from the counter-reason of others. We see besides, that these dissenters from the public will also be, probably, more or less dissenters from each other. The process of philosophy may be differently performed by two enquirers equally free and sincere, even of the same age and country : and it is sure to be differently performed, if they belong to ages and countries widely apart. It is essentially relative to the individual reasoning mind, and to the medium by which the reasoner is surrounded. Philosophy herself has every thing to gain by such dissent ; for it is only thereby that the weak and defective points of each point of view are likely to be exposed. If unanimity is not attained, at least each of the dissentients will better understand what he rejects as well as what he adopts.

The number of individual intellects, independent, inquisitive, and acute, is always rare everywhere ; but was comparatively less rare in these ages of Greece. The first topic, on which such intellects broke loose from the common consciousness of the world around them, and struck out new points of view for themselves, was in reference to the *Kosmos* or the Universe. The received belief, of a multitude of unseen divine persons bringing about by volitions all the different phenomena of nature, became unsatisfactory to men like Thales, Anaximander, Parmenides, Pythagoras, Anaxagoras. Each of these volunteers, following his own independent inspirations, struck out a new hypothesis, and endeavoured

and must assume that man does not naturally think aright, but must be taught to do so : that truth does not come to him spontaneously, but must be brought to him by his own exertions. If man does not naturally think aright, he must think, we shall not say wrongly (for that implies malice prepense) but inadvertently : the native occupant of his mind must be, we shall not say falsehood (for that too implies malice prepense) but error. The original dowry then of universal man is inadvertency and error. This assumption is the ground and only justification of the existence of philo-

sophy. The circumstance that philosophy exists only to put right the oversights of common thinking—renders her polemical not by choice, but by necessity. She is controversial as the very tenure and condition of her existence : for how can she correct the slips of common opinion, the oversights of natural thinking, except by controverting them ?

Professor Ferrier deserves high commendation for the care taken in this volume to set out clearly Proposition and Counter-Proposition : the theses which he impugns, as well as that which he sustains.

to commend it to others with more or less of sustaining reason. There appears to have been little of negation or refutation in their procedure. None of them tried to disprove the received point of view, or to throw its supporters upon their defence. Each of them unfolded his own hypothesis, or his own version of affirmative reasoned truth, for the adoption of those with whom it might find favour.

The dialectic age had not yet arrived. When it did arrive, with Sokrates as its principal champion, the topics of philosophy were altered, and its process revolutionised. We have often heard repeated the Ciceronian dictum—that Sokrates brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth: from the distant, abstruse, and complicated phenomena of the Kosmos—in respect to which he adhered to the vulgar point of view, and even disapproved any enquiries tending to rationalise it—to the familiar business of man, and the common generalities of ethics and politics. But what has been less observed about Sokrates, though not less true, is, that along with this change of topics he introduced a complete revolution in method. He placed the negative in the front of his procedure; giving to it a point, an emphasis, a substantive value, which no one had done before. His peculiar gift was that of cross-examination, or the application of his Elenchus to discriminate pretended from real knowledge. He found men full of confident beliefs on these ethical and political topics—affirming with words which they had never troubled themselves to define—and persuaded that they required no farther teaching: yet at the same time unable to give clear or consistent answers to his questions, and shown by this convincing test to be destitute of real knowledge. Declaring this false persuasion of knowledge, or confident unreasoned belief, to be universal, he undertook, as the mission of his life, to expose it: and he proclaimed that until the mind was disabused thereof and made pain-

fully conscious of ignorance, no affirmative reasoned truth could be presented with any chance of success.

Such are the peculiar features of the Sokratic dialogue, exemplified in the compositions here reviewed. I do not mean that Sokrates always talked so; but that such was the marked peculiarity which distinguished his talking from that of others. It is philosophy, or reasoned truth, approached in the most polemical manner; operative at first only to discredit the natural, unreasoned intellectual growths of the ordinary mind, and to generate a painful consciousness of ignorance. I say this here, and I shall often say it again throughout these volumes. It is absolutely indispensable to the understanding of the Platonic dialogues; one half of which must appear unmeaning, unless construed with reference to this separate function and value of negative dialectic. Whether readers may themselves agree in such estimation of negative dialectic, is another question: but they must keep it in mind as the governing sentiment of Plato during much of his life, and of Sokrates throughout the whole of life: as being moreover one main cause of that antipathy which Sokrates inspired to many respectable orthodox contemporaries. I have thought it right to take constant account of this orthodox sentiment among the ordinary public, as the perpetual drag-chain, even when its force is not absolutely repressive, upon free speculation.

Proceeding upon this general view, I have interpreted the numerous negative dialogues in Plato as being really negative and nothing beyond. I have not presumed, still less tried to divine, an ulterior affirmative beyond what the text reveals—neither *arcana coelestia*, like Proklus and Ficinus,¹ nor any other *arcanum* of terrestrial character. While giving such an analysis of each dialogue as my space permitted and

¹ F. A. Wolf, Vorrede, Plato, Sympos. p. vi.

"Ficinus suchte, wie er sich in der Zueignungsschrift seiner Version ausdrückt, im Platon allenthalben *arcana*

coelestia: und da er sie in seinem Kopfe mitbrachte, so konnte es ihm nicht sauer werden, etwas zu finden, was freilich jedem andern verborgen bleiben muss."

as will enable the reader to comprehend its general scope and peculiarities—I have studied each as it stands written, and have rarely ascribed to Plato any purpose exceeding what he himself intimates. Where I find difficulties forcibly dwelt upon without any solution, I imagine, not that he had a good solution kept back in his closet, but that he had failed in finding one: that he thought it useful, as a portion of the total process necessary for finding and authenticating reasoned truth, both to work out these unsolved difficulties for himself, and to force them impressively upon the attention of others.¹

Moreover, I deal with each dialogue as a separate composition. Each represents the intellectual scope and impulse of a peculiar moment, which may or may not be in harmony with the rest. Plato would have protested not less earnestly than Cicero,² against those who sought to foreclose debate, in the grave and arduous struggles for searching out reasoned truth—and to bind down the free inspirations of his intellect in one dialogue, by appealing to sentence already pronounced

¹ A striking passage from Bentham illustrates very well both the Sokratic and the Platonic point of view. (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, vol. II. ch. xvi. p. 57, ed. 1823.)

"Gross ignorance describes no difficulties. Imperfect knowledge finds them out and struggles with them. It must be perfect knowledge that overcomes them."

Of the three different mental conditions here described, the first is that against which Sokrates made war, i.e. real ignorance, and false persuasion of knowledge, which therefore describes no difficulties.

The second, or imperfect knowledge struggling with difficulties, is represented by the Platonic negative dialogues.

The third—or perfect knowledge victorious over difficulties—will be found in the following pages marked by the character *ὁ δύνανται λόγον δίδόναι καὶ δέχεσθαι*. You do not possess "perfect knowledge," until you are able to answer, with unflinching

promptitude and consistency, all the questions of a Sokratic cross-examiner—and to administer effectively the like cross-examination yourself, for the purpose of testing others. *Ὅλως δὲ σφαιριώτερος τοῦ εἰδένος τὸ δύνανθαι διδόναι καὶ ἔστιν.* (Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 981, b. 8.)

Perfect knowledge, corresponding to this definition, will not be found manifested in Plato. Instead of it, we note in his latter years the lawgiver's assumed infallibility.

² Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 11, 32.

The colloquator remarks that what Cicero says is inconsistent with what he (Cicero) had written in the fourth book *De Finibus*. To which Cicero replies:—

"Tu quidem tabellis obsignatis agis mecum, et testificaris, quid dixerim aliquando aut scripserim. Cum aliis isto modo, qui legibus impositis disputant. Nos in diem vivimus: quodcumque nostros animos probabilitate percussit, id dicimus: itaque soli sumus liberi."

in another preceding. Of two inconsistent trains of reasoning, both cannot indeed be true—but both are often useful to be known and studied: and the philosopher, who professes to master the theory of his subject, ought not to be a stranger to either. All minds athirst for reasoned truth will be greatly aided in forming their opinions by the number of points which Plato suggests, though they find little which he himself settles for them finally.

There have been various critics, who, on perceiving inconsistencies in Plato, either force them into harmony by a subtle exegesis, or discard one of them as spurious.¹ I have not followed either course. I recognise such inconsistencies, when found, as facts—and even as very interesting facts—in his philosophical character. To the marked contradiction in the spirit of the *Leges*, as compared with the earlier Platonic compositions, I have called special attention. Plato has been called by Plutarch a mixture of Sokrates with Lykurgus. The two elements are in reality opposite, predominant at different times: Plato begins his career with the confessed ignorance and philosophical negative of Sokrates: he closes it with the peremptory, dictatorial, affirmative of Lykurgus.

To Xenophon, who belongs only in part to my present work, and whose character presents an interesting contrast with Plato, I have devoted a separate chapter. To the other less celebrated Sokratic Companions also, I have endeavoured to do justice, as far as the scanty means of knowledge permit:

¹ Since the publication of the first edition of this work, there have appeared valuable commentaries on the philosophy of the late Sir William Hamilton, by Mr. John Stuart Mill, and Mr. Stirling and others. They have exposed inconsistencies, both grave and numerous, in some parts of Sir William Hamilton's writings as compared with others. But no one has dreamt of drawing an inference from this fact, that one or other of the inconsistent trains of reasoning

must be spurious, falsely ascribed to Sir William Hamilton.

Now in the case of Plato, this same fact of inconsistency is accepted by nearly all his commentators as a sound basis for the inference that both the inconsistent treatises cannot be genuine: though the dramatic character of Plato's writings makes inconsistencies much more easily supposable than in dogmatic treatises such as those of Hamilton.

to them, especially, because they have generally been misconceived and unduly depreciated.

The present volumes, however, contain only one half of the speculative activity of Hellas during the fourth century B.C. The second half, in which Aristotle is the hero, remains still wanting. If my health and energies continue, I hope one day to be able to supply this want: and thus to complete from my own point of view, the history, speculative as well as active, of the Hellenic race, down to the date which I prescribed to myself in the Preface of my History near twenty years ago.

The philosophy of the fourth century B.C. is peculiarly valuable and interesting, not merely from its intrinsic speculative worth—from the originality and grandeur of its two principal heroes—from its coincidence with the full display of dramatic, rhetorical, artistic genius—but also from a fourth reason not unimportant—because it is purely Hellenic; preceding the development of Alexandria, and the amalgamation of Oriental veins of thought with the inspirations of the Academy or the Lyceum. The Orontes¹ and the Jordan had not yet begun to flow westward, and to impart their own colour to the waters of Attica and Latium. Not merely the real world, but also the ideal world, present to the minds of Plato and Aristotle, were purely Hellenic. Even during the century immediately following, this had ceased to be fully true in respect to the philosophers of Athens: and it became less and less true with each succeeding century. New foreign centres of rhetoric and literature—Asiatic and Alexandrian Hellenism—were fostered into importance by regal encouragement. Plato and Aristotle are thus the special representatives of genuine Hellenic philosophy. The remarkable intellectual ascendancy acquired by them in their own day, and maintained over succeeding centuries, was

¹ Juvenal *iii.* 62:—

"Jampridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes," &c.

one main reason why the Hellenic vein was enabled so long to maintain itself, though in impoverished condition, against adverse influences from the East, ever increasing in force. Plato and Aristotle outlasted all their Pagan successors—successors at once less purely Hellenic and less highly gifted. And when Saint Jerome, near 750 years after the decease of Plato, commemorated with triumph the victory of unlettered Christians over the accomplishments and genius of Paganism—he illustrated the magnitude of the victory, by singling out Plato and Aristotle as the representatives of vanquished philosophy.¹

¹ The passage is a remarkable one, as marking both the effect produced on a Latin scholar by Hebrew studies, and the neglect into which even the greatest writers of classical antiquity had then fallen (about 400 A.D.).

Hieronymus—Comment. in Epist. ad Galatas, III. 5, p. 486-487, ed. Venet. 1769:—

"Sed omnem sermonis elegantiam, et Latini sermonis venustatem, stridor lectionis Hebraicae sordidavit. Nostis enim et ipse" (i.e. Paula and Eustochium, to whom his letter is addressed) "quod plus quam quindecim anni sunt, ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius, nunquam Maro, nunquam Gentilium literarum quilibet Auctor ascendit: et si quid forte inde,

dum loquimur, obrepit, quasi antiqua per nebulam somni recordamur. Quod autem profecerim ex lingua illius infatigabili studio, aliorum iudicio derelinquo: ego quid in mea amiserim, scio . . . Si quis eloquentiam quærit vel declamationibus delectatur, habet in utraque lingua Demosthenem et Tullium, Polemonem et Quintilianum. Ecclesia Christi non de Academiâ et Lyceo, sed de vili plebeculâ congregata est. . . . Quotusquisque nunc Aristotelem legit? Quanti Platonis vel libros novêre vel nomen? Vix in angulis otiosi eos senes recolunt. Eusticanos vero et piscatores nostros totus orbis loquitur, universus mundus sonat."

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CHAPTER I.

PLATO.

PRE-SOKRATIC PHILOSOPHY.

CHAPTER I.

SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY IN GREECE, BEFORE AND IN THE TIME OF SOKRATES.

THE life of Plato extends from 427-347 B.C. He was born in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, and he died at the age of 80, about the time when Olynthus was taken by the Macedonian Philip. The last years of his life thus witnessed a melancholy breach in the integrity of the Hellenic world, and even exhibited data from which a far-sighted Hellenic politician might have anticipated something like the coming subjugation, realised afterwards by the victory of Philip at Chæroneia. But during the first half of Plato's life, no such anticipations seemed even within the limits of possibility. The forces of Hellas, though discordant among themselves, were superabundant as to defensive efficacy, and were disposed rather to aggression against foreign enemies, especially against a country then so little formidable as Macedonia. It was under this contemplation of Hellas self-acting and self-sufficing—an aggregate of cities, each a political unit, yet held together by strong ties of race, language, religion, and common feelings of various kinds—that the mind of Plato was both formed and matured.

Change in the political condition of Greece during the life of Plato.

In appreciating, as far as our scanty evidence allows, the circumstances which determined his intellectual and speculative

character, I shall be compelled to touch briefly upon the various philosophical theories which were propounded anterior to Sokrates—as well as to repeat some matters already brought to view in the sixteenth, sixty-seventh, and sixty-eighth chapters of my History of Greece.

To us, as to Herodotus, in his day, the philosophical speculation of the Greeks begins with the theology and cosmology of Homer and Hesiod. The series of divine persons and attributes, and generations presented by these poets, and especially the Theogony of Hesiod, supplied at one time full satisfaction to the curiosity of the Greeks respecting the past history and present agencies of the world around them. In the emphatic censure bestowed by Herakleitus on the poets and philosophers who preceded him, as having much knowledge but no sense—he includes Hesiod, as well as Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hekataeus: upon Homer and Archilochus he is still more severe, declaring that they ought to be banished from the public festivals and scourged.¹ The sentiment of curiosity as it then existed was only secondary and derivative, arising out of some of the strong primary or personal sentiments—fear or hope, antipathy or sympathy,—impression of present weakness,—unsatisfied appetites and longings,—wonder and awe under the presence of the terror-striking phenomena of nature, &c. Under this state of the mind, when problems suggested themselves for solution, the answers afforded by Polytheism gave more satisfaction than could have been afforded by any other hypothesis. Among the indefinite multitude of invisible, personal, quasi-human, agents, with different attributes and dispositions, some one could be found to account for every perplexing phenomenon. The question asked was, not What are the antecedent conditions or causes of rain, thunder, or earthquakes, but Who rains and thunders? Who produces earthquakes?² The Hesiodic Greek was satisfied when informed that it was Zeus or Poseidon. To be told of physical agencies would have appeared to him not merely

¹ Diogen. Laert. ix. 1. Πολυμαθὴς ἦν οὐ δίδωκεν· (οὐ φέει, ap. Proclum in Platon. Timæ. p. 81 F., p. 72, ed. Schneider). 'Ἡσιόδου γὰρ ἂν δίδωκε καὶ Πυθαγόραν, εὖ τις τε Κρονόφρονος τε καὶ

'Ἑκαταίου· τὸν θ' Ὀμηρον ἐφασκεν ἔχον εἶναι ἐκ τῶν ἀγίων ἐκβέλλεσθαι καὶ βεβίωσθαι, καὶ Ἀρχιλόχον ἐμοίως.
² Aristophanes, Nubes, 368, Ἄλλὰ τίς δει; Herodot. vii. 129.

unsatisfactory, but absurd, ridiculous, and impious. It was the task of a poet like Hesiod to clothe this general polytheistic sentiment in suitable details: to describe the various Gods, Goddesses, Demigods, and other quasi-human agents, with their characteristic attributes, with illustrative adventures, and with sufficient relations of sympathy and subordination among each other, to connect them in men's imaginations as members of the same brotherhood. Okeanus, Gæa, Uranus, Helios, Selênê,—Zeus, Poseidon, Hades—Apollo and Artemis, Dionysus and Aphroditê—these and many other divine personal agents, were invoked as the producing and sustaining forces in nature, the past history of which was contained in their filiations or contests. Anterior to all of them, the primordial matter or person, was Chaos.

Hesiod represents the point of view ancient and popular (to use Aristotle's expression¹) among the Greeks, from whence all their philosophical speculation took its departure; and which continued throughout their history, to underlie all the philosophical speculations, as the faith of the ordinary public who neither frequented the schools nor conversed with philosophers. While Aristophanes, speaking in the name of this popular faith, denounces and derides Sokrates as a searcher, alike foolish and irreligious, after astronomical and physical causes—Sokrates himself not only denies the truth of the allegation, but adopts as his own the sentiment which dictated it; proclaiming Anaxagoras and others to be culpable for prying into mysteries which the Gods intentionally kept hidden.² The repugnance felt by a numerous public, against scientific explanation—as eliminating the divine agents and substituting in their place irrational causes,³—was a permanent fact of which philosophers were always obliged to take account, and

Belief in such agency continued among the general public, even after the various sects of philosophy had arisen.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 8, p. 989, a. 10. *Ἡσίοδος δὲ καὶ Ἡρόδοτος τὴν γῆν πρῶτον γενέσθαι τῶν σμμάτων· οὕτως ἀρχαίαν καὶ δημοτικὴν συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν δόξαν.*

Again, in the beginning of the second book of the *Meteorologica*, Aristotle contrasts the ancient and primitive theology with the "human wisdom" which grew up subsequently:

Οἱ ἀρχαίοι καὶ διατριβόντες περὶ τὰς θεολογίας—οἱ σοφώτεροι τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν (*Meteor.* II. i. p. 353, a.).

² Xenophon, *Memor.* iv. 7, 5; i. 1, 11-15. Plato, *Apolog.* p. 30 E.

³ Plutarch, *Nikias*, c. 23. *Οὐ γὰρ ἤντικτο τοὺς φυσικοὺς καὶ μετεωρολόγους τότε καλούμενους, ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους καὶ ἀνύμεις ἀπροσφύτους καὶ καταρρακασμένα πάθῃ διατριβόντας τὸ θεῖον.*

which modified the tone of their speculations without being powerful enough to repress them.

Even in the sixth century B.C., when the habit of composing in prose was first introduced, Pherekydes and Akusilaus still continued in their prose the theogony, or mythical cosmogony, of Hesiod and the other old poets: while Epimenides and the Orphic poets put forth different theogonies, blended with mystical dogmas. It was, however, in the same century, and in the first half of it, that Thales, of Miletus (620-560 B.C.), set the example of a new vein of thought.

Instead of the Homeric Okeanus, father of all things, Thales assumed the material substance, Water, as the primordial matter and the universal substratum of everything in nature. By various transmutations, all other substances were generated from water; all of them, when destroyed, returned into water. Like the old poets, Thales conceived the surface of the earth to be flat and round; but he did not, like them, regard it as stretching down to the depths of Tartarus: he supposed it to be flat and shallow, floating on the immensity of the watery expanse or Ocean.¹ This is the main feature of the Thaletian hypothesis, about which, however, its author seems to have left no writing. Aristotle says little about Thales, and that little in a tone of so much doubt,² that we can hardly confide in the opinions and discoveries ascribed to him by others.³

The next of the Ionic philosophers, and the first who pub-

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 2, p. 983, b. 21. *De Caelo*, II. 13, p. 294, a. 29. *Θαλῆς, ὁ πρὸς τοὺς ἀρχαίους φιλοσοφίας*, &c. Seneca, *Natural. Quest.* vi. 6.

Pherekydes, Epimenides, &c., were contemporary with the earliest Ionic philosophers (Brandis, *Handbuch der Gesch. der Gr.-Röm. Phil.*, s. 23).

According to Plutarch (*Aquæ et Ignis Comparatio*, p. 965, init.), most persons believed that Hesiod, by the word Chaos, meant Water. Zeno the Stoic adopted this interpretation (*Schol. Apollon. Rhod.* I. 496). On the other hand, Bacchylides the poet, and after him Zenodotus, called Air by the name Chaos (*Schol. Hesiod. Theogon.* p. 392, Gaisf.). Hermann considers that the Hesiodic Chaos means empty space (see note, Brandis,

Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-Röm. Phil., vol. I., p. 71).

² See two passages in Aristotle *De Anima*, I. 2, and I. 5.

³ Cicero says (*De Naturâ Deorum*, I. 10), "Thales—quam dixit esse initium rerum, Deum autem eam mentem, quæ ex aquâ cuncta fingeret." That the latter half of this Ciceronian statement, respecting the doctrines of Thales, is at least unfounded, and probably erroneous, is recognised by Preller, Brandis, and Zeller. Preller, *Histor. Philos. Græc. ex Fontium Locis Contexta*, sect. 15; Brandis, *Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos.* sect. 31, p. 115; Zeller, *Die Philos. der Griechen*, vol. I., p. 151, ed. 2.

It is stated by Herodotus that Thales foretold the year of the memorable solar

lished his opinions in writing, was Anaximander, of Miletus, the countryman and younger contemporary of Thales (570-520 B.C.). He too searched for an *'Αρχή*, a primordial Something or principle, self-existent and comprehending in its own nature a generative, motive, or transmutative force. Not thinking that water, or any other known and definite substance fulfilled these conditions, he adopted as the foundation of his hypothesis a substance which he called the Infinite or Indeterminate. Under this name he conceived Body simply, without any positive or determinate properties, yet including the fundamental contraries, Hot, Cold, Moist, Dry, &c., in a potential or latent state, including farther a self-changing and self-developing force,¹ and being moreover immortal and indestructible.² By this inherent force, and by the evolution of one or more of these dormant contrary qualities, were generated the various definite substances of nature—Air, Fire, Water, &c. But every determinate substance thus generated was, after a certain time, destroyed and resolved again into the Indeterminate mass. "From thence all substances proceed, and into this they relapse: each in its turn thus making atonement to the others, and suffering the penalty of injustice."³ Anaximander conceived separate existence (determinate and particular existence, apart from the indeterminate and universal) as an unjust privilege, not to be tolerated

Anaximander—laid down *ἀσέπρῳ* the Infinite or indeterminate—generation of these elements out of it, by evolution of latent fundamental contraries—astronomical and geological doctrines.

eclipse which happened during the battle between the Medes and the Lydians (Herod. i. 74). This eclipse seems to have occurred in B.C. 585, according to the best recent astronomical enquiries by Professor Alry.

¹ See Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. i. p. 157, seq. ed. 2nd.

Anaximander conceived τὸ ἄπειρον as infinite matter: the Pythagoreans and Plato conceived it as a distinct nature by itself—as a subject, not as a predicate (Aristotel. *Physic.* iii. 4, p. 208, a. 2).

About these fundamental contraries, Aristotle says (*Physic.* i. 4, *inft.*): οἱ δ' ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἐκείνου τὰς ἐναντιότητας ἐκρίνεσθαι, ὥστερ' Ἀναξίμανδρος φησι. Which Simplicius explains, ἐναντιότητες εἰσι, θερρὸν, ψυχρὸν, ξηρὸν, ὕγρὸν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι, &c.

Compare also Schleiermacher, "Ue-

ber Anaximandros," in his *Vermischte Schriften*, vol. ii. p. 178, seq. Deutinger (*Gesch. der Philos.* vol. i. p. 165, *Regenab.* 1852) maintains that this *ἐκρίσις* of contraries is at variance with the hypothesis of Anaximander, and has been erroneously ascribed to him. But the testimony is sufficiently good to outweigh this suspicion.

² Anaximander spoke of his ἄπειρον as ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀνώλεστον (Aristotel. *Physic.* iii. 4, 7, p. 208, b. 16).

³ Simplicius ad Aristotel. *Physic.* fol. 6 a apud Preller, *Histor. Philos. Græco-Rom.* § 57, ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις ἐστὶ τοῖς εἶναι, καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρόνον· δοδεκαὶ γὰρ αὐτὰ τίσιν καὶ διαφ. ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. Simplicius remarks upon the poetical character of this phraseology, ποιητικαῖς ὁνομασίαις αὐτὰ λέγων.

except for a time, and requiring atonement even for that. As this process of alternate generation and destruction was unceasing, so nothing less than an Infinite could supply material for it. Earth, Water, Air, Fire, having been generated, the two former, being cold and heavy, remained at the bottom, while the two latter ascended. Fire formed the exterior circle, encompassing the air like bark round a tree: this peripheral fire was broken up and aggregated into separate masses, composing the sun, moon, and stars. The sphere of the fixed stars was nearest to the earth: that of the moon next above it: that of the sun highest of all. The sun and moon were circular bodies twenty-eight times larger than the earth: but the visible part of them was only an opening in the centre, through which¹ the fire or light behind was seen. All these spheres revolved round the earth, which was at first semi-fluid or mud, but became dry and solid through the heat of the sun. It was in shape like the section of a cylinder, with a depth equal to one-third of its breadth or horizontal surface, on which men and animals live. It was in the centre of the Kosmos; it remained stationary because of its equal distance from all parts of the outer revolving spheres; there was no cause determining it to move upward rather than downward or sideways, therefore it remained still.² Its exhalations nourished the fire in the peripheral regions of the Kosmos. Animals were produced from the primitive muddy fluid of the earth: first, fishes and other lower animals—next, in process of time man, when circumstances permitted his development.³ We

¹ Origen. *Philosophum.* p. 11, ed. Miller; Plutarch ap. Eusebium *Præp. Evang.* i. 8, xv. 22-46-47; Stobæus *Eclog.* i. p. 510. Anaximander supposed that eclipses of the sun and moon were caused by the occasional closing of these apertures (Euseb. xv. 50-51). The part of the sun visible to us was, in his opinion, not smaller than the earth, and of the purest fire (Diog. Laert. ii. 1).

Eudæmus, in his history of astronomy, mentioned Anaximander as the first who had discussed the magnitudes and distances of the celestial bodies (Simplikios ad Aristot. *De Cælo*, ap. Schol. Brand. p. 497, a. 12).

² Aristot. *Meteorol.* ii. 2, p. 256, a. 21, which is referred by Alexander of Aphrodisias to Anaximander; also *De Cælo*, ii. 12, p. 226, b. 12.

A doctrine somewhat like it is ascribed even to Thales. See Alexander's Commentary on Aristot. *Metaphys.* i. p. 983, b. 17.

The reason here assigned by Anaximander why the Earth remained still, is the earliest example in Greek philosophy of that fallacy called the principle of the Sufficient Reason, so well analysed and elucidated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his *System of Logic*, book v., ch. 3, sect. 6.

The remarks which Aristotle himself makes upon it are also very interesting, when he cites the opinion of Anaximander. Compare Plato, *Phædon*, p. 109, c. 132, with the citations in Wyttenbach's note.

³ Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* v. 19.

learn farther respecting the doctrines of Anaximander, that he proposed physical explanations of thunder, lightning, and other meteorological phenomena :¹ memorable as the earliest attempt of speculation in that department, at a time when such events inspired the strongest religious awe, and were regarded as the most especial manifestations of purposes of the Gods. He is said also to have been the first who tried to represent the surface and divisions of the earth on a brazen plate, the earliest rudiment of a map or chart.²

The third physical philosopher produced by Miletus, seemingly before the time of her terrible disasters suffered from the Persians after the Ionic revolt between 500-494 B.C., was Anaximenes, who struck out a third hypothesis. He assumed, as the primordial substance, and as the source of all generation or transmutation, Air, eternal in duration, infinite in extent. He thus returned to the principle of the Thaletian theory, selecting for his beginning a known substance, though not the same substance as Thales. To explain how generation of new products was possible (as Anaximander had tried to explain by his theory of evolution of latent contraries), Anaximenes adverted to the facts of condensation and rarefaction, which he connected respectively with cold and heat.³ The Infinite Air, possessing and exercising an inherent generative and developing power, perpetually in motion, passing from dense to rare or from rare to dense, became in its utmost rarefaction, Fire and Æther ; when passing through successive stages of increased condensation it became first cloud, next water, then earth, and, lastly, in its

Anaximenes—
adopted
Air as *ἀέρις*
—rise of
substances
out of it, by
condensation
and
rarefaction.

¹ Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* III. 3 ; Seneca, *Quest. Nat.* II. 18-19.

² Strabo, I. p. 7. Diogenes Laertius (II. 1) states that Anaximander affirmed the figure of the earth to be spherical ; and Dr. Whewell, in his *History of the Inductive Sciences*, follows his statement. But Schleiermacher (*Ueber Anaximandros*, vol. II. p. 204 of his *Sämmtliche Werke*) and Gruppe (*Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, p. 38) contest this assertion, and prefer that of Plutarch (ap. Eusebium *Præp. Evang.* I. 8, *Placit. Philos.* III. 10), which I have adopted in the text. It is to be remembered that Diogenes himself, in another place (IX. 3, 21),

affirms Parmenides to have been the first who propounded the spherical figure of the earth. See the facts upon this subject collected and discussed in the instructive dissertation of L. Oettinger, *Die Vorstellungen der Griechen und Römer ueber die Erde als Himmelskörper*, p. 38 ; Freiburg, 1850.

³ Origen, *Philosophumena*. c. 7 ; Simplicius in *Aristot. Physic.* f. 32 ; Brandis, *Handb. d. Gesch. d. Gr.-R. Phil.* p. 144. Cicero, *Academic.* II. 37, 118. "Anaximenes infinitum aera, sed ea, quæ ex eo orientur, definita."

The comic poet Philémon introduced in one of his dramas, of which a short fragment is preserved (Frag. 2, Mel-

utmost density, stone.¹ Surrounding, embracing, and pervading the Kosmos, it also embodied and carried with it a vital principle, which animals obtained from it by inspiration, and which they lost as soon as they ceased to breathe.² Anaximenes included in his treatise (which was written in a clear Ionic dialect) many speculations on astronomy and meteorology, differing widely from those of Anaximander. He conceived the Earth as a broad, flat, round plate, resting on the air.³ Earth, Sun, and Moon were in his view condensed air, the Sun acquiring heat by the extreme and incessant velocity with which he moved. The Heaven was not an entire hollow sphere encompassing the Earth below as well as above, but a hemisphere covering the Earth above, and revolving laterally round it like a cap round the head.⁴

The general principle of cosmogony, involved in the hypothesis of these three Milesians—one primordial substance or Something endued with motive and transmutative force, so as to generate all the variety of products, each successive and transient, which our senses witness—was taken up with more or less modification by others, especially by Diogenes of Apollonia, of whom I shall speak presently. But there were three other men who struck out different veins of thought—Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Hera-
kleitus: the two former seemingly contemporary with Anaximenes (550-490 B.C.), the latter somewhat later.

Of Pythagoras I have spoken at some length in the thirty-seventh chapter of my History of Greece. Speculative originality was only one among many remarkable features in his character. He was an inquisitive traveller, a religious reformer or innovator, and the founder of a powerful and active brotherhood, partly ascetic, partly political, which stands without parallel in Grecian history. The immortality of the soul, with its transmigration (metempsychosis) after death into other bodies, either

Pythagoras
—his life
and career
—Pythagorean
brother-
hood, great
political
influence

neke, p. 840), the omnipresent and omniscient Air, to deliver the prologue:

— οὐδὲς εἰμ' ἐγὼ
Ἄϊο, ὅν ἔν τις δρομάσει καὶ Δία.
ἐγὼ δ', ὃ θεοῦ ὅστις ἴσθω, εἰμὶ παρὰ τοῦ
πάντος ἐξ ἀνάγκης οἶδα, παρὰ τοῦ πάντων.

¹ Plutarch, De Primo Frigido, p.

947; Plutarch, ap. Euseb. P. E. i. 8.

² Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. i. 3, p. 878.

³ Aristotel. De Caelo, ii. 13; Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. iii. 10, p. 896.

⁴ Origen. Philosophum. p. 12, ed. Miller: ὡς περὶ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν κεφαλὴν στρέφεται τὸ πᾶν.

of men or of other animals—the universal kindred thus recognised between men and other animals, and the prohibition which he founded thereupon against the use of animals for food or sacrifice—are among his most remarkable doctrines: said to have been borrowed (together with various ceremonial observances) from the Egyptians.¹ After acquiring much celebrity in his native island of Samos and throughout Ionia, Pythagoras emigrated (seemingly about 530 B.C.) to Kroton and Metapontum in Lower Italy, where the Pythagorean brotherhood gradually acquired great political ascendancy: and from whence it even extended itself in like manner over the neighbouring Greco-Italian cities. At length it excited so much political antipathy among the body of the citizens,² that its rule was violently put down, and its members dispersed about 509 B.C. Pythagoras died at Metapontum.

Though thus stripped of power, however, the Pythagoreans still maintained themselves for several generations as a social, religious, and philosophical brotherhood. They continued and extended the vein of speculation first opened by the founder himself. So little of proclaimed individuality was there among them, that Aristotle, in criticising their doctrine, alludes to them usually under the collective name Pythagoreans. Epicharmus, in his comedies at Syracuse (470 B.C.) gave occasional utterance to various doctrines of the sect; but the earliest of them who is known to have composed a book, was Philolaus,³ the contemporary of Sokrates. Most of the opinions ascribed to the Pythagoreans originated probably among the successors of Pythagoras; but the basis and principle upon which they proceed seems undoubtedly his.

The problem of physical philosophy, as then conceived, was

¹ Herodot. ii. 81; Isokrates, Busirid. Encom. s. 23.

² Polybius, ii. 39; Porphyry, Vit. Pythag. 64, seq.

³ Diogen. Laert. viii. 7-15-78-86.

Some passages of Aristotle, however, indicate divergences of doctrine among the Pythagoreans themselves (Metaphys. A. 6, p. 986, s. 22). He probably

speaks of the Pythagoreans of his own time when dialectical discussion had modified the original orthodoxy of the order. Compare Gruppe, Ueber die Fragmente des Archytas, cap. 5, p. 61-63. About the gradual development of the Pythagorean doctrine, see Brandis, Handbuch der Gr.-R. Philos. s. 74, 75.

which it acquired among the Greco-Italian cities—incur great enmity, and was violently put down.

The Pythagoreans continue as a recluse sect, without political power.

Doctrine of the Pythagoreans—
 Number the Essence of Things.

to find some primordial and fundamental nature, by and out of which the sensible universe was built up and produced; something which co-existed always underlying it, supplying fresh matter and force for generation of successive products. The hypotheses of Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, to solve this problem, have been already noticed: Pythagoras solved it by saying, That the essence of things consisted in Number. By this he did not mean simply that all things were numerable, or that number belonged to them as a predicate. Numbers were not merely predicates inseparable from subjects, but subjects in themselves: substances or magnitudes, endowed with active force, and establishing the fundamental essences or types according to which things were constituted. About water,¹ air, or fire, Pythagoras said nothing.² He conceived that sensible phenomena had greater resemblance to numbers than to any one of these substrata assigned by the Ionic philosophers. Number was (in his doctrine) the self-existent reality—the fundamental material and in-dwelling force pervading the universe. Numbers were not separate from things³ (like the Platonic Ideas), but *fundamenta* of things—their essences or determining principles: they were moreover conceived as having magnitude and active force.⁴ In the movements of the celestial bodies, in works of human art, in musical harmony—measure and number are the producing and directing agencies. According to the Pythagorean Philolaus, “the Dekad, the full and perfect number, was of supreme and universal efficacy as the guide and principle of life, both to the

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 5, p. 985, b. 27. “Ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, ἰδέσκειν θεωρεῖν ἀνομήματα πολλὰ τοῖς ὄντι καὶ γινόμενοις, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς καὶ γὰ καὶ ὄντι, &c. Cf. N. 3, p. 1080, a. 21.

² Aristotel. *Metaph.* A 9, p. 990, a. 16. Διὸ περὶ τοῦτο ἡ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιοῦτων συμμέτρου ὅδ’ ὅτιον εἰρήκεται, &c. (the Pythagoreans); also N. 3.

³ *Physic.* III. 4, p. 203, a. 6. Οὐ γὰρ χωριστὸν τοιοῦτον (the Pythagoreans) τὸν ἀριθμὸν, &c. *Metaphys.* M. 6, p. 1080, b. 19: τὰς μονάδας ἀνταριθμῶνται ἔχειν μέγεθος. M. 8, p. 1063, b. 17: ἐπειτα (the Pythagoreans) τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ὄντα λέγουσιν· τὰ γοῦν θεωρεῖσθαι προσέκτοντα τοῖς σώμασιν ὡς ἐξ ἐκείνων ὄντων τὸν ἀριθμὸν.

⁴ An analogous application of this principle (Number as the fundamental substance and universal primary agent) may be seen in an eminent physical philosopher of the nineteenth century, Oken’s *Elements of Physico-Philosophy*, translated by Tulk. Aphorism 57:—“While numbers in a mathematical sense are positions and negations of nothing, in the philosophical sense they are positions and negations of the Eternal. Every thing which is real, posited, finite, has become this, out of numbers; or more strictly speaking, every Real is absolutely nothing else than a number. This must be the sense entertained of numbers in the Pythagorean doctrine

Kosmos and to man. The nature of number was imperative and lawgiving, affording the only solution of all that was perplexing or unknown; without number all would be indeterminate and unknowable."¹

The first principle or beginning of Number, was the One or Monas—which the Pythagoreans conceived as including both the two fundamental contraries—the Determining and the Indeterminate.² All particular numbers, and through them all things, were compounded from the harmonious junction and admixture of these two fundamental contraries.³ All numbers being either odd or even, the odd numbers were considered as analogous to the Determining, the even numbers to the Indeterminate. In One or the Monad, the Odd and Even were supposed to be both contained, not yet separated: Two was the first indeterminate even number; Three, the first odd and the first determinate number, because it included beginning, middle, and end. The sum of the first four numbers—One,

The Monas
—*Ἀρχή*, or
principle of
Number—
geometrical
conception
of number—
symbolical
attributes of
the first ten
numbers,
especially of
the Dekad.

—namely, that every thing, or the whole universe, had arisen from numbers. This is not to be taken in a merely quantitative sense, as it has hitherto been erroneously; but in an intrinsic sense, as implying that all things are numbers themselves, or the acts of the Eternal. The essence in numbers is nought else than the Eternal. The Eternal only is or exists, and nothing else is when a number exists. There is therefore nothing real but the Eternal itself; for every Real, or every thing that is, is only a number and only exists by virtue of a number."

Ibid., Aphorism 105-107:—"Arithmetic is the science of the second idea, or that of time or motion, or life. It is therefore the first science. Mathematics not only begin with it, but creation also, with the becoming of time and of life. Arithmetic is, accordingly, the truly absolute or divine science; and therefore every thing in it is also directly certain, because every thing in it resembles the Divine. Theology is arithmetic personified."—"A natural thing is nothing but a self-moving number. An organic or living thing is a number moving itself out of itself or spontaneously: an inorganic thing, however, is a number moved by another thing: now as this

other thing is also a real number, so then is every inorganic thing a number moved by another number, and so on *ad infinitum*. The movements in nature are only movements of numbers by numbers: even as arithmetical computation is none other than a movement of numbers by numbers; but with this difference—that in the latter, this operates in an ideal manner, in the former after a real."

¹ Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 129, seqq. *Θεωρεῖν δὲ τὰ ἔργα καὶ τὰν ἰστίαν (οὐσίαν) τὸ ἀριθμὸν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν, ἥτις ἐν τῇ δεκάδῃ· μεγάλα γὰρ καὶ παντοίως βίω καὶ παντοεργὸς καὶ θεῖα καὶ οὐρανίου βίω καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῃ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἀγνῶν . . . ἀντι δὲ ταύτας πάντα ἀντίπα καὶ ἀγῶνα καὶ ἀπαρτῇ· νομικὰ γὰρ ἂ φῶσις τὸ ἀριθμὸν καὶ ἀγεμονικὰ καὶ διδασκαλικὰ τὸ ἀπορομίνω παρὸς καὶ ἀπορομίνω παρὶ. Compare the Fr. p. 58, of the same work.*

According to Plato, as well as the Pythagoreans, number extended to ten, and not higher: all above ten were multiples and increments of ten. (Aristot. *Physic.* iii. 6, p. 203, b. 20).

² See the instructive explanations of Boeckh, in his work on the Fragments of Philolaus, p. 54 seq.

³ Philolaus, Fr., p. 62, Boeckh.—Diogen. L. viii. 7, 86.

By *ἀμωρία*, Philolaus meant the

Two, Three, Four = Ten ($1 + 2 + 3 + 4$) was the most perfect number of all.¹ To these numbers, one, two, three, four, were understood as corresponding the fundamental conceptions of Geometry—Point, Line, Plane, Solid. Five represented colour and visible appearance: Six, the phenomenon of Life: Seven, Health, Light, Intelligence, &c.: Eight, Love or Friendship.² Man, Horse, Justice and Injustice, had their representative numbers: that corresponding to Justice was a square number, as giving equal for equal.³

The Pythagoreans conceived the Kosmos, or the universe, as one single system, generated out of numbers.⁴ Of this system the central point—the determining or limiting One—was first in order of time, and in order of philosophical conception. By the determining influence of this central constituted One, portions of the surrounding Infinite were successively attracted and brought into system: numbers, geometrical figures, solid substances, were generated. But as the Kosmos thus constituted was composed of numbers, there could be no continuum: each numerical unit was distinct and separated from the rest by a portion of vacant space, which was imbibed, by a sort of inhalation, from the infinite space or spirit without.

musical octave: and his work included many explanations and comparisons respecting the intervals of the musical scale. (Boeckh, p. 65 seq.)

¹ Aristot. *De Caelo*, l. 1, p. 268, a. 10. καθάπερ γὰρ φασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς ἑπτὰ ἀριθμοῖς τελευτῇ γὰρ καὶ μίσει καὶ ἀρχῇ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ πέντε, ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριῶδος. Διὸ κατὰ τῆς φύσεως εὐλαφέστερον ὄντων νόμους ἀκρίβης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀνοσιετίας χροῖσθαι τὸν θεὸν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ (l. a. three). It is remarkable that Aristotle here adopts and sanctions, in regard to the number Three, the mystic and fanciful attributes ascribed by the Pythagoreans.

² Strümpell, *Geschichte der theoreetischen Philosophie der Griechen*, a. 78. Brandis, *Handbuch der Gr.-Röm. Phil.*, sect. 80, p. 467 seq.

The number Five also signified marriage, because it was a junction of the first masculine number Three with the first feminine Two. Seven signified also marriage or Right Season. See Aristot.

Metaphys. A. 5, p. 985, b. 26, and M. 4, p. 1078, b. 23, compared with the commentary of Alexander on the former passage.

³ Aristot. *Ethica Magna*, i. 1.

⁴ Aristot. *Metaph.* M. 6, p. 1080, b. 18. τὸν γὰρ ὅλον οὐρανὸν κατασκευάζουσιν ἐξ ἀριθμῶν. Compare p. 1075, b. 37, with the Scholia.

A poet calls the tetraktys (consecrated as the sum total of the first four numbers $1 + 2 + 3 + 4 = 10$) πρῶτην ἀέντου φύσεως μεζήμεν ἔχουσαν. *Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat.* vii. 94.

⁵ Philolaus, ed. Boeckh, p. 91-96. τὸ πρῶτον ἀμυσθῆν, τὸ ἐν ἐν τῷ μίσει τῆς σφαίρας ἰστία καλεῖται—ἑμὸν τε καὶ συνεχὴ καὶ μέτρον φύσεως—πρῶτον εἶναι φύσιν τὸ μίσειν.

Aristot. *Metaph.* N. 3, p. 1001, a. 15. φανερόν γὰρ λέγουσιν (the Pythagoreans) ὅτι τοῦ ὅλου συντελεστος—τὸ δὲ τὸ ἕκαστον τοῦ ἀκρίβους ἐστὶ εἰλαστο καὶ ἐτεροειδὲς ἐπὶ τοῦ εἰλαστο.

Aristot. *Physic.* iv. 6, p. 218, b. 21.

The central point was fire, called by the Pythagoreans the Hearth of the Universe (like the public hearth or perpetual fire maintained in the prytaneum of a Grecian city), or the watch-tower of Zeus. Around it revolved, from West to East, ten divine bodies, with unequal velocities, but in symmetrical movement or regular dance.¹ Outermost was the circle of the fixed stars, called by the Pythagoreans Olympus, and composed of fire like the centre. Within this came successively,—with orbits more and more approximating to the centre,—the five planets, Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, Venus, Mercury: next, the Sun, the Moon, and the Earth. Lastly, between the Earth and the central fire, an hypothetical body, called the Antichthon or Counter-Earth, was imagined for the purpose of making up a total represented by the sacred number Ten, the symbol of perfection and totality. The Antichthon was analogous to a separated half of the Earth; simultaneous with the Earth in its revolutions, and corresponding with it on the opposite side of the central fire.

The inhabited portion of the Earth was supposed to be that which was turned away from the central fire and towards the Sun, from which it received light. But the Sun itself was not self-luminous: it was conceived as a glassy disk, receiving and concentrating light from the central fire, and reflecting it upon the Earth, so long as the two were on the same side of the central fire. The Earth revolved, in an orbit obliquely intersecting that of the Sun, and in twenty-four hours, round the central fire, always turning the same side towards that fire. The alternation of day and night was occasioned by the Earth being during a part of such revolution on the same side of the central fire with the Sun, and thus receiving light reflected from him: and during the remaining part of her revolution on the side opposite to him, so that she received no light at all from him. The Earth, with the Antichthon, made this revolution in one day: the Moon, in

ἔστιν δ' ἄρα καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι κέντρον, καὶ ἐκτείνεσθαι αὐτὸ τὸ οὐράνιον ἐκ τοῦ κέντρον πύργου, ὡς ἀνακρινόντι· καὶ τὸ κέντρον, δ' ἀπορίζει τὰς φύσεις, ὡς ἔστιν τοῦ κέντρον χωρισμοῦ τινος τῶν ἀφ' ἑξῆς καὶ τῆς ἀπορίσεως, καὶ τοῦτο εἶναι πρῶτον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις· τὸ γὰρ κέντρον ἀπορίζει τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν. Stobæus (Eclog. Phys. i. 18, p. 381, Heer.)

states the same, referring to the lost work of Aristotle on the Pythagorean philosophy.

Compare Preller, *Histor. Philos. Græc. Font. Loc. Context.*, sect. 114-115.

¹ Philolaus, p. 94. Boeckh. *περὶ δὲ τοῦτο δὲκα σήματα θεῖα χορεύειν*, &c. Aristot. *De Cælo*, ii. 13. *Metaphys.* A. 5.

one month :¹ the Sun, with the planets, Mercury and Venus, in one year: the planets, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn, in longer periods respectively, according to their distances from the centre: lastly, the outermost circle of the fixed stars (the Olympus, or the Aplanes), in some unknown period of very long duration.²

The revolutions of such grand bodies could not take place, Music of the in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, without pro-Spheres.

ducing a loud and powerful sound; and as their distances from the central fire were supposed to be arranged in musical ratios,³ so the result of all these separate sounds was full and perfect harmony. To the objection—Why were not these sounds heard by us?—they replied, that we had heard them constantly and without intermission from the hour of our birth; hence they had become imperceptible by habit.⁴

Ten was, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, the perfection

¹ The Pythagoreans supposed that eclipses of the moon took place, sometimes by the interposition of the earth, sometimes by that of the Antichthon, to intercept from the moon the light of the sun (Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 27, p. 560. Heeren). Stobæus here cites the history (*Γεωγραφία*) of the Pythagorean philosophy by Aristotle, and the statement of Philippus of Opus, the friend of Plato.

² Aristot. de Cælo, li. 12. Respecting this Pythagorean cosmical system, the elucidations of Boeckh are clear and valuable. Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, Berlin, 1852, p. 99-102; completing those which he had before given in his edition of the fragments of Philolaus.

Martin (in his *Études sur le Timée de Platon*, vol. ii. p. 107) and Gruppe (*Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, ch. iv.) maintain that the original system proposed by Pythagoras was a geocentric system, afterwards transformed by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans into that which stands in the text. But I agree with Boeckh (*Ueber das Kosmische System des Platon*, p. 89 seqq.), and with Zeller (*Phil. d. Griech.*, vol. i. p. 308, ed. 2), that this point is not made out. That which Martin and Gruppe (on the authority of Alexander Polyhistor, *Diog. viii. 25*, and others) consider to be a description of the original Pythagorean system as it stood before Philolaus, is more pro-

bably a subsequent transformation of it; introduced after the time of Aristotle, in order to suit later astronomical views.

³ Playfair observes (in his dissertation on the Progress of Natural Philosophy, p. 87) respecting Kepler—"Kepler was perhaps the first person who conceived that there must be always a law capable of being expressed by arithmetic or geometry, which connects such phenomena as have a physical dependence on each other". But this seems to be exactly the fundamental conception of the Pythagoreans: or rather a part of their fundamental conception, for they also considered their numbers as active forces bringing such law into reality. To illustrate the determination of the Pythagoreans to make up the number of Ten celestial bodies, I transcribe another passage from Playfair (p. 96). Huygens, having discovered one satellite of Saturn, "believed that there were no more, and that the number of the planets was now complete. The planets, primary and secondary, thus made up twelve—the double of six, the first of the perfect numbers."

⁴ Aristot. de Cælo, li. 9; Pliny, H.N. li. 20.

See the Pythagorean system fully set forth by Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen*, vol. i. p. 302-310, ed. 2nd.

and consummation of number. The numbers from One to Ten were all that they recognised as primary, original, generative. Numbers greater than ten were compounds and derivatives from the decad. They employed this perfect number not only as a basis on which to erect a bold astronomical hypothesis, but also as a sum total for their list of contraries. Many Hellenic philosophers¹ recognised pairs of opposing attributes as pervading nature, and as the fundamental categories to which the actual varieties of the sensible world might be reduced. While others laid down Hot and Cold, Wet and Dry, as the fundamental contraries, the Pythagoreans adopted a list of ten pairs. 1. Limit and Unlimited; 2. Odd and Even; 3. One and Many; 4. Right and Left; 5. Male and Female; 6. Rest and Motion; 7. Straight and Curve; 8. Light and Darkness; 9. Good and Evil; 10. Square and Oblong.² Of these ten pairs, five belong to arithmetic or to geometry, one to mechanics, one to physics, and three to anthropology or ethica. Good and Evil, Regularity and Irregularity, were recognised as alike primordial and indestructible.³

Pythagorean list of fundamental Contraries—Ten opposing pairs.

The arithmetical and geometrical view of nature, to which such exclusive supremacy is here given by the Pythagoreans, is one of the most interesting features of Grecian philosophy. They were the earliest cultivators of mathematical science,⁴ and are to be recognised as having paved the way for Euclid and Archimedes, notwithstanding the symbolical and mystical fancies

¹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* I. 2, p. 1004, b. 30. τὰ δ' ὅτι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀμελεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐναντίων σχεδὸν ἀναρτῶσιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι.

² Aristot. *Metaphys.* A. 5, p. 980, a. 22. He goes on to say that Alkmaeon, a semi-Pythagorean and a younger contemporary of Pythagoras himself, while agreeing in the general principle that "human affairs were generally in pairs," (εἶναι δύο τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων), laid down pairs of fundamental contraries at random (τὰς ἐναντιότητας τὰς τυχεύσας)—black and white, sweet and bitter, good and evil, great and little. All that you can extract from these philosophers is (continues Aristotle) the general axiom, that "contraries are the principle of

existing things"—ὅτι τὰντίοντα ἀρχαὶ τῶν ὄντων.

This axiom is to be noted as occupying a great place in the minds of the Greek philosophers.

³ Theophrast. *Metaphys.* 9. Probably the recognition of one dominant antithesis—Τὸ Ἐν—ἡ ἀδριστεύς Ἀντις—is the form given by Plato to the Pythagorean doctrine. Eudorus (in Simplicius ad Aristot. *Physic.* fol. 30) seems to blend the two together.

⁴ Aristot. *Metaph.* A. 5, p. 985, b. 23. οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τῶν μαθημάτων ἀφάμενοι πρῶτοι ταῦτα προήγαγον, καὶ ἐντραφέντες ἐν αὐτοῖς τὰς τούτων ἀρχὰς τῶν ὄντων ἀρχὰς ψήθησαν εἶναι πάντων.

with which they so largely perverted what are now regarded as the clearest and most rigorous processes of the human intellect. The important theorem which forms the forty-seventh Proposition of Euclid's first book, is affirmed to have been discovered by Pythagoras himself: but how much progress was made by him and his followers in the legitimate province of arithmetic and geometry, as well as in the applications of these sciences to harmonics,¹ which they seem to have diligently cultivated, we have not sufficient information to determine with certainty.

Contemporary with Pythagoras, and like him an emigrant from Ionia to Italy, was Xenophanes of Kolophon. Eleatic Philosophy —Xenophanes. He settled at the Phokæan colony of Elea, on the Gulf of Poseidonia; his life was very long, but his period of eminence appears to belong (as far as we can make out amidst conflicting testimony) to the last thirty years of the sixth century B.C. (530-500 B.C.). He was thus contemporary with Anaximander and Anaximenes, as well as with Pythagoras, the last of whom he may have personally known.² He composed, and recited in person, poems—epic, elegiac, and iambic—of which a very few fragments remain.

Xenophanes takes his point of departure, not from Thales or Anaximander, but from the same ancient theogonies which they had forsaken. But he follows a very different road. The most prominent feature in his poems (so far as they remain), is the directness and asperity with which he attacks the received opinions respecting the Gods—and the poets Hesiod and Homer, the popular exponents of those opinions. Xenophanes not only condemns these poets for having ascribed to the Gods discreditable exploits, but even calls in question the existence of the Gods, and ridicules the anthropomorphic conception which pervaded the Hellenic faith. "If horses or lions could paint, they would delineate their Gods in form like themselves. The Ethiopians conceive their Gods as black, the Thracians conceive theirs as fair and with reddish hair."³ Dissatisfied with much of the

¹ Concerning the Pythagorean doctrines on Harmonics, see Boeckh's Philolaus, p. 60-84, with his copious and learned comments.

² Karsten. Xenophanis Fragm., a. 4, p. 9, 10.

³ Xenophanis Fragm. 5-6-7, p. 39 seq. ed. Karsten; Clemens Alexandr. Strom. v. p. 601; vii. p. 711.

customary worship and festivals, Xenophanes repudiated divination altogether, and condemned the extravagant respect shown to victors in Olympic contests,¹ not less than the lugubrious ceremonies in honour of Leukothea. He discountenanced all Theogony, or assertion of the birth of Gods, as impious, and as inconsistent with the prominent attribute of immortality ascribed to them.² He maintained that there was but one God, identical with, or a personification of, the whole Uranus. "The whole Kosmos, or the whole God, sees, hears, and thinks." The divine nature (he said) did not admit of the conception of separate persons one governing the other, or of want and imperfection in any way.³

Though Xenophanes thus appears (like Pythagoras) mainly as a religious dogmatist, yet theogony and cosmogony were so intimately connected in the sixth century B.C., that he at the same time struck out a new philosophical theory. His negation of theogony was tantamount to a negation of cosmogony. In substituting one God for many, he set aside all distinct agencies in the universe, to recognise only one agent, single, all-pervading, indivisible. He repudiated all genesis of new reality, all actual existence of parts, succession, change, beginning, end, etc., in reference to the universe, as well as in reference to God. "Wherever I turned my mind (he exclaimed) everything resolved itself into One and the same: all things existing came back always and everywhere into one similar and permanent nature."⁴ The fundamental tenet of Xenophanes was partly religious, partly philosophical, Pantheism, or Pankosmism: looking upon the universe as one real all-comprehensive Ens, which he would not call either finite or infinite,

His doctrine of Pankosmism, or Pantheism — The whole Kosmos is Ens Unum or God — *ἓν καὶ πᾶν*. Non-Ens inadmissible.

¹ Xenophan. Fragm. 19, p. 60, ed. Karsten; Cicero, *Divinat.* i. 3, 5.

² Xenophanis Fragment. 34-35. p. 86, ed. Karsten; Aristotel. *Rhetoric.* ii. 23; *Metaphys.* A. 5, p. 986, b. 19.

³ Xenoph. Frag. 1-2, p. 26.

Ὅστος ὁρᾷ, ὅστος δὲ νοεῖ, ὅστος δὲ λέγει.

Plutarch ap. Eusebium, *Præp. Evang.* i. 8; Diogen. Laert. ix. 19.

⁴ Timon, fragment of the Silli ap. Sext. *Empiric. Hypot. Pyrrh.* i. 33, sect. 224.

*ὅσην γὰρ ἔμην νόον εἰρύσσειμι,
εἰς ἐν ταῦτό τε πᾶν ἀνελύετο, πᾶν δὲ
ὅν αἰεὶ
πάντῃ ἀνελκόμενον μίαν εἰς φύσιν
ἴστανθ' ὁμοίαν.*

Alci here appears to be more conveniently construed with *ἴστανθ'*, not (as Karsten construes it, p. 118) with *δν*.

It is fair to presume that these lines are a reproduction of the sentiments of Xenophanes, if not a literal transcript of his words.

either in motion or at rest.¹ Non-Ens he pronounced to be an absurdity—an inadmissible and unmeaning phrase.

It was thus from Xenophanes that the doctrine of Pankosmism first obtained introduction into Greek philosophy, recognising nothing real except the universe as an indivisible and unchangeable whole. Such a creed was altogether at variance with common perception, which apprehends the universe as a plurality of substances, distinguishable, divisible, changeable, &c. And Xenophanes could not represent his One and All, which excluded all change, to be the substratum out of which phenomenal variety was generated—as Water, Air, the Infinite, had been represented by the Ionic philosophers. The sense of this contradiction, without knowing how to resolve it, appears to have occasioned the mournful complaints of irremediable doubt and uncertainty, preserved as fragments from his poems. "No man (he exclaims) knows clearly about the Gods or the universe: even if he speak what is perfectly true, he himself does not know it to be true: all is matter of opinion."²

Nevertheless while denying all real variety or division in the universe, Xenophanes did not deny the variety of human perceptions and beliefs. But he allowed them as facts belonging to man, not to the universe—as subjective or relative, not as objective or absolute. He even promulgated opinions of his own respecting many of the physical and cosmological subjects treated by the Ionic philosophers.

Without attempting to define the figure of the Earth, he considered it to be of vast extent and of infinite depth;³ including, in its interior cavities, prodigious reservoirs both of fire and water. He thought that it had at one time been covered with water, in proof of which he

His conjectures on physics and astronomy.

¹ Theophrastus ap. Simplicium in Aristotel. Physic. f. 6, Karsten, p. 106; Arist. Met. A. 5, p. 986, b. 21: *Ξενοφάνης δὲ πρῶτος τούτων ἀνίστας, ὃ γὰρ Παρμενίδης τούτου λέγεται μαθητής, — εἰς τὸν ἕλεος οὐρανὸν ἀποβλέψας τὸ ἐν ἐλευσίῃ φησὶ τὸν θεόν.*

² Xenophan. Fragm. 14, p. 51, ed. Karsten.

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφέος οὗτος ἀνὴρ γένορ' οὐδὲ τις ἔσται.

εἰδὼς, ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἔσσης λέγω περὶ πάντων· οἱ γὰρ καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τέχνοι τετελεσμένον εἶναι, αὐτὸς ἄμως οὐκ ὀλλε· δάκρυ δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι τέκνεται.

Compare the extract from the *SOLH* of Timon in Sextus Empiricus—*Pyrrhon. Hypot.* l. 324; and the same author, *adv. Mathematic.* vii. 48-52.

³ Aristot. *De Caelo*, ii. 12.

noticed the numerous shells found inland and on mountain tops, together with the prints of various fish which he had observed in the quarries of Syracuse, in the island of Paros, and elsewhere. From these facts he inferred that the earth had once been covered with water, and even that it would again be so covered at some future time, to the destruction of animal and human life.¹ He supposed that the sun, moon, and stars were condensations of vapours exhaled from the Earth, collected into clouds, and alternately inflamed and extinguished.²

Parmenides, of Elea, followed up and gave celebrity to the Xenophanean hypothesis in a poem, of which the striking exordium is yet preserved. The two veins of thought, which Xenophanes had recognised and lamented his inability to reconcile, were proclaimed by Parmenides as a sort of inherent contradiction in the human mind—Reason or Cogitation declaring one way, Sense (together with the remembrances and comparisons of sense) suggesting a faith altogether opposite. Dropping that controversy with the popular religion which had been raised by Xenophanes, Parmenides spoke of many different Gods or Goddesses, and insisted on the universe as one, without regarding it as one God. He distinguished Truth from matter of Opinion.³ Truth was knowable only by pure mental contemplation or cogitation, the object of which was Ens or Being, the Real or Absolute: here the Cogitans and the Cogitatum were identical, one and the same.⁴ Parmenides conceived Ens not simply as existent, but as

Parmenides continues the doctrine of Xenophanes—Ens Parmenideum, self-existent, eternal, unchangeable, extended,—Non-Ens, an unmeaning phrase.

¹ Xenophan. Fragm. p. 178, ed. Karsten; Achilles Tatius, Εἰσαγωγή in Arat. Phaenom. p. 128, τὰ καὶ τὰ ὅς ἐς ἀσέπων ἰκάνει.

This inference from the shells and prints of fishes is very remarkable for so early a period. Compare Herodotus (ii. 12), who notices the fact, and draws the same inference, as to Lower Egypt: also Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 40, p. 367; and Strabo, l. p. 49-50, from whom we learn that the Lydian historian Xanthus had made the like observation, and also the like inference, for himself. Straton of Lampsakus, Eratosthenes, and Strabo himself, approved what Xanthus said.

² Xenophanes Frag. p. 161 seq., ed. Karsten.

Compare Lucretius, v. 458.

"per rara foramina, terræ
Partibus erumpens primus se sustulit
æther
Ignifer et multos secum levis abstulit
ignis
Sic igitur tum se levis ac diffusilis æther
Corpore concreto circumdatus undique
flexit:
Hunc exordia sunt solis lunæque se-
cutæ."

³ Parmenides Frag. v. 29.

⁴ Parm. Frag. v. 40, 52-56.

τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι.

Ἄλλὰ σὺ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διεξήσεις
εἴργε νόημα.

self-existent, without beginning or end,¹ as extended, continuous, indivisible, and unchangeable. The Ens Parmenideum comprised the two notions of Extension and Duration :² it was something Enduring and Extended ; Extension including both space, and matter so far forth as filling space. Neither the contrary of Ens (Non-Ens), nor anything intermediate between Ens and Non-Ens, could be conceived, or named, or reasoned about. Ens comprehended all that was Real, without beginning or end, without parts or difference, without motion or change, perfect and uniform like a well-turned sphere.³

In this subject Ens, with its few predicates, chiefly negative, consisted all that Parmenides called Truth. Everything else belonged to the region of Opinion, which embraced all that was phenomenal, relative, and transient : all that involved a reference to man's senses, apprehension, and appreciation, all the indefinite diversity of observed facts and inferences. Plurality, succession, change, motion, generation, destruction, division of parts, &c., belonged to this category. Parmenides did not deny that he and other men had perceptions and beliefs corresponding to these terms, but he denied their application to the Ens or the self-existent. We are conscious of succession, but the self-existent has no succession : we perceive change of colour and other sensible qualities, and change of place or motion, but Ens neither changes nor moves. We talk of things generated or destroyed—things coming into being or going out of being—but this phrase can have no application to the self-existent Ens, which is always and cannot properly be called either past or future.⁴

He recognises a region of opinion, phenomenal and relative, apart from Ens.

μηδὲ σ' ἴδως πολὺναιρον ὁδὸν κατὰ
τήνδε βιάσθω,
νομῶν ἄσκοπον ὅμμα καὶ ἤχησσαν
ἀκούην
καὶ γλῶσσαν· κρίναι δὲ λόγῳ πολὺ-
θενον ἡλάρχον
ἔξ ἡμῶν ἡγήθητα.

¹ Parm. Frag. v. 81.

αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μέγανον ἐν πείρασιν
δοσμῶν
ἰόντιν, ἀναρχον, ἄκτιστον, &c.

² Zeller (Die Philosophie der Griech. i. p. 408, ed. 2) maintains, in my opinion justly, that the Ens Parmenideum is conceived by its author as extended. Strümpell (Geschichte

der theor. Phil. der Griech. s. 44) represents it as unextended : but this view seems not reconcilable with the remaining fragments.

³ Parm. Frag. v. 102.

⁴ Parmenid. Fr. v. 96.

— ἐπεὶ τό γε μοῖρ' ἐπέστηεν
Ὀλον ἀκίνητον τελέθειν τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ'
εἶναι,
"Ὅσσα βροτοὶ κατέθεντο, ποιοῦντές εἵναι
ἀληθῆ,
γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ ἀλλασθαι, εἶναι τε καὶ
οὐκί,
καὶ τόπον ἀλλάσσειν, διὰ τε χρεά φανερ
ἀμείβειν.

v. 75 :—

Nothing is really generated or destroyed, but only in appearance to us, or relatively to our apprehension.¹ In like manner we perceive plurality of objects, and divide objects into parts. But Ens is essentially One, and cannot be divided.² Though you may divide a piece of matter you cannot divide the extension of which that matter forms part: you cannot (to use the expression of Hobbes³) pull asunder the first mile from the second, or the first hour from the second. The milestone, or the striking of the clock, serve as marks to assist you in making a mental division, and in considering or describing one hour and one mile apart from the next. This, however, is your own act, relative to yourself: there is no real division of extension into miles, or of duration into hours. You may consider the same space or time as one or as many, according to your convenience: as one hour or as sixty minutes, as one mile or eight furlongs. But all this is a process of your own mind and thoughts; another man may divide the same total in a way different from you. Your division noway modifies the reality without you, whatever that may be—the Extended and Enduring Ens—which remains still a continuous one, undivided and unchanged.

The Ens of Parmenides thus coincided mainly with that which (since Kant) has been called the *Noumenon*—the Thing in itself—the Absolute; or rather with that which, by a frequent illusion, passes for the absolute—no notice being taken of the cogitant and believing mind, as if cogitation and belief, *cogitata* and *credita*, would be had without it. By Ens was understood

Parmenidean ontology stands completely apart from phenomenology.

εἰ γε γίνουσι, οὐκ ἔστι· οὐδ' εἰ πότε μάλ' αἰ
ἵσταται.

τῶς γίνεσθαι μὲν ἀπίστανται, καὶ ἀπιστος
ὁλόθροισι.

¹ Aristotel. De Caelo, lib. 1. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ὅλως ἀνύκλιον γίνεσθαι καὶ φθορὰν· οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτε γίνεσθαι φασὶν οὕτε φθεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, ἀλλὰ μόνον δοκεῖν ἡμῖν· ὅλον οἱ περὶ Μίλωνος καὶ Παρμενίδου, &c.

² Parm. Frag. v. 77. Οὐδὲ διαίρετόν ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ἑμῶν.

οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τὸ καὶ εἶργον μιν ἐνέ-
χουσθαι,

οὐδέ τι χειρότερον· πᾶν δὲ πλεον ἐστὶν
ὄντος.

τῇ ἐνυχὸς πᾶν ἐστὶν· ἐὼν γὰρ ὄντι
κελάζει.

Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 5, p. 986, b. 29, with the Scholia, and Physic. I. 2, 3. Simplicius Comm. in Physic. Aristot. (apud Tennemann Geschichte der Philos. b. I. s. 4, vol. I. p. 170) πάντα γὰρ φησι (Παρμενίδου) τὰ ὄντα, καθὼς ὄντα, ἐν ἐστίν. This chapter, in which Tennemann gives an account of the Eleatic philosophy, appears to me one of the best and most instructive in his work.

³ "To make parts,—or to part or divide, Space or Time,—is nothing else but to consider one and another within the same: so that if any man divide

the remnant in his mind, after leaving out all that abstraction, as far as it had then been carried, could leave out. It was the minimum indispensable to the continuance of thought; you cannot think (Parmenides says) without thinking of Something, and that Something Extended and Enduring. Though he and others talk of this Something as an Absolute (i.e. apart from or independent of his own thinking mind), yet he also uses some juster language (*τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν τε καὶ εἶναι*), showing that it is really relative: that if the Cogitans implies a Cogitatum, the Cogitatum also implies no less its correlative Cogitans: and that though we may divide the two in words, we cannot divide them in fact. It is to be remarked that Parmenides distinguishes the Enduring or Continuous from the Transient or Successive, Duration from Succession (both of which are included in the meaning of the word Time), and that he considers Duration alone as belonging to Ens or the Absolute—to the region of Truth—setting it in opposition or antithesis to Succession, which he treats as relative and phenomenal. We have thus (with the Eleates) the first appearance of Ontology, the science of Being or Ens, in Grecian philosophy. Ens is everything, and everything is Ens. In the view of Parmenides, Ontology is not merely narrow, but incapable of enlargement or application; we shall find Plato and others trying to expand it into numerous imposing generalities.¹

space or time, the diverse conceptions he has are more, by one, than the parts which he makes. For his first conception is of that which is to be divided—then, of some part of it—and again of some other part of it: and so forwards, as long as he goes in dividing. But it is to be noted, that here, by *division*, I do not mean the severing or pulling asunder of one space or time from another (for does any man think that one hemisphere may be separated from the other hemisphere, or the first hour from the second?), but *diversity of consideration*: so that division is not made by the operation of the hands, but of the mind.”—Hobbes, *First Grounds of Philosophy*, chap. vii. 5, vol. i. p. 96, ed. Molesworth.

“Expansion and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both considered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not separable one from another, not even in thought;

though the parts of bodies from which we take our measure of the one—and the parts of motion, from which we take the measure of the other—may be interrupted or separated.”—Locke, *Essay on the Human Understanding*, book ii. ch. 15, s. 11.

In the Platonic *Parmenides*, p. 156 D., we find the remarkable conception of what he calls *τὸ ἀεὶ ὄντος, ἔστιν τε φέρεται*—a break in the continuity of duration, an extra-temporal moment.

¹ Leibnitz says, *Réponse à M. Foucher*, p. 117, ed. Erdmann, “Comment seroit il possible qu’aucune chose existât, si l’être même, ipsum Esse, n’avoit l’existence? Mais bien au contraire ne pourrait on pas dire avec beaucoup plus de raison, qu’il n’y a que lui qui existe véritablement, les êtres particuliers n’ayant rien de permanent? Semper generantur, et nunquam sunt.”

Apart from Ontology, Parmenides reckons all as belonging to human opinions. These were derived from the observations of sense (which he especially excludes from Ontology) with the comparisons, inferences, hypothesis, &c., founded thereupon: the phenomena of Nature generally.¹ He does not attempt (as Plato and Aristotle do after him) to make Ontology serve as a principle or beginning for anything beyond itself,² or as a premiss from which the knowledge of nature is to be deduced. He treats the two—Ontology and Phenomenology, to employ an Hegelian word—as radically disparate, and incapable of any legitimate union. Ens was essentially one and enduring: Nature was essentially multi-form, successive, ever changing and moving relative to the observer, and different to observers at different times and places. Parmenides approached the study of Nature from its own start-

Parmenidean phenomenology—relative and variable.

¹ Karsten observes that the Parmenidean region of opinion comprised not merely the data of sense, but also the comparisons, generalisations, and notions, derived from sense.

"*Ἀνέφατον ἐν νοῦν ἐννοεῖται δύο γενεὰς ἰνερ σε διῶσα, quorum alterum complectitur res externas et fluxas, notionemque quæ ex his ducuntur—alterum res æternas et à conspectu remotas,*" &c. (Parm. Fragm. p. 148-149).

² Marbach (Lehrbuch der Gesch. der Philos., s. 71, not. 3), after pointing out the rude philosophical expression of the Parmenidean verses, has some just remarks upon the double aspect of philosophy as there proclaimed, and upon the recognition by Parmenides of that which he calls the "illegitimate" vein of enquiry along with the "legitimate."

"Learn from me (says Parmenides) the opinions of mortals, brought to your ears in the deceitful arrangement of my words. This is not philosophy (Marbach says): it is Physics. We recognise in modern times two perfectly distinct ways of contemplating Nature: the philosophical and the physical. Of these two, the second dwells in plurality, the first in unity: the first teaches everything as infallible truth, the second as multiplicity of different opinions. We ought not to ask why Parmenides, while recognising the fallibility of this second road of

enquiry, nevertheless undertook to march in it,—any more than we can ask, Why does not modern philosophy render physics superfluous?"

The observation of Marbach is just and important, that the line of research which Parmenides treated as illegitimate and deceitful, but which he nevertheless entered upon, is the analogon of modern Physics. Parmenides (he says) indicated most truly the contrast and divergence between Ontology and Physics; but he ought to have gone farther, and shown how they could be reconciled and brought into harmony. This (Marbach affirms) was not even attempted, much less achieved, by Parmenides: but it was afterwards attempted by Plato, and achieved by Aristotle.

Marbach is right in saying that the reconciliation was attempted by Plato; but he is not right (I think) in saying that it was achieved by Aristotle—nor by any one since Aristotle. It is the merit of Parmenides to have brought out the two points of view as radically distinct, and to have seen that the phenomenal world, if explained at all, must be explained upon general principles of its own, raised out of its own data of facts—not by means of an illusory Absolute and Real. The subsequent philosophers, in so far as they hid and slurred over this distinction, appear to me to have receded rather than advanced.

ing point, the same as had been adopted by the Ionic philosophers—the data of sense, or certain agencies selected among them, and vaguely applied to explain the rest. Here he felt that he relinquished the full conviction, inseparable from his intellectual consciousness, with which he announced his few absolute truths respecting Ens and Non-Ens, and that he entered upon a process of mingled observation and conjecture, where there was great room for diversity of views between man and man.

Yet though thus passing from Truth to Opinions, from full certainty to comparative and irremediable uncertainty,¹ Parmenides does not consider all opinions as equally true or equally untrue. He announces an opinion of his own—what he thinks most probable or least improbable—respecting the structure and constitution of the Kosmos, and he announces it without the least reference to his own doctrines about Ens. He promises information respecting Earth, Water, Air, and the heavenly bodies, how they work, and how they came to be what they are.² He recognises two elementary principles or beginnings, one contrary to the other, but both of them positive—Light, comprehending the Hot, the Light, and the Rare—Darkness, comprehending the Cold, the Heavy, and the Dense.³ These two elements, each endued with active and vital properties, were brought into junction and commixture by the

¹ Parmen. Fr. v. 109.

ἐν τῷ οὐκ ὡς πρὸς λόγον ἔστι νόημα
ἀμφὶ ἀληθείης· δίδως δ' ἀπὸ τοῦδε βρο-
ταίας
μάρτυρας, πόσων ἡμῶν ἰστέον ἀναγκαζόντων.

² Parm. Frag. v. 122-142.

³ Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 5, p. 987, a. 1) represents Parmenides as assimilating one of his phenomenal principles (Heat) to Ens, and the other (Cold) to Non-Ens. There is nothing in the fragments of Parmenides to justify this supposed analogy. Heat as well as Cold belongs to Non-Ens, not to Ens, in the Parmenidean doctrine. Moreover Cold or Dense is just as much a positive principle as Hot or Rare, in the view of Parmenides; it is the female to the male (Parm. Fragm. v. 129; comp. Karsten, p. 270). Aristotle conceives Ontology as a substratum for Phenomenology; and his

criticisms on Parmenides imply (erroneously in my judgment) that Parmenides did the same. The remarks which Brucker makes both on Aristotle's criticism and on the Eleatic doctrine are in the main just, though the language is not very suitable.

Brucker, Hist. Philosoph., part ii. lib. ii. ch. xi. tom. 1, p. 1152-3, about Xenophanes:—"Ex his enim quæ apud Aristotelem ex ejus mente contra motum disputantur, patet Xenophanem motus notionem aliam quam quæ in physicis obtinet, sibi concepsisse; et ad verum motum progressum a non-ente ad ens ejusque existentiam requisivisse. Quo sensu notionis hujus semel admisso, sequebatur (cum illud impossibile sit, ut ex nihilo fiat aliquid) universum esse immobile, adeoque et partes ejus non ita moveri, ut ex statu nihili procederet ad statum existentie. Quibus admisis, de rerum tamen mutationibus disserere poterat,

influence of a Dea Genitalis analogous to Aphroditê,¹ with her first-born son Eros, a personage borrowed from the Hesiodic Theogony. From hence sprang the other active forces of nature, personified under various names, and the various concentric circles or spheres of the Kosmos. Of those spheres, the outermost was a solid wall of fire—"flammantia mœnia mundi"—next under this the Æther, distributed into several circles of fire unequally bright and pure—then the circle called the Milky Way, which he regarded as composed of light or fire combined with denser materials—then the Sun and Moon, which were condensations of fire from the Milky Way—lastly, the Earth, which he placed in the centre of the Kosmos.² He is said to have been the first who pronounced the earth to be spherical, and even distributed it into two or five zones.³ He regarded it as immovable, in consequence of its exact position in the centre. He considered the stars to be fed by exhalation from the Earth. Midway between the Earth and the outer flaming circle, he supposed that there dwelt a Goddess—Justice or Necessity—who regulated all the movements of the Kosmos, and maintained harmony between its different parts. He represented the human

quas non alterationes, generationes, et extinctiones, rerum naturalium, sed modificationes, esse putabat: hoc nomine indignas, eo quod rerum universi natura semper maneret immutabilis, soliusque materiæ æternum fluentis particule varie inter se modificarentur. Hæc ratione si Eleaticos priores explicemus de motu dissidentes, rationem facile dabimus, qui de rebus physicis disserere et phenomena naturalia explicare, salva istâ hypothesi, potuerint. Quod tamen de his negat Aristoteles, conceptum motû metaphysicum ad physicum transiens: ut, more suo, Eleatico systemate corrupto, eò vehementius illud premeret."

¹ Parmenides, ap. Simplic. ad Aristot. Physic. fol. 9 a.

ἢ ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τοῦτον δαίμων, ὃ πάντα κυβερνᾷ, &c.

Plutarch, Amator, 13.

² See especially the remarkable passage from Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. 22. p. 482, cited in Karsten, Frag. Parm. p. 341, and Cicero, De Natur. Deor. i. 11, s. 28, with the Commentary of Kriache, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie, viii. p. 98, seqq.

It is impossible to make out with any clearness the Kosmos and its generation as conceived by Parmenides. We cannot attain more than a general approximation to it.

³ Diogen. Laert. ix. 21, viii. 48; Strabo, ii. p. 93 (on the authority of Poseidonius). Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iii. 11) and others ascribe to Parmenides the recognition not of five zones, but only of two. If it be true that Parmenides held this opinion about the figure of the earth, the fact is honourable to his acuteness; for Leukippos, Anaxagoras, Archelaus, Diogenes the Apolloniate, and Demokritus, all thought the earth to be a flat, round surface, like a dish or a drum: Plato speaks about it in so confused a manner that his opinion cannot be made out: and Aristotle was the first who both affirmed and proved it to be spherical. The opinion had been propounded by some philosophers earlier than Anaxagoras, who controverted it. See the dissertation of L. Oettinger, Die Vorstellungen der Griechen über die Erde als Himmelskörper, Freiburg, 1850, p. 42-46.

race as having been brought into existence by the power of the sun,¹ and he seems to have gone into some detail respecting animal procreation, especially in reference to the birth of male and female offspring. He supposed that the human mind, as well as the human body, was compounded of a mixture of the two elemental influences, diffused throughout all Nature: that like was perceived and known by like: that thought and sensation were alike dependent upon the body, and upon the proportions of its elemental composition: that a certain limited knowledge was possessed by every object in Nature, animate or inanimate.²

Before we pass from Parmenides to his pupil and successor Zeno, who developed the negative and dialectic side of the Eleatic doctrine, it will be convenient to notice various other theories of the same century: first among them that of Herakleitus, who forms as it were the contrast and antithesis to Xenophanes and Parmenides.

Herakleitus of Ephesus, known throughout antiquity by the denomination of the Obscure, comes certainly after Pythagoras and Xenophanes and apparently before Parmenides. Of the two first he made special mention, in one of the sentences, alike brief and contemptuous, which have been preserved from his lost treatise:—"Much learning does not teach reason: otherwise it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, Xenophanes and Hekataeus." In another passage Herakleitus spoke of the "extensive knowledge, cleverness, and wicked arts" of Pythagoras. He declared that Homer as well as Archilochus deserved to be scourged and expelled from the public festivals.³ His thoughts were all embodied in one single treatise, which he is said to have deposited in the temple of the Ephesian Artemis. It was composed in a style most perplexing and difficult to understand, full of metaphor, symbolical illustration, and anti-

¹ Diogen. Laert. ix. 22.

² Parmen. Frag. v. 145; Theophrastus, De Sensu, Karsten, pp. 208, 270.

Parmenides (according to Theophrastus) thought that the dead body, having lost its fiery element, had no perception of light, or heat, or sound; but that it had perception of darkness, cold, and silence—καὶ ὄλωσ' ἐὶ πᾶν τὸ ὄν

ἔχειν τινα γῶσιν.

³ Diogen. L. ix. 1. Πολυμαθὴς γένον οὐ διδάσκει. Ἡσίωδον γὰρ ἐν ἐββάτῃ καὶ Πυθαγόραν, ἀπὲρ τοῦ κενεοφάνεα καὶ Ἑκαταίου, ἀπ. Ib. viii. 1, 6. Πυθαγόρας Μηροσκόρον ἱστορίων ᾤχεσθαι ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα πάντων, καὶ ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγραφαὶς ἐποίησεν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, πολυμαθίαν, κακοτεχνίαν.

thesis: but this very circumstance imparted to it an air of poetical impressiveness and oracular profundity.¹ It exercised a powerful influence on the speculative minds of Greece, both in the Platonic age and subsequently: the Stoics especially both commented on it largely (though with many dissentient opinions among the commentators), and borrowed with partial modifications much of its doctrine.²

The expositors followed by Lucretius and Cicero conceived Herakleitus as having proclaimed Fire to be the universal and all-pervading element of nature;³ as Thales had recognised water, and Anaximenes air. This interpretation was countenanced by some striking passages of Herakleitus: but when we put together all that remains from him, it appears that his main doctrine was not physical, but metaphysical or ontological: that the want of adequate general terms induced him to clothe it in a multitude of symbolical illustrations, among which fire was only one, though the most prominent and most significant.⁴ Xenophanes and the Eleates had recognised, as the only objective reality, One extended Substance or absolute Ens, perpetual, infinite, indeterminate, incapable of change or modification. They denied the objective reality of motion, change, generation, and destruction—considering all these to be purely relative and phenomenal. Herakleitus on the contrary denied

Doctrine of Herakleitus—perpetual process of generation and destruction—everything flows, nothing stands—transition of the elements into each other backwards and forwards.

¹ Diogen. Laert. ix. 1-6. Theophrastus conceived that Herakleitus had left the work unfinished, from eccentricity of temperament (ὡς μετ' ἀσυχολίας). Of him, as of various others, it was imagined by some that his obscurity was intentional (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 26, 74, De Finib. 2, 5). The words of Lucretius about Herakleitus are remarkable (l. 641):—

Clarus ob obscuram linguam magis
inter inanes
Quamde graves inter Græcos qui vera
requirunt:
Omnia enim stolidi magis admirantur
amantque
Inversis quæ sub verbis latitantia
cernunt.

Even Aristotle complains of the difficulty of understanding Herakleitus,

and even of determining the proper punctuation (Rhetoric, iii. 5).

² Cicero, Nat. Deor., iii. 14, 85.

³ To some it appeared that Herakleitus hardly distinguished Fire from Air. Aristotel. De Animâ, i. 2; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 127-129, ix. 360.

⁴ Zeller's account of the philosophy of Herakleitus in the second edition of his Philosophie der Griechen, vol. i. p. 450-496, is instructive. Marbach also is useful (Gesch. der Phil. s. 46-49); and his (Hegelian) exposition of Herakleitus is further developed by Ferdinand Lassalle (Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunklen, published 1868). This last work is very copious and elaborate, throwing great light upon a subject essentially obscure and difficult.

everything in the nature of a permanent and perpetual substratum : he laid down nothing as permanent and perpetual except the process of change—the alternate sequence of generation and destruction, without beginning or end—generation and destruction being in fact coincident or identical, two sides of the same process, since the generation of one particular state was the destruction of its antecedent contrary. All reality consisted in the succession and transition, the coming and going, of these finite and particular states : what he conceived as the infinite and universal, was the continuous process of transition from one finite state to the next—the perpetual work of destruction and generation combined, which terminated one finite state in order to make room for a new and contrary state.

This endless process of transition, or ever-repeated act of generation and destruction in one, was represented by Herakleitus under a variety of metaphors and symbols—fire consuming its own fuel—a stream of water always flowing—opposite currents meeting and combating each other—the way from above downwards, and the way from below upwards, one and the same—war, contest, penal destiny or retributive justice, the law or decree of Zeus realising each finite condition of things and then destroying its own reality to make place for its contrary and successor. Particulars are successively generated and destroyed, none of them ever arriving at permanent existence :¹ the universal process of generation and destruction alone continues. There is no *Esse*, but a perpetual *Fieri* : a transition from *Esse* to Non-*Esse*, from Non-*Esse* to *Esse*, with an intermediate temporary halt between them : a ceaseless meeting and confluence of the stream of generation with the opposite stream of destruction : a rapid and instant succession, or rather coincidence and coal-

¹ Plato, *Kratylos*, p. 402, and *Theaet.* p. 152, 153.

Plutarch, *De Ex.* apud Delphos, c. 18, p. 302. Ποταμὸς γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ Ἡράκλειτον, οὐδὲ θνητὴς οὐσίας εἰς ἀφασθαι κατὰ ξένον· ἀλλ' ὀδύνηται καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς σκιδνοῖται καὶ πάλιν συνάγει, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ πάλιν οὐδὲ ὕστερον, ἀλλ' ἅμα συνίσταται καὶ ἀπολείπει, πρόσκειται καὶ ἀφίκει. Ὅθεν οὐδ' εἰς τὸ εἶναι περᾶναι τὸ

γινόμενον αὐτῆς, τῷ κηδέσθαι λίγειν καὶ ἵστασθαι τὴν γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σπέρματος εἰς μεταβάλλονσαν—τὰς πρῶτας φθίρουσας γενέσκει καὶ ἡλικίας ταῖς ἐπιγινόμεναις.

Clement Alex. *Strom.* v. 14, p. 711. Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων οὐτε τις θεὸς οὐτ' ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν· ἀλλ' ἦν εἰ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ αἰζῶνον, ἀπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεσνόμενον μέτρα. Compare also Eusebius, *Præpar. Evang.* xiv. 2, 8; Diogen. *L.* ix. 8.

escence, of contraries. Living and dead, waking and sleeping, light and dark, come into one or come round into each other: everything twists round into its contrary: everything both is and is not.¹

The universal law, destiny, or divine working (according to Herakleitus), consists in this incessant process of generation and destruction, this alternation of contraries. To carry out such law fully, each of the particular manifestations ought to appear and pass away instantaneously—to have no duration of its own, but to be supplanted by its contrary at once. And this happens to a great degree, even in cases where it does not appear to happen: the river appears unchanged, though the water which we touched a short time ago has flowed away:² we and all around us are in rapid movement, though we appear stationary: the apparent sameness and fixity is thus a delusion. But Herakleitus does not seem to have thought that his absolute universal force was omnipotent, or accurately carried out in respect to all particulars. Some positive and particular manifestations, when once brought to pass, had a certain measure of fixity, maintaining themselves for more or less time before they were destroyed. There was a difference between one particular and another, in this respect of comparative durability: one was more durable, another less.³ But according to the universal law or destiny, each particular ought simply to make its appearance, then to be supplanted and re-absorbed; so that the time during which it continued on the scene was, as it were, an unjust usurpation, obtained by en-

Nothing permanent except the law of process and implication of contraries—the transmutative force. Fixity of particulars is an illusion for the most part: so far as it exists, it is a sin against the order of Nature.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 242 E. Διαφερόμενοι γὰρ αἱ ἐνυφέρεται.

Plutarch. *Consolat.* ad Apollonium c. 10, p. 106. Πότε γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ θάνατος; καὶ ἢ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, ταῦτό τ' ἐνὶ ζῶν καὶ τεθνηκός, καὶ τὸ ἐντηγάρως καὶ τὸ καθεύδων, καὶ νέον καὶ γηραιόν· ταῦτε γὰρ μεταπεσόντα ἐκείνα ἐστί, καὶ ἐκείνα πάλιν μεταπεσόντα ταῦτα.

Pseudo-Origenes, *Refut. Hær.* ix. 10. Ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη, εὐφρόνη—χειμῶν, θέρος—πύλεμος, εὐρηγή—κόρος, λιμός, &c.

² Aristot. *De Cælo*, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30; *Physic.* viii. 3, p. 253, b. 9. Φασὶ τίνας κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐ τὰ μὲν τὰ

δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ αἰεὶ, ἀλλὰ λαβάνειν τοῦτο τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰσθησιν— which words doubtless refer to Herakleitus. See Preller, *Hist. Phil. Grec.* Rom. a. 47.

³ Lassalle, *Philosophie des Herakleitos*, vol. i. pp. 64, 65. "Andererseits bieten die sinnlichen Existenzen *graduelle* oder *Mass-Unterschiede* dar, je nachdem in ihnen das Moment des festen Seins über die Unruhe des Werdens vorwiegt oder nicht; und diese Graduation wird also zugleich dem Leitfadens zur Classification der verschiedenen Existenz-formen bilden."

croaching on the equal right of the next comer, and by suspending the negative agency of the universal. Hence arises an antithesis or hostility between the universal law or process on one side, and the persistence of particular states on the other. The universal law or process is generative and destructive, positive and negative, both in one: but the particular realities in which it manifests itself are all positive, each succeeding to its antecedent, and each striving to maintain itself against the negativity or destructive interference of the universal process. Each particular reality represented rest and fixity: each held ground as long as it could against the pressure of the cosmical force, essentially moving, destroying, and renovating. Hera-
kleitus condemns such pretensions of particular states to separate stability, inasmuch as it keeps back the legitimate action of the universal force, in the work of destruction and renovation.

**Illustrations by which Hera-
kleitus sym-
bolised his
perpetual
force, de-
stroying and
generating.**

The theory of Hera-
kleitus thus recognised no permanent sub-
stratum, or Ens, either material or immaterial—no
category either of substance or quality—but only a
ceaseless principle of movement or change, generation
and destruction, position and negation, immediately
succeeding, or coinciding with each other.¹ It is this
principle or everlasting force which he denotes under
so many illustrative phrases—"the common (τὸ κοινόν),

¹ Aristotle. De Caelo, iii. 1, p. 298, b. 30. Οἱ δὲ τὰ μὲν ἅλα πάντα γίνεσθαι τέ φασι καὶ εἶναι, εἶναι δὲ παγίως οὐδέν, ἐν δὲ τι μόνον ὑπομένειν, ἐξ οὗ ταῦτα πάντα μετασχηματίζεσθαι πέφυκεν· ὑπερτοκίαςιν βούλεσθαι λέγειν ἄλλοι τε πολλοὶ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος. See the explanation given of this passage by Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 21, 39, 40, founded on the comment of Simplicius. He explains it as an universal law or ideal force—the reine Idee des Werdens selbst (p. 24), and "eine unsinnliche Potenz" (p. 25). Yet, in i. p. 55 of his elaborate exposition, he does indeed say, about the theory of Hera-
kleitus, "Hier sind zum erstenmale die sinnlichen Bestimmtheiten zu bloss verschiedenen und absolut in einander-übergehenden Formen eines identischen, ihnen zu Grunde liegenden, Substrats herabgesetzt". But this last expression appears to me to contradict the whole tenor and peculiarity of Lassalle's own explanation of the He-

rakleitean theory. He insists almost in every page (compare ii. p. 166) that "das Allgemeine" of Hera-
kleitus is "reines Werden; reiner, steter, erzeugender, Prozess". This process cannot with any propriety be called a sub-
stratum, and Hera-
kleitus admitted no other. In thus rejecting any substratum he stood alone. Lassalle has been careful in showing that Fire was not understood by Hera-
kleitus as a sub-
stratum (as water by Thales), but as a symbol for the universal force or law. In the theory of Hera-
kleitus no sub-
stratum was recognised—no τὸδε τι or οὐσία—in the same way as Aristotle observes about τὸ ἀείρον (Physic. iii. 6, a. 22-31) ὥστε τὸ ἀείρον οὐ δεῖ λαμβάνειν ὡς τὸδε τι, οἷον ἀνθρώπου ἢ οἰκίας, ἀλλ' ὡς ἡ ἡμέρα λέγεται καὶ ὁ αἶψος, οἷς τὸ εἶναι οὐχ ὡς οὐσία τις γέγονεν, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἐν γενέσει ἢ φθορᾷ, εἰ καὶ περὶ ἀστέρον, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ γε ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον.

the universal, the all-comprehensive (τὸ περὶ ὅλον), the governing, the divine, the name or reason of Zeus, fire, the current of opposites, strife or war, destiny, justice, equitable measure, Time or the Succeeding," &c. The most emphatic way in which this theory could be presented was, as embodied, in the coincidence or co-affirmation of contraries. Many of the dicta cited and preserved out of Herakleitus are of this paradoxical tenor.¹ Other dicta simply affirm perpetual flow, change, or transition, without express allusion to contraries: which latter, however, though not expressed, must be understood, since change was conceived as a change from one contrary to the other.² In the Heraclidean idea, contrary forces come simultaneously into action: destruction and generation always take effect together: there is no negative without a positive, nor positive without a negative.³

Such was the metaphysical or logical foundation of the philosophy of Herakleitus: the idea of an eternal process of change, manifesting itself in the perpetual destruction and renovation of particular realities, but having itself no reality apart from these particulars, and existing only in them as an immanent principle or condition. This principle, from the want of appropriate abstract terms, he expressed in a variety of symbolical and metaphorical

Water—
intermediate
between
Fire (Air)
and Earth

¹ Aristotle or Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Mundo*, c. 5, p. 396, b. 20. Ταῦτό ἐστι τοῦτο ἦν καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῷ σκοτεινῷ λεγόμενον Ἡρακλείτῳ: "συνάφεια οὐλα καὶ οὐχὶ οὐλα, συμφερόμενον καὶ διαφερόμενον, συνᾶδον καὶ διᾶδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα." Heraclid. *Allegor. ap. Schleiermacher* (*Herakleitos*, p. 529), ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐμβαίνοντες τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνοντες, εἰμὲν τε καὶ οὐκ εἰμὲν: Plato, *Sophist*, p. 242, E., διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ συμφύεται: Aristotle, *Metaphys.* iii. 7, p. 1012, b. 24, εἴποιτο δ' ὁ μὲν Ἡρακλείτῳ λόγος, λέγων πάντα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, ἅπαντα ἀλλήθῃ ποιεῖν: Aristotle, *Topic*, viii. 6, p. 155, b., ὅλον ἀγνοῖν καὶ κακὸν εἶναι ταῦτον, καθάπερ Ἡρακλείτῳ φησιν: also Aristotle, *Physic.* i. 2, p. 185, b. Compare the various Heraclidean phrases cited in Pseudo-Origen, *Refut. Hæres.* *Fragm.* ix. 10; also Krische, *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der alten Philosophie*, vol. i. p. 370-468.

Bernays and Lassalle (vol. i. p. 81) contend, on reasonable grounds (though in opposition to Zeller, p. 495), that the

following verses in the Fragments of Parmenides refer to Herakleitus:

οἷς τὸ πᾶν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι ταῦτόν τε νόμισται
καὶ ταῦτόν, πάντων δὲ τελειότατός ἐστι κλέωντος.

The commentary of Alexander Aphrodisias on the *Metaphysica* says, "Heraclitus ergo cum diceret omnem rem esse et non esse et opposita simul consistere, contradictionem veram simul esse statuebat, et omnia dicebat esse vera." (*Lassalle*, p. 83).

One of the metaphors by which Herakleitus illustrated his theory of opposite and co-existent forces, was the pulling and pushing of two sawyers with the same saw. See Bernays, *Heraclitus*, part i. p. 16; Bonn, 1848.

² Aristotle, *Physic.* viii. 2, p. 253, b. 20, εἰς τοῦναντίον γὰρ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις: also iii. 5, p. 306, a. 6, πάντα γὰρ μεταβάλλει ἐξ ἐναντίον εἰς ἐναντίον, εἰς δὲ θερμοῦ εἰς ψυχρόν.

³ Lassalle, *Herakleitos*, vol. i. p. 323.

phrases, among which Fire stood prominent.¹ But though Fire was thus often used to denote the principle or ideal process itself, the same word was also employed to denote that one of the elements which formed the most immediate manifestation of the principle. In this latter sense, Fire was the first stage of incipient reality: the second stage was water, the third earth. This progression, fire, water, earth, was in Herakleitean language "the road downwards," which was the same as "the road upwards," from earth to water and again to fire. The death of fire was its transition into water: that of water was its transition partly into earth, partly into flame. As fire was the type of extreme mobility, perpetual generation and destruction—so earth was the type of fixed and stationary existence, resisting movement or change as much as possible.² Water was intermediate between the two.

Herakleitus conceived the sun and stars, not as solid bodies, but as meteoric aggregations perpetually dissipated and perpetually renewed or fed, by exhalation upward from the water and earth. The sun became extinguished and rekindled in suitable measure and proportion, under the watch of the Erinnyes, the satellites of Justice. These celestial lights were contained in troughs, the open side of which was turned towards our vision. In case of eclipses the trough was for the time reversed, so that the dark side was turned towards us; and the different phases of the moon were occasioned by the gradual turning round of the trough in which

¹ See a striking passage cited from Gregory of Nyssa by Lassalle (vol. i. p. 287), illustrating this characteristic of fire: the flame of a lamp appears to continue the same, but it is only a succession of flaming particles, each of which takes fire and is extinguished in the same instant:—*ὅσοντι τὸ ἐστὶν τῆς θραύλλης πῦρ τῷ μὲν δοκῶν εἶναι τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνεται—τὸ γὰρ συνεχὲς εἶναι τῆς αἰρήσεως ἐκδιδωσμένου αὐτὸ καὶ φεμίνοντος πρὸς αὐτὸ δίδωσεν—τῇ δὲ ἀληθείᾳ πάντοτε αὐτὸ αὐτὸ διαδεχόμενον, οὐδέποτε τὸ αὐτὸ μένει—ἡ γὰρ ἐφαπνομένη εἰς τῆς θερμότητος ἰσχύος ὁμοῦ τοῦ διεφλογώθη καὶ εἰς ἀγνῶν ἐκκαυθεῖσα μεταποιεῖται, &c.*

² Diogen. Laert. ix. 9; Clemens Alexand. Strom. v. 14, p. 599, vi. 2, p. 624. *Πρὸς τροπαί πρώτων θάλασσα, θαλάττης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἦμισυ γῆ, τὸ δ' ἦμισυ πηροτήρ.* A full explanation of the curious expression *πηροτήρ* is given by Lassalle (Herakl. vol. ii. p. 87-90). See Brandis (Handbuch der Gr. Philos. sect. xliii. p. 164), and Plutarch (De Primo Frigido, c. 17, p. 952, F.).

The distinction made by Herakleitus, but not clearly marked out or preserved, between the *ideal fire* or universal process, and the *elementary fire* or first stage towards realization, is brought out by Lassalle (Herakleitos, vol. ii. p. 25-29).

her light was contained. Of the phenomena of thunder and lightning also, Herakleitus offered some explanation, referring them to aggregations and conflagrations of the clouds, and violent currents of winds.¹ Another hypothesis was often ascribed to Herakleitus, and was really embraced by several of the Stoics in later times—that there would come a time when all existing things would be destroyed by fire (*καύρωσις*), and afterwards again brought into reality in a fresh series of changes. But this hypothesis appears to have been conceived by him metaphysically rather than physically. Fire was not intended to designate the physical process of combustion, but was a symbolical phrase for the universal process; the perpetual agency of conjoint destruction and renovation, manifesting itself in the putting forth and re-absorption of particulars, and having no other reality except as immanent in these particulars.² The determinate Kosmos of the present moment is perpetually destroyed, passing into fire or the indeterminate: it is perpetually renovated or passes out of fire into water, earth—out of the indeterminate, into the various determinate modifications. At the same time, though Herakleitus seems to have mainly employed these symbols for the purpose of signifying or typifying a metaphysical conception, yet there was no clear apprehension, even in his own mind, of this generality, apart from all symbols: so that the illustration came to count as a physical fact by itself, and has been so understood by many.³ The line between what he meant as the ideal or metaphysical process, and the elementary or physical process, is not easy to draw, in the fragments which now remain.

¹ Aristot. Meteorol. ii. e. p. 355, a. Plato, Republ. vi. p. 498, c. 11; Plutarch, De Exilio, c. 11, p. 604 A.; Plutarch, De Isid. et Osirid. c. 48, p. 370, E.; Diogen. L. ix. 10; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 17-22-24-28, p. 889-891; Stobæus, Eclog. Phys. i. p. 694.

About the doctrine of the Stoics, built in part upon this of Herakleitus, see Cicero, Natur. Deor. ii. 46; Seneca, Quest. Natur. ii. 5, vi. 16.

² Aristot. or Pseudo-Aristot., De Mundo, εκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνός πάντα.

³ See Lassalle, Herakleitos, vol. ii. s. 26-27, p. 182-258.

Compare about the obscure and debated meaning of the Herakleitean *καύρωσις*, Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 103; Zeller, Philos. der Griech. vol. i. p. 477-479.

The word *διαστροφή* stands as the antithesis (in the language of Herakleitus) to *καύρωσις*. A passage from Philo Judeus is cited by Lassalle illustrating the Herakleitean movement from ideal unity into totality of sensible particulars, forwards and backwards—ὁ δὲ γινώσκων (λόγος) ἐκ κόσμου πάντα καὶ εἰς κόσμον ἀνάγει, ὅθεν θεοῦ δὲ μηδὲν οἰόμενος, Ἡρακλείτεον δόξης ἑταίρος, κόσμον καὶ χρησιμότητος, καὶ ἐν τῷ πᾶσι καὶ πάντα ἰσοῦσθαι

His doctrines respecting the human soul and human knowledge. All wisdom resided in the Universal Reason—individual Reason is worthless.

The like blending of metaphysics and physics—of the abstract and notional with the concrete and sensible—is to be found in the statements remaining from Herakleitus respecting the human soul and human knowledge. The human soul, according to him, was an effluence or outlying portion of the Universal—the fire—the perpetual movement or life of things. As such, its nature was to be ever in movement: but it was imprisoned and obstructed by the body, which represented the stationary, the fixed, the particular—that which resisted the universal force of change. So long as a man lived, his soul or mind, though thus confined, participated more or less in the universal movement: but when he died, his body ceased to participate in it, and became therefore vile, "fit only to be cast out like dung". Every man, individually considered, was irrational;¹ reason belonged only to the universal or the whole, with which the mind of each living man was in conjunction, renewing itself by perpetual absorption, inspiration or inhalation, vaporous transition, impressions through the senses and the pores, &c. During sleep, since all the media of communication, except only those through respiration, were suspended, the mind became stupefied and destitute of memory. Like coals when the fire is withdrawn, it lost its heat and tended towards extinction.² On waking, it recovered its full communication with the great source of intelligence without—the universal all-comprehensive process of life and movement. Still, though this was

είσόδων—where κόσμος and χρησιμοσύνη are used to illustrate the same ideal antithesis as διακόσμησις and ἐκπύρωσις (Lassalle, vol. i. p. 232).

¹ Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 130. ἡ ἐπιφωτισθείσα τοῖς ἡμετέροις σώμασιν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος μοῖρα.

Plutarch, Sympos., p. 644. νεκρὸς κοσμίαν ἐβλάτοτέροισι.

Plutarch, Placit. Philos. i. 23, p. 884. Ἡράκλειτος ἡρεμίαν καὶ στάσιν ἐκ τῶν ὧν ἀντρεῖ· ἐστὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τῶν νεκρῶν.

² See Schleiermacher, Herakleitos, p. 522; Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. viii. 236.

³ The passage of Sextus Empiricus (adv. Mathem. vii. 137-134) is curious and instructive about Herakleitus.

Ἀρίσκει γὰρ τῷ φυνεῖν (Herakleitos) τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς λογικὸν τε ὅν

καὶ φανήσκει—τοῦτον δὲ τὸν θεῖον λόγον, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, δι' ἀναπνοῆς σπένδοντες νεκροὶ γινώσκουσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν ὕπνῳ λεθαλοῖσι, κατὰ δὲ ἔγερσιν πάλιν ἐκφύονται. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ὕπνῳ μυσάμενοι τὸν αἰσθητικὸν πόρον χωρεῖται τῇ πρὸς τὸ περιέχον συμφύσις ὃ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῖς, μονῇ τῇ κατὰ ἀναπνοῆν προφύονται συζωμένης οἰοῦναι τινοὺς μίξαι, χωρισθεῖς τε ἀποβάλλει ἢ πρῶτον οἷα μηχανικὴν δύναμιν. ἐν δὲ ἐγρηγορήσει πάλιν διὰ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν πόρων ὥσπερ διὰ τινῶν θυρῶν προκύπτει καὶ τὸ περιέχοντι συμβάλλων λογικὸν ἐνδύεται δύναμιν. Then follows the simile about coals brought near to, or removed away from, the fire.

The Stoic version of this Herakleitean doctrine, is to be seen in Marcus Antoninus, viii. 54. Μαρτὶν μόνον

the one and only source of intelligence open to all waking men, the greater number of men could neither discern it for themselves, nor understand it without difficulty even when pointed out to them. Though awake, they were not less unconscious or forgetful of the process going on around them, than if they had been asleep.¹ The eyes and ears of men with barbarous or stupid souls, gave them false information.² They went wrong by following their own individual impression or judgment: they lived as if reason or intelligence belonged to each man individually. But the only way to attain truth was, to abjure all separate reason, and to follow the common or universal reason. Each man's mind must become identified and familiar with that common process which directed and transformed the whole: in so far as he did this, he attained truth: whenever he followed any private or separate judgment of his own, he fell into error.³ The highest pitch of this severance of the individual judgment was seen during sleep, at which time each man left the common world to retire into a world of his own.⁴

By this denunciation of the mischief of private judgment, Herakleitus did not mean to say that a man ought to think like his neighbours or like the public. In his view the public were wrong, collectively as well as

By Universal Reason, he did not mean the

συμπνεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ συμφρονεῖν τῷ περιέχοντι πάντα νοεῖν. Οὐ γὰρ ἦτον ἢ νοεῖν δύναιμι πάντῃ κέχνηται καὶ διαπεφοίτηκε τῷ σπᾶσαι βουλομένῳ, ἥπερ ἢ ἀερώδης τῷ ἀναπνεύσαι δυναμένη.

The Stoics, who took up the doctrine of Herakleitus with farther abstraction and analysis, distinguished and named separately matters which he conceived in one and named together—the physical inhalation of air—the metaphysical supposed influx of intelligence—inspiration in its literal and metaphorical senses. The word τὸ περιέχον, as he conceives it, seems to denote, not any distinct or fixed local region, but the rotatory movement or circulation of the elements, fire, water, earth, reverting back into each other. Lassalle, vol. ii. p. 119-120; which transition also is denoted by the word ἀναθυμίασις in the Herakleitean sense—cited from Herakleitus by Aristotle. *De Animâ*, i. 2, 16.

¹ Sextus Empiricus (adv. Math. vii. 152) here cites the first words of the treatise of Herakleitus (compare also Aristotle, *Rhet.* iii. 5). λόγον τοῦδε δόντος ἀδύνατοι γίνονται ἀνθρώποι καὶ πρόθεον ἢ ἀκούσαι καὶ ἀκούσαντες τὸ πρῶτον.—τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους λαμβάνει δόξα εὐδοντες ἐκλασθάνοντες. ² Sext. Empiric. ib. vii. 126, a citation from Herakleitus.

³ Sext. Emp. ib. vii. 133 (the words of Herakleitus) διὰ τοῦτο ἐρεσθαι τῷ ξυνῷ.—τοῦ λόγου δὲ ἴοντος ζῶσι, ζῶσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν· ἢ δ' ἴσθιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἀλλ' ἐξήγησις τοῦ τρόπου τῆς τοῦ πάντος διοικήσεως· διὰ καθ' ὃ τι ἐν αὐτοῦ τῆς μέτης κοινωνήσωμεν, ἀληθέσωμεν, ἃ δὲ ἐν ἰδίῳ ἔσωμεν, ψευδόμεθα.

⁴ Plutarch, *De Superstit.* c. 2, p. 106, C. See also the passage in Clemens Alexandr. *Strom.* iv. 22, about the comparison of sleep to death by Herakleitus.

Reason of most men as it is, but as it ought to be individually. The universal reason to which he made appeal, was not the reason of most men as it actually is, but that which, in his theory, ought to be their reason: ¹ that which formed the perpetual and governing process throughout all nature, though most men neither recognised nor attended to it, but turned away from it in different directions equally wrong. No man was truly possessed of reason, unless his individual mind understood the general scheme of the universe, and moved in full sympathy with its perpetual movement and alternation or unity of contraries.² The universal process contained in itself a sum-total of particular contraries which were successively produced and destroyed: to know the universal was to know these contraries in one, and to recognise them as transient, but correlative and inseparable, manifestations, each implying the other—not as having each a separate reality and each excluding its contrary.³ In so far as a man's mind maintained its kindred nature and perpetual conjoint movement with the universal, he acquired true knowledge; but the individualising influences arising from the body usually overpowered this kindred with the universal, and obstructed the continuity of this movement, so that most persons became plunged in error and illusion.

¹ Sextus Empiricus misinterprets the Herakleitean theory when he represents it (vii. 134) as laying down—*τὰ κοινὰ φαινόμενα, πικρά, ὅς ἐν τῷ κοινῷ κρινόμενα λόγῳ, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἴδιον ἄδύνατα, ψευδῆ*. Herakleitus denounces mankind generally as in error. Origen. *Philosophum.* i. 4; *Diog. Laert.* ix. 1.

² The analogy and sympathy between the individual mind and the cosmical process—between the knowing and the known—was reproduced in many forms among the ancient philosophers. It appears in the Platonic *Timæus*, c. 20, p. 47 C.

³ *Τὸ κοινόμενον τῷ κοινωμένῳ γινώσκουσα* was the doctrine of several philosophers. *Aristot.* *De Anima*, i. 2. *Plato*, *Kratylus*, p. 412 A: *καὶ μὴν ἡ γε ἐπιστήμη μόνον ὡς φερόμενός τοις πράγμασιν ἐκινούμενη τῆς ψυχῆς τῆς ἑξῆς λόγῳ, καὶ οὕτω ἀπελευθερίηται ὅτε προδοῦσιν*. A remarkable passage from the comment of *Philoponus* (on the treatise of *Aristotle De Anima*) is cited by *Lassalle*, ii. p.

330, describing the Herakleitean doctrine, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς ἀναδυμένης αὐτὴν ἔλκεν (*Herakleitus*): τῶν γὰρ πραγμάτων ἐν κινήσει ὄντων δεῖν καὶ τὸ γίνωσκον τὰ πράγματα ἐν κινήσει εἶναι, ἵνα συμπαραθέσθω αὐτοῖς ἐφάπτεται καὶ ἐφαρμόζει αὐτοῖς. Also *Simplikios ap. Lassalle*, p. 341: ἐν μεταβολῇ γὰρ συνεχεῖ τὰ ὄντα ὑποτιθέμενος ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, καὶ τὸ γνωσκόμενον αὐτὰ τῇ ἐξαφῇ γίνωσκον, συντίθεσθαι ἐβούλετο ὡς δεῖ εἶναι κατὰ τὸ γνωστικὸν ἐν κινήσει.

² *Stobæus*, *Eclog. Phys.* p. 58; and the passage of *Philo Judæus*, cited by *Schleiermacher*, p. 437; as well as more fully by *Lassalle*, vol. ii. p. 265-267 (*Quis rerum divinar. hæres*, p. 503, *Mangey*): ἐν γὰρ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τῶν ἐναντίων, οὐ τμηθέντος γράμμα τὰ ἐναντία. Οὐ τοῦτ' ὅστιν ὁ φασιν Ἕλληνες τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀδιέκταν παρ' αὐτοῖς Ἡράκλειτον, ἀφελείαν τῆς αὐτοῦ προσσησμένον φιλοσοφίας, εὐχεῖν ὡς εὐρίσκει κατὰ; ταλαίων γὰρ εὐρύμα Μαιώσις ὄντιν.

The absolute of Herakleitus stands thus at the opposite pole as compared with that of Parmenides: it is absolute movement, change, generation and destruction — negation of all substance and stability,¹ except as a temporary and unbecoming resistance of each successive particular to the destroying and renewing current of the universal. The Real, on this theory, was a generalisation, not of substances, but of facts, events, changes, revolutions, destructions, generations, &c., determined by a law of justice or necessity which endured, and which alone endured, for ever. Herakleitus had many followers, who adopted his doctrine wholly or partially, and who gave to it developments which he had not adverted to, perhaps might not have acknowledged.² It was found an apt theme by those who, taking a religious or poetical view of the universe, dwelt upon the transitory and contemptible value of particular existences, and extolled the grandeur or power of the universal. It suggested many doubts and debates respecting the foundations of logical evidence, and the distinction of truth from falsehood; which debates will come to be noticed hereafter, when we deal with the dialectical age of Plato and Aristotle.

After Herakleitus, and seemingly at the same time with

¹ The great principle of Herakleitus, which Aristotle states in order to reject (*Physic.* viii. 3, p. 263, b. 10, *φασὶ τινες κινεῖσθαι τὸν ὄντων ἐν τῷ μὲν τὰ δ' οὐ, ἀλλὰ πάντα καὶ αἰεὶ. ἀλλὰ λαμβάνουσιν τοῦτο ὅτι κινεῖσθαι εἰσθῆναι*) now stands averred in modern physical philosophy. Mr. Grove observes, in his instructive *Treatise on the Correlation of Physical Forces*, p. 22:

"Of absolute rest, Nature gives us no evidence. All matter, as far as we can discern, is ever in movement: not merely in masses, as in the planetary spheres, but also molecularly, or throughout its intimate structure. Thus every alteration of temperature produces a molecular change throughout the whole substance heated or cooled: slow chemical or electrical forces, actions of light or invisible radiant forces, are always at play; so that, as a fact, we cannot predicate of any portion of matter, that it is absolutely at rest."

² Many references to Herakleitus are

found in the recently published books of the *Refutatio Hæresium* by Pseudo-Origen or Hippolytus—especially Book ix. p. 279-283, ed. Miller. To judge by various specimens there given, it would appear that his juxtapositions of contradictory predicates, with the same subject, would be recognised as paradoxes merely in appearance, and not in reality, if we had his own explanation. Thus he says (p. 282) "the pure and the corrupt, the drinkable and the undrinkable, are one and the same." Which is explained as follows: "The sea is most pure and most corrupt: to fish, it is drinkable and nutritive; to men, it is undrinkable and destructive." This explanation appears to have been given by Herakleitus himself, *θάλασσα, φησὶν, &c.*

These are only paradoxes in appearance—the relative predicate being affirmed without mention of its correlate. When you supply the correlate to each predicate, there remains no contradiction at all.

Empedokles—his doctrine of the four elements, and two moving or restraining forces.

Parmenides, we arrive at Empedokles (about 500-430 B.C.) and his memorable doctrine of the Four Elements. This philosopher, a Sicilian of Agrigentum, and a distinguished as well as popular-minded citizen, expounded his views in poems, of which Lucretius¹ speaks with high admiration, but of which few fragments are preserved. He agreed with Parmenides, and dissented from Herakleitus and the Ionic philosophers, in rejecting all real generation and destruction.² That which existed had not been generated and could not be destroyed. Empedokles explained what that was, which men mistook for generation and destruction. There existed four distinct elements—Earth, Water, Air, and Fire—eternal, inexhaustible, simple, homogeneous, equal, and co-ordinate with each other. Besides these four substances, there also existed two moving forces, one contrary to the other—Love or Friendship, which brought the elements into conjunction—Enmity or Contest, which separated them. Here were alternate and conflicting agencies, either bringing together different portions of the elements to form a new product, or breaking up the product thus formed and separating the constituent elements. Sometimes the Many were combined into One; sometimes the One was decomposed into Many. Generation was simply this combination of elements already existing separately—not the calling into existence of anything new: destruction was in like manner the dissolution of some compound, not the termination of any existent simple substance. The four simple substances or elements (which Empedokles sometimes calls by names of the popular Deities—Zeus, Hêrê, Aidoneus, &c.), were the roots or foundations of everything.³

From the four elements—acted upon by these two forces,

¹ Lucretius, l. 781.

*Carmine quin etiam divini pectoris ejus Vociferantur, et exponunt præclara re-
perta:*

Ut vix humanâ videatur stirpe creatus.

² Empedokles, Frag. v. 77-83, ed. Karsten, p. 96:

*φύσεις οὐδενός ἴστων ἀνάστων
Θεγγῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανατοῖο
τελευτῇ,*

*ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διὰλλαξις τε μεγίσ-
των
ἴστων, φύσις δ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐνομαζέσθαι ἀνθρώ-
ποισιν. . . .*

Φύσις here is remarkable, in its primary sense, as derivative from φύσμαι, equivalent to γένεσις. Compare Plutarch adv. Koloten, p. 1111, 1112.

³ Emp. Fr. v. 56. *Τέσσαρα τῶν πάντων μίσγματα.*

abstractions or mythical personifications — Empedokles showed how the Kosmos was constructed. He supposed both forces to be perpetually operative, but not always with equal efficacy: sometimes the one was predominant, sometimes the other, sometimes there was equilibrium between them. Things accordingly pass through a perpetual and ever-renewed cycle. The complete preponderance of Love brings all the elements into close and compact unity, Enmity being for the time eliminated. Presently the action of the latter recommences, and a period ensues in which Love and Enmity are simultaneously operative; until at length Enmity becomes the temporary master, and all union is for the time dissolved. But this condition of things does not last. Love again becomes active, so that partial and increasing combination of the elements is produced, and another period commences—the simultaneous action of the two forces, which ends in renewed empire of Love, compact union of the elements, and temporary exclusion of Enmity.¹

Construction of the Kosmos from these elements and forces—action and counter action of love and enmity. The Kosmos alternately made and unmade.

This is the Empedoklean cycle of things,² divine or predestined, without beginning or end: perpetual substitution of new for old compounds—constancy only in the general principle of combination and dissolution. The Kosmos which Empedokles undertakes to explain, takes its commencement from the period of complete empire of Love, or compact and undisturbed union of all the elements. This he conceives and divinises under the name of Sphærus—as One sphere, harmonious, uniform, and universal, having no motion, admitting no parts or separate existences within it, exhibiting

Empedoklean predestined cycle of things—complete empire of Love—Sphærus—Empire of Enmity—disengagement or separation of the ele-

¹ Zeller, *Philos. der Griech.*, vol. i. p. 535-536, ed. 2nd.

² Emp. Frag. v. 96, *Karst.*, p. 96:

Ὅπως ἢ μὲν ἐν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμῆσται
φύσθαι,
ἢ δὲ πάλιν διαφυγνὺς ἐνδὲ πλεόν' ἐστὶν
λέθουσι,
τῇ μὲν γίγνεται τε καὶ οὐ σφίσι
ἐμπεδος αἰὼν·
ἢ δὲ τὰδ' ἀλλὰσσέσθαι διαφυγνὺς οὐ-
δὲν λήγει,
ταύτῃ δ' αἰὼν ἔσται ἐλπίστια κατὰ
κόσμον.

Also:—

καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταύτῃ ἦν τε καὶ ἔσται
οὐδέ ποτ', οἷα,
ταύτῃ ἀποφύγει (Love and Dis-
cord) καυδέσθαι ἄσπετος αἰὼν.

These are new Empedoklean verses, derived from the recently published fragments of Hippolytus (*Hier. Refut.*) and printed by Stein, v. 110, in his collection of the Fragments of Empedokles, p. 43. Compare another passage in the same treatise of Hippolytus, p. 251.

ments—
astronomy
and meteo-
rology.

no one of the four elements distinctly, "instabilis tellus, innabilis unda"—a sort of chaos.¹ At the time prescribed by Fate or Necessity, the action of Enmity recommenced, penetrating gradually through the interior of Sphaerus, "agitating the members of the God one after another,"² disjoining the parts from each other, and distending the compact ball into a vast porous mass. This mass, under the simultaneous and conflicting influences of Love and Enmity, became distributed partly into homogeneous portions, where each of the four elements was accumulated by itself—partly into compounds or individual substances, where two or more elements were found in conjunction. Like had an appetite for Like—Air for Air, Fire for Fire, and so forth: and a farther extension of this appetite brought about the mixture of different elements in harmonious compounds. First, the Air disengaged itself, and occupied a position surrounding the central mass of Earth and Water: next, the Fire also broke forth, and placed itself externally to the Air, immediately in contact with the outermost crystalline sphere, formed of condensed and frozen air, which formed the wall encompassing the Kosmos. A remnant of Fire and Air still remained embodied in the Earth, but the great mass of both so distributed themselves, that the former occupied most part of one hemisphere, the latter most part of the other.³ The rapid and uniform rotation of the Kosmos, caused by the exterior

¹ Emped. Fr. v. 59, Karsten:

Ὅπως ἁρμονίης πυκινῇ κρυφῇ ἐστί-
μηται
σφαῖρος κυκλωτέρης, μοτιῇ περιγυγί-
γαιον.

Plutarch, De Facie in Orbe Luna, c. 12.

About the divinity ascribed by Empedokles to Sphaerus, see Aristot. *Metaphys.* B. 4, p. 1000, a. 22. ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐκ τούτων (τελειούσιν) τέλλει ἐστὶ πᾶν δ' ὁ θεός (i. e. Sphaerus).—Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἦν τὸ τελεῖον ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, ἂν ἐν ἡμῶν, ἐκ φασὶν (Empedokles). See Preller, *Hist. Philos.* ex Font. Loc. Contexta, sect. 171, 172, ed. 2.

The condition of things which Empedokles calls Sphaerus may be illustrated (translating his Love and Enmity into the modern phraseology of attraction and repulsion) from an eminent modern work on Physics:—

"Were there only atoms and attrac-

tion, as now explained, the whole material of creation would rush into close contact, and the universe would be one huge solid mass of stillness and death. There is heat or caloric, however, which directly counteracts attraction, and singularly modifies the results. It has been described by some as a most subtle fluid pervading all things, as water does a sponge: others have accounted it merely a vibration among the atoms. The truth is, that we know little more of heat as a cause of repulsion, than of gravity as a cause of attraction: but we can study and classify the phenomena of both most accurately." (Dr. Arnott, *Elements of Physics*, vol. i. p. 26.)

² Emp. Fr. v. 66-70, Karsten:

πάντα γὰρ ἐξείης τελευτήσεται γυνὰ θεοῦ.
³ Plutarch ap. Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* i. 8, 10; Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* li. 6, p. 387; Aristot. *Éthica Nic.* viii. 2.

Fire, compressed the interior elements, squeezed the water out of the earth like perspiration from the living body, and thus formed the sea. The same rotation caused the earth to remain unmoved, by counterbalancing and resisting its downward pressure or gravity.¹ In the course of the rotation, the light hemisphere of Fire, and the comparatively dark hemisphere of Air, alternately came above the horizon: hence the interchange of day and night. Empedokles (like the Pythagoreans) supposed the sun to be not self-luminous, but to be a glassy or crystalline body which collected and reflected the light from the hemisphere of Fire. He regarded the fixed stars as fastened to the exterior crystalline sphere, and revolving along with it, but the planets as moving free and detached from any sphere.² He supposed the alternations of winter and summer to arise from a change in the proportions of Air and Fire in the atmospheric regions: winter was caused by an increase of the Air, both in volume and density, so as to drive back the exterior Fire to a greater distance from the Earth, and thus to produce a diminution of heat and light: summer was restored when the Fire, in its turn increasing, extruded a portion of the Air, approached nearer to the Earth, and imparted to the latter more heat and light.³ Empedokles farther supposed (and his contemporaries, Anaxagoras and Diogenes, held the same opinion) that the Earth was round and flat at top and bottom, like a drum or tambourine: that its surface had been originally horizontal, in reference to the rotation of the Kosmos around it, but that it had afterwards tilted down to the south and upward towards the north, so as to lie aslant instead of horizontal. Hence he explained the fact that the north pole of the heavens now appeared obliquely elevated above the horizon.⁴

From astronomy and meteorology Empedokles⁵ proceeded to

¹ Emped. Fr. 126. Karsten. αἰθήρ σφύγγειον περὶ κύκλον ἀναστὰς. Aristot. De Caelo, ii. 13, 14; iii. 2, 2. τὴν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς αἰθρῆς ἡρεμεῖν, &c. Empedokles called the sea ὠρεῖρα τῆς γῆς. Emp. Fr. 461, Karsten; Aristot. Meteor. ii. 1.
² Plutarch, Placit. Philo. ii. 20, p. 890.
³ Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 532-533, 2nd ed.: Karsten—De Emped. Philo. p. 424-431.

The very imperfect notices which remain, of the astronomical and me-

teorological doctrines of Empedokles, are collected and explained by these two authors.

⁴ Plutarch, Placit. Philo. ii. 8; Schaumbach, Anaxag. Fragm. p. 176. Compare the remarks of Gruppe (Ueber die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen, p. 96) upon the obscure Welt-Gebäude of Empedokles.

⁵ Hippokrates—Περὶ ἀρχαῖς ἰγνῶστος—c. 20, p. 620, vol. i. ed. Littre. καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἃ ἄλλοι οἱ περὶ φύσεως

Formation of the Earth, of Gods, men, animals, and plants. describe the Earth, its tenants, and its furniture; how men were first produced, and how put together. All were produced by the Earth: being thrown up under the stimulus of Fire still remaining within it. In its earliest manifestations, and before the influence of Discord had been sufficiently neutralized, the Earth gave birth to plants only, being as yet incompetent to produce animals.¹ After a certain time she gradually acquired power to produce animals, first imperfectly and piecemeal, trunks without limbs and limbs without trunks; next, discordant and monstrous combinations, which did not last, such as creatures half man half ox; lastly, combinations with parts suited to each other, organizations perfect and durable, men, horses, &c., which continued and propagated.² Among these productions were not only plants, birds, fishes, and men, but also the "long-lived Gods."³ All compounds were formed by intermixture of the four elements, in different proportions, more or less harmonious.⁴ These elements remained unchanged: no one of them was transformed into another. But the small particles of each flowed into the pores of the others, and the combination was more or less intimate, according as the structure of these pores was more or less adapted to receive them. So intimate did the mixture of these fine particles become, when the effluvia of one and the pores of another were in symmetry, that the constituent ingredients, like colours compounded together by the painter,⁵ could not be dis-

γράφειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὅ τι ἔστιν ἀνθρώποι, καὶ ὅπως γίνονται πρῶτον, καὶ ὅπως συνέστην.

This is one of the most ancient allusions to Empedokles, recently printed by M. Littre, out of one of the MSS. in the Parisian Library.

¹ Emp. Fr. v. 253, Kar. τοὺς μὲν πρῶ ἀνθρώπων ἔθελεν πρὸς ἑμῶν ἰσθμοῖς, &c.

Aristot., or Pseudo-Aristot. De Plantis, l. 2. εἴπερ πάλιν ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, ὅτι τὰ φυτόν ἔχοντες γίνονται ἐν κόσμῳ φλογισμῶν, καὶ οὐ τελείῃ κατὰ τὴν συμπλέξεσιν αὐτοῦ· ταῦτες δὲ συμπλερουμένης (while it is in course of being completed), οὐ γυνάσκουσιν.

² Emp. Frag. v. 124, 150, 225, 240, ed. Karst. Ver. 228:—

πολλὰ μὲν ἀμειψόμενα καὶ ἀμφί-
στερον ἴσθοντα,

βουνην ἀνδρόεσσαν, &c. Ver. 251:—
Οὐλοφθαί μὲν πρῶτα τῶναι χροὺς
ἐξαιτέλλον, &c.

Lucretius, v. 824; Aristot. Gen. Animal. i. 18, p. 722, b. 20; Physic. ii. 8, 2, p. 198, b. 32; De Caelo, iii. 2, 5, p. 300, b. 29; with the commentary of Simplicius ap. Schol. Brand. b. 512.

³ Emp. Fr. v. 135, Kar.

⁴ Plato, Menon. p. 76 A.; Aristot. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 824, b. 30 seq.

⁵ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐξ ἀμεταβλήτων τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων ἡγεῖτο γίνεσθαι τὴν τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων φύσιν, οὕτως ἀναμεμιγμένον ἀλλήλοις τῶν πρῶτων, ὥς εἰ τις λευκὰς ἀκριβοῦς καὶ χροῶδη ποιήσας ἰδὼν καὶ χαλκίαν καὶ καθμειαν καὶ μίσην μίξεν, ὥς μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ μεταχειρίσασθαι χωρὶς ἑτέρου.

Galen, Comm. in Hippokrat. De Homin. Nat. t. iii. p. 101. See Kar-

cerned or handled separately. Empedokles rarely assigned any specific ratio in which he supposed the four elements to enter into each distinct compound, except in the case of flesh and blood, which were formed of all the four in equal portions; and of bones, which he affirmed to be composed of one-fourth earth, one-fourth water, and the other half fire. He insisted merely on the general fact of such combinations, as explaining what passed for generation of new substances—without pointing out any reason to determine one ratio of combination rather than another, and without ascribing to each compound a distinct ratio of its own. This omission in his system is much animadverted on by Aristotle.

Empedokles farther laid down many doctrines respecting physiology. He dwelt on the procreation of men and animals, entered upon many details respecting gestation and the fœtus, and even tried to explain what it was that determined the birth of male or female offspring. About respiration, alimentation, and sensation, he also proposed theories: his explanation of respiration remains in one of the fragments. He supposed that man breathed, partly through the nose, mouth, and lungs, but partly also through the whole surface of the body, by the pores wherewith it was pierced, and by the internal vessels connected with those pores. Those internal vessels were connected with the blood vessels, and the portion of them near the surface was alternately filled with blood or emptied of blood, by the flow outwards from the centre or the ebb inwards towards the centre. Such was the movement which Empedokles considered as constantly belonging to the blood: alternately a projection outwards from the centre and a recession backwards towards the centre. When the blood thus receded, the extremities of the vessels were

Physiology
of Empedokles—
Procreation
—Respiration—movement
of the blood.

seen. De Emped. Phil. p. 407, and Emp. Fr. v. 155.

Galen says, however (after Aristot. Gen. et Corr. li. 7, p. 334, a. 30), that this mixture, set forth by Empedokles, is not mixture properly speaking, but merely close proximity. Hippokrates (he says) was the first who propounded the doctrine of real mixture. But Empedokles seems to have intended a real mixture, in all cases where the structure of the pores was in sym-

metry with the inflowing particles. Oil and water (he said) would not mix together, because there was no such symmetry between them—*ὅλως γὰρ ποιεῖ (Empedokles) τὴν μίξιν τῇ συμμετρίας τῶν πόρων· διότι οὐκ ἔστιν ὅμοιον μὲν καὶ ὅμοιον οὐ μίγνυσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ὅρῳ καὶ περὶ ὅμοιον δὲ καταριθμῆναι τὰς ἰσῆς ἀνάγκης* (Theophrastus, De Sensu et Sensill. a. 12, vol. i. p. 651, ed. Schneider).

left empty, and the air from without entered : when the outward tide of blood returned, the air which had thus entered was expelled.¹ Empedokles conceived this outward tide of blood to be occasioned by the effort of the internal fire to escape and join its analogous element without.²

The doctrine of pores and effluvia, which formed so conspicuous an item in the physics of Empedokles, was applied by him to explain sensation. He maintained the general doctrine (which Parmenides had advanced before him, and which Plato retained after him), that sensation was produced by like acting upon like : Herakleitus before him, and Anaxagoras after him, held that it was produced by unlike acting upon unlike. Empedokles tried (what Parmenides had not tried) to apply his doctrine to the various senses separately.³ Man was composed of the same four elements as the universe around him : and since like always tended towards like, so by each of the four elements within himself, he perceived and knew the like element without. Effluvia from all bodies entered his pores, wherever they found a suitable channel : hence he perceived and knew earth by earth, water by water, and so forth.⁴ Empedokles, assuming perception and knowledge to be produced by such intercommunication of the four elements, believed that not man

¹ Emp. Fr. v. 275, seqq. Karst.

The comments of Aristotle on this theory of Empedokles are hardly pertinent : they refer to respiration by the nostrils, which was not what Empedokles had in view (Aristot. De Respiratione c. 8).

² Karsten, De Emp. Philosoph. p. 480.

Emp. Fr. v. 307—*τὸ τ' ἐν μέντοι ἐκ τῶν ὁρίων πῦρ—πῦρ δ' ἔξω διασπείρει, &c.*

Empedokles illustrates this influx and efflux of air in respiration by the klepsydra, a vessel with one high and narrow neck, but with a broad bottom pierced with many small holes. When the neck was kept closed by the finger or otherwise, the vessel might be plunged into water, but no water would ascend into it through the holes in the bottom, because of the resistance of the air within. As soon as the neck was freed from pressure, and the air within allowed to escape, the water would

immediately rush up through the holes in the bottom.

This illustration is interesting. It shows that Empedokles was distinctly aware of the pressure of the air as countervailing the ascending movement of the water, and the removal of that pressure as allowing such movement. Vera. 236 :—

*οὐδὲ τ' ἐς ἄγρος δ' ὄμβρος ἐσφίγγεται,
ἀλλὰ μιν εἰσρεῖ
ἀέρος ὅγκος ἰσχυρὸς πύσσιν ἐπὶ τρήματα
τυκρά, &c.*

This dealing with the klepsydra seems to have been a favourite amusement with children.

³ Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 2, p. 647, Schneid.

⁴ Emp. Frag. Karst. v. 267, seqq.
*γὰρ δ', ὅτι πάντων εἰσὶν ἀπορροαὶ
ἑστ' ἐγένοντο, &c.*

ib. v. 321 :

*γαῖα μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ἐπύσσεται, ὕδωρ
δ' ὕδωρ,*

and animals only, but plants and other substances besides, perceived and knew in the same way. Everything possessed a certain measure of knowledge, though less in degree than man, who was a more compound structure.¹ Perception and knowledge was more developed in different animals in proportion as their elementary composition was more mixed and varied. The blood, as the most compound portion of the whole body, was the principal seat of intelligence.²

In regard to vision, Empedokles supposed that it was operated mainly by the fire or light within the eye, though Sense of vision aided by the light without. The interior of the eye was of fire and water, the exterior coat was a thin layer of earth and air. Colours were brought to the eye as effluvia from objects, and became apprehended as sensations by passing into the alternate pores or ducts of fire and water: white colour was fitted to (or in symmetry with) the pores of fire, black colour with those of water.³ Some animals had the proportions of fire and water in their eyes better adjusted, or more conveniently located, than others: in some, the fire was in excess, or too much on the outside, so as to obstruct the pores or ducts of water: in others, water was in excess, and fire in defect. The latter were the

αἰθέρα δ' αἰθέρα διοῦ, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ
αἰθέριον,
στοργὴ δὲ στοργήν, νίκας δὲ τα νίκαι
λυγρῇ.

Theophrastus, De Sensu, c. 10, p. 650, Schneid.

Aristotle says that Empedokles regarded each of these six as a ψυχὴ (soul, vital principle) by itself. Sextus Empiricus treats Empedokles as considering each of the six to be a κριτήριον ἀληθείας (Aristot. De Anima, i. 2; Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 118).

¹ Emp. Fr. v. 313, Karst. ap. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem. viii. 286; also apud Diogen. L. viii. 77.

πάντα γὰρ ἰσθὶ φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ
νόηματος εἶναι.

Stein gives (Emp. Fr. v. 222-231) several lines immediately preceding this from the treatise of Hippolytus; but they are sadly corrupt.

Parmenides had held the same opinion before—καὶ ὅλος πᾶν τὸ ἐν ἔχειν

τὴν γνώσιν—ap. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 4.

Theophrastus, in commenting upon the doctrine of Empedokles, takes as one of his grounds of objection—That Empedokles, in maintaining sensation and knowledge to be produced by influx of the elements into pores, made no difference between animated and inanimate substances (Theophr. De Sens. s. 12-23). Theophrastus puts this as if it were an inconsistency or oversight of Empedokles: but it cannot be so considered, for Empedokles (as well as Parmenides) appears to have accepted the consequence, and to have denied all such difference, except one of degree, as to perception and knowledge.

² Emp. Frag. 316, Karst. αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περιεχόμενον ἴσθι νόημα. Comp. Theophrast. De Sensu, s. 11.

³ Emp. Frag. v. 301-310, Karst. τό τ' ἐν μεγάλῃ ἐργασίον ὀργάνον πῦρ, &c. Theophr. De Sensu, s. 7, 8; Aristot. De Sensu, c. 3; Aristot. De Gen. et Corrupt. i. 8.

animals which saw better by day than by night, a great force of external light being required to help out the deficiency of light within : the former class of animals saw better by night, because, when there was little light without, the watery ducts were less completely obstructed—or left more free to receive the influx of black colour suited to them.¹

In regard to hearing, Empedokles said that the ear was like a ball or trumpet set in motion by the air without ; through which motion the solid parts were brought into shock against the air flowing in, and caused the sensation of sound within.² Smell was, in his view, an adjunct of the respiratory process : persons of acute smell were those who had the strongest breathing : olfactory effluvia came from many bodies, and especially from such as were light and thin. Respecting taste and touch, he gave no further explanation than his general doctrine of effluvia and pores : he seems to have thought that such interpenetration was intelligible by itself, since here was immediate and actual contact. Generally, in respect to all the senses, he laid it down that pleasure ensued when the matter which flows in was not merely fitted in point of structure to penetrate the interior pores or ducts (which was the condition of all sensation), but also harmonious with them in respect to elementary mixture.³

Empedokles held various opinions in common with the Pythagoreans and the brotherhood of the Orphic mysteries—especially that of the metempsychosis. He represented himself as having passed through prior states of existence, as a boy, a girl, a shrub, a bird, and a fish. He proclaims it as an obligation of justice, absolute and universal, not to kill anything that had life : he denounces as an abomination the sacrificing or eating of an animal, in whom perhaps might dwell

Empedokles declared that justice absolutely forbade the killing of anything that had life. His belief in the metempsychosis. Sufferings of

¹ Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, a. 7, 8.

² Theophrast. *De Sensu*, a. 9-21.

Empedokles described the ear under the metaphor of *σφαῖρα ἄστρον*, "the fleshy branch."

³ Theophrast. *De Sensu*, a. 9, 10.

The criticisms of Theophrastus upon this theory of Empedokles are extremely interesting, as illustrating the

change in the Grecian physiological point of view during a century and a half, but I reserve them until I come to the Aristotelian age. I may remark, however, that Theophrastus, disputing the doctrine of sensory effluvia generally, disputes the existence of the olfactory effluvia not less than the rest (a. 20).

the soul of a deceased friend or brother.¹ His religious faith, however, and his opinions about Gods, Dæmons, and the human soul, stood apart (mostly in a different poem) from his doctrines on kosmology and physiology. In common with many Pythagoreans, he laid great stress on the existence of Dæmons (of intermediate order and power between Gods and men), some of whom had been expelled from the Gods in consequence of their crimes, and were condemned to pass a long period of exile, as souls embodied in various men or animals. He laments the misery of the human soul, in himself as well as in others, condemned to this long period of expiatory degradation, before they could regain the society of the Gods.² In one of his remaining fragments, he announces himself almost as a God upon earth, and professes his willingness as well as ability to impart to a favoured pupil the most wonderful gifts—powers to excite or abate the winds, to bring about rain or dry weather, to raise men from the dead.³ He was in fact a man of universal pretensions; not merely an expositor of nature, but a rhetorician, poet, physician, prophet, and conjurer. Gorgias the rhetor had been personally present at his magical ceremonies.⁴

None of the remaining fragments of Empedokles are more remarkable than a few in which he deploras the impossibility of finding out any great or comprehensive truth, amidst the distraction and the sufferings of our short life. Every man took a different road, confiding only in his own accidental experience or

life are an expiation for wrong done during an antecedent life. Pretensions to magical power.

Complaint of Empedokles on the impossibility of finding out truth.

¹ Emp. Frag. v. 380-410, Karsten; Plutarch, De Esu Carnium, p. 907-8.

Aristot. Rhetoric. i. 13, 2: ἰστί γὰρ, ὁ μανθάνωντα τι πόνους, φέσει κοινὴν δίκαιον καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ ἀρετήν κοινωμένην πρὸς ἀλλήλους, καὶ, κατὰ συνέθειαν—ὡς ἔραυδαλλῆς λέγει περὶ τοῦ μὴ κτείνειν τὸ ἐμψυχον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τίσι μὲν δίκαιον, τίσι δ' οὐ δίκαιον,

Ἄλλα τὸ μὲν πάντως νόμιμον διὰ τ' αἰσθημένους
Αἰθέρος φέειν τεύχεα διὰ τ' ἀπλό-
του αἰγῆς.

Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathem. ix. 137.

² Emp. Frag. v. 5-13, Karst.; compare Herod. ii. 123; Plato, Phædrus, 55, p. 246 C.; Plutarch, De Iud. et Ouid. c. 23.

Plutarch observes in another place on the large proportion of religious mysticism blended with the philosophy of Empedokles—ἡμετέρας, φασὶν μύθων καὶ θεωρημάτων ἀνακλίσας φιλοσοφίας ἀπὸ Πυθαγόρου καὶ ἔραυδαλλῆς δεξιμένους, εὖ μάλ' ἀβασχευμένους, &c. (Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, p. 580 C.)

See Fr. Aug. Ukert, Ueber Dæmonen, Heroen, und Genien, p. 151.

³ Emp. Fr. v. 380-425, Karst.

⁴ Dialog. Laert. viii. 56.

particular impressions; but no man could obtain or communicate satisfaction about the whole.¹

Anaxagoras of Klazomenæ, a friend of the Athenian Perikles, and contemporary of Empedokles, was a man of far simpler and less ambitious character: devoted to physical contemplation and geometry, without any of those mystical pretensions common among the Pythagoreans. His doctrines were set forth in prose, and in the Ionic dialect.² His theory, like all those of his age, was all-comprehensive in its purpose, starting from a supposed beginning, and shewing how heaven, earth, and the inhabitants of earth, had come into those appearances which were exhibited to sense. He agreed with Empedokles in departing from the point of view of Thales and other Ionic theorists, who had supposed one primordial matter, out of which, by various transformations, other sensible things were generated—and into which, when destroyed, they were again resolved. Like Empedokles, and like Parmenides previously, he declared that generation, understood in this sense, was a false and impossible notion: that no existing thing could have been generated, or could be destroyed, or could undergo real transformation into any other thing different from what it was.³ Existing things were what they were, possessing their several inherent properties: there could be no generation except the putting together of these things in various compounds, nor any destruction except the breaking up of such compounds, nor any transformation except the substitution of one compound for another.

But Anaxagoras did not accept the Empedoklean four elements as the sum total of first substances. He reckoned all the different sorts of matter as original and primeval

Homöome-
ries—small

¹ Emp. Fr. v. 34, ed. Karst., p. 68.
παύρον δὲ ζῆτος ἔθλον μέρος ἀλλήσαντες
ἀνθρώποι, πάντως δὲ καὶ ἀφ' ἑτέρων, ἀπεί-
στην
αὐτὰ μόνον ποιήσαντες ὅταν προσέκρυσεν
ἕκαστος,
πάντας ἐκινούμενοι· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἐκεί-
χεται αἰεὶ
αἰώνος· οὐδ' ἐπιτελεστέον τὰς ἀνθρώπων οὐδ'
ἑκαστου
οὐτε νῦν περιληπτὰ.

² Aristotel. Ethic. Eudem. I. 4, 5;
Diogen. Laert. II. 10.

³ Anaxagor. Fr. 22, p. 135, ed. Schan-
bach.—τὸ δὲ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπώλυσθαι
οὐκ ὁρθῶς νομίζουσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες. Οὐ-
δὲν γὰρ χρῆμα γίνεσθαι, οὐδὲ ἀπώ-
λυσθαι, ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἐόντων χρημάτων συμ-
μίσχεται τι καὶ διακρίνεται· καὶ οὕτως
δὲ ὁρθῶς καλοῖεν τὸ τι γίνεσθαι συμ-
μίσχεται καὶ τὸ ἀπώλυσθαι διακρί-
νεται.

existences : he supposed them all to lie ready made, in portions of all sizes, whereof there was no greatest and no least.¹ Particles of the same sort he called Homœomeries : the aggregates of which formed bodies of like parts ; wherein the parts were like each other and like the whole. Flesh, bone, blood, fire,² earth, water, gold, &c., were aggregations of particles mostly similar, in which each particle was not less flesh, bone, and blood, than the whole mass.

But while Anaxagoras held that each of these Homœomeries³ was a special sort of matter with its own properties, and each of them unlike every other : he held farther the peculiar doctrine, that no one of them could have an existence apart from the rest. Everything was mixed with everything : each included in itself all the others : not one of them could be obtained pure and unmixed. This was true of any portion however small. The visible and tangible bodies around us affected our senses, and received their denominations according to that one peculiar matter of which they possessed a decided preponderance and prominence. But each of them included in itself all the other matters, real and inseparable, although latent.⁴

In the beginning (said Anaxagoras) all things (all sorts of

¹ Anaxag. Fr. 5, ed. Schaub, p. 94.

Τὰ ὁμοιομερή are the primordial particles themselves : ὁμοιομερία is the abstract word formed from this concrete — existence in the form or condition of ὁμοιομερή. Each distinct substance has its own ὁμοιομερή, little particles like each other, and each possessing the characteristics of the substance. But the state called ὁμοιομερία pervades all substances (Marbach, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie*, s. 53, note 3).

² Laërtius, l. 830 :

Nunc et Anaxagoras scrutatur Homœomerian,

Quam Grai memorant, nec nostrâ dicere lingua
Concedit nobis patrii sermonis egestas.

Laërtius calls this theory Homœomeria, and it appears to me that this name must have been bestowed upon it by its author. Zeller and several others, after Schleiermacher, conceive the name to date first from Aristotle and his physiological classification. But what other name was so natural

or likely for Anaxagoras himself to choose?

³ Anaxag. Fr. 8 ; Schaub. p. 101 ; compare p. 112. ἴσμεν δὲ οὐδὲν εἶναι ὁμοιον οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ. Ἀλλ' ὅτεν πλείστα ἐστὶ, ταῦτα ἐνθάλύεσθαι ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ ἕν.

⁴ Laërtius, l. 876 :

Id quod Anaxagoras sibi sumit, ut omnibus omnes
Res putet inmixtas rebus latitare, sed illud

Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mista,

Et magis in promptu primâque in front locata.

Aristotel. *Physic.* l. 4, 3. Διὸ φασι τῶν ἐν παντί μεμιχθαι, διότι τῶν ἐκ παντὸς ὁρίων γινόμενον· φαίνεσθαι δὲ διαφέροντα καὶ προσεγορεύεσθαι ἴσμεν ἁλλήλων, ἐκ τοῦ μέγιστα ὑπερέχοντος, διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐν τῷ μίσει τῶν ἀκρίων· εὐλαμνέει μὲν γὰρ ὅλον λευκὸν ἢ μέλαν ἢ σίρκα ἢ δοντινὴ, οὐκ εἰς αὐτὰ· ὅτεν δὲ πλείστον ἑαυτοῦ ὅρα, τοῦτο δοκῶν εἶναι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος. Also Aristotle. *De Caelo*, iii. 2 ; *Gen. et Corr.* l. 1.

First condition of things—all the primordial varieties of matter were huddled together in confusion. Nous, or Reason, distinct from all of them, supervened and acted upon this confused mass, setting the constituent particles in movement.

matter) were together, in one mass or mixture. Infinitely numerous and infinite in diversity of magnitude, they were so packed and confounded together that no one could be distinguished from the rest: no definite figure, or colour, or other property, could manifest itself. Nothing was distinguishable except the infinite mass of Air and Æther (Fire), which surrounded the mixed mass and kept it together.¹ Thus all things continued for an infinite time in a state of rest and nullity. The fundamental contraries—wet, dry, hot, cold, light, dark, dense, rare,—in their intimate contact neutralised each other.² Upon this inert mass supervened the agency of Nous or Mind. The characteristic virtue of mind was, that it alone was completely distinct, peculiar, pure in itself, unmixed with anything else: thus marked out from all other things which were indissolubly mingled with each other. Having no communion of nature with other things, it was noway acted upon by them, but was its own master or autocratic, and was of very great force. It was moreover the thinnest and purest of all things; possessing complete knowledge respecting all other things. It was like to itself throughout—the greater manifestations of mind similar to the less.³

But though other things could not act upon mind, mind could act upon them. It first originated movement in the

¹ Anaxag. Frag. 1; Schaub. p. 65; 'Ομοῦ πάντα χρεμάτα ἦν, ἄπειρα καὶ πλεῖστα καὶ συμπερικείμενα. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ συμπερικείμενον ἄπειρον ἦν. Καὶ πάντων ὁμοῦ ὁόντων οὐδὲν ὑψηλόν ἦν ὑπὸ συμπερικείμενον. Πάντα γὰρ εἶρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ παντίζεν, ἀμείκτα ἀπειρα ἴσταν. Ταῦτα γὰρ μέγιστα ἴστανται ἐν τοῖς συντάσσιν καὶ πλεῖστοι καὶ πρῶτον.

The first three words—ὁμοῦ πάντα χρεμάτα—were the commencement of the Anaxagorean treatise, and were more recollected and cited than any other words in it. See Fragm. 16, 17, Schaubach, and p. 66-68. Aristotle calls this primeval chaos τὸ πρῶτον.

² Anax. Frag. 6, Schaub. p. 97; Aristotel. Physic. I. 4, p. 187, a, with the commentary of Simplicius ap. Scholia, p. 236; Brandis also, III. 203,

a. 25; and De Caelo, III. 301. a. 12, εἰς αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔρχεται (Anaxagoras) κοσμοποιεῖν.

³ Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Schaub. Τὰ μὲν ἅλλα πάντες μοῖραν ἔχει, τοὺς δὲ ἔστιν ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὴς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρεμάτι, ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἔστιν. Εἰ μὴ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἦν, ἀλλὰ τεφ' ἐμείκτο ἄλλῳ, μετείχεν ἂν ἀπάντων χρεμάτων, εἰ ἐμείκτο τεφ' . . . Καὶ ἀνεκώλυνεν αὐτὸν τὰ συμμεμειγμένα, ὥστε μηδεὶς χρεμάτος ἀρτεῖν ὁμοίως, ὡς καὶ μόνον εἶντα ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ. 'Εστὶ γὰρ λεπτότατον τε πάντων χρεμάτων καὶ καθαρώτατον, καὶ γνῶμην γε περὶ πάντων ἔσχει, καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον.

Compare Plato, Cratylus, c. 65, p. 413, c. τοὺν αὐτοκράτορα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμειγμένον (ὃ λέγει Ἀναξαγόρας).

quiescent mass. The movement impressed was that of rotation, which first began on a small scale, then gradually extended itself around, becoming more efficacious as it extended, and still continuing to extend itself around more and more. Through the prodigious velocity of this rotation, a separation was effected of those things which had been hitherto undistinguishably huddled together.¹ Dense was detached from rare, cold from hot, dark from light, dry from wet.² The Homœomeric particles congregated together, each to its like; so that bodies were formed—definite and distinguishable aggregates, possessing such a preponderance of some one ingredient as to bring it into clear manifestation.³ But while the decomposition of the multifarious mass was thus carried far enough to produce distinct bodies, each of them specialised, knowable, and regular—still the separation can never be complete, nor can any one thing be “cut away as with a hatchet” from the rest. Each thing, great or small, must always contain in itself a proportion or trace, latent if not manifest, of everything else.⁴ Nothing except mind can be thoroughly pure and unmixed.

Nevertheless other things approximate in different degrees to purity, according as they possess a more or less decided preponderance of some few ingredients over the remaining multitude. Thus flesh, bone, and other similar portions of the animal organism, were (according to Anaxagoras) more nearly pure (with one constituent more thoroughly preponderant and all other coexistent natures more thoroughly subordinate and

Movement of rotation in the mass originated by Nous on a small scale, but gradually extending itself. Like particles congregate together—distinguishable aggregates are formed.

Nothing (except Nous) can be entirely pure or unmixed, but other things may be comparatively pure.

¹ Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 100, Sch. Καὶ γὰρ περιχωρήσεις τῆς συμπόσεως τοὺς ἀερίστους, ὥστε περιχωρήσονται τὴν ἀρχήν. Καὶ πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ σμικροῦ πλεονος περιχωρήσονται, ὥστε γὰρ πλεονος περιχωρήσει, καὶ περιχωρήσονται ἐπὶ πλέον. Καὶ τὰ συμμιγμένα τὰ καὶ ἀποκρινόμενα καὶ διακρινόμενα, πάντα ἔγνω τοῦς. Also Fr. 14, p. 129; Fr. 21, p. 134, Schan.

² Anaxag. Fr. 8-19, Schanbach.

³ Anaxag. Fr. 8, p. 101, Schanb. ἕτερον πλείοντα ἐστὶ, ταῦτα ἐνθάδε τὰ ἐν ἱεστέον ἐστὶ καὶ ψ. Pseudo-Origen.

Philosophumena. 8. κινήσεως δὲ μετέχον τὰ πάντα ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῦ κινουμένου, συνέλθον τε τὰ ἁπλοῦς, &c. Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. i. p. 138, a. 13 (p. 237, Schol. Brandis).

⁴ Aristotel. Physic. iii. 4, 5, p. 203, a. 23, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτι μόνον εἶναι μίγμα ἁπλοῦς τῶ πάντι, &c. Anaxag. Fr. 16, p. 123, Schanb.

Anaxag. Fr. 11, p. 119, Schanb. οὐκ ἐκρίσθη τὰ ἐν ἐπὶ λόγῳ, οὐδὲ ἀποκρίσθηται πάλαι, &c. Frag. 12, p. 123. ἐν παντί πάντα, οὐδὲ χωρὶς ἕτερον εἶναι.—Fr. 15, p. 125.

Flesh, Bone, &c., are purer than Air or Earth. latent) than the four Empedoklean elements, Air, Fire, Earth, &c.; which were compounds wherein many of the numerous ingredients present were equally effective, so that the manifestations were more confused and complicated. In this way the four Empedoklean elements formed a vast seed-magazine, out of which many distinct developments might take place, of ingredients all pre-existing within it. Air and Fire appeared to generate many new products, while flesh and bone did not.¹ Amidst all these changes, however, the infinite total mass remained the same, neither increased nor diminished.²

In comparing the theory of Anaxagoras with that of Empedokles, we perceive that both of them denied not only the generation of new matter out of nothing (in

¹ Aristotle, in two places (De Caelo, iii. 3, p. 302, a. 28, and Gen. et Corr. i. 1, p. 814, a. 18) appears to state that Anaxagoras regarded flesh and bone as simple and elementary: air, fire, and earth, as compounds from these and other Homœomeries. So Zeller, Philos. d. Griech., v. i. p. 670, ed. 2), with Ritter, and others, understand him. Schaubach (Anax. Fr. p. 81, 82) dissents from this opinion, but does not give a clear explanation. Another passage of Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 3, p. 984, a. 11) appears to contradict the above two passages, and to put fire and water, in the Anaxagorean theory, in the same general category as flesh and bone: the explanatory note of Bonitz, who tries to show that the passage in the *Metaphysica* is in harmony with the other two above named passages, seems to me not satisfactory.

Lucrotius (l. 835, referred to in a previous note) numbers flesh, bone, fire, and water, all among the Anaxagorean Homœomeries; and I cannot but think that Aristotle, in contrasting Anaxagoras with Empedokles, has ascribed to the former language which could only have been used by the latter. 'Ἐναντίως δὲ φαίνονται λέγοντες οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τοῖς περὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ (Emp.) φησὶ σῶν καὶ ὕδαρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν στοιχεῖα τίσσασθαι καὶ ἀπλὰ εἶναι, πολλὸν δὲ σάρκα καὶ ὀστέον καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν. Οἱ δὲ (Anaxag.) τὰτα μὲν ἀπλὰ καὶ στοιχεῖα, γῆν δὲ καὶ σῶν καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετον· παντομερίαν γὰρ εἶναι τούτων. (Gen. et Corr. i. 1.) The last

words (*παντομερίαν*) are fully illustrated by a portion of the other passage, De Caelo, iii. 3, ἀέρα δὲ καὶ πῦρ μίγναι τούτων (the Homœomeries, such as flesh and blood) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συνεμάτων πάντων· εἶναι γὰρ ἑκάστην αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀοράτων ὁμοιομερῶν πάντων ἡρμοσμένον· διὸ καὶ γίνεσθαι πάντα ἐκ τούτων.

Now it can hardly be said that Anaxagoras recognised one set of bodies as simple and elementary, and that Empedokles recognised another set of bodies as such. Anaxagoras expressly denied *all simple bodies*. In his theory, all bodies were compound: *Nous* alone formed an exception. Everything existed in everything. But they were compounds in which particles of one sort, or of a definite number of sorts, had come together into such positive and marked action, as practically to nullify the remainder. The generation of the Homœomeric aggregate was by disengaging these like particles from the confused mixture in which their agency had before lain buried (*γένεσις, ἐφάνησις μόνον καὶ ἑκκρίσις τοῦ πρὶν κρυπτομένου*. Simplicius ap. Schaub. Anax. Fr. p. 115). The Homœomeric aggregates or bodies were infinite in number: for ingredients might be disengaged and recombined in countless ways, so that the result should always be some positive and definite manifestations. Considered in reference to the Homœomeric body, the constituent particles might in a certain sense be called elements.

² Anaxag. Fr. 14, p. 125, Schaub.

which denial all the ancient physical philosophers concurred), but also the transformation of one form of matter into others, which had been affirmed by Thales and others. Both of them laid down as a basis the existence of matter in a variety of primordial forms. They maintained that what others called generation or transformation, was only a combination or separation of these pre-existing materials, in great diversity of ratios. Of such primordial forms of matter Empedokles recognised only four, the so-called Elements; each simple and radically distinct from the others, and capable of existing apart from them, though capable also of being combined with them. Anaxagoras recognised primordial forms of matter in indefinite number, with an infinite or indefinite stock of particles of each; but no one form of matter (except *Nous*) capable of being entirely severed from the remainder. In the constitution of every individual body in nature, particles of all the different forms were combined; but some one or a few forms were preponderant and manifest, all the others overlaid and latent. Herein consisted the difference between one body and another. The Homœomeric body was one in which a confluence of like particles had taken place so numerous and powerful, as to submerge all the coexistent particles of other sorts. The majority thus passed for the whole, the various minorities not being allowed to manifest themselves, yet not for that reason ceasing to exist: a type of human society as usually constituted, wherein some one vein of sentiment, ethical, æsthetical, religious, political, &c., acquires such omnipotence as to impose silence on dissentients, who are supposed not to exist because they cannot proclaim themselves without ruin.

The hypothesis of multifarious forms of matter, latent yet still real and recoverable, appears to have been suggested to Anaxagoras mainly by the phenomena of animal nutrition.¹ The bread and meat on which we feed nourishes all the different parts of our body—blood, flesh, bones, ligaments, veins, trachea, hair, &c. The nutriment must contain in itself different matters homogeneous with all these tissues and organs; though we cannot see such matters, our

*Suggested
partly by the
phenomena
of animal
nutrition.*

¹ See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, *Placit. Philosoph.* i. 2.

reason tells us that they must be there. This physiological divination is interesting from its general approximation towards the results of modern analysis.

Both Empedokles and Anaxagoras begin their constructive process from a state of stagnation and confusion tantamount to Chaos; which is not so much active discord (as Ovid paints it), as rest and nullity arising from the equilibrium of opposite forces. The chaos of Anaxagoras is in fact almost a reproduction of the Infinite of Anaximander.¹ But Anaxagoras as well as Empedokles enlarged his hypothesis by introducing (what had not occurred or did not seem necessary to Anaximander) a special and separate agency for eliciting positive movement and development out of the negative and stationary Chaos. The Nous or Mind is the Agency selected for this purpose by Anaxagoras: Love and Enmity by Empedokles. Both the one and the other initiate the rotatory cosmical motion; upon which follows as well the partial disaggregation of the chaotic mass, as the congregation of like particles of it towards each other.

The Nous of Anaxagoras was understood by later writers as a God;² but there is nothing in the fragments now remaining to justify the belief that the author himself conceived it in that manner—or that he proposed it (according to Aristotle's expression³) as the cause of all that was good in the world, assigning other agencies as the causes of all evil. It is not characterised by him as a person—not so much as the Love and Enmity of Empedokles. It is not one but multitudinous, and all its separate manifestations are alike, differing only as greater or less. It is in fact identical with the soul, the vital principle, or vitality, belonging not only to all men and animals, but to all plants also.⁴ It is one substance, or form of

¹ This is a just comparison of Theophrastus. See the passage from his *φυσικὴ ἱστορία*, referred to by Simplicius ad Aristot. *Physic.* i. p. 187, a. 11 (p. 336, Schol. Brand.).

² Cicero, *Academ.* iv. 37; Sext. *Empiric.* adv. *Mathematicos*, ix. 6, τὸν μὲν νοῦν, ὅς ἐστι καὶ αἰσὶν θεός, &c.

Compare Schanbach, *Anax. Frag.* p. 163.

³ Aristot. *Metaphys.* A. p. 984, b. 17. He praises Anaxagoras for this, *ὡς ὁρθῶς καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀθύρματα τοῦ νοῦν ὑπέθετο, &c.*

⁴ Aristoteles (or Pseudo-Aristot.) *De Plantis*, i. 1.

matter among the rest, but thinner than all of them (thinner than even fire or air), and distinguished by the peculiar characteristic of being absolutely unmixed. It has moving power and knowledge, like the air of Diogenes the Apolloniate: it initiates movement; and it knows about all the things which either pass into or pass out of combination. It disposes or puts in order all things that were, are, or will be; but it effects this only by acting as a fermenting principle, to break up the huddled mass, and to initiate rotatory motion, at first only on a small scale, then gradually increasing. Rotation having once begun, and the mass having been as it were unpacked and liberated the component Homœomeries are represented as coming together by their own inherent attraction.¹ The Anaxagorean Nous introduces order and symmetry into Nature, simply by stirring up rotatory motion in the inert mass, so as to release the Homœomeries from prison. It originates and maintains the great cosmical fact of rotatory motion; which variety of motion, from its perfect regularity and sameness, is declared by Plato also to be the one most consonant to Reason and Intelligence.² Such rotation being once set on foot, the other phenomena of the universe are supposed to be determined by its influence, and by their own tendencies and properties besides: but there is no farther agency of Nous, which only *knows* these phenomena as and when they occur. Anaxagoras tried to explain them as well as he could; not by reference to final causes, nor by assuming good purposes of Nous which each combination was intended to answer—but by physical analogies, well or ill chosen, and especially by the working of the grand cosmical rotation.³

Aristot. De Animâ, i. 2, 65-6-13.

Aristotle says that the language of Anaxagoras about νοῦς and ψυχὴ was not perfectly clear or consistent. But it seems also from Plato De Legg. xii. p. 967, B, that Anaxagoras made no distinction between νοῦς and ψυχὴ. Compare Plato, Kratylus, p. 400 A.

¹ Anaxag. Fr. 8, and Schanbach's Comm. p. 112-116.

"Mens erat id, quod movebat mo-
lem homœomeriarum: hæc ratione,
per hunc motum à mente excitatum,
secretio facta est. . . . Materiarum
proprie insunt vires: proprio suo
pondere hæc, quæ mentis vi mota et

secreta sunt, feruntur in eum locum,
quo punc sunt."

Compare Alexand. Aphrod. ap. Scho-
lia ad Aristot. Physic. II. p. 194, a.
(Schol. p. 348 a. Brandis): Martbach,
Lehrbuch der Gesch. Philos. a. 64, note
2, p. 82; Preller, Hist. Phil. ex Font.
Loc. Contexta, a. 63, with his comment.

² Plato, Phædo, c. 107, 108, p. 98;
Plato, De Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Aristot.
Metaphys. A. 4, p. 986, b. 18; Plato,
Timæus, 34 A. 83 E.

³ Aristoph. Nub. 830, 828. αἰθέριος
ἀέρας—ἀέρας βασιλεύει, τὸς δὲ ἰσχυ-
ρὰ λαλεῖς—the sting of which applies
to Anaxagoras and his doctrines.

This we learn from Plato and Aristotle, who blame Anaxagoras for inconsistency in deserting his own hypothesis, and in invoking explanations from physical agencies, to the neglect of *Nous* and its supposed optimising purposes. But Anaxagoras, as far as we can judge by his remaining fragments, seems not to have committed any such inconsistency. He did not proclaim

Plato and Aristotle blame Anaxagoras for deserting his own theory.

h's *Nous* to be a powerful extra-cosmical Architect, like the Demiurgus of Plato—nor an intra-cosmical, immanent, undeliberating instinct (such as Aristotle calls Nature), tending towards the production and renewal of regular forms and conjunctions, yet operating along with other agencies which produced concomitants irregular, unpredictable, often even obstructive and monstrous. Anaxagoras appears to conceive his *Nous* as one among numerous other real agents in Nature, material like the rest, yet differing from the rest as being powerful, simple, and pure from all mixture,¹ as being endued with universal cognizance, as being the earliest to act in point of time, and as furnishing the primary condition to the activity of the rest by setting on foot the cosmical rotation. The Homœomerics are coeternal with, if not anterior to, *Nous*. They have laws and properties of their own, which they follow, when once liberated, without waiting for the dictation of *Nous*. What they do is known by, but not ordered by, *Nous*.² It is therefore no inconsistency in Anaxagoras that he assigns to mind one distinct and peculiar agency, but nothing more; and that when trying to

Anaxagoras δίδουσι τινὰς ἀνοήτους ἀνε-
γγραφῶν, οὐκ ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ ἀρραγίς καὶ
ἀνοή (Clemens. Alexandrin. Stromat.
ii. p. 265).

To move (in the active sense, i.e. to cause movement in) and to know, are the two attributes of the Anaxagorean *Nous* (Aristotol. De Anima, i. 2, p. 405, a. 18).

¹ Anaxagoras, Fr. & p. 100, Schanb.

ἰστέι γὰρ λεπτότατον τε πάντων χρημά-
των, &c.

This means, not that *νοῦς* was unextended or immaterial, but that it was thinner or more subtle than either fire or air. Herakleitos regarded τὸ πᾶν ἄχρο ἄς λογικὸν καὶ φρονήσαν. Diogenes of Apollonia considered air as

endued with cognition, and as imparting cognition by being inhaled. Compare Pintarch, De Placit. Philos. iv. 3.

I cannot think, with Brucker (Hist. Philosop. part ii. b. ii. De Sectâ Ionicâ, p. 504, ed. 2nd), and with Tennemann, Ges. Ph. i. 8, p. 312, that Anaxagoras was "primus qui Dei ideam inter Græcos à materialitate quasi purificavit," &c. I agree rather with Zeller (Philos. der Griech. i. p. 680-683, ed. 2nd), that the Anaxagorean *Nous* is not conceived as having either immateriality or personality.

² Simplicius, in Physic. Aristot. p. 73. καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὸν νοῦν ἴσασαι, ὥς φησιν Εὐδόμος, καὶ αὐτοματίῃν τὰ πολλὰ συνίστησιν.

explain the variety of phenomena he makes reference to other physical agencies, as the case seems to require.¹

In describing the formation of the Kosmos, Anaxagoras supposed that, as a consequence of the rotation initiated by mind, the primitive chaos broke up.

Astronomy
and physics
of Anaxa-
goras.

"The Dense, Wet, Cold, Dark, Heavy, came together into the place where now Earth is: Hot, Dry, Rare, Light, Bright, departed to the exterior region of the revolving *Æther*."² In such separation each followed its spontaneous and inherent tendency. Water was disengaged from air and clouds, earth from water: earth was still farther consolidated into stones by cold.³ Earth remained stationary in the centre, while fire and air were borne round it by the force and violence of the rotatory movement. The celestial bodies—Sun, Moon, and Stars—were solid bodies analogous to the earth, either caught originally in the whirl of the rotatory movement, or torn from the substance of the earth and carried away into the outer region of rotation.⁴ They were rendered hot and luminous by the fiery fluid in the rapid whirl of which they were hurried along. The Sun was a stone thus made red-hot, larger than Peloponnesus: the Moon was of earthy matter, nearer to the Earth, deriving its light from the Sun, and including not merely plains and mountains, but also cities and inhabitants.⁵ Of the planetary movements, apart from the diurnal rotation of the celestial sphere, Anaxagoras took no notice.⁶ He explained the periodical changes in the apparent course of the sun and moon by resistances which they encountered, the former from accumulated and condensed air, the latter from the cold.⁷ Like Anaximenes and Demokritus, Anaxagoras conceived the Earth as flat, round in the surface, and not deep, resting on and supported by the air beneath it. Originally (he thought) the earth was horizontal, with the axis of celestial rotation perpendicular, and the north pole at the zenith, so that

¹ Diogen. Laert. ii. 8. Νόον . . . ἀρχὴν αἰσθητός.

Brucker, Hist. Philos. ut supra. "Scilicet, aemul inducto in materiam à mente motu, sufficere putavit Anaxagoras, juxta leges naturæ motusque, rerum ortum describere."

² Anaxag. Fr. 19, p. 131, Schaub.; compare Fr. 6, p. 97; Diogen. Laert. ii. 8.

³ Anaxag. Fr. 20, p. 133, Schaub.

⁴ See the curious passage in Plutarch, Lysander 12, and Plato, Legg. xii. p. 967 B; Diogen. Laert. ii. 12; Plutarch, Placit. Philos. ii. 12.

⁵ Plato, Kratylos, p. 408 A; Plato, Apol. Sok. c. 14; Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7.

⁶ Schaumbach, ad Anax. Fr. p. 165.

⁷ Plutarch, Placit. Philosoph. ii. 22.

this rotation was then lateral, like that of a dome or roof; it was moreover equable and unchanging with reference to every part of the plane of the earth's upper surface, and distributed light and heat equally to every part. But after a certain time the Earth tilted over of its own accord to the south, thus lowering its southern half, raising the northern half, and causing the celestial rotation to appear oblique.¹

Besides these doctrines respecting the great cosmical bodies, Hisgeology, Anaxagoras gave explanations of many among the meteorology, striking phenomena in geology and meteorology—the physiology. sea, rivers, earthquakes, hurricanes, hail, snow, &c.² He treated also of animals and plants—their primary origin, and the manner of their propagation.³ He thought that animals were originally produced by the hot and moist earth; but that being once produced, the breeds were continued by propagation. The seeds of plants he supposed to have been originally contained in the air, from whence they fell down to the warm and moist earth, where they took root and sprung up.⁴ He believed that all plants, as well as all animals, had a certain measure of intelligence and sentiment, differing not in kind but only in degree from the intelligence and sentiment of men; whose superiority of intelligence was determined, to a great extent, by their possession of hands.⁵ He explained sensation by the action of unlike upon unlike (contrary to Empedokles, who referred it to the action of like upon like),⁶ applying this doctrine to the explanation of the five senses separately. But he pronounced the

¹ Diogenes Laert. ii. 9. τὰ δ' ἄντα κατ' ἀρχὰς θολοτάτα; ἐπεὶ γὰρ, ὅντι κατὰ ἀναγκὴν τῆς γῆς τὸν ἀπὸ φαινομένου αἵματος πόλεον, ὅτερον δὲ τῆς (γῆς) ἐκκλίνει λαβεῖν. Plutarch, Placit. Phil. ii. 8.

² See Schoenbach; ad Anax. Fr. p. 174-181.

Among the points to which Anaxagoras addressed himself was the annual inundation of the Nile, which he ascribed to the melting of the snows in Æthiopia, in the higher regions of the river's course.—Diodor. i. 28. Herodotus notices this opinion (ii. 23), calling it plausible, but false, yet without naming any one as its author. Compare Euripides, Helen. 2.

³ Aristotel. De Generat. Animal. iii. 6, iv. 1.

⁴ Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. iii. 2; Diogen. Laert. ii. 9; Aristot. De Plantis, i. 2.

⁵ Aristot. De Plantis, i. 1; Aristot. Part. Animal. iv. 10.

⁶ Theophrastus, De Sensu, sect. 1—sect. 27-30.

This difference followed naturally from the opinions of the two philosophers on the nature of the soul or mind. Anaxagoras supposed it peculiar in itself, and dissimilar to the Homœomeries without. Empedokles conceived it as a compound of the four elements, analogous to all that was without: hence man knew each exterior element by its like within himself—earth by earth, water by water, &c.

senses to be sadly obscure and insufficient as means of knowledge. Apparently, however, he did not discard their testimony, nor assume any other means of knowledge independent of it, but supposed a concomitant and controlling effect of intelligence as indispensable to compare and judge between the facts of sense when they appeared contradictory.¹ On this point, however, it is difficult to make out his opinions.

Anaxagoras, residing at Athens and intimately connected with Perikles, incurred not only unpopularity, but even legal prosecution, by the tenor of his philosophical opinions, especially those on astronomy. To Greeks who believed in Helios and Selênê as not merely living beings but Deities, his declaration that the Sun was a luminous and fiery stone, and the Moon an earthy mass, appeared alike absurd and impious. Such was the judgment of Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon, as well as of Aristophanes and the general Athenian public.² Anaxagoras was threatened with indictment for blasphemy, so that Perikles was compelled to send him away from Athens.

That physical enquiries into the nature of things, and attempts

¹ Anaxag. Fr. 19, Schanh.; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathem. vii. 91-140; Cicero, Academ. i. 12.

Anaxagoras remarked that the contrast between black and white might be made imperceptible to sense by a succession of numerous intermediate colours very finely graduated. He is said to have affirmed that snow was really black, notwithstanding that it appeared white to our senses: since water was black, and snow was only frozen water (Cicero, Academ. iv. 81; Sext. Empir. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 33). "Anaxagoras non modo id ita esse (sc. albam nivem esse) negabat, sed sibi, quia sciret aquam nigram esse, unde illa concreta esset, albam ipsam esse se videri quidem." Whether Anaxagoras ever affirmed that snow did not appear to him white, may reasonably be doubted: his real affirmation probably was, that snow, though it appeared white, was not really white. And this affirmation depended upon the line which he drew between the fact of sense, the phenomenal, the relative, on one side—and the substratum, the real, the absolute, on the other. Most philosophers recognise a distinc-

tion between the two; but the line between the two has been drawn in very different directions. Anaxagoras assumed as his substratum, real, or absolute, the Homœomeries—numerous primordial varieties of matter, each with its inherent qualities. Among these varieties he reckoned water, but he did not reckon snow. He also considered that water was really and absolutely black or dark (the Homeric μέλας ὕδωρ)—that blackness was among its primary qualities. Water, when consolidated into snow, was so disguised as to produce upon the spectator the appearance of whiteness; but it did not really lose, nor could it lose, its inherent colour. A negro covered with white paint, and therefore looking white, is still really black: a wheel painted with the seven prismatic colours, and made to revolve rapidly, will look white, but it is still really septi-coloured: i.e. the state of rapid revolution would be considered as an exceptional state, not natural to it. Compare Plato, *Lysis*, c. 32, p. 217 D.

² Plato, *Apol. So.* c. 14; Xenophon, *Memor.* iv. 7.

The doctrines of Anaxagoras were regarded as offensive and impious.

to substitute scientific theories in place of the personal agency of the Gods, were repugnant to the religious feelings of the Greeks, has been already remarked.¹ Yet most of the other contemporary philosophers must have been open to this reproach, not less than Anaxagoras; and we learn that the Apolloniate Diogenes left Athens from the same cause. If others escaped the like prosecution which fell upon Anaxagoras, we may probably ascribe this fact to the state of political party at Athens, and to the intimacy of the latter with Perikles. The numerous political enemies of that great man might fairly hope to discredit him in the public mind—at the very least to vex and embarrass him—by procuring the trial and condemnation of Anaxagoras. Against other philosophers, even when propounding doctrines not less obnoxious respecting the celestial bodies, there was not the same collateral motive to stimulate the aggressive hostility of individuals.

Contemporary with Anaxagoras—yet somewhat younger, as far as we can judge, upon doubtful evidence—lived the philosopher Diogenes, a native of Apollonia in Krete. Of his life we know nothing except that he taught during some time at Athens, which city he was forced to quit on the same ground as Anaxagoras. Accusations of impiety were either brought or threatened against him:² physical philosophy being offensive generally to the received religious sentiment, which was specially awakened and appealed to by the political opponents of Perikles.

Diogenes the Apolloniate, the latest in the series of Ionic philosophers or physiologists, adopted, with modifications and enlargements, the fundamental tenet of Anaximenes. There

¹ Plutarch, Nikias, 23.

² Diogen. Laert. ix. 52. The danger incurred by Diogenes the Apolloniate at Athens is well authenticated, on the evidence of Demetrius the Phalerean, who had good means of knowing. And the fact may probably be referred to some time after the year B.C. 440, when Athens was at the height of her power and of her attraction for foreign visitors—when the visits of philosophers to the city had been multiplied by the countenance of Perikles—and when the political rivals of that great man had set the fashion of assailing them in

order to injure him. This seems to me one probable reason for determining the chronology of the Apolloniate Diogenes: another is, that his description of the veins in the human body is so minute and detailed as to betoken an advanced period of philosophy between B.C. 440-410. See the point discussed in Panzerbieter, Fragment. Diogen. Apoll. c. 12-18 (Leipzig, 1830).

Simplikios (ad Aristot. Phys. fol. 6 A) describes Diogenes as having been *εὐρύς φρένας* in the series of physical theorists.

was but one primordial element—and that element was air. He laid it down as indisputable that all the different objects in this Kosmos must be at the bottom one and the same thing: unless this were the fact, they would not act upon each other, nor mix together, nor do good and harm to each other, as we see that they do. Plants would not grow out of the earth, nor would animals live and grow by nutrition, unless there existed as a basis this universal sameness of nature. No one thing therefore has a peculiar nature of its own: there is in all the same nature, but very changeable and diversified.¹

Now the fundamental substance, common to all, was air. Air was infinite, eternal, powerful; it was, besides, full of Air was the intelligence and knowledge. This latter property primordial, universal element. Diogenes proved by the succession of climatic and atmospheric phenomena of winter and summer, night and day, rain, wind, and fine weather. All these successions were disposed in the best possible manner by the air: which could not have laid out things in such regular order and measure, unless it had been endowed with intelligence. Moreover, air was the source of life, soul, and intelligence, to men and animals: who inhaled all these by respiration, and lost all of them as soon as they ceased to respire.²

Air, life-giving and intelligent, existed everywhere, formed the essence of everything, comprehended and governed everything. Nothing in nature could be without it: yet at the same time all things in nature partook of it

Air possessed numerous and diverse pro-

¹ Diogen. Ap. Fragm. ii. c. 29 Panzerb.; Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 39.

εἰ γὰρ τὰ ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ὄντα νῦν γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰλλα, ὅσα φαίνεται ἐν τῷδε τῷ κόσμῳ ὄντα, εἰ τούτων τι ἦν τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ὂν τῇ ἰδίῃ φύσει, καὶ μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ὂν μετέπαιτε πολλαχῶς καὶ ἡτεροῖο. οὐδ' αὖτε οὔτε μίσγεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἠδύνατο οὔτε ἀφάλλεσθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ οὔτε βλάβη, &c.

Aristotle approves this fundamental tenet of Diogenes, the conclusion that there must be one common Something out of which all things came—*ἐξ ἧδος ἅπαντα* (Gen. et Corrupt. i. 6-7, p. 322, s. 14), inferred from the fact that they acted upon each other.

² Diog. Apoll. Fr. iv.-vi. c. 36-42, Panz.

—Οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω διδασθαι ὁλόν τε ἦν ἀνὺ νοήσιος, ὥστε πάντων μέτρα εἶναι, χειμῶνός τε καὶ θέρος καὶ νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρης καὶ ὑετῶν καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ εὐδίων. καὶ τὰ ἄλλα εἰ τις βούλεται ἐννοεῖσθαι, εὐρίσκοι ἂν οὕτω διακείμενα, ὥς ἀνυστὸν κάλλιστα. Ἐτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις καὶ τὰδε μεγάλα σημεῖα: ἀνθρώπος γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα ἀναπνεύοντα ζῶει τῷ ἀέρι. Καὶ τούτω αὐτοῖς καὶ ψυχῇ ἴσται καὶ νόησις—

—Καὶ μοι δοκεῖ τὸ τὴν νόησιν ἔχειν εἶναι ὃ ἀήρ καλεόμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Schleiermacher has an instructive commentary upon these fragments of the Apollonian Diogenes (Vermischte Schriften, vol. ii. p. 157-162; Ueber Diogenes von Apollonia).

porties : in a different manner.¹ For it was distinguished by
 was emi- great diversity of properties and by many gradations
 nently modi- of intelligence. It was hotter or colder—moister or
 fiable. drier—denser or rarer—more or less active and movable—ex-
 hibiting differences of colour and taste. All these diversities
 were found in objects, though all at the bottom were air.
 Reason and intelligence resided in the warm air. So also to all
 animals as well as to men, the common source of vitality,
 whereby they lived, saw, heard, and understood, was air; hotter
 than the atmosphere generally, though much colder than that
 near the sun.² Nevertheless, in spite of this common charac-
 teristic, the air was in other respects so indefinitely modifiable,
 that animals were of all degrees of diversity, in form, habits, and
 intelligence. Men were doubtless more alike among themselves :
 yet no two of them could be found exactly alike, furnished with
 the same dose of aerial heat or vitality. All other things, ani-
 mate and inanimate, were generated and perished, beginning
 from air and ending in air: which alone continued immortal and
 indestructible.³

The intelligence of men and animals, very unequal in
 character and degree, was imbibed by respiration, the
 Physiology of Diogenes inspired air passing by means of the veins and along
 —his de- with the blood into all parts of the body. Of the
 scription of the veins veins Diogenes gave a description remarkable for its
 in the minuteness of detail, in an age when philosophers
 human body. dwelt almost exclusively in loose general analogies.⁴
 He conceived the principal seat of intelligence in man to be in
 the thoracic cavity, or in the ventricle of the heart, where a
 quantity of air was accumulated ready for distribution.⁵ The

¹ Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ ἴσιν μὲν
 ἐν δ, τι μὴ μετέχει τούτου (air). Μετέ-
 χει δὲ οὐδὲ ἐν ὁμοίᾳ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ
 ἑτέρῳ· ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ τρόποι καὶ αὐτοῦ
 τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ τῆς νοήσεως εἰσιν.

Aristotel. De Anima, i. 2, p. 406, a. 21.
 Διηγόντες δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτεροί τινες,
 ἀέρα [ἐνέλαβεν τὴν ψυχὴν], &c.

² Diog. Ap. Fr. vi. καὶ πάντων ζώων
 ἢ ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστίν, ἀπὸ θερμό-
 τερος μὲν τοῦ ἔξω ἐν ᾧ ἐσμέν, τοῦ
 μέρους παρὰ τῷ ἡλίῳ πολλὸν ψυχρό-
 τερος.

³ Diogen. Apoll. Fr. v. ch. 38, Panz.

⁴ Diogen. Apoll. Fr. vii. ch. 48, Panz.

The description of the veins given by
 Diogenes is preserved in Aristotel.
 Hist. Animal. iii. 2: yet seemingly
 only in a defective abstract, for Theo-
 phrastus alludes to various opinions of
 Diogenes on the veins, which are not
 contained in Aristotle. See Philippi-
 son, 'Υλη ἀνθρώπου, p. 203.

⁵ Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 5. 'Ἐν
 τῇ ἀσπληνικῇ κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας, ἥτις
 ἐστὶ καὶ πνευματικὴ. See Panzerbieter's
 commentary upon these words, which
 are not very clear (c. 50), nor easy to
 reconcile with the description given by
 Diogenes himself of the veins.

warm and dry air concentrated round the brain, and reached by veins from the organs of sense, was the centre of sensation. Taste was explained by the soft and porous nature of the tongue, and by the number of veins communicating with it. The juices of sapid bodies were sucked up by it as by a sponge: the odorous stream of air penetrated from without through the nostrils: both were thus brought into conjunction with the sympathising cerebral air. To this air also the image impressed upon the eye was transmitted, thereby causing vision: ¹ while pulsations and vibrations of the air without, entering through the ears and impinging upon the same centre, generated the sensation of sound. If the veins connecting the eye with the brain were inflamed, no visual sensation could take place; ² moreover if our minds or attention were absorbed in other things, we were often altogether insensible to sensations either of sight or of sound: which proved that the central air within us was the real seat of sensation. ³ Thought and intelligence, as well as sensation, was an attribute of the same central air within us, depending especially upon its purity, dryness, and heat, and impeded or deadened by moisture or cold. Both children and animals had less intelligence than men: because they had more moisture in their bodies, so that the veins were choked up, and the air could not get along them freely to all parts. Plants had no intelligence; having no apertures or ducts whereby the air could pervade their internal structure. Our sensations were pleasurable when there was much air mingled with the blood, so as to lighten the flow of it, and to carry it easily to

¹ Plutarch, *Placit. Philosoph.* iv. 18. Theophrast. *De Sensu*, s. 39-41-43. Κριτικώτατον δὲ ἦδοντες τὴν γλῶτταν ἀεὶ αὐτὸν γὰρ εἶναι καὶ μὲν καὶ τὰς φλέβας ἀνάσσει ἀνέκειν εἰς αὐτήν.

² Plutarch, *Placit. Philosoph.* iv. 18; Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 40.

³ Theophrast. *De Sensu*, s. 42. Ὅτι δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ἂν μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ, σημεῖον εἶναι, ὅτι πολλὰς πρὸς ἄλλα τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας οὐδ' ὁρῶμεν οὐτ' ἀκούμεν. The same opinion—that sensation, like thought, is a mental process, depending on physical conditions—is ascribed to Strato (the disciple and successor of Theophrastus) by Porphyry, *De Abstinentiâ*, iii. 21. Στράτωνος τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν

ἀποδεικνύναι, ὡς οὐδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι το παρὰ παν ἀνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει. καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλὰκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὀφθαλμῷ καὶ λόγοι προσηκόντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλαθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέρους τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας—ἢ καὶ λήλεκται, νοῦς ὅρη καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά.

The expression ascribed to Diogenes by Theophrastus—ὁ ἄνθρωπος αἰσθάνεται, μικρὸν ἂν μέρος τοῦ θεοῦ—is so printed by Philippson; but the word θεοῦ seems not well avouched as to the text, and Schneider prints θύμου. It is not impossible that Diogenes may have called the air God, without departing from his physical theory: but this requires proof.

all parts : they were painful when there was little air, and when the blood was torpid and thick.¹

The structure of the Kosmos Diogenes supposed to have been effected by portions of the infinite air, taking upon them new qualities and undergoing various transformations. Some air, becoming cold, dense, and heavy, sunk down to the centre, and there remained stationary as earth and water : while the hotter, rarer, and lighter air ascended and formed the heavens, assuming through the intelligence included in it a rapid rotatory movement round the earth, and shaping itself into sun, moon, and stars, which were light and porous bodies like pumice stone. The heat of this celestial matter acted continually upon the earth and water beneath, so that the earth became comparatively drier, and the water was more and more drawn up as vapour, to serve for nourishment to the heavenly bodies. The stars also acted as breathing-holes to the Kosmos, supplying the heated celestial mass with fresh air from the infinite mass without.² Like Anaxagoras, Diogenes conceived the figure of the earth as flat and round, like a drum ; and the rotation of the heavens as lateral, with the axis perpendicular to the surface of the earth, and the north pole always at the zenith. This he supposed to have been the original arrangement ; but after a certain time, the earth tilted over spontaneously towards the south—the northern half was elevated and the southern half depressed—so that the north pole was no longer at the zenith, and the axis of rotation of the

¹ Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 43-46 ; Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* v. 20. That moisture is the cause of dulness, and that the dry soul is the best and most intelligent—is cited among the doctrines of Herakleitos, with whom Diogenes of Apollonia is often in harmony. *Αὐτὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη*. See Schleiermacher. Herakleitos, sect. 63-64.

² Plutarch ap. Eusebium *Præp. Evang.* i. 8 ; Aristotel. *De Anima*, i. 2 ; Diogen. *Lært.* ix. 63. *Διογένης κισσηροειδῆ τὰ ἀστρα, διαπνοίας δὲ αὐτὰ νομίζει τοῦ κόσμου, εἶναι δὲ διάπνυρα· συμπεριφέρεισθαι δὲ τοῖς φανοῖς ἀστροῖς ἀφανῆς λίθους καὶ παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦτ' ἀναγνόμενος· τίπτοντα δὲ πολλάκις ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σβέννυσθαι· καθάπερ τὸν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ*

ποταμοῖς πυρρῶς καταγεχόμενα ἀστέρων κέντρον. This remarkable anticipation of modern astronomy—the recognition of aerolithes as a class of non-luminous earthy bodies revolving round the sun, but occasionally coming within the sphere of the earth's attraction, becoming luminous in our atmosphere, falling on the earth, and there being extinguished—is noticed by Alex. von Humboldt in his *Kosmos*, vol. i. p. 98-104, Eng. trans. He says—"The opinion of Diogenes of Apollonia entirely accords with that of the present day," p. 110. The charm and value of that interesting book is greatly enhanced by his frequent reference to the ancient points of view on astronomical subjects.

heavens became apparently oblique.¹ He thought, moreover, that the existing Kosmos was only of temporary duration; that it would perish and be succeeded by future analogous systems, generated from the same common substance of the infinite and indestructible air.² Respecting animal generation—and to some extent respecting meteorological phenomena³—Diogenes also propounded several opinions, which are imperfectly known, but which appear to have resembled those of Anaxagoras.

Nearly contemporary with Anaxagoras and Empedokles, two other enquirers propounded a new physical theory very different from those already noticed—usually known under the name of the atomic theory. This theory, though originating with the Eleate Leukippus, obtained celebrity chiefly from his pupil Demokritus of Abdêra, its expositor and improver. Demokritus (born seemingly in B.C. 460, and reported to have reached extreme old age) was nine years younger than Sokrates, thirty-three years older than Plato, and forty years younger than Anaxagoras. The age of Leukippus is not known, but he can hardly have been much younger than Anaxagoras.

Of Leukippus we know nothing: of Demokritus, very little—yet enough to exhibit a life, like that of Anaxagoras, consecrated to philosophical investigation, and neglectful not merely of politics, but even of inherited patrimony.⁴ His attention was chiefly turned towards the study of Nature, with conceptions less vague, and a more enlarged observation of facts, than any of his contemporaries had ever bestowed. He was enabled to boast that no one had surpassed him in extent of travelling over foreign lands, in intelligent research and converse with enlightened natives, or in following out the geometrical relations

Leukippus
and Demokritus—
Atomic
theory.

Long life,
varied travels,
and numerous
compositions
of Demokritus.

¹ Plutarch, *Placit. Philos.* ii. 8; Panzerbieter ad *Diog. Ap.* c. 76-78; Schanbach ad *Anaxagor.* Fr. p. 175.

² Plut. *Ap. Euseb.* *Præp. Evang.* i. 8. ³ Preller, *Hist. Philosoph. Græc.-Rom.* ex *Font. Loc. Contexta*, sect. 68.

Preller thinks that Diogenes employed his chief attention "in animantium naturæ ex aeris principio repetendâ"; and that he was less full "in cognitione rerû perceptor". But the fragments scarcely justify this.

⁴ *Diogen. Laert.* ix. 41. See the chronology of Demokritus discussed in Mullach, *Frag. Dem.* p. 12-25; and in Zeller, *Phil. der Griech.*, vol. i. p. 576-581, 2nd edit. The statement of Apollodorus as to the date of his birth, appears more trustworthy than the earlier date assigned by Thrasyllus (B.C. 470). Demokritus declared himself to be forty years younger than Anaxagoras.

⁵ *Dionys.* ix. 38-39.

of lines.¹ He spent several years in visiting Egypt, Asia Minor, and Persia. His writings were numerous, and on many different subjects, including ethics, as well as physics, astronomy, and anthropology. None of them have been preserved. But we read, even from critics like Dionysius of Halikarnassus and Cicero, that they were composed in an impressive and semi-poetical style, not unworthy to be mentioned in analogy with Plato; while in range and diversity of subjects they are hardly inferior to Aristotle.²

The theory of Leukippus and Demokritus (we have no means of distinguishing the two) appears to have grown out of the Eleatic theory.³ Parmenides the Eleate (as I have already stated) in distinguishing Ens, the self-existent, real, or absolute, on one side—from the phenomenal and relative on the other—conceived the former in such a way that its connection with the latter was dissolved. The real and absolute, according to him, was One, extended, enduring, continuous, unchangeable, immovable: the conception of Ens included these affirmations, and at the same time excluded peremptorily Non-Ens, or the contrary of Ens. Now the plural, unextended, transient, discontinuous, changeable, and moving, implied a mixture of Ens and Non-Ens, or a partial transition from one to the other. Hence (since Non-Ens was inadmissible) such plurality, &c., could not belong to the real or absolute (ultra-phenomenal), and could only be affirmed as phenomenal or relative. In the latter sense, Parme-

¹ Demokrit. Fragm. 6, p. 228, ed. Mullach. Compare ib. p. 41; Diogen. Laert. ix. 86; Strabo, xv. p. 703.

Pliny, Hist. Natur. "Democritus—vitam inter experimenta consumpsit," &c.

² Cicero, Orat. c. 20; Dionys. De Comp. Verbor. c. 24; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. vii. 265. *Δημόκριτος, ὃ τῇ αἰδῇ πάσης παρακαλούμενος, &c.*

Diogenes (ix. 45-46) enumerates the titles of the treatises of Demokritus, as edited in the days of Tiberius by the rhetor Thrasyllus: who distributed them into tetralogies, as he also distributed the dialogues of Plato. It was probably the charm of style, common to Demokritus with Plato, which induced the rhetor thus to edit them both. In regard to scope and spirit of

philosophy, the difference between the two was so marked, that Plato is said to have had a positive antipathy to the works of Demokritus, and a desire to burn them (Aristoxenus ap. Diog. Laert. ix. 40). It could hardly be from congeniality of doctrine that the same editor attached himself to both. It has been remarked that Plato never once names Demokritus, while Aristotle cites him very frequently, sometimes with marked praise.

³ Simplicius, in Aristotel. Physic. fol. 7 A. *Ἀρκύτου . . . κοινωφύσως Παρμενίδῃ τῆς φιλοσοφίας, οὐ τὴν αὐτῆς ἰδέαν Παρμενίδῃ καὶ Κεραμέει περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξαν, ἀλλ', ὥς δοκεῖ, τὴν ἐναντίαν.* Aristotel. De Gener. et Corr. i. 8, p. 251, a. 21. Diogen. Laert. ix. 30.

nides *did* affirm it, and even tried to explain it: he explained the phenomenal facts from phenomenal assumptions, apart from and independent of the absolute. While thus breaking down the bridge between the phenomenal on one side and the absolute on the other, he nevertheless recognised each in a sphere of its own.

This bridge the atomists undertook to re-establish. They admitted that Ens could not really change—that there could be no real generation, or destruction—no transformation of qualities—no transition of many into one, or of one into many. But they denied the unity and continuity and immobility of Ens: they affirmed that it was essentially discontinuous, plural, and moving. They distinguished the extended, which Parmenides had treated as an *Unum continuum*, into extension with body, and extension without body: into *plenum* and *vacuum*, matter and space. They conceived themselves to have thus found positive meanings both for Ens and Non-Ens. That which Parmenides called Non-Ens or nothing, was in their judgment the *vacuum*; not less self-existent than that which he called Something. They established their point by showing that Ens, thus interpreted, would become reconcilable to the phenomena of sense: which latter they assumed as their basis to start from. Assuming motion as a phenomenal fact, obvious and incontestable, they asserted that it could not even appear to be a fact, without supposing *vacuum* as well as body to be real: and the proof that both of them were real was, that only in this manner could sense and reason be reconciled. Farther, they proved the existence of a *vacuum* by appeal to direct physical observation, which showed that bodies were porous, compressible, and capable of receiving into themselves new matter in the way of nutrition. Instead of the Parmenidean Ens, one and continuous, we have a Demokritean Ens, essentially many and discontinuous: *plena* and *vacua*, spaces full and spaces empty, being infinitely intermingled.¹ There existed atoms innumerable, each one in itself

Demokri-
tean theory
—Atoms—
Plena and
Vacua—Ens
and Non-
Ens.

¹ It is chiefly in the eighth chapter of the treatise *De Gener. et Corr.* (l. 8) that Aristotle traces the doctrine of Leukippus as having grown out of that of the Eleates. *Δευκίππος δ' ἔχει*

ψῆφον λέγοντες, οἷοντες πρὸς τὴν αἰσθησιν ὁμιλοῦμενα λέγοντες οὐκ ἀναρρίσσουσιν οὔτε γίνεσθαι οὔτε φθορὰν οὔτε κίνησιν καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὄντων, &c. (l. 8, 5). Compare also Aristotle. *De Caelo*, iii.

essentially a plenum, admitting no vacant space within it, and therefore indivisible as well as indestructible: but each severed from the rest by surrounding vacant space. The atom could undergo no change: but by means of the empty space around, it could freely move. Each atom was too small to be visible: yet all atoms were not equally small; there were fundamental differences between them in figure and magnitude: and they had no other qualities except figure and magnitude. As no atom could be divided into two, so no two atoms could merge into one. Yet though two or more atoms could not so merge together as to lose their real separate individuality, they might nevertheless come into such close approximation as to appear one, and to act on our senses as a phenomenal combination manifesting itself by new sensible properties.¹

The bridge, broken down by Parmenides, between the real and the phenomenal world, was thus in theory re-established.

4, p. 303, a. 6: *Metaphys. A. 4, p. 985, b. 8. Physic. iv. 6: Λέγουσι δὲ (Demokritus, &c., in proving a vacuum) ἐν μὲν οὐτὶ ἢ κίνησις ἢ κατὰ τόπον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, οὐ γὰρ ἂν δοκίμην εἶναι κίνησιν εἰ μὴ εἴη κενόν· τὸ γὰρ πλήρες ἀδύνατον εἶναι διέξασθαι τὴν &c.*

Plutarch adv. Kolot. p. 1108. Οἱ οὐδ' ἑναρ ἐντυχὼν δὲ Κολώτην, ἐσφάλη περὶ λέγειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου (Demokritus) ἐν ᾧ διορίζεται, μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν, ἢ τὸ μὴδὲν εἶναι· δὲν μὲν ὀνομάζων τὸ σῶμα μὴδὲν δὲ τὸ κενόν, ὡς καὶ τούτου φύσιν τινὰ καὶ ὑπόστασιν ἰδίαν ἔχοντος.

The affirmation of Demokritus—That Nothing existed, just as much as Something—appears a paradox which we must probably understand as implying that he here adopted, for the sake of argument, the language of the Eleatics, his opponents. They called the vacuum *Nothing*, but Demokritus did not so call it. If (said Demokritus) you call vacuum *Nothing*, then I say that *Nothing* exists as well as *Something*.

The direct observations by which Demokritus showed the existence of a vacuum were—1. A vessel with ashes in it will hold as much water as if it were empty: hence we know that there are pores in the ashes, into which the water is received. 2. Wine can be compressed in skins. 3. The growth of organised bodies proves that they have pores, through which new matter in the form of nourishment is ad-

mitted. (Aristot. *Physic. iv. 6, p. 213, b.*)

Besides this, Demokritus set forth motion as an indisputable fact, ascertained by the evidence of sense: and affirmed that motion was impossible, except on the assumption that vacuum existed. Melissus, the disciple of Parmenides, inverted the reasoning, in arguing against the reality of motion. If it be real (he said), then there must exist a vacuum: but no vacuum does or can exist: therefore there is no real motion. (Aristot. *Physic. iv. 6.*)

Since Demokritus started from these facts of sense, as the base of his hypothesis of atoms and vacua, so Aristotle (*Gen. et Corr. i. 2; De Anima, i. 2*) might reasonably say that he took sensible appearances as truth. But we find Demokritus also describing reason as an improvement and enlightenment of sense, and complaining how little of truth was discoverable by man. See Mullach, *Demokritus* (pp. 414, 415). Compare Philippson—*Υἱὰς ἀνθρωπίνης*—Berlin, 1831.

¹ Aristot. *Gen. et Corr. i. 3, p. 325, a. 25, τὰ πρῶτα μετέβαλ' εἰς ἀκίνητους σπερμὰ. Diogen. Laert. i. 44; Plutarch. adv. Koloten. v. 1110 seq.*

Zeller, *Philos. d. r. Griech.*, vol. i. p. 583-588, ed. 2nd; Aristot. *Metaphys. Z. 13, p. 1039, a. 10, ἀδύνατον εἶναι φησι Δημόκριτος ἐκ δύο ἐν ᾧ εἴς ἑναρ δύο γινώσθαι· τὰ γὰρ μετέβαλ' εἰς ἄτομα τὰς οὐσίας τοιαύται.*

For the real world, as described by Demokritus, differed entirely from the sameness and barrenness of the Parmenidean Ens, and presented sufficient movement and variety to supply a basis of explanatory hypothesis, accommodated to more or less of the varieties in the phenomenal world. In respect of quality, indeed, all the atoms were alike, not less than all the vacua: such likeness was (according to Demokritus) the condition of their being able to act upon each other, or to combine as phenomenal aggregates.¹ But in respect to quantity or magnitude as well as in respect to figure, they differed very greatly: moreover, besides all these diversities, the ordination and position of each atom with regard to the rest were variable in every way. As all objects of sense were atomic compounds, so, from such fundamental differences—partly in the constituent atoms themselves, partly in the manner of their arrangement when thrown into combination—arose all the diverse qualities and manifestations of the compounds. When atoms passed into new combination, then there was generation of a new substance: when they passed out of an old combination there was destruction: when the atoms remained the same, but were merely arranged anew in order and relative position, then the phenomenon was simply change. Hence all qualities and manifestations of such compounds were not original, but derivative: they had no “nature of their own,” or law peculiar to them, but followed from the atomic composition of the body to which they belonged. They were not real and absolute, like the magnitude and figure of the constituent atoms, but phenomenal and relative—i.e. they were powers of acting upon correlative organs of sentient beings, and nullities in the absence of such organs.² Such were the colour, sonorousness,

Primordial atoms differed only in magnitude, figure, position, and arrangement—they had no qualities, but their movements and combinations generated qualities.

¹ Aristotel. *Gener. et Corr.* i. 7, p. 323, b. 12. It was the opinion of Demokritus, that there could be no action except where agent and patient were alike. *Ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁμοιον εἶναι τὸ τι ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον· οὐ γὰρ ἑταίρειν τὰ ἔτερα καὶ διαφέροντα πάσχον ὡς ἑλλήλων· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτερα ἔτετα ποιεῖ τι εἰς ἄλληλα, οὐχ ἢ ἑτερα, ἀλλ’ ἢ ταυτὸν τι ὑπάρχει, ταύτην τούτω συμβαίνειν αὐτοῖς.* Many contemporary

philosophers affirmed distinctly the opposite. *Τὸ ὁμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοιον καὶ ἑταίρει, &c.* Diogenes the Apolloniate agreed on this point generally with Demokritus; see above, p. 61, note¹. The facility with which these philosophers laid down general maxims is constantly observable.

² Aristot. *Gen. et Corr.* i. 2, p. 316, a. 1; Theophrast. *De Sensu*, a. 63, 64. *Περὶ μὲν οὖν βαρὺς καὶ λευκός καὶ*

taste, smell, heat, cold, &c., of the bodies around us : they were relative, implying correlative percipients. Moreover they were not merely relative, but perpetually fluctuating ; since the compounds were frequently changing either in arrangement or in diversity of atoms, and every such atomic change, even to a small extent, caused it to work differently upon our organs.¹

Among the various properties of bodies, however, there were two which Demokritus recognised as not merely relative to the observer, but also as absolute and belonging to the body in itself. These were weight and hardness — primary qualities (to use the phraseology of Locke and Reid), as contrasted with the secondary qualities of colour, taste, and the like. Weight, or tendency downward, belonged (according to Demokritus) to each individual atom separately, in proportion to its magnitude: the specific gravity of all atoms was supposed to be equal. In compound bodies one body was heavier than another, in proportion as its bulk was more filled with atoms and less with vacant space.² The hardness and softness of bodies Demokritus explained by the peculiar size and peculiar junction of their component atoms. Thus, comparing lead with iron, the former is heavier and softer, the latter is lighter and harder. Bulk for bulk, the lead contained a larger proportion of solid, and a smaller proportion of interstices, than the iron : hence it was heavier. But its structure was equable throughout ; it had a greater multitude of minute atoms diffused through its bulk, equally close to and coherent with each other on every side, but not more close and coherent on one side than on another. The structure of the iron, on the contrary, was unequal and irregular, including larger

σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ ἐν τοῖσι τοῖσι ἀφορίζεσθαι τῶν δὲ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἐνδὲς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιομένης, ἐξ ἧς γίνεσθαι τὴν φαντασίαν, &c.

Stobæus, Eclog. Physic. i. c. 16. Φύσιν μὲν μηδὲν εἶναι χρώμα, τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄποια, τὰ τε μεστὰ καὶ τὸ κενόν· τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν συγκρίματα κίχρωσθαι διαταγῇ τε καὶ ρυθμῷ καὶ προτροπῇ, &c.

Demokritus restricted the term φύσις — Nature—to the primordial atoms and vacua (Simpliklus ad Aristot. Physic. p. 810 A.).

¹ Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 2, p. 815, b. 10. Ὅστε τὰς μεταβολὰς τοῦ συγκείμενου τὸ αὐτὸ ἐναντίον δοκεῖν ἄλλῃ καὶ ἄλλῃ, καὶ μετακινεῖσθαι μικροῦ ἐμμεγνυμένου, καὶ ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἐνδὲς μετακινήσεως.

² Theophrastus, De Sensu, s. 61. Βαρὺ μὲν οὖν καὶ κοῦφον τῷ μεγέθει διαίρει Δημόκριτος, &c.

Aristotel. De Cælo, iv. 2, 7, p. 309, a. 10 ; Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 326, a. 9. Καίτοι βαρύτερόν γε κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν φησὶν εἶναι Δημόκριτος ἕκαστον τῶν ἀδιαίρετων, &c.

spaces of vacuum in one part, and closer approach of its atoms in other parts: moreover these atoms were in themselves larger, hence there was a greater force of cohesion between them on one particular side, rendering the whole mass harder and more unyielding than the lead.¹

We thus see that Demokritus, though he supposed single atoms to be all of the same specific gravity, yet recognised a different specific gravity in the various compounds of atoms or material masses. It is to be remembered that, when we speak of contact or combination of atoms, this is not to be understood literally and absolutely, but only in a phenomenal and relative sense; as an approximation, more or less close, but always sufficiently close to form an atomic combination which our senses apprehended as one object. Still every atom was essentially separate from every other, and surrounded by a margin of vacant space: no two atoms could merge into one, any more than one atom could be divided into two.

All atoms essentially separate from each other.

Pursuant to this theory, Demokritus proclaimed that all the properties of objects, except weight, hardness, and softness, were not inherent in the objects themselves, but simply phenomenal and relative to the observer—"modifications of our sensibility". Colour, taste, smell, sweet and bitter, hot and cold, &c., were of this description. In respect to all of them, man differed from other animals, one man from another, and even the same man from himself at different times and ages. There was no sameness of impression, no unanimity or constancy of judgment, because there was no real or objective "nature" corresponding to the impression. From none of these senses could we at all learn what the external thing was in itself. "Sweet and bitter, hot and cold (he said) are by law or convention (i.e., these names designate the impressions of most men on most occasions, taking no account of dissentients): what really exists is, atoms and vacuum. The sensible objects which we suppose and believe to exist do not exist in truth; there exist only atoms and vacuum.

All properties of objects, except weight and hardness, were phenomenal and relative to the observer. Sensation could give no knowledge of the real and absolute.

¹ Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, a. 62.

We know nothing really and truly about an object, either what it is or what it is not: our opinions depend upon influences from without, upon the position of our body, upon the contact and resistances of external objects. There are two phases of knowledge, the obscure and the genuine. To the obscure belong all our senses—sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. The genuine is distinct from these. When the obscure phase fails, when we can no longer see, nor hear, nor smell, nor taste, nor touch—from minuteness and subtlety of particles—then the genuine sense, or reason and intelligence, comes into operation."¹

True knowledge (in the opinion of Demokritus) was hardly at all attainable; but in so far as it could be obtained, we must seek it, not merely through the obscure and insufficient avenues of sense, but by reason or intelligence penetrating to the ultimum of corpuscular structure, farther than sense could go. The atoms were not pure Abstracta (like Plato's Ideas and geometrical plane figures, and Aristotle's *materia prima*), but concrete bodies, each with its own² magnitude, figure, and movement; too small to be seen or felt by us, yet not too small to be seen or felt by beings endowed with finer sensitive power. They were abstractions mainly in so far as all other qualities were supposed absent. Demokritus professed to show how the movements, approximations, and collisions of these atoms, brought them into such combinations as to form the existing Kosmos; and not that system alone, but also many other cosmical systems, independent of and different from each other, which he supposed to exist.

How this was done we cannot clearly make out, not having before us the original treatise of Demokritus, called the Great Diakosmos. It is certain, however, that he did not invoke any separate agency to set the atoms

¹ Demokritus, Fr. p. 205, Mullach; Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. p. 135; Diogen. Laert. ix. 72.

² Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 8, p. 825, a. 29. Ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος καὶ ἄορατα διὰ σμικρότητα τῶν ὄγκων, &c.

Marbach observes justly that the Demokritean atoms, though not really objects of sense in consequence of their

smallness (of their disproportion to our visual power), are yet spoken of as objects of sense: they are as it were microscopic objects, and the γρησὶ γνώμη, or intelligence, is conceived as supplying something of a microscopic power. (Marbach, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, sect. 53, vol. i. p. 94.)

in motion—such as the Love and Discord of Empedokles—the Nous or Intelligence of Anaxagoras. Demokritus supposed that the atoms moved by an inherent force of their own: that this motion was as much without beginning as the atoms themselves:¹ that eternal motion was no less natural, no more required any special cause to account for it, than eternal rest. “Such is the course of nature—such is and always has been the fact,” was his ultimatum.² He farther maintained that all the motions of the atoms were necessary—that is, that they followed each other in a determinate order, each depending upon some one or more antecedents, according to fixed laws, which he could not explain.³ Fixed

motion—they moved by an inherent force of their own. Like atoms naturally tend towards like. Rotatory motion, the capital fact of the Kosmos.

¹ Aristotel. De Caelo, iii. 2, 3, p. 300, b. 9. *Αερίωνται καὶ Ἀναγκαστὶ τοῖς Ἀέρεσιν διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν τὰ πάντα σέματα, &c.* (Physic. viii. 3, 3, p. 258, b. 12, viii. 9, p. 265, b. 23; Cicero, De Finib. i. 6 17.)

² Aristot. Generat. Animal. ii. 6, p. 742, b. 20; Physic. viii. 1, p. 252, b. 32.

Aristotle blames Demokritus for thus acquiescing in the general course of nature as an ultimatum, and for omitting all reference to final causes. M. Lafayet, in a good dissertation, Sur la Philosophie Atomistique (Paris, 1833, p. 78), shows that this is exactly the ultimatum of natural philosophers at the present day. “Un phénomène se passait-il, si on lui en demandait la raison, il (Demokritus) répondait, ‘La chose se passe ainsi, parcequ’elle s’est toujours passée ainsi.’ C’est, en d’autres termes, la seule réponse que font encore aujourd’hui les naturalistes. Suivant eux, une pierre, quand elle n’est pas soutenue, tombe en vertu de la loi de la pesanteur. Qu’est ce que la loi de la pesanteur? La généralisation de ce fait plusieurs fois observé, qu’une pierre tombe quand elle n’est pas soutenue. Le phénomène dans un cas particulier arrive ainsi, parceque toujours il est arrivé ainsi. Le principe qu’implique l’explication des naturalistes modernes est celle de Démokrite, c’est que la nature demeure constante à elle-même. La proposition de Démokrite—‘Tel phénomène a lieu de cette façon, parceque toujours il a eu lieu de cette même façon’—est la première forme qu’ait revêtue le principe de la stabilité des lois naturelles.”

³ Aristotle (Physic. ii. 4, p. 196, a.

25) says that Demokritus (he seems to mean Demokritus) described the motion of the atoms to form the cosmical system, as having taken place *ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*. Upon which Mullach (Dem. Frag. p. 382) justly remarks—“Casu (*ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου*) videntur fieri, quæ naturalī quādam necessitate cujus leges ignoramus evenire dicuntur. Sed quamvis Aristoteles naturalem Abderitani philosophi necessitatem, vitato ἀνάγκης vocabulo, quod alii aliter usurpabant, casum et fortunam vocaret—ipse tamen Democritus, abhorrens ab his omnibus quæ destinatum causarum seriem tollerent rerumque naturam perturbarent, nihil juris fortunæ et casui in singulis rebus concessit.”

Zeller has a like remark upon the phrase of Aristotle, which is calculated to mislead as to the doctrine of Demokritus (Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 600, 2d ed.).

Dugald Stewart, in one of the Dissertations prefixed to the Encyclopedia Britannica, has the like comment respecting the fundamental principle of the Epicurean (identical *quoad hoc* with the Demokritean) philosophy.

“I cannot conclude this note without recurring to an observation ascribed by Laplace to Leibnitz—‘that the *blind chance* of the Epicureans involves the supposition of an effect taking place without a cause’. This is a very incorrect statement of the philosophy taught by Lucretius, which nowhere gives countenance to such a supposition. The distinguishing tenet of this sect was, that the order of the universe does not imply the existence of *intelligent* causes, but may be accounted for by the active powers belonging to the

laws, known or unknown, he recognised always. Fortune or chance was only a fiction imagined by men to cover their own want of knowledge and foresight.¹ Demokritus seems to have supposed that like atoms had a spontaneous tendency towards like; that all, when uncombined, tended naturally downwards, yet with unequal force, owing to their different sizes and weight proportional to size; that this unequal force brought them into impact and collision one with another, out of which was generated a rotatory motion, gradually extending itself, comprehending a larger and larger number of them, up to a certain point, when an exterior membrane or shell was formed around them.² This rotatory motion was the capital fact which both constituted the Kosmos, and maintained the severance of its central and peripheral masses—Earth and Water in the centre—Air, Fire, and the celestial bodies, near the circumference. Demokritus, Anaxagoras, and Empedokles, imagined different preliminary hypotheses to get at the fact of rotation; but all employed the fact, when arrived at, as a basis from which to deduce the formation of the various cosmical bodies and their known manifestations.³ In respect to these bodies—Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c.—Demokritus seems to have held several opinions like those of Anaxagoras. Both of them conceived the Sun as a red-hot mass, and the Earth as a flat surface above and below, round horizontally like a drum, stationary in the centre of the revolving celestial bodies, and supported by the resistance of air beneath.⁴

atoms of matter: which active powers, being exerted through an indefinitely long period of time, might have produced, nay must have produced, exactly such a combination of things as that with which we are surrounded. This does not call in question the necessity of a cause to produce every effect, but, on the contrary, virtually assumes the truth of that axiom. It only excludes from these causes the attribute of intelligence. In the same way, when I apply the words *blind chance* to the throw of a die, I do not mean to deny that I am ultimately the cause of the particular event that is to take place; but only to intimate that I do not here act as a *designing* cause, in consequence of my ignorance of the various accidents to which the die is subjected

while shaken in the box. If I am not mistaken, this Epicurean theory approaches very nearly to the scheme which it is the main object of the *Essay on Probabilities* (Laplace) to inculcate." (Stewart's *Dissertation*, part ii. p. 139, note.)

¹ Demokrit. Frag. p. 107, ed. Mullach; Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 27. ἀνθρώποι τύχης εἰδωλὸν ἐπλάσαντο πρόφασιν ἰδίᾳ ἀβουλῆς.

² Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.*, i. p. 604 seq.; Demokrit. Fragm. p. 207, Mull.; Sext. Empiricus adv. Mathem. vii. 117.

³ Demokrit. Fragm. p. 108, Mullach. Δημοκρίτος ἐν οἷς φησὶ οὐκ ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀποκρίνεσθαι παρρωτῶν εἶναι, &c.

Diog. Laert. ix. 31-44.

⁴ Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.*, i. p. 612. ed. 2nd.

Among the researches of Demokritus there were some relating to animal generation, and zoology; but we cannot find that his opinions on these subjects were in peculiar connection with his atomic theory.¹ Nor do we know how far he carried out that theory into detail by tracing the various phenomenal manifestations to their basis in atomic reality, and by showing what particular magnitude, figure, and arrangement of atoms belonged to each. It was only in some special cases that he thus connected determinate atoms with compounds of determinate quality; for example, in regard to the four Empedoklean elements. The atoms constituting heat or fire he affirmed to be small and globular, the most mobile, rapid, and penetrating of all: those constituting air, water, and earth, were an assemblage of all varieties of figures, but differed from each other in magnitude—the atoms of air being apparently smallest, those of earth largest.²

Researches of Demokritus on zoology and animal generation.

In regard to mind or soul generally, he identified it with heat or fire, conceiving it to consist in the same very small, globular, rapidly movable atoms, penetrating everywhere: which he illustrated by comparison with the fine dust seen in sunbeams when shining through a doorway. That these were the constituent atoms of mind, he proved by the fact, that its first and most essential property was to move the body, and to be itself moved.³ Mind, soul, the vital principle, fire, heat, &c., were, in the opinion of Demokritus, substantially identical—not confined to man or even to animals, but diffused, in unequal proportions, throughout plants, the air, and nature generally. Sensation, thought, knowledge, were all motions of mind or of these restless mental particles, which Demokritus supposed to be distributed over every part of the living body, mingling and alternating with the corporeal particles.⁴ It was the essential condition of life, that the mental particles should be maintained

His account of mind—he identified it with heat or fire, diffused throughout animals, plants, and nature generally. Mental particles intermingled throughout all the frame with corporeal particles.

¹ Mullach, *Demokr. Fragm.* p. 395 seqq.

² Aristotle, *Gen. et Corr.* i. 8, p. 826, a. 5; *De Cælo*, iii. 8, p. 306, b. 35; *Theophrastus, De Sensu*, a. 64.

³ Aristotel. *De Animâ*, i. 2, 2-3, p. 403, b. 28; i. 3, p. 406, b. 20; Cicero, *Tuscul. Disput.* i. 11; Diogen. Laert. ix. 44.

⁴ Aristotel. *De Respirat.* (c. 4, p.

in proper number and distribution throughout the body; but by their subtle nature they were constantly tending to escape, being squeezed or thrust out at all apertures by the pressure of air on all the external parts. Such tendency was counteracted by the process of respiration, whereby mental or vital particles, being abundantly distributed throughout the air, were inhaled along with air, and formed an inward current which either prevented the escape, or compensated the loss, of those which were tending outwards. When breathing ceased, such inward current being no longer kept up, the vital particles in the interior were speedily forced out, and death ensued.¹

Though Demokritus conceived these mental particles as distributed all over the body, yet he recognised different mental aptitudes attached to different parts of the body. Besides the special organs of sense, he considered intelligence as attached to the brain, passion to the heart, and appetite to the liver. The same tripartite division afterwards adopted by Plato. He gave an explanation of perception or sensation in its different varieties, as well as of intelligence or thought. Sensation and thought were, in his opinion, alike material, and alike mental. Both were affections of the same peculiar particles, vital or mental, within us: both were changes operated in these particles by effluvia or images from without; nevertheless the one change was different from the other.²

In regard to sensations, Demokritus said little about those of

472, a. 5), λέγει (Demokritus) ὡς ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταῦτόν, τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα τῶν σφαιροειδῶν.
Lucretius, iii. 370.

Illud in his rebus nequaquam sumere possis,
Democriti quod sancta viri sententia ponit;
Corporis atque animi primordia singula privis
Adposita alternis variare ac nectere membra.

¹ Aristotel. De Respiratione, c. 4, p. 472, a. 10; De Anima, i. 2, p. 404, a. 12.

² Zeller, Phil. d. Griech., i. p. 618, ed. 2nd.

Plutarch (Placit. Philos. iv. 4), ascribes a bipartite division of the soul to Demokritus: τὸ λογικόν, in the thorax: τὸ αἰσθητικόν, distributed over all the body. But in the next section (iv. 5), he departs from this statement, affirming that both Demokritus and Plato supposed τὸ ἡγεμονικόν of the soul to be in the head.

³ Plutarch, Placit. Philos. iv. 8. Demokritus and Leukippus affirm τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν νόησιν γίνεσθαι, εἰδῶλων ἐξωθεν προσιόντων· μηδενὶ γὰρ ἐπιβάλλειν μηδενίαν χωρὶς τοῦ προσπίπτοντος εἰδῶλου.

Cicero, De Finibus, i. 6, 21, "imagines, quas idola nominant, quorum incursione non solum videamus, sed etiam cogitemus," &c.

touch, smell, and hearing; but he entered at some length into those of sight and taste.¹

Proceeding upon his hypothesis of atoms and vacua as the only objective existences, he tried to show what particular modifications of atoms, in figure, size, and position, produced upon the sentient the impressions of different colours. He recognised four fundamental or simple colours—white, black, red, and green—of which all other colours were mixtures and combinations.²

White colour (he said) was caused by smooth surfaces, which presented straight pores and a transparent structure, such as the interior surface of shells: where these smooth substances were brittle or friable, this arose from the constituent atoms being at once spherical and loosely connected together, whereby they presented the clearest passage through their pores, the least amount of shadow, and the purest white colour. From substances thus constituted, the effluvia flowed out easily, and passed through the intermediate air without becoming entangled or confused with it. Black colour was caused by rough, irregular, unequal substances, which had their pores crooked and obstructed, casting much shadow, and sending forth slowly their effluvia, which became hampered and entangled with the intervening medium of air. Red colour arose from the effluvia of spherical atoms, like those of fire, though of larger size: the connection between red colour and fire was proved by the fact that heated substances, man as well as the metals, became red. Green was produced by atoms of large size and wide vacua, not restricted to any determinate shape, but arranged in peculiar order and position. These four were given by Demokritus as the simple colours. But he recognised an infinite diversity of compound colours, arising from mixture of them in different proportions, several of which he explained—gold-colour, purple, blue, violet, leek-green, nut-brown, &c.³

¹ Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 64.

² Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 73 seq.; Aristotel. *De Sensu*, c. iv. p. 442, b. 10.

The opinions of Demokritus on colour are illustrated at length by Prantl in his *Uebersicht der Farbenlehre der Alten* (p. 49 seq.), appended to his edition of the Aristotelian

or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, *Περὶ Χρωμάτων* (Munich, 1840).

Demokritus seems also to have attempted to show, that the sensation of cold and shivering was produced by the irruption of jagged and acute atoms. See Plutarch, *De Primo Frigido*, p. 947, 948, c. 8.

³ Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, s. 76-78.

Besides thus setting forth those varieties of atoms and atomic motions which produced corresponding varieties of colour, Demokritus also brought to view the intermediate stages whereby they realised the act of vision. All objects, compounds of the atoms, gave out effluvia or images resembling themselves. These effluvia stamped their impression, first upon the intervening air, next upon the eye beyond: which, being covered by a fine membrane, and consisting partly of water, partly of vacuum, was well calculated to admit the image. Such an image, the like of which any one might plainly see by looking into another person's eye, was the immediate cause of vision.¹ The air, however, was no way necessary as an intervening medium, but rather obstructive: the image proceeding from the object would be more clearly impressed upon the eye through a vacuum: if the air did not exist, vision would be so distinct, even at the farthest distance, that an object not larger than an ant might be seen in the heavens.² Demokritus believed that the visual image, after having been impressed upon the eye, was distributed or multiplied over the remaining body.³ In like manner, he believed that, in hearing, the condensed air carrying the sound entered with some violence through the ears, passed through the veins to the brain, and was from thence dispersed over the body.⁴ Both sight and hearing were thus not simply acts of the organ of sense, but concurrent operations of the entire frame: over all which (as has been already stated) the mental or vital particles were assumed to be disseminated.

Farther, Demokritus conceived that the diversities of taste were generated by corresponding diversities of atoms, or compounds of atoms, of particular figure, magnitude, and position. Acid taste was caused by atoms rough, angular, twisted, small, and subtle, which

ἀπειρα τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυλοὺς κατὰ τὰς μίξεις—οὐδὲν γὰρ ὁμοίον ἔσθθαι θάτερον θάτερον.

¹ Theophrast. De Sensu, a. 50. τὸν ἀέρα τὸν μεταξὺ τῆς ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ τοῦ ὁραμένου τυποῦσθαι, &c. Aristotel. De Sensu, c. 2, p. 438, a. 6.

Theophrastus notices this intermediate ἀποτύπωσις ἐν τῷ ἀέρι as a doctrine peculiar (ιδίως) to Demo-

kritus: he himself proceeds to combat it (51, 52).

² Aristotel. De Animâ, li. 7-9, p. 419, a. 16.

³ Theophrastus, De Sensu, a. 54.

⁴ Theophrastus, De Sensu, 55, 56. τὴν γὰρ φωνὴν εἶναι συγκρουμένην τοῦ ἀέρος καὶ μετὰ βίας εἰσδύοντος, &c.

Demokritus thought that air entered into the system not only through the

forced their way through all the body, produced large interior vacant spaces, and thereby generated great heat: for heat was always proportional to the amount of vacuum within.¹ Sweet taste was produced by spherical atoms of considerable bulk, which slid gently along and diffused themselves equably over the body, modifying and softening the atoms of an opposite character. Astringent taste was caused by large atoms with many angles, which got into the vessels, obstructing the movement of fluids both in the veins and intestines. Salt taste was produced by large atoms, much entangled with each other, and irregular. In like manner Demokritus assigned to other tastes particular varieties of generating atoms: adding, however, that in every actual substance, atoms of different figures were intermingled, so that the effect of each on the whole was only realised in the ratio of the preponderating figure.² Lastly, the working of all atoms, in the way of taste, was greatly modified by the particular system upon which they were brought to act: effects totally opposite being sometimes produced by like atoms upon different individuals.³

As sensation, so also thought or intelligence, was produced by the working of atoms from without. But in what manner the different figures and magnitudes of atoms were understood to act, in producing diverse modifications of thought, we do not find explained. It was, however, requisite that there should be a symmetry, or correspondence of condition between the thinking mind within and the inflowing atoms from without, in order that these latter might work upon a man properly: if he were too hot, or too cold, his mind went astray.⁴ Though Demokritus identified the mental or vital particles with the

Thought or Intelligence
—was produced by influx of atoms from without.

ears, but also through pores in other parts of the body, though so gently as to be imperceptible to our consciousness: the ears afforded a large aperture, and admitted a considerable mass.

¹ Theophrast. De Sensu, 66-68.

² Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. ἀπάντων δὲ τῶν σχημάτων οὐδὲν ἀκέραιον εἶναι καὶ ἀμυγῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκάστῳ πολλὰ εἶναι . . . ὅς δ' ἐν ἐνῇ πλείστον, τοῦτο μάλιστα ἐνισχύειν πρὸς τὴν αἰσθῆσιν καὶ τὴν δύναμιν.

This essential intermixture, in each distinct substance, of atoms of all

different shapes, is very analogous to the essential intermixture of all sorts of Homœomeries in the theory of Anaxagoras.

³ Theophrast. De Sensu, 67. εἰς ὅποιας ἔξιν ἐν εἰσέλθῃ, διαφέρειν οὐκ ὀλίγον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ αὐτὸ γινώσκον, καὶ γινώσκον τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ποιεῖν ἐπίσταν.

⁴ Theophrast. De Sensu, 68. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἴρηκαν, ὅτι γίνεται συμμείκτως ἔχουσα τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τὴν αἰσθῆσιν· ἐὰν δὲ περιθέρμῳ τις ἢ περιψυχρῷ γίγνηται, μεταλλάττειν φησί.

spherical atoms constituting heat or fire, he nevertheless seems to have held that these particles might be in excess or in deficiency, and that they required, as a condition of sensation, to be diluted or attuned with others. The soul, therefore, and, however, did not work by itself or spontaneously, but acted in action by atoms or effluvia from without: this was not the intellectual mind, not less than of the sensational mind, there was an objective something without, corresponding to and generating every different thought—just as there was an objective something corresponding to every different sensation. In the first, the object of sensation was an atomic compound of some appreciable bulk, while that of thought might be several atoms or vacua so minute as to be invisible and intangible. But the object of sensation did not reveal itself as it was in its own nature, but merely produced changes in the perceptive, and different changes in different percipients (except as to colour and light, hard and soft, which were not simply modified by our sensibility, but were also primary qualities inherent in the objects themselves¹): while the object of thought, though it worked a change in the thinking subject, yet also revealed itself as it was, and worked alike upon all.

Hence Demokritus termed sensation, *obscure knowledge*—thought, *genuine knowledge*.² It was only by thought (reason, intelligence) that the fundamental realities of nature, atoms and vacua, could be apprehended: even by thought, however, only imperfectly, since there was always more or less of subjective movements and conditions, which partially clouded the pure objective apprehension—and since the atoms themselves were in perpetual movement, as well as inseparably mingled one with another. Under such obstructions,

¹ Theophrastus, *De Sensu*, 71. *τὴν δὲ σκληροῦ μὲν καὶ μαλακοῦ καὶ βαρέος καὶ κοῦφου ποιεῖ τὴν οὐσίαν, ὅπερ (ἀπὸ) οὐχ ἥττον ἔδοξε λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἡμᾶς, θερμοῦ δὲ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδενός.*

This is a remarkable point to be noted in the criticisms of Theophrastus on the doctrine of Demokritus. Demokritus maintains that *hot* and *cold* are relative to us: *hard* and *soft*, *heavy* and *light*, are not only relative to us,

but also absolute, objective, things in their own nature,—though causing in us sensations which are like them. Theophrastus denies this distinction altogether: and denies it with the best reason. Not many of his criticisms on Demokritus are so just and pertinent as this one.

² Demokritus *Fragm.* Mullach, p. 205, 206; ap. Sext. *Empir.* adv. *Mathemat.* vii. 135-139, *γνώμης δύο εἶσι· ἰδέαι· ἡ μὲν γνησίη, ἡ δὲ σκοτιή, &c.*

Demokritus proclaimed that no clear or certain knowledge was attainable: that the sensible objects, which men believed to be absolute realities, were only phenomenal and relative to us,—while the atoms and vacua, the true existences or things in themselves, could scarce ever be known as they were:¹ that truth was hidden in an abyss, and out of our reach.

As Demokritus supposed both sensations and thoughts to be determined by effluvia from without, so he assumed a similar cause to account for beliefs, comfortable or uncomfortable dispositions, fancies, dreams, presentiments, &c. He supposed that the air contained many effluences, spectres, images, cast off from persons and substances in nature—sometimes even from outlying very distant objects which lay beyond the bounds of the Kosmos. Of these images, impregnated with the properties, bodily and mental, of the objects from whence they came, some were beneficent, others mischievous: they penetrated into the human body through the pores and spread their influence all through the system.² Those thrown off by jealous and vindictive men were especially hurtful,³ as they inflicted suffering corresponding to the tempers of those with whom they originated. Trains of thought and feeling were thus excited in men's minds; in sleep,⁴ dreams, divinations, prophetic warnings, and threats, were communicated: sometimes, pestilence and other misfortunes were thus begun. Demokritus believed that men's happiness depended much upon the nature and character of the images which might approach them, expressing an anxious wish that he might himself meet with such as were propitious.⁵ It was from grand and terrific images of this nature, that he supposed the idea and belief of the Gods to have arisen: a sup-

Idola or images were thrown off from objects, which determined the tone of thoughts, feelings, dreams, divinations, &c.

¹ Democr. Frag., Mull., p. 204-5. *Ἄπειρο νομίζεται μὴ εἶναι καὶ δοξάζονται τὰ αἰσθητά, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα· ἀλλὰ τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ κενόν. ἡμεῖς δὲ τῷ μὲν ἰστέν οὐδὲν ἀκριβὲς ξυνίεμεν, μετακίετο δὲ κατὰ τὸ σωματικὸν διαδύνην, καὶ τῶν ἐναισιόοντων, καὶ τῶν ἐντιστηριζόντων . . . ἔτι μὲν νυν, ὅτι οἷον ἑκαστὸν ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐ ξυνίεμεν, πολλὰ καὶ δοξάζονται, &c.*

Compare Cicero, Acad. Quæst. l. 13, §§. 10; Diog. Laert. ix. 72; Aristotel. Metaphys. iii. 5, p. 1009, b. 10.

² Demokriti Frag. p. 207, Mullach; Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 19; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 10, p. 785 A.

³ Plutarch, Symposiac. vi. 1, p. 683 A.

⁴ Aristotel. De Divinat. per Somnum, p. 464, a. 5; Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733 E. *ὅτι καὶ κόσμον ἐκτὸς φθαρέντων καὶ σωματικῶν ἀλλοφύλων ἐκ τῆς ἀπορροίας ἐπιρρόοντων, ἐνταῦθα πολλὰς ἀρχαὶ παρεμπίπτουσι λοιπῶν καὶ παθῶν οὐ συνήθων.*

⁵ Plutarch, De Oraculor. Defectu, p. 419. *αὐτὸς εὐχεται εὐλόγων εἰδῶλων τε γάρ κεν.*

position countenanced by the numerous tales, respecting the appearances of the Gods both to dreaming and to waking in the current among the poets and in the familiar talk of Greece.

Among the lost treasures of Hellenic intellect, there are few which are more to be regretted than the works of Demokritus. Little is known of them except the titles: but these are instructive as well as multifarious. The number of different subjects which they embrace is astonishing. Besides his atomic theory, and its application to cosmogony and physics, where he is chiefly known, and from whence his title of *physicus* is derived—we find mention of works on geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, optics, geography or geology, zoology, botany, medicine, music, and poetry, grammar, history, ethics, &c.¹ In such universality he is the predecessor, perhaps the model, of Aristotle. It is not likely that this wide range of subjects should have been handled in a spirit of empty generality, without facts and particulars: for we know that his life was long, his curiosity insatiable, and his personal travel and observation greater than that of any contemporary. We know too that he entered more deeply upon the field of dialectics, discussing those questions of evidence which became so rife in the Platonic age. He criticised, and is said to have combated, the doctrine laid down by Protagoras, "Man is the measure of all things". It would have been interesting to know from what point of view he approached it: but we learn only the fact that he criticised it adversely.² The numerous treatises of Demokritus, together with the proportion of them which relate to ethical and social subjects, rank him with the philosophers of the Platonic and Aristotelian age. His

¹ See the list of the works of Demokritus in Diogen. Laert. ix. 46, and in And Dionysius of Hal. (De Comp. Verb. Mullach's edition of the Fragments, p. 187, R.) characterises Demokritus, 105-107. Mullach mentions here (note 18) that Demokritus is cited seventy-eight times in the extant works of Aristotle, and sometimes with honourable mention. He is never mentioned by Plato. In the fragment of Philodemus de Musica, Demokritus is called *ἀνὴρ οὐ φυσιολογώτατος μόνον τῶν ἀρχαίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἰστορούμενα οὐδένος ἤττον πολυπράγμων* (Mullach, p. 237). Seneca calls him "Democritus, subtilissimus antiquorum omnium".—Question. Natural. vii. 2.

² Plutarch. adv. Kolōten, p. 1108. Among the Demokritean treatises, was one entitled Pythagoras, which contained probably a comment on the life and doctrines of that eminent man, written in an admiring spirit. (Diog. Laert. ix. 88.)

Summum Bonum, as far as we can make out, appears to have been the maintenance of mental serenity and contentment: in which view he recommended a life of tranquil contemplation, apart from money-making, or ambition, or the exciting pleasures of life.¹

¹ Seneca, De Tranquill. Animæ, cap. Cicero De Finib. v. 29; Diogen. Laert.
2. "Hanc stabilem animi sedem Græci ix. 46. For εὐθυμία Demokritus used as
Εὐθυμία vocant, de quo Democriti synonyms εὐερέα, ἀταρξία, ἀραξία,
volumen egregium est." Compare &c. See Mullach, p. 416.

CHAPTER II.

GENERAL REMARKS ON THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHERS—
GROWTH OF DIALECTIC—ZENO AND GORGIAS.

THE first feeling of any reader accustomed to the astronomy and physics of the present century, on considering the various theories noticed in the preceding chapter, is a sort of astonishment that such theories should have been ever propounded or accepted as true. Yet there can be no doubt that they represent the best thoughts of sincere, contemplative, and ingenious men, furnished with as much knowledge of fact, and as good a method, as was then attainable. The record of what such men have received as scientific truth or probability, in different ages, is instructive in many ways, but in none more than in showing how essentially relative and variable are the conditions of human belief; how unfounded is the assumption of those modern philosophers who proclaim certain first truths or first principles as universal, intuitive, self-evident; how little any theorist can appreciate *a priori* the causes of belief in an age materially different from his own, or can lay down maxims as to what must be universally believed or universally disbelieved by all mankind. We shall have farther illustration of this truth as we proceed: here I only note variety of belief, even on the most fundamental points, as being the essential feature of Grecian philosophy even from its outset, long before the age of those who are usually denounced as the active sowers of discord, the Sophists and the professed disputants. Each philosopher followed his own individual reason, departing from traditional or established creeds, and incurring from the believing public more

Variety of
sects and
theories—
multiplicity
of individual
authorities
is the
charac-
teristic of
Greek philo-
sophy.

or less of obloquy ; but no one among the philosophers acquired marked supremacy over the rest. There is no established philosophical orthodoxy, but a collection of Dissenters—*ἄλλῃ δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα μεμιγμένη*—small sects, each with its own following, each springing from a special individual as authority, each knowing itself to be only one among many.

It is a misfortune that we do not possess a complete work, or even considerable fragments, from any one of these philosophers, so as to know what their views were when stated by themselves, and upon what reasons they insisted. All that we know is derived from a few detached notices, in very many cases preserved by Aristotle ; who, not content (like Plato) with simply following out his own vein of ideas, exhibits in his own writings much of that polymathy which he transmitted to the Peripatetics generally, and adverts often to the works of predecessors. Being a critic as well as a witness, he sometimes blends together inconveniently the two functions, and is accused (probably with reason to a certain extent) of making unfair reports ; but if it were not for him, we should really know nothing of the Hellenic philosophers before Plato. It is curious to read the manner in which Aristotle speaks of these philosophical predecessors as "the ancients" (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*), and takes credit to his own philosophy for having attained a higher and more commanding point of view.¹

These early theorists are not known from their own writings, which have been lost. Importance of the information of Aristotle about them.

¹ Bacon ascribes the extinction of these early Greek philosophers to Aristotle, who thought that he could not assure his own philosophical empire, except by putting to death all his brothers, like the Turkish Sultan. This remark occurs more than once in Bacon (Nov. Org. Aph. 67 ; Redargutio Philosoph. vol. xi. p. 450, ed. Montagu). In so far as it is a reproach, I think it is not deserved. Aristotle's works, indeed, have been preserved, and those of his predecessors have not : but Aristotle, far from seeking to destroy their works, has been the chief medium for preserving to us the little which we know about them. His attention to the works of his predecessors is something very unusual among the theorists of the ancient world. His friends Eudæmus and Theophrastus followed

his example, in embodying the history of the earlier theories in distinct works of their own, now unfortunately lost.

It is much to be regretted that no scholar has yet employed himself in collecting and editing the fragments of the lost scientific histories of Eudæmus (the Rhodian) and Theophrastus. A new edition of the Commentaries of Simplicius is also greatly wanted : those which exist are both rare and unreadable.

Zeller remarks that several of the statements contained in Proklus's commentary on Euclid, respecting the earliest Grecian mathematicians, are borrowed from the *γεωμετρικαὶ ἱστορίαι* of the Rhodian Eudæmus (Zeller—De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platonico, p. 12).

During the century and a half between Thales and the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we have passed in review twelve distinct schemes of philosophy—Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Herakleitus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, the Apolloniate Diogenes, Leukippus, and Demokritus. Of most of these philosophers it may fairly be said that each speculated upon nature in an original vein of his own. Anaximenes and Diogenes, Xenophanes and Parmenides, Leukippus and Demokritus, may indeed be coupled together as kindred pairs—yet by no means in such manner that the second of the two is a mere disciple and copyist of the first. Such abundance and variety of speculative genius and invention is one of the most memorable facts in the history of the Hellenic mind. The prompting of intelligent curiosity, the thirst for some plausible hypothesis to explain the Kosmos and its generation, the belief that a basis or point of departure might be found in the Kosmos itself, apart from those mythical personifications which dwelt both in the popular mind and in the poetical Theogonies, the mental effort required to select some known agency and to connect it by a chain of reasoning with the result—all this is a new phenomenon in the history of the human mind.

An early Greek philosopher found nothing around him to stimulate or assist the effort, and much to obstruct it. He found Nature disguised under a diversified and omnipresent Polytheistic agency, eminently captivating and impressive to the emotions—at once mysterious and familiar—embodied in the ancient Theogonies, and penetrating deeply all the abundant epic and lyric poetry, the only literature of the time.

It is perfectly true (as Aristotle remarks¹) that Hesiod and the other theological poets, who referred everything to the generation and agency of the Gods, thought only of what was plausible to themselves, without enquiring whether it would

¹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* B. 4, p. 1000. a. 10.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδου, καὶ πάντες ὅσοι θεόλογοι, μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πιθανοῦ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἡμῶν δ' ὀλιγόωρσαν. Θεοὺς γὰρ ποιοῦντες τὰς

ἀρχὰς καὶ ἐκ θεῶν γεγονέναι, &c. Aristotle mentions them a few lines afterwards as not worth serious notice. περὶ τῶν μυθικῶς σοφισσομένων οὐκ ἔστιν μετὰ σπουδῆς σκοπεῖν.

appear equally plausible to their successors ; a reproach which bears upon many subsequent philosophers also. The contemporary public, to whom they addressed themselves, knew no other way of conceiving Nature than under this religious and poetical view, as an aggregate of manifestations by divine personal agents, upon whose volition—sometimes signified beforehand by obscure warnings intelligible to the privileged interpreters, but often inscrutable—the turn of events depended. Thales and the other Ionic philosophers were the first who became dissatisfied with this point of view, and sought for some “causes and beginnings” more regular, knowable, and predictable. They fixed upon the common, familiar, widely-extended, material substances, water, air, fire, &c. ; and they could hardly fix upon any others. Their attempt to find a scientific basis was unsuccessful ; but the memorable fact consisted in their looking for one.

In the theories of these Ionic philosophers, the physical ideas of generation, transmutation, local motion, are found in the foreground : generation in the Kosmos to replace generation by the God. Pythagoras and Empedokles blend with their speculations a good deal both of ethics and theology, which we shall find yet more preponderant when we come to the cosmical theories of Plato. He brings us back to the mythical Prometheus, armed with the geometrical and arithmetical combinations of the Pythagoreans : he assumes a chaotic substratum, modified by the intentional and deliberate construction of the Demiurgus and his divine sons, who are described as building up and mixing like a human artisan or chemist. In the theory of Aristotle we find Nature half personified, and assumed to be perpetually at work under the influence of an appetite for good or regularity, which determines her to aim instinctively and without deliberation (like bees or spiders) at constant ends, though these regular tendencies are always accompanied, and often thwarted, by accessories, irregular, undefinable, unpredictable. Both Plato and Aristotle, in their dialectical age, carried abstraction farther than it had been carried by the Ionic philosophers.¹ Aristotle imputes to the

Views of the
Ionic philo-
sophers—
compared
with the
more recent
abstractions
of Plato and
Aristotle.

¹ Plato (*Sophistes*, 242-243) observes Aristotle says about Hesiod and the *Theogonies*—that they followed out

Ionic philosophers that they neglected three out of his four causes (the efficient, formal, and final), and that they attended only to the material. This was a height of abstraction first attained by Plato and himself; in a way sometimes useful, sometimes misleading. The earlier philosophers had not learnt to divide substance from its powers or properties; nor to conceive substance without power as one thing, and power without substance as another. Their primordial substance, with its powers and properties, implicated together as one concrete and without any abstraction, was at once an efficient, a formal, and a material cause: a final cause they did not suppose themselves to want, inasmuch as they always conceived a fixed terminus towards which the agency was directed, though they did not conceive such fixed tendency under the symbol of an appetite and its end. Water, Air, Fire, were in their view not simply inert and receptive patients, impotent until they were stimulated by the active force residing in the ever revolving celestial spheres—but positive agents themselves, productive of important effects. So also a geologist of the present day, when he speculates upon the early condition¹ of the Kosmos, reasons upon gaseous, fluid, solid,

their own respective veins of thought without caring whether we, the many listeners, were able to follow them or were left behind in the dark. I dare say that this was true (as indeed it is true respecting most writers on speculative matters), but I am sure that all of them would have made the same complaint if they had heard Plato read his *Timæus*.

¹ Bacon has some striking remarks on the contrast in this respect between the earlier philosophers and Aristotle.

Bacon, after commending the early Greek philosophers for having adopted as their first principle some known and positive matter, not a mere abstraction, goes on to say:—

“Videntur antiqui illi, in inquisitione principiorum, rationem non admodum acutam instituisse, sed hoc solummodo egisse, ut ex corporibus apparentibus et manifestis, quod maxime excelleret, quaerent, et quod tale videbatur, principium rerum ponerent: tanquam per excellentiam, non verè aut realiter. . . . Quod si principium illud suum teneant non per excellentiam, sed simpliciter, videntur utique in duriorum

tropum incidere: cum res planè deducatur ad æquivocum, neque de igne naturali, aut naturali aere, aut aqua, quod asserunt, prædicari videatur, sed de igne aliquo phantastico et notionali (et sic de cæteris) qui nomen ignis retineat, definitionem abneget. . . . Principium statuerunt secundum sensum, aliquod ens verum: modum autem ejus dispensandi (liberius se gerentes) phantasticum.” (Bacon, *Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia*, vol. xi., p. 115-116, ed. Montagu.)

“Materia illa spoliata et passiva prorsus humanæ mentis commentum quoddam videtur. Materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum principio motus primo, ut invenitur. Hæc tria (materia, forma, motus) nullo modo discernenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda, atque asserenda materia (quæcumque ea sit), ita ornata et apparatus et formata, ut omnis virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et emanatio esse possit. Omnes ferè antiqui, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materia primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc conveniunt, quod materiam activam formâ

varieties of matter, as manifesting those same laws and properties which experience attests, but manifesting them under different combinations and circumstances. The defect of the Ionic philosophers, unavoidable at the time, was, that possessing nothing beyond a superficial experience, they either ascribed to these physical agents powers and properties not real, or exaggerated prodigiously such as were real; so that the primordial substance chosen, though bearing a familiar name, became little better than a fiction. The Pythagoreans did the same in regard to numbers, ascribing to them properties altogether fanciful and imaginary.

Parmenides and Pythagoras, taking views of the Kosmos metaphysical and geometrical rather than physical, supplied the basis upon which Plato's speculations were built. Aristotle recognises Empedokles and Anaxagoras as having approached to his own doctrine—force abstracted or considered apart from substance, yet not absolutely detached from it. This is true about Empedokles to a certain extent, since his theory admits Love and Enmity as agents, the four elements as patients: but it is hardly true about Anaxagoras, in whose theory *Nóus* imparts nothing more than a momentary shock, exercising what modern chemists

Parmenides and Pythagoras—more nearly akin to Plato and Aristotle.

nonnulla, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, posuerunt." (Bacon, De Parmenidis, Telesii, et Campanellæ, Philosoph., p. 653-654, t. v.)

Compare Aphorism I. 50 of the *Novum Organum*.

Bacon, Parmenidis, Telesii, et Democriti Philosophia, vol. xi. ed. Montagu, p. 106-107. "Sed omnes fere antiqui (anterior to Plato), Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Democritus, de materiâ primâ in cæteris dissidentes, in hoc conveniunt, quod materiam activam, formâ nonnullâ, et formam suam dispensantem, atque intra se principium motûs habentem, posuerunt. Neque aliter cuiquam opinari licebit, qui non experientiam planè desertor esse velit. Itaque hi omnes mentem rebus submisserunt. At Plato mundum cogitationibus, Aristoteles verb etiam cogitationes verbis, adjudicavit."

"Omnino materia prima ponenda est conjuncta cum formâ primâ, ac etiam cum principio motûs primo, ut invenitur. Nam et motûs quoque abstractio

infinitas phantasias peperit, de animis, vitis, et similibus—ac si his per materiam et formam non satisfaceret, sed ex suis propriis penderent illa principia. Sed hæc tria nullo modo discernenda, sed tantummodo distinguenda: atque asserenda materia (qualiscunque ea sit) ita ornata et apparatus et formata, ut omnis virtus, essentia, actio, atque motus naturalis, ejus consecutio et emanatio esse possit. Neque propterea metuendum, ne res torpeant, aut varietas ista, quam cernimus, explicari non possit—at postea docebimus."

Playfair also observes, in his *Dissertation on the Progress of Natural Philosophy*, prefixed to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, p. 31:—

"Science was not merely stationary, but often retrograde; and the reasonings of Democritus and Anaxagoras were in many respects more solid than those of Plato and Aristotle."

See a good summary of Aristotle's cosmical views, in *Ideler, Comm. in Aristotel. Meteorologica*, l. 2, p. 323-329.

call a catalytic agency in originating movement among a stationary and stagnant mass of Homœomeries, which, as soon as they are liberated from imprisonment, follow inherent tendencies of their own, not receiving any farther impulse or direction from Noûs.

In the number of cosmical theories proposed, from Thales down to Demokritus, as well as in the diversity and even discordance of the principles on which they were founded—we note not merely the growth and development of scientific curiosity, but also the spontaneity and exuberance of constructive imagination.¹

This last is a prominent attribute of the Hellenic mind, displayed to the greatest advantage in their poetical, oratorical, historical, artistic, productions, and transferred from thence to minister to their scientific curiosity. None of their known contemporaries showed the like aptitudes, not even the Babylonians and Egyptians, who were diligent in the observation of the heavens. Now the constructive imagination is not less indispensable to the formation of scientific theories than to the compositions of art, although in the two departments it is subject to different conditions, and appeals to different canons and tests in the human mind. Each of these early Hellenic theories, though all were hypotheses and “anticipations of nature,” yet as connecting together various facts upon intelligible principles, was a step in advance; while the very number and discordance of them (urged by Sokrates² as an argument for discrediting the purpose common to all), was on the whole advantageous. It lessened the mischief arising from the imperfections of each, increased the chance of exposing such imperfections, and prevented the consecration of any one among them (with that inveterate and peremptory orthodoxy which Plato so much admires³ in the Egyptians) as an infallible dogma and an exclusive mode of

¹ Karsten observes, in his account of the philosophy of Parmenides (sect. 23, p. 241):—

“Primum mundi descriptionem consideremus. Argumentum illustre et magnificum, cujus quanto major erat veterum in contemplando admiratio, tanto minor fere in observando diligentia fuit. Quippe universi ornatum et pulcritudinem admirati, ejus naturam

partiumque ordinem non sensu assequi studuerunt, sed mente informantur ad eam pulcri perfectique speciem quæ in ipsorum animis insideret: sic ut Aristoteles ait, non sua cogitata suasque notiones ad mundi naturam, sed hanc ad illa accommodantes. Hujusmodi quoque fuit Parmenidea ratio.”

² Xenophon, Memor. I. 1, 13-14.

³ Plato, Legg. II. 650-667.

looking at facts. All the theorists laboured under the common defect of a scanty and inaccurate experience: all of them were prompted by a vague but powerful emotion of curiosity to connect together the past and present of Nature by some threads intelligible and satisfactory to their own minds; each of them followed out some analogy of his own, such as seemed to carry with it a self-justifying plausibility; and each could find some phenomena which countenanced his own peculiar view. As far as we can judge, Leukippus and Demokritus greatly surpassed the others, partly in the pains which they took to elaborate their theory, partly in the number of facts which they brought into consistency with it. The loss of the voluminous writings of Demokritus is deeply to be regretted.¹

In studying the writings of Plato and Aristotle, we must recollect that they found all these theories pre-existent or contemporaneous. We are not to imagine that they were the first who turned an enquiring eye on Nature. So far is this from being the case that Aristotle is, as it were, oppressed both by the multitude and by the discordance of his predecessors, whom he cites, with a sort of indulgent consciousness of superiority, as "the ancients" (*οἱ ἀρχαῖοι*).² The dialectic activity, inaugurated by Sokrates and Zeno, lowered the estimation of these cosmical theories in more ways than one: first, by the new topics of man and society, which Sokrates put in the foreground for discussion, and treated as the only topics worthy of discussion: next, by the great acuteness which each of them displayed in the employment of the negative weapons, and in bringing to view the weak part of an opponent's case. When we look at the number of these early theories, and the great need which all of them had to be sifted and scrutinised, we shall recognise the value of negative procedure under such circumstances, whether the negationist had or had not any better affirmative theory of his own. Sokrates,

All these theories were found in circulation by Sokrates, Zeno, Plato, and the dialecticians. Importance of the scrutiny of negative Dialectic.

¹ About the style of Demokritus, see Cicero *De Orat.* l. 11. *Orator.* c. 20.

² *Aristot. Gen. et Corr.* l. 314, a. 6; 325, a. 2; *Metaphys. A.* 1069, a. 25. See the sense of *ἀρχαῖοι*, *Met. N.* 1069, a. 2, with the note of Bonitz.

Adam Smith, in his very instructive examination of the ancient systems of Physics and Metaphysics, is too much inclined to criticise Plato and Aristotle as if they were the earliest theorists, and as if they had no predecessors.

moreover, not only turned the subject-matter of discussion from physics to ethics, but also brought into conscious review the *method* of philosophising: which was afterwards still farther considered and illustrated by Plato. General and abstract terms and their meaning, stood out as the capital problems of philosophical research, and as the governing agents of the human mind during the process: in Plato and Aristotle and the Dialectics of their age, we find the meaning or conception of these terms invested with an objective character, and represented as a cause or beginning; by which, or out of which, real concrete things were produced. Logical, metaphysical, ethical, entities, whose existence consists in being named and reasoned about, are presented to us (by Plato) as the real antecedents and producers of the sensible Kosmos and its contents, or (by Aristotle) as coeternal with the Kosmos, but as the underlying constituents—the *ἀρχαί*, primordia or ultimates—to which it was the purpose and duty of the philosopher to reduce sensible things. The men of words and debate, the dialecticians or metaphysical speculators of the period since Zeno and Sokrates, who took little notice of the facts of Nature, stand contrasted in the language of Aristotle with the antecedent physical philosophers who meddled less with debate and more with facts. The contrast is taken in his mind between Plato and Demokritus.¹

Both by Stoics and by Epikureans, during the third and second centuries B.C., Demokritus, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, and Herakleitus were studied along with Plato and Aristotle—by some, even more. Lucretius mentions and criticises all the four, though he never names Plato or Aristotle. Cicero greatly admires the style of Demokritus, whose works were arranged in tetralogies by Thrasyllus, as those of Plato were.²

¹ Aristotel. Gen. et Corr. i. 316, a. 6.—*διὸ ὅσοι ἐνερμήκασι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς, μᾶλλον δύναται ὑποτίθεσθαι τοιαύτας ἀρχάς, αἱ ἐπὶ πολλῷ δύναται συνείρην· οἱ δ' ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἀειδάρητοι τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ὄντες, πρὸς ὀλίγα βλίσσαντες, ἀποφαίνονται ῥῶον· ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅσον διαφέρουσιν οἱ φυσικῶς καὶ λογικῶς σκοποῦντες,*

&c. This remark is thoroughly Baconian.

Οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις is the phrase by which Aristotle characterises the Platonici.—Metaphys. E. 1050, b. 35.

² Epikurus is said to have especially admired Anaxagoras (Diog. I. i. x. 12).

In considering the early theorists above enumerated, there is great difficulty in finding any positive characteristic applicable to all of them. But a negative characteristic may be found, and has already been indicated by Aristotle. "The earlier philosophers (says he) had no part in dialectics: Dialectical force did not yet exist."¹ And the period upon which we are now entering is distinguished mainly by the introduction and increasing preponderance of this new element—Dialectic—first made conspicuously manifest in the Eleatic Zeno and Sokrates; two memorable persons, very different from each other, but having this property in common.

Negative attribute common to all the early theorists—little or no dialectic.

It is Zeno who stands announced, on the authority of Aristotle, as the inventor of dialectic: that is, as the first person of whose skill in the art of cross-examination and refutation conspicuous illustrative specimens were preserved. He was among the first who composed written dialogues on controversial matters of philosophy.² Both he, and his contemporary the Samian Melissus, took up the defence of the Parmenidean doctrine. It is remarkable that both one and the other were eminent as political men in their native cities. Zeno is even said to have perished miserably, in generous but fruitless attempts to preserve Elea from being enslaved by the despot Nearchus.

Zeno of Elea—Melissus.

We know the reasonings of Zeno and Melissus only through scanty fragments, and those fragments transmitted by opponents. But it is plain that both of them, especially Zeno, pressed their adversaries with grave difficulties, which it was more easy to deride than to elucidate. Both took their departure from the ground occupied by Parmenides. They agreed with him in recognising the phenomenal, apparent, or relative world, the world of sense and experience, as a subject of knowledge, though of uncertain and imperfect knowledge.

Zeno's Dialectic—he refuted the opponents of Parmenides, by showing that their assumptions led to contradictions and absurdities.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 987, b. 32. Οἱ γὰρ πρότεροι διαλεκτικῆς οὐ μετέειχον.—*M.* 1078, b. 25: διαλεκτικῇ γὰρ ἰσχύς οὐκ ἔστιν ἢν, ὥστε δύνασθαι, &c.

² Diogen. Laert. *ix.* 25-28.

The epithets applied to Zeno by Timon are remarkable.

Ἀμφοτερογλώσσου τε μέγα σθέλιος
οὐκ ἁλαπαδὸν
Σήρωνος πάντων ἐπιλαπτορος, &c.

Each of them gave, as Parmenides had done, certain affirmative opinions, or at least probable conjectures, for the purpose of explaining it.¹ But beyond this world of appearances, there lay the real, absolute, ontological, ultra-phenomenal, or Noumenal world, which Parmenides represented as *Ens unum continuum*, and which his opponents contended to be plural and discontinuous. These opponents deduced absurd and ridiculous consequences from the theory of the One. Herein both Zeno and Melissus defended Parmenides. Zeno, the better dialectician of the two, retorted upon the advocates of absolute plurality and discontinuousness, showing that their doctrine led to consequences not less absurd and contradictory than the *Ens unum* of Parmenides. He advanced many distinct arguments; some of them antinomies, deducing from the same premisses both the affirmative and the negative of the same conclusion.²

If things in themselves were many (he said) they must be both infinitely small and infinitely great. *Infinitely small*, because the many things must consist in a number of units, each essentially indivisible: but that which is indivisible has no magnitude, or is infinitely small—if indeed it can be said to have any existence whatever:³ *Infinitely great*, because each of the many things, if assumed to exist, must have

Consequences of their assumption of *Entia Plura Discontinua*. Reductiones ad Absurdum.

¹ Diog. Laert. ix. 24-29.

Zeller (Phil. d. Griech. i. p. 424, note 2) doubts the assertion that Zeno delivered probable opinions and hypotheses, as Parmenides had done before him, respecting phenomenal nature. But I see no adequate ground for such doubt.

² Simplicius, in Aristotel. Physic. f. 30. *ἐν μόντοις τῷ συγγραμμάτων αὐτοῦ, πολλά ἔχοντι ἐπιχειρήματα, καθ' ἑκάστον δείκνυσιν, ὅτι τὰ πολλά εἶναι λέγοντι συμβαίνει τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν, &c.*

³ Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 4, p. 1001, b. 7. *ἐπεὶ εἰ ἀδιαίρετον αὐτὸ τὸ ἐν, κατὰ μὲν τὸ ζήνωνος ἄξιωμα, οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη.*

ὁ γὰρ μήτε προστιθέμενον μήτε ἀφαιρούμενον ποιεῖ τι μείζον μὴδ' ἥλαττον, οὐ φησιν εἶναι τοῦτο τῶν ὄντων, ὡς δὲ ἅλων ἐστὶ ὄντος μεγέθους τοῦ ὄντος.

Seneca (Epistol. 88) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (see the passages of Themistius and Simplicius cited by

Brandis, Handbuch Philos. i. p. 412-416) conceive Zeno as having dissented from Parmenides, and as having denied the existence, not only of τὰ πολλά, but also of τὸ ἐν. But Zeno seems to have adhered to Parmenides; and to have denied the existence of τὸ ἐν, only upon the hypothesis opposed to Parmenides—namely, that τὰ πολλά existed. Zeno argued thus:—Assuming that the Real or Absolute is essentially divisible and discontinuous, divisibility must be pushed to infinity, so that you never arrive at any ultimatum, or any real unit (*ἀκρίβως ἐν*). If you admit τὰ πολλά, you renounce τὸ ἐν. The reasoning of Zeno, as far as we know it, is nearly all directed against the hypothesis of *Entia plura discontinua*. Tennemann (Gesch. Philos. i. 4, p. 206) thinks that the reasoning of Zeno is directed against the world of sense: in which I cannot agree with him.

magnitude. Having magnitude, each thing has parts which also have magnitude: these parts are, by the hypothesis, essentially discontinuous, but this implies that they are kept apart from each other by other intervening parts—and these intervening parts must be again kept apart by others. Each body will thus contain in itself an infinite number of parts, each having magnitude. In other words, it will be infinitely great.¹

Again—If things in themselves were many, they would be both finite and infinite in number. *Finite*, because they are as many as they are, neither more nor less: and every number is a finite number. *Infinite*, because being essentially separate, discontinuous, units, each must be kept apart from the rest by an intervening unit; and this again by something else intervening. Suppose a multitude A, B, C, D, &c. A and B would be continuous unless they were kept apart by some intervening unit Z. But A and Z would then be continuous unless they were kept apart by something else—Y: and so on ad infinitum: otherwise the essential discontinuousness could not be maintained.²

By these two arguments,³ drawn from the hypothesis which affirmed perpetual divisibility and denied any Continuum, Zeno showed that such *Entia multa discontinua* would have contradictory attributes: they would be both infinitely great and infinitely small—they would be both finite and infinite in number. This he advanced as a *reductio ad absurdum* against the hypothesis.

Again—If existing things be many and discontinuous, each of these must exist in a place of its own. Nothing can exist except in some place. But the place is itself an existing something: each place must therefore have a place of its own to exist in: the second place must have a third place to exist in—and so forth ad infinitum.⁴ We have here a farther *reductio ad impossibile* of the

¹ Scholia ad Aristotel. Physic. p. 334 a. ed. Brandis.

² See the argument cited by Simplicius in the words of the Zenonian treatise, in Preller, Hist. Philos. Græc. ex font. context. p. 101, sect. 156.

³ Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. f. 30. καὶ οὗτοι μὲν τὸ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἀρεῖσθαι ἐκ τῆς διχονομίας ὁρίζεται, τὸ

δὲ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος πρῶτον κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιχειροῦσιν. Compare Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. f. p. 427.

⁴ Aristotel. Physic. iv. 1, p. 209, a. 22; iv. 3, p. 210, b. 23.

Aristotle here observes that the Zenonian argument respecting place is easy to be refuted: and he proceeds to give the refutation. But his refutation

Each thing
must exist
in its own
place—
Grain of
millet not
sonorous.

original hypothesis: for that hypothesis denies the continuity of space, and represents space as a multitude of discontinuous portions or places.

Another argument of Zeno is to the following effect:—“Does a grain of millet, when dropped upon the floor, make a sound? No.—Does a bushel of millet make sound under the same circumstances? Yes.—Is there not a determinate proportion between the bushel and the grain? There is.—The sound must therefore be the same proportion between the sonorousness of the two. If one grain be not sonorous, neither can ten thousand grains be so.”¹

To appreciate the contradiction brought out by Zeno, we must recollect that he is not here reasoning about facts of sense, phenomenal and relative—but about things in themselves, absolute and ultra phenomenal realities. He did not deny the fact of sense: to appeal to that fact in reply, would have been to concede his point. The adversaries against whom he reasoned (Protagoras is mentioned, but he can hardly have been among them, if we have regard to his memorable dogma, of which more will be said presently) were those who maintained the reality of absolute substances, each for itself, with absolute attributes, apart from the fact of sense, and independent of any sensible subject. One grain of millet (Zeno argues) has no absolute sonorousness, neither can ten thousand such grains taken together have any. Upon the hypothesis of absolute reality as a discontinuous multitude, you are here driven to a contradiction which Zeno intends as an argument against the hypothesis. There is no absolute sonorousness in the ten thousand grains: the sound which they make is a phenomenal fact, relative to us as subjects of sound, and having no reality except in correlation with a hearer.²

is altogether unsatisfactory. Those who despise these Zenonian arguments as *sophisms*, ought to look at the way in which they were answered, at or near the time.

Eudémus ap. Simplic. ad Aristot. Physic. f. 131. ἀφ' οὗ γὰρ τὰς τῶν ὄντων τοῦ εἶναι· εἰ δὲ ὁ τόπος τῶν ὄντων, οὐκ ἔστιν.

¹ Aristotel. Physic. vii. 5, p. 250, a. 20, with the Scholia of Simplicius on the passage, p. 423, ed. Brandis.

² It will be seen that Aristotle in explaining this ἀπορία, takes into consideration the difference of force in the vibrations of air, and the different impressibility of the ear. The explanation is pertinent and just, if applied to the fact of sense: but it is no reply to Zeno, who did not call in question the fact of sense. Zeno is impugning the doctrine of absolute substances and absolute divisibility. To say that ten thousand grains are sonorous, but that

Other memorable arguments of Zeno against the same hypothesis were those by which he proved that if it were admitted, motion would be impossible. Upon the theory of absolute plurality and discontinuousness, every line or portion of distance was divisible into an infinite number of parts: before a moving body could get from the beginning to the end of this line, it must pass in succession over every one of these parts: but to do this in a finite time was impossible: therefore motion was impossible.¹

Zenonian arguments in regard to motion.

A second argument of the same tendency was advanced in the form of comparison between Achilles and the tortoise—the swiftest and slowest movers. The two run a race, a certain start being given to the tortoise. Zeno contends that Achilles can never overtake the tortoise. It is plain indeed, according to the preceding argument, that motion both for the one and for the other is an impossibility. Neither one nor the other can advance from the beginning to the end of any line, except by passing successively through all the parts of that line: but those parts are infinite in number, and cannot therefore be passed through in any finite time. But suppose such impossibility to be got over: still Achilles will not overtake the tortoise. For while Achilles advances one hundred yards, the tortoise has advanced ten: while Achilles passes over these additional ten yards, the tortoise will have passed over one more yard: while Achilles is passing over this remaining one yard, the tortoise will have got over one-tenth of another yard: and so on ad infinitum: the tortoise will always be in advance of him by a certain distance, which, though ever diminishing, will never vanish into nothing.

The third Zenonian argument derived its name from the flight of an arrow shot from a bow. The arrow while thus carried forward (says Zeno) is nevertheless at rest.² For the time from

no one of them separately taken is so, appears to him a contradiction, similar to what is involved in saying that a real magnitude is made up of mathematical points. Aristotle does not meet this difficulty.

¹ Aristot. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239 b., with the Scholia, p. 412 seq. ed. Brandis; Aristotel. De Lineis Insecabilibus, p. 968, a. 19.

These four arguments against absolute motion caused embarrassment to Aristotle and his contemporaries. τέτταρες δ' εἰσι λόγοι Ζήνωνος οἱ παρέχοντες τὰς δυσκολίας τοῖς λυόνειν, &c.

² Aristotel. Physic. vi. 9, p. 239, b. 8-30. τρίτος ὁ νῦν ἄρβεις, ὅτι ἡ ὁριστὸς φερομένη ἔστηκεν.

the beginning to the end of its course consists of a multitude of successive instants. During each of these instants the arrow is in a given place of equal dimension with itself. But that which is during any instant in a given place, is at rest. Accordingly during each successive instant of its flight, the arrow is at rest. Throughout its whole flight it is both in motion and at rest. This argument is a deduction from the doctrine of discontinuous time, as the preceding is a deduction from that of discontinuous space.

A fourth argument¹ was derived from the case of two equal bodies moved with equal velocity in opposite directions, and passing each other. If the body A B were at rest, the other body C D would move along the whole length of C D in two minutes. But if C D be itself moving with equal velocity in the opposite direction, A B will pass along the whole length of C D in half that time, or one minute. Hence Zeno infers that the motion of A B is nothing absolute, or belonging to the thing in itself—for if that were so, it would not be varied according to the movement of C D. It is no more than a phenomenal fact, relative to us and our comparison.

This argument, so far as I can understand its bearing, is not deduced (as those preceding are) from the premisses of opponents: but rests upon premisses of its own, and is intended to prove that motion is only relative.

These Zenonian reasonings are memorable as the earliest known manifestations of Grecian dialectic, and are probably equal in acuteness and ingenuity to anything which it ever produced. Their bearing is not always accurately conceived. Most of them are *argumenta ad hominem*: consequences contradictory and inadmissible, but shown to follow legitimately from a given hypothesis, and therefore serving to disprove the hypothesis itself.² The hypothesis was one relating

General purpose and result of the Zenonian Dialectic. Nothing is knowable except the relative.

¹ See the illustration of this argument at some length by Simplicius, especially the citation from Eudémus at the close of it—ap. Scholia ad Aristotel. p. 414, ed. Brandis.

² The scope of the Zenonian dialectic, as I have here described it, is set forth clearly by Plato, in his Par-

menides, c. 3-6, p. 127, 128. Πῶς ὁ Ζήνων, τοῦτο λέγει; εἰ πολλά ἐστὶ τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἄρα δεῖ αὐτὰ ὁμοιά τε εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοια, τοῦτο δὲ δὴ ἀδύνατον.—Οὐκοῦν εἰ ἀδύνατον τὰ τε ἀνόμοια ὁμοία εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὁμοία ἀνόμοια, ἀδύνατον δὴ καὶ πολλά εἶναι; εἰ γὰρ πολλά εἴη, πάσχοι ἂν

to the real, absolute, or ultra-phenomenal, which Parmenides maintained to be *Ens Unum Continuum*, while his opponents affirmed it to be essentially multiple and discontinuous. Upon the hypothesis of Parmenides, the Real and Absolute, being a continuous One, was obviously inconsistent with the movement and variety of the phenomenal world: Parmenides himself recognised the contradiction of the two, and his opponents made it a ground for deriding his doctrine.¹ The counter-hypothesis, of the discontinuous many, appeared at first sight not to be open to the same objection: it seemed to be more in harmony with the facts of the phenomenal and relative world, and to afford an absolute basis for them to rest upon. Against this delusive appearance the dialectic of Zeno was directed. He retorted upon the opponents, and showed that if the hypothesis of the *Unum Continuum* led to absurd consequences, that of the discontinuous many was pregnant with deductions yet more absurd and contradictory. He exhibits in detail several of these contradictory deductions, with a view to refute the hypothesis from whence they flow; and to prove that, far from performing what it promises, it is worse than useless, as entangling us in contradictory conclusions. The result of his reasoning, implied rather than announced, is—That neither of the two hypotheses are of any avail to supply a real and absolute basis for the phenomenal and relative world: That the latter must rest upon its own evidence, and must be interpreted, in so far as it can be interpreted at all, by its own analogies.

But the purport of Zeno's reasoning is mistaken, when he is

τὰ δόξιν. Ἄρα τοῦτο ἐστὶν ὃ
βούλονται σου οἱ λόγοι; οὐκ
ἄλλο τι ἢ διαμέχεσθαι παρὰ
πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα, ὥς οὐ
πολλὰ ἐστίν; Again, p. 123 D.
Ἀντιλέγει οὖν τοῦτο τὸ γράμμα πρὸς
τοὺς τὰ πολλὰ λέγοντας, καὶ ἀνταπο-
δίδωσι ταῦτα καὶ πάλιν, τοῦτο βουλό-
μεν ἐπλοῦν, ὥς ἐπὶ γελοιότατα πάσχει
ἐν αὐτῶν ἢ ὑπόθεσις, ἢ εἰ
πολλὰ ἐστίν—ἢ τοῦ ἐν εἶναι
—εἰ τις ἱκανῶς διεξέλθῃ.

Here Plato evidently represents Zeno as merely proving that contradictory conclusions followed, if you assumed a given hypothesis; which hypothesis was thereby shown to be inadmissible. But Plato alludes to

Zeno in another place (Phædrus, c. 97, p. 261) under the name of the Eleatic Palamedes, as "showing his art in speaking, by making the same things appear to the hearers like and unlike, one and many, at rest and in motion". In this last passage, the impression produced by Zeno's argumentation is brought to view, apart from the scope and purpose with which he employed it: which scope and purpose are indicated in the passage above cited from the Parmenides.

So also Isokrates (Encom. Helen. init.) Ζήνων, τὸν ταῦτα δυνατὰ καὶ ῥᾶν δόξιν περιέμενον ἀποδείκνυει.

¹ Plato, Parmenides, p. 123 D.

Mistake of supposing Zeno's *reductioes ad absurdum* of an opponent's doctrine to be contradictions of data generalised from experience.

conceived as one who wishes to delude his hearers by proving both sides of a contradictory proposition. His contradictory conclusions are elicited with the express purpose of disproving the premisses from which they are derived. For these premisses Zeno himself is not to be held responsible, since he borrows them from his opponents: a circumstance which Aristotle forgets, when he censures the Zenonian arguments as paralogisms, because they assume the

Continua, Space, and Time, to be discontinuous or divided into many distinct parts.¹ Now this absolute discontinuousness of matter, space, and time, was not advanced by Zeno as a doctrine of his own, but is the very doctrine of his opponents, taken up by him for the purpose of showing that it led to contradictory consequences, and thus of indirectly refuting it. The sentence of Aristotle is thus really in Zeno's favour, though apparently adverse to him. In respect to motion, a similar result followed from the Zenonian reasonings; namely, to show That motion, as an attribute of the Real and Absolute, was no less inconsistent with the hypothesis of those who opposed Parmenides, than with the hypothesis of Parmenides himself:—That absolute motion could no more be reconciled with the doctrine of the discontinuous Many, than with that of the Continuous One:—That motion therefore was only a phenomenal fact, relative to our sensations, conceptions, and comparisons; and having no application to the absolute. In this phenomenal point of view, neither Zeno nor Parmenides nor Melissus disputed the fact of motion. They recognised it as a portion of the world of sensation and experience; which world they tried to explain, well or ill, by analogies and conjectures derived from itself.

Though we have not the advantage of seeing the Zenonian dialectics as they were put forth by their author, yet, if we compare the substance of them as handed down to us, with those dialectics which form the latter half of the Platonic dialogue called Parmenides,

Zenonian
Dialectic—
Platonic
Parmenides.

¹ Aristotel. *Physic.* vi. 9, p. 239 b. Ζήνων δὲ παραλογίζεται· οὐ γὰρ σύνκειται ὁ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν οὐκ ὄντων τῶν ἀδιαίρετων, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἄλλο μέγεθος οὐδέν, &c.

Aristotle, in the second and third chapters of his *Physica*, canvasses and refutes the doctrine of Parmenides and Zeno respecting Ens and Unum. He maintains that Ens and Unum are

we shall find them not inferior in ingenuity, and certainly more intelligible in their purpose. Zeno furnishes no positive support to the Parmenidean doctrine, but he makes out a good negative case against the counter-doctrine.

Zeller and other able modern critics, while admitting the reasoning of Zeno to be good against this counter-doctrine, complain that he takes it up too exclusively; that One and Many did not exclude each other, and that the doctrines of Parmenides and his opponents were both true together, but neither of them true to the exclusion of the other. But when we reflect that the subject of predication on both sides was the Real (*Ens per se*), it was not likely that either Parmenides or his opponents would affirm it to be both absolutely One and Continuous, and absolutely Many and Discontinuous.¹ If the opponents of Parmenides had taken this ground, Zeno need not have imagined deductions for the purpose of showing that their hypothesis led to contradictory conclusions; for the contradictions would have stood avowedly registered in the hypothesis itself. If a man affirms both at once, he divests the predication of its absolute character, as belonging unconditionally to *Ens per se*; and he restricts it to the phenomenal, the relative, the conditioned—dependent upon our sensations and our fluctuating point of view. This was not intended either by Parmenides or by his opponents.

Views of
historians of
philosophy
respecting
Zeno.

If, indeed, we judge the question, not from their standing-point, but from our own, we shall solve the difficulty by adopting the last-mentioned answer. We shall admit that One and Many are predicates which do not necessarily exclude each other; but we shall refrain from affirming or denying either of them respecting the Real, the Absolute, the Unconditioned. Of an object absolutely one and continuous—or of objects absolutely many and discontinuous, apart from the facts of our own sense and con-

Absolute
and relative
—the first
unknown-
able.

equivocal — *πολλὰ καὶ ἑνὸς λεγόμενα*. He farther maintained that no one before him had succeeded in refuting Zeno. See the Scholia of Alexander ad Sophistic. Elench. p. 320 b. 6, ed. Brandis.

¹ That both of them could not be true respecting *Ens per se*, seems to have been considered indisputable. See the argument of Sokrates in the Parmenides of Plato, p. 129 B-E.

sciousness, and independent of any sentient subject—we neither know nor can affirm anything. Both these predicates (One—Many) are relative and phenomenal, grounded on the facts and comparisons of our own senses and consciousness, and serving only to describe, to record, and to classify, those facts. Discrete quantity or number, or succession of distinct unities—continuous quantity, or motion and extension—are two conceptions derived from comparison, abstracted and generalised from separate particular phenomena of our consciousness; the continuous, from our movements and the consciousness of persistent energy involved therein—the discontinuous, from our movements, intermitted and renewed, as well as from our impressions of sense. We compare one discrete quantity with another, or one continual quantity with another, and we thus ascertain many important truths: but we select our unit, or our standard of motion and extension, as we please, or according to convenience, subject only to the necessity of adapting our ulterior calculations consistently to this unit, when once selected. The same object may thus be considered sometimes as one, sometimes as many; both being relative, and depending upon our point of view. Motion, Space, Time, may be considered either as continuous or as discontinuous: we may reason upon them either as one or the other, but we must not confound the two points of view with each other. When, however, we are called upon to travel out of the Relative, and to decide between Parmenides and his opponents—whether the Absolute be One or Multitudinous—we have only to abstain from affirming either, or (in other words) to confess our ignorance. We know nothing of an absolute, continuous, self-existent One, or of an absolute, discontinuous Many.

Some critics understand Zeno to have denied motion as a fact—opposing sophistical reasoning to certain and familiar experience. Upon this view is founded the Zeno did not deny motion as a fact, phenomenal and relative. well-known anecdote, that Diogenes the Cynic refuted the argument by getting up and walking. But I do not so construe the scope of his argument. He did not deny motion as a fact. It rested with him on the evidence of sense, acknowledged by every one. It was therefore only a phenomenal fact relative to our consciousness, sensation,

movements, and comparisons. As such, but as such only, did Zeno acknowledge it. What he denied was, motion as a fact belonging to the Absolute, or as deducible from the Absolute. He did not deny the Absolute or Thing in itself, as an existing object, but he struck out variety, divisibility, and motion, from the list of its predicates. He admitted only the Parmenidean Ens, one, continuous, unchanged, and immovable, with none but negative predicates, and severed from the relative world of experience and sensation.

Other reasoners, contemporary with Zeno, did not agree with him, in admitting the Absolute, even as an object with no predicates, except unity and continuity. They denied it altogether, both as substratum and as predicate. To establish this negation is the purpose of a short treatise ascribed to the rhetor or Sophist Gorgias, a contemporary of Zeno; but we are informed that all the reasonings, which Gorgias employed, were advanced, or had already been advanced, by others before him.¹ Those reasonings are so imperfectly preserved, that we can make out little more than the general scope.

Gorgias the Leontine—did not admit the Absolute, even as conceived by Parmenides.

Ens, or Entity *per se* (he contended), did not really exist. Even granting that it existed, it was unknowable by any one. And even granting that it both existed, and was known by any one, still such person could not communicate his knowledge of it to others.²

His reasonings against the Absolute, either as Ens or Entia.

As to the first point, Ens was no more real or existent than Non-Ens: the word Non-Ens must have an objective meaning, as well as the word Ens: it was Non-Ens, therefore it *was*, or existed. Both of them existed alike, or rather neither of them existed. Moreover, if Ens existed, it must exist either as One or as Many—either as eternal or as generated—either in itself, or

¹ See the last words of the Aristotelian or Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise, *De Melisso, Xenophane et Gorgia*, p. 980.

² ἄναρς δὲ ἀνὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀποχαιρέων εἶναι ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε ἐν τῇ περὶ ἐκείνου ἐκείνου καὶ ταύτας ἵστασθαι.

³ ἄναρς is the reading of Mullach in his edition of this treatise (p. 79), in place of ἀνάρης or ἀνάρης.

⁴ See the treatise of Aristotle or

Pseudo-Aristotle, *De Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia*, in *Aristot.* p. 979-980, Bekker. also in Mullach's edition, p. 62-78. The argument of Gorgias is also abridged by Sextus Empiric. adv. *Mathemat.* vii. p. 384, sect. 65-86.

See also a copious commentary on the Aristotelian treatise in Foss, *De Gorgia Leontino*, p. 115 seq.

The text of the Aristotelian treatise is so corrupt as to be often unintelligible.

in some other place. But Melissus, Zeno, and other previous philosophers, had shown sufficient cause against each of these alternatives separately taken. Each of the alternative essential predicates had been separately disproved ; therefore the subject, *Ens*, could not exist under either of them, or could not exist at all.

As to the second point, let us grant that *Ens* or *Entia* exist ; they would nevertheless (argued Gorgias) be incogitable and unknowable. To be cogitated is no more an attribute of *Ens* than of *Non-Ens*. The fact of cogitation does not require *Ens* as a condition, or attest *Ens* as an absolute or thing in itself. If our cogitation required or attained *Ens* as an indispensable object, then there could be no fictitious *cogitata* nor any false propositions. We think of a man flying in the air, or of a chariot race on the surface of the sea. If our *cogitata* were realities, these must be so as well as the rest : if realities alone were the object of cogitation, then these could not be thought of. As *Non-Ens* was thus undeniably the object of cogitation, so *Ens* could not be its object : for what was true respecting one of these contraries, could not be true respecting the other.

As to the third point : Assuming *Ens* both to exist and to be known by you, you cannot (said Gorgias) declare or explain it to any one else. You profess to have learnt what *Ens* is in itself, by your sight or other perceptions ; but you declare to others by means of words, and these words are neither themselves the absolute *Ens*, nor do they bring *Ens* before the hearer. Even though you yourself know *Ens*, you cannot, by your words, enable *him* to know it. If he is to know *Ens*, he must know it in the same way as you. Moreover, neither your words, nor *Ens* itself, will convey to the hearer the same knowledge as to you ; for the same cannot be at once in two distinct subjects ; and even if it were, yet since you and the hearer are not completely alike, so the effect of the same object on both of you will not appear to be like.¹

¹ In this third branch of the argument, showing that *Ens*, even if known, cannot be communicable to others, Gorgias travels beyond the Absolute, and directs his reasoning against the communicability of the Relative or

Such is the reasoning, as far as we can make it out, whereby Gorgias sought to prove that the absolute Ens was neither existent, nor knowable, nor communicable by words from one person to another.

The arguments both of Zeno and of Gorgias (the latter presenting the thoughts of others earlier than himself), dating from a time coinciding with the younger half of the life of Sokrates, evince a new spirit and purpose in Grecian philosophy, as compared with the Ionians, the two first Eleates, and the Pythagoreans. Zeno and Gorgias exhibit conspicuously the new element of dialectic: the force of the negative arm in Grecian philosophy, brought out into the arena, against those who dogmatized or propounded positive theories: the fertility of Grecian imagination in suggesting doubts and difficulties, for which the dogmatists, if they aspired to success and reputation, had to provide answers. Zeno directed his attack against one scheme of philosophy—the doctrine of the Absolute Many: leaving by implication the rival doctrine—the Absolute One of Parmenides—in exclusive possession of the field, yet not reinforcing it with any new defences against objectors. Gorgias impugned the philosophy of the Absolute in either or both of its forms—as One or as Many: not with a view of leaving any third form as the only survivor, or of providing any substitute from his own invention, but of showing that Ens, the object of philosophical research, could neither be found nor known. The negative purpose, disallowing altogether the philosophy of Nature (as then conceived, not as now conceived), was declared without reserve by Gorgias, as we shall presently find that it was by Sokrates also.

Zeno and Gorgias—contrasted with the earlier Grecian philosophers.

It is the opening of the negative vein which imparts from this time forward a new character to Grecian philosophy. The positive and negative forces, emanating from different aptitudes in the human mind, are now both of them actively developed, and in strenuous anti-

New character of Grecian philosophy—antithesis of affirmations.

Phenomenal also. Both of his arguments against such communicability have some foundation, and serve to prove that the communicability can-

not be exact or entire, even in the case of sensible facts. The sensations, thoughts, emotions, &c., of one person are not *exactly* like those of another.

tive and negative—proof and disproof. thesis to each other. Philosophy is no longer exclusively confined to dogmatists, each searching in his imagination for the Absolute Ens of Nature, and each propounding what seems to him the only solution of the problem. Such thinkers still continue their vocation, but under new conditions of success, and subject to the scrutiny of numerous dissentient critics. It is no longer sufficient to propound a theory,¹ either in obscure, oracular metaphors and half-intelligible aphorisms, like Herakleitus—or in verse more or less impressive, like Parmenides or Empedokles. The theory must be sustained by proofs, guarded against objections, defended against imputations of inconsistency: moreover, it must be put in comparison with other rival theories, the defects of which must accordingly be shown up along with it. Here are new exigencies, to which dogmatic philosophers had not before been obnoxious. They were now required to be masters of the art of dialectic attack and defence, not fearing the combat of question and answer—a combat in which, assuming tolerable equality between the duellists, the questioner had the advantage of the sun, or the preferable position,² and the farther advantage of choosing where to aim his blows. To expose fallacy or inconsistency, was found to be both an easier process, and a more appreciable display of ingenuity, than the discovery and establishment of truth in such manner as to command assent. The weapon of negation, refutation, cross-examination, was wielded for its own results, and was found hard to parry by the affirmative philosophers of the day.

¹ The repugnance of the Heraklitean philosophers to the scrutiny of dialectical interrogation is described by Plato in strong language, it is indeed even caricatured. (*Theætétus*, 179-180.)

² *Theokritus*, *Idyll* xxii. 83; the description of the pugilistic contest between Pollux and Amyrus:—

*ἔνθα πολὺς σφισι μάχος ἐπειγομένοισιν
ἐτύχθη,
ὁππότερος κατὰ νῦτα λάβη φάος ἡελίου·
ἀλλ' ἰδρίη μάγαν ἔνθερα παρήλυτες ἃ
Πολύδευκες·
βάλλετο δ' ἐκτίνεσσιν ἄπαν Ἀμύνκοιο
πρόσωπον.*

To toss up for the sun, was a practice not yet introduced between pugilists.

APPENDIX.

To illustrate by comparison the form of Grecian philosophy, before Dialectic was brought to bear upon it, I transcribe from two eminent French scholars (M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire and Professor Robert Mohl) some account of the mode in which the Indian philosophy has always been kept on record and communicated.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (in his *Premier Mémoire sur le Sâṅkhya*, pp. 5-11) gives the following observations upon the Sâṅkhya or philosophy of Kapila, one of the principal systems of Sanskrit philosophy : date (as supposed) about 700 B.C.

There are two sources from whence the Sâṅkhya philosophy is known :—

“ 1. Les Soûtras ou aphorismes de Kapila.

“ 2. Le traité déjà connu et traduit sous le nom de Sâṅkhya Kârikâ, c'est à dire Vers Mémoriaux du Sâṅkhya.

“ Les Soûtras de Kapila sont en tout au nombre de 499, divisés en six lectures, et répartis inégalement entre chacune d'elles. Les Soûtras sont accompagnés d'un commentaire qui les explique, et qui est d'un brahmane nommé le Mendant. Le commentateur explique avec des développements plus ou moins longs les Soûtras de Kapila, qu'il cite un à un.

“ Les Soûtras sont en général très concis : parfois ils ne se composent que de deux ou trois mots, et jamais ils ne comprennent plus d'une phrase. Cette forme aphoristique, sous laquelle se présente à nous la philosophie Indienne—est celle qu'a prise la science Indienne dans toutes ses branches, depuis la grammaire jusqu' à la philosophie. Les Soûtras de Panini, qui a réduit toutes les règles de la grammaire sanscrite en 3996 aphorismes, ne sont pas moins concis que ceux de Kapila. Ce mode étrange d'exposition tient dans l'Inde à la manière même dont la science s'est transmise d'âge en âge. Un maître n'a généralement qu'un disciple : il lui suffit, pour la doctrine qu'il communique, d'avoir des points de repère, et le commentaire oral qu'il ajoute

à ces sentences pour les expliquer, met le disciple en état de les bien comprendre. Le disciple lui-même, une fois qu'il en a pénétré le sens véritable, n'a pas besoin d'un symbole plus développé, et la concision même des aphorismes l'aide à les mieux retenir. *C'est une initiation qu'il a reçue : et les sentences, dans lesquelles cette initiation se résume, restent toujours assez claires pour lui.*

"Mais il n'en est pas de même pour les lecteurs étrangers, et il serait difficile de trouver rien de plus obscur que ces Sôûtras. Les commentaires mêmes ne suffisent pas toujours à les rendre parfaitement intelligibles.

"Le seul exemple d'une forme analogue dans l'histoire de l'esprit humain et de la science en Occident, nous est fourni par les Aphorismes d'Hippocrate : eux aussi s'adressaient à des adeptes, et ils réclamaient, comme les Sôûtras Indiens, l'explication des maîtres pour être bien compris par les disciples. Mais cet exemple unique n'a point tiré à conséquence dans le monde occidental, tandis que dans le monde Indien l'aphorisme est resté pendant de longs siècles la forme spéciale de la science : et les développements de pensée qui nous sont habituels, et qui nous semblent indispensables, ont été réservés aux commentaires.

"La Sâmkhya Kârikâ est en vers : En Grèce, la poésie a été pendant quelque temps la langue de la philosophie ; Empédocle, Parménide, ont écrit leurs systèmes en vers. Ce n'est pas Kapila qui l'a écrite. Entre Kapila, et l'auteur de la Kârikâ, Isvara Krishna, on doit compter quelques centaines d'années tout au moins : et le second n'a fait que rédiger en vers, pour aider la mémoire des élèves, la doctrine que le maître avait laissée sous la forme axiomatique.

"On conçoit, du reste, sans peine, que l'usage des vers mémoriaux se soit introduit dans l'Inde pour l'enseignement et la transmission de la science : c'était une conséquence nécessaire de l'usage des aphorismes. Les sciences les plus abstraites (mathematics, astronomy, algebra), emploient aussi ce procédé, quoiqu'il semble peu fait pour leur austérité et leur précision. Ainsi, le rythme est, avec les aphorismes, et par le même motif, la forme à peu près générale de la science dans l'Inde."

(Kapila as a personage is almost legendary ; nothing exact is known about him. His doctrine passes among the Indians "comme une sorte de révélation divine".—Pp. 252, 253.)

M. Mohl observes as follows :—

"Ceci m'amène aux Pouranas. Nous n'avons plus rien du Pourana primitif, qui paraît avoir été une cosmogonie, suivie d'une histoire des Dieux et des familles héroïques. Les sectes ont fini par s'approprier

ce cadre, après des transformations dont nous ne savons ni le nombre ni les époques : et s'en sont servies, pour exalter chacune son dieu, et y fondre, avec des débris de l'ancienne tradition, leur mythologie plus moderne. Ce que les Pouranas sont pour le peuple, les six systèmes de philosophie le sont pour les savants. Nous trouvons ces systèmes dans la forme abstruse que les Hindous aiment à donner à leur science : chaque école a ses aphorismes, qui, sous forme de vers mnémoniques, contiennent dans le moins grand nombre de mots possible tous les résultats d'une école. Mais nous n'avons aucun renseignement sur les commencements de l'école, sur les discussions que l'élaboration du système a dû provoquer, sur les hommes qui y ont pris part, sur la marche et le développement des idées : nous avons le système dans sa dernière forme, et rien ne nous permet de remplir l'espace qui le sépare des théories plus vagues que l'on trouve dans les derniers écrits de l'époque védique, à laquelle pourtant tout prétend se rattacher. À partir de ces aphorismes, nous avons des commentaires et des traités d'exposition et d'interprétation : mais les idées premières, les termes techniques, et le système entier, sont fixés antérieurement. Tous ces systèmes reposent sur une analyse psychologique très raffinée ; et chacun a sa terminologie précise, et à laquelle la nôtre ne répond que fort imparfaitement : il faut donc, sous peine de se tromper et de tromper ses lecteurs, que les traducteurs créent une foule de termes techniques, ce qui n'est pas la moindre difficulté de ce travail."—R. Mohl, 'Rapport Annuel Fait à la Société Asiatique,' 1863, pp. 108-105 ; collected edition, 'Vingt-sept ans d'histoire des Études Orientales,' vol. ii. pp. 496, 498-9.

When the purpose simply is to imprint affirmations on the memory, and to associate them with strong emotions of reverential belief—mnemonic verses and aphorisms are suitable enough ; Empedokles employed verse, Herakleitus and the Pythagoreans expressed themselves in aphorisms—brief, half-intelligible, impressive symbols. But if philosophy is ever to be brought out of such twilight into the condition of "reasoned truth," this cannot be done without submitting all the affirmations to cross-examining opponents—to the scrutiny of a negative Dialectic. It is the theory and application of this Dialectic which we are about to follow in Sokrates and Plato.

CHAPTER III. *

OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKRATES.

HAVING dwelt at some length on the life and compositions of Plato, I now proceed to place in comparison with him some other members of the Sokratic philosophical family : less eminent, indeed, than the illustrious author of the Republic, yet still men of marked character, ability, and influence.¹ Respecting one of the brethren, Xenophon, who stands next to Plato in celebrity, I shall say a few words separately in my next and concluding chapter.

The ascendancy of Sokrates over his contemporaries was powerfully exercised in more than one way. He brought into vogue new subjects both of indefinite amplitude, and familiar as well as interesting to every one. On these subjects, moreover, he introduced, or at least popularised, a new method of communication, whereby the relation of teacher and learner, implying a direct transfer of ready-made knowledge from the one to the other, was put aside. He substituted an interrogatory process, at once destructive and suggestive, in which the teacher began by unteaching and the learner by unlearning what was supposed to be already known, for the purpose of provoking in the learner's mind a self-operative energy of thought, and an internal generation of new notions. Lastly, Sokrates worked forcibly upon the minds of several

* As stated in the prefatory note to this edition, the present and the following chapter have been, for convenience, transferred from the place given to them by the author, to their present position.

¹ Dionysius of Halikarnassus contrasts Plato with τὸ Σωκράτους διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν (De Adm. Vi Dic. Demos. then. p. 956.) Compare also Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp. p. 762, where he contrasts the style and phraseology of Plato with that of the Σωκρατικοὶ διάλογοι generally.

friends, who were in the habit of attending him when he talked in the market-place or the palaestra. Some tried to copy his wonderful knack of colloquial cross-examination: how far they did so with success or reputation we do not know: but Xenophon says that several of them would only discourse with those who paid them a fee, and that they thus sold for considerable sums what were only small fragments obtained gratuitously from the rich table of their master.¹ There were moreover several who copied the general style of his colloquies by composing written dialogues. And thus it happened that the great master,—he who passed his life in the oral application of his Elenchus, without writing anything,—though he left no worthy representative in his own special career, became the father of numerous written dialogues and of a rich philosophical literature.²

Besides Plato and Xenophon, whose works are known to us, we hear of Alexamenus, Antisthenes, Æschines, Aristippus, Bryson, Eukleides, Phædon, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, &c., as having composed dialogues of this sort.

Names of
those com-
panions.

All of them were companions of Sokrates; several among them either set down what they could partially recollect of his conversations, or employed his name as a dramatic speaker of their own thoughts. Seven of these dialogues were ascribed to Æschines, twenty-five to Aristippus, seventeen to Kriton, twenty-three to Simmias, three to Kebês, six to Eukleides, four to Phædon. The compositions of Antisthenes were far more numerous: ten

¹ Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 60. ὅν τινας μικρὰ μέρη παρ' ἐκείνου προίκα λαβόντες πολλοὺ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπώλουν, καὶ οὐκ ἔσαν ὥστερ' ἐκείνος δημοτικοί· τοῖς γὰρ μὴ ἔχουσιν χρήματα διδόναι οὐκ ἔθελον διαλέγεσθαι.

² We find a remarkable proof how long the name and conception of Sokrates lasted in the memory of the Athenian public, as having been the great progenitor of the philosophy and philosophers of the fourth century B.C. in Athens. It was about 306 B.C., almost a century after the death of Sokrates, that Democharês (the nephew of the orator Demosthenes) delivered an oration before the Athenian judiciary for the purpose of upholding the law proposed by Sophokles, forbidding philosophers or Sophists to lecture without a license obtained

from the government; which law, passed a year before, had determined the secession of all the philosophers from Athens until the law was repealed. In this oration Democharês expatiated on the demerits of many philosophers, their servility, profligate ambition, rapacity, want of patriotism, &c., from which Athenæus makes several extracts. Τοιοῦτοι εἰσιν οἱ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας στρατηγοί· περὶ ὧν Δημοχάρης ἔλεγεν, —Ὅσπερ ἐκ θυμβρᾶς οὐδὲς ἂν δύνατο κατασκευάσαι λόγῳ, οὐδ' ἐκ Σωκράτους στρατιωτὴν ἀμεμπτον.

Demetrius Phalereus also, in or near that same time, composed a Σωκράτους ἀπολογία (Dialog. La. ix. 37-57). This shows how long the interest in the personal fate and character of Sokrates endured at Athens.

volumes of them, under a variety of distinct titles (some of them probably not in the form of dialogues) being recorded by Diogenes.¹ Aristippus was the first of the line of philosophers called Kyrenaic or Hedonic, afterwards (with various modifications) Epikurean: Antisthenes, of the Cynics and Stoics: Eukleides, of the Megaric school. It seems that Aristippus, Antisthenes, Eukleides, and Bryson, all enjoyed considerable reputation, as contemporaries and rival authors of Plato: Æschines, Antisthenes (who was very poor), and Aristippus, are said to have received money for their lectures; Aristippus being named as the first who thus departed from the Sokratic canon.²

Æschines the companion of Sokrates did not become (like Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus) the founder of a succession or sect of philosophers. The few fragments remaining of his dialogues do not enable us to appreciate their merit. He seems to have employed the name of Aspasia largely as a conversing personage, and to have esteemed her highly. He also spoke with great admiration of

Æschines—
Oration of
Lysias
against him.

¹ Diogenes Laert. i. 47-61-83, vi. 15; Athenæ. xi. p. 505 C.

Bryson is mentioned by Theopompus ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 508 D. Theopompus, the contemporary of Aristotle and pupil of Isokrates, had composed an express treatise or discourse against Plato's dialogues, in which discourse he affirmed that most of them were not Plato's own, but borrowed in large proportion from the dialogues of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson. Ephippus also, the comic writer (of the fourth century B.C., contemporary with Theopompus, perhaps even earlier), spoke of Bryson as contemporary with Plato (Athenæ. xi. 509 C). This is good proof to authenticate Bryson as a composer of "Sokratic dialogues" belonging to the Platonic age, along with Antisthenes and Aristippus: whether Theopompus is correct when he asserts that Plato borrowed much from the three, is very doubtful.

Many dialogues were published by various writers, and ascribed falsely to one or other of the *virt Sokratici*: Diogenes (ii. 64) reports the judgment delivered by Panætius, which among them were genuine and which not so. Panætius considered that the dialogues

ascribed to Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Æschines, were genuine that those assigned to Phædon and Eukleides were doubtful; and that the rest were all spurious. He thus regarded as spurious those of Alexamenus, Kriton, Simmias, Kebês, Simon, Bryson, &c., or he did not know them all. It is possible that Panætius may not have known the dialogues of Bryson; if he did know them, and believed them to be spurious, I should not accept his assertion, because I think that it is outweighed by the contrary testimony of Theopompus. Moreover, though Panætius was a very able man, our confidence in his critical estimate is much shaken when we learn that he declared the Platonic Phædon to be spurious.

² Diogen. Laert. i. 62-65; Athenæus, xi. p. 507 C.

Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. De Homero et Socrate, vol. ii. p. 289, Reiske) must have had in his view some of these other Sokratic dialogues, not those composed by Plato or Xenophon, when he alludes to conversations of Sokrates with Lysikles, Glykon, and Anytus; what he says about Anytus can hardly refer to the Platonic Menon.

Themistokles. But in regard to present or recent characters, he stands charged with much bitterness and ill-nature: especially we learn that he denounced the Sophists Prodikus and Anaxagoras, the first on the ground of having taught Theramenes, the second as the teacher of two worthless persons—Ariphrades and Arignôtus. This accusation deserves greater notice, because it illustrates the odium raised by Melétus against Sokrates as having instructed Kritias and Alkibiades.¹ Moreover, we have Æschines presented to us in another character, very unexpected in a *vir Socraticus*. An action for recovery of money alleged to be owing was brought in the Athenian Dikastery against Æschines, by a plaintiff, who set forth his case in a speech composed by the rhetor Lysias. In this speech it is alleged that Æschines, having engaged in trade as a preparer and seller of unguents, borrowed a sum of money at interest from the plaintiff; who affirms that he counted with assurance upon honest dealing from a disciple of Sokrates, continually engaged in talking about justice and virtue.² But so far was this expectation from being realized, that Æschines had behaved most dishonestly. He repaid neither principal nor interest; though a judgment of the Dikastery had been obtained against him, and a branded slave belonging to him had been seized under it. Moreover, Æschines had been guilty of dishonesty equally scandalous in his dealings with many other creditors also. Furthermore, he had made love to a rich woman seventy years old, and had got possession of her property; cheating and impoverishing her family. His character as a profligate and cheat was well known and could be proved by many

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 24-32; Cicero, De Invent. i. 31; Athenæus, v. 220. Some other citations will be found in Fischer's collection of the few fragments of Æschines Socraticus (Leipzig, 1783, p. 63 seq.), though some of the allusions which he produces seem rather to belong to the orator Æschines. The statements of Athenæus, from the dialogue of Æschines called Telaugê, are the most curious. The dialogue contained, among other things, τὴν Προδικὸν καὶ Ἀναξαγόρου τῶν σοφιστῶν διαμῶνῃσιν, where we see Anaxagoras denominated a *Sophist* (see also Diodor. xii. 39) as well as Prodikus.

Fischer considers the three Pseudo-

Platonic dialogues—Περὶ Ἀρετῆς, Περὶ Πλούτου, Περὶ Θανάτου—as the works of Æschines. But this is now established.

² Athenæus, xlii. pp. 611-612. Παισθεὶς δ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα λέγοντος, καὶ ἅμα οἰόμενος τούτου Λισχίνην Σωκράτους γεγενῆσθαι μαθητὴν, καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀρετῆς πολλοὺς καὶ σεμνοὺς λέγοντα λόγους, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐπιχειρήσαι οὐδὲ τολμήσαι ἄνερ οἱ πονηρότατοι καὶ ἀδικώτατοι ἄνθρωποι ἐπιχειροῦσι πράττειν.

We read also about another oration of Lysias against Æschines—περὶ συκοφαντίας (Diogen. Laert. ii. 63), unless indeed it be the same oration differently described.

witnesses. Such are the allegations against Æschines, contained in the fragment of a lost speech of Lysias, and made in open court by a real plaintiff. How much of them could be fairly proved, we cannot say : but it seems plain at least that Æschines must have been a trader as well as a philosopher. All these writers on philosophy must have had their root and dealings in real life, of which we know scarce anything.

The dialogues known by the title of Sokratic dialogues,¹ were composed by all the principal companions of Sokrates, and by many who were not companions. Yet though thus composed by many different authors, they formed a recognised class of literature, noticed by the rhetorical critics as distinguished for plain, colloquial, unstudied, dramatic execution, suiting the parts to the various speakers : from which general character Plato alone departed—and he too not in all of his dialogues. By the Sokratic authors

Written
Sokratic
Dialogues—
their general
character.

¹ Aristotel. ap. Athenæum, xi. p. 506 C; Rhetoric, iii. 16.

Dionys. Halikarnass. ad Cn. Pomp. de Platone, p. 762, Reiske. Τραφεῖς (Plato) ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς διαλόγοις ἰσχυροτάτοις οὐδὲ καὶ ἀκριβεστάτοις, οὐ μάλιστα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῆς Γοργίου καὶ Θουκυδίδου κατασκευῆς ἱσχυροτάτοις; also, De Admir. vi. Dicend. in Demosthene, p. 968. Again in the same treatise De Adm. v. D. Demosth. p. 956. ἡ δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέξις, ἡ λιτὴ καὶ ἀφελὴς καὶ δοκούσα κατασκευὴν τε καὶ ἰσχυρὴν τὴν πρὸς ἰδίωτὴν ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὁμοιωτῆρα, πολλοὺς μὲν ἔσχε καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδράς προστάτας—καὶ οἱ τῶν ἠθικῶν διαλόγων ποιηταί, ὧν ἦν τὸ Σωκρατικὸν διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν, ἔξω Πλάτωνος, &c.

Dionysius calls this style ὁ Σωκρατικὸς χαρακτήρ, p. 1025. I presume it is the same to which the satirist Timon applies the words:—

Ἀσθενικὴ τε λόγων δυας ἢ τριὰς ἢ ἐνὶ πόντῳ,
Οἷος Ξειρόφωνος, ἥτ' Αἰσχίνου οὐκ ἐπι-
πειθῆς
γράφει.— Diogen. La. ii. 55.

Lucian, Hermogenes, Phrynichus, Longinus, and some later rhetorical critics of Greece judged more favourably than Timon about the style of Æschines as well as of Xenophon. See Zeller, Phil. d. Griech. ii. p. 171, sec.

ed. And Demetrius Phalereus (or the author of the treatise which bears his name), as well as the rhetor Aristides, considered Æschines and Plato as the best representatives of the Σωκρατικὸς χαρακτήρ, Demetr. Phaler. De Interpretat. 310; Aristides, Orat. Platon. i. p. 35; Photius, Cods. 61 and 158; Longinus, ap. Walz. ix. p. 559, c. 2. Lucian says (De Parasito, 33) that Æschines passed some time with the elder Dionysius at Syracuse, to whom he read aloud his dialogue, entitled Miltiades, with great success.

An inedited discourse of Michael Psellus, printed by Mr. Cox in his very careful and valuable catalogue of the MSS. in the Bodleian Library, recites the same high estimate as having been formed of Æschines by the chief ancient rhetorical critics: they reckoned him among and alongside of the foremost Hellenic classical writers, as having his own peculiar merits of style—παρὰ μὲν Πλάτῳ, τὴν διαλογικὴν φράσιν, παρὰ δὲ τοῦ Σωκρατικοῦ Αἰσχίνου, τὴν ἐμμελὴ συνθήκην τῶν λείων, παρὰ δὲ Θουκυδίδου, &c. See Mr. Cox's Catalogue, pp. 743-745. Cicero speaks of the Sokratic philosophers generally, as writing with an elegant playfulness of style (De Officiis, i. 22, 104); which is in harmony with Lucian's phrase—Αἰσχίνης ὁ τοὺς διαλόγους μακροῦς καὶ ἀστέλους γράψας, &c.

generally Sokrates appears to have been presented under the same main features: his proclaimed confession of ignorance was seldom wanting: and the humiliation which his cross-questioning inflicted even upon insolent men like Alkibiades, was as keenly set forth by Æschines as by Plato: moreover the Sokratic disciples generally were fond of extolling the Dæmon or divining prophecy of their master.¹ Some dialogues circulating under the name of some one among the companions of Sokrates, were spurious, and the authorship was a point not easy to determine. Simon, a currier at Athens, in whose shop Sokrates often conversed, is said to have kept memoranda of the conversations which he heard, and to have afterwards published them: Æschines also, and some other of the Sokratic companions, were suspected of having preserved or procured reports of the conversations of the master himself, and of having made much money after his death by delivering them before select audiences.² Aristotle speaks of the followers of Antisthenes as unschooled, vulgar men: but Cicero appears to have read with satisfaction the dialogues of Antisthenes, whom he designates as acute though not well-instructed.³ Other accounts describe his dialogues as composed in a rhetorical style, which is ascribed to the fact of his having received lessons from Gorgias:⁴ and Theopompus must have held in considerable estimation the dialogues of that

¹ Cicero, Brutus, 85, s. 292; De Divinatione, i. 54-122; Aristides, Orat. xiv. περὶ Περικλέους, vol. ii. pp. 24-25; Orat. xlv. Ὑπερ τῶν Τερράμων, vol. ii. pp. 296-309, ed. Dindorf. It appears by this that some of the dialogues composed by Æschines were mistaken by various persons for actual conversations held by Sokrates. It was argued, that because Æschines was inferior to Plato in ability, he was more likely to have repeated accurately what he had heard Sokrates say.

² Diog. L. ii. 122. He mentions a collection of thirty-three dialogues in one volume, purporting to be reports of real colloquies of Sokrates, published by Simon. But they can hardly be regarded as genuine.

The charge here mentioned is advanced by Xenophon (see a preceding note, Memorab. i. 2, 60), against some persons (rusts), but without specifying

names. About Æschines, see Athenæus, xiii. p. 611 C; Diogen. Laert. ii. 62.

³ Cicero, Epist. ad Atticum, xii. 38:—"viri acuti magis quam eruditi," is the judgment of Cicero upon Antisthenes. I presume that these words indicate the same defect as that which is intended by Aristotle when he says—οἱ Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ οἱ οὐκ ἀπαιδεύτοι, Metaphysic. H. 3, p. 1043, b. 24. It is plain, too, that Lucian considered the compositions of Antisthenes as not unworthy companions to those of Plato (Lucian, adv. Indoctum, c. 27).

⁴ Diogen. Laert. vi. 1. If it be true that Antisthenes received lessons from Gorgias, this proves that Gorgias must sometimes have given lessons gratis; for the poverty of Antisthenes is well known. See the Symposium of Xenophon.

same author, as well as those of Aristippus and Bryson, when he accused Plato of having borrowed from them largely.¹

Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, were all companions and admirers of Sokrates, as was Plato. But none of them were his disciples, in the strict sense of the word: none of them continued or enforced his doctrines, though each used his name as a spokesman. During his lifetime the common attachment to his person formed a bond of union, which ceased at his death. There is indeed some ground for believing that Plato then put himself forward in the character of leader, with a view to keep the body united.² We must recollect that Plato though then no more than twenty-eight years of age, was the only one among them who combined the advantages of a noble Athenian descent, opulent circumstances, an excellent education, and great native genius. Eukleides and Aristippus were neither of them Athenians: Antisthenes was very poor: Xenophon was absent on service in the Cyreian army. Plato's proposition, however, found no favour with the others and was even indignantly repudiated by Apollodorus: a man ardently attached to Sokrates, but violent and overboiling in all his feelings.³ The companions of Sokrates, finding themselves unfavourably looked upon at Athens after his death, left the city for a season and followed Eukleides to Megara. How long they stayed there we do not know. Plato is said, though I think on no sufficient authority, to have remained absent from Athens for several years continuously. It seems certain (from an anecdote recounted by Aristotle)⁴ that he talked with something like

¹ Theopomp. ap. Athenæ. xi. p. 508. See K. F. Hermann, Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, p. 300.

An extract of some length, of a dialogue composed by Aschines between Sokrates and Alkibiades, is given by Aristides, Or. xlv. Ὑπερ τῶν Τερράπων, vol. ii. pp. 292-294, ed. Dindorf.

² Athenæus, xi. p. 507 A-B. from the *ὑπομνήματα* of the Delphian Hegesander. Who Hegesander was, I do not know: but there is nothing improbable in the anecdote which he recounts.

³ Plato, Phædon. pp. 69 A, 117 D. Eukleides, however, though his school

was probably at Megara, seems to have possessed property in Attica: for there existed, among the orations of Isæus, a pleading composed by that rhetor for some client—Πρὸς Εὐκλείδην τὸν Σωκρατικὸν ἀμφισβήτησιν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χωρίου Λύσεων (Dion. Hal., Isæ., c. 14, p. 612 Reiske). Harpokr.—Ὅτι τὰ ἐπισημασμένα: also under some other words by Harpokration and by Pollux, viii. 48.

⁴ Aristot. Rhet. ii. 23, p. 1398, b. 30. ἢ ὡς Ἀριστικῶτος, πρὸς Πλάτωνα ἐπαγγελτικώτερόν τι εἰκότα, ὡς ἦν—ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ γ' ἐταῖρος ἡμῶν, ἔφη, οὐθέν τοιοῦτον—λέγων τὸν Σωκράτην.

arrogance among the companions of Sokrates: and that Aristippus gently rebuked him by reminding him how very different had been the language of Sokrates himself. Complaints too were made by contemporaries, about Plato's jealous, censorious, spiteful, temper. The critical and disparaging tone of his dialogues, notwithstanding the admiration which they inspire, accounts for the existence of these complaints: and anecdotes are recounted, though not verified by any sufficient evidence, of ill-natured dealing on his part towards other philosophers who were poorer than himself.¹ Dissension or controversy on philosophical topics is rarely carried on without some invidious or hostile feeling. Athens, and the *virī Sokratici*, Plato included, form no exception to this ordinary malady of human nature.

It is common for historians of philosophy to speak of a Sokratic school: but this phrase, if admissible at all, is only admissible in the largest and vaguest sense. The effect produced by Sokrates upon his companions was, not to teach doctrine, but to stimulate self-working enquiry, upon ethical and social subjects.

No Sokratic school—each of the companions took a line of his own.

Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus, each took a line of his own, not less decidedly than Plato. But unfortunately we have no compositions remaining from either of the three. We possess only brief reports respecting some leading points of their doctrine, emanating altogether from those who disagreed with it: we have besides aphorisms, dicta, repartees, *bons-mots*, &c., which they are said to have uttered. Of these many are evident inventions; some proceeding from opponents and probably coloured or exaggerated, others hardly authenticated at all. But if they were ever so well authenticated, they would form very insufficient evidence on which to judge a philosopher—much less

¹ This anecdote, mentioned by Aristotle, who had good means of knowing, appears quite worthy of belief.

The jealousy and love of supremacy inherent in Plato's temper (ὁ φιλότιμος), were noticed by Dionysius Hal. (Epist. ad Cn. Pompeium, p. 756).

² Athenæus, xi. pp. 506-508. Diog. Laert. ii. 60-65, iii. 36.

The statement made by Plato in the Phædon—that Aristippus and Kleombrotus were not present at the death of

Sokrates, but were said to be in Ægina—is cited as an example of Plato's ill-will and censorious temper (Demetr. Phaler. a. 306). But this is unfair. The statement ought not to be so considered, if it were true: and if not true, it deserves a more severe epithet. We read in Athenæus various other criticisms, citing or alluding to passages of Plato, which are alleged to indicate ill-nature; but many of the passages cited do not deserve the remark.

to condemn him with asperity.¹ Philosophy (as I have already observed) aspires to deliver not merely truth, but reasoned truth. We ought to know not only what doctrines a philosopher maintained, but how he maintained them :—what objections others made against him, and how he replied :—what objections he made against dissentient doctrines, and what replies were made to him. Respecting Plato and Aristotle, we possess such information to a considerable extent :—respecting Eukleides, Antisthenes, and Aristippus, we are without it. All their compositions (very numerous, in the case of Antisthenes) have perished.

EUKLEIDES.

Eukleides was a Parmenidean, who blended the ethical point of view of Sokrates with the ontology of Parmenides, and followed out that negative Dialectic which was common to Sokrates with Zeno. Parmenides (I have already said)² and Zeno after him, recognised no absolute reality except *Ens Unum*, continuous, indivisible : they denied all real plurality : they said that the plural was Non-Ens or Nothing, i.e. nothing real or absolute, but only apparent, perpetually transient and changing, relative, different as appreciated by one man and by another. Now Sokrates laid it down that wisdom or knowledge of Good, was the sum total of ethical perfection, including within it all the different virtues : he spoke also about the divine wisdom inherent in, or pervad-

¹ Respecting these ancient philosophers, whose works are lost, I transcribe a striking passage from Descartes, who complains, in his own case, of the injustice of being judged from the statements of others, and not from his own writings :—

“Quod adeo in hac materiâ verum est, ut quamvis sæpe aliquas ex meis opinionibus explicaverim virtus acutissimis, et qui me loquente videbantur eas valde distinctè intelligere : attamen cum eas retulerunt, observavi ipsos fere semper illas ita mutavisse, ut pro meis

agnoscere amplius non possem. Quâ occasione posteros hic oratos volo, ut nunquam credant, quidquam à me esse profectum, quod ipse in lucem non edidero. Et nullo modo miror absurda illa dogmata, quæ veteribus illis philosophis tribuuntur, quorum scripta non habemus : nec propterea iudico ipsorum cogitationes valde à ratione fuisse alienas, cum habuerint præstantissima suorum sæculorum ingenia ; sed tantum nobis perperam esse relatas.” (Descartes, Diss. De Methodo, p. 43.)

² See ch. i. pp. 19-22.

ing the entire Kosmos or universe.¹ Eukleides blended together the Ens of Parmenides with the Good of Sokrates, saying that the two names designated one and the same thing: sometimes called Good, Wisdom, Intelligence, God, &c., and by other names also, but always one and the same object named and meant. He farther maintained that the opposite of Ens, and the opposite of Bonum (Non-Ens, Non-Bonum, or Malum) were things non-existent, unmeaning names, Nothing,² &c.: i.e. that they were nothing really, absolutely, permanently, but ever varying and dependent upon our ever varying conceptions. The One—the All—the Good—was absolute, immoveable, invariable, indivisible. But the opposite thereof was a non-entity or nothing: there was no one constant meaning corresponding to Non-Ens—but a variable meaning, different with every man who used it.

It was in this manner that Eukleides solved the problem which Sokrates had brought into vogue—What is the Bonum—or (as afterwards phrased) the Summum Bonum? Eukleides pronounced the Bonum to be coincident with the Ens Unum of Parmenides. The Parmenidean thesis, originally belonging to Transcendental Physics or Ontology, became thus implicated with Transcendental Ethics.³

Plato departs from Sokrates on the same point. He agrees with Eukleides in recognising a Transcendental Bonum. But it appears that his doctrines on this head underwent some change. He held for some time what is called the doctrine of Ideas: transcendental Forms, Entia, Essences: he considered the Transcendental to be essentially multiple, or to be an aggregate—whereas Eukleides had regarded it as essentially One. This is

Doctrine of
Eukleides
about
Bonum.

The doctrine
compared to
that of Plato
—changes
in Plato.

¹ Xenophon. Memor. i. 4, 17. τὴν ἐν τῷ παντὶ φρόνησιν. Compare Plato, Philébus, pp. 29-30; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 6, iii. 11.

² Diog. L. ii. 106. Οὐτος ἐν τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀπεφρίνετο πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενον· ὅτε μὴ γὰρ φράνησιν, ὅτε δὲ θεῶν, καὶ ἄλλοτε γούν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ. Τὰ δὲ ἀντικείμενα τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνήρει, μὴ εἶναι φάσκων. Compare also vii. 2, 161, where the Megarici are represented

as recognising only μίαν ἀρετὴν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασι καλούμενην. Cicero, Academ. ii. 42.

³ However, in the verse of Xenophanes, the predecessor of Parmenides—Οὐλος ὄρε', οὐλος δὲ νοε', οὐλος δὲ ἴ' ἀκούει—the Universe is described as a thinking, seeing, hearing God—"Ὁν καὶ Παν." Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. ix. 144; Xenophon. Fragu. p. 36, ed. Karsten.

the doctrine which we find in some of the Platonic dialogues. In the Republic, the Idea of Good appears as one of these, though it is declared to be the foremost in rank and the most ascendant in efficacy.¹ But in the later part of his life, and in his lectures (as we learn from Aristotle), Plato came to adopt a different view. He resolved the Ideas into numbers. He regarded them as made up by the combination of two distinct factors:—1. The One—the Essentially One. 2. The Essentially Plural: The Indeterminate Dyad: the Great and Little.—Of these two elements he considered the Ideas to be compounded. And he identified the Idea of Good with the essentially One—*τὸ ἀγαθὸν* with *τὸ ἓν*: the principle of Good with the principle of Unity: also the principle of Evil with the Indeterminate. But though Unity and Good were thus identical, he considered Unity as logically antecedent, or the subject—Good as logically consequent, or the predicate.²

This last doctrine of Plato in his later years (which does not appear in the dialogues, but seems, as far as we can make out, to have been delivered substantially in his oral lectures, and is ascribed to him by Aristotle) was nearly coincident with that of Eukleides. Both of them held the identity of *τὸ ἓν* with *τὸ ἀγαθόν*. This one doctrine is all that we know about Eukleides: what

Last doctrine of Plato nearly the same as that of Eukleides.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E, vii. p. 517 A.

² The account given by Aristotle of Plato's doctrine of Ideas, as held by Plato in his later years, appears in various passages of the *Metaphysica*, and in the curious account repeated by Aristoxenus (who had often heard it from Aristotle—*Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ διηγείτο*) of the *ἀκρόασις* or lecture delivered by Plato, *De Bono*. See Aristoxen. Harmon. ii. p. 30, Meibom. Compare the eighth chapter in this work.—Platonic Compositions Generally. *Metaphys.* N. 1091, b. 13. *τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων* (sc. Platonic) *οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι· οὐσίαν μὲν τοι τὸ ἓν αὐτοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μάλιστα*, which words are very clearly explained by Bonitz in the note to his Commentary, p. 586: also *Metaphys.* 987, b. 20, and Scholia, p. 551, b. 20, p. 567, b. 34, where the work of Aristotle, *Περὶ Τάγαθου*, is referred to:

probably the memoranda taken down by Aristotle from Plato's lecture on that subject, accompanied by notes of his own.

In Schol. p. 573, a. 18, it is stated that the astronomer Eudoxus was a hearer both of Plato and of Eukleides.

The account given by Zeller (*Phil. der Griech.* ii. p. 453, 2nd ed.) of this latter phase of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, applies exactly to that which we hear about the main doctrine of Eukleides. Zeller describes the Platonic doctrine as being "Eine Vermischung des ethischen Begriffes vom höchsten Gut, mit dem Metaphysischen des Absoluten: Der Begriff des Guten ist zunächst aus dem menschlichen Leben abstrahirt; er bezeichnet das, was dem Menschen zuträglich ist. So noch bei Sokrates. Plato verallgemeinert ihn nun zum Begriff des Absoluten; dabei spielt aber seine ursprüngliche Bedeutung noch fortwährend herein, und so ent-

consequences he derived from it, or whether any, we do not know. But Plato combined, with this transcendental Unum = Bonum, a transcendental indeterminate plurality: from which combination he considered his Ideas or Ideal Numbers to be derivatives.

Eukleides is said to have composed six dialogues, the titles of which alone remain. The scanty information which we possess respecting him relates altogether to his negative logical procedure. Whether he deduced any consequences from his positive doctrine of the Transcendental Ens, Unum, Bonum, we do not know: but he, as Zeno had been before him,¹ was acute in exposing contradictions and difficulties in the positive doctrines of opponents. He was a citizen of Megara, where he is said to have harboured Plato and the other companions of Sokrates, when they retired for a time from Athens after the death of Sokrates. Living there as a teacher or debater on philosophy, he founded a school or succession of philosophers who were denominated *Megarici*. The title is as old as Aristotle, who both names them and criticises their doctrines.² None of their compositions are preserved. The earliest who becomes known to us is Eubulides, the contemporary and opponent of Aristotle; next Ichthyas, Apollonius, Diodorus Kronus, Stilpon, Alexinus, between 340-280 B.C.

Megaric succession of philosophers. Eleian or Eretrian succession.

With the Megaric philosophers there soon become confounded another succession, called Eleian or Eretrian, who trace their origin to another Sokratic man—Phædon. The chief Eretrians

steht die Unklarheit, dass weder der ethische noch der metaphysische Begriff des Guten rein gefasst wird."

This remark is not less applicable to Eukleides than to Plato, both of them agreeing in the doctrine here criticised. Zeller says truly, that the attempt to identify Unum and Bonum produces perpetual confusion. The two notions are thoroughly distinct and independent. It ought not to be called (as he phrases it) "a generalization of Bonum". There is no common property on which to found a generalization. It is a forced conjunction between two disparates.

¹ Plato, *Parmenides*, p. 128 C, where

Zeno represents himself as taking for his premisses the conclusions of opponents, to show that they led to absurd consequences. This seems what is meant, when Diogenes says about Eukleides—ταῖς ἀποδείξουσιν ἐνίστατο οὐ κατὰ λήμματα, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπιφοράν (ii. 107); Deycks, *De Megaricorum Doctrina*, p. 34.

² *Aristot. Metaph. iv. p. 1046, b. 29.* The sarcasm ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic implies that Eukleides was really known as the founder of a school—καὶ τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἐλεγε σχολήν (*Diog. L. vi. 24*)—the earliest mention (I apprehend) of the word σχολή in that sense.

made known to us are Pleistanus, Menedēmus, Asklepiades. The second of the three acquired some reputation.

The Megarics and Eretrians, as far as we know them, turned their speculative activity altogether in the logical or intellectual direction, paying little attention to the ethical and emotional field. Both Antisthenes and Aristippus, on the contrary, pursued the ethical path. To the Sokratic question, What is the Bonum? Eukleides had answered by a transcendental definition: Antisthenes and Aristippus each gave to it an ethical answer, having reference to human wants and emotions, and to the different views which they respectively took thereof. Antisthenes declared it to consist in virtue, by which he meant an independent and self-sufficing character, confining all wants within the narrowest limits: Aristippus placed it in the moderate and easy pleasures, in avoiding ambitious struggles, and in making the best of every different situation, yet always under the guidance of a wise calculation and self-command. Both of them kept clear of the transcendental: they neither accepted it as *Unum et Omne* (the view of Eukleides), nor as *Plura* (the Eternal Ideas or Forms, the Platonic view). Their speculations had reference altogether to human life and feelings, though the one took a measure of this wide subject very different from the other: and in thus confining the range of their speculations, they followed Sokrates more closely than either Eukleides or Plato followed him. They not only abstained from transcendental speculation, but put themselves in declared opposition to it. And since the intellectual or logical philosophy, as treated by Plato, became intimately blended with transcendental hypothesis—Antisthenes and Aristippus are both found on the negative side against its pretensions. Aristippus declared the mathematical sciences to be useless, as conducing in no way to happiness, and taking no account of what was better or what was worse.¹ He declared

¹ Aristotel. *Metaph.* B. 906, a. 32. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα τῶν σοφιστῶν τινες οἶον Ἀριστίππου προσηλάκιζον αὐτὰς (τὰς μαθηματικὰς τέχνας).—ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις, καὶ ταῖς βαναύσοις, οὐκ ἐν τεκτονικῇ καὶ σκυτικῇ, διότι βέλτιον ἢ χεῖρον λέγεσθαι πάντα, τὰς δὲ μαθηματικὰς οὐθὲνα ποιεῖσθαι λόγον περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

Aristotle here ranks Aristippus among the σοφισταί.

Aristippus, in discountenancing φιλολογίαν, cited the favourite saying of Sokrates that the proper study of mankind was ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροις κακόν τ' ἀγαθόν τε τέτυκται.

Plutarch, ap. Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* l. 8.

that we could know nothing except in so far as we were affected by it, and as it was or might be in correlation with ourselves : that as to causes not relative to ourselves, or to our own capacities and affections, we could know nothing about them.¹

Such were the leading writers and talkers contemporary with Plato, in the dialectical age immediately following on the death of Sokrates. The negative vein

Preponderance of the negative vein in the Platonic age.

greatly preponderates in them, as it does on the whole even in Plato—and as it was pretty sure to do, so long as the form of dialogue was employed. Affirmative exposition and proof is indeed found in some of the later Platonic works, carried on by colloquy between two speakers. But the colloquial form manifests itself evidently as unsuitable for the purpose : and we must remember that Plato was a lecturer as well as a writer, so that his doctrines made their way, at least in part, through continuous exposition. But it is Aristotle with whom the form of affirmative continuous exposition first becomes predominant, in matters of philosophy. Though he composed dialogues (which are now lost), and though he appreciates dialectic as a valuable exercise, yet he considers it only as a discursive preparation ; antecedent, though essential, to the more close and concentrated demonstrations of philosophy.

Most historians deal hardly with this negative vein. They depreciate the Sophists, the Megarics and Eretrians, the Academics and Sceptics of the subsequent ages—under the title of Eristics, or lovers of contention for itself—as captious and perverse enemies of truth.

Harsh manner in which historians of philosophy censure the negative vein.

I have already said that my view of the importance and value of the negative vein of philosophy is altogether different. It appears to me quite as essential as the affirmative. It is required as an antecedent, a test, and a corrective. Aristotle deserves all honour for his attempts to construct and defend various affirmative theories : but the value of these theories depends upon their being defensible against all objectors. Affirmative philosophy,

Negative method in philosophy essential to the controul of the affirmative.

¹ Sext. Emp. adv. Math. vii. 191 ; Diog. L. ii. 92.

as a body not only of truth but of reasoned truth, holds the champion's belt, subject to the challenge not only of competing affirmants, but of all deniers and doubters. And this is the more indispensable, because of the vast problems which these affirmative philosophers undertake to solve: problems especially vast during the age of Plato and Aristotle. The question has to be determined, not only which of two proposed solutions is the best, but whether either of them is tenable, and even whether any solution at all is attainable by the human faculties: whether there exist positive evidence adequate to sustain any conclusion, accompanied with adequate replies to the objections against it. The burthen of proof lies upon the affirmant: and the proof produced must be open to the scrutiny of every dissentient.

Among these dissentients or negative dialecticians, Sokrates himself, during his life, stood prominent. In his footsteps followed Eukleides and the Megarics: who, though they acquired the unenviable surname of Eristics or Controversialists, cannot possibly have surpassed Sokrates, and probably did not equal him, in the refutative Elenchus. Of no one among the Megarics, probably, did critics ever affirm, what the admiring Xenophon says about Sokrates—"that he dealt with every one in colloquial debate just as he chose,"—i.e., that he baffled and puzzled his opponents whenever he chose. No one of these Megarics probably ever enunciated so sweeping a negative programme, or declared so emphatically his own inability to communicate positive instruction, as Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. A person more thoroughly Eristic than Sokrates never lived. And we see perfectly, from the Memorabilia of Xenophon (who nevertheless strives to bring out the opposite side of his character), that he was so esteemed among his contemporaries. Plato, as well as Eukleides, took up this vein in the Sokratic character, and worked it with unrivalled power in many of his dialogues. The Platonic Sokrates is compared, and compares himself, to Antæus, who compelled every new-comer, willing or unwilling, to wrestle with him.¹

¹ Plato, Theætet. p. 169 A. Theodorus. Οὐ γάρ τινος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπιτρέψαι μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ δίδοναι λόγον.

ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἄρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων σε ἐπιτρέψαι μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ σοὶ παρακαθήμενον μὴ δίδοναι λόγον. ἀναγκάσειν καθάπερ Δακεταίμωροι. σὺ

Of the six dialogues composed by Eukleides, we cannot speak positively, because they are not preserved. But they cannot have been more refutative, and less affirmative, than most of the Platonic dialogues; and we can hardly be wrong in asserting that they were very inferior both in energy and attraction. The *Theætetus* and the *Parmenides*, two of the most negative among the Platonic dialogues, seem to connect themselves, by the *personnel* of the drama, with the Megaric philosophers: the former dialogue is ushered in by Eukleides, and is, as it were, dedicated to him: the latter dialogue exhibits, as its *protagonistes*, the veteran Parmenides himself, who forms the one factor of the Megaric philosophy, while Sokrates forms the other. Parmenides (in the Platonic dialogue so called) is made to enforce the negative method in general terms, as a philosophical duty co-ordinate with the affirmative; and to illustrate it by a most elaborate argumentation, directed partly against the Platonic Ideas (here advocated by the youthful Sokrates), partly against his own (the Parmenidean) dogma of *Ens Unum*. Parmenides adduces unanswerable objections against the dogma of Transcendental Forms or Ideas; yet says at the same time that there can be no philosophy unless you admit it. He reproves the youthful Sokrates for precipitancy in affirming the dogma, and contends that you are not justified in affirming any dogma until you have gone through a bilateral scrutiny of it—that is, first assuming the doctrine to be true, next assuming it to be false, and following out the deductions arising from the one assumption as well as from the other.¹ Parmenides then gives a string of successive

Platonic
Parmenides
—its ex-
treme nega-
tive charac-
ter.

δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν Σκίρβωνα μᾶλλον
τείνειν. Λαλεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀπέναι
ἢ ἀποδέσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ'
Ἀστιάδην τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα
δρᾶν; τὸν γὰρ προσελθόντα οὐκ ἀνιῇ
πρὶν ἀναγκασθῆναι ἀποδέσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
προσπαλαίσει.

Σοκράτης. Ἄριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν
νόσον μου ἀπέεικας. ἰσχυρικώ-
τερος μὲντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων· μυρίοι γὰρ
ᾗδ' μοι Ἡρακλῆες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐν-
τυχόντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ' ἐν
ἐγκυκλοφασίν, ἅλλ' ἐγὼ οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον
ἀφίσταμαι. οὕτω τις ἐρῶς δεινὸς
ἐνδίδυκε τῆς περὶ ταῦτα γυμνα-
σίας· μὴ οὖν μηδὲ σὺ φθοιῇσιν προσανα-
τριψάμενος σαυτὸν τι ἅμα καὶ ἐμὲ ὀνῆσαι.

How could the eristic appetite be manifested in stronger language either by Eukleides, or Eubulides, or Diodorus Kronus, or any of those Sophists upon whom the Platonic commentators heap so many harsh epithets?

Among the compositions ascribed to Protagoras by Diogenes Laertius (ix. 55), one is entitled *Τέχνη Ἐριστικῶν*. But if we look at the last chapter of the *Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis*, we shall find Aristotle asserting explicitly that there existed no *Τέχνη Ἐριστικῶν* anterior to his own work the *Topica*.

¹ Plato, *Parmen.* p. 136.

deductions (at great length, occupying the last half of the dialogue)—four pairs of counter-demonstrations or Antinomies—in which contradictory conclusions appear each to be alike proved. He enunciates the final result as follows:—"Whether Unum exists, or does not exist, Unum itself and Cætera, both exist and do not exist, both appear and do not appear, all things and in all ways—both in relation to themselves and in relation to each other".¹

If this memorable dialogue, with its concluding string of elaborate antinomies, had come down to us under the name of Eukleides, historians would probably have denounced it as a perverse exhibition of ingenuity, worthy of "that litigious person, who first infused into the Megarians the fury of disputation".² But since it is of Platonic origin, we must recognise Plato not only as having divided with the Megaric philosophers the impulse of negative speculation which they had inherited from Sokrates, but as having carried that impulse to an extreme point of invention, combination, and dramatic handling, much beyond their powers. Undoubtedly, if we pass from the Parmenidés to other dialogues, we find Plato very different. He has various other intellectual impulses, an abundant flow of ideality and of constructive fancy, in many distinct channels. But negative philosophy is at least one of the indisputable and prominent items of the Platonic aggregate.

While then we admit that the Megaric succession of philosophers exhibited negative subtlety and vehement love of contentious debate, we must recollect that these qualities were inherited from Sokrates and shared with Plato. The philosophy of Sokrates, who taught nothing and cross-examined every one, was essentially more negative and controversial, both in him and his successors, than any which had preceded it. In an age when

The Megarics shared the negative impulse with Sokrates and Plato.

¹ Plato, Parmen. p. 166. *ἐν εἵρ' ἔστιν, εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτό τε καὶ τᾶλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.*—*Ἀληθέστατα.*
See below, vol. iii. chap. xxvii. Parmenides.

² This is the phrase of the satirical sillographer Timon, who spoke with

scorn of all the philosophers except Pyrrhon:—

Ἄλλ' οὐ μοι τούτων φλεβόνων μέλει,
οὐδὲ μὲν ἄλλου
Οὐδενός, οὐ Φαίδωνος, ὅτις γε μὲν—
οὐδ' ἐριδάντew
Εὐκλείδου, Μεγαρεῦσιν δὲ ἔμβαλε
λύσσαν ἐρίσμου.

dialectic colloquy was considered as appropriate for philosophical subjects, and when long continuous exposition was left to the rhetor—Eukleides established a succession or school¹ which was more distinguished for impugning dogmas of others than for defending dogmas of its own. Schleiermacher and others suppose that Plato in his dialogue Euthydēmus intends to expose the sophistical fallacies of the Megaric school:² and that in the dialogue Sophistēs, he refutes the same philosophers (under the vague designation of “the friends of Forms”) in their speculations about Ens and Non-Ens. The first of these two opinions is probably true to some extent, though we cannot tell how far: the second of the two is supported by some able critics—yet it appears to me untenable.³

Of Eukleides himself, though he is characterised as strongly controversial, no distinct points of controversy have been preserved: but his successor Eubulides is celebrated for various sophisms. He was the contemporary and rival of Aristotle: who, without however expressly naming him, probably intends to speak of him when alluding to the Megaric philosophers generally.⁴ Another of the same school, Alexinus (rather later than Eubulides) is also said to have written against Aristotle.

¹ If we may trust a sarcastic bon-mot ascribed to Diogenes the Cynic, the contemporary of the *virī Socratici* and the follower of Antisthenes, the term σχολή was applied to the visitors of Eukleides rather than to those of Plato—καὶ τὴν μὲν Εὐκλείδου σχολὴν ἵλεγε χολῆν, τὴν δὲ Πλάτωνος διατριβήν, κατατριβήν. *Diog. L. vi. 24.*

² Schleierm. *Einführung zu Plat. Euthyd.* p. 403 seq.

³ Schleierm. *Introduction to the Sophistēs*, pp. 134-135.

See Deycks, *Megaricorum Doctrina*, p. 41 seq. Zeller, *Phil. der Griech.* vol. ii. p. 180 seq., with his instructive note. Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, vol. i. p. 37, and others cited by Zeller.—Ritter dissents from this view, and I concur in his dissent. To affirm that Eukleides admitted a plurality of Ideas or Forms, is to contradict the only one deposition, certain and unequivocal, which we have about his philosophy. His doctrine is that

of the Transcendental Unum, Ens, Bonum; while the doctrine of the Transcendental Plura (Ideas or Forms) belongs to Plato and others. Both Deycks and Zeller (p. 185) recognise this as a difficulty. But to me it seems fatal to their hypothesis; which, after all, is only an hypothesis—first originated by Schleiermacher. If it be true that the Megarici are intended by Plato under the appellation of τῶν εἰδῶν φίλοι, we must suppose that the school had been completely transformed before the time of Stilpon, who is presented as the great opponent of ῥα εἶναι.

⁴ Aristokles, ap. Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xv. 2. Eubulides is said not merely to have controverted the philosophical theories of Aristotle, but also to have attacked his personal character with bitterness and alander: a practice not less common in ancient controversy than in modern. About Alexinus, *Diog. L. ii. 109.*

Among those who took lessons in rhetoric and pronunciation from Eubu-

Eubulides—his logical problems or puzzles—difficulty of solving them—many solutions attempted.

Six sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides. 1. 'Ο ψευδόμενος — Mentiens. 2. 'Ο διαλανθάνων, or ἔγκεκαλυμμένος—the person hidden under a veil. 3. Ἡλέκτρα. 4. Σωρείτης — Sorites. 5. Κερατίνης — Cornutus. 6. Φάλακρος — Calvus. Of these the second is substantially the same with the third; and the fourth the same with the sixth, only inverted.¹

These sophisms are ascribed to Eubulides, and belonged probably to the Megaric school both before and after him. But it is plain both from the Euthydēmus of Plato, and from the Topica of Aristotle, that there were many others of similar character; frequently employed in the abundant dialectic colloquies which prevailed at Athens during the fourth and third centuries B.C. Plato and Aristotle handle such questions and their authors contemptuously, under the name of Eristic: but it was more easy to put a bad name upon them, as well as upon the Eleate Zeno, than to elucidate the logical difficulties which they brought to view. Neither Aristotle nor Plato provided a sufficient answer to them: as is proved by the fact, that several subsequent philosophers wrote treatises expressly in reference to them—even philosophers of reputation, like Theophrastus and Chrysippus.² How these two latter philosophers performed their task, we cannot say. But the fact that they attempted the task, exhibits a commendable anxiety to make their logical theory complete, and to fortify it against objections.

Idea, we read the name of the orator Demosthenes, who is said to have improved his pronunciation thereby. Diog. Laert. ii. p. 108. Plutarch, x. Orat. 21, p. 845 C.

¹ Diog. L. ii. pp. 108-109; vii. 82. Lucian Vit. Auct. 22.

² 1. Cicero, Academ. ii. pp. 30-96. "Si dicis te mentiri verumque dicis, mentiris. Dicis autem te mentiri, verumque dicis: mentiris igitur."

2, 3. 'Ο ἔγκεκαλυμμένος. You know your father: you are placed before a person covered and concealed by a thick veil: you do not know him. But this person is your father. Therefore you both know your father and do not know him. 5. Κερατίνης. That which you have not lost, you have: but you have not lost horns; therefore you have horns. 4, 6. Σωρείτης—

Φάλακρος. What number of grains make a heap—or are many? What number are few? Are three grains few, and four many?—or, where will you draw the line between Few and Many? The like question about the hairs on a man's head—How many must he lose before he can be said to have only a few, or to be bald?

³ Diog. L. v. p. 49; vii. pp. 192-198. Seneca, Epistol. p. 45. Plutarch (De Stoicor. Repugnantia, p. 1037) has some curious extracts and remarks from Chrysippus; who (he says) spoke in the harshest terms against the Μεγαρικά ἐρωτήματα, as having puzzled and unsettled men's convictions without ground—while he (Chrysippus) had himself proposed puzzles and difficulties still more formidable, in his treatise κατὰ Σωκράτους.

It is in this point of view—in reference to logical theory—that the Megaric philosophers have not been fairly appreciated. They, or persons reasoning in their manner, formed one essential encouragement and condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory. They administered, to minds capable and constructive, that painful sense of contradiction, and shock of perplexity, which Sokrates relied upon as the stimulus to mental parturition—and which Plato extols as a lever for raising the student to general conceptions.¹ Their sophisms were not intended to impose upon any one, but on the contrary, to guard against imposition.² Whoever states a fallacy clearly and nakedly, applying it to a particular case in which it conducts to a conclusion known upon other evidence not to be true—contributes to divest it of its misleading effect. The persons most liable to be deceived by the fallacy are those who are not forewarned:—in cases where the premisses are stated not nakedly, but in an artful form of words—and where the conclusion, though false, is not known beforehand to be false by the hearer. To use Mr. John Stuart Mill's phrase,³ the fallacy is a case of apparent evidence mistaken for real evidence: you expose it to be evidence only apparent and not real, by giving a type of the fallacy, in which the conclusion obtained is

Real character of the Megaric sophisms, not calculated to deceive, but to guard against deception.

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 523 A, 524. τὰ μὲν ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα τὴν νόησιν εἰς ἐπισκεψιν, ὡς ἱκανῶς ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως κρινόμενα—τὰ δὲ παντάπασι διακελεύμενα ἐκείνην ἐπισκεψασθαι, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ὑπὲρ ποιήσεως. . . . Τὰ μὲν οὐ παρακαλοῦντα, ὅσα μὴ ἐκβαίνει εἰς ἐναντίαν αἰσθησιν ἅμα· τὰ δ' ἐκβαίνοντα, ὡς παρακαλοῦντα τίθῃμι, ἐπειδὴν ἡ αἰσθησις μᾶλλον τοῦτο ἢ τὸ ἐναντίον ὁλοῖ. Compare p. 524 E: the whole passage is very interesting.

² The remarks of Ritter (Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 139, 2nd ed.) upon these Megaric philosophers are more just and discerning than those made by most of the historians of philosophy—"Doch darf man wohl annehmen, dass sie solche Trugschlüsse nicht zur Täuschung, sondern zur Belehrung für unvorsichtige, oder zur Warnung vor der Seichtigkeit gewöhnlicher Vorstellungsweisen, gebrauchen wollten. So

viel ist gewiss, dass die Megariker sich viel mit den Formen des Denken beschäftigten, vielleicht mehr zu Aufsuchung einzelner Regeln, als zur Begründung eines wissenschaftlichen Zusammenhangs unter ihnen; obwohl auch besondere Theile der Logik unter ihren Schriften erwähnt werden."

This is much more reasonable than the language of Prantl, who denounces "the shamelessness of doctrinarism" (die Unverschämtheit des Doctrinarismus) belonging to these Megarici—"the petulance and vanity which prompted them to seek celebrity by intentional offences against sound common sense," &c. (Gesch. der Logik, pp. 39-40.—Sir Wm. Hamilton has some good remarks on these sophisms, in his Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 452 seq.)

³ See the first chapter of his book v. on Fallacies, System of Logic, vol. ii.

obviously false : and the more obviously false it is, the better suited for its tutelary purpose. Aristotle recognises, as indispensable in philosophical enquiry, the preliminary wrestling into which he conducts his reader, by means of a long string of unsolved difficulties or puzzles—(ἀπόρραι). He declares distinctly and forcibly, that whoever attempts to lay out a positive theory, without having before his mind a full list of the difficulties with which he is to grapple, is like one who searches without knowing what he is looking for ; without being competent to decide whether what he hits upon as a solution be really a solution or not.¹ Now that enumeration of puzzles which Aristotle here postulates (and in part undertakes, in reference to Philosophia Prima) is exactly what the Megarics, and various other dialecticians (called by Plato and Aristotle Sophists) contributed to furnish for the use of those who theorised on Logic.

You may dislike philosophy : you may undervalue, or altogether proscribe, the process of theorising. This is the standing-point usual with the bulk of mankind, ancient as well as modern : who generally dislike all accurate reasoning, or analysis and discrimination of familiar abstract words, as mean and tiresome hair-splitting.² But if you admit the business of theorising to be legitimate, useful, and even honourable, you must reckon on free working of independent, individual, minds as the operative force—and on the necessity of dissentient, conflicting, manifestations of this common force, as essential conditions to any successful result. Upon no other conditions can you obtain any tolerable body of reasoned truth—or even reasoned *quasi-truth*.

¹ Aristotel. Metaphys. B. 1, p. 996, a. 23.

διὰ δὲ τὰς δυσχερείας θεωρημάτων πάσας πρότερον, τούτων δὲ χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητούντας ἀντὶ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποὶ διὰ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἰ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὗρηκεν ἢ μὴ γινώσκουσιν· τὸ γὰρ τίλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ ἔστι, τῷ δὲ προσηγορηκῶτι δόλον.

Aristotle devotes the whole of this Book to an enumeration of ἀπόρραι.

² See my account of the Platonic dialogue Hippias Major, vol. II. chap. xiii. Aristot. Metaphys. A. minor, p. 996, a. 9. τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβές, ἢ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνέχειν, ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολογίαν· ἔχει γὰρ τι τὸ ἀκριβές· τινούτων, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβολαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι τοὺς δοκτοί. Cicero (Paradoxa, c. 2) talks of the "minutes interrogatuncule" of the Stoics as tedious and tiresome.

Now the historians of philosophy seldom take this view of philosophy as a whole—as a field to which the free antithesis of affirmative and negative is indispensable. They consider true philosophy as represented by Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, one or other of them: while the contemporaries of these eminent men are discredited under the name of Sophists, Eristics, or sham-philosophers, sowing tares among the legitimate crop of wheat—or as devils whom the miraculous virtue of Sokrates and Plato is employed in expelling from the Athenian mind. Even the companions of Sokrates, and the Megarics among them, whom we know only upon the imperfect testimony of opponents, have fallen under this unmerited sentence: ¹ as if they were destructive agents breaking down an edifice of well-constituted philosophy—no such edifice in fact having ever existed in Greece, though there were several dissenting lecture rooms and conflicting veins of speculation promoted by eminent individuals.

Logical position of the Megaric philosophers erroneously described by historians of philosophy. Necessity of a complete collection of difficulties.

Whoever undertakes, *bona fide*, to frame a complete and defensible logical theory, will desire to have before him a copious collection of such difficulties, and will consider those who pro-

¹ The same charge is put by Cicero into the mouth of Lucullus against the Academics:—"Similiter vos (Academici) quum perturbare, ut illi" (the Gracchi and others) "republicam, sic vos philosophiam, bene jam constitutam velitis. . . . Tum exortus est, ut in optima republica Tib. Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcesilas, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret" (Acad. Prior. ii. 5, 14-15).

Even in the liberal and comprehensive history of the Greek philosophy by Zeller (vol. II. p. 187, ed. 2nd), respecting Eukleides and the Megaricans:—"Dagegen bot der Streit gegen die geltenden Meinungen dem Scharfsinn, der Rechthaberei, und dem wissenschaftlichen Ehrgeiz, ein unerschöpfliches Feld dar, welches denn auch die Megarischen Philosophen rüstig ausbeuteten."

If by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means the common sense of the day—that is, the opinions and beliefs current among the *laïques*, the working, enjoying, non-theorising public—it is very true that the Megaric philo-

sophers contended against them: but Sokrates and Plato contended against them quite as much: we see this in the Platonic Apology, Gorgias, Republic, Timæus, Parmenides, &c.

If, on the other hand, by "die geltenden Meinungen" Zeller means any philosophical or logical theories generally or universally admitted by thinking men as valid, the answer is that there were none such in the fourth and third centuries B.C. Various eminent speculative individuals were labouring to construct such theories, each in his own way, and each with a certain congregation of partisans; but established theory there was none. Nor can any theory (whether accepted or not) be firm or trustworthy, unless it be exposed to the continued thrusts of the negative weapon, searching out its vulnerable points. We know of the Megarics only what they furnished towards that negative testing; without which, however,—as we may learn from Plato and Aristotle themselves,—the true value of the affirmative defences can never be measured.

pound them as useful auxiliaries.¹ If he finds no one to propound them, he will have to imagine them for himself. "The philosophy of reasoning" (observes Mr. John Stuart Mill) "must comprise the philosophy of bad as well as of good reasoning."² The one cannot be complete without the other. To enumerate the different varieties of apparent evidence which is not real evidence (called Fallacies), and of apparent contradictions which are not real contradictions—referred as far as may be to classes, each illustrated by a suitable type—is among the duties of a logician. He will find this duty much facilitated, if there happen to exist around him an active habit of dialectic debate: ingenious men who really study the modes of puzzling and confuting a well-armed adversary, as well as of defending themselves against the like. Such a habit did exist at Athens: and unless it had existed, the Aristotelian theories on logic would probably never have been framed. Contemporary and antecedent dialecticians, the Megarici among them, supplied the stock of particular examples enumerated and criticised by Aristotle in the *Topica*:³ which treatise (especially the last book, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*) is intended both to explain the theory, and to give suggestions on the practice, of logical controversy. A man who takes lessons in fencing must learn not only how to thrust and parry, but also how to impose on his opponent by feints, and to meet the feints employed against himself: a general who learns the art of war must know how to take advantage of the enemy by effective cheating and treachery (to use the language of Xenophon), and how to avoid being cheated himself. The Aristotelian *Topica*, in

¹ Marbach (*Gesch. der Philos.* s. 91), though he treats the Megarics as jesters (which I do not think they were), yet adds very justly: "Nevertheless these puzzles (propounded by the Megarics) have their serious and scientific side. We are forced to inquire, how it happens that the contradictions shown up in them are not merely possible but even necessary."

Both Tiedemann and Winckelmann also remark that the debaters called Eristics contributed greatly to the formation of the theory and precepts of Logic, afterwards laid out by Aristotle. Winckelmann, *Prolegg. ad Platon.*

Euthydem. pp. xxiv.-xxxi. Even Stallbaum, though full of harshness towards those Sophists whom he describes as belonging to the school of Protagoras, treats the Megaric philosophers with much greater respect. *Prolegom. ad Platon. Euthydem.* p. 9.

² *System of Logic*, Book v. l. 1.

³ Prantl (*Gesch. der Logik*, vol. i. pp. 43-50) ascribes to the Megarics all or nearly all the sophisms which Aristotle notices in the *Treatise De Sophisticis Elenchis*. This is more than can be proved, and more than I think probable. Several of them are taken from the Platonic Euthydemus.

like manner, teach the arts both of dialectic attack and of dialectic defence.¹

The Sophisms ascribed to Eubulidès, looked at from the point of view of logical theory, deserve that attention which they seem to have received. The logician lays down as a rule that no affirmative proposition can be at the same time true and false. Now the first sophism (called *Mentiens*) exhibits the case of a proposition which is, or appears to be, at the same time

Sophisms propounded by Eubulides.

1. *Mentiens*.
2. The Veiled Man.
3. *Sorites*.
4. Cornutus.

¹ See the remarkable passages in the discourses of Sokrates (Memorab. iii. 1, 6; iv. 2, 15), and in that of Kambyses to Cyrus, which repeats the same opinion—Cypriod. i. 6, 27—respecting the amount of deceit, treachery, the thievish and rapacious qualities required for conducting war against an enemy—(ὡς πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους νόμιμα, i. 6, 34).

Aristotle treats of Dialectic, as he does of Rhetoric, as an art having its theory, and precepts founded upon that theory. I shall have occasion to observe in a future chapter (xxi.), that logical fallacies are not generated or invented by persons called Sophists, but are inherent liabilities to error in the human intellect; and that the habit of debate affords the only means of bringing them into clear daylight, and guarding against being deceived by them. Aristotle gives precepts both how to thrust, and how to parry with the best effect: if he had taught only how to parry, he would have left out one-half of the art.

One of the most learned and candid of the Aristotelian commentators—M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire—observes as follows (Logique d'Aristote, p. 435, Paris, 1833) respecting De Sophist. Elenchis:—

“Aristote va donc s'occuper de la marche qu'il faut donner aux discussions sophistiques: et ici il serait difficile quelquefois de décider, à la manière dont les choses sont présentées par lui, si ce sont des conseils qu'il donne aux Sophistes, ou à ceux qui veulent éviter leurs ruses. Tout ce qui précède, prouve, au reste, que c'est en ce dernier sens qu'il faut entendre la pensée du philosophe. Ceci est d'ailleurs la seconde portion du traité.”

It appears to me that Aristotle in-

tended to teach or to suggest both the two things which are here placed in Antithesis—though I do not agree with M. St. Hilaire's way of putting the alternative—as if there were one class of persons, professional Sophists, who fenced with poisoned weapons, while every one except them refrained from such weapons. Aristotle intends to teach the art of Dialectic as a whole; he neither intends nor wishes that any learners shall make a bad use of his teaching; but if they do use it badly, the fault does not lie with him. See the observations in the beginning of the Rhetorica, i. p. 1355, a. 26, and the observations put by Plato into the mouth of Gorgias (Gorg. p. 456 E).

Even in the Analytica Priora (ii. 19, a. 34) (independent of the Topica) Aristotle says:—ὅτι δ' ὅτι ἐπεὶ φύλασσαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινόμενοι, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειρασθαι λαμβάνειν. Investigations of the double or triple senses of words (he says) are useful—καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ παραλογισθῆναι, καὶ πρὸς τὸ παραλογισθῆναι, Topica, i. 18, p. 106, a. 26. See also other passages of the Topica where artifices are indicated for the purpose of concealing your own plan of proceeding and inducing your opponent to make answer in the sense which you wish, Topica, i. 2, p. 101, a. 25; vi. 10, p. 148, a. 37; viii. 1, p. 161, b. 23; viii. 1, p. 163, a. 6; viii. 2, p. 164, a. 6; viii. 11, p. 161, a. 24 seq. You must be provided with the means of meeting every sort and variety of objection—πρὸς γὰρ τὸν πάντως ἐπιστάμενον πάντως ἀντιτακτῆς ἐστίν. Topic. v. 4, p. 134, a. 4.

I shall again have to touch on the Topica, in this point of view, as founded upon and illustrating the Megaric logical puzzles (ch. viii. of the present volume).

true and false.¹ It is for the logician to explain how this proposition can be brought under his rule—or else to admit it as an exception. Again, the second sophism in the list (the Veiled or Hidden Man) is so contrived as to involve the respondent in a contradiction: he is made to say both that he knows his father, and that he does not know his father. Both the one answer and the other follow naturally from the questions and circumstances supposed. The contradiction points to the loose and equivocal way in which the word to *know* is used in common speech. Such equivocal meaning of words is not only one of the frequent sources of error and fallacy in reasoning, but also one of the least heeded by persons untrained in dialectics; who are apt to presume that the same word bears always the same meaning. To guard against this cause of error, and to determine (or impel others to determine) the accurate meaning or various distinct meanings of each word, is among the duties of the logician: and I will add that the verb to *know* stands high in the list of words requiring such determination—as the Platonic Theætétus² alone would be sufficient to teach us. Farthermore, when we examine what is called the Soritès of Eubulidès, we perceive that it brings to view an inherent indeterminateness of various terms: indeterminateness which cannot be avoided, but which must be pointed out in order that it may not mislead. You cannot say how many grains are *much*—or how many grains

¹ Theophrastus wrote a treatise in three books on the solution of the puzzle called 'Ο ψευδόμενος (see the list of his lost works in Diogenes L. v. 49). We find also other treatises entitled Μεγαρίδης α (which Diogenes cites, vi. 22),—'Αγαστικὸν τῆς περὶ τοὺς ἐριστικοὺς λόγους θεωρίας—Σοφισμάτων δ, β—besides several more titles relating to dialectics, and bearing upon the solution of syllogistic problems. Chrysippus also, in the ensuing century, wrote a treatise in three books, Περί τῆς τοῦ ψευδομένου λύσεως (Diog. vii. 197). Such facts show the importance of these problems in their bearing upon logical theory, as conceived by the ancient world. Epikurus also wrote against the Μεγαρίκοι (Diog. x. 27).

The discussion of sophisms, or logical difficulties (Λύσεις ἀπορίων), was a favourite occupation at the banquets

of philosophers at Athens, on or about 100 B.C. 'Αντιστρέφει δ' ὁ φιλόσοφος, συμπερίσσει ποτε συνέγνων, συνίσταται τοῖς ἐρχομένοις ὡς περὶ σοφισμάτων ἐρούσιν (Athenæus, v. 186 C). Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, p. 1096 C; De Sanitate Præcepta, c. 20, p. 133 B.

² Various portions of the Theætétus illustrate this Megaric sophism (pp. 165-168). The situation assumed in the question of Eubulidès—having before your eyes a person veiled—might form a suitable addition to the various contingencies specified in Theætét. pp. 192-193.

The manner in which the Platonic Sokrates proves (Theæt. 165) that you at the same time see, and do not see, an object before you, is quite as sophistical as the way in which Eubulidès proves that you both know, and do not know, your father.

make a *heap*. When this want of precision, pervading many words in the language, was first brought to notice in a suitable special case, it would naturally appear a striking novelty. Lastly, the sophism called *Keparisms* or Cornutus, is one of great plausibility, which would probably impose upon most persons, if the question were asked for the first time without any forewarning. It serves to administer a lesson, nowise unprofitable or superfluous, that before you answer a question, you should fully weigh its import and its collateral bearings.

The causes of error and fallacy are inherent in the complication of nature, the imperfection of language, the small range of facts which we know, the indefinite varieties of comparison possible among those facts, and the diverse or opposite predispositions, intellectual as well as emotional, of individual minds. They are not fabricated by those who first draw attention to them.¹ The Megarics, far from being themselves deceivers, served as sentinels against deceit. They planted conspicuous beacons upon some of the sunken rocks whereon unwary reasoners were likely to be wrecked. When the general type of a fallacy is illustrated by a particular case in which the conclusion is manifestly untrue, the like fallacy is rendered less operative for the future.

Causes of error constant—the Megarics were sentinels against them.

Of the positive doctrines of the Megarics we know little: but there is one upon which Aristotle enters into controversy with them, and upon which (as far as can be made out) I think they were in the right. In the question about Power, they held that the power to do a thing did not exist, except when the thing was

Controversy of the Megarics with Aristotle about Power. Arguments of Aristotle.

¹ Cicero, in his *Academ. Prior. ii.* 92-94, has very just remarks on the obscurities and difficulties in the reasoning process, which the Megarics and others brought to view—and were blamed for so doing, as unfair and captious reasoners—as if they had themselves created the difficulties—“(Dialectica) primo progressu festive tradit elementa loquendi et ambiguum intelligentiam concludendique rationem; tum paucis additis venit ad sortitas, lubricum sanè et periculosum locum, quod tu modo dicebas esse vitiosum interrogandi genus. Quid ergo? *istius vitii num nostra culpa est?* Rerum natura nullam

nobis dedit cognitionem finium, ut ullà in re statuere possimus quatenus. Nec hoc in acervo tritici solum, unde nomen est, sed nullà omnino in minutatim interroganti—dives, pauper—clarus, obscurus, sit—multa, pauca, magna, parva, longa, brevia, lata, angusta, quanto aut addito aut dempto certum respondeamus, non habemus. At vitiosi sunt sortitas. Frangite igitur eos, si potestis, ne molesti sint. . . . Sic me (inquit) sustineo, neque diutius captiosè interroganti respondeas. Si habes quod liqueat neque respondes, superbis: si non habes, ne tu quidem percipias.”

The principle of the Sorites (*η σορής*).

actually done : that an architect, for example, had no power to build a house, except when he actually did build one. Aristotle controverts this opinion at some length : contending that there exists a sort of power or cause which is in itself irregular and indeterminate, sometimes turning to the affirmative, sometimes to the negative, to do or not to do ;¹ that the architect *has* the power to build constantly, though he exerts it only on occasions : and that many absurdities would follow if we did not admit, That a given power or energy—and the exercise of that power—are things distinct and separable.²

Now these arguments of Aristotle are by no means valid against the Megarics, whose doctrine, though apparently paradoxical, will appear when explained to be no paradox at all, but perfectly true. When we say that the architect has power to build, we do not mean that he has power to do so under all supposable circumstances, but only under certain conditions : we wish to distinguish him from non-professional men, who under those same conditions have no power to build. The architect must be awake and sober : he must have the will or disposition to build :³ he must be provided with tools and materials, and be secure against destroying enemies. These and other conditions being generally understood, it is unnecessary to enunciate them in common speech. But when we engage in dialectic analysis, the accurate discussion (*ἀκριβολογία*) indispensable to philosophy requires us to bring under distinct notice, that which the elliptical character of common speech implies without enunciating. Unless these favourable conditions be supposed, the architect is no more able to build than an ordinary non-professional man. Now the

τις ἐνέργεια—Sextus adv. Gramm. a. 68), though differently applied, is involved in the argument of Zeno the Eleate, addressed to Protagoras—see Simplicius ad Aristot. Physic. 250, p. 423, b. 42, Sch. Brand. Compare chap. ii. of this volume.

¹ Aristot. De Interpret. p. 19, a. 6-20. ὁμοῦ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς μὴ εἶναι ἐνεργουσι τὸ δυνατόν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ὁμοίως ἐν οἷς ἄμφω ἰσχύεται, καὶ τὸ εἶναι καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι, ὥστε καὶ τὸ γενέσθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι.

² Aristot. Metaph. Θ. 3, p. 1046. b. 29. Εἰσὶ δὲ τινες, οἱ φασιν, ὅτι οἱ

Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ, μόνον δύνασθαι, ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ, μὴ δύνασθαι—ὅλον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Deycks (De Megaricorum Doctrina, pp. 70-71) considers this opinion of the Megarics to be derived from their general Eleatic theory of the Ens Unum et Immutatum. But I see no logical connection between the two.

³ About this condition implied in the predicate δυνατός, see Plato, Hippias Minor, p. 366 D.

Megarics did not deny the distinctive character of the architect, as compared with the non-architect: but they defined more accurately in what it consisted, by restoring the omitted conditions. They went a step farther: they pointed out that whenever the architect finds himself in concert with these accompanying conditions (his own volition being one of the conditions) he goes to work—and the building is produced. As the house is not built, unless he wills to build, and has tools and materials, &c.—so conversely, whenever he has the will to build and has tools and materials, &c., the house is actually built. The effect is not produced, except when the full assemblage of antecedent conditions come together: but as soon as they do come together, the effect is assuredly produced. The accomplishments of the architect, though an essential item, are yet only one item among several, of the conditions necessary to building the house. He has no power to build, except when those other conditions are assumed along with him: in other words, he has no such power except when he actually does build.

Aristotle urges against the Megarics various arguments, as follows:—1. Their doctrine implies that the architect is not an architect, and does not possess his professional skill,¹ except at the moment when he is actually building.—But the Megarics would have denied that their doctrine did imply this. The architect possesses his art at all times: but his art does not constitute a power of building except under certain accompanying conditions.

2. The Megaric doctrine is the same as that of Protagoras, implying that there exists no perceivable Object, and no Subject capable of perceiving, except at the moment when perception actually takes place.²—On this we may observe, that the Megarics coincide with Protagoras thus far, that they bring into open daylight the relative and conditional, which the received phraseology tends to hide. But neither they nor he affirm what is here put upon them. When we speak of a perceivable Object, we mean that which may and will be perceived, if there be a proper Subject to perceive it: when we affirm a Subject capable of perception, we mean, one which will perceive, under those

¹ Aristot. *Metaph.* Θ. 3, 1047, a. 3. *ὅταν παύσῃται (οἰκοδομῆν) οὐκ ἔχει τὴν τέχνην.*

² Aristot. *Metaph.* Θ. 3, 1047, a. 8-12.

circumstances which we call the presence of an Object suitably placed. The Subject and Object are correlates: but it is convenient to have a language in which one of them alone is introduced unconditionally, while the conditional sign is applied to the correlate: though the matter affirmed involves a condition common to both.

3. According to the Megaric doctrine (Aristotle argues) every man when not actually seeing, is blind; every man when not actually speaking, is dumb.—Here the Megarics would have said that this is a misinterpretation of the terms dumb and blind; which denote a person who cannot speak or see, even though he wishes it. One who is now silent, though not dumb, may speak if he wills it: but his own volition is an essential condition.¹

4. According to the Megaric doctrine (says Aristotle) when you are now lying down, you have no power to rise: when you are standing up, you have no power to lie down: so that the present condition of affairs must continue for ever unchanged: nothing can come into existence which is not now in being.—Here again, the Megarics would have denied his inference. The man who is now standing up, has power to lie down, *if he wills* to do so—or he may be thrown down by a superior force: that is, he will lie down, *if* some new fact of a certain character shall supervene. The Megarics do not deny that he has power, *if*—so and so: they deny that he has power, without the *if*—that is, without the farther accompaniments essential to energy.

¹ The question between Aristotle and the Megarics has not passed out of debate with modern philosophers.

Dr. Thomas Brown observes, in his inquiry into Cause and Effect—"From the mere silence of any one, we cannot infer that he is dumb in consequence of organic imperfection. He may be silent only because he has no desire of speaking, not because speech would not have followed his desire: and it is not with the mere existence of any one, but with his desire of speaking, that we suppose utterance to be connected. A man who has no desire of speaking, has in truth, and in strictness of language, no power of speaking, when in that state of mind: since he has not a circumstance which, as immediately

prior, is essential to speech. But since he has that power, as soon as the new circumstance of desire arises—and as the presence or absence of the desire cannot be perceived but in its effects—there is no inconvenience in the common language, which ascribes the power, as if it were possessed at all times, and in all circumstances of mind, though unquestionably, nothing more is meant than that the desire existing will be followed by utterance." (Brown, Essay on the Relation of Cause and Effect, p. 200.)

This is the real sense of what Aristotle calls τὸ εἶναι (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ) δύνασθαι, οἷον δύνασθαι εἶναι παύσειν ἢ παύσεσθαι ἄν, i.e. he will walk if he desires to do so (De Interpret. p. 23, a. 9-15).

On the whole, it seems to me that Aristotle's refutation of the Megarics is unsuccessful. A given assemblage of conditions is requisite for the production of any act:— while there are other circumstances, which, if present at the same time, would defeat its production. We often find it convenient to describe a state of things in which some of the antecedent conditions are present without the rest: in which therefore the act is not produced, yet would be produced, if the remaining circumstances were present, and if the opposing circumstances were absent.¹ The state of things thus described is the *potential* as distinguished from the *actual*: power, distinguished from act or energy: it represents an incomplete assemblage of the antecedent positive conditions—or perhaps a complete assemblage, but counteracted by some opposing circumstances. As soon as the assemblage becomes complete, and the opposing circumstances removed, the potential passes into the actual. The architect, when he is not building, possesses, not indeed the full or plenary power to build, but an important fraction of that power, which will become plenary when the other fractions supervene, but will then at the same time become operative, so as to produce the actual building.²

Potential as
distingu-
ished
from the
Actual—
What it is.

¹ Hobbes, in his *Computation or Logic* (chaps. ix. and x. Of Cause and Effect. Of Power and Act) expounds this subject with his usual perspicuity. "A Cause simply, or an Entire Cause, is the aggregate of all the accidents, both of the agents, how many soever they be, and of the patient, put together; which, when they are all supposed to be present, it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant: and if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood but that the effect is not produced" (ix. 3).

"Correspondent to Cause and Effect are Power and Act: nay, those and these are the same things, though for divers considerations they have divers names. For whensoever any agent has all those accidents which are necessarily requisite for the production of some effect in the patient, then we say that agent has power to produce that effect if it be applied to a patient. In like manner, whensoever any patient has all those accidents which it is requisite it should have for the produc-

tion of some effect in it, we say it is in the power of that patient to produce that effect if it be applied to a fitting agent. Power, active and passive, are parts only of plenary and entire power: nor, except they be joined, can any effect proceed from them. And therefore these powers are but conditional: namely, the agent has power if it be applied to a patient, and the patient has power if it be applied to an agent. *Otherwise neither of them have power, nor can the accidents which are in them severally be properly called powers*: nor any action be said to be possible for the power of the agent alone or the patient alone."

² Aristotle does in fact grant all that is here said, in the same book and in the page next subsequent to that which contains his arguments against the Megaric doctrine, *Metaphys.* Θ. 5, 1048, a. 1-24.

In this chapter Aristotle distinguishes powers belonging to things, from powers belonging to persons—powers irrational from powers rational—powers in which the agent acts with-

The doctrine which I have just been canvassing is expressly cited by Aristotle as a Megaric doctrine, and was therefore probably held by his contemporary Eubulidēs. From the pains which Aristotle takes (in the treatise 'De Interpretatione' and elsewhere) to explain and vindicate his own doctrine about the Potential and the Actual, we may see that it was a theme much debated among the dialecticians of the day. And we read of another Megaric, Diodorus¹ Kronus, perhaps contemporary (yet probably a little later than Aristotle), as advancing a position substantially the same as that of Eubulidēs. That alone is possible (Diodorus affirmed) which either is happening now, or will happen at some future time. As in speaking about facts of an unrecorded past, we know well that a given fact either occurred or did not occur, yet without knowing which of the two is true—and therefore we affirm only that the fact *may* have occurred: so also about the future, either the assertion that a given fact will at some time

out any will or choice, from those in which the will or choice of the agent is one item of the aggregate of conditions. He here expressly recognises that the power of the agent, separately considered, is only *conditional*; that is, conditional on the presence and suitable state of the patient, as well as upon the absence of counteracting circumstances. But he contends that such absence of counteracting circumstances is plainly implied, and need not be expressly mentioned in the definition.

ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν τι δυνατόν καὶ ποτὶ καὶ πῶς καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἀνάγκη προσεῖναι ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ—

τὸ δυνατόν κατὰ λόγον ἅπαν ἀνάγκη, ὅταν ὀρέσγῃται, οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὡς ἔχει, τοῦτο ποιεῖν· ἔχει δὲ παρόντος τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ὡς ἔχοντος ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ποιεῖν οὐ δύνασται. τὸ γὰρ μὴ πᾶσι τῶν ἐξω κωλύοντος προσδιορίζεται, οὐδὲν ἔτι δεῖ τὴν γὰρ δύναμιν ἔχει ὡς ἔστι δύναμις τοῦ ποιεῖν, ἔστι δὲ οὐ πάντως, ἀλλ' ἐχόντων πῶς, ἐν οἷς ἀφορισθῆσεται καὶ τὰ ἐξω κωλύοντα· ἀφαιρείται γὰρ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν τῷ διορισμῷ προσόντων ἐνία. The commentary of Alexander Aphr. upon this chapter is well worth consulting (pp. 546-548 of the edition of his commentary by Bonitz, 1847). Moreover Aristotle affirms in this chapter, that when τὸ ποιητικόν and

τὸ παθητικόν come together under suitable circumstances, the power will certainly pass into act.

Here then, it seems to me, Aristotle concedes the doctrine which the Megarics affirmed; or, if there be any difference between them, it is rather verbal than real. In fact, Aristotle's reasoning in the third chapter (wherein he impugns the doctrine of the Megarics), and the definition of *δυνατόν* which he gives in that chapter (1047, a. 25), are hardly to be reconciled with his reasoning in the fifth chapter. Bonitz (Notes on the Metaphys. pp. 393-395) complains of the *nira levitas* of Aristotle in his reasoning against the Megarics, and of his omitting to distinguish between *Vermögen* and *Möglichkeit*. I will not use so uncourteous a phrase; but I think his refutation of the Megarics is both unsatisfactory and contradicted by himself. I agree with the following remark of Bonitz:—"Nec mirum, quod Megarici, aliis illi quidem in rebus arguti, in hac autem satis acuti, existentiam τῷ δυνάμει ὄντι tribuere recusarint." &c.

¹ The dialectic ingenuity of Diodorus is powerfully attested by the verse of Ariston, applied to describe Arkesilaus (Sextus Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp. i. p. 234): Πρὸς τε Πλάτωνα, δὲ πῶς Πύρρων, μίστος Διόδωρος.

occur, is positively true, or the assertion that it will never occur, is positively true: the assertion that it may or may not occur some time or other, represents only our ignorance, which of the two is true. That which will never at any time occur, is impossible.

The argument here recited must have been older than Diodorus, since Aristotle states and controverts it: but it seems to have been handled by him in a peculiar Sophism of Diodorus—
'Ο Κυρίων' dialectic arrangement, which obtained the title of 'Ο Κυρίων.¹ The Stoics (especially Chrysippus), in times somewhat later, impugned the opinion of Diodorus, though seemingly upon grounds not quite the same as Aristotle. This problem was one upon which speculative minds occupied themselves for several centuries. Aristotle and Chrysippus maintained that affirmations respecting the past were *necessary* (one necessarily true and the other necessarily false)—affirmations respecting the future, *contingent* (one must be true and the other false, but either might be true). Diodorus held that both varieties of affirmations were equally necessary—Kleanthes the Stoic thought that both were equally contingent.²

It was thus that the Megaric dialecticians, with that fertility of mind which belonged to the Platonic and Aristotelian century, stirred up many real problems and difficulties connected with logical evidence, and supplied matters for discussion which not only occupied the speculative minds of the next four or five centuries, but have continued in debate down to the present day.

The question about the Possible and Impossible, raised between Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon the larger question, Whether there are universal laws of Nature or not? whether the sequences are, universally and throughout, composed of assemblages of conditions regularly antecedent, and assemblages of events Question between Aristotle and Diodorus, depends upon whether

¹ Aristot. De Interpret. p. 18, a. pp. 27-38. Alexander ad Aristot. Analyt. Prior. 34, p. 163, b. 34. Schol. Brandis. See also Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lect. xxiii. p. 464.

² Arrian ad Epiktet. ii. p. 19. Upton, in his notes on this passage of Arrian (p. 151) has embodied a very valuable

and elaborate commentary by Mr. James Harris (the great English Aristotelian scholar of the 18th century), explaining the nature of this controversy, and the argument called ὁ Κυρίων.

Compare Cicero, De Fato, c. 7-9. Epistol. Fam. ix. 4.

universal-regularity of sequence be admitted or denied.

regularly consequent; though from the number and complication of causes, partly co-operating and partly conflicting with each other, we with our limited intelligence are often unable to predict the course of events in each particular situation. Sokrates, Plato, and Aristotle, all maintained that regular sequence of antecedent and consequent was not universal, but partial only: ¹ that there were some agencies essentially regular, in which observation of the past afforded ground for predicting the future—other agencies (or the same agencies on different occasions) essentially irregular, in which the observation of the past afforded no such ground. Aristotle admitted a graduation of causes from perfect regularity to perfect irregularity:—1. The Celestial Spheres, with their included bodies or divine persons, which revolved and exercised a great and preponderant influence throughout the Kosmos, with perfect uniformity; having no power of contraries, i.e., having no power of doing anything else but what they actually did (having *ἐνέργεια* without *δύναμις*). 2. The four Elements, in which the natural agencies were to a great degree necessary and uniform, but also in a certain degree otherwise—either always or for the most part uniform (*τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ*)—tending by inherent appetency towards uniformity, but not always attaining it. 3. Besides these there were two other varieties of Causes accidental, or perfectly irregular—Chance and Spontaneity: powers of contraries, or with equal chance of contrary manifestations—essentially capricious, undeterminable, unpredictable.² This *Chance* of Aristotle—with one of two contraries sure to turn up, though you could never tell beforehand which of the two—was a conception analogous to what logicians sometimes call an Indefinite Proposition, or to what some grammarians have reckoned as a special variety of genders called the *doubtful gender*. There were thus positive causes of regularity, and positive

¹ Xenophon, Memor. I. 1; Plato, Timæus, p. 48 A. ἡ πλατυμένη αἰτία, &c.

² Ἡ τύχη—τὸ ἀπρότερον ἐτυχεν—τὸ αἰτιόματον are in the conception of Aristotle independent Ἀρχαί, attached to and blending with ἀνάγκη and τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ. See Physic. II. 196, b. 11; Metaphys. E. 1026-1027.

Sometimes τὸ ἀπρότερον ἐτυχεν is spoken

of as an Ἀρχή, but not as an αἰτία, or belonging to ὕλη as the Ἀρχή. 1027, b. 11. δῆλον ἔρα ὅτι μέχρι τινὸς βαδίζει Ἀρχή, αὐτὴ δ' οὐκ εἰς ἄλλο· ἔσται οὖν ἡ τοῦ ἀπρότερον ἐτυχεν αὐτῇ, καὶ αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς οὐδὲν.

See. respecting the different notions of Cause held by ancient philosophers, my remarks on the Platonic Phædon infra, vol. III. ch. xxv.

causes of irregularity, the co-operation or conflict of which gave the total manifestations of the actual universe. The principle of irregularity, or the Indeterminate, is sometimes described under the name of Matter,¹ as distinguishable from, yet co-operating with, the three determinate Causes—Formal, Efficient, Final. The Potential—the Indeterminate—the *May or May not be*—is characterised by Aristotle as one of the inherent principles operative in the Kosmos.

In what manner Diodorus stated and defended his opinion upon this point, we have no information. We know only that he placed affirmations respecting the future on the same footing as affirmations respecting the past: maintaining that our potential affirmation—*May or May not be*—respecting some future event, meant no more than it means respecting some past event, viz.: no inherent indeterminateness in the future sequence, but our

Conclusion of Diodorus—defended by Hobbes—Explanation given by Hobbes.

¹ Aristot. Metaph. E. 1027, a. 13; A. 1071, a. 10.

ὅτι ἡ ὕλη ἔσται αἰρία, ἡ ἐνδεχομένη κατὰ τὸ ὅς ἐστι το πᾶσι ἄλλοις τοῖς συμβεβηκόσι.

Matter is represented as the principle of irregularity, of τὸ ὁπότερ' ἐντυχῇ—as the δύναμις τῶν ἐναντίων.

In the explanation given by Alexander of Aphrodisias of the Peripatetic doctrine respecting chance—free-will, the principle of irregularity—τύχη is no longer assigned to the material cause, but is treated as an αἰρία κατὰ συμβεβηκός, distinguished from αἰρία προσηγουμένη or κατ' αἰρίαν. The exposition given of the doctrine by Alexander is valuable and interesting. See his treatise De Fato, addressed to the Emperor Severus, in the edition of Orelli, Zurich, 1824 (a very useful volume, containing treatises of Ammonius, Plotinus, Bardesanes, &c., on the same subject); also several sections of his *Questiones Naturales et Morales*, ed. Spengel, Munich, 1842, pp. 22-61-65-123, &c. He gives, however, a different explanation of τὸ δυνατόν and τὸ ἀδύνατον in pp. 62-63, which would not be at variance with the doctrine of Diodorus. We may remark that Alexander puts the antithesis of the two doctrines differently from Aristotle,—in this way. 1. Either all events happen κατ' εἰρημότητα. 2. Or all events do not happen κατ' εἰρημότητα, but

some events are ἐφ' ἡμῖν. See De Fato, p. 14 seq. This way of putting the question is directed more against the Stoics, who were the great advocates of εἰρημότητα, than against the Megaric Diodorus. The treatises of Chrysippus and the other Stoics alter both the wording and the putting of the thesis. We know that Chrysippus impugned the doctrine of Diodorus, but I do not see how.

The Stoic antithesis of τὰ κατ' εἰρημότητα—τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν is different from the antithesis conceived by Aristotle and does not touch the question about the universality of regular sequence. Τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν describes those sequences in which human volition forms one among the appreciable conditions determining or modifying the result; τὰ κατ' εἰρημότητα includes all the other sequences wherein human volition has no appreciable influence. But the sequence τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν is just as regular as the sequence τῶν κατ' εἰρημότητα; both the one and the other are often imperfectly predictable, because our knowledge of facts and power of comparison is so imperfect.

Theophrastus discussed τὸ κατ' εἰρημότητα, and explained it to mean the same as τὸ κατὰ φύσιν. φανερότατα δὲ θεόφραστος δεικνύει τούτων ὅτι τὸ κατ' εἰρημότητα τῇ κατὰ φύσιν (Alexander Aphrodisias ad Aristot. De Anima, ii).

ignorance of the determining conditions, and our inability to calculate their combined working.¹ In regard to scientific method generally, this problem is of the highest importance: for it is only so far as uniformity of sequence prevails, that facts become fit matter for scientific study.² Consistently with the doctrine of all-pervading uniformity of sequence, the definition of Hobbes gives the only complete account of the Impossible and Possible: i.e. an account such as would appear to an omniscient calculator, where *May or May not* merge in *Will or Will not*. According as each person falls short of or approaches this ideal

¹ The same doctrine as that of the Megaric Diodorus is declared by Hobbes in clear and explicit language (First Grounds of Philosophy, II. 10, 4-5):—

"That is an impossible act, for the production of which there is no power plenary. For seeing plenary power is that in which all things concur which are requisite for the production of an act, if the power shall never be plenary, there will always be wanting some of those things, without which the act cannot be produced. Wherefore that act shall never be produced: that is, that act is impossible. And every act, which is not impossible, is possible. Every act therefore which is possible, shall at some time or other be produced. For if it shall never be produced, then those things shall never concur which are requisite for the production of it; wherefore the act is impossible, by the definition; which is contrary to what was supposed.

"A necessary act is that, the production of which it is impossible to hinder: and therefore every act that shall be produced, shall necessarily be produced; for that it shall not be produced is impossible, because, as has already been demonstrated, every possible act shall at some time be produced. Nay, this proposition—*What shall be shall be*—is as necessary a proposition as this—*A man is a man*.

"But here, perhaps, some man will ask whether those future things which are commonly called *contingents*, are necessary. I say, then, that generally all contingents have their necessary causes, but are called *contingents*, in respect of other events on which they do not depend—as the rain which shall be to-morrow shall be necessary, that is,

from necessary causes; but we think and say, it happens by chance, because we do not yet perceive the causes thereof, though they exist now. For men commonly call that *casual* or *contingent*, whereof they do not perceive the necessary cause: and in the same manner they use to speak of things past, when not knowing whether a thing be done or not, they say, *It is possible it never was done*.

"Wherefore all propositions concerning future things, contingent or not contingent, as this—*It will rain to-morrow*, or *To-morrow the sun will rise*—are either necessarily true or necessarily false: but we call them contingent, because we do not yet know whether they be true or false; whereas their verity depends not upon our knowledge, but upon the foregoing of their causes. But there are some, who, though they will confess this whole proposition—*To-morrow it will either rain or not rain*—to be true, yet they will not acknowledge the parts of it, as, *To-morrow it will rain*, or *To-morrow it will not rain*, to be either of them true by itself; because (they say) neither this nor that is true *determinately*. But what is this true *determinately*, but true upon our knowledge or *evidently true*? And therefore they say no more but that it is not yet known whether it be true or not; but they say it more obscurely, and darken the evidence of the truth with the same words by which they endeavour to hide their own ignorance."

² The reader will find this problem admirably handled in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, Book III. ch. 21, and Book VI. chs. 2 and 3; also in the volume of Professor Bain on the Emotions and the Will, Chapter on Belief.

standard—according to his knowledge and mental resource, inductive and deductive—will be his appreciation of what may be or may not be—as of what may have been or may not have been during the past. But such appreciation, being relative to each individual mind, is liable to vary indefinitely, and does not admit of being embodied in one general definition.

Besides the above doctrine respecting Possible and Impossible, there is also ascribed to Diodorus a doctrine respecting Hypothetical Propositions, which, as far as I comprehend it, appears to have been a correct one.¹ He is also said to have reasoned against the reality of motion, renewing the arguments of Zeno the Eleate.

But if he reproduced the arguments of Zeno, he also employed another, peculiar to himself. He admitted the reality of *past* motion : but he denied the reality of *present* motion. You may affirm truly (he said) that a thing *has been moved* : but you cannot truly affirm that any thing *is being moved*. Since it was *here* before, and is *there* now, you may be sure that it has been moved : but actual present motion you cannot perceive or prove. Affirmation in the perfect tense may be true, when affirmation in the present tense neither is nor ever was true : thus it is true to say—Helen *had* three husbands (Menelaus, Paris, Deiphobus) : but it was never true to say—Helen *has* three husbands, since they became her husbands in succession.² Diodorus supported this paradox by some ingenious arguments, and the opinion which he denied seems to have presented itself to him as involving the position of indivisible minima—atoms of body, points of space, instants of time. He admitted such minima of atoms, but not of space or time : and without such admission he could not make intelligible to himself the fact of present or actual motion. He could find no present *Now* or Minimum of Time ; without which

Reasonings
of Diodorus
—respect-
ing Hypo-
thetical
Proposi-
tions—
respecting
Motion. His
difficulties
about the
Now of time.

¹ Sextus Emp. Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. II. pp. 110-115. ἀληθὲς συνημμένον. Adv. Mathemat. viii. 112. Philo maintained that an hypothetical proposition was true, if both the antecedent and consequent were true—"If it be day, I am conversing". Diodorus denied that this proposition, as an Hypothe-

tical proposition, was true; since the consequent might be false, though the antecedent were true. An Hypothetical proposition was true only when, assuming the antecedent to be true, the consequent must be true also.

² Sextus Empir. adv. Mathemat. x. pp. 85-101.

neither could any present motion be found. Plato in the Parmenides¹ professes to have found this inexplicable moment of transition, but he describes it in terms not likely to satisfy a dialectical mind: and Aristotle denying that the Now is any portion or constituent part of time, considers it only as a boundary of the past and future.²

This opinion of Aristotle is in the main consonant with that of Diodorus; who, when he denied the reality of present motion, meant probably only to deny the reality of *present motion apart from past and future motion*. Herein also we find him agreeing with Hobbes, who denies the same in clearer language.³ Sextus Empiricus declares

Motion is always present, past, and future.

¹ Plato, Parmenides, p. 156 D-E. Πέρ' οὖν μεταβάλλει; οὐτε γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄν οὐτε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει, οὐτε ἐν χρόνῳ ὄν. (Here Plato adverts to the difficulties attending the supposition of actual μεταβολή, as Diodorus to those of actual κίνησις. Next we have Plato's hypothesis for getting over the difficulties.) 'Αρ' οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ἀτοκον τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τὸν ἄν εἴη ὅτε μεταβάλλει; Τὸ τοιον δέ; Τὸ εἰαίφνης· ἡ εἰαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἀτοπὸς τις ἐγκάθηται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδὲν ὄντα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τὸ τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐπὶ τὸ ἐστάναι καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι.

Diodorus could not make out this φύσις ἀτοπὸς which Plato calls τὸ εἰαίφνης.

² To illustrate this apparent paradox of Diodorus, affirming past motion, but denying present motion, we may compare what is said by Aristotle about the Now or Point of Present Time—that it is not a part, but a boundary between Past and Future.

Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 218, a. 4-10. τοῦ δὲ χρόνου τὰ μὲν γέγονε, τὰ δὲ μέλλει, ἐστὶ δ' οὐδὲν, ὅντος μεριστοῦ· τὸ δὲ νῦν οὐ μέρος—τὸ δὲ νῦν πᾶρας ἐστὶ (a. 24)—p. 222, a. 10-20-223, a. 20. ὃ δὲ χρόνος καὶ ἡ κίνησις ἀμα κατὰ τὴ δύναμιν καὶ κατ' ἐνέργειαν.

Which doctrine is thus rendered by Harris in his Hermes, ch. vii. pp. 101-103-105:—

"Both Points and Nows being taken as Bounds, and not as Parts, it will follow that in the same manner as the same point may be the end of one line and the beginning of another—so the same Now may be the End of one

time, and the beginning of another. . . I say of these two times, that with respect to the *Now*, or Instant which they include, the first of them is necessarily Past time, as being previous to it: the other is necessarily Future, as being subsequent. . . From the above speculations, there follow some conclusions, which may be called paradoxes, till they have been attentively considered. In the first place, there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as Time Present. For if all Time be transient, as well as continuous, it cannot like a line be present altogether, but part will necessarily be gone and part be coming. If therefore any portion of its continuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be Time no longer. But if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can Time possibly be present, to which such continuity is essential?"—Compare Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy, p. 581.

³ Hobbes, First Grounds of Philosophy, li. 8, 11.

"That is said to be at rest which, during any time, is in one place; and that to be moved, or to have been moved, which whether it be now at rest or moved, was formerly in another place from that which it is now in. From which definition it may be inferred, first, that whatsoever is moved *has been* moved: for if it still be in the same place in which it was formerly, it is at rest: but if it be in another place, it *has been* moved, by the definition of moved. Secondly, that what is moved, *will yet be* moved: for that which is moved, leaveth the place where it is,

Diodorus to have been inconsistent in admitting past motion while he denied present motion.¹ But this seems not more inconsistent than the doctrine of Aristotle respecting the *Now* of time. I know, when I compare a child or a young tree with what they respectively were a year ago, that they have grown : but whether they actually are growing, at every moment of the intervening time, is not ascertainable by sense, and is a matter of probable inference only.² Diodorus could not understand present motion, except in conjunction with past and future motion, as being the common limit of the two : but he could understand past motion, without reference to present or future. He could not state to himself a satisfactory theory respecting the beginning of motion : as we may see by his reasonings distinguishing the motion of a body all at once in its integrity, from the motion of a body considered as proceeding from the separate motion of its constituent atoms—the moving atoms preponderating over the atoms at rest, and determining them to motion,³ until gradually the whole body came to move. The same argument re-appears in another example, when he argues—The wall does not fall while its component stones hold together, for then it is still standing : nor yet when they have come apart, for then it *has* fallen.⁴

That Diodorus was a person seriously anxious to solve logical difficulties, as well as to propose them, would be incontestably proved if we could believe the story recounted of him—that he hanged himself because he could not solve a problem proposed by Stilpon in the presence of Ptolemy Soter.⁵ But this story probably grew out of the fact, that Stilpon succeeded Diodorus at Megara, and eclipsed him in reputation. The celebrity of Stilpon, both at Megara and

and consequently will be moved still. Thirdly, that whatsoever is moved, is not in one place during any time, how little soever that may be : for by the definition of rest, that which is in one place during any time, is at rest. . . . From what is above demonstrated—namely, that whatsoever is moved, *has also been moved, and will be moved* : this also may be collected, That there can be no conception of motion without conceiving past and future time."

¹ Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 91-97-112-116.

² See this point touched by Plato in *Philebus*, p. 43 B.

³ Sext. Emp. adv. Math. x. 113. *κίνησις κατ' εἰδικόμενα* . . . *κίνησις κατ' ἀναπάρετα*. Compare Zeller, *die Philosophie, der Griechen*. ii. p. 191, ed. 2nd.

⁴ Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. x. pp. 346-348.

⁵ Diog. L. ii. 112.

at Athens (between 320-300 B.C., but his exact date can hardly be settled), was equal, if not superior, to that of any contemporary philosopher. He was visited by listeners from all parts of Greece, and he drew away pupils from the most renowned teachers of the day; from Theophrastus as well as the others.¹ He was no less remarkable for fertility of invention than for neatness of expression. Two persons, who came for the purpose of refuting him, are said to have remained with him as admirers and scholars. All Greece seemed as it were looking towards him, and inclining towards the Megaric doctrines.² He was much esteemed both by Ptolemy Soter and by Demetrius Poliorkêtes, though he refused the presents and invitations of both: and there is reason to believe that his reputation in his own day must have equalled that of either Plato or Aristotle in theirs. He was formidable in disputation; but the nine dialogues which he composed and published are characterised by Diogenes as cold.³

Contemporary with Stilpon (or perhaps somewhat later) was Menedêmus of Eretria, whose philosophic parentage is traced to Phædon. The name of Phædon Eretriacus has been immortalised, not by his own works, but by the splendid dialogue of which Plato has made him the reciter. He is said (though I doubt the fact) to have been a native of Elis. He was of good parentage, a youthful companion of Sokrates in the last years of his life.⁴ After the death of Sokrates, Phædon went to Elis, composed some dialogues, and established a suc-

¹ This is asserted by Diogenes upon the authority of Φίλιππος ὁ Μεγαρίτης, whom he cites κατὰ λέξιν. We do not know anything about Philippos.

Menedêmus, who spoke with contempt of the other philosophers, even of Plato and Xenokrates, admired Stilpon (Diog. L. ii. 134).

² The phrase of Diogenes is here singular, and must probably have been borrowed from a partisan—ὥστε μικροῦ δεῖσαι πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἀφορῶσαν εἰς αὐτὸν μεγαρίσαι. Stilpon εὐρεσιλογεῖ καὶ σοφιστεία προῆγε τοὺς ἄλλους—κομψότατος (Diog. L. ii. 118-116).

³ Diog. L. ii. 119-120. ψυχροί.

⁴ The story given by Diogenes L. (ii. 31 and 106; compare Aulus Gellius, ii. 18) about Phædon's adventures antecedent to his friendship with Sokrates, is unintelligible to me.

"Phædon was made captive along with his country (Elis), sold at Athens, and employed in a degrading capacity; until Sokrates induced Alkibiades or Kriton to pay his ransom." Now, no such event as the capture of Elis, and the sale of its Eupatrids as slaves, happened at that time: the war between Sparta and Elis (described by Xenophon, Hell. iii. 2, 21 seq.) led to no such result, and was finished, moreover, after the death of Sokrates. Alkibiades had been long in exile. If, in the text of Diogenes, where we now read *θαῖων*, Ἡλείος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν—we were allowed to substitute *θαῖων* Μελίος, τῶν εὐπατριδῶν—the narrative would be rendered consistent with known historical facts. The Athenians captured the island of Melos in 415 B.C., put to death the Melians of

cession or sect of philosophers—Pleistanus, Anchipylus, Moschus. Of this sect Menedēmus,¹ contemporary and hearer of Stilpon, became the most eminent representative, and from him it was denominated Eretriac instead of Eleian. The Eretriacs, as well as the Megarics, took up the negative arm of philosophy, and were eminent as puzzlers and controversialists.

But though this was the common character of the two, in a logical point of view, yet in Stilpon, as well as Menedēmus, other elements became blended with the logical. These persons combined, in part at least, the free censorial speech of Antisthenes with the subtlety of Eukleides. What we hear of Menedēmus is chiefly his bitter, stinging sarcasms, and clever repartees. He did not, like the Cynic Diogenes, live in contented poverty, but occupied a prominent place (seemingly under the patronage of Antigonus and Demetrius) in the government of his native city Eretria. Nevertheless he is hardly less celebrated than Diogenes for open speaking of his mind, and carelessness of giving offence to others.²

Open speech
and licence
of censure
assumed by
Menedēmus.

ANTISTHENES.

Antisthenes, the originator of the Cynic succession of philosophers, was one of those who took up principally the ethical element of the Sokratic discoursing, which the Megarics left out or passed lightly over. He did not indeed altogether leave out the logical element: all his doctrines respecting it, as far as we hear of them, appear to have been on the negative side. But

Antisthenes
took up
Ethics prin-
cipally, but
with nega-
tive Logic
inter-
mingled.

military age, and sold into slavery the younger males as well as the females (Thucyd. v. 116). If Phædon had been a Melian youth of good family, he would have been sold at Athens, and might have undergone the adventures narrated by Diogenes. We know that Alkibiades purchased a female

Melian as slave (Pseudo-Andokides cont. Alkibiad.).

¹ Diog. L. ii. 106, 126 seq. There was a statue of Menedēmus in the ancient stadium of Eretria: Diogenes speaks as if it existed in his time, and as if he himself had seen it (ii. 132).

² Diog. L. ii. 129-142.

respecting ethics, he laid down affirmative propositions,¹ and delivered peremptory precepts. His aversion to pleasure, by which he chiefly meant sexual pleasure, was declared in the most emphatic language. He had therefore, in the negative logic, a point of community with Eukleides and the Megarics: so that the coalescence of the two successions, in Stilpon and Menedémus, is a fact not difficult to explain.

The life of Sokrates being passed in conversing with a great variety of persons and characters, his discourses were of course multifarious, and his ethical influence operated in different ways. His mode of life, too, exercised a certain influence of its own.

Antisthenes, and his disciple Diogenes, were in many respects closer approximations to Sokrates than either Plato or any other of the Sokratic companions. The extraordinary colloquial and cross-examining force was indeed a peculiar gift, which Sokrates bequeathed to none of them: but Antisthenes took up the Sokratic purpose of inculcating practical ethics not merely by word of mouth, but also by manner of life. He was not inferior to his master in contentment under poverty, in strength of will and endurance,² in acquired insensibility both to pain and pleasure, in disregard of opinion around him, and in fearless exercise of a self-imposed censorial mission. He learnt from Sokrates indifference to conventional restraints and social superiority, together with the duty of reducing wants to a minimum, and stifling all such as were above the lowest term of necessity. To this last point, Sokrates gave a religious colour, proclaiming that the Gods had no wants, and that those who had least came nearest to the Gods.³ By Antisthenes, these qualities were exhibited in eminent measure; and by his disciple Diogenes

¹ Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. 20, p. 485, Potter. ἐγὼ δ' ἀποδέχομαι τὸν Ἀφροδίτην λέγοντα κῆν κατατοξίσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι, &c.

² Μανεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν, Diog. L. vi. 3.

³ Cicero, de Orator. iii. 17, 62; Diog. L. vi. 2. παρ' οὗ (Sokrates) καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατήρξε πρῶτος τοῦ κυνισμοῦ: also vi. 15. The appellation of Cynics is said to have arisen from the practice

of Antisthenes to frequent the gymnasium called Κυνόσαυρος (D. L. vi. 13), though other causes are also assigned for the denomination (Winckelmann, Antisth. Frag. pp. 8-10).

³ Sokrates had said, τὸ μηδεὶς δεέσθαι, θεῖον εἶναι. τὸ δ' ὡς ἐλαχίστων, ἐγγυρᾶτω τοῦ θεοῦ (Xenophon, Memor. i. 6, 10. Compare Apuleius, Apol. p. 25). Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 E. The same dictum is ascribed to Diogenes (Diog. L. vi. 105).

they were still farther exaggerated. Epiktetus, a warm admirer of both, considers them as following up the mission from Zeus which Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) sets forth as his authority, to make men independent of the evils of life by purifying and disciplining the appreciation of good and evil in the mind of each individual.¹

Antisthenes declared virtue to be the End for men to aim at—and to be sufficient *per se* for conferring happiness; but he also declared that virtue must be manifested in acts and character, not by words. Neither much discourse nor much learning was required for virtue; nothing else need be postulated except bodily strength like that of Sokrates.² He undervalued theory even in regard to Ethics: much more in regard to Nature (Physics) and to Logic: he also despised literary, geometrical, musical teaching, as distracting men's attention from the regulation of their own appreciative sentiment, and the adaptation of their own conduct to it. He maintained strenuously (what several Platonic dialogues call in question) that virtue both could be taught and must be taught: when once learnt, it was permanent, and could not be eradicated. He prescribed the simplest mode of life, the reduction of wants to a minimum, with perfect indifference to enjoyment, wealth, or power. The reward was, exemption from fear, anxiety, disappointments, and wants: together with the pride of approximation to the Gods.³ Though Antisthenes thus despised both literature and theory, yet he had obtained a rhetorical education, and had even heard the rhetor Gorgias. He composed a large number of dialogues and other treatises, of which only the titles (very multifarious) are preserved to us.⁴ One dialogue, entitled *Sathon*, was a coarse attack on Plato: several treated of Homer and of other poets, whose verses he seems to have allegorised. Some of his dialogues are also declared by Athenæus to contain slanderous abuse of Alkibiades and other leading Athenians.

Doctrines of Antisthenes exclusively ethical and ascetic. He despised music, literature, and physics.

¹ Epiktetus, Dissert. iii. 1, 19-22, iii. 21-19, iii. 24-40-60-69. The whole of the twenty-second Dissertation, *Περὶ Κυνισμοῦ*, is remarkable. He couples Sokrates with Diogenes more closely than with any one else.

² Diog. L. vi. 11.

³ Diog. L. vi. 102-104.

⁴ Diog. L. vi. 1, 15-18. The two remaining fragments—*Αἴας*, *Ὀδυσσεύς* (Winckelmann, Antisth. Fragm. pp. 38-42)—cannot well be genuine, though Winckelmann seems to think them so.

On the other hand, the dialogues are much commended by competent judges; and Theopompus even affirmed that much in the Platonic dialogues had been borrowed from those of Antisthenes, Aristippus, and Bryson.¹

Antisthenes was among the most constant friends and followers of Sokrates, both in his serious and in his playful colloquia.² The Symposium of Xenophon describes both of them, in their hours of joviality. The picture, drawn by an author, himself a friend and companion, exhibits Antisthenes (so far as we can interpret caricature and jocular inversion) as poor, self-denying, austere, repulsive, and disputatibus—yet bold and free-spoken, careless of giving offence, and forcible in colloquial repartee.³

In all these qualities, however, Antisthenes was surpassed by his pupil and successor Diogenes of Sinôpê; whose ostentatious austerity of life, eccentric and fearless character, indifference to what was considered as decency, great acuteness and still greater power of expression, freedom of speech towards all and against all—constituted him the perfect type of the Cynical sect. Being the son of a money-agent at Sinôpê,

¹ Athenæus, v. 220, xi. 508; Diog. L. iii. 24-35; Phrynichus ap. Photium, cod. 158; Epiktétus, ii. 16-35. Antisthenes is placed in the same line with Kritias and Xenophon, as a Sokratic writer, by Dionysius of Halikarnassus, De Thucyd. Jud. p. 941. That there was standing reciprocal hostility between Antisthenes and Plato we can easily believe. Plato never names Antisthenes; and if the latter attacked Plato, it was under the name of Sathon. How far Plato in his dialogues intends to attack Antisthenes without naming him—is difficult to determine. Probably he does intend to designate Antisthenes as γῆρας ἀνιστάμενος, in Sophist. 251. Schleiermacher and other commentators think that he intends to attack Antisthenes in Philébus, Theætétus, Euthydémus, &c. But this seems to me not certain. In Philébus, p. 44, he can hardly include Antisthenes among the μάλα δεῖνοι περὶ φύσιν. Antisthenes neglected the study of φύσις.

² Xenophon, Memor. iii. 11, 17.

³ Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11, 17; Symposium, ii. 10, iv. 2-3-44. Plutarch

(Quest. Symp. ii. 1, 6, p. 632) and Diogenes Laertius (vi. 1, 15) appear to understand the description of Xenophon as ascribing to Antisthenes a winning and conciliatory manner. To me it conveys the opposite impression. We must recollect that the pleasantry of the Xenophontic Symposium (not very successful as pleasantry) is founded on the assumption, by each person, of qualities and pretensions the direct reverse of that which he has in reality—and on his professing to be proud of that which is a notorious disadvantage. Thus Sokrates pretends to possess great personal beauty, and even puts himself in competition with the handsome youth Kritobulus; he also prides himself on the accomplishments of a good μαρτυρός. Antisthenes, quite indigent, boasts of his wealth; the neglected Hermogenes boasts of being powerfully friended. The passage, iv. 57, 61, which talks of the winning manners of Antisthenes, and his power of imparting popular accomplishments, is to be understood in this ironical and inverted sense.

he was banished with his father for fraudulently counterfeiting the coin of the city. On coming to Athens as an exile, he was captivated with the character of Antisthenes, who was at first unwilling to admit him, and was only induced to do so by his invincible importunity. Diogenes welcomed his banishment, with all its poverty and destitution, as having been the means of bringing him to Antisthenes,¹ and to a life of philosophy. It was Antisthenes (he said) who emancipated him from slavery, and made him a freeman. He was clothed in one coarse garment with double fold: he adopted the wallet (afterwards the symbol of cynicism) for his provisions, and is said to have been without any roof or lodging—dwelling sometimes in a tub near the Metroon, sometimes in one of the public porticoes or temples: he is also said to have satisfied all his wants in the open day. He here indulged unreservedly in that unbounded freedom of speech, which he looked upon as the greatest blessing of life. No man ever turned that blessing to greater account: the string of repartees, sarcasms, and stinging reproofs, which are attributed to him by Diogenes Laertius, is very long, but forms only a small proportion of those which that author had found recounted.² Plato described Diogenes as Sokrates running mad:³ and when

¹ Diog. L. vi. 2, 21-49; Plutarch *Quæst. Sympos.* ii. 1, 7; Epiktetus, iii. 22, 67, iv. 1, 114; Dion Chrysostom. *Orat.* viii.-ix.-x.

Plutarch quotes two lines from Diogenes respecting Antisthenes:—

Ὅς με ῥάκη τ' ἤμικτοχε κατήνάγκασε
Πτωχὸν γενέσθαι καὶ δόμων ἀνάστατον—

οὐ γὰρ ἐν ὁμοίῳ τιθεὶς ἐν λέγων—

Ὅς με σοφὸν καὶ αὐτάραξ καὶ μακάριον ἐποίησεν. The interpretation given of the passage by Plutarch is curious, but quite in the probable meaning of the author. However, it is not easy to reconcile with the fact of this extreme poverty another fact mentioned about Diogenes, that he asked fees from listeners, in one case as much as a mina (Diog. L. vi. 2, 67).

² Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 2, 69. *ἰρωτηθεὶς τί κάλλιστον ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἶη—παρήγορσις.* Among the numerous lost works of Theophrastus (enumerated by Diogen. Laert. v. 43) one is *Τὸν Διογένητος Συναγωγή*, &c., a remarkable evidence of the impression made by the sayings and proceedings of Diogenes upon his contemporaries. Compare

Dion Chrysostom, *Or.* ix. (vol. i. 228 seq. Reiske) for the description of the conduct of Diogenes at the Isthmian festival, and the effect produced by it on spectators.

These smart sayings, of which so many are ascribed to Diogenes, and which he is said to have practised beforehand, and to have made occasions for—*ὅτι χρειαὶ εἰν μεμνημένος* (Diog. L. v. 18, vi. 91, vii. 26)—were called by the later rhetors *Χρειαί*. See Hermogenes and Theon, apud Wals, *Rhetor. Græc.* l. pp. 19-201; Quintilian, l. 9, 4.

Such collections of *ἄνα* were ascribed to all the philosophers in greater or less number. Photius, in giving the list of books from which the Sophist Sopater collected extracts, indicates one as *τὰ Διογένητος τοῦ Κυρκικοῦ Ἀποφθέγματα* (Codex 161).

³ Diog. L. vi. 54: *Σωκράτης μανὲς μενός.* vi. 26: *Οἱ δὲ φασὶ τὸν Διογένητα εἰπεῖν, Παρὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα τῶφον· τὸν δὲ φάσαι, Ἐρίσας γε τῶφον, Διόγενες.* The term *τῶφος* ('vanity, self-conceit, assumption of knowing better than

Diogenes, meeting some Sicilian guests at his house and treading upon his best carpet, exclaimed—"I am treading on Plato's empty vanity and conceit," Plato rejoined—"Yes, with a different vanity of your own". The impression produced by Diogenes in conversation with others, was very powerfully felt both by young and old. Phokion, as well as Stilpon, were among his hearers.¹ In crossing the sea to Ægina, Diogenes was captured by pirates, taken to Krete, and there put up to auction as a slave: the herald asked him what sort of work he was fit for: whereupon Diogenes replied—To command men. At his own instance, a rich Corinthian named Xeniadēs bought him and transported him to Corinth. Diogenes is said to have assumed towards Xeniadēs the air of a master: Xeniadēs placed him at the head of his household, and made him preceptor of his sons. In both capacities Diogenes discharged his duty well.² As a slave well treated by his master, and allowed to enjoy great freedom of speech, he lived in greater comfort than he had ever enjoyed as a freeman: and we are not surprised that he declined the offers of friends to purchase his liberation. He died at Corinth in very old age: it is said, at ninety years old, and on the very same day on which Alexander the Great died at Babylon (B.C. 323). He was buried at the gate of Corinth leading to the Isthmus: a monument being erected to his honour, with a column of Parian marble crowned by the statue of a dog.³

In politics, ethics, and rules for human conduct, Diogenes adopted views of his own, and spoke them out freely. He was a freethinker (like Antisthenes) as to the popular religion: and he disapproved of marriage laws, considering that the intercourse of the sexes

Doctrines
and smart
sayings of
Diogenes—
Contempt of

others, being puffed up by the praise of vulgar minds") seems to have been much interchanged among the ancient philosophers, each of them charging it upon his opponents; while the opponents of philosophy generally imputed it to all philosophers alike. Pyrrho the Sceptic took credit for being the only *ἀνταρ*: and he is complimented as such by his panegyrist Timon in the *Silli*. Aristokles affirmed that Pyrrho had just as much *νῦθος* as the rest. Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 18.

¹ Diog. L. vi. 2, 75-76.

² Diog. L. vi. 2, 74.

Xeniadēs was mentioned by Demokritus: he is said to have been a sceptic (*Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.* vii. 43-53), at least he did not recognise any *ἀνταρ*.

³ Diog. L. vi. 2, 77-78.

Diogenes seems to have been known by his contemporaries under the title of *ὁ Κύν*. Aristotle cites from him a witty comparison under that designation, *Rhetoric*, iii. 10, 1410, a. 24. *καὶ ὁ Κύν (κύων) τὰ κατηρία, τὰ ἄντικα φιδίνα.*

ought to be left to individual taste and preference.¹ Though he respected the city and conformed to its laws, yet he had no reverence for existing superstitions, or for the received usages as to person, sex, or family. He declared himself to be a citizen of the Kosmos and of Nature.² His sole exigency was, independence of life, and freedom of speech: having these, he was satisfied, fully sufficient to himself for happiness, and proud of his own superiority to human weakness. The main benefit which he derived from philosophy (he said) was, that he was prepared for any fortune that might befall him. To be ready to accept death easily, was the sure guarantee of a free and independent life.³ He insisted emphatically upon the necessity of exercise or training (*ἀσκησις*) both as to the body and as to the mind. Without this, nothing could be done: by means of it everything might be achieved. But he required that the labours imposed should be directed to the acquisition of habits really useful; instead of being wasted, as they commonly were, upon objects frivolous and showy. The truly wise man ought to set before him as a model the laborious life of Hēraklēs: and he would find, after proper practice and training, that the contempt of pleasures would afford him more enjoyment than the pleasures themselves.⁴

Dioigenes declared that education was sobriety to the young, consolation to the old, wealth to the poor, ornament to the rich. But he despised much of what was commonly imparted as education—music, geometry, astronomy, &c.: and he treated with equal scorn Plato and Eukleides.⁵ He is said however to have conducted the education of the sons of his master Xenias with-

¹ Diog. L. vi. 2, 72. Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* i. 13.

² Diog. L. vi. 2, 63-71. The like declaration is ascribed to Sokrates. Epiktētus, i. 9, 1.

³ Diog. L. vi. 2, 63, 72. *μηδὲν ἐλευθερίας προκρίνων.* Epiktētus, iv. 1, 30. *Οὕτω καὶ Διογένης λέγει, μίαν εἶναι μηχανὴν πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν—τὸ εὐ-αίως ἀποθνήσκειν.* Compare iv. 7-28, i. 24, 6.

⁴ Diog. L. vi. 2, 70-71. *καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἡ καταφρόνησις ἡδυστάτη προμηλετηθεῖσα, καὶ ὥσπερ οἱ συνθεσθέντες ἡδῶς ζῇν, ἀήδως ἐπὶ τοῦναντίον*

μερίσσειν, οὕτω οἱ τοῦναντίον ἀσκηθέντες ἡδῶν αὐτῶν τῶν ἡδῶν καταφρονοῦσι. See Lucian, *Vitar. Auct.* c. 9, about the hard life and the happiness of Diogenes. Compare s. 26 about the *τύφος* of Diogenes treading down the different *τύφος* of Plato, and Epiktētus iii. 22, 57. Antisthenes, in his dialogue or discourse called *Ἡρακλῆς*, appears to have enforced the like appeal to that hero as an example to others. See Winckelmann, *Fragm. Antisthen.* pp. 15-18.

⁵ Diog. L. vi. 2, 68-73-24-27.

⁶ Diog. L. vi. 2, 30-31.

out material departure from the received usage. He caused them to undergo moderate exercise (not with a view to athletic success) in the palaestra, and afterwards to practise riding, shooting with the bow, hurling the javelin, slinging and hunting: he cultivated their memories assiduously, by recitations from poets and prose authors, and even from his own compositions: he kept them on bread and water, without tunic or shoes, with clothing only such as was strictly necessary, with hair closely cut, habitually silent, and fixing their eyes on the ground when they walked abroad. These latter features approximate to the training at Sparta (as described by Xenophon) which Diogenes declared to contrast with Athens as the apartments of the men with those of the women. Diogenes is said to have composed several dialogues and even some tragedies.¹ But his most impressive display (like that of Sokrates) was by way of colloquy—prompt and incisive interchange of remarks. He was one of the few philosophers who copied Sokrates in living constantly before the public—in talking with every one indiscriminately and fearlessly, in putting home questions like a physician to his patient.² Epiktétus,—speaking of Diogenes as equal, if not superior, to Sokrates—draws a distinction pertinent and accurate. “To Sokrates” (says he) “Zeus assigned the elenctic or cross-examining function: to Diogenes, the magisterial and chastising function: to Zeno (the Stoic) the didactic and dogmatical.” While thus describing Diogenes justly enough, Epiktétus nevertheless insists upon his agreeable person and his extreme gentleness and good-nature:³ qualities for which

¹ Diog. L. vi. 2, 80. Diogenes Laertius himself cites a fact from one of the dialogues—Pordalus (vi. 2, 20): and Epiktétus alludes to the treatise on Ethics by Diogenes—*iv τῇ Ἠθικῇ*—il. 20, 14. It appears however that the works ascribed to Diogenes were not admitted by all authors as genuine (Diog. L. c).

² Dion Chrysost. Or. x.; De Servis, p. 295 R. Or. ix.; Isthmicus, p. 389 H. ὡς περ ἰατροὶ ἀνακρίνουσι τοὺς ἀσθενούντας, οὕτως Διογένης ἀνέκρινε τὸν ἄνθρωπον, &c.

³ Epiktétus, iii. 21, 19. ὡς Σωκράτης συνεβούλευε τὴν ἐλεγκτικὴν χώραν εἶχειν, ὡς Διογένης τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύτικὴν, ὡς Ζήνωνι τὴν διδασκαλικὴν καὶ δογματικὴν.

About τὸ ἡμέρον καὶ φιλόανθρωπον of

Diogenes, see Epiktétus, iii. 24, 64; who also tells us (iv. 11, 19), professing to follow the statements of contemporaries, that the bodies both of Sokrates and Diogenes were by nature so sweet and agreeable (*εὐχάρι καὶ ἡδύ*) as to dispense with the necessity of washing.

“Ego certé” (says Seneca, *Epist.* 108, 13-14, about the lectures of the eloquent Stoic Attalus) “cum Attalum audirem, in vitia, in errores, in mala vitæ perorantem, sæpe misertus sum generis humani, et illum sublimem altioresque humano fastigio credidi. Ipse regem se esse dicebat: sed plus quam regnare mihi videbatur, cui liceret censuram agere regnantium.” See also his treatises *De Beneficiis*, v. 4-6, and *De Tranquillitate Animi* (c. 8), where,

probably Diogenes neither took credit himself, nor received credit from his contemporaries. Diogenes seems to have really possessed—that which his teacher Antisthenes postulated as indispensable—the Sokratic physical strength and vigour. His ethical creed, obtained from Antisthenes, was adopted by many successors, and (in the main) by Zeno and the Stoics in the ensuing century. But the remarkable feature in Diogenes which attracts to him the admiration of Epiktétus, is—that he set the example of acting out his creed, consistently and resolutely, in his manner of life: ¹ an example followed by some of his immediate successors, but not by the Stoics, who confined themselves to writing and preaching. Contemporary both with Plato and Aristotle, Diogenes stands to both of them in much the same relation as Phokion to Demosthenes in politics and oratory: he exhibits strength of will, insensibility to applause as well as to reproach, and self-acting independence—in antithesis to their higher gifts and cultivation of intellect. He was undoubtedly, next to Sokrates, the most original and unparalleled manifestation of Hellenic philosophy.

Admiration of Epiktétus for Diogenes, especially for his consistency in acting out his own ethical creed.

Respecting Diogenes and the Cynic philosophers generally, we have to regard not merely their doctrines, but the effect produced by their severity of life. In this point Diogenes surpassed his master Antisthenes, whose life he criticised as not fully realising the lofty spirit of his doctrine. The spectacle of man not merely abstaining from enjoyment, but enduring with indifference hunger, thirst, heat, cold, poverty, privation, bodily torture, death, &c., exercises a powerful influence on the imagination of mankind.

Admiration excited by the asceticism of the Cynics—Asceticism extreme in the East—Comparison of the Indian Gymnosophists with Diogenes.

after lofty encomium on Diogenes, he exclaims—"Si quis de felicitate Diogenis dubitat, potest idem dubitare et de Deorum immortalium statu, an parum beatè degant," &c.

¹ Cicero, in his Oration in defence of Murena (80-61-62) compliments Cato (the accuser) as one of the few persons who adopted the Stoic tenets with a view of acting them out, and who did really act them out—"Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato, auctoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit: neque disputandi causâ, ut magna pars, sed

ita vivendi". Tacitus (Histor. iv. 5) pays the like compliment to Helvidius Priscus.

M. Gaston Boissier (Étude sur la Vie et les Ouvrages de Varron, pp. 113-114, Paris, 1861) expresses an amount of surprise which I should not have expected, on the fact that persons adopted a philosophical creed for the purpose only of debating it and defending it, and not of acting it out. But he recognises the fact, in regard to Varro and his contemporaries, in terms not less applicable to the Athe-

It calls forth strong feelings of reverence and admiration in the beholders : while in the sufferer himself also, self-reverence and self-admiration, the sense of power and exaltation above the measure of humanity, is largely developed. The extent to which self-inflicted hardships and pains have prevailed in various regions of the earth, the long-protracted and invincible resolution with which they have been endured, and the veneration which such practices have procured for the ascetics who submitted to them—are among the most remarkable chapters in history.¹ The East, especially India, has always been, and still is, the country in which these voluntary endurances have reached their extreme pitch of severity ; even surpassing those of the Christian monks in Egypt and Syria, during the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era.² When Alexander the Great first opened India to the observation of Greeks, one of the novelties which most surprised him and his followers was, the sight of the Gymnosophists or naked philosophers. These men were found lying on the ground, either totally uncovered or with nothing but a cloth round the loins ; abstaining from all enjoyment, nourishing themselves upon a minimum of coarse vegetables or fruits, careless of the extreme heat of the plain, and the extreme cold of the mountain ; and often superadding pain, fatigue, or prolonged and distressing uniformity of posture. They passed their time either in silent meditation or in discourse on religion and philosophy : they were venerated as well as consulted by every one, censuring even the most powerful persons in the land. Their fixed idea was to stand as examples to all, of endurance, insensibility, submission only to the indispensable necessities of nature, and freedom from all other fear or authority. They acted out the doctrine, which Plato so eloquently preaches

nian world : amidst such general practice, Antisthenes, Diogenes, Krates, &c., stood out as memorable exceptions. "Il ne faut pas non plus oublier de quelle manière, et dans quel esprit, les Romains lettrés étudiaient la philosophie Grecque. Ils venaient écouter les plus habiles maîtres, connaître les sectes les plus célèbres : mais ils les étudiaient plutôt en curieux, qu'ils ne s'y attachaient en adeptes. On ne les voit guères approfondir un système et s'y tenir, adopter un ensemble de croy-

ances, et y conformer leur conduite. On étudiait le plus souvent la philosophie pour discuter. C'était seulement une matière à des conversations savantes, un exercice et un aliment pour les esprits curieux. Voilà pourquoi la secte Académique étoit alors mieux accueillie que les autres," &c.

¹ Dion Chrysostom, viii. p. 275, Relake.

² See the striking description in Gibbon, Decl. and Fall, ch. xxxvii. pp. 253-266.

under the name of Sokrates in the Phædon—That the whole life of the philosopher is a preparation for death : that life is worthless, and death an escape from it into a better state.¹ It is an interesting fact to learn that when Onesikritus (one of Alexander's officers, who had known and frequented the society of Diogenes in Greece), being despatched during the Macedonian march through India for the purpose of communicating with these Gymnosophists, saw their manner of life and conversed with them—he immediately compared them with Diogenes, whom he had himself visited—as well as with Sokrates and Pythagoras, whom he knew by reputation. Onesikritus described to the Gymnosophists the manner of life of Diogenes : but Diogenes wore a threadbare mantle, and this appeared to them a mark of infirmity and imperfection. They remarked that Diogenes was right to a considerable extent ; but wrong for obeying convention in preference to nature, and for being ashamed of going naked, as they did.²

¹ Strabo, xv. 713 A (probably from Onesikritus, see Geier, Fragment. Alexandr. Magn. Histor. p. 379). Πλείστον δ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι λόγους περὶ τοῦ θανάτου· νομίζουσιν γὰρ οὐδὲν μὴ ἐνθάδε βίον ὥς ἂν ἀκμὴν κινούμενων εἶναι, τὸν δὲ θάνατον γένεσιν εἰς τὸν ὄντως βίον καὶ τὸν εὐδαιμόνεια τοῖς φιλοσοφήσασιν· διὸ τῇ ἀσκήσει πλείστη χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ ἐτοιμοθάνατον· ἀγαθὸν δὲ ἢ κακὸν μηδὲν εἶναι τῶν συμβαινόντων ἀνθρώποις, &c.

This is an application of the doctrines laid down by the Platonic Sokrates in the Phædon, p. 64 A : Κινούμενοι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λεληθέναι τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν ἢ ἀπονήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνήσκειν. Compare p. 67 D.; Cicero, Tusc. D. i. 30. Compare Epiktētus, iv. i. 30 (cited in a former note) about Diogenes the Cynic. Also Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 27; Valerius Maximus, iii. 3, 6; Diogen. L. Proœm. s. 6; Pliny, H. N. vii. 2.

Bohlen observes (Das Alte Indien, ch. ii. pp. 279-280), "It is a remarkable fact that Indian writings of the highest antiquity depict as already existing the same ascetic exercises as we see existing at present : they were even then known to the ancients, who were especially astonished at such fanaticism".

² Strabo gives a condensed summary of this report, made by Onesikritus

respecting his conversation with the Indian Gymnosophist Mandanis, or Dandamis (Strabo, xv. p. 716 B): —Ταῦτ' εἰπόντα ἐξερῆσθαι (Dandamis asked Onesikritus), εἰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλησι λόγοι τοιοῦτοι λέγοντο. Εἰπόντος δ' (Ὀνησικρίτου), ὅτι καὶ Πυθαγόρας τοιαῦτα λέγει, κελύει τε ἐμψυχον ἀπέχεσθαι, καὶ Ξενοκράτης, καὶ Διογένης, οὗ καὶ αὐτὸς (Onesikritus) ἀποέσσετο, ἀποκρίνεσθαι (Dandamis) ὅτι τὰλλα μὴ νομίζω φρονίμως αὐτοῖς δοκεῖν, ἐν δ' ἀμαρτάνειν—νόμον πρὸ τῆς φύσεως τιθεμένους· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αἰσχύνεσθαι γυμνοῦς, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς, διόγειν, ἀπὸ λιτῶν ζῶντας· καὶ γὰρ οἰκίαν ἀρίστην εἶναι, ἥτις ἐν ἐπισκευῇ ἐλαχίστην δέχεται.

About Onesikritus, Diog. Laert. vi. 75-84; Plutarch, Alexand. c. 66; Plutarch, De Fortuna Alexandri, p. 331.

The work of August Gladstich (Einkleitung in das Verständnis der Weltgeschichte, Posen, 1841) contains an instructive comparison between the Gymnosophists and the Cynics, as well as between the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers—between the Eleatic sect and the Hindoo philosophers. The points of analogy, both in doctrine and practice, are very numerous and strikingly brought out, pp. 256-377. I cannot, however, agree in his conclusion, that the doctrines and practice of Antisthenes were borrowed,

The precepts and principles laid down by Sokrates were carried into fullest execution by the Cynics.

These observations of the Indian Gymnosophist are a reproduction and an application in practice¹ of the memorable declaration of principle enunciated by Sokrates—"That the Gods had no wants: and that the man who had fewest wants, approximated most nearly to the Gods". This principle is first introduced into Grecian ethics by Sokrates: ascribed to him both by Xenophon and Plato, and seemingly approved by both. In his life, too, Sokrates carried the principle into effect, up to a certain point. Both admirers and opponents attest his poverty, hard fare, coarse clothing, endurance of cold and privation:² but he was a family man, with a wife and children to maintain, and he partook occasionally of indulgences which made him fall short of his own ascetic principle. Plato and Xenophon—both of them well-born Athenians, in circumstances affluent, or at least easy, the latter being a knight, and even highly skilled in horses and horsemanship—contented themselves with preaching on the text, whenever they had to deal with an opponent more self-indulgent than themselves; but made no attempt to carry it into practice.³ Zeno the Stoic laid down broad principles of self-denial and apathy: but in practice he was unable to conquer the sense of shame, as the Cynics did, and still more the Gymnosophists. Antisthenes, on the other hand, took to heart, both in word and act, the principle

not from Sokrates with exaggeration, but from the Parmenidean theory, and the Vedanta theory of the *Ens Unum*, leading to negation and contempt of the phenomenal world.

¹ Onesikritus observes, respecting the Indian Gymnosophists, that "they were more striking in act than in discourse" (*ἡ ἔργῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν κρείττονος ἢ λόγῳ εἶναι*, Strabo, xv. 718 B); and this is true about the Cynic succession of philosophers, in Greece as well as in Rome. Diogenes Laërtius (compare his proem, a. 19, 20, and vi. 103) ranks the Cynic philosophy as a distinct *αἵρεσις*: but he tells us that other writers (especially Hippobotus) would not reckon it as an *αἵρεσις*, but only as an *ἐκπαίδευσις βίου*—practice without theory.

² Xenophon, *Memor.* i. 6, 2-5; Plato, *Sympos.* 219, 220.

The language of contemporary comic

writers, Ameipsias, Eupolis, Aristophanes, &c., about Sokrates—is very much the same as that of Menander a century afterwards about Krates. Sokrates is depicted as a Cynic in mode of life (Diogen. L. ii. 23; Aristophan. *Nubes*, 104-362-415).

³ Zeno, though he received instructions from Krates, was ἄλλως μὲν ἑταίρος πρὸς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, αἰδέμενος δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὴν κυνικὴν ἀναίσχυρίαν (Diog. L. vii. 3).

"Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuro quiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis vincere, cum Cynicis excedere." &c. This is the distinction which Seneca draws between Stoic and Cynic (*De Brevitat. Vitæ*, 14, 5). His admiration for the "seminudus" Cynic Demetrius, his contemporary and companion, was extreme (*Epist.* 62, 2, and *Epist.* 20, 13).

of Sokrates: yet even he, as we know from the Xenophontic Symposium, was not altogether constant in rigorous austerity. His successors Diogenes and Krates attained the maximum of perfection ever displayed by the Cynics of free Greece. They stood forth as examples of endurance, abnegation—insensibility to shame and fear—free-spoken censure of others. Even they however were not so recognised by the Indian Gymnosophists; who, having reduced their wants, their fears, and their sensibilities, yet lower, had thus come nearer to that which they called the perfection of Nature, and which Sokrates called the close approach to divinity.¹ When Alexander the Great (in the first year of his reign and prior to any of his Asiatic conquests) visited Diogenes at Corinth, found him lying in the sun, and asked if there was anything which he wanted—Diogenes made the memorable reply—"Only that you and your guards should stand out of my sunshine". This reply doubtless manifests the self-satisfied independence of the philosopher. Yet it is far less impressive than the fearless reproof which the Indian Gymnosophists administered to Alexander, when they saw him in the Punjab at the head of his victorious army, after exploits, dangers, and fatigues almost superhuman, as conqueror of Persia and acknowledged son of Zeus.²

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 6, 10 (the passage is cited in a previous note).

² The Emperor Julian (Orat. vi. p. 192 Spanh.) says about the Cynics—*ἀνέστιον γὰρ ποιοῦνται τὸ τέλος, τοῦτο δὲ τὸν ἐστὶ τῷ θεῷ γινώσκειν*. Dion Chrysostom (Or. vi. p. 206) says also about Diogenes the Cynic—*καὶ μάλιστα ἐμμεῖστο των θεῶν τὸν βίον*.

³ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. v. 32, 92, and the Anabasis of Arrian, vii. 1-2-3, where both the reply of Diogenes and that of the Indian Gymnosophists are reported. Dion Chrysostom (Orat. iv. p. 145 seq. Reiske) gives a prolix dialogue between Alexander and Diogenes. His picture of the effect produced by Diogenes upon the different spectators at the Isthmian festival, is striking and probable.

Kalanus, one of the Indian Gymnosophists, was persuaded, by the instances of Alexander, to abandon his Indian mode of life and to come away with the Macedonian army—very much to the disgust of his brethren, who

scornfully denounced him as infirm and even as the slave of appetite (*ἀκόλαστον*, Strabo, xv. 718). He was treated with the greatest consideration and respect by Alexander and his officers; yet when the army came into Persia, he became sick of body and tired of life. He obtained the reluctant consent of Alexander to allow him to die. A funeral pile was erected, upon which he voluntarily burnt himself in presence of the whole army; who witnessed the scene with every demonstration of military honour. See the remarkable description in Arrian, Anab. vii. 3. Cicero calls him "*Indus indoctus ac barbarus*" (Tusc. Disp. ii. 22, 52); but the impression which he made on Alexander himself, Onesikritus, Lysimachus, and generally upon all who saw him, was that of respectful admiration (Strabo, xv. 715; Arrian, l. c.). One of these Indian sages, who had come into Syria along with the Indian envoys sent by an Indian king to the Roman Emperor Augustus, burnt

Another point, in the reply made by the Indian Gymnosophist to Onesikritus, deserves notice: I mean the antithesis between law (or convention) and nature (*νόμος—φύσις*)—the supremacy which he asserts for Nature over law—and the way in which he understands Nature and her supposed ordinances. This antithesis was often put forward and argued in the ancient Ethics: and it is commonly said, without any sufficient proof, that the Sophists (speaking of them collectively) recognised only the authority of law—while Sokrates and Plato had the merit of vindicating against them the superior authority of Nature. The Indian Gymnosophist agrees with the Athenian speaker in the Platonic treatise *De Legibus*, and with the Platonic Kallikles in the *Gorgias*, thus far—that he upholds the paramount authority of Nature. But of these three interpreters, each hears and reports the oracles of Nature differently from the other two: and there are many other dissenting interpreters besides.¹ Which of them are we to follow? And if, adopting any one of them, we reject the others, upon what grounds are we to justify our preference? When the Gymnosophist points out, that nakedness is the natural condition of man; when he farther infers, that because natural it is therefore right—and that the wearing of clothes, being a departure from nature, is also a departure from right—how are we to prove to him that his interpretation of nature is the wrong one? These questions have received no answer in any of the Platonic dialogues: though we have seen that Plato is very bitter against those who dwell upon the antithesis between Law and Nature, and who undertake to decide between the two.

himself publicly at Athens, with an exulting laugh when he leaped upon the funeral pile (Strabo, xv. 720 A) —κατὰ τὰ νότια τῶν Ἰσθμίων ἱερῶν.

The like act of self-immolation was performed by the Grecian Cynic Peregrinus Proteus, at the Olympic festival in the reign of Marcus Antoninus, 165 A.D. (See Clinton, *Fasti Romani*.) Lucian, who was present and saw the proceeding, has left an animated description of it, but ridicules it as a piece of silly vanity. Theagenes, the admiring disciple of Peregrinus, and other Cynics,

who were present in considerable numbers—and also Lucian himself—compare this act to that of the Indian Gymnosophists—*ὅσους δὲ τινος αἰτίας ἐνεκεν ἐμβάλλει φέροντα αὐτὸν εἰς τὸ πῦρ; ἢ δὲ, ὅπως τὴν καρτερίας ἐνδείξῃται, καθάπερ οἱ Βραχμάνες* (Lucian, *De Morte Peregrini*, 25-29, &c.).

¹ Though Seneca (*De Brevitate Vit.* 14) talks of the Stoics as "conquering Nature, and the Cynics as exceeding Nature," yet the Stoic Epiktétus considers his morality as the only scheme conformable to Nature

Reverting to the Cynics, we must declare them to be in one respect the most peculiar outgrowth of Grecian philosophy: because they are not merely a doctrinal sect, with phrases, theories, reasonings, and teachings, of their own—but still more prominently a body of practical ascetics, a mendicant order¹ in philosophy, working up the bystanders by exhibiting themselves as models of endurance and apathy. These peculiarities seem to have originated partly with Pythagoras, partly with Sokrates—for there is no known prior example of it in Grecian history, except that of the anomalous priests of Zeus at Dodona, called Selli, who lay on the ground with unwashed feet. The discipline of Lykurgus at Sparta included severe endurance; but then it was intended to form, and actually did form, good soldiers. The Cynics had no view to military action. They exaggerated the peculiarities of Sokrates, and we should call their mode of life the Sokratic life, if we followed the example of those who gave names to the Pythagorean or Orphic life, as a set of observances derived from the type of Pythagoras or Orpheus.²

The Greek Cynics—an order of ascetic or mendicant friars.

Though Antisthenes and Diogenes laid chief stress upon ethical topics, yet they also delivered opinions on logic and evidence.³ Antisthenes especially was engaged in controversy, and seemingly in acrimonious contro-

Logical views of Antisthenes and Diogenes.

(Epiktét. Diss. iv. 1, 121-128); while the Epikurean Lucretius claims the same conformity for the precepts of Epikurus.

¹ Respecting the historical connexion between the Grecian Cynics and the ascetic Christian monks, see Zeller, *Philos. der Griech.* ii. p. 241, ed. 2nd.

Homer, *Iliad* xvi. 223-5:—

Ζεὺ ἄνα, Διὸς υἱοῖς, Πηλεΐωναί, τολέει
ναῖον,
Διὸς υἱοῖς, μέδοντες θυγατέρων, ἀμφὶ δὲ
Σέλλοι.
Σεὶ ναῖοντα ὑποφῆται ἀνιπτόποδες, χα-
μαισῆναι.

There is no analogy in Grecian history to illustrate this very curious passage: the Excursus of Heyne furnishes no information (see his edition of the *Iliad*, vol. vii. p. 280) except the general remark:—"Selli—vitas genus et institutum affectarunt abhorrens à communi usu, vitas monachorum

mendicantium haud abeimile, cum sine vitas cultu viverent, nec corpus abluerent, et humi cubarent. Ita inter barbaros non modo, sed inter ipsas feras gentes intellectum est, eos qui auctoritatem apud multitudinem consequi vellent, externâ specie, vitas cultu austiore, abstinentiâ et continentiâ, oculos hominum in se convertere et mirationem facere debere."

² Plato, *Republic*, x. 600 B; Legib. vi. 782 C; Eurip. *Hippol.* 965; Fragm. Κρήνη.

See also the citations in Athenæus (iv. pp. 161-163) from the writers of the Attic middle comedy, respecting the asceticism of the Pythagoreans, analogous to that of the Cynics.

³ Among the titles of the works of Antisthenes, preserved by Diogenes Laërtius (vi. 15), several relate to dialectic or logic. *Λαίβεα*. Περὶ τοῦ διελύεσθαι, ἀντιλογίας. *Σίδων*, περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, α. β. γ. Περὶ Διαλέκτου. Περὶ Παιδείας ἡ ἀρετῆς,

genes—they
opposed the
Platonic
Ideas.

versy, with Plato; whose opinions he impugned in an express dialogue entitled *Sathon*. Plato on his side also attacked the opinions of Antisthenes, and spoke contemptuously of his intelligence, yet without formally naming him. At least there are some criticisms in the Platonic dialogues (especially in the *Sophistês*, p. 251) which the commentators pronounce, on strong grounds, to be aimed at Antisthenes: who is also unfavourably criticised by Aristotle. We know but little of the points which Antisthenes took up against Plato—and still less of the reasons which he urged in support of them. Both he and Diogenes, however, are said to have declared express war against the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas. The functions of general Concepts and general propositions, together with the importance of defining general terms, had been forcibly insisted on in the colloquies of Sokrates; and his disciple Plato built upon this foundation the memorable hypothesis of an aggregate of eternal, substantive realities, called Ideas or Forms, existing separate from the objects of sense, yet affording a certain participation in themselves to those objects: not discernible by sense, but only by the Reason or understanding. These bold creations of the Platonic fancy were repudiated by Antisthenes and Diogenes: who are both said to have declared—"We see Man, and we see Horse; but Manness and Horseness we do not see". Whereunto Plato replied—"You possess that eye by which Horse is seen: but you have not yet acquired that eye by which Horseness is seen".¹

This debate between Antisthenes and Plato marks an interesting point in the history of philosophy. It is the first protest of Nominalism against the doctrine of an extreme Realism. The Ideas or Forms of Plato (according to many of his phrases, for he is not

First protest
of Nominal-
ism against
Realism.

α, β, γ, δ, ε. Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως, ἢ ἐριστικῶς. Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρι-
σεως, &c., &c.

Diogenes Laertius refers to *ten τόμοι* of these treatises.

¹ Simplicius, ad Aristot. Categ. p. 66, b. 47, 67, b. 18, 68, b. 25, Schol. Brand.; Tzetzes, Chiliad. vii. 606.

τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰς ποιότητας τελέως, τὸ πούν συγχωροῦν-
τες εἶναι· ὡς περ Ἀντισθένης, ὅς ποτε

Πλάτωνι διαμφοβητῶν—ὁ Πλάτων, ἐφ' ἣν, ἵππον μὲν ὁρᾷ, ἵπποτητα δ' οὐχ ὁρᾷ· καὶ ὅς εἶπεν, ἔχεις μὲν φ' ἵππος ὁρᾶται τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, φ' δὲ ἵπποτης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι. καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ τινες ᾤσαν ταύτης τῆς δόξης. οἱ δὲ τινὰς μὲν ἀνθρώπων ποιότητας, τινὰς δὲ κατε-
λίμπανον.

Ἀνθρωπότης occurs p. 68, a. 31. Compare p. 20, a. 2.

The same conversation is reported

always consistent with himself) are not only real existences distinct from particulars, but absorb to themselves all the reality of particulars. The real universe in the Platonic theory was composed of Ideas or Forms—such as Manness or Horseness¹ (called by Plato the *Αὐτὸ-Ἄνθρωπος* and *Αὐτὸ-ἵππος*), of which particular men and horses were only disfigured, transitory, and ever-varying photographs. Antisthenes denied what Plato affirmed, and as Plato affirmed it. Aristotle denied it also; maintaining that genera, species, and attributes, though distinguishable as separate predicates of, or inherencies in, individuals—yet had no existence apart from individuals. Aristotle was no less wanting than Antisthenes, in the intellectual eye required for discerning the Platonic Ideas. Antisthenes is said to have declared these Ideas to be mere thoughts or conceptions (*ψυχὰς ἐννοίας*): i.e., merely subjective or within the mind, without any object corresponding to them. This is one of the various modes of presenting the theory of Ideas, resorted to even in the Platonic Parmenidēs, not by one who opposes that theory, but by one seeking to defend it—viz., by Sokrates, when he is hard pressed by the objections of the Eleate against the more extreme and literal version of the theory.² It is remarkable, that the objections ascribed to Parmenides against that version which exhibits the Ideas as mere Concepts of and in the mind, are decidedly less forcible than those which he urges against the other versions.

There is another singular doctrine, which Aristotle ascribes to Antisthenes, and which Plato notices and confutes; alluding to its author contemptuously, but not mentioning his name. Every name (Antisthenes argued) has its own special reason or meaning (*οἰκείος*³ λόγος),

Doctrine of Antisthenes about predication—He admits no

as having taken place between Diogenes and Plato, except that instead of *ἰσότης* and *ἀνθρωπότης*, we have *τραπέζιότης* and *κυνάδοτης* (Diog. L. vi. 68).

We have *ζωότης*—*Ἀθηναϊότης*—in Galen's argument against the Stoics (vol. xix. p. 481, Kühn).

¹ We know from Plato himself (*Theætétus*, p. 182 A) that even the word *σοφότης*, if not actually first introduced by himself, was at any rate so recent as to be still repulsive, and

to require an Apology. If *σοφότης* was strange, *ἀνθρωπότης* and *ἰσότης* would be still more strange. Antisthenes probably invented them, to present the doctrine which he impugned in a dress of greater seeming absurdity.

² Plato, *Parmenidēs*, p. 132 B.

See, afterwards, chapter xxvii., *Parmenides*.

³ Diogen. L. vi. 3. *Πρῶτος τε ὁρίσατο* (Antisthenes) *λόγον, εἰπών, λόγος ἐστίν ὁ τὸ τί ἐστι δηλών.*

other predi- declaring the essence of the thing named, and
cation but differing from every other word: you cannot there-
identical. fore truly predicate any one word of any other, because the
reason or meaning of the two is different: there can be no true
propositions except identical propositions, in which the predicate
is the same with the subject—"man is man, good is good".
"Man is good" was an inadmissible proposition: affirming
different things to be the same, or one thing to be many.¹
Accordingly, it was impossible for two speakers really to con-
tradict each other. There can be no contradiction between them
if both declare the essence of the same thing—nor if neither of
them declare the essence of it—nor if one speaker declares the
essence of one thing, and another speaker that of another. But
one of these three cases must happen: therefore there can be no
contradiction.²

The works of Antisthenes being lost, we do not know how he
himself stated his own doctrine, nor what he said on
behalf of it, declaring contradiction to be impossible.
The same doctrine as- asserted by
serted by Stilpon, after the
time of
Aristotle. Plato sets aside the doctrine as absurd and silly;
Aristotle—since he cites it as a paradox, apt for
dialectical debate, where the opinion of a philosopher
stood opposed to what was generally received—seems
to imply that there were plausible arguments to be urged in its
favour.³ And that the doctrine actually continued to be held

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphy.* Δ. 1024, b. 32, attributes this doctrine to Antisthenes by name; which tends to prove that Plato meant Antisthenes, though not naming him, in *Sophist.* p. 251 B, where he notices the same doctrine. Compare *Philébus*, p. 14 D.

It is to be observed that a doctrine exactly the same as that which Plato here censures in Antisthenes, will be found maintained by the Platonic Sokrates himself, in Plato, *Hippias Major*, p. 304 A. See chap. xiii. vol. II. of the present work.

² Aristotle. *Topic.* I. p. 104, b. 20. *θεσις δὲ ἴσθιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν· ὅλον οὐκ οὐκ ἴσθιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης.*

Plato puts this *θεσις* into the mouth of Dionysodorus, in the *Euthydēmus*—p. 286 B; but he says (or makes Sokrates say) that it was maintained

by many persons, and that it had been maintained by Protagoras, and even by others yet more ancient.

Antisthenes had discussed it specially in a treatise of three sections polemical against Plato—*Σάβωρ, ἡ περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, α, β, γ* (*Diog. L.* vi. 16).

³ Aristotle (*Met.* Δ. 1024) represents the doctrine of Antisthenes. That contradictory and false propositions are impossible—as a consequence deduced from the position laid down—That no propositions except identical propositions were admissible. If you grant this last proposition, the consequences will be undeniable. Possibly Antisthenes may have reasoned in this way: "There are many contradictory and false propositions now afloat; but this arises from the way in which predication is conducted. So long as the predicate is different from the subject, there is nothing in the form of a proposition

and advocated, in the generation not only after Antisthenes but after Aristotle—we may see by the case of Stilpon: who maintained (as Antisthenes had done) that none but identical propositions, wherein the predicate was a repetition of the subject, were admissible: from whence it followed (as Aristotle observed) that there could be no propositions either false or contradictory. Plutarch,¹ in reciting this doctrine of Stilpon (which had been vehemently impugned by the Epikurean Kolôtes), declares it to have been intended only in jest. There is no ground for believing that it was so intended: the analogy of Antisthenes goes to prove the contrary.

Stilpon, however, while rejecting (as Antisthenes had done) the universal Ideas² or Forms, took a larger ground of objection. He pronounced them to be inadmissible both as subject and as predicate. If you speak of Man in general (he said), what, or whom, do you mean? You do not mean A or B, or C or D, &c.: that is, you do not mean any one of these more than any other. You have no determinate meaning at all: and beyond this indefinite multitude of individuals, there is nothing that the term can mean. Again, as to predicates—when you say, *The man runs*, or *The man is good*, what do you mean by the predicate *runs*, or *is good*? You do not mean any thing specially belonging to *man*: for you apply the same predicates to many other subjects: you

Nominalism of Stilpon. His reasons against accidental predication.

to distinguish falsehood from truth (to distinguish *Theatêtus sedet*, from *Theatêtus volat*—to take the instance in the Platonic *Sophistês*—p. 263). There ought to be no propositions except identical propositions: the form itself will then guarantee you against both falsehood and contradiction: you will be sure always to give τὸν οὐκ ἴδιον λόγον τοῦ πράγματος." There would be nothing inconsistent in such a precept: but Aristotle might call it silly (αἰετὸν), because, while shutting out falsehood and contradiction, it would also shut out the great body of useful truth, and would divest language of its usefulness as a means of communication.

Brandis (Gesch. der Gr. Römisch. Phil. vol. ii. xciii. 1) gives something like this as the probable purpose of Antisthenes—"Nur Eins bezeichne die Wesenheit eines Dinges—die Wesen-

heit als einfachen Träger des mannichfaltigen der Eigenschaften" (this is rather too Aristotelian)—"zur Abwehr von Streitigkeiten auf dem Gebiete der Erscheinungen". Compare also Ritter, Gesch. Phil. vol. ii. p. 130. We read in the *Kratylus*, that there were persons who maintained the rectitude of all names: to say that a name was not right, was (in their view) tantamount to saying that it was no name at all, but only an unmeaning sound (Plato, *Krat.* pp. 429-430).

¹ Plutarch, adv. Kolôtes, p. 1119 C-D.
² Hegel (Geschichte der Griech. Philos. i. p. 123) and Marbach (Geschichte der Philos. s. 91) disallow the assertion of Diogenes, that Stilpon ἀρρῖπει τὰ εἶδη. They maintain that Stilpon rejected the particular affirmations, and allowed only general or universal affirmations. This construction appears to me erroneous.

say *runs*, about a horse, a dog, or a cat—you say *good* in reference to food, medicine, and other things besides. Your predicate, therefore, being applied to many and diverse subjects, belongs not to one of them more than to another: in other words, it belongs to neither: the predication is not admissible.¹

¹ *Diog. L. ii. 113*; Plutarch, *adv. Kolōten*, 1119-1120. εἰ περὶ ἵππου τὸ τρέχειν κατηγοροῦμεν, οὐ φησὶ (Stillpon) ταῦτόν εἶναι τῇ περὶ οὐ κατηγορεῖται τὸ κατηγορούμενον—ἀκατέρου γὰρ ἀπαιτούμενοι τὸν λόγον, οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἀποδίδομεν ὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν. Ὅθεν ἀμαρτάνειν τοὺς ἑτέρον ἑτέρου κατηγοροῦντας. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ταῦτόν ἐστι τῇ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ τῇ ἵππῳ τὸ τρέχειν, πῶς καὶ σιτίον καὶ φαρμάκον τὸ ἀγαθόν; καὶ νῆ διὰ πάλιν λέοντος καὶ κυνὸς τὸ τρέχειν, κατηγοροῦμεν; εἰ δ' ἑτέρον, οὐκ ὁρθὸν ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἵππου τρέχειν λέγομεν.

Sextus Empiricus (*adv. Mathem. vii. p. 269-282*) gives a different vein of reasoning respecting predication,—yet a view which illustrates this doctrine of Antisthenes. Sextus does not require that all predication shall be restricted to identical predication: but he maintains that you cannot define any general word. To define, he says, is to enunciate the essence of that which is defined. But when you define Man—"a mortal, rational animal, capable of reason and knowledge"—you give only certain attributes of Man, which go along with the essence—you do not give the essence itself. If you enumerate even all the accompaniments (*συμβεβηκότα*), you will still fail to tell me what the essence of Man is; which is what I desire to know, and what you profess to do by your definition. It is useless to enumerate accompaniments, until you explain to me what the essence is which they accompany.

These are ingenious objections, which seem to me quite valid, if you assume the logical subject to be a real, absolute essence, apart from all or any of its predicates. And this is a frequent illusion, favoured even by many logicians. We enunciate the subject first, then the predicate; and because the subject can be conceived after abstraction of this, that, or the other predicates—we are apt to imagine that it may be conceived without *all* or *any* of the predicates. But this is an illusion. If you suppress all predicates,

the subject or supposed substratum vanishes along with them: just as the Genus vanishes, if you suppress all the different species of it.

"Sais-tu au moins ce que c'est que la matière? Très-bien. . . Par exemple, cette pierre est grise, est d'une telle forme, a ses trois dimensions; elle est pesante et divisible. Eh bien (dit le Sirien), cette chose qui te parait être divisible, pesante, et grise, me dirois-tu bien ce que c'est? Tu vois quelques attributs: mais le fond de la chose, le connois-tu? Non, dit l'autre. Tu ne sais donc point ce que c'est que la matière." (Voltaire, *Micromégas*, c. 7.)

"Le fond de la chose"—the Ding an sich—is nothing but the name itself, divested of every fraction of meaning: it is *titulus sine re*. But the name being familiar, and having been always used with a meaning, still appears invested with much of the old emotional associations, even though it has been stripped of all its meaning by successive acts of abstraction. If you subtract from four, 1 + 1 + 1 + 1, there will remain zero. But by abstracting, from the subject man, all its predicates, real and possible, you cannot reduce it to zero. The name man always remains, and appears by old association to carry with it some meaning—though the meaning can no longer be defined.

This illusion is well pointed out in a valuable passage of Cabanis (*Du Degré de Certitude de la Médecine*, p. 61):—

"Je pourrais d'ailleurs demander ce qu'on entend par la nature et les causes premières des maladies. Nous connoissons de leur nature, ce que les faits en manifestent. Nous savons, par exemple, que la fièvre produit tels et tels changements: ou plutôt, c'est par ces changements qu'elle se montre à nos yeux: c'est par eux seuls qu'elle existe pour nous. Quand un homme toussé, crache du sang, respire avec peine, ressent une douleur de côté, a le pouls plus vite et plus dur, la peau plus chaude que dans l'état naturel—l'on dit qu'il est attaqué d'une pleurésie. Mais qu'est ce donc qu'une pleurésie? On vous répliquera que c'est une ma-

Stilpon (like Antisthenes, as I have remarked above) seems to have had in his mind a type of predication, similar to the type of reasoning which Aristotle laid down in the syllogism : such that the form of the proposition should be itself a guarantee for the truth of what was affirmed. Throughout the ancient philosophy, especially in the more methodised debates between the Academics and Sceptics on one side, and the Stoics on the other—what the one party affirmed and the other party denied, was, the existence of a Criterion of Truth : some distinguishable mark, such as falsehood could not possibly carry. To find this infallible mark in propositions, Stilpon admitted none except identical. While agreeing with Antisthenes, that no predicate could belong to a subject different from itself, he added a new argument, by pointing out that predicates applied to one subject were also applied to many other subjects. Now if the predicates belonged to one, they could not (in his view) belong to the others : and therefore they did not really belong to any. He considered that predication involved either identity or special and exclusive implication of the predicate with the subject.

Difficulty of understanding how the same predicate could belong to more than one subject.

Stilpon was not the first who had difficulty in explaining to himself how one and the same predicate could be applied to many different subjects. The difficulty had already been set forth in the Platonic *Parmenides*.¹ How can the Form (Man, White, Good, &c.) be present at one and the same time in many distinct indi-

Analogous difficulties in the Platonic *Parmenides*.

ladie, dans laquelle tous, ou presque tous, ces accidents se trouvent combinés. S'il en manque un ou plusieurs, ce n'est point la pleurésie, du moins la vraie pleurésie essentielle des écoles. C'est donc le concours de ces accidents qui la constitue. Le mot pleurésie ne fait que les retracer d'une manière plus courte. Ce mot n'est pas un titre par lui-même : il exprime une abstraction de l'esprit, et réveille par un seul trait toutes les images d'un assez grand tableau.

"Ainsi lorsque, non content de connaître une maladie par ce qu'elle offre à nos sens, par ce qui seul la constitue, et sans quoi elle n'existeroit pas, vous demandez encore quelle est sa nature en elle-même, quelle est son essence—c'est comme si vous demandiez quelle est la nature ou l'essence d'un mot, d'une pure abstrac-

tion. Il n'y a donc pas beaucoup de justesse à dire, d'un air de triomphe, que les médecins ignorent même la nature de la fièvre, et que sans cesse ils agissent dans des circonstances, ou manient des instruments, dont l'essence leur est inconnue."

¹ Plato, *Parmenides*, p. 131. Compare also Philébus, p. 15, and Stallbaum's *Proleg.* to the *Parmenides*, pp. 46-47. The long commentary of Proklos (v. 100-110. pp. 670-682 of the edition of Stallbaum) amply attests the *δυσκολία* of the problem.

The argument of *Parmenides* (in the dialogue called *Parmenides*) is applied to the Platonic *ἰδέα* and to *ῥα μαθήματα*. But the argument is just as much applicable to attributes, genera, species : to all general predicates.

viduals? It cannot be present as a whole in each: nor can it be divided, and thus present partly in one, partly in another. How therefore can it be present at all in any of them? In other words, how can the One be Many, and how can the Many be One? Of this difficulty (as of many others) Plato presents no solution, either in the *Parmenidēs* or anywhere else.¹ Aristotle alludes to several contemporaries or predecessors who felt it. Stilpon reproduces it in his own way. It is a very real difficulty, requiring to be dealt with by those who lay down a theory of predication; and calling upon them to explain the functions of general propositions, and the meaning of general terms.

Menedēmus the Eretrian, one among the hearers and admirers of Stilpon, combined even more than Stilpon the attributes of the Cynic with those of the Megaric. He was fearless in character, and uncontrolled in speech, delivering harsh criticisms without regard to offence given: he was also a great master of ingenious dialectic and puzzling controversy.² His robust frame, grave deportment, and simplicity of life, inspired great respect; especially as he occupied a conspicuous position, and enjoyed political influence at Eretria. He is said to have thought meanly both of Plato and Xenokrates. We are told that Menedēmus, like Antisthenes and Stilpon, had doctrines of his own on the subject of predication. He disallowed all negative propositions, admitting none but affirmative: moreover even of the affirmative propositions, he disallowed all the hypothetical, approving only the simple and categorical.³

It is impossible to pronounce confidently respecting these doctrines, without knowing the reasons upon which they were grounded. Unfortunately these last have not been transmitted to us. But we may be very sure that there *were* reasons, sufficient or insufficient: and the knowledge of those reasons would have enabled us to appreciate more fully the state of the Greek

¹ *Aristot. Physic. i. 2, 185, b. 26-36.* Lykophron and some others anterior to Aristotle proposed to elude the difficulty, by ceasing to use the substantive verb as copula in predication: instead of saying Σωκράτης ἐστὶ λευκός, they said either Σωκράτης λευκός, simply, or Σωκράτης λελευκωται.

This is a remarkable evidence of the difficulty arising, even in these early days of logic, about the logical function of the copula.

² *Diog. L. ii. 127-134.* ἦν γὰρ καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ παρρησιαστέῳ.

³ *Diog. L. ii. 134.*

mind, in respect to logical theory, in and before the year 300 B.C.

Another doctrine, respecting knowledge and definition, is ascribed by Aristotle to "the disciples of Antisthenes and other such uninstructed persons": it is also canvassed by Plato in the *Theætétus*,¹ without specifying its author, yet probably having Antisthenes in view. As far as we can make out a doctrine which both these authors recite as opponents, briefly and in their own way, it is as follows:—"Objects must be distinguished into—1. Simple or primary; and 2. Compound or secondary combinations of these simple elements. This last class, the compounds, may be explained or defined, because you can enumerate the component elements. By such analysis, and by the definition founded thereupon, you really come to *know* them—describe them—predicate about them. But the first class, the simple or primary objects, can only be perceived by sense and named: they cannot be analysed, defined, or known. You can only predicate about them that they are like such and such other things: *e.g.*, *silver*, you cannot say what it is in itself, but only that it is like tin, or like something else. There may thus be a *ratio* and a definition of any compound object, whether it be an object of perception or of conception: because one of the component elements will serve as Matter or Subject of the proposition, and the other as Form or Predicate. But there can be no definition of any one of the component elements separately taken: because there is neither Matter nor Form to become the Subject and Predicate of a defining proposition."

Distinction ascribed to Antisthenes between simple and complex objects. Simple objects undefinable.

This opinion, ascribed to the followers of Antisthenes, is not in harmony with the opinion ascribed by Aristotle to Antisthenes himself (*viz.*, That no propositions, except identical propositions, were admissible): and we are led to suspect that the first opinion must have been understood or qualified by its author in some manner not now determinable. But the second opinion, drawing a marked logical distinction between simple and complex Objects, has some interest from the criticisms of Plato and Aristotle: both of whom select, for the example illustrating the opinion, the

¹ Plato, *Theætét.*, pp. 201-202. Aristotel. *Metaph.* H. 1043, b. 22.

syllable—as the compound made up of two or more letters which are its simple constituent elements.

Plato refutes the doctrine,¹ but in a manner not so much to prove its untruth, as to present it for a verbal incongruity. How can you properly say (he argues) that you *know* the compound AB, when you know neither A nor B separately? Now it may be incongruous to restrict in this manner the use of the words *know*—*knowledge*: but the distinction between the two cases is not denied by Plato. Antisthenes said—"I feel a simple sensation (A or B) and can name it, but I do not *know* it: I can affirm nothing about it in itself, or about its real essence. But the compound AB I do know, for I know its essence: I can affirm about it that *it is* compounded of A and B, and this is its essence." Here is a real distinction: and Plato's argument amounts only to affirming that it is an incorrect use of words to call the compound *known*, when the component elements are not known. Unfortunately the refutation of Plato is not connected with any declaration of his own counter-doctrine, for Theætétus ends in a result purely negative.

Aristotle, in his comment on the opinion of Antisthenes, makes us understand better what it really is:—"Respecting simple essences (A or B), I cannot tell what they really are: but I can tell what they are like or unlike, i.e., I can compare them with other essences, simple or compound. But respecting the compound AB, I can tell what it really is: its essence is, to be compounded of A and B. And this I call *knowing* or *knowledge*."² The distinction

¹ Plato, Theætétus, ut supra.
² Aristot. Metaphys. H. 1043, b. 24-25, with the Scholia, p. 774, b. Br.
 Mr. J. S. Milli observes, Syst. of Logic, i. 5, 6, p. 116, ed. 2:—"There is still another exceptional case, in which, though the predicate is the name of a class, yet in predicating it we affirm nothing but resemblance: the class being founded not on resemblance in any given particular, but on general unanalysable resemblance. The classes in question are those into which our simple sensations, or other simple feelings, are divided. Sensations of white, for instance, are classed together,

not because we can take them to pieces, and say, they are alike in this, not alike in that, but because we feel them to be alike altogether, though in different degrees. When therefore I say—The colour I saw yesterday was a white colour, or, The sensation I feel is one of tightness—in both cases the attribute I affirm of the colour or of the other sensation is mere resemblance: simple likeness to sensations which I have had before, and which have had that name bestowed upon them. The names of feelings, like other concrete general names, are connotative: but they connote a mere resemblance. When pre-

here taken by Antisthenes (or by his followers) is both real and useful: Plato does not contest it: while Aristotle distinctly acknowledges it, only that among the simple items he ranks both *Percepta* and *Concepta*.

Monimus a Syracusan, and Krates a Theban, with his wife Hipparchia,¹ were successors of Diogenes in the Cynic vein of philosophy: together with several others of less note. Both Monimus and Krates are said to have been persons of wealthy condition,² yet their minds were so powerfully affected by what they saw of Diogenes, that they followed his example, renounced their wealth, and threw themselves upon a life of poverty; with nothing beyond the wallet and the threadbare cloak, but with fearless independence of character, free censure of every one, and indifference to opinion. "I choose as my country" (said Krates) "poverty and low esteem, which fortune cannot assail: I am the fellow-citizen of Diogenes, whom the snares of envy cannot reach."³ Krates is said to have admonished every one, whether they invited it or not: and to have gone unbidden from house to

Later Gra-
cian Cynics
—Monimus
—Krates—
Hipparchia

dedicated of any individual feelings, the information they convey is that of its likeness to the other feelings which we have been accustomed to call by the same name."

¹ Hipparchia was a native of Maroneia in Thrace; born in a considerable station, and belonging to an opulent family. She came to Athens with her brother Métroklés, and heard both Theophrastus and Krates. Both she and her brother became impressed with the strongest admiration for Krates: for his mode of life, as well as for his discourses and doctrine. Rejecting various wealthy suitors, she insisted upon becoming his wife, both against his will and against the will of her parents. Her resolute enthusiasm overcame the reluctance of both. She adopted fully his hard life, poor fare, and threadbare cloak. She passed her days in the same discourses and controversies, indifferent to the taunts which were addressed to her for having relinquished the feminine occupations of spinning and weaving. Diogenes Laërtius found many striking dicta or replies ascribed to her (ἐλάλη μὲν τὰς φιλοσόφους, vi. 96-98). He gives

an allusion made to her by the contemporary comic poet Menander, who (as I before observed) handled the Cynics of his time as Aristophanes, Eupolis, &c., had handled Sokrates—

Συμπεριπατήσεις γὰρ τρίβων ἔχουσ
ἐμοί,
ὥσπερ Κράτητι τῷ Κυνικῷ ποθ' ἡ γυνή.
Καὶ θυγατὶρ' ἐξίδωκ' ἑκείνος, ὡς εἶπεν
αὐτὸς, ἐπὶ πειρῇ δοῦς τριάκονθ' ἡμέρας.

(vi. 93.)

² Diog. L. vi. 82-88. Μόνιμος ὁ Κύνων, Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem. vii. 48-88.

About Krates, Plutarch, De Vit. Aere Alieno, 7, p. 831 F.

³ Diog. L. vi. 93. ἔχειν δὲ πατριδὰ ἀδοξίαν τε καὶ πένιαν, ἀνάλογα τῇ τύχῃ: καὶ—Διογένηος εἶναι πολίτης ἀντιβουλεύοντον φθόνῳ. The parody or verses of Krates, about his city of Pera (the Wallet), vi. 85, are very spirited—

Πήρη τις πόλις ἐστὶ μέση ἐνὶ οἴκῳ
τύφῳ, &c.

Krates composed a collection of philosophical Epistles, which Diogenes pronounced to be excellent, and even to resemble greatly the style of Plato (vi. 98).

house for the purpose of exhortation. His persistence in this practice became so obtrusive that he obtained the title of "the Door-Opener".¹ This feature, common to several other Cynics, exhibits an approximation to the missionary character of Sokrates, as described by himself in the Platonic Apology : a feature not found in any of the other eminent heads of philosophy—neither in Plato nor in Aristotle, Zeno, or Epikurus.

Among other hearers of Krates, who carried on, and at the same time modified, the Cynic discipline, we have to mention Zeno, of Kitium in Cyprus, who became celebrated as the founder of the Stoic sect. In him the Cynic, Megaric, and Herakleitean tendencies may be said to have partially converged, though with considerable modifications :² the ascetic doctrines (without the ascetic practices or obtrusive forwardness) of the Cynics—and the logical subtleties of the others. He blended them, however, with much of new positive theory, both physical and cosmological. His compositions were voluminous ; and those of the Stoic Chrysippus, after him, were still more numerous. The negative and oppugning function, which in the fourth century B.C. had been directed by the Megarics against Aristotle, was in the third century B.C. transferred to the Platonists, or Academy represented by Arkesilaus : whose formidable dialectic was brought to bear upon the Stoic and Epikurean schools—both of them positive, though greatly opposed to each other.

ARISTIPPUS.

Along with Antisthenes, among the hearers and companions of Sokrates, stood another Greek of very opposite dispositions, yet equally marked and original—Aristippus of Kyrenê. The stimulus of the Sokratic method, and the novelty of the topics on which it was brought to bear, operated forcibly upon both,

¹ Dlog. L. vi. 88. ἀναλαίρω δὲ θυπε-
 πανοικτρῆς, διὰ τὸ εἰς πᾶσαν εἰσέρχαι
 οἰκίαν καὶ νοθεύειν. Compare Seneca, Epist. 29.

² Numenius ap. Euseb. Præp. Evang.
 xiv. 6.

prompting each of them to theorise in his own way on the best plan of life.

Aristippus, a Kyrenean of easy circumstances, having heard of the powerful ascendancy exercised by Sokrates over youth, came to Athens for the express purpose of seeing him, and took warm interest in his conversation.¹ He set great value upon mental cultivation and accomplishments; but his habits of life were inactive, easy, and luxurious. Upon this last count, one of the most interesting chapters in the Xenophontic Memorabilia reports an interrogative lecture addressed to him by Sokrates, in the form of dialogue.²

Sokrates points out to Aristippus that mankind may be distributed into two classes: 1. Those who have trained themselves to habits of courage, energy, bodily strength, and command over their desires and appetites, together with practice in the actual work of life:—these are the men who become qualified to rule, and who do actually rule. 2. The rest of mankind, inferior in these points, who have no choice but to obey, and who do obey.³—Men of the first or ruling class possess all the advantages of life: they perform great exploits, and enjoy a full measure of delight and happiness, so far as human circumstances admit. Men of the second class are no better than slaves, always liable to suffer, and often actually suffering, ill-treatment and spoliation of the worst kind. To which of these classes (Sokrates asks Aristippus) do you calculate on belonging—and for which do you seek to qualify yourself?—To neither of them (replies Aristippus). I do not wish to share the lot of the subordinate multitude: but I have no relish for a life of command, with all the fatigues, hardships, perils, &c., which are inseparable from it. I prefer a middle course: I wish neither to rule, nor to be ruled, but to be a freeman: and I consider freedom as the best guarantee for happiness.⁴ I desire only

¹ Plutarch (*De Curiositate*, p. 516 A) says that Aristippus informed himself, at the Olympic games, from Ischomachus respecting the influence of Sokrates.

² See the first chapter of the Second Book of the *Memorabilia*.

I give an abstract of the principal points in the dialogue, not a literal translation.

³ Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1, 1 seq. τὸν μὲν ὥπως ἱκανὸς εἶναι ἀρχεῖν, τὸν δὲ ὥπως μὴδ' ἀντιποιήσεται ἀρχῆς—τὸν ἀρχικόν.

⁴ Xen. *Mem.* ii. 1, 11. ἀλλ' εἶναι τίς μοι δοκεῖ μέσος, τούτων ὁδός, ἥ περὶ μοι βαδίζειν, οὔτε δι' ἀρχῆς, οὔτε διὰ δουλείας, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐλευθερίας, ἥτερ μέλι στα πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν ἔχει.

to pass through life as easily and pleasantly as possible.¹—Which of the two do you consider to live most pleasantly, the rulers or the ruled? asks Sokrates.—I do not rank myself with either (says Aristippus): nor do I enter into active duties of citizenship anywhere: I pass from one city to another, but everywhere as a stranger or non-citizen.—Your scheme is impracticable (says Sokrates). You cannot obtain security in the way that you propose. You will find yourself suffering wrong and distress along with the subordinates²—and even worse than the subordinates: for a stranger, wherever he goes, is less befriended and more exposed to injury than the native citizens. You will be sold into slavery, though you are fit for no sort of work: and your master will chastise you until you become fit for work.—But (replies Aristippus) this very art of ruling, which you consider to be happiness,³ is itself a hard life, a toilsome slavery, not only stripped of enjoyment, but full of privation and suffering. A man must be a fool to embrace such discomforts of his own accord.—It is that very circumstance (says Sokrates), that he does embrace them of his own accord—which renders them endurable, and associates them with feelings of pride and dignity. They are the price paid beforehand, for a rich reward to come. He who goes through labour and self-denial, for the purpose of gaining good friends or subduing enemies, and for the purpose of acquiring both mental and bodily power, so that he may manage his own concerns well and may benefit both his friends and his country—such a man will be sure to find his course of labour pleasurable. He will pass his life in cheerful⁴ satisfaction, not only enjoying his own esteem and admiration, but also extolled and envied by others. On the contrary, whoever passes his earlier years in immediate pleasures and indolent ease, will

¹ Xen. Mem. II. 1, 9. ἑαυτον τοίνυν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ῥῆστα καὶ ἥδιστα βιοτεύειν.

² Xen. Mem. II. 1, 12. εἰ μέντοι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὧν μήτε ἀρχειν ἀξιώσεις μήτε ἀρχεσθαι, μήτε τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἐκὼν θεραπεύσεις, οἰμαὶ σε ὅραν ὡς ἐπιστάνται οἱ κρείττονες τοὺς ἥττονας καὶ κοινῇ καὶ ἰδίᾳ κλαίοντας καθίσαντες, ὡς δούλοις χρῆσθαι.

What follows is yet more emphatic, about the unjust oppression of rulers,

and the suffering on the part of subjects.

³ Xen. Mem. II. 1, 17. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἱ εἰς τὴν βασιλικὴν τέχνην παιδευόμενοι, ἦν δοκεῖς μοι σὺ νομίζειν εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

Compare Memor. II. 8, 4.

⁴ Xen. Mem. II. 1, 19. πῶς οὐκ οἰεσθαι χρὴ τοὺτους καὶ ποιεῖν ἡδέως εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ζῆν εὐφραυνόμενους, ἀγαθόνους μὲν ἑαυτοὺς, ἐπαινουμένους δὲ καὶ ζηλουμένους ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων;

acquire no lasting benefit either in mind or body. He will have a soft lot at first, but his future will be hard and dreary¹.

Sokrates enforces his lecture by reciting to Aristippus the memorable lecture or apologue, which the Sophist Prodikus was then delivering in lofty diction to ^{Choice of} Héraklēs. numerous auditors²—the fable still known as the Choice of Héraklēs. Virtue and Pleasure (the latter of the two being here identified with Evil or Vice) are introduced as competing for the direction of the youthful Héraklēs. Each sets forth her case, in dramatic antithesis. Pleasure is introduced as representing altogether the gratification of the corporeal appetites and the love of repose: while Virtue replies by saying, that if youth be employed altogether in pursuing such delights, at the time when the appetites are most vigorous—the result will be nothing but fatal disappointment, accompanied with entire loss of the different and superior pleasures available in mature years and in old age. Youth is the season of labour: the physical appetites must be indulged sparingly, and only at the call of actual want: accomplishments of body and mind must be acquired in that season, which will enable the mature man to perform in after life great and glorious exploits. He will thus realise the highest of all human delights—the love of his friends and the admiration of his countrymen—the sound of his own praises and the reflexion upon his own deserts. At the price of a youth passed in labour and self-denial, he will secure the fullest measure of mature and attainable happiness.

"It is worth your while, Aristippus" (says Sokrates, in concluding this lecture), "to bestow some reflexion on what is to happen in the latter portions of your life."

This dialogue (one of the most interesting remnants of antiquity, and probably reported by Xenophon from actual hearing) is valuable in reference not only to Aristippus, but also to Sokrates himself. Many recent historians of philosophy describe Sokrates and Plato as setting up an idea of Virtue or Good Absolute (i.e.

Illustration
afforded of
the views of
Sokrates
respecting
Good and
Evil.

¹ Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 20, cited from Epicharmus:—
μή τὰ μαλακὰ μέσο, μὴ τὰ σκληρὰ
έχης.

² Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21-24. ἐν τῇ συγ-
γράμματι τῇ περὶ Ἡρακλέους, ὅπερ δὴ
καὶ πλείστοις ἐπιτείνονται—μεγαλειότη-
τοις ῥήμασιν.

having no essential reference to the happiness or security of the agent or of any one else) which they enforce—and an idea of Vice or Evil Absolute (i.e. having no essential reference to suffering or peril, or disappointment, either of the agent or of any one else) which they denounce and discommend—and as thereby refuting the Sophists, who are said to have enforced Virtue and denounced Vice only relatively—i.e. in consequence of the bearing of one and the other upon the security and happiness of the agent or of others. Whether there be any one doctrine or style of preaching which can be fairly ascribed to the Sophists as a class, I will not again discuss here: but I believe that the most eminent among them, Protagoras and Prodikus, held the language here ascribed to them. But it is a mistake to suppose that upon this point Sokrates was their opponent. The Xenophontic Sokrates (a portrait more resembling reality than the Platonic) always holds this same language: the Platonic Sokrates not always, yet often. In the dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, as well as in the apologue of Prodikus, we see that the devotion of the season of youth to indulgence and inactive gratification of appetite, is blamed as productive of ruinous consequences—as entailing loss of future pleasures, together with a state of weakness which leaves no protection against future suffering; while great care is taken to show, that though laborious exercise is demanded during youth, such labour will be fully requited by the increased pleasures and happiness of after life. The pleasure of being praised, and the pleasure of seeing good deeds performed by one's self, are especially insisted on. On this point both Sokrates and Prodikus concur.¹

If again we compare the Xenophontic Sokrates with the Platonic Sokrates, we shall find that the lecture of the former to Aristippus coincides sufficiently with the theory laid down by the latter in the dialogue Protagoras; to which theory the Sophist Protagoras is represented as yielding a reluctant adhesion. But we shall find also that it differs materially from the doctrine main-

¹ Xenoph. Mem. ii. 1, 31. τοῦ πάντοτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τοῦτά ἐστιν. . . .
 δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου τὰ μὲν ἡδέα ἐν τῇ νεότητι διεπρα-
 σεαυτῆς, ἀνῆκοος εἰ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων μόντες, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ ἐς τὸ γῆρας ἀποθέ-
 ῃδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ μόνου.

tained by Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias. Nay, if we follow the argument addressed by the Xenophontic Sokrates to Aristippus, we perceive that it is in substance similar to that which the Platonic dialogue Gorgias puts in the mouth of the rhetor Pôlus and the politician Kalliklês. The Xenophontic Sokrates distributes men into two classes—the rulers and the ruled: the former strong, well-armed, and well-trained, who enjoy life at the expense of the submission and suffering of the latter: the former committing injustice, the latter enduring injustice. He impresses upon Aristippus the misery of being confounded with the suffering many, and exhorts him to qualify himself by a laborious apprenticeship for enrolment among the ruling few. If we read the Platonic Gorgias, we shall see that this is the same strain in which Pôlus and Kalliklês address Sokrates, when they invite him to exchange philosophy for rhetoric, and to qualify himself for active political life. “Unless you acquire these accomplishments, you will be helpless and defenceless against injury and insult from others: while, if you acquire them, you will raise yourself to political influence, and will exercise power over others, thus obtaining the fullest measure of enjoyment which life affords: see the splendid position to which the Macedonian usurper Archelaus has recently exalted himself.¹ Philosophy is useful, when studied in youth for a short time as preface to professional and political apprenticeship: but if a man perseveres in it and makes it the occupation of life, he will not only be useless to others, but unable to protect himself; he will be exposed to suffer any injustice which the well-trained and powerful men may put upon him.” To these exhortations of Pôlus and Kalliklês Sokrates replies by admitting their case as true matter of fact. “I know that I am exposed to such insults and injuries: but my life is just and innocent. If I suffer, I shall suffer wrong: and those who do the wrong will thereby inflict upon themselves a greater mischief than they inflict upon me. Doing wrong is worse for the agent than suffering wrong.”²

There is indeed this difference between the Xenophontic

¹ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 466-470-486.

² Plato, Gorgias, pp. 508-509-521-527 C και ἴσασιν τινα σοῦ καταφρονῆσαι ὡς ἀνεχθῆναι, καὶ προσηλακίσσαι ἐὰν

βούληται, καὶ ναι μὰ Δία σὺ γε θαρρῶν πατάξαι τὸν ἄτιμον ταύτην πλεγγὴν· οὐδὲν γὰρ βιαιὸν πείσει, ἐὰν τῷ ὅτι ἤς καλὸς καγαθός, ἀσπῶν ἀρετῆν.

Xenophon-
tic Sokrates
talking to
Aristippus
—Kallikles
in Platonic
Gorgias.

Sokrates in his address to Aristippus, and the Platonic Kalliklēs in his exhortation to Sokrates: That whereas Kalliklēs proclaims and even vindicates it as natural justice and right, that the strong should gratify their desires by oppressing and despoiling the weak—the Xenophontic Sokrates merely asserts such oppression as an actual fact, notorious and undeniable,¹ without either approving or blaming it. Plato, constructing an imaginary conversation with the purpose that Sokrates shall be victorious, contrives intentionally and with dramatic consistency that the argument of Kalliklēs shall be advanced in terms so invidious and revolting that no one else would be bold enough to speak it out:² which contrivance was the more necessary, as Sokrates is made not only to disparage the poets, rhetors, and most illustrious statesmen of historical Athens, but to sustain a thesis in which he admits himself to stand alone, opposed to aristocrats as well as democrats.³ Yet though there is this material difference in the manner of handling, the plan of life which the Xenophontic Sokrates urges upon Aristippus, and the grounds upon which he enforces it, are really the same as those which Kalliklēs in the Platonic Gorgias urges upon Sokrates. "Labour to qualify yourself for active political power"—is the lesson addressed in the one case to a wealthy man who passed his life in ease and indulgence, in the other case to a poor man who devoted himself to speculative debate on general questions, and to cross-examination of every one who would listen and answer. The man of indulgence, and the man of speculation,⁴ were both of them equally destitute of those active energies,

¹ If we read the conversation alleged by Thucydides (v. 94-105-112) to have taken place between the Athenian generals and the executive council of Melos, just before the siege of that island by the Athenians, we shall see that this same language is held by the Athenians. "You, the Melians, being much weaker, must submit to us who are much stronger; this is the universal law and necessity of nature, which we are not the first to introduce, but only follow out, as others have done before us, and will do after us. Submit—or it will be worse for you. No middle course, or neutrality, is open to you."

² Plato, Gorgias, pp. 482-487-492.

³ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 472-521.

⁴ If we read the treatise of Pinitarch, *Περὶ Στωικῶν ἠθαιωμάτων* (c. 2-3, p. 1033 C-D), we shall see that the Stoic writers, Zeno, Kleantes, Chrysippus, Diogenes, Antipater, all of them earnestly recommended a life of active citizenship and laborious political duty, as incumbent upon philosophers not less than upon others; and that they treated with contempt a life of literary leisure and speculation. Chrysippus explicitly declared οὐδὲν διαφέρειν τὸν σχολαστικὸν βίον τοῦ ἡθικοῦ, i. e. that the speculative philosopher who kept aloof from political activity, was in substance a follower of Epikurus. Tacitus holds much the same language (Hist. iv. 5) when he says about

which were necessary to confer power over others, or even security against oppression by others.

In the Xenophontic dialogue, Aristippus replies to Sokrates that the apprenticeship enjoined upon him is too laborious, and that the exercise of power, itself laborious, has no charm for him. He desires a middle course, neither to oppress nor to be oppressed: neither to command, nor to be commanded—like Otanes among the seven Persian conspirators.¹ He keeps clear of political obligation, and seeks to follow, as much as he can, his own individual judgment. Though Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue, is made to declare this middle course impossible, yet it is substantially the same as what the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias aspires to:—moreover the same as what the real Sokrates at Athens both pursued as far as he could, and declared to be the only course consistent with his security.² The Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias declares emphatically that no man can hope to take active part in the government of a country, unless he be heartily identified in spirit with the ethical and political system of the country: unless he not merely professes, but actually and sincerely shares, the creed, doctrines, tastes, and modes of appreciation prevalent among the citizens.³ Whoever is deficient in this indispensable condition, must be content "to mind his own business and to abstain from active meddling with public affairs". This is the course which the Platonic Sokrates claims both for

Language
held by
Aristippus
—his scheme
of life.

Helvidius Priscus:—"ingenium illustre altioribus studiis juvenis admodum dedit: non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constanter adversus fortuita rempublicam capesseret." &c.

The contradiction which Plutarch notes is, that these very Stoic philosophers (Chrysippus and the others) who affected to despise all modes of life except active civic duty—were themselves, all, men of literary leisure, spending their lives away from their native cities, in writing and talking philosophy. The same might have been said about Sokrates and Plato (except as to leaving their native cities), both of whom incurred the same reproach for inactivity as Sokrates here addresses to Aristippus.

¹ Herodot. iii. 80-83.

² Plato, Apol. So. p. 33 A. ἰδιωτεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

³ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 510-513. Τίς οὖν ποτ' ἐστὶ τίχνη τῆς παρασκευῆς τοῦ μηδὲν ἀδικεῖσθαι ἢ ὡς ὀλίγιστα: σκέψαι εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ ἥτις ἐμολίμην γὰρ δοκεῖ ἥδε· ἢ αὐτὸν ἀρχεῖν εἶναι ἐν τῇ πόλει ἢ καὶ τυραννεῖν, ἢ τῆς ὑπαρχούσης πολιτείας ἐταίρον εἶναι. (This is exactly the language which Sokrates holds to Aristippus, Xenoph. Memor. ii. 1, 12.)

ὅς ἐν, δημοθῆς ἐν, ταῦτά φέρων καὶ ἐταίρων, ἐθέλη ἀρχεσθαι καὶ ὑποκείσθαι τῇ ἀρχῇ—εὐθύς ἐκ νόου ἐθέλει αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἀχθεσθαι τῇ δεσπότῃ (510 D). οὐ γὰρ μμῆτην δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφῶς ὁμοιον τοῖς τοῖς (513 B).

himself and for the philosopher generally¹: it is also the course which Aristippus chooses for himself, under the different title of a middle way between the extortion of the ruler and the suffering of the subordinate. And the argument of Sokrates that no middle way is possible—far from refuting Aristippus (as Xenophon says that it did)² is founded upon an incorrect assumption: had it been correct, neither literature nor philosophy could have been developed.

The real Sokrates, since he talked incessantly and with every one, must of course have known how to diversify his conversation and adapt it to each listener. Xenophon not only attests this generally,³ but has preserved the proofs of it in his *Memorabilia*—real conversations, reported though doubtless dressed up by himself. The conversations which he has preserved relate chiefly to piety and to the duties and proceedings of active life: and to the necessity of controuling the appetites: these he selected partly because they suited his proclaimed purpose of replying to the topics of indictment, partly because they were in harmony with his own *ideal*. Xenophon was a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, performing with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His heroes were men like Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus—warriors, horsemen, hunters, husbandmen, always engaged in active competition for power, glory, or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue,

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 526 C-D. (Compare *Republic*, vi. p. 496 D.) ἀνδρὶς ἰδίου τῆς ἑαυτοῦ τιμῆς, μάλιστα μὲν, ἰσχυρῶς φημι, ὃ Καννίκλεις, φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ—καὶ ὃ καὶ σὲ ἀντιμαρακαλί (Sokrates to Kalliklēs) ἐπὶ τούτῳ τὸν βίον. Upon these words Bouth remarks: "Respicitur inter hæc verba ad Kalliklēs orationem, quæ rerum civilium tractatio et πολυπραγμοσύνη Sokratī persuadentur,"—which is the same invitation as the Xenophontic Sokrates addresses to Aristippus. Again, in *Plat. Republ.* viii. pp. 549 C, 550 A, we read, that corruption of the virtuous character begins by invitations to the shy youth to depart from the quiet plan of life followed by a virtuous father (who τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττει) and to enter on a career of active political ambition. The youth is induced, by

instigation of his mother and relatives without, to pass from ἀπραγμοσύνη to φιλοπραγμοσύνη, which is described as a change for the worse. Even in Xenophon (*Memor.* iii. 11, 16) Sokrates recognises and jests upon his own ἀπραγμοσύνη.

² Xen. *Mem.* iii. 8, 1. Diogenes L. says (and it is probable enough, from radical difference of character) that Xenophon was adversely disposed to Aristippus. In respect to other persons also, Xenophon puts invidious constructions (for which at any rate no ground is shown) upon their purposes in questioning Sokrates: thus, in the dialogue (i. 6) with the Sophist Antiphon, he says that Antiphon questioned Sokrates in order to seduce away his companions (*Mem.* i. 6, 1).

³ Xen. *Mem.* iv. 1, 2-3.

or privation. For a life of easy and unambitious indulgence, even though accompanied by mental and speculative activity—"homines ignavâ operâ et philosophâ sententiâ"—he had no respect. It was on this side that the character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be, and probably really was, the most defective. Sokrates employed the arguments the most likely to call forth within him habits of action—to render him *πρακτικώτερον*.¹ In talking with the presumptuous youth Glaukon, and with the diffident Charmides,² Sokrates used language adapted to correct the respective infirmities of each. In addressing Kritias and Alkibiades, he would consider it necessary not only to inculcate self-denial as to appetite, but to repress an exorbitance of ambition.³ But in dealing with Aristippus, while insisting upon command of appetite and acquirement of active energy, he at the same time endeavours to kindle ambition, and the love of command: he even goes so far as to deny the possibility of a middle course, and to maintain (what Kritias and Alkibiades⁴ would have cordially approved) that there was no alternative open, except between the position of the oppressive governors and that of the suffering subjects. Addressed to Aristippus, these topics were likely to thrust forcibly upon his attention the danger of continued indulgences during the earlier years of life, and the necessity, in view to his own future security, for training in habits of vigour, courage, self-command, endurance.

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 1. ὅς δὲ καὶ πρακτικώτερος ἐποίησε τοὺς συνόντας αὐτῷ, πρὶν αὖ τοῦτο λέγειν.

² Xenoph. Mem. iii. capp. 6 and 7.

³ Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 15-18-24. Respecting the different tone and arguments employed by Sokrates, in his conversations with different persons, see a good passage in the Rhetor Aristides, Orat. xvi. Ὑπὲρ τῶν τετραέπων, p. 161, Dindorf.

⁴ We see from the first two chapters of the Memorabilia of Xenophon (as well as from the subsequent intimation of Æschines, in the oration against Timarchus, p. 173) how much stress was laid by the accusers of Sokrates on the fact that he had educated Kritias and Alkibiades; and how the accusers alleged that his teaching tended to encourage the like exorbitant aspirations in others, dangerous to established authority, traditional, legal, parental, divine. I do not doubt (what Xenophon

affirms) that Sokrates, when he conversed with Kritias and Alkibiades, held a very opposite language. But it was otherwise when he talked with men of ease and indulgence without ambition, such as Aristippus. If Melétus and Anytus could have put in evidence the conversation of Sokrates with Aristippus, many points of it would have strengthened their case against Sokrates before the Dikasta. We read in Xenophon (Mem. i. 2, 58) how the point was made to tell, that Sokrates often cited and commented on the passage of the Iliad (Il. 188) in which the Grecian chiefs, retiring from the agora to their ships, are described as being respectfully addressed by Odysseus—while the common soldiers are scolded and beaten by him, for the very same conduct: the relation which Sokrates here dwells on as subsisting between οἱ ἀρχαῖοι and οἱ ἀρχόμενοι, would favour the like colouring.

Xenophon notices briefly two other colloquies between Sokrates and Aristippus. The latter asked Sokrates, "Do you know anything good?" in order (says Xenophon) that if Sokrates answered in the affirmative and gave as examples, health, wealth, strength, courage, bread, &c., he (Aristippus) might show circumstances in which this same particular was evil; and might thus catch Sokrates in a contradiction, as Sokrates had caught him before.¹ But Sokrates (says Xenophon) far from seeking to fence with the question, retorted it in such a way as to baffle the questioner, and at the same time to improve and instruct the by-standers.² "Do you ask me if I know anything good for a fever?—No. Or for ophthalmic distemper?—No. Or for hunger?—No. Oh! then, if you mean to ask me, whether I know anything good, which is good for nothing—I reply that I neither know any such thing, nor care to know it."

Again, on another occasion Aristippus asked him—"Do you know anything beautiful?—Yes; many things.—Are they all like to each other?—No; they are as unlike as possible to each other.—How then (continues Aristippus) can that which is unlike to the beautiful, be itself beautiful?—Easily enough (replies Sokrates); one man is beautiful for running; another man, altogether unlike him, is beautiful for wrestling. A shield which is beautiful for protecting your body, is altogether unlike to a javelin, which is beautiful for being swiftly and forcibly hurled.—Your answer (rejoined Aristippus) is exactly the same as it was when I asked you whether you knew anything good.—Certainly (replies Sokrates). Do you imagine, that the Good is one thing, and the Beautiful another? Do you not know that all things are good and beautiful in relation to the same purpose? Virtue is not good in relation to one purpose, and beautiful in relation to another. Men are called both good and beautiful in reference to the same ends: the

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. Both Xenophon and some of his commentators censure this as a captious string of questions put by Aristippus—"captiosas Aristippi questionuculas". Such a criticism is preposterous, when we recollect that Sokrates was continually examining and questioning others in

the same manner. See in particular his cross-examination of Euthydēmus, reported by Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2; and many others like it, both in Xenophon and in Plato.

² Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1. βουλόμενος τοὺς συνόντας ἀφελείν.

bodies of men, in like manner: and all things which men use, are considered both good and beautiful, in consideration of their serving their ends well.—Then (says Aristippus) a basket for carrying dung is beautiful?—To be sure (replied Sokrates), and a golden shield is ugly; if the former be well made for doing its work, and the latter badly.—Do you then assert (asked Aristippus) that the same things are beautiful and ugly?—Assuredly (replied Sokrates); and the same things are both good and evil. That which is good for hunger, is often bad for a fever: that which is good for a fever, is often bad for hunger. What is beautiful for running is often ugly for wrestling—and *vice versa*. All things are good and beautiful, in relation to the ends which they serve well: all things are evil and ugly, in relation to the ends which they serve badly.”¹

These last cited colloquies also, between Sokrates and Aristippus, are among the most memorable remains of Grecian philosophy: belonging to one of the years preceding 399 B.C., in which last year Sokrates perished. Here (as in the former dialogue) the doctrine is distinctly enunciated by Sokrates—That Good and Evil—Beautiful (or Honourable) and Ugly (or Dishonourable—Base)—have no intelligible meaning except in relation to human happiness and security. Good or Evil Absolute (i.e., apart from such relation) is denied to exist. The theory of Absolute Good (a theory traceable to the Parmenidean doctrines, and adopted from them by Eukleides) becomes first known to us as elaborated by Plato. Even in his dialogues it is neither always nor exclusively advocated, but is often modified by, and sometimes even exchanged for, the eudæmonistic or relative theory.

Sokrates declares very explicitly, in his conversation with Aristippus, what he means by the Good and the Beautiful: and when therefore in the name of the Good and the Beautiful, he protests against an uncontrolled devotion to the pleasures of sense (as in one of the Xenophontic dialogues with Euthydemus*), what he

Remarks on the conversation—Theory of Good.

Good is relative to human beings and wants, in the view of Sokrates.

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iii. 8, 1-9.

² Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5.

Sokrates exhorts those with whom he converses to be sparing in indulgences, and to cultivate self-command

and fortitude as well as bodily energy and activity. The reason upon which these exhortations are founded is eudæmonistic: that a person will thereby escape or be able to confront

means is, that a man by such intemperance ruins his prospects of future happiness, and his best means of being useful both to himself and others. Whether Aristippus first learnt from Sokrates the relative theory of the Good and the Beautiful, or had already embraced it before, we cannot say. Some of his questions, as reported in Xenophon, would lead us to suspect that it took him by surprise: just as we find, in the Protagoras of Plato that a theory substantially the same, though in different words, is proposed by the Platonic Sokrates to the Sophist Protagoras: who at first repudiates it, but is compelled ultimately to admit it by the elaborate dialectic of Sokrates.¹ If Aristippus did not learn the theory from Sokrates, he was at any rate fortified in it by the authority of Sokrates; to whose doctrine, in this respect, he adhered more closely than Plato.

Aristippus is recognised by Aristotle² in two characters: both as a Sophist, and as a companion of Sokrates and Plato. Moreover it is remarkable that the doctrine of Sokrates, in reference to which Aristotle cites him as one among the Sophists, is a doctrine unquestionably Sokratic—contempt of geometrical science as useless, and as having no bearing on the good or evil of life.³ Herein also Aristippus followed Sokrates, while Plato departed from him.

In estimating the character of Aristippus, I have brought into particular notice the dialogues reported by Xenophon, because the Xenophontic statements, with those of Aristotle, are the only contemporary evidence (for Plato only names him once to say that he was not present at the death of Sokrates, and was reported to be in Ægina). The other statements respecting Aristippus, preserved

Life and dicta of Aristippus—His type of character.

serious dangers—and will obtain for himself ultimately greater pleasures than those which he foregoes (Memor. i. 6, 8; ii. 1, 31-33; iii. 12, 2-5). Τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ καὶ ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ οἷσι τι ἄλλο αἰσιώτερον εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἔτερε εἶναι τοῖς τε καὶ ἴδιον, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρεῖᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑλπίδας παρέχοντα ἀφελίσσειν ἀντί: See also Memor. ii. 4, ii. 10, 4, about the importance of acquiring and cultivating friends, because a good friend is the most useful and valuable of all possessions. Sokrates, like Aristippus, adopts the prudential view of life, and

not the transcendental; recommending sobriety and virtue on the ground of pleasures secured and pains averted. We find Plutarch, in his very bitter attacks on Epikurus, reasoning on the Hedonistic basis, and professing to prove that Epikurus discarded pleasures more and greater for the sake of obtaining pleasures fewer and less. See Plutarch, Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum, pp. 1096-1099.

¹ Plato, Protagoras, pp. 351-361.

² Aristot. Rhetoric. ii. 24; Metaphysic. B. 996, a. 32.

³ Xenophon. Memor. iv. 7, 2.

by Diogenes and others, not only come from later authorities, but give us hardly any facts; though they ascribe to him a great many sayings and repartees, adapted to a peculiar type of character. That type of character, together with an imperfect notion of his doctrines, is all that we can make out. Though Aristippus did not follow the recommendation of Sokrates, to labour and qualify himself for a ruler, yet both the advice of Sokrates, to reflect and prepare himself for the anxieties and perils of the future—and the spectacle of self-sufficing independence which the character of Sokrates afforded—were probably highly useful to him. Such advice being adverse to the natural tendencies of his mind, impressed upon him forcibly those points of the case which he was most likely to forget: and contributed to form in him that habit of self-command which is a marked feature in his character. He wished (such are the words ascribed to him by Xenophon) to pass through life as easily and agreeably as possible. Ease comes before pleasure: but his plan of life was to obtain as much pleasure as he could, consistent with ease, or without difficulty and danger. He actually realised, as far as our means of knowledge extend, that middle path of life which Sokrates declared to be impracticable.

Much of the advice given by Sokrates, Aristippus appears to have followed, though not from the reasons which Sokrates puts forward for giving it. When Sokrates reminds him that men liable to be tempted and ensnared by the love of good eating, were unfit to command—when he animadverts on the insanity of the passionate lover, who exposed himself to the extremity of danger for the purpose of possessing a married woman, while there were such abundant means of gratifying the sexual appetite without any difficulty or danger whatever¹—to all this Aristippus assents: and what we read about his life is in perfect conformity therewith. Reason and prudence supply ample motives for following such advice, whether a man be animated with the love of command or not. So again, when Sokrates impresses upon Aristippus that

Aristippus acted conformably to the advice of Sokrates.

¹ Xen. Mem. II. 1, 5. καὶ τηλικούτων μὲν ἐπικειμένων τῷ μοιχεύοντι κακίων τε καὶ αἰσχρῶν, ὅντων δὲ πολλῶν τῶν ἀπολυσόντων τῆς τῶν ἀφροδι-

σιῶν ἐπιθυμίας ἐν ἀδείῃ, ὅμοι εἰς τὰ ἐπικινύοντα φέρεσθαι, ἂρ' οὐκ ᾗδ' τοῦτο παντάπασι κακοδαιμονιώντος ἐστίν; Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ, εἴφ' (Ἀριστίππος).

the Good and the Beautiful were the same, being relative only to human wants or satisfaction—and that nothing was either good or beautiful, except in so far as it tended to confer relief, security, or enjoyment—this lesson too Aristippus laid to heart, and applied in a way suitable to his own peculiar dispositions and capacities.

The type of character represented by Aristippus is the man who enjoys what the present affords, so far as can be done without incurring future mischief, or provoking the enmity of others—but who will on no account enslave himself to any enjoyment; who always maintains his own self-mastery and independence—and who has prudence and intelligence enabling him to regulate each separate enjoyment so as not to incur preponderant evil in future.¹ This self-mastery and independence is in point of fact the capital aspiration of Aristippus, hardly less than of Antisthenes and Diogenes. He is competent to deal suitably with all varieties of persons, places, and situations, and to make the best of each—Ὁδὲ γὰρ τοιούτων δεῖ, τοιοῦτος εἰμι ἐγώ :² but he accepts what the situation presents, without yearning or struggling for that which it cannot present.³ He enjoys the society both of the Syracusan despot Dionysius, and of the Hetæra Lais; but he will not make himself subservient either to one or to the other: he conceives himself able to afford, to both, as much satisfaction as he receives.⁴ His enjoyments are not enhanced by the idea that others are excluded from the like enjoyment, and that he is a superior, privileged man: he has no jealousy or antipathy, no passion for triumphing over rivals, no demand for envy or admiration from spectators. Among the Hetærae in Greece were included all the most engaging and accomplished women—for in

¹ Diog. L. II. 67. οὕτως ἦν καὶ ἐλίσθαι καὶ καταφρονησαὶ πολὺν.

² Diog. L. II. 66. ἦν δὲ ἱκανὸς ἀρμόσασθαι καὶ τῶν καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ προσώπῳ, καὶ πάσαις περιστάσιν ἁρμονίως ὑποκρίνασθαι· διὸ καὶ παρὰ Διονυσίῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδοκίμει μᾶλλον, αἰεὶ τὸ προσπεσὼν εὖ διατιθέμενος· ἀπέλαυε μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς τῶν παρόντων, οὐκ ἐθῆρα δὲ πόνον τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν οὐ παρόντων.

Horat. Epistol. I. 17, 23-24:—

"Omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, Tentantem majora, ferè præsentibus æquum."

³ Sophokles, Philoktètes, 1049 (the words of Odysseus).

⁴ Diog. L. II. 75. ἐχρητο καὶ Λαίδῃ τῇ ἑταίρῃ· πρὸς οὖν τοὺς μεμφομένους εἶπεν, "Ἐχω Λαίδα, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχομαι· ἐπεὶ τὸ κρατεῖν καὶ μὴ ἡττάσθαι ἡδονῶν, ἀριστον—οὐ τὸ μὴ χρῆσθαι." II. 77, Διονυσίῳ ποτὲ ἐρομένου, ἐπὶ τί ἦκοι, εἶπεν, ἐπὶ τῷ μεταβάσειν ὧν ἔχοι, καὶ μεταλήψεσθαι ὧν μὴ ἔχοι.

Lucian introduces Ἀρετὴν καὶ Τρυφὴν as litigating before Δίῳι for the possession of Aristippus: the litigation is left undecided (Bis Accusatus, c. 13-23).

Grecian matrimony, it was considered becoming and advantageous that the bride should be young and ignorant, and that as a wife she should neither see nor know any thing beyond the administration of her own feminine apartments and household.¹ Aristippus attached himself to those Hetærae who pleased him; declaring that the charm of their society was in no way lessened by the knowledge that others enjoyed it also, and that he could claim no exclusive privilege.² His patience and mildness in argument is much commended. The main lesson which he had learnt from philosophy (he said), was self-appreciation—to behave himself with confidence in every man's society: even if all laws were abrogated, the philosopher would still, without any law, live in the same way as he now did.³ His confidence remained unshaken, when seized as a captive in Asia by order of the Persian satrap Artaphernes: all that he desired was, to be taken before the satrap himself.⁴ Not to renounce pleasure, but to enjoy pleasure moderately and to keep desires under controul,—was in his judgment the true policy of life. But he was not solicitous to grasp enjoyment beyond what was easily attainable, nor to accumulate wealth or power which did not yield positive result.⁵ While Sokrates recommended, and Antisthenes practised, the precaution of deadening the sexual appetite by approaching no women except such as were ugly and repulsive,⁶ —while Xenophon in the *Cyropædia*,⁷ working out the Sokratic idea of the dangerous fascination of beauty, represents Cyrus as refusing to see the captive Pantheia, and depicts the too con-

¹ Xenophon, *Œconomic*. iii. 13, vii. 5, Ischomachus says to Sokrates about his wife, *Καὶ τί ἂν ἐπισταμένην αὐτὴν παρέλαβον, ἥ τί μιν οὕτω πεντεκαίδεκα γεγονυῖα ἦλθε πρὸς ἐμέ, τὸν δ' ἔμπροσθεν χρόνον εἴη ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ὥστε ὡς ἐλαχίστα μὲν εἴποιτο, ἐλαχίστα δ' ἀκούσοιτο, ἐλαχίστα δὲ ἴροιτο;*

² Dion. L. ii. 74. On this point his opinion coincided with that of Diogenes, and of the Stoics Zeno and Chrysippus (D. L. vii. 131), who maintained, that among the wise wives ought to be in common, and that all marital jealousy ought to be discarded. *Ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι τὰς γυναῖκας δεῖν παρὰ τοῖς σοφοῖς ὥστε τὸν ἐντυχόντα τῇ ἐντυχούσῃ χρῆσθαι, καθά*

φησι Ζήνων ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ καὶ Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ Πολιτείας, ἀλλὰ τε Διογένης ὁ Κυνικός καὶ Πλάτων· πάντας τε παῖδας ἐπίσης στρέφον πατέρων τρέφον, καὶ ἡ ἐπὶ μοιχείᾳ ζηλοτυπία περιαιρεθίσεται. Compare Sextus Emp. *Pyrh.* H. iii. 205.

³ Diog. L. ii. 68. The like reply is ascribed to Aristotle. *Diog.* L. v. 20; Plutarch, *De Profect. in Virtut.* p. 80 D.

⁴ Diog. L. ii. 79.

⁵ Diog. L. ii. 72-74.

⁶ Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 3, 11-14; *Symposion*, iv. 33; *Diog.* L. vi. 3. (*Ἀντισθένης*) *ἔλεγε συνεχῆς—Μανεῖν μάλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν—καὶ—χρὴ τοιαύταις πλησιάζειν γυναῖκιν, αἱ χάριν εἰσόνται.*

⁷ Xenoph. *Cyropæd.* v. 1, 2-18.

fidant Araspes (who treats such precaution as exaggerated timidity, and fully trusts his own self-possession), when appointed to the duty of guarding her, as absorbed against his will in a passion which makes him forget all reason and duty—Aristippus has sufficient self-mastery to visit the most seductive Hetærae without being drawn into ruinous extravagance or humiliating subjugation. We may doubt whether he ever felt, even for Laïs, a more passionate sentiment than Plato in his Epigram expresses towards the Kolophonian Hetæra Archeanassa.

Aristippus is thus remarkable, like the Cynics Antisthenes and Diogenes, not merely for certain theoretical doctrines, but also for acting out a certain plan of life.¹ We know little or nothing of the real life of Aristippus, except what appears in Xenophon. The biography of him (as of the Cynic Diogenes) given by Diogenes Laërtius, consists of little more than a string of anecdotes, mostly sayings, calculated to illustrate a certain type of character.² Some of these are set down by those who approved the type, and who therefore place it in a favourable point of view—others by those who disapprove it and give the opposite colour.

We can understand and compare the different types of character represented by Antisthenes or Diogenes, and by Aristippus: but we have little knowledge of the real facts of their lives. The two types, each manifesting that marked individuality which belongs to the Sokratic band, though in many respects strongly contrasted, have also some points of agreement. Both Aristippus and Diogenes are bent on individual freedom and independence of character: both of them stand upon their own appreciation of life and its phenomena: both of them are impatient of that servitude to the opinions and antipathies of

¹ Sextus Empiricus and others describe this by the Greek word ἀναισθησία (Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. i. 160). Plato's beautiful epigram upon Archeanassa is given by Diogenes L. iii. 51. Compare this with the remark of Aristippus—Plutarch, Amatorius, p. 750 E.

That the society of these fascinating Hetærae was dangerous, and exhaustive to the purses of those who sought it,

may be seen from the expensive manner of life of Theodotê, described in Xenophon, Mem. iii. 11, 4.

The amorous impulses or fancies of Plato were censured by Dikearchus. See Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iv. 34, 71, with Davies's note.

² This is justly remarked by Wendt in his instructive Dissertation, *De Philosophiâ Cyrenaicâ*, p. 8 (Göttingen, 1841).

others, which induces a man to struggle for objects, not because they afford him satisfaction, but because others envy him for possessing them—and to keep off evils, not because he himself feels them as such, but because others pity or despise him for being subject to them : both of them are exempt from the competitive and ambitious feelings, from the thirst after privilege and power, from the sense of superiority arising out of monopolised possession and exclusion of others from partnership. Diogenes kept aloof from political life and civil obligations as much as Aristippus ; and would have pronounced (as Aristippus replies to Sokrates in the Xenophontic dialogue) that the task of ruling others, instead of being a prize to be coveted, was nothing better than an onerous and mortifying servitude,¹ not at all less onerous because a man took up the burthen of his own accord. These points of agreement are real : but the points of disagreement are not less real. Diogenes maintains his free individuality, and puts himself out of the reach of human enmity, by clothing himself in impenetrable armour : by attaining positive insensibility, as near as human life permits. This is with him not merely the acting out of a scheme of life, but also a matter of pride. He is proud of his ragged garment and coarse² fare, as exalting him above others, and as constituting him a pattern of endurance : and he indulges this sentiment by stinging and contemptuous censure of every one. Aristippus has no similar vanity : he achieves his independence without so heavy a renunciation : he follows out his own plan of life, without setting himself up as a pattern for others. But his plan is at the same time more delicate ; requiring greater skill and intelligence, more of

¹ It is this servitude of political life, making the politician the slave of persons and circumstances around him, which Horace contrasts with the philosophical independence of Aristippus:—

Ac ne fortis roges, quo me ducos, quo
lare tuter ;

Nullius addictus jurare in verba
magistri

Quo me cunque rapit tempestas, deferor
hospes.

Nunc agilis flo et mensor civilibus
undis,

Virtutis veræ custos rigidusque mat-
alles :

Nunc in Aristippi furtim præcepta
relabor,

Et mihi res, non me rebus, sub-
jungere conor.

(*Epist.* i. 1, 15.)

So also the Platonic Sokrates (*Theæstet.* pp. 172-175) depicts forcibly the cramped and fettered lives of rhetors and politicians ; contrasting them with the self-judgment and independence of speculative and philosophical enquirers—*ὅς τις αἰσθάνεται ἐλευθέρως τε καὶ σχολῇ τετραμμένος, ὃ δὲ φιλόσοφος καλῶς.*

² *Diog. L. II. 26.* σπράγγαντος Ἀντισθέους τὸ διεφθαρτὸς τοῦ τριβύρου εἰς τοῦμακας, ὅρα σὺ, ἄρα (λακράτης), διὰ τοῦ τριβύρου τὴν αὐτοβίαν.

manifold sagacity, in the performer. Horace, who compares the two and gives the preference to Aristippus, remarks that Diogenes, though professing to want nothing, was nevertheless as much dependent upon the bounty of those who supplied his wallet with provisions, as Aristippus upon the favour of princes: and that Diogenes had only one fixed mode of proceeding, while Aristippus could master and turn to account a great diversity of persons and situations—could endure hardship with patience and dignity, when it was inevitable, and enjoy the opportunities of pleasure when they occurred. "To Aristippus alone it is given to wear both fine garments and rags"—is a remark ascribed to Plato.¹ In truth, Aristippus possesses in eminent measure that accomplishment, the want of which Plato proclaims to be so misleading and mischievous—artistic skill in handling human affairs, throughout his dealings with mankind.²

That the scheme of life projected by Aristippus was very difficult, requiring great dexterity, prudence, and resolution, to execute it—we may see plainly by the Xenophontic dialogue; wherein Sokrates pronounces it to be all but impracticable. As far as we can judge, he surmounted the difficulties of it: yet we do not know enough of his real life to determine with accuracy what varieties of difficulties he experienced. He

Attachment of Aristippus to ethics and philosophy—contempt for other studies.

¹ Horat. Epistol. i. 17, 18-24; Diog. L. vi. 46-56-66.

"Si pranderet olus patienter, regibus uti

Nollet Aristippus." "Si sciret regibus uti,

Fastidiret olus, qui me notat." Utrius horum

Verba probes et facta, doce: vel junior audi

Cur sit Aristippi potior sententia.

Namque Mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt:

"Scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et

Splendidius multo est. Equus ut me portet, alat rex,

Officium facio: tu poscis villa rerum, Dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem."

Omnis Aristippum decuit color, et status, et res,

Totentantum majora, ferè presentibus æquum.

(Compare Diog. L. ii. 102, vi. 58, where this anecdote is reported as of Plato instead of Aristippus.)

Horace's view and scheme of life are exceedingly analogous to those of Aristippus. Plutarch, *Fragm. De Homero*, p. 1190; *De Fortuna Alex.* p. 330 D. Diog. Laert. ii. 67. *ὁ δὲ ποτε Σπάρταν, οἱ δὲ Πλάτωνα, πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰπεῖν, τοὶ μὲν δίδουσι καὶ χλαῖνα φορεῖν καὶ ῥάκος.* The remark cannot have been made by Straton, who was not contemporary with Aristippus. Even Sokrates lived by the bounty of his rich friends, and indeed could have had no other means of supporting his wife and children; though he accepted only a small portion of what they tendered to him, declining the remainder. See the remark of Aristippus, Diog. L. ii. 74.

² Plato, *Phædon*, p. 89 E. *ὅτι ἀνευ τέχνης τῆς περὶ τὰν θάνατον ὁ τοιοῦτος χρηστὰς ἐπιχειρεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.*

followed the profession of a Sophist, receiving fees for his teaching: and his attachment to philosophy (both as contrasted with ignorance and as contrasted with other studies not philosophy) was proclaimed in the most emphatic language. It was better (he said) to be a beggar, than an uneducated man: ¹ the former was destitute of money, but the latter was destitute of humanity. He disapproved varied and indiscriminate instruction, maintaining that persons ought to learn in youth what they were to practise in manhood: and he compared those who, neglecting philosophy, employed themselves in literature or physical science, to the suitors in the *Odyssey* who obtained the favours of Melantho and the other female servants, but were rejected by the Queen Penelopë herself. ² He treated with contempt the study of geometry, because it took no account, and made no mention, of what was good and evil, beautiful and ugly. In other arts (he said), even in the vulgar proceeding of the carpenter and the currier, perpetual reference was made to good, as the purpose intended to be served—and to evil as that which was to be avoided: but in geometry no such purpose was ever noticed. ³

This last opinion of Aristippus deserves particular attention, because it is attested by Aristotle. And it confirms what we hear upon less certain testimony, that Aristippus discountenanced the department of physical study generally (astronomy and physics) as well as geometry; confining his attention to facts and reasonings which bore upon the regulation of life. ⁴ In this restrictive view he followed the example and precepts of Sokrates—of Isokrates—seemingly also of Protagoras and Prodikus—though not of the Eleian Hippias, whose course of study was larger and more varied. ⁵ Aristippus taught as a Sophist, and appears to have acquired great reputa-

Aristippus taught as a Sophist. His reputation thus acquired procured for him the attentions of Dionysius and others.

¹ Diog. L. ii. 70; Plutarch, *Fragm.* 'Ἐπομήματ' εἰς Ἡρόδοτον, α. 9. 'Ἀριστιππος δὲ ἂν ἐπ' ἀναγκῆς ὁ Σοκρατικὸς ἔλεγε, συμβούλου δεῖσθαι χεῖρον εἶναι ἢ προσαιτεῖν.

² Diog. L. ii. 79-80. τοὺς τῶν ἐγκυλίων παιδευμάτων μετασχόντας, φιλοσοφίας δὲ ἀπολειφθέντας, &c. Plutarch, *Fragm.* Στραματέων, sect. 9.

³ Aristot. *Metaph.* B. 996, a 32, M.

1078, a. 35. ὥστε διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν τινὲς οἶον Ἀριστιππος προεπλάκισον αὐτὰς, &c.

⁴ Diog. L. ii. 92. Sext. *Emp. adv. Math.* vii. 11. Plutarch, *apud Eusebium Præp. Ev.* i. 8, 9.

⁵ Plato, *Protagor.* p. 318 E, where the different methods followed by Protagoras and Hippias are indicated.

tion in that capacity both at Athens and elsewhere.¹ Indeed, if he had not acquired such intellectual and literary reputation at Athens, he would have had little chance of being invited elsewhere, and still less chance of receiving favours and presents from Dionysius and other princes:² whose attentions did not confer celebrity, but waited upon it when obtained, and doubtless augmented it. If Aristippus lived a life of indulgence at Athens, we may fairly presume that his main resources for sustaining it, like those of Isokrates, were derived from his own teaching: and that the presents which he received from Dionysius of Syracuse, like those which Isokrates received from Nikokles of Cyprus, were welcome additions, but not his main income. Those who (like most of the historians of philosophy) adopt the opinion of Sokrates and Plato, that it is disgraceful for an instructor to receive payment from the persons taught—will doubtless despise Aristippus for such a proceeding: for my part I dissent from this opinion, and I therefore do not concur in the disparaging epithets bestowed upon him. And as for the costly indulgences, and subservience to foreign princes, of which Aristippus stands accused, we must recollect that the very same

¹ Diog. Laert. ii. 62. Alexis Comicus ap. Athenæ. xii. 644.

Aristokles (ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. xiv. 18) treats the first Aristippus as a mere voluptuary, who said nothing generally *περί τοῦ τέλους*. All the doctrine (he says) came from the younger Aristippus. I think this very improbable. To what did the dialogues composed by the first Aristippus refer? How did he get his reputation?

² Several anecdotes are recounted about sayings and doings of Aristippus in his intercourse with Dionysius. Which Dionysius is meant?—the elder or the younger? Probably the elder.

It is to be remembered that Dionysius the Elder lived and reigned until the year 367 B.C., in which year his son Dionysius the Younger succeeded him. The death of Sokrates took place in 399 B.C.: between which, and the accession of Dionysius the Younger, an interval of 82 years occurred. Plato was old, being sixty years of age, when he first visited the younger Dionysius, shortly after the accession of the latter. Aristippus

cannot well have been younger than Plato, and he is said to have been older than Æschines Sokraticus (D. L. ii. 83). Compare D. L. ii. 41.

When, with these dates present to our minds, we read the anecdotes recounted by Diogenes L. respecting the sayings and doings of Aristippus with Dionysius, we find that several of them relate to the contrast between the behaviour of Aristippus and that of Plato at Syracuse. Now it is certain that Plato went *once* to Syracuse when he was forty years of age (Epist. vii. int.), in 387 B.C.—and according to one report (Lucian, *De Parasito*, 34), he went there *twice*—while the elder Dionysius was in the plenitude of power: but he made an unfavourable impression, and was speedily sent away in displeasure. I think it very probable that Aristippus may have visited the elder Dionysius, and may have found greater favour with him than Plato found (see Lucian, l. c.), since Dionysius was an accomplished man and a composer of tragedies. Moreover Aristippus was a Kyrenæan, and wrote about Libya (D. L. ii. 83).

reproaches were advanced against Plato and Aristotle by their contemporaries: and as far as we know, with quite as much foundation.¹

Aristippus composed several dialogues, of which the titles alone are preserved.² They must however have been compositions of considerable merit, since Theopompus accused Plato of borrowing largely from them.

As all the works of Aristippus are lost, we cannot pretend to understand fully his theory from the meagre abstract given in Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes. Yet the theory is of importance in the history of ancient speculation, since it passed with some modifications to Epikurus, and was adopted by a large proportion of instructed men. The Kyrenaic doctrine was transmitted by Aristippus to his disciples Æthiops and Antipater: but his chief disciple appears to have been his daughter Arêtê: whom he instructed so well, that she was able to instruct her own son, the second Aristippus, called for that reason Metrodidactus. The basis of his ethical theory was, pleasure and pain: pleasure being *smooth motion*, pain, *rough motion*:³ pleasure being the object which all animals, by nature and without deliberation, loved, pursued, and felt satisfaction in obtaining—pain being the object which they all by nature hated and tried to avoid. Aristippus considered that no one pleasure was different from another, nor more pleasurable than another:⁴ that the attainment of these special pleasurable moments, or as many of them as practicable, was The End to be pursued in life. By *Happiness*, they understood the sum total of these special pleasures, past, present, and future: yet Happiness was desirable

Ethical theory of Aristippus and the Kyrenaic philosophers.

¹ See the epigram of the contemporary poet, Theokritus of Chios, in *Diog. L. v. 11*; compare Athenæus, viii. 364, xiii. 566. Aristokles, ap. Eusebius *Præp. Ev.* xv. 2.

² *Diog. L. ii. 84-85.*

³ *Diog. L. ii. 86-87.* δύο πάθη ὑφίσταται, πόνον καὶ ἡδονήν· τὴν μὲν λείαν κίνησιν, τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πόνον, τραχίαν κίνησιν· μὴ διαφέρειν τὴν ἡδονήν ἡδονῇ, μηδὲ πόνον τι εἶναι· καὶ τὴν μὲν, οὐκ ἡγενοῦσθαι πᾶσι ζώοις, τὸν δὲ ἀποκροῦσθαι τοῖς.

⁴ *Diog. L. ii. p. 87.* μὴ διαφέρειν

τὴν ἡδονήν ἡδονῇ, μηδὲ πόνον τι εἶναι. They did not mean by these words to deny that one pleasure was more vehement and attractive than another pleasure, or that one pain is more vehement and deterrent than another pain: for it is expressly said afterwards (s. 90) that they admitted this. They meant to affirm that one pleasure did not differ from another so far forth as pleasure: that all pleasures must be ranked as a class, and compared with each other in respect of intensity, durability, and other properties possessed in greater or less degree.

not on its own account, but on account of its constituent items, especially such of those items as were present and certainly future.¹ Pleasures and pains of memory and expectation were considered to be of little importance. Absence of pain or relief from pain, on the one hand—they did not consider as equivalent to positive pleasure—nor absence of pleasure or withdrawal of pleasure, on the other hand—as equivalent to positive pain. Neither the one situation nor the other was a *motion* (*κίνησις*), i.e. a positive situation, appreciable by the consciousness: each was a middle state—a mere negation of consciousness, like the phenomena of sleep.² They recognised some mental pleasures and pains as derivative from bodily sensation and as exclusively individual—others as not so: for example, there were pleasures and pains of sympathy; and a man often felt joy at the prosperity of his friends and countrymen, quite as genuine as that which he felt for his own good fortune. But they maintained that the bodily pleasures and pains were much more vehement than the mental which were not bodily: for which reason, the pains employed by the laws in punishing offenders were chiefly bodily. The fear of pain was in their judgments more operative than the love of pleasure: and though pleasure was desirable for its own sake, yet the accompanying conditions of many pleasures were so painful as to deter the prudent man from aiming at them. These obstructions rendered it impossible for any one to realise the sum total of pleasures constituting Happiness. Even the wise man sometimes failed, and the foolish man sometimes did well, though in general the reverse was the truth: but under the difficult conditions of life, a man must be satisfied if he realised some particular pleasurable conjunctions, without aspiring to a continuance or totality of the like.³

¹ Diog. L. II. pp. 88-89. Athenæus, xii. p. 544.

² Diog. L. II. 89-90. μή οὐσης τῆς ἀπονίας ἢ τῆς ἀνδονίας κινήσεως, ἐπεὶ ἡ ἀπονία οἰοῦναι καθυπνόντος ἔστι κατάστασις—μῆρας καταστάσεις ἀνόμενον ἀνδονίαν καὶ ἀπονίαν.

A doctrine very different from this is ascribed to Aristippus in Galen-Placid. Philos. (xix. p. 230, Kühn). It is there affirmed that by pleasure Aristippus understood, not the pleasure of sense, but that disposition of

mind whereby a person becomes insensible to pain, and hard to be imposed upon (ἀνάλγητος καὶ δυσσώγχευτος).

³ Diog. L. II. 91.

It does not appear that the Kyrenaic sect followed out into detail the derivative pleasures and pains; nor the way in which, by force of association, these come to take precedence of the primary, exercising influence on the mind both more forcible and more constant. We find this important fact remarkably stated in the doctrine of Kalliphon.

Aristippus regarded prudence or wisdom as good, yet not as good *per se*, but by reason of the pleasures which it enabled us to procure and the pains which it enabled us to avoid—and wealth as a good, for the same reason. A friend also was valuable, for the use and necessities of life: just as each part of one's own body was precious, so long as it was present and could serve a useful purpose.¹ Some branches of virtue might be possessed by persons who were not wise: and bodily training was a valuable auxiliary to virtue. Even the wise man could never escape pain and fear, for both of these were natural: but he would keep clear of envy, passionate love, and superstition, which were not natural, but consequences of vain opinion. A thorough acquaintance with the real nature of Good and Evil would relieve him from superstition as well as from the fear of death.²

Prudence—good, by reason of the pleasure which it ensured, and of the pains which it was necessary to avoid. Just and honourable, by law or custom—not by nature.

The Kyrenaics did not admit that there was anything just, or honourable, or base, by nature: but only by law and custom: nevertheless the wise man would be sufficiently restrained, by the fear of punishment and of discredit, from doing what was repugnant to the society in which he lived. They maintained that wisdom was attainable; that the senses did not at first judge truly, but might be improved by study; that progress was realised in philosophy as in other arts, and that there were different gradations of it, as well as different gradations of pain and suffering, discernible in different men. The wise man, as they conceived him, was a reality; not (like the wise man of the Stoics) a sublime but unattainable ideal.³

Such were (as far as our imperfect evidence goes) the ethical and emotional views of the Kyrenaic school: their theory and precepts respecting the plan and prospects of life. In regard to truth and knowledge, they

Their logical theory—nothing known except

Clemens Alexandr. Stromat. ii. p. 415, ed. 1629. Κατὰ δὲ τοὺς περὶ Καλ. λιφῶντα, ἔνεκα μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς παριστάμενη ἢ ἀρετῇ· χρόνῳ δὲ ὕστερον, τὸ περὶ αὐτὴν κάλλος κατιδούσα, ἰσότημον αὐτῇ τῇ ἀρχῇ, τοῦτέστι τῇ ἡδονῇ, παρίσχειν.

¹ Diog. L. ii. 91. τὴν φρόνησιν ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι λέγουσιν, οὐ δὲ αὐτὴν δὲ αἰρετήν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὰ ἐξ αὐτῆς περι-

γινόμενα· τὸν φίλον τῆς χρείας ἔνεκα· καὶ γὰρ μέρος σώματος, μέχρις ἂν παρῇ, ἀσπάσασθαι.

The like comparison is employed by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia (i. 2, 52-55), that men cast away portions of their own body, so soon as these portions cease to be useful.

² Diog. L. ii. p. 92.

³ Diog. L. ii. p. 93.

the phenomenal, our own sensations and feelings—no knowledge of the absolute.

maintained that we could have no knowledge of anything but human sensations, affections, feelings, &c. (*πάθη*): that respecting the extrinsic, extra-sensational, absolute, objects or causes from whence these feelings proceeded, we could know nothing at all. Partly for this reason, they abstained from all attention to the study of nature—to astronomy and physics: partly also because they did not see any bearing of these subjects upon good and evil, or upon the conduct of life. They turned their attention mainly to ethica, partly also to logic as subsidiary to ethical reasoning.¹

Such low estimation of mathematics and physics—and attention given almost exclusively to the feelings and conduct of human life—is a point common to the opposite schools of Aristippus and Antisthenes, derived by both of them from Sokrates. Herein Plato stands apart from all the three.

The theory of Aristippus, as given above, is only derived from a meagre abstract and from a few detached hints. We do not know how he himself stated it: still less how he enforced and vindicated it.—He, as well as Antisthenes, composed dialogues: which naturally implies diversity of handling. Their main thesis, therefore—the text, as it were, upon which they debated or expatiated (which is all that the abstract gives)—affords very inadequate means, even if we could rely upon the accuracy of the statement, for appreciating their philosophical competence. We should form but a poor idea of the acute, abundant, elastic and diversified dialectic of Plato, if all his dialogues had been lost—and if we had nothing to rely upon except the summary of Platonism prepared by Diogenes Laertius: which summary, nevertheless, is more copious and elaborate than the same author has furnished either of Aristippus or Antisthenes.

In the history of the Greek mind these two last-mentioned philosophers (though included by Cicero among the *plebeii philosophi*) are not less important than Plato and Aristotle. The speculations and precepts of Antisthenes passed, with various enlargements and modifications, into the Stoic philosophy: those of

Doctrines of Antisthenes and Aristippus passed to the Stoics and Epicureans.

¹ Diog. L. II. p. 92. Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vi. 53.

Aristippus into the Epikurean : the two most widely extended ethical sects in the subsequent Pagan world.—The Cynic sect, as it stood before it embraced the enlarged physical, kosmical, and social theories of Zeno and his contemporaries, reducing to a minimum all the desires and appetites—cultivating insensibility to the pains of life, and even disdainful insensibility to its pleasures—required extraordinary force of will and obstinate resolution, but little beyond. Where there was no selection or discrimination, the most ordinary prudence sufficed. It was otherwise with the scheme of Aristippus and the Kyrenaics : which, if it tasked less severely the powers of endurance, demanded a far higher measure of intelligent prudence. Selection of that which might safely be enjoyed, and determination of the limit within which enjoyment must be confined, were constantly indispensable. Prudence, knowledge, the art of mensuration or calculation, were essential to Aristippus, and ought to be put in the foreground when his theory is stated.

That theory is, in point of fact, identical with the theory expounded by the Platonic Sokrates in Plato's Protagoras. The general features of both are the same. Sokrates there lays it down explicitly, that pleasure *per se* is always good, and pain *per se* always evil : that there is no other good (*per se*) except pleasure and diminution of pain—no other evil (*per se*) except pain and diminution of pleasure : that there is no other object in life except to live through it as much as possible with pleasures and without pains ;¹ but that many pleasures become evil, because they cannot be had without depriving us of greater pleasures or imposing upon us greater pains—while many pains become good, because they prevent greater pains or ensure greater pleasures : that the safety of life thus lies in a correct comparison of the more or less in pleasures and pains, and in a selection founded thereupon. In other words, the safety of life

Ethical theory of Aristippus is identical with that of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras.

¹ Plato, Protag. p. 355 A. ἡ ἀρεὴ ὅμιν τὸ ἥδαι καταβῆναι τὸν βίον ἀνευ λυπῶν ; εἰ δὲ ἀρεὴ, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴδὲν ἕλλο φάναι εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ὃ μὴ εἰς ταῦτα τελευτᾷ, τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούειν.

The exposition of this theory, by the Platonic Sokrates, occupies the latter portion of the Protagoras, from p. 351 to

near the conclusion. See below, ch. xxiii. of the present work.

The language held by Aristippus to Sokrates, in the Xenophontic dialogue (Memor. ii. l. 9), is exactly similar to that of the Platonic Sokrates, as above cited—ἐμαυτὸν τάττω εἰς τοὺς βουλομένους ἢ ῥησά τε καὶ ῥῆστα βιοτεύειν.

depends upon calculating knowledge or prudence, the art or science of measuring.

The theory here laid down by the Platonic Sokrates is the same as that of Aristippus. The purpose of life is stated almost in the same words by both : by the Platonic Sokrates, and by Aristippus in the Xenophontic dialogue—"to live through with enjoyment and without suffering". The Platonic Sokrates denies, quite as emphatically as Aristippus, any good or evil, honourable or base, except as representing the result of an intelligent comparison of pleasures and pains. Judicious calculation is postulated by both : pleasures and pains being assumed by both as the only ends of pursuit and avoidance, to which calculation is to be applied. The main difference is, that the prudence, art, or science, required for making this calculation rightly, are put forward by the Platonic Sokrates as the prominent item in his provision for passing through life : whereas, in the scheme of Aristippus, as far as we know it, such accomplished intelligence, though equally recognised and implied, is not equally thrust into the foreground. So it appears at least in the abstract which we possess of his theory ; if we had his own exposition of it, perhaps we might find the case otherwise. In that abstract, indeed, we find the writer replying to those who affirmed prudence or knowledge to be good *per se*—and maintaining that it is only good by reason of its consequences :¹ that is, that it is not good as End, in the same sense in which pleasure or mitigation of pain are good. This point of the theory, however, coincides again with the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras : where the art of calculation is extolled simply as an indispensable condition to the most precious results of human happiness.

What I say here applies especially to the Protagoras : for I am well aware that in other dialogues the Platonic Sokrates is made to hold different language.² But in the Protagoras he

¹ *Diog. L. li. p. 91.*

² See chapters xxiii., xxix., xxxii. of the present work, in which I enter more fully into the differences between the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Philébus, in respect to this point.

Aristippus agrees with the Platonic

Sokrates in the Protagoras, as to the general theory of life respecting pleasure and pain.

He agrees with the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias (see pp. 600-615), in keeping aloof from active political life. ἀσθενὲς ἀφαιρῶν, καὶ οὐ πολὺν χρόνον

defends a theory the same as that of Aristippus, and defends it by an elaborate argument which silences the objections of the Sophist Protagoras ; who at first will not admit the unqualified identity of the pleasurable, judiciously estimated and selected, with the good. The general and comprehensive manner in which Plato conceives and expounds the theory, is probably one evidence of his superior philosophical aptitude as compared with Aristippus and his other contemporaries. He enunciates, side by side, and with equal distinctness, the two conditions requisite for his theory of life. 1. The calculating or measuring art. 2. A description of the items to which alone such measurement must be applied—pleasures and pains.—These two together make the full theory. In other dialogues Plato insists equally upon the necessity of knowledge or calculating prudence : but then he is not equally distinct in specifying the items to which such prudence or calculation is to be applied. On the other hand, it is quite possible that Aristippus, in laying out the same theory, may have dwelt with peculiar emphasis upon the other element in the theory : i.e. that while expressly insisting upon pleasures and pains, as the only data to be compared, he may have tacitly assumed the comparing or calculating intelligence, as if it were understood by itself, and did not require to be formally proclaimed.

A distinction must here be made between the general theory of life laid down by Aristippus—and the particular application which he made of that theory to his own course of proceeding. What we may observe is, that the Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras) agrees in the first, or general theory : whether he would have agreed in the second (or application to the particular case) we are not informed, but we may probably assume the negative. And we find Sokrates (in the Xenophontic dialogue) taking the same negative ground against Aristippus—upon the second point, not upon the first. He seeks to prove that the course of conduct adopted by Aristippus, instead of carrying with it a pre-

Distinction to be made between a general theory—and the particular application of it made by the theorist to his own tastes and circumstances.

καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ—which Sokrates, in the Gorgias (p. 526 C), proclaims as the conduct of the true philosopher, is proclaimed with equal emphasis by Aristippus. Compare the Platonic Apology, p. 31 D-E.

ponderance of pleasure, will entail a preponderance of pain. He does not dispute the general theory.

Though Aristippus and the Kyrenaic sect are recognised as the first persons who laid down this general theory, yet various others apart from them adopted it likewise. We may see this not merely from the Protagoras of Plato, but also from the fact that Aristotle, when commenting upon the theory in his *Ethica*,¹ cites Eudoxus (eminent both as mathematician and astronomer, besides being among the hearers of Plato) as its principal champion. Still the school of Kyréné are recorded as a continuous body, partly defending, partly modifying the theory of Aristippus.² Hegesias, Annikeris, and Theodôrus are the principal Kyrenaics named: the last of them contemporary with Ptolemy Soter, Lysimachus, Epikurus, Theophrastus, and Stilpon.

Diogenes Laërtius had read a powerfully written book of Theodôrus, controverting openly the received opinions respecting the Gods:—which few of the philosophers ventured to do. Cicero also mentions a composition of Hegesias.³ Of Annikeris we know none; but he, too, probably, must have been an author. The doctrines which we find ascribed to these Kyrenaics evince how much affinity there was, at bottom, between them and the Cynics, in spite of the great apparent opposition. Hegesias received the surname of the Death-Persuader: he considered happiness to be quite unattainable, and death to be an object not of fear, but of welcome acceptance, in the eyes of a wise man. He started from the same basis as Aristippus: pleasure as the *expetendum*, pain as the *fugendum*, to which all our personal friendships and aversions were ultimately referable. But he considered that the pains of life preponderated over the pleasures, even under the

¹ Aristot. *Eth. Nicom.* x. 2.

² Sydenham, in his notes on Philébus (note 39, p. 76), accuses Aristippus and the Kyrenaics of prevarication and sophistry in the statement of their doctrine respecting Pleasure. He says that they called it indiscriminately *ἀγαθόν* and *καλάδόν*—(a good—The Good)—“they used the fallacy of changing a particular term for a term which is universal, or vice versa, by the sly omission or insertion of the

definite article *The* before the word Good” (p. 73). He contrasts with this prevarication the ingenuousness of Eudoxus, as the advocate of Pleasure (Aristot. *Eth. N.* x. 2). I know no evidence for either of these allegations: either for the prevarication of Aristippus or the ingenuousness of Eudoxus.

³ Diog. L. ii. 97. *Θεόδοτος—πρωτότατος ἀνακρίων τὰς περὶ θεῶν δόξας.* Diog. L. ii. 86, 97. Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 34, 83-84. *Ἡγέσιος δὲ περὶ θανάτου.*

most favourable circumstances. For conferring pleasure, or for securing continuance of pleasure—wealth, high birth, freedom, glory, were of no greater avail than their contraries poverty, low birth, slavery, ignominy. There was nothing which was, by nature or universally, either pleasurable or painful. Novelty, rarity, satiety, rendered one thing pleasurable, another painful, to different persons and at different times. The wise man would show his wisdom, not in the fruitless struggle for pleasures, but in the avoidance or mitigation of pains: which he would accomplish more successfully by rendering himself indifferent to the causes of pleasure. He would act always for his own account, and would value himself higher than other persons: but he would at the same time reflect that the mistakes of these others were involuntary, and he would give them indulgent counsel, instead of hating them. He would not trust his senses as affording any real knowledge: but he would be satisfied to act upon the probable appearances of sense, or upon phenomenal knowledge.¹

Such is the summary which we read of the doctrines of Hegesias: who is said to have enforced his views,²—of the real character of life, as containing a great preponderance of misfortune and suffering—in a manner so persuasive, that several persons were induced to commit suicide. Hence he was prohibited by the first Ptolemy from lecturing in such a strain. His opinions respecting life coincide in the main with those set forth by Sokrates in the *Phædon* of Plato: which dialogue also is alleged to have operated so powerfully on the Platonic disciple Kleombrotus, that he was induced to terminate his own existence. Hegesias, agreeing with Aristippus that pleasure would be the Good, if you could get it—maintains that the circumstances of life are such as to render pleasure unattainable: and therefore advises to renounce pleasure at once and systematically, in order that we may turn our attention to the only practicable end—that of lessening pain. Such deliberate renunciation of pleasure brings him into harmony with the doctrine of the Cynics.

Hegesias—
Low estimation
of life—
renunciation
of pleasure—
coincidence
with
the Cynics.

¹ Diog. L. H. 93, 94.

² Compare the Pseudo-Platonic dialogue entitled *Axiochus*, pp. 366, 367,

and the doctrine of Kleanthes in Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathemat. ix. 88-92. Lucretius, v. 196-234.

On another point, however, Hegesias repeats just the same doctrine as Aristippus. Both deny any thing like absolute knowledge: they maintain that all our knowledge is phenomenal, or relative to our own impressions or affections: that we neither do know, nor can know, anything about any real or supposed ultra-phenomenal object, i.e., things in themselves, as distinguished from our own impressions and apart from our senses and other capacities. Having no writings of Aristippus left, we know this doctrine only as it is presented by others, and those too opponents. We cannot tell whether Aristippus or his supporters stated their own doctrine in such a way as to be open to the objections which we read as urged by opponents. But the doctrine itself is not, in my judgment, refuted by any of those objections. "Our affections (*πάθη*) alone are known to us, but not the supposed objects or causes from which they proceed." The word rendered by *affections* must here be taken in its most general and comprehensive sense—as including not merely sensations, but also remembrances, emotions, judgments, beliefs, doubts, volitions, conscious energies, &c. Whatever we know, we can know only as it appears to, or implicates itself somehow with, our own minds. All the knowledge which I possess, is an aggregate of propositions affirming facts, and the order or conjunction of facts, as they are, or have been, or may be, relative to myself. This doctrine of Aristippus is in substance the same as that which Protagoras announced in other words as—"Man is the measure of all things". I have already explained and illustrated it, at considerable length, in my chapter on the Platonic Theætétus, where it is announced by Theætetus and controverted by Sokrates.¹

¹ See below, vol. III. ch. xxviii. Compare Aristokles ap. Eusebium, *Præp. Ev.* xiv. 18, 19, and Sextus *Emp. adv. Mathemat.* vii. 190-197, vi. 53.

Sextus gives a summary of this doctrine of the Kyrenaics, more fair and complete than that given by Aristokles—at least so far as the extract from the latter in Eusebius enables us to judge. Aristokles impugns it vehemently, and tries to fasten upon it many absurd consequences—in my judgment without foundation. It is probable that by

the term *πάθη* the Kyrenaics meant simply sensations internal and external: and that the question, as they handled it, was about the reality of the supposed Substratum or Object of sense, independent of any sentient Subject. It is also probable that, in explaining their views, they did not take account of the memory of past sensations—and the expectation of future sensations, in successions or conjunctions more or less similar—associating in the mind with the sensation present and actual, to

form what is called a permanent object of sense. I think it likely that they set forth their own doctrine in a narrow and inadequate manner.

But this defect is noway corrected by Aristokles their opponent. On the contrary, he attacks them on their strong side: he vindicates against them the hypothesis of the ultra phenomenal, absolute, transcendental Object, independent of and apart from any sensation, present, past, or future—and from any sentient Subject. Besides that, he assumes them to deny, or ignore, many points which their theory noway requires them to deny. He urges one argument which, when properly understood, goes not against them, but strongly in their favour. "If these philosophers," says Aristokles (Eus. xiv. 19, 1), "know that they experience sensation and perceive, they must know something beyond the sensation itself. If I say *ἐγὼ καίνομαι*, 'I am being burned,' this is a proposition, not a sensation. These three things are of necessity co-essential—the sensation itself, the Object which causes it, the Subject which feels it (*ἀνάγκη γὰρ τρία ταῦτα συνυφίστασθαι—τὸ καὶ τὸ πάθος αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχον*)." In trying to make good his conclusion—That you cannot know the sensation without the Object of sense—Aristokles at the same time asserts that the Object cannot be known apart from the sensation, nor apart from the knowing Subject. He asserts that the three are

by necessity co-essential—i.e. implicated and indivisible in substance and existence: if distinguishable therefore, distinguishable only logically (*λόγῳ χωριστά*), admitting of being looked at in different points of view. But this is exactly the case of his opponents, when properly stated. They do not deny Object: they do not deny Subject: but they deny the independent and separate existence of the one as well as of the other: they admit the two only as relative to each other, or as reciprocally implicated in the indivisible fact of cognition. The reasoning of Aristokles thus goes to prove the opinion which he is trying to refute. Most of the arguments, which Sextus adduces in favour of the Kyrenaic doctrine, show forcibly that the Objective Something, apart from its Subjective correlate, is unknowable and a non-entity; but he does not include in the Subjective as much as ought to be included; he takes note only of the present sensation, and does not include sensations remembered or anticipated. Another very forcible part of Sextus's reasoning may be found, vii. sect. 269-272, where he shows that a logical Subject *per se* is undefinable and inconceivable—that those who attempt to define Man (e.g.) do so by specifying more or fewer of the predicates of Man—and that if you suppose all the predicates to vanish, the Subject vanishes along with them.

CHAPTER IV.

XENOPHON.

THERE remains one other companion of Sokrates, for whom a dignified place must be reserved in this volume—Xenophon the son of Gryllus. It is to him that we owe, in great part, such knowledge as we possess of the real Sokrates. For the Sokratic conversations related by Xenophon, though doubtless dressed up and expanded by him, appear to me reports in the main of what Sokrates actually said. Xenophon was sparing in the introduction of his master as titular spokesman for opinions, theories, or controversial difficulties, generated in his own mind : a practice in which Plato indulged without any reserve, as we have seen by the numerous dialogues already passed in review.

Xenophon—his character—essentially a man of action and not a theorist—the Sokratic element is in him an accessory.

I shall not however give any complete analysis of Xenophon's works : because both the greater part of them, and the leading features of his personal character, belong rather to active than to speculative Hellenic life. As such, I have dealt with them largely in my History of Greece. What I have here to illustrate is the Sokratic element in his character, which is important indeed as accessory and modifying—yet not fundamental. Though he exemplifies and attests, as a witness, the theorising negative vein, the cross-examining Elenchus of Sokrates—it is the preceptorial vein which he appropriates to himself and expands in its bearing on practical conduct. He is the semi-philosophising general ; undervalued indeed as a hybrid by Plato—but by high-minded Romans like Cato, Agricola, Helvidius Priscus, &c.

likely to be esteemed higher than Plato himself.¹ He is the military brother of the Sokratic family, distinguished for ability and energy in the responsible functions of command: a man of robust frame, courage, and presence of mind, who affronts cheerfully the danger and fatigues of soldiership, and who extracts philosophy from experience of the variable temper of armies, together with the multiplied difficulties and precarious authority of a Grecian general.² For our knowledge, imperfect as it is, of real Grecian life, we are greatly indebted to his works. All historians of Greece must draw largely from his *Hellenica* and *Anabasis*: and we learn much even from his other productions, not properly historical; for he never soars high in the region of ideality, nor grasps at ethereal visions—"nubes et inania"—like Plato.

Respecting the personal history of Xenophon himself, we possess but little information: nor do we know the year either of his birth or death. His *Hellenica* concludes with the battle of Mantinea in 362 B.C. But he makes incidental mention in that work of an event five years later—the assassination of Alexander, despot of Phæræ, which took place in 357 B.C.³—and his language seems to imply that the event was described shortly after it took place. His pamphlet *De Vectigalibus* appears to have been composed still later—not before 355 B.C. In the year 400 B.C., when Xenophon joined the Grecian military force assembled at Sardis to accompany Cyrus the younger in his march to Babylon, he must have been still a young man: yet he had even then established an intimacy with Sokrates at Athens: and he was old enough to call himself the "ancient guest" of the Boeotian Proxenus, who engaged him to come and take service with Cyrus.⁴

¹ See below, my remarks on the Platonic *Euthydēmus*, vol. II. chap. xxi.

² We may apply to Plato and Xenophon the following comparison by Euripides, *Supplices*, 905. (Tydeus and Melæger.)

γνώμη δ' ἀδελφοῦ Μελεάγρου λελεῖ-
μένης,
ἴσον παρίσχευε δόγμα διὰ τέχνην δορός,
εὐρὺν ἀκριβῆ μυσσικὴν ἐν ἀσπίδι·
φιλότιμον ἦθος, πλούσιον φρόνημα δὲ
ἐν τοῖσιν ἔργοις, οὐχὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἔχων.

³ Xenoph. *Hellen.* vi. 4, 37. τῶν δὲ ταῦτα πράξαντων (i.e. of the brothers of Thèbè, which brothers had assassinated Alexander) ἔχρη οὐδὲ δὲ λόγος ἐγράφετο, Τισίφορος, πρεσβύτατος ὢν τῶν ἀδελφῶν, τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶχε.

⁴ That he was still a young man appears from his language, *Anabasis* iii. 1, 25. His intimacy with Sokrates, whose advice he asked about the propriety of accepting the invitation of Proxenus to go to Asia, is shown iii. 1, 5. Proxenus was his γένος ἀρχαῖος, iii. 1, 4.

We may suppose him to have been then about thirty years of age; and thus to have been born about 430 B.C.—two or three years earlier than Plato. Respecting his early life, we have no facts before us: but we may confidently affirm (as I have already observed about¹ Plato), that as he became liable to military service in 412 B.C., the severe pressure of the war upon Athens must have occasioned him to be largely employed, among other citizens, for the defence of his native city, until its capture in 405 B.C. He seems to have belonged to an equestrian family in the census, and therefore to have served on horseback. More than one of his compositions evinces both intelligent interest in horsemanship, and great familiarity with horses.

Our knowledge of his personal history begins with what he himself recounts in the *Anabasis*. His friend Proxenus, then at Sardis commanding a regiment of Hellenic mercenaries under Cyrus the younger, wrote recommending him earnestly to come over and take service, in the army prepared ostensibly against the Pisidians. Upon this Xenophon asked the advice of Sokrates: who exhorted him to go and consult the Delphian oracle—being apprehensive that as Cyrus had proved himself the strenuous ally of Sparta, and had furnished to her the principal means for crushing Athens, an Athenian taking service under him would incur unpopularity at home. Xenophon accordingly went to Delphi: but instead of asking the question broadly—"Shall I go, or shall I decline to go?"—he put to Apollo the narrower question—"Having in contemplation a journey, to which of the Gods must I sacrifice and pray, in order to accomplish it best, and to come back with safety and success?" Apollo indicated to him the Gods to whom he ought to address himself: but Sokrates was displeased with him for not having first asked, whether he ought to go at all. Nevertheless (continued Sokrates), since you have chosen to put the question in your own way you must act as the God has prescribed.²

The story mentioned by Strabo (ix. 403) that Xenophon served in the Athenian cavalry at the battle of Delium (424 B.C.), and that his life was saved by Sokrates, I consider to be not less inconsistent with any rea-

sonable chronology, than the analogous anecdote—that Plato distinguished himself at the battle of Delium. See below, ch. v.

¹ See ch. v.

² Xenoph. *Anab.* iii. 1, 4-6.

The anecdote here recounted by Xenophon is interesting, as it illustrates his sincere faith, as well as that of Sokrates, in the Delphian oracle: though we might have expected that on this occasion, Sokrates would have been favoured with some manifestation of that divine sign, which he represents to have warned him so frequently and on such trifling matters. Apollo however was perhaps displeased (as Sokrates was) with Xenophon, for not having submitted the question to him with full frankness: since the answer given was proved by subsequent experience to be incomplete.¹ After fifteen months passed, first, in the hard upward march—next, in the still harder retreat—of the Ten Thousand, to the preservation of whom he largely contributed by his energy, presence of mind, resolute initiative, and ready Athenian eloquence, as one of their leaders—Xenophon returned to Athens. It appears that he must have come back not long after the death of Sokrates. But Athens was not at that time a pleasant residence for him. The Sokratic companions shared in the unpopularity of their deceased master, and many of them were absent: moreover Xenophon himself was unpopular as the active partisan of Cyrus. After a certain stay, we know not how long, at Athens, Xenophon appears to have gone back to Asia; and to have resumed his command of the remaining Cyreian soldiers, then serving under the Lacedæmonian generals against the Persian satraps Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus. He served first under Derkyllidas, next under Agesilaus. For the latter he conceived the warmest admiration, and contracted with him an intimate friendship. At the time when Xenophon rejoined the Cyreians in Asia, Athens was not at war with the Lacedæmonians: but after some time, the hostile confederacy of Athens, Thebes, and Corinth, against them was organised: and Agesilaus was summoned home by them from Asia, to fight their battles in

His service and command with the Ten Thousand Greeks; afterwards under Agesilaus and the Spartans.—He is banished from Athens.

¹ Compare *Anab.* vi. 1, 22, and vii. 8, 1-6.

See also Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 33 C, and Plato, *Theages*, p. 129; also below, vol. II. ch. xv.

Sokrates and Xenophon are among the most imposing witnesses cited by Quintus Cicero, in his long pleading

to show the reality of divination (*Cicero, De Divinatione*, i. 25, 52, i. 54, 122). Antipater the Stoic collected a large number of examples, illustrating the miraculous divining power of Sokrates. Several of these examples appear much more trifling than this incident of Xenophon.

Greece. Xenophon and his Cyreians were still a portion of the army of Agesilaus, and accompanied him in his march into Bœotia; where they took part in his desperate battle and bloody victory at Koroneia.¹ But he was now lending active aid to the enemies of Athens, and holding conspicuous command in their armies. A sentence of banishment, on the ground of Laconism, was passed against him by the Athenians, on the proposition of Eubulus.²

How long he served with Agesilaus, we are not told. At the end of his service, the Lacedæmonians provided him with a house and land at the Triphylian town of Skillus near Olympia. Skillus near Olympia, which they had seemingly taken from the Eleians and re-colonised. Near Skillus residence he also purchased, under the authority of the God (perhaps Olympian Zeus) a landed estate to be consecrated to the Goddess Artemis: employing therein a portion of the tithe of plunder devoted to Artemis by the Cyreian army, and deposited by him for the time in the care of Megabyzus, priest of Artemis at Ephesus. The estate of the Goddess contained some cultivated ground, but consisted chiefly of pasture; with wild ground, wood and mountain, abounding in game and favourable for hunting. Xenophon became Conservator of this property for Artemis: to whom he dedicated a shrine and a statue, in miniature copy of the great temple at Ephesus. Every year he held a formal hunting-match, to which he invited all the neighbours, with abundant hospitality, at the expense of the Goddess. The Conservator and his successors were bound by formal vow, on pain of her displeasure, to employ one tenth of the whole annual produce in sacrifices to her: and to keep the shrine and statue in good order, out of the remainder.³

Xenophon seems to have passed many years of his life either at Skillus or in other parts of Peloponnesus, and is said to have died very old at Corinth. The sentence of banishment passed

¹ Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 6; Plutarch, Agesilaus, c. 18.

² Diog. L. ii. 51-59. ἐπὶ Λακωνισμῷ φύγην ὅτι Ἀθηναίων καταγνώσθη.

³ Xenoph. Anab. v. 3, 8-12; Diog. L. ii. 52; Pausanias, v. 6, 3.

φύσει δ' ὁ Δεινάρχος ὅτι καὶ οἰκίαν καὶ

ἀγρον αὐτῷ ἰδοσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι.

Deinarchus appears to have composed for a client at Athens a judicial speech against Xenophon, the grandson of Xenophon Sokraticus. He introduced into the speech some facts relating to the grandfather.

against him by the Athenians was revoked after the battle of Leuktra, when Athens came into alliance with the Lacedæmonians against Thebes. Some of Xenophon's later works indicate that he must have availed himself of this revocation to visit Athens: but whether he permanently resided there is uncertain. He had brought over with him from Asia a wife named Philesia, by whom he had two sons, Gryllus and Diodorus.¹ He sent these two youths to be trained at Sparta, under the countenance of Agesilaus:² afterwards the eldest of them, Gryllus, served with honour in the Athenian cavalry which assisted the Lacedæmonians and Mantineians against Epameinondas, B.C. 362. In the important combat³ of the Athenian and Theban cavalry, close to the gates of Mantinea—shortly preceding the general battle of Mantinea, in which Epameinondas was slain—Gryllus fell, fighting with great bravery. The death of this gallant youth—himself seemingly of great promise, and the son of so eminent a father—was celebrated by Isokrates and several other rhetors, as well as by the painter Euphranor at Athens, and by sculptors at Mantinea itself.⁴

Family of
Xenophon—
his son Gryl-
lus killed at
Mantineia.

Skillus, the place in which the Lacedæmonians had established Xenophon, was retaken by the Eleians during the humiliation of Lacedæmonian power, not long before the battle of Mantinea. Xenophon himself was absent at the time; but his family were constrained to retire to Lepreum. It was after this, we are told, that he removed to Corinth, where he died in 355 B.C. or in some year later. The Eleian Exegetæ told the traveller Pausanias,

Death of
Xenophon
at Corinth—
Story of
the Kleian
Exegetæ.

¹ *Æschines* Sokraticus, in one of his dialogues, introduced *Aspasia* conversing with Xenophon and his (Xenophon's) wife. *Cicero*, *De Invent.* i. 21, 51-54; *Quintil.* *Inst. Orat.* v. p. 312.

² *Plutarch*, *Agesilaus*, c. 20.

³ *Xenoph.* *Hellen.* vii. 5, 15-16-17. This combat of cavalry near the gates of Mantinea was very close and sharply contested; but at the great battle fought a few days afterwards the Athenian cavalry were hardly at all engaged, vii. 5, 25.

⁴ *Pausanias*, i. 3, 3, viii. 11, 4, ix. 15, 3; *Diogenes L.* ii. 54. *Harpokratron* v. *Κρυλλόεστος*.

It appears that Euphranor, in his picture represented Gryllus as engaged in personal conflict with Epameinondas and wounding him—a compliment not justified by the facts. The Mantineians believed Antikrates, one of their own citizens, to have mortally wounded the great Theban general with his spear, and they awarded to him as recompense immunity from public burthens (*ἀντίλευον*), both for himself and his descendants. One of his descendants, Kallikrates, continued even in Plutarch's time to enjoy this immunity. *Plutarch*, *Agesilaus*, c. 35.

when he visited the spot five centuries afterwards, that Xenophon had been condemned in the judicial Council of Olympia as wrongful occupant of the property at Skillus, through Lacedæmonian violence; but that the Eleians had granted him indulgence, and had allowed him to remain.¹ As it seems clearly asserted that he died at Corinth, he can hardly have availed himself of the indulgence; and I incline to suspect that the statement is an invention of subsequent Eleian Exegetæ, after they had learnt to appreciate his literary eminence.

From the brief outline thus presented of Xenophon's life, it will plainly appear that he was quite different in character and habits from Plato and the other Sokratic brethren. He was not only a man of the world (as indeed Aristippus was also), but he was actively engaged in the most responsible and difficult functions of military command: he was moreover a landed proprietor and cultivator, fond of strong exercise with dogs and horses, and an intelligent equestrian. His circumstances were sufficiently easy to dispense with the necessity of either composing discourses or taking pupils for money. Being thus enabled to prosecute letters and philosophy in an independent way, he did not, like Plato and Aristotle, open a school.² His relations, as active coadjutor and subordinate, with Agesilaus, form a striking contrast to those of Plato with Dionysius, as tutor and pedagogue. In his mind, the Sokratic conversations, suggestive and stimulating to every one, fell upon the dispositions and aptitudes of a citizen-soldier, and fructified in a peculiar manner. My present work deals with Xenophon, not as an historian of Grecian affairs or of the Cyreian expedition, but only on the intellectual and theorising side:—as author of the *Memorabilia*,

¹ Pausan. v. 6, 3; Dicg. L. ii. 53-56.

² See, in the account of Theopompus by Photius (Cod. 176, p. 120; compare also Photius, Cod. 159, p. 102, a. 41), the distinction taken by Theopompus: who said that the four most celebrated literary persons of his day were, his master Isokrates, Theodoktēs of Phaselis, Naukrates of Erythræ, and himself (Theopompus). He himself and Naukrates were in good circumstances,

so that he passed his life in independent prosecution of philosophy and philomathy. But Isokrates and Theodoktēs were compelled δι' ἀπορίαν βίου, μισθοῦ λόγους γράφειν καὶ σφιστευεῖν, ἐκπαιδεύοντες τοὺς νέους; κακίθην καρπομένους τὰς ὑφελείας.

Theopompus does not here present the profession of a Sophist (as most Platonic commentators teach us to regard it) as a mean, unprincipled, and corrupting employment.

the *Cycropædia*, *Œkonomikus*, *Symposiôn*, *Hieron*, *De Vectigalibus*, &c.

The *Memorabilia* were composed as records of the conversations of Sokrates, expressly intended to vindicate Sokrates against charges of impiety and of corrupting youthful minds, and to show that he inculcated, before every thing, self-denial, moderation of desires, reverence for parents, and worship of the Gods. The *Œkonomikus* and the *Symposion* are expansions of the *Memorabilia*: the first¹ exhibiting Sokrates not only as an attentive observer of the facts of active life (in which character the *Memorabilia* present him also), but even as a learner of husbandry² and family management from *Ischomachus*—the last describing Sokrates and his behaviour amidst the fun and joviality of a convivial company. Sokrates declares³ that as to himself, though poor, he is quite as rich as he desires to be; that he desires no increase, and regards poverty as no disadvantage. Yet since *Kritobulus*, though rich, is beset with temptations to expense quite sufficient to embarrass him, good proprietary management is to him a necessity. Accordingly, Sokrates, announcing that he has always been careful to inform himself who were the best economists in the city,⁴ now cites as authority *Ischomachus*, a citizen of wealth and high position, recognised by all as one of the "super-excellent".⁵ *Ischomachus* loves wealth, and is anxious to maintain and even enlarge his property: desiring to spend magnificently for the honour of the Gods, the assistance of friends, and the support of the city.⁶ His whole life is arranged, with intelligence and

His various works—*Memorabilia*, *Œkonomikus*, &c.

¹ Galen calls the *Œkonomikus* the last book of the *Memorabilia* (ad Hippokrat. De Articulis, t. xviii. p. 301, Kühn). It professes to be repeated by Xenophon from what he himself heard Sokrates say—*ἤκουσα δὲ ποτὲ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ οἰκονομίας τοιούτῳ διαλεγόμενον*, &c. Sokrates first instructs *Kritobulus* that economy, or management of property, is an art, governed by rules, and dependent upon principles; next, he recounts to him the lessons which he professes to have himself received from *Ischomachus*.

I have already adverted to the Xenophonic *Symposion* as containing jocular remarks which some erroneously cite as serious.

² To learn in this way the actualities

of life, and the way of extracting the greatest amount of wheat and barley from a given piece of land, is the sense which Xenophon puts on the word φιλόσοφος (Xen. Œk. xvi. 9; compare *Cycropædia*, vi. 1, 41).

³ Xenoph. Œkonom. ii. 3; xi. 3, 4.

I have made some observations on the Xenophonic *Symposion*, comparing it with the Platonic *Symposion*, in a subsequent chapter of this work, ch. xxvi.

⁴ Xen. Œkon. ii. 16.

⁵ Xen. Œkon. vi. 17, xi. 3. πρὸς πάντων καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, καὶ ξένων καὶ δούλων, καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἐπινομαζόμενον.

⁶ Xen. Œkon. xi. 9.

forethought, so as to attain this object, and at the same time to keep up the maximum of bodily health and vigour, especially among the horsemen of the city as an accomplished rider¹ and cavalry soldier. He speaks with respect, and almost with enthusiasm, of husbandry, as an occupation not merely profitable, but improving to the character: though he treats with disrespect other branches of industry and craft.² In regard to husbandry, too, as in regard to war or steersmanship, he affirms that the difference between one practitioner and another consists, not so much in unequal knowledge, as in unequal care to practise what both of them know.³

Ischomachus describes to Sokrates, in reply to a string of successive questions, both his scheme of life and his scheme of husbandry. He had married his wife before she was fifteen years of age: having first ascertained that she had been brought up carefully, so as to have seen and heard as little as possible, and to know nothing but spinning and weaving.⁴ He describes how he took this very young wife into training, so as to form her to the habits which he himself approved. He declares that the duties and functions of women are confined to in-door work and superintendence, while the outdoor proceedings, acquisition as well as defence, belong to men:⁵ he insists upon such separation of functions emphatically, as an ordinance of nature—holding an opinion the direct reverse of that which we have seen expressed by Plato.⁶ He makes many remarks on the arrangements of the house, and of the stores within it: and he dwells particularly on the management of servants, male and female.

¹ Xen. Œkon. xi. 17-21. *ἐν τοῖς ἱππικωτάτοις τε καὶ πλουσιωτάτοις.*

² Xen. Œkon. iv. 2-3, vi. 5-7. Ischomachus asserts that his father had been more devoted to agriculture (*φιλοαγρογύστατος*) than any man at Athens; that he had bought several pieces of land (*χῆρον*) when out of order, improved them, and then resold them with very large profit, xx. 26.

³ Xen. Œkon. xi. 2-10.

⁴ Xen. Œkon. vii. 3-7. *τὸν δ' ἐμπροσθεν χρόνον ἐξῆ ὑπὸ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ὅπως ὥς ἐλάχιστα μὲν ὄψοιτο,*

ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἀκούσειτο, ἐλάχιστα δὲ ἔροιτο.

The *διδασκαλία* addressed to Sokrates by Ischomachus is in the form of *ἐρώτησις*, xix. 15. The Sokratic interrogation is here brought to bear upon Sokrates, instead of by Sokrates; like the *Klenchus* in the *Parmenides* of Plato.

⁵ Xen. Œkon. vii. 23-32.

⁶ See below, ch. xxxvii.

Compare also *Aristotel. Politic. iii. 4*, 1277, b. 25, where Aristotle lays down the same principle as Xenophon.

It is upon this last point that he lays more stress than upon any other. To know how to command men—is the first of all accomplishments in the mind of Xenophon. Ischomachus proclaims it as essential that the superior shall not merely give orders to his subordinates, but also see them executed, and set the example of personal active watchfulness in every way. Xenophon aims at securing not simply obedience, but cheerful and willing obedience—even attachment from those who obey. “To exercise command over willing subjects”¹ (he says) “is a good more than human, granted only to men truly consummated in virtue of character essentially divine. To exercise command over unwilling subjects, is a torment like that of Tantalus.”

Text upon which Xenophon insists—capital difference between command over subordinates willing, and subordinates unwilling.

The sentence just transcribed (the last sentence in the *Œkonomikos*) brings to our notice a central focus in Xenophon's mind, from whence many of his most valuable speculations emanate. “What are the conditions under which subordinates will cheerfully obey their commanders?”—was a problem forced upon his thoughts by his own personal experience, as well as by contemporary phenomena in Hellas. He had been elected one of the generals of the Ten Thousand: a large body of brave warriors from different cities, most of them unknown to him personally, and inviting his authority only because they were in extreme peril, and because no one else took the initiative.² He discharged his duties admirably: and his ready eloquence was an invaluable accomplishment, distinguishing him from all his colleagues. Nevertheless when the army arrived at the Euxine, out of the reach of urgent peril, he was made to feel sensibly the vexations of authority resting upon such precarious basis, and perpetually traversed by jealous rivals. Moreover, Xenophon, be-

Probable circumstances generating these reflections in Xenophon's mind.

¹ Xen. *Œkon.* xxi. 10-12. ἥθους βασιλικού—θεῖον γενέσθαι. Οὐ γὰρ πάντῃ μοι δοκεῖ ὅλον τοῦτ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπινον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ θεῖον, τὸ ἐθελοῦντων ἀρχεῖν· σαφὲς δὲ δίδωται τοῖς ἀληθινῶς συμφροσύνῃ τετελεσμένοις. Τὸ δὲ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν διδάσκειν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐς ἂν ἡγῶνται ἀξίους εἶναι βιοτείνεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὁ Τάνταλος

ἐν ᾧδον λέγεται. Compare also iv. 19, xiii. 3-7.

² The reader will find in my ‘History of Greece,’ ch. 70, p. 103 seq., a narrative of the circumstances under which Xenophon was first chosen to command, as well as his conduct afterwards.

sides his own personal experience, had witnessed violent political changes running extensively through the cities of the Grecian world: first, at the close of the Peloponnesian war—next, after the battle of Knidus—again, under Lacedæmonian supremacy, after the peace of Antalkidas, and the subsequent seizure of the citadel of Thebes—lastly, after the Thebans had regained their freedom and humbled the Lacedæmonians by the battle of Leuktra. To Xenophon—partly actor, partly spectator—these political revolutions were matters of anxious interest; especially as he ardently sympathised with Agesilaus, a political partisan interested in most of them, either as conservative or revolutionary.

We thus see, from the personal history of Xenophon, how his attention came to be peculiarly turned to the difficulty of ensuring steady obedience from subordinates, and to the conditions by which such difficulty might be overcome. The sentence, above transcribed from the *Œkonomikus*, embodies two texts upon which he has discoursed in two of his most interesting compositions—*Cyropædia* and *Hieron*. In *Cyropædia* he explains and exemplifies the divine gift of ruling over cheerful subordinates: in *Hieron*, the torment of governing the disaffected and refractory. For neither of these purposes would the name and person of Sokrates have been suitable, exclusively connected as they were with Athens. Accordingly Xenophon, having carried that respected name through the *Œkonomikus* and *Symposium*, now dismisses it, yet retaining still the familiar and colloquial manner which belonged to Sokrates. The Epilogue, or concluding chapter, of the *Cyropædia*, must unquestionably have been composed after 364 B.C.—in the last ten years of Xenophon's life: the main body of it may perhaps have been composed earlier.

The *Hieron* gives no indication of date: but as a picture purely Hellenic, it deserves precedence over the *Cyropædia*, and conveys to my mind the impression of having been written earlier. It describes a supposed conversation (probably suggested by current traditional conversations, like that between Solon and Kræsus) between the poet Simonides and Hieron the despot of Syracuse; who, shortly after the Persian invasion of Greece by Xerxes, had succeeded his

This text
affords subjects for the
Hieron and
Cyropædia.
—Name of
Sokrates
not suitable.

Hieron—
Persons of
the dialogue
—Simonides
and Hieron.

brother Gelon the former despot.¹ Both of them had been once private citizens, of no remarkable consequence : but Gelon, an energetic and ambitious military man, having raised himself to power in the service of Hippokrates despot of Gela, had seized the sceptre on the death of his master : after which he conquered Syracuse, and acquired a formidable dominion, enjoyed after his death by his brother Hieron. This last was a great patron of eminent poets—Pindar, Simonides, Æschylus, Bacchylides : but he laboured under a painful internal complaint, and appears to have been of an irritable and oppressive temper.²

Simonides asks of Hieron, who had personally tried both the life of a private citizen and that of a despot, which of the two he considered preferable, in regard to pleasures and pains. Upon this subject, a conversation of some length ensues, in which Hieron declares that the life of a despot has much more pain, and much less pleasure, than that of a private citizen under middling circumstances :³ while Simonides takes the contrary side, and insists in detail upon the superior means of enjoyment, apparent at least, possessed by the despot. As each of these means is successively brought forward, Hieron shews that however the matter may appear to the spectator, the despot feels no greater real happiness in his own bosom : while he suffers many pains and privations, of which the spectator takes no account. As to the pleasures of sight, the despot forfeits altogether the first and greatest, because it is unsafe for him to visit the public festivals and matches. In regard to hearing—many praises, and no reproach, reach his ears : but then he knows that the praises are insincere—and that reproach is unheard, only because speakers dare not express what they really feel. The despot has finer cookery and richer unguents ; but others enjoy a modest banquet

Questions
put to
Hieron ;
view taken
by Simon-
ides. An-
swer of
Hieron.

¹ Plato, Epistol. ii. p. 311 A. Aristot. Rhetor. ii. 16, 1391. a. 9 ; Cicero, Nat. Deo. i. 22, 60. How high was the opinion entertained about Simonides as a poet, may be seen illustrated in a passage of Aristophanes, Vespe, 1862.

² See the first and second Pythian Odes of Pindar, addressed to Hieron, especially Pyth. i. 55-61-90, with the Scholia and Boeckh's Commentary. Pindar compliments Hieron upon hav-

ing founded his new city of Ætna—*θεομάτῃσιν σὺν ἰλευθερίᾳ*. This does not coincide with the view of Hieron's character taken by Xenophon ; but Pindar agrees with Xenophon in exhorting Hieron to make himself popular by a liberal expenditure.

³ Xenoph. Hier. i. 8. εὖ ἴσθι, ὁ Σιμωνίδῃ, ὅτι πολὺ μῖν εὐφραίνονται οἱ τύραννοι τῶν μετρίως διαγόντων ἰδιωτῶν, πολὺ δὲ πλεῖον καὶ μείζων λυποῦνται.

as much or more—while the scent of the unguents pleases those who are near him more than himself.¹ Then as to the pleasures of love, these do not exist, except where the beloved person manifests spontaneous sympathy and return of attachment. Now the despot can never extort such return by his power; while even if it be granted freely, he cannot trust its sincerity and is compelled even to be more on his guard, since successful conspiracies against his life generally proceed from those who profess attachment to him.² The private citizen on the contrary knows that those who profess to love him, may be trusted, as having no motive for falsehood.

Still (contends Simonides) there are other pleasures greater than those of sense. You despots possess the greatest abundance and variety of possessions—the finest chariots and horses, the most splendid arms, the finest palaces, ornaments, and furniture—the most brilliant ornaments for your wives—the most intelligent and valuable servants. You execute the greatest enterprises: you can do most to benefit your friends, and hurt your enemies: you have all the proud consciousness of superior might.³—Such is the opinion of the multitude (replies Hieron), who are misled by appearances: but a wise man like you, Simonides, ought to see the reality in the background, and to recollect that happiness or unhappiness reside only in a man's internal feelings. You cannot but know that a despot lives in perpetual insecurity, both at home and abroad: that he must always go armed himself, and have armed guards around him: that whether at war or at peace, he is always alike in danger: that, while suspecting every one as an enemy, he nevertheless knows that when he has put to death the persons suspected, he has only weakened the power of the city:⁴ that he has no sincere friendship with any one: that he cannot count even upon good faith, and must cause all his food to be tasted by others, before he eats it: that whoever has slain a private citizen, is shunned in Grecian cities as an abomi-

¹ Xen. Hieron, i. 12-15-24.

² Xen. Hier. i. 26-38. Τῷ τυράννῳ οὐ ποτ' ἴσῳ πιστεῦσαι, ὡς φιλεῖται. Αἱ ἐπιβουλαὶ ἐξ οὐδέων πλείονες τοῖς τυράννοις εἰσὶν ἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μάλιστα φιλεῖν αὐτοὺς προσποιησάμενων.

This chapter affords remarkable

illustration of Grecian manners, especially in the distinction drawn between τὰ παιδικὰ ἀφροδίσια and τὰ τεκνοποία ἀφροδίσια.

³ Xen. Hier. ii. 2.

⁴ Xen. Hieron, ii. 5-17.

nation—while the tyrannicide is everywhere honoured and recompensed : that there is no safety for the despot even in his own family, many having been killed by their nearest relatives :¹ that he is compelled to rely upon mercenary foreign soldiers and liberated slaves, against the free citizens who hate him : and that the hire of such inauspicious protectors compels him to raise money, by despoiling individuals and plundering temples :² that the best and most estimable citizens are incurably hostile to him, while none but the worst will serve him for pay : that he looks back with bitter sorrow to the pleasures and confidential friendships which he enjoyed as a private man, but from which he is altogether debarred as a despot.³

Nothing brings a man so near to the Gods (rejoins Simonides) as the feeling of being honoured. Power and a brilliant position must be of inestimable value, if they are worth purchasing at the price which you describe.⁴ Otherwise, why do you not throw up your sceptre ? How happens it that no despot has ever yet done this ?—To be honoured (answers Hieron) is the greatest of earthly blessings, when a man obtains honour from the spontaneous voice of freemen. But a despot enjoys no such satisfaction. He lives like a criminal under sentence of death by every one : and it is impossible for him to lay down his power, because of the number of persons whom he has been obliged to make his enemies. He can neither endure his present condition, nor yet escape from it. The best thing he can do is to hang himself.⁵

Simonides in reply, after sympathising with Hieron's despondency, undertakes to console him by showing that such consequences do not necessarily attend despotic rule. The despot's power is an instrument

Advice to
Hieron by
Simonides
—that he

¹ Xenoph. Hieron, ii. 8, iii. 1, 5. Compare Xenophon, Hellenic. iii. 1, 14.

² Xen. Hieron, iv. 7-11.

³ Xen. Hieron, vi. 1-12.

⁴ Xen. Hieron, vii. 1-5.

⁵ Xen. Hieron, vii. 5-13. 'Ο δὲ τύραννος, ὡς ὑπὸ πάντων ἀνθρώπων κατακερμίνους δι' ἀδικίαν ἀποθνήσκειν—καὶ νύστα καὶ ἡμέραν διέγει. . . . Ἀλλ' εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ λυσitelει ἀπάγξασθαι, ἴσθι ὅτι τῷ τῶν ἄλλων ἔργῳ εὐρίσκω μάλιστα τοῦτο λυσitelοῦν ποιῆσαι. Μόνῃ γὰρ αὐτῷ

οὕτω ἔχειν, οὕτω καταβίβαι τὰ κακὰ λυσitelει.

Solon in his poems makes the remark, that for the man who once usurps the sceptre no retreat is possible. See my 'History of Greece,' chap. xi. p. 132 seq.

The impressive contrast here drawn by Hieron (c. vi.) between his condition as a despot and the past enjoyments of private life and citizenship which he has lost, reminds one of the still more sorrowful contrast in the Atys of Catullus, v. 58-70.

should govern well, and thus make himself beloved by his subjects.

available for good as well as for evil. By a proper employment of it, he may not only avoid being hated, but may even make himself beloved, beyond the measure attainable by any private citizen. Even kind words, and petty courtesies, are welcomed far more eagerly when they come from a powerful man than from an equal: moreover a showy and brilliant exterior seldom fails to fascinate the spectator.¹ But besides this, the despot may render to his city the most substantial and important services. He may punish criminals and reward meritorious men: the punishments he ought to inflict by the hands of others, while he will administer the rewards in person—giving prizes for superior excellence in every department, and thus endearing himself to all.² Such prizes would provoke a salutary competition in the performance of military duties, in choric exhibitions, in husbandry, commerce, and public usefulness of every kind. Even the foreign mercenaries, though usually odious, might be so handled and disciplined as to afford defence against foreign danger,—to ensure for the citizens undisturbed leisure in their own private affairs—to protect and befriend the honest man, and to use force only against criminals.³ If thus employed, such mercenaries, instead of being hated, would be welcome companions: and the despot himself may count, not only upon security against attack, but upon the warmest gratitude and attachment. The citizens will readily furnish contributions to him when asked, and will regard him as their greatest benefactor. "You will obtain in this way" (Simonides thus concludes his address to Hieron), "the finest and most enviable of all acquisitions. You will have your subjects obeying you willingly, and caring for you of their own accord. You may travel safely wherever you please, and will be a welcome visitor at all the crowded festivals. You will be happy, without jealousy from any one."⁴

The dialogue of which I have given this short abstract, illustrates what Xenophon calls the torment of Tantalus —the misery of a despot who has to extort obedience

¹ Xen. Hieron, viii. 2-7.

² Xen. Hieron, ix. 1-4.

³ Xen. Hieron, x. 6-8.

⁴ Xen. Hieron, xi. 10-12-15.

ταῦτα πάντα ποιῆς, εἰ ἴσθι πάντων τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις κάλλιστον καὶ μακαριώτατον κτῆμα κτεκμημένος· εὐδαιμονὸν γὰρ οὐ φθονηθήσῃ.

from unwilling subjects :—especially if the despot be one who has once known the comfort and security of private life, under tolerably favourable circumstances. If we compare this dialogue with the Platonic *Gorgias*, where we have seen a thesis very analogous handled in respect to Archelaus,—we shall find Plato soaring into a sublime ethical region of his own, measuring the despot's happiness and misery by a standard peculiar to himself, and making good what he admits to be a paradox by abundant eloquence covering faulty dialectic : while Xenophon, herein following his master, applies to human life the measure of a rational common sense, talks about pleasures and pains which every one can feel to be such, and points out how many of these pleasures the despot forfeits, how many of these pains and privations he undergoes,—in spite of that great power of doing hurt, and less power, though still considerable, of doing good, which raises the envy of spectators. The Hieron gives utterance to an interesting vein of sentiment, more common at Athens than elsewhere in Greece ; enforced by the conversation of Sokrates, and serving as corrective protest against that unqualified worship of power which prevailed in the ancient world no less than in the modern. That the Syrakusan Hieron should be selected as an exemplifying name, may be explained by the circumstance, that during thirty-eight years of Xenophon's mature life (405-367 B.C.), Dionysius the elder was despot of Syrakuse ; a man of energy and ability, who had extinguished the liberties of his native city, and acquired power and dominion greater than that of any living Greek. Xenophon, resident at Skillus, within a short distance from Olympia, had probably¹ seen the splendid *Theory* (or sacred legation of representative envoys) installed in rich and ornamented tents, and the fine running horses sent by Dionysius, at the ninety-ninth Olympic festival (384 B.C.) : but he probably also heard the execration with which the name of Dionysius himself had been received by the spectators, and he would feel that the despot could hardly shew himself there in person. There were narratives in circulation about the interior life of Dionysius,² analogous to those statements which Xenophon

had by
Xenophon
of the feel-
ings at
Olympia
against
Dionysius

¹ Xenoph. *Anab.* v. 3, 11.

² See chap. 83, vol. xi. pp. 40-50, of my

'History of Greece,' where this memorable scene at Olympia is described.

puts into the mouth of Hieron. A predecessor of Dionysius as despot of Syracuse¹ and also as patron of poets, was therefore a suitable person to choose for illustrating the first part of Xenophon's thesis—the countervailing pains and penalties which spoil all the value of power, if exercised over unwilling and repugnant subjects.²

But when Xenophon came to illustrate the second part of his thesis—the possibility of exercising power in such manner as to render the holder of it popular and beloved—it would have been scarcely possible for him to lay the scene in any Grecian city. The repugnance of the citizens of a Grecian city towards a despot who usurped power over them, was incurable—however much the more ambitious individuals among them might have wished to obtain such power for themselves: a repugnance as great among oligarchs as among democrats—perhaps even greater. When we read the recommendations addressed by Simonides, teaching Hieron how he might render himself popular, we perceive at once that they are alike well intentioned and ineffectual. Xenophon could neither find any real Grecian despot corresponding to this portion of his illustrative purpose—nor could he invent one with any shew of plausibility. He was forced to resort to other countries and other habits different from those of Greece.

To this necessity probably we owe the *Cyropædia*: a romance in which Persian and Grecian experience are singularly blended, and both of them so transformed as to suit the philosophical purpose of the narrator. Xenophon had personally served and communicated with Cyrus the younger: respecting whom also he had large means of information, from his intimate friend Proxenus, as well as from the other Grecian generals of the expedition. In the first book of the *Anabasis*, we find this young prince depicted as an energetic and magnanimous

Cyropædia
—blending
of Spartan
and Persian
customs—
Xenophon's
experience
of Cyrus the
Younger.

¹ Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* v. 20, 57-63; *De Officiis*, ii. 7, 24-25.

"Multos timebit ille, quem multi timeant."

² An anecdote is told about a visit

of Xenophon to Dionysius at Syracuse—whether the elder or the younger is not specified—but the tenor of the anecdote points to the younger; if so, the visit must have been later than 367 B.C. (*Athenæus* x. 437).

character, faithful to his word and generous in his friendships—inspiring strong attachment in those around him, yet vigorous in administration and in punishing criminals—not only courting the Greeks as useful for his ambitious projects, but appreciating sincerely the superiority of Hellenic character and freedom over Oriental servitude.¹ And in the *Œkonomikus*, Cyrus is quoted as illustrating in his character the true virtue of a commander; the test of which Xenophon declares to be—That his subordinates follow him willingly, and stand by him to the death.²

It is this character—Hellenised, Sokratished, idealised—that Xenophon paints into his glowing picture of Cyrus the founder of the Persian monarchy, or the *Cyropædia*. He thus escapes the insuperable difficulty arising from the position of a Grecian despot; who never could acquire willing or loving obedience, because his possession of power was felt by a majority of his subjects to be wrongful, violent, tainted. The Cyrus of the *Cyropædia* begins as son of Kambyzes, king or chief of Persia, and grandson of Astyages, king of Media; recognised according to established custom by all, as the person to whom they look for orders. Xenophon furnishes him with a splendid outfit of heroic qualities, suitable to this ascendant position: and represents the foundation of the vast Persian empire, with the unshaken fidelity of all the heterogeneous people composing it, as the reward of a laborious life spent in the active display of such qualities. In his interesting Preface to the *Cyropædia*, he presents this as the solution of a problem which had greatly perplexed him. He had witnessed many revolutions in the Grecian cities—subversions of democracies, oligarchies, and despotisms: he had seen also private establishments, some with numerous servants, some with few, yet scarcely any house-master able to obtain hearty or continued obedience. But as to herds of cattle or flocks of sheep, on the contrary, he had seen them uniformly obedient; suffering the

Portrait of
Cyrus the
Great—his
education
—Preface
to the
Cyropædia.

¹ Xenoph. *Anab.* i. 2, also i. 7, 3, the address of Cyrus to the Greek soldiers—Ὅπως οὖν ἐσσεσθε ἀνδρες ἄβιοι τῆς ἐλευθερίας ἢς κτήσθε, καὶ παρὲς ἢς ἡμᾶς εὐδαιμονίῃς. Εἰ γὰρ ἴστε, ὅτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἠλοῦμεν ἂν, ἀπὲρ ἂν ἔχω πάντων καὶ ἄλλων πολλὰ πλῆσιν, compared with i. 5, 16, where Cyrus gives his appreciation of the Oriental

portion of his army, and the remarkable description of the trial of Orontes, i. 6.

² Xenoph. *Œconom.* iv. 18-19. Κῶρος, εἰ ἴδωσιν, ἀριστος ἂν δοκεῖ ἀρχὴν γινώσκειν—ἡγεῖσθαι μᾶλλον τακτικῶν ἀρχόντων ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ὃ ἂν ἐκόντες ἑπυνται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς παραμένειν ἰδίῳ μιν. Compare *Anab.* i. 9, 29-30.

hardsmen or shepherd to do what he pleased with them, and never once conspiring against him. The first inference of Xenophon from these facts was, that man was by nature the most difficult of all animals to govern.¹ But he became satisfied that he was mistaken, when he reflected on the history of Cyrus; who had acquired and maintained dominion over more men than had ever been united under one empire, always obeying him cheerfully and affectionately. This history proved to Xenophon that it was not impossible, nor even difficult,² to rule mankind, provided a man undertook it with scientific or artistic competence. Accordingly, he proceeded to examine what Cyrus was in birth, disposition, and education—and how he came to be so admirably accomplished in the government of men.³ The result is the *Cyropædia*. We must observe, however, that his solution of the problem is one which does not meet the full difficulties. These difficulties, as he states them, had been suggested to him by his Hellenic experience: by the instability of government in Grecian cities. But the solution which he provides departs from Hellenic experience, and implies what Aristotle and Hippocrates called the more yielding and servile disposition of Asiatics:⁴ for it postulates an hereditary chief of heroic or divine lineage, such as was nowhere acknowledged in Greece, except at Sparta—and there, only under restrictions which would have rendered the case unfit for Xenophon's purpose. The heroic and regal lineage of Cyrus was a condition not less essential to success than his disposition and education:⁵ and not merely his lineage, but also the farther fact, that besides being constant in the duties of prayer and sacrifice to the Gods, he was peculiarly favoured by them with premonitory signs and warnings in all difficult emergencies.⁶

¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 1, 2.

² Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 1, 3. ἐκ τούτου δὲ ἤμαρξάμεθα μετανοεῖν, μὴ οὐτε τῶν ἀδυνάτων οὐτε τῶν χαλεπῶν ἔργων ὅ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἀρχεῖν, ἢν τις ἐπιστάμενος τούτο πράττει.

³ Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 1, 3-8.

⁴ Aristot. *Politica* vii. 7, 1327, b. 25. τὰ δὲ περὶ τὴν Ἀσίαν, διασημαῖα μὲν καὶ τεχνικά τὴν ψυχὴν, ἔθνη δὲ διέσητα ἀρχέμενα καὶ δουλεύοντα διατελεῖ.

⁵ Hippocrates, *De Aere, Locis, et Aquis*, c. 19-22.

⁵ So it is stated by Xenophon himself, in the speech addressed by Kroesus after his defeat and captivity to Cyrus, vii. 2, 24—ἀγνοῶν ἑμαυτὸν ὅτι σοὶ ἀντιπαραμειν ἱκανὸς εἴημι εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐκ θεῶν γεγονότι, ἔπειτα δὲ διὰ βασιλείων πεφυκότι, ἔπειτα δὲ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρετῇν ἀσκούντι· τῶν δ' ἱμῶν προγόνων ἀκούς τὸν πρῶτον βασιλευσάντα ἅμα τε βασιλεὺς καὶ λευτέρους γένεσθαι. *Cyrop.* i. 2, 1: τοῦ Περσικῶν γένους, &c.

⁶ See the remarkable words addressed by Cyrus, shortly before his death, in sacrificing on the hill-top to

The fundamental principle of Xenophon is, that to obtain hearty and unshaken obedience is not difficult for a ruler, provided he possesses the science or art of ruling. This is a principle expressly laid down by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia.¹ We have seen Plato affirming in the Politikus² that this is the only true government, though very few individuals are competent to it: Plato gives to it a peculiar application in the Republic, and points out a philosophical or dialectic tuition whereby he supposes that his Elders will acquire the science or art of command. The Cyropædia presents to us an illustrative example. Cyrus is a young prince who, from twenty-six years of age to his dying day, is always ready with his initiative, provident in calculation of consequences, and personally active in enforcement: giving the right order at the right moment, with good assignable reasons. As a military man, he is not only personally forward, but peculiarly dexterous in the marshalling and management of soldiers; like the Homeric Agamemnon³—

Xenophon does not solve his own problem—The governing aptitudes and popularity of Cyrus come from nature, not from education.

Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθός, κρατερός τ' αἰχμητής.

But we must consider this aptitude for command as a spontaneous growth in Cyrus—a portion of his divine constitution or of the golden element in his nature (to speak in the phrase of the Platonic Republic): for no means are pointed out whereby he acquired it, and the Platonic Sokrates would have asked in vain, where teachers of it were to be found. It is true that he is made to go through a rigorous and long-continued training: but this training is common to him with all the other Persian youths of

Ζεὺς Πατὴρ and Ἥλιος, *Cyrop.* viii. 7, 8.

The special communications of the Gods to Cyrus are insisted on by Xenophon, like those made to Sokrates, and like the constant aid of Athênê to Odysseus in Homer, *Odys.* iii. 221:—

Ὁς γὰρ πρὶν ἴδεν ἔδει θεοῖς ἀναφανδὸν φιλεῖντας
'Ὅς κεῖνον ἀναφανδὸν παρίστατο Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

¹ *Xenophon Mem.* iii. 9, 10-12.

² See what is said below about the Platonic Politikus, chap. xxx.

³ Cicero, when called upon in his province of Cilicia to conduct warlike operations against the Parthians, as well as against some refractory mountaineers, improved his military knowledge by studying and commenting on the *Cyropædia*. *Epist. ad Famil.* ix. 25. Compare the remarkable observation made by Cicero (*Academic. Prior.* ii. init.) about the way in which Lucullus made up his deficiency of military experience by reading military books.

good family, and is calculated to teach obedience, not to communicate aptitude for command; while the master of tactics, whose lessons he receives apart, is expressly declared to have known little about the duties of a commander.¹ Kambyes indeed (father of Cyrus) gives to his son valuable general exhortations respecting the multiplicity of exigencies which press upon a commander, and the constant watchfulness, precautions, fertility of invention, required on his part to meet them. We read the like in the conversations of Sokrates in the *Memorabilia*:² but neither Kambyes nor Sokrates are teachers of the art of commanding. For this art, Cyrus is assumed to possess a natural aptitude; like the other elements of his dispositions—his warm sympathies, his frank and engaging manners, his ardent emulation combined with perfect freedom from jealousy, his courage, his love of learning, his willingness to endure any amount of labour for the purpose of obtaining praise, &c., all which Xenophon represents as belonging to him by nature, together with a very handsome person.³

The *Cyropædia* is a title not fairly representing the contents of the work, which contains a more copious biography of the hero than any which we read in Plutarch or Suetonius. But the education of Cyrus⁴ is the most remarkable part of it, in which the ethico-political theory of Xenophon, generated by Sokratic refining criticism brought to bear on the Spartan drill and discipline, is put forth. Professing to describe the Persian polity, he in reality describes only the Persian education; which is public, and prescribed by law, intended to form the character of individuals so that they shall stand in no need of coercive laws or penalties. Most cities leave the education of youth to be conducted at the discretion of their parents, and think it sufficient to enact and enforce laws forbidding, under penal sanction, theft, murder, and various other acts enumerated as criminal. But Xenophon (like Plato and Aristotle) disapproves of this system.⁵ His Persian

Views of
Xenophon
about public
and official
training of
all citizens.

¹ Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 6, 12-15.

² Compare *Cyropæd.* i. 6, with *Memorab.* iii. 1.

³ *Cyropæd.* i. 2, 1. φῶς αἰ δὲ ἰ
κῆρος λέγεται, &c. i. 2, 1-2. πᾶν
τὸν ἄλκιμον διαφέρειν ἐφαίμετο . . .
ταῖς φέρεται φιλοσοφίας, &c.

⁴ I have already observed that the

phrase of Plato in *Legg.* iii. p. 604 C may be considered as conveying his denial of the assertion, that Cyrus had received a good education.

⁵ Xenophon says the same about the scheme of Lykurgus at Sparta, *De Lac. Repub.* c. 2.

polity places the citizen even from infancy under official tuition, and aims at forming his first habits and character, as well as at upholding them when formed, so that instead of having any disposition of his own to commit such acts, he shall contract a repugnance to them. He is kept under perpetual training, drill, and active official employment throughout life, but the supervision is most unremitting during boyhood and youth.

There are four categories of age :—boys, up to sixteen—young men or ephēbi, from sixteen to twenty-six—mature men, as far as fifty-one—above that age, elders. To each of these four classes there is assigned a certain portion of the “free agora” : *i.e.*, the great square of the city, where no buying or selling or vulgar occupation is allowed—where the regal residence is situated, and none but dignified functions, civil or military, are carried on. Here the boys and the mature men assemble every day at sunrise, continue under drill, and take their meals ; while the young men even pass the night on guard near the government house. Each of the four sections is commanded by superintendents or officers : those superintending the boys are Elders, who are employed in administering justice to the boys, and in teaching them what justice is. They hold judicial trials of the boys for various sorts of misconduct : for violence, theft, abusive words, lying, and even for ingratitude. In cases of proved guilt, beating or flogging is inflicted. The boys go there to learn justice (says Xenophon), as boys in Hellas go to school to learn letters. Under this discipline, and in learning the use of the bow and javelin besides, they spend the time until sixteen years of age. They bring their food with them from home (wheaten bread, with a condiment of kardamon, or bruised seed of the nasturtium), together with a wooden cup to draw water from the river : and they dine at public tables under the eye of the teacher. The young men perform all the military and police duty under the commands of the King and the Elders : moreover, they accompany the King when he goes on a hunting expedition—which accustoms them to fatigue and long abstinence, as well as to the encounter of dangerous wild animals. The Elders do not take part in these hunts, nor in any foreign military march, nor are they bound, like the others, to daily attendance in the agora.

Details of
(so-called)
Persian edu-
cation—
Severe dis-
cipline—
Distribution
of four ages

They appoint all officers, and try judicially the cases shown up by the superintendents, or other accusers, of all youths or mature men who have failed in the requirements of the public discipline. The gravest derelictions they punish with death : where this is not called for, they put the offender out of his class, so that he remains degraded all his life.¹

This severe discipline is by law open to all Persians who choose to attend, and the honours of the state are attainable by all equally. But in practice it is confined to a few : for neither boys nor men can attend it continuously, except such as possess an independent maintenance ; nor is any one allowed to enter the regiment of youths or mature men, unless he has previously gone through the discipline of boyhood. The elders, by whom the higher functions are exercised, must be persons who have passed without reproach through all the three preceding stages : so that these offices, though legally open to all, are in practice confined to a few—the small class of Homotimoi.²

Such is Xenophon's conception of a perfect Polity. It consists in an effective public discipline and drill, begun in early boyhood and continued until old age. The evidence on which he specially insists to prove its good results relates first to the body. The bodies of the Persians become so dry and hard, that they neither spit, nor have occasion to wipe their noses, nor are full of wind, nor are ever seen to retire for the satisfaction of natural wants.³ Besides this, the discipline enforces complete habits of obedience, sobriety, justice, endurance of pain and privation.

We may note here both the agreement, and the difference, between Xenophon and Plato, as to the tests applied for measuring the goodness of their respective disciplinarian schemes. In regard to the ethical effects desirable (obedience, sobriety, &c.) both were agreed. But while Plato (in Republic) dwells much besides upon the musical training necessary, Xenophon omits this, and substitutes in its place the working off of all the superfluous moisture of the body.⁴

¹ Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, 6-16. καὶ ἦν τις ἢ ἐν ἰσχύρεσσιν ἢ ἐν τελείοις ἀνδράσιν ἄλλω τι τῶν νομίμων φαίνοντο μὴ οἱ φύλαρχοι ἔκαστον, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁ βουλόμενος· οἱ δὲ γεραίτεροι ἀκούσαντες

ἀκρίνουσιν· ὁ δὲ ἀκρίθεις ἀτιμος τὸν λοιπὸν βίον διατελεῖ.

² Cyropæd. i. 2, 14-15.

³ Cyrop. i. 2, 16.

⁴ See below, chap. xxxvii.

Through the two youthful stages of this discipline Cyrus is represented as having passed; undergoing all the fatigues as well as the punishment (he is beaten or flogged by the superintendent¹) with as much rigour as the rest, and even surpassing all his comrades in endurance and exemplary obedience, not less than in the bow and the javelin. In the lessons about justice he manifests such pre-eminence, that he is appointed by the superintendent to administer justice to other boys: and it is in this capacity that he is chastised for his well-known decision, awarding the large coat to the great boy and the little coat to the little boy, as being more convenient to both,² though the proprietorship was opposite: the master impressing upon him, as a general explanation, that the lawful or customary was the Just.³ Cyrus had been brought as a boy by his mother Mandané to visit her father, the Median king Astyages. The boy wins the affection of Astyages and all around by his child-like frankness and affectionate sympathy (admirably depicted in Xenophon): while he at the same time resists the corruptions of a luxurious court, and adheres to the simplicity of his Persian training. When Mandané is about to depart and to rejoin her husband Kambyzes in Persia, she is entreated by Astyages to allow Cyrus to remain with him. Cyrus himself also desires to remain: but Mandané hesitates to allow it: putting to Cyrus, among other difficulties, the question—How will you learn justice here, when the teachers of it are in Persia? To which Cyrus replies—I am already well taught in justice: as you may see by the fact, that my teacher made me a judge over other boys, and compelled me to render account to him of all my proceedings.⁴ Besides which, if I am found wanting, my grandfather Astyages will make up the deficient teaching. But (says Mandané) justice is not the same here under Astyages, as it is in Persia. Astyages has made himself master of all the Medes: while among the Persians equality is accounted justice. Your father Kambyzes both performs all that the city directs, and receives nothing more

Exemplary obedience of Cyrus to the public discipline—He had learnt justice well—His award about the two coats—Lesson inculcated upon him by the Justice-Master.

¹ Cyrop. i. 3, 17; i. 5, 4.

² Cyrop. i. 3, 17. This is an ingenious and apposite illustration of the law of property.

³ Cyrop. i. 3, 17. *ἔπειτα δὲ ἔφη τὸ μὲν νόμιμον δίκαιον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἀνθρώπων, βίαιον.*

⁴ Cyropæd. i. 4, 2.

than what the city allows : the measure for him is, not his own inclination, but the law. You must therefore be cautious of staying here, lest you should bring back with you to Persia habits of despotism, and of grasping at more than any one else, contracted from your grandfather : for if you come back in this spirit, you will assuredly be flogged to death. Never fear, mother (answered Cyrus) : my grandfather teaches every one round him to claim less than his due—not more than his due : and he will teach me the same.¹

The portion of the *Cyropædia* just cited deserves especial attention, in reference to Xenophon as a companion and pupil of Sokrates. The reader has been already familiarised throughout this work with the questions habitually propounded and canvassed by Sokrates—What is Justice, Temperance, Courage, &c. ? Are these virtues teachable ? If they are so, where are the teachers of them to be found ?—for he professed to have looked in vain for any teachers.² I have farther remarked that Sokrates required these questions to be debated in the order here stated. That is—you must first know what Justice is, before you can determine whether it be teachable or not—nay, before you are in a position to affirm any thing at all about it, or to declare any particular acts to be either just or unjust.³

Now Xenophon, in his description of the Persian official discipline, provides a sufficient answer to the second question—Whether justice is teachable—and where are the teachers thereof ? It is teachable : there are official teachers appointed : and every boy passes through a course of teaching prolonged for several years.—But Xenophon does not at all recognise the Sokratic requirement, that the first question shall be fully canvassed and satisfactorily answered, before the second is approached. The first question is indeed answered in a certain way—though the answer appears here only as an *obiter dictum*, and is never submitted to any Elenchus at all. The master explains—What is Justice ?—by telling Cyrus, “That the lawful is just,

¹ *Cyrop.* i. §. 17-18. Ὅπως οὖν μὴ ἀπολῇ μαστιγούμενος, ἐπειδὴν οἶκοι ἦς, ἂν παρὰ τούτων μαθὼν ἤκησεν ἀντὶ τοῦ βασιλικοῦ τὸ τυραννικόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον οἰεσθαι χρῆναι πάντων ἔχειν.
² *Xenoph. Memor.* i. 18, iv. 4, 5.
³ See below, ch. xiii., ch. xxii., and ch. xxiii.

and that the lawless is violent". Now if we consider this as preceptorial—as an admonition to the youthful Cyrus how he ought to decide judicial cases—it is perfectly reasonable:—"Let your decisions be conformable to the law or custom of the country". But if we consider it as a portion of philosophy or reasoned truth—as a definition or rational explanation of Justice, advanced by a respondent who is bound to defend it against the Sokratic cross-examination—we shall find it altogether insufficient. Xenophon himself tells us here, that Law or Custom is one thing among the Medes, and the reverse among the Persians: accordingly an action which is just in the one place will be unjust in the other. It is by objections of this kind that Sokrates, both in Plato and Xenophon, refutes explanations propounded by his respondents.¹

Though the explanation of Justice here given is altogether untenable, yet we shall find it advanced by Sokrates himself as complete and conclusive, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, where he is conversing with the Sophist Hippias. That Sophist is represented as at first urging difficulties against it, but afterwards as concurring with Sokrates: who enlarges upon the definition, and extols it as perfectly satisfactory. If

Definition given by Sokrates of Justice—Insufficient to satisfy the exigencies of the Sokratic Elenchus.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 479 A. τούτων τῶν πολλῶν καλὸν μὲν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχροὺς φανήσεται; καὶ τῶν δίκαιων, ὃ οὐκ ἀδίκον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον; Compare *Republ.* i. p. 331 C, and the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydēmus in the *Xenophontic Memorab.* iv. 2, 13-19, and *Cyropædia*, i. 6, 27-34, about what is just and good morality towards enemies.

We read in Pascal, *Pensées*, i. 6, 8-9:—"On ne voit presque rien de juste et d'injuste, qui ne change de qualité en changeant de climat. Trois degrés d'élévation du pôle renversent toute la jurisprudence. Un méridien décide de la vérité: en peu d'années de possession, les loix fondamentales changent: le droit a ses époques. Plaisante justice, qu'une rivière ou une montagne borne! Vérité au deçà des Pyrénées—erreur au delà!"

"Ils confessent que la justice n'est pas dans les coutumes, mais qu'elle reside dans les loix naturelles, connues en tout pays. Certainement ils la

soutiendraient opiniâtement, si la témérité du hasard qui a semé les loix humaines en avait rencontré au moins une qui fut universelle: mais la plaisanterie est telle, que le caprice des hommes s'est si bien diversifié, qu'il n'y en a point.

"Le larcin, l'inceste, le meurtre des enfans et des pères, tout a eu sa place entre les actions vertueuses. Se peut-il rien de plus plaisant, qu'un homme ait droit de me tuer parcequ'il demeure au-delà de l'eau, et que son prince a querelle avec le mien, quoique je n'en aie aucune avec lui?"

"L'un dit que l'essence de la justice est l'autorité du législateur: l'autre, la commodité du souverain: l'autre, la coutume présente—et c'est le plus sûr. Rien, suivant la seule raison, n'est juste de soi: tout branle avec le temps. La coutume fait toute l'équité, par cela seul qu'elle est reçue: c'est le fondement mystique de son autorité. Qui la ramène à son principe, l'anéantit."

Sokrates really delivered this answer to Hippias, as a general definition of Justice—we may learn from it how much greater was his negative acuteness in overthrowing the definitions of others, than his affirmative perspicacity in discovering unexceptionable definitions of his own. This is the deficiency admitted by himself in the Platonic Apology—lamented by friends like Kleitophon—arraigned by opponents like Hippias and Thrasymachus. Xenophon, whose intellect was practical rather than speculative, appears not to be aware of it. He does not feel the depth and difficulty of the Sokratic problems, even while he himself enunciates them. He does not appreciate all the conditions of a good definition, capable of being maintained against that formidable cross-examination (recounted by himself) whereby Sokrates humbled the youth Euthydémus: still less does he enter into the spirit of that Sokratic order of precedence (declared in the negative Platonic dialogues), in the study of philosophical questions:—First define Justice, and find a definition of it such as you can maintain against a cross-examining adversary—before you proceed either to affirm or deny any predicates concerning it. The practical advice and reflexions of Xenophon are, for the most part, judicious and penetrating. But he falls very short when he comes to deal with philosophical theory:—with reasoned truth, and with the Sokratic Elenchus as a test for discriminating such truth from the false, the doubtful, or the not-proven.

Cyrus is allowed by his mother to remain amidst the luxuries of the Median court. It is a part of his admirable disposition that he resists all its temptations,¹ and goes back to the hard fare and discipline of the Persians with the same exemplary obedience as before. He is appointed by the Elders to command the Persian contingent which is sent to assist Kyaxares (son of Astyages), king of Media; and he thus enters upon that active military career which is described as occupying his whole life, until his conquest of Babylon, and his subsequent organization of the great Persian empire. His father Kambyzes sends him forth with excellent exhortations, many of which are almost in the same words as those which we read

Biography
of Cyrus—
constant
military
success
earned by
suitable
qualities—
Variety of
characters
and situa-
tions.

¹ Cyropæd. I. 5, 1.

ascribed to Sokrates in the *Memorabilia*. In the details of Cyrus's biography which follow, the stamp of Sokratic influence is less marked, yet seldom altogether wanting. The conversation of Sokrates had taught Xenophon how to make the most of his own large experience and observation. His biography of Cyrus represents a string of successive situations, calling forth and displaying the aptitude of the hero for command. The epical invention with which these situations are imagined—the variety of characters introduced, Araspes, Abradates, Pantheia, Chrysantas, Hystaspes, Gادات, Gobryas, Tigranes, &c.—the dramatic propriety with which each of these persons is animated as speaker, and made to teach a lesson bearing on the predetermined conclusion—all these are highly honourable to the Xenophontic genius, but all of them likewise bespeak the Companion of Sokrates. Xenophon dwells, with evident pleasure, on the details connected with the *rationale* of military proceedings: the wants and liabilities of soldiers, the advantages or disadvantages of different weapons or different modes of marshalling, the duties of the general as compared with those of the soldier, &c. Cyrus is not merely always ready with his orders, but also competent as a speaker to explain the propriety of what he orders.¹ We have the truly Athenian idea, that persuasive speech is the precursor of intelligent and energetic action: and that it is an attribute essentially necessary for a general, for the purpose of informing, appeasing, re-assuring, the minds of the soldiers.² This, as well as other duties and functions of a military commander, we find laid down generally in the conversations of Sokrates,³ who conceives these functions, in their most general aspect, as a branch of the comprehensive art of guiding or governing men. What Sokrates thus enunciates generally, is exemplified in detail throughout the life of Cyrus.

Throughout all the *Cyropædia*, the heroic qualities and per-

¹ *Cyropæd.* v. 5, 46. *ἀκτινίζοντας καὶ ἐπακτινίζοντας*. Compare the *Memorabilia*, iv. 6, 1-15.

² *Memorab.* iii. 3, 11; Hipparch. viii. 22; *Cyropæd.* vi. 2, 13. Compare the impressive portion of the funeral oration delivered by Perikles in Thucydides, ii. 40.

³ See the four first chapters of the

third book of the Xenophontic *Memorabilia*. The treatise of Xenophon called *Ἱππάρχικος* enumerates also the general duties required from a commander of cavalry: among these, *ψευδοστροφολοί* are mentioned (iv. 7). Now the employment, with effect, of a *ψευδοστροφολός*, is described with much detail in the *Cyropædia*. See the case of Araspes (vi. 1, 37, vi. 2, 16).

Generous
and amiable
qualities of
Cyrus.
Abradates
and Pan-
theia.

sonal agency of Cyrus are always in the foreground, working with unerring success and determining every thing. He is moreover recommended to our sympathies, not merely by the energy and judgment of a leader, but also by the amiable qualities of a generous man—by the remarkable combination of self-command with indulgence towards others—by considerate lenity towards subdued enemies like Kroesus and the Armenian prince—even by solicitude shown that the miseries of war should fall altogether on the fighting men, and that the cultivators of the land should be left unmolested by both parties.¹ Respecting several other persons in the narrative, too—the Armenian Tigranes, Gadatas, Gobryas, &c.—the adventures and scenes described are touching: but the tale of Abradates and Pantheia transcends them all, and is perhaps the most pathetic recital embodied in the works of Hellenic antiquity.² In all these narratives the vein of sentiment is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, but belongs to Xenophon himself.

Scheme of
government
devised by
Cyrus when
his con-
quests are
completed
—Oriental
despotism,
wisely ar-
ranged.

This last remark may also be made respecting the concluding proceedings of Cyrus, after he has thoroughly completed his conquests, and when he establishes arrangements for governing them permanently. The scheme of government which Xenophon imagines and introduces him as organizing, is neither Sokratic nor Platonic, nor even Hellenic: it would probably have been as little acceptable to his friend Agesilaus, the marked "hater of Persia,"³ as to any Athenian politician. It is altogether an Oriental despotism, skilfully organized both for the security of the despot and for enabling him to keep a vigorous hold on subjects distant as well as near: such as the younger Cyrus might possibly have attempted, if his brother Artaxerxes had been slain at Kunaxa, instead of himself. "Eam conditionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet, quam si uni reddatur"⁴—is a maxim repugnant to Hellenic ideas, and not likely to be rendered welcome even by the regulations of

¹ Cyrop. iii. 1, 10-38, vii. 2, 9-29, v. 4, 28, vi. 1, 87. Ἀλλὰ σὺ μὲν, ὦ Κύρε, καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως εἶ, πρῶτος τε καὶ συγγνωμὸν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἀμαρτημάτων.

² Cyrop. vii. 3.

³ Xenoph. Agesilaus, vii. 7. εἰ δ' αὖ καλὸν καὶ μισοπέροσθον εἶναι—ἰδέσθαι πλεῖστον, δ, τι δύναται κακὸν ποιῆσαι τὸν βάρβαρον.

⁴ Tacit. Annal. i. 6.

detail with which Xenophon surrounds it; judicious as these regulations are for their contemplated purpose. The amiable and popular character which Cyrus has maintained from youth upwards, and by means of which he has gained an uninterrupted series of victories, is difficult to be reconciled with the insecurity, however imposing, in which he dwells as Great King. When we find that he accounts it a necessary precaution to surround himself with eunuchs, on the express ground that they are despised by every one else and therefore likely to be more faithful to their master—when we read also that in consequence of the number of disaffected subjects, he is forced to keep a guard composed of twenty thousand soldiers taken from poor Persian mountaineers¹—we find realised, in the case of the triumphant Cyrus, much of that peril and insecurity which the despot Hieron had so bitterly deplored in his conversation with Simonides. However unsatisfactory the ideal of government may be, which Plato lays out either in the Republic or the Leges—that which Xenophon sets before us is not at all more acceptable, in spite of the splendid individual portrait whereby he dazzles our imagination. Few Athenians would have exchanged Athens either for Babylon under Cyrus, or for Plato's Magnétic colony in Krete.

The Xenophontic government is thus noway admirable, even as an ideal. But he himself presents it only as an ideal—or (which is the same thing in the eyes of a companion of Sokrates) as a quasi-historical fact, belonging to the unknown and undetermined past. When Xenophon talks of what the Persians *are now*, he presents us with nothing but a shocking contrast to this ideal; nothing but vice, corruption, degeneracy of every kind, exorbitant sensuality, faithlessness and cowardice.² His picture of Persia is like that of the Platonic Kosmos, which we can read in the Timæus:³ a splendid Kosmos in its original plan and construction, but full of defects and evil as it actually exists. The strength and excellence of the Xenophontic orderly despotism dies with its heroic beginner. His two sons (as Plato remarked) do not receive the same elabo-

Persian present reality—is described by Xenophon as thoroughly depraved, in striking contrast to the establishment of Cyrus.

¹ Xen. Cyrop. vii. 5, 58-70.

² See below, ch. xxxviii.

³ Cyrop. viii. 8.

rate training and discipline as himself: nor can they be restrained, even by the impressive appeal which he makes to them on his death-bed, from violent dissension among themselves, and misgovernment of every kind.¹

Whatever we may think of the political ideal of Xenophon, his *Cyropædia* is among the glories of the Sokratic family; as an excellent specimen of the philosophical imagination, in carrying a general doctrine into illustrative details—and of the epical imagination in respect to varied characters and touching incident. In stringing together instructive conversations, moreover, it displays the same art which we trace in the *Memorabilia*, *Œkonomikus*, *Hieron*, &c., and which is worthy of the attentive companion of Sokrates. Whenever Xenophon talks about military affairs, horsemanship, agriculture, house-management, &c., he is within the range of personal experience of his own; and his recommendations, controlled as they thus are by known realities, are for the most part instructive and valuable. Such is the case not merely with the *Cyropædia* and *Œkonomikus*, but also in his two short treatises, *De Re Equestri* and *De Officio Magistri Equitum*.

But we cannot say so much when he discusses plans of finance.

We read among his works a discourse—composed after his sentence of exile had been repealed, and when he was very old, seemingly not earlier than 355 B.C.²—criticising the actual condition of Athens, and proposing various measures for the improvement of the finances, as well as for relief of the citizens from poverty. He begins this discourse by a sentiment thoroughly Sokratic and Platonic, which would serve almost as a continuation of the *Cyropædia*. The government of a city will be measured by the character and ability of its leaders.³ He closes it by another sentiment equally Sokratic and Platonic; advising that

¹ *Cyropæd.* viii. 7, 9-10: Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 694 D.

² Xenophon, *Πάροι*—ἡ περὶ Προσόδων. *De Vectigalibus*. See Schneider's Proleg. to this treatise, pp. 138-140.

³ *De Vectig.* i. 1. ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἀεὶ ποτε νομίζουσιν, ὅποιοι τινες ἂν οἱ προστάται ᾖσι, τοιαύτας καὶ τὰς πολιτείας γίγνεσθαι.

before his measures are adopted, special messengers shall be sent to Delphi and Dodona ; to ascertain whether the Gods approve them—and if they approve, to which Gods they enjoin that the initiatory sacrifices shall be offered.¹ But almost everything in the discourse, between the first and last sentences, is in a vein not at all Sokratic—in a vein, indeed, positively anti-Platonic and anti-Spartan. We have already seen that wealth, gold and silver, commerce, influx of strangers, &c., are discouraged as much as possible by Plato, and by the theory (though evaded partially in practice) of Sparta. Now it is precisely these objects which Xenophon, in the treatise before us, does his utmost to foster and extend at Athens. Nothing is here said about the vulgarising influence of trade as compared with farming, which we read in the *Œkonomikus* : nor about the ethical and pædagogic dictation which pervades so much of the *Cyropædia*, and reigns paramount throughout the Platonic Republic and *Leges*. Xenophon takes Athens as she stands, with great variety of tastes, active occupation, and condition among the inhabitants : her mild climate and productive territory, especially her veins of silver and her fine marble : her importing and exporting merchants, her central situation, as convenient entrepôt for commodities produced in the most distant lands :² her skilful artisans and craftsmen : her monied capitalists : and not these alone, but also the congregation and affluence of fine artists, intellectual men, philosophers, Sophists, poets, rhapsodes, actors, &c. : last, though not least, the temples adorning her akropolis, and the dramatic representations exhibited at her Dionysiac festivals, which afforded the highest captivation to eye as well as ear, and attracted strangers from all quarters as visitors.³ Xenophon extols these charms of Athens with a warmth which reminds us of the Periklean funeral oration in Thucydides.⁴ He no longer speaks like one whose heart and affections are with the Spartan

¹ De Vect. vi. 2. Compare this with *Anab.* iii. 1, 5, where Sokrates reproves Xenophon for his evasive manner of putting a question to the Delphian God. Xenophon here adopts the plenary manner enjoined by Sokrates.

² De Vectig. c. i. 2-3.

³ De Vect. v. 3-4. *Τί δὲ οἱ πολυδαίμοι;*

τί δὲ οἱ πολυπρόβατοι; τί δὲ οἱ γνώμη καὶ ἀργυρίῳ δυνάμενοι χρηματίζεσθαι; Καὶ μὴν χειροτέχναι τε καὶ σοφισταὶ καὶ φιλόσοφοι· οἱ δὲ ποιηταί, οἱ δὲ τὰ τούτων μεταχειριζόμενοι, οἱ δὲ ἀξιοθεάτων ἢ ἀξιακούστων ἱερῶν ἢ ὁσίων ἐπιθυμούντες, &c.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 34-42; Plutarch, *Periklēs*, c. 12. Compare Xenophon, *Republ. Athen.* ii. 7, iii. 8.

drill : still less does he speak like Plato—to whom (as we see both by the Republic and the Leges) such artistic and poetical exhibitions were abominations calling for censorial repression—and in whose eyes gold, silver, commerce, abundant influx of strangers, &c., were dangerous enemies of all civic virtue.

Yet while recognising all these charms and advantages, Xenophon finds himself compelled to lament great poverty among the citizens ; which poverty (he says) is often urged by the leading men as an excuse for unjust proceedings. Accordingly he comes forward with various financial suggestions, by means of which he confidently anticipates that every Athenian citizen may obtain a comfortable maintenance from the public.¹

First, he dwells upon the great advantage of encouraging metics, or foreigners resident at Athens, each of whom paid an annual capitation tax to the treasury. There were already many such, not merely Greeks, but Orientals also, Lydians, Phrygians, Syrians, &c. :² and by judicious encouragement all expatriated men everywhere might be made to prefer the agreeable residence at Athens, thus largely increasing the annual amount of the tax. The metics ought (he says) to be exempted from military service (which the citizens ought to perform and might perform alone), but to be admitted to the honours of the equestrian duty, whenever they were rich enough to afford it : and farther, to be allowed the liberty of purchasing land and building houses in the city. Moreover not merely resident metics, but also foreign merchants who came as visitors, conducting an extensive commerce—ought to be flattered by complimentary votes and occasional hospitalities : while the curators of the harbour, whose function it was to settle disputes among them, should receive prizes if they adjudicated equitably and speedily.³

All this (Xenophon observes) will require only friendly and considerate demonstrations. His farther schemes are more ambitious, not to be effected without a large outlay. He proposes to raise an ample fund for the

Recognised poverty among the citizens. Plan for improvement.

Advantage of a large number of Metics. How these may be encouraged.

Proposal to raise by voluntary contribu-

¹ De Vectig. iv. 83. καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν δὴ εἶρηται, ὥς ἂν ἡγοῦμαι κατασκευασθεῖσθαι τὴν πόλιν ἱκανὴν ἂν πᾶσιν Ἀθηναίοις τροφὴν ἀπὸ κοινοῦ γενέσθαι.

² De Vect. ii. 3-7.

³ De Vect. iii. 2-6.

purposes of the city, by voluntary contributions ; which he expects to obtain not merely from private Athenians and metics, rich and in easy circumstances—but also from other cities, and even from foreign despots, kings, satraps, &c. The tempting inducement will be, that the names of all contributors with their respecting contributions will be inscribed on public tablets, and permanently commemorated as benefactors of the city.¹ Contributors (he says) are found, for the outfit of a fleet, where they expect no return : much more will they come forward here, where a good return will accrue. The fund so raised will be employed under public authority with the most profitable result, in many different ways. The city will build docks and warehouses for bonding goods—houses near the harbour to be let to merchants—merchant-vessels to be let out on freight. But the largest profit will be obtained by working the silver mines at Laureion in Attica. The city will purchase a number of foreign slaves, and will employ them under the superintendence of old free citizens who are past the age of labour, partly in working these mines for public account, each of the ten tribes employing one tenth part of the number—partly by letting them out to private mining undertakers, at so much per diem for each slave : the slaves being distinguished by a conspicuous public stamp, and the undertaker binding himself under penalty always to restore the same number of them as he received.² Such competition between the city and the private mining undertakers will augment the total produce, and will be no loss to either, but wholesome for both. The mines will absorb as many workmen as are put into them : for in the production of silver (Xenophon argues) there can never be any glut, as there is sometimes in corn, wine, or oil. Silver is always in demand, and is not lessened in value by increase of quantity. Every one is anxious to get it, and has as much pleasure in hoarding it under ground as in actively employing it.³ The scheme, thus described, may (if found necessary) be brought into operation by degrees, a certain number of slaves being purchased annually until the full total is made up. From these various financial projects, and

tions a large sum to be employed as capital by the city. Distribution of three oboli per head per day to all the citizens.

¹ De Vect. iii. 11² De Vect. iv. 13-19.³ De Vect. iv. 4. 7.

especially from the fund thus employed as capital under the management of the Senate, the largest returns are expected. Amidst the general abundance which will ensue, the religious festivals will be celebrated with increased splendour—the temples will be repaired, the docks and walls will be put in complete order—the priests, the Senate, the magistrates, the horsemen, will receive the full stipends which the old custom of Athens destined for them.¹ But besides all these, the object which Xenophon has most at heart will be accomplished: the poor citizens will be rescued from poverty. There will be a regular distribution among all citizens, per head and equally. Three oboli, or half a drachma, will be allotted daily to each, to poor and rich alike. For the poor citizens, this will provide a comfortable subsistence, without any contribution on their part: the poverty now prevailing will thus be alleviated. The rich, like the poor, receive the daily triobolon as a free gift: but if they even compute it as interest for their investments, they will find that the rate of interest is full and satisfactory, like the rate on bottomry. Three oboli per day amount in the year of 360 days to 180 drachmæ: now if a rich man has contributed ten minæ (= 1000 drachmæ), he will thus receive interest at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum: if another less rich citizen has contributed one mina (= 100 drachmæ), he will receive interest at the rate of 180 per cent. per annum: more than he could realise in any other investment.²

Half a drachma, or three oboli, per day, was the highest rate of pay ever received (the rate varied at different times) by the citizens as Dikasts and Ekklesiasts, attending in judicature or in assembly. It is this amount of pay which Xenophon here proposes to ensure to every citizen, without exception, out of the public treasury; which (he calculates) would be enriched by his project so as easily to bear such a disbursement. He relieves the poor citizens from poverty by making them all pensioners on the public treasury, with or

¹ De Vectig. vi. 1-2. Καὶ ὁ μὲν δῆμος τροφῆς εὐπορήσει, οἱ δὲ πλούσιοι τῆς εἰς τὸν πόλεμον δαπάνης ἀπαλλαγῇσονται, περιουσίας δὲ πολλῆς γενόμενης, μεγαλοπρεπέστερον μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ νῦν τὰς ἑορτάς ἀξιομένῃ, ἱερὰ δ' ἐπισκευάσασθαι, τεῖχῃ δὲ καὶ ναυῖα ἀνορθώσασθαι,

ἱερῶσι δὲ καὶ βουλῇ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἱππύσι τὰ πάτρια ἀποδώσασθαι—πῶς οὐκ ἄξιον ὡς τάχιστα τοῦτοισι ἐρχεῖσθαι, ἵνα ἐπὶ ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐπιδωκεῖν τὴν πόλιν μετ' ἀσφαλείας εὐδαιμονοῦσιν;

² De Vectig. iii. 9-12.

without service rendered, or the pretence of service. He strains yet farther the dangerous principle of the *Theôrikon*, without the same excuse as can be shown for the *Theôrikon* itself on religious grounds.¹ If such a proposition had been made by Kleon, Hyperbolus, Kleophon, Agyrrhius, &c., it would have been dwelt upon by most historians of Greece as an illustration of the cacoethes of democracy—to extract money, somehow or other, from the rich, for the purpose of keeping the poor in comfort. Not one of the democratical leaders, so far as we know, ever ventured to propose so sweeping a measure: we have it here from the pen of the oligarchical Xenophon.

But we must of course discuss Xenophon's scheme as a whole : the aggregate enlargement of revenue, from his various new ways and means, on one side—against the new mode and increased amount of expenditure, on the other side. He would not have proposed such an expenditure, if he had not thoroughly believed in the correctness of his own anticipations, both as to the profits of the mining scheme, and as to the increase of receipts from other sources : such as the multiplication of tax-paying Metics, the rent paid by them for the new houses to be built by the city, the increase of the harbour dues from expanded foreign trade. But of these anticipations, even the least unpromising are vague and uncertain : while the prospects of the mining scheme appear thoroughly chimerical. Nothing is clear or certain except the disbursement. We scarcely understand how Xenophon could seriously have imagined, either that voluntary contributors could have been found to subscribe the aggregate fund as he proposes—or that, if subscribed, it could have yielded the prodigious return upon which he reckons. We must, however, recollect that he had no familiarity with finance, or with the conditions and liabilities of commerce, or with the raising of money from voluntary contributors for any collective purpose. He would not have indulged in similar fancies if the question had been about getting together supplies for an army. Practical Athenian financiers would probably say, in criticising his financial project—what

Visionary
anticipa-
tions of
Xenophon,
financial
and com-
mercial.

¹ Respecting the *Theôrikon* at Athens, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 88, pp. 492-498.

Heraldus¹ observes upon some views of his opponent Salmasius, about the relations of capital and interest in Attica—"Somnium est hominis harum rerum, etiam cum vigilat, nihil scientis".² The financial management of Athens was doubtless defective in

¹ This passage of Heraldus is cited by M. Boeckh in his *Public Economy of Athens*, B. iv. ch. 21, p. 606, Eng. Trans. In that chapter of M. Boeckh's work (pp. 600-610) some very instructive pages will be found about the Xenophontic scheme here noticed.

I will however mention one or two points on which my understanding of the scheme differs from his. He says (p. 606):—"The author supposes that the profit upon this speculation would amount to three oboli per day, so that the subscribers would obtain a very high per centage on their shares. Xenophon supposes unequal contributions, according to the different amounts of property, agreeable to the principles of a property-tax, but an equal distribution of the receipts for the purpose of favouring and aiding the poor. What Xenophon is speaking of is an income annually arising upon each share, either equal to or exceeding the interest of the loans on bottomry. Where, however, is the security that the undertaking would produce three oboli a day to each subscriber?"

I concur in most of what is here said; but M. Boeckh states the matter too much as if the three oboli per diem were a real return arising from the scheme, and payable to each shareholder upon each *share* as he calls it. This is an accident of the case, not the essential feature. The poorest citizens—for whose benefit, more than for any other object, the scheme is contrived—would not be shareholders at all: they would be too poor to contribute anything, yet each of them would receive his triobolon like the rest. Moreover, many citizens, even though able to pay, might hold back, and decline to pay: yet still each would receive as much. And again, the foreigners, kings, satraps, &c., would be contributors, but would receive nothing at all. The distribution of the triobolon would be made to citizens only. Xenophon does indeed state the proportion of receipt to payments in the cases of some rich contributors, as an auxiliary motive to conciliate them. But we ought not to treat this receipt as if

it were a real return yielded by the public mining speculation, or as profit actually brought in.

As I conceive the scheme, the daily triobolon, and the respective contributions furnished, have no premeditated ratio, no essential connection with each other. The daily payment of the triobolon to every citizen indiscriminately, is a new and heavy burden upon the city. But this is only one among many other burdens, as we may see by cap. 6. In order to augment the wealth of the city, so as to defray these large expenses, he proposes several new financial measures. Of these the most considerable was the public mining speculation; but it did not stand alone. The financial scheme of Xenophon, both as to receipts and as to expenditure, is more general than M. Boeckh allows for.

² It is truly surprising to read in one of Hume's Essays the following sentence. Essay XII. on Civil Liberty, p. 107 ed. of Hume's *Philosophical Works*, 1825.

"The Athenians, though governed by a Republic, paid near two hundred per cent for those sums of money which any emergence made it necessary for them to borrow, as we learn from Xenophon."

In the note Hume quotes the following passage from this discourse, *De Vectigalibus*:—Κτήσιν δὲ ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ἂν οὕτω καλῶν κτήσαντο, ὥσπερ ἀπ' οὗ ἂν προτελέσωσιν εἰς τὴν ἀφορμὴν. Οἱ δὲ γε πλείστοι Ἀθηναίων πλείονα λήψονται κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν ἢ ὅσα ἂν εἰσενέγκωσιν. Οἱ γὰρ μὲν προτελέσαντες, ἄλλοις δοῖν μὲν πρόσδοτον ἔχουσι. Ὅ δοκεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσφαλίστατον τε καὶ πολυχρονιώτατον εἶναι.

Hume has been misled by dwelling upon one or two separate sentences. If he had taken into consideration the whole discourse and its declared scope, he would have seen that it affords no warrant for any inference as to the rate of interest paid by the Athenian public when they wanted to borrow. In Xenophon's scheme there is no fixed proportion between what a contributor

many ways: but it would not have been improved in the hands of Xenophon—any more than the administrative and judiciary department of Athens would have become better under the severe regimen of Plato.¹ The merits of the Sokratic companions—and great merits they were—lay in the region of instructive theory.

Xenophon accompanies his financial scheme with a strong recommendation to his countrymen that they should abstain from warlike enterprises and maintain peace with every one. He expatiates on the manifest advantages, nay, even on the necessity, of continued peace, under the actual poverty of the city: for the purpose of recruiting the exhausted means of the citizens, as well as of favouring his own new projects for the improvement of finance and commerce. While he especially deprecates any attempt on the part of Athens to regain by force her lost headship over the Greeks, he at the same time holds out hopes that this dignity would be spontaneously tendered to her, if, besides abstaining from all violence, she conducted herself with a liberal and conciliatory spirit towards all: if she did her best to adjust differences among other cities, and to uphold the autonomy of the Delphian temple.² As far as we can judge, such pacific exhortations were at that time wise and politic. Athens had just then concluded peace (355 B.C.) after the three years of ruinous and unsuccessful war, called the Social War, carried on against her revolted allies Chios, Kos, Rhodes, and Byzantium. To attempt the recovery of empire by force was most mischievous. There was indeed one purpose, for which she was called upon by a wise forecast to put forth her strength—to check the aggrandisement of Philip in Macedonia. But this was a distant purpose: and the necessity, though it became every year more urgent, was not

Xenophon exhorts his countrymen to maintain peace.

to the fund would pay and what he would receive. The triobolon received is a fixed sum to each citizen, whereas the contributions of each would be different. Moreover the foreigners and metics would contribute without receiving anything, while the poor citizens would receive their triobolon per head, without having contributed anything.

¹ Aristides the Rhetor has some

forcible remarks in defending Rhetoric and the Athenian statesmen against the bitter criticisms of Plato in the Gorgias: pointing out that Plato himself had never made trial of the difficulty of governing any real community of men, or of the necessities under which a statesman in actual political life was placed (Orat. xiv. Περὶ Πρωτοῦ, pp. 109-110. Dindorf).

² Xenoph. De Vectig. v. 3-8.

so prominently manifest' in 355 B.C. as to affect the judgment of Xenophon. At that early day, Demosthenes himself did not see the danger from Macedonia: his first Philippic was delivered in 351 B.C., and even then his remonstrances, highly creditable to his own forecast, made little impression on others. But when we read the financial oration *De Symmoriis* we appreciate his sound administrative and practical judgment; compared with the benevolent dreams and ample public largess in which Xenophon here indulges.¹

We have seen that Plato died in 347 B.C., having reached the full age of eighty: Xenophon must have attained the same age nearly, and may perhaps have attained it completely—though we do not know the exact year of his death. With both these two illustrious companions of Sokrates, the point of view is considerably modified in their last compositions as compared to their earlier. Xenophon shows the alteration not less clearly than Plato, though in an opposite direction. His discourse on the Athenian revenues differs quite as much from the *Anabasis*, *Cyropædia*, and *Œkonomikos*—as the *Leges* and *Epinomis* differ from any of Plato's earlier works. Whatever we may think of the financial and commercial anticipations of Xenophon, his pamphlet on the Athenian revenues betokens a warm sympathy for his native city—a genuine appreciation of her individual freedom and her many-sided intellectual activity—an earnest interest in her actual career, and even in the extension of her commercial and manufacturing wealth. In these respects it recommends itself to our feelings more than the last Platonic production—*Leges* and *Epinomis*—composed nearly at the same time, between 356-347 B.C. While Xenophon in old age, becoming reconciled to his country, forgets his early passion for the Spartan drill and discipline, perpetual, monotonous, unlettered—we find in the senility of Plato a more cramping limitation of the varieties of human agency—a stricter com-

¹ See my 'History of Greece,' ch. 86, p. 325 seq.

I agree with Boeckh, *Public Econ. of Athens*, ut supra, p. 601, that this pamphlet of Xenophon is probably to be referred to the close of the Social

War, about 355 B.C.

² Respecting the first Philippic, and the *Oratio De Symmoriis* of Demosthenes, see my 'History of Greece,' ch. 87, pp. 401-431.

pression, even of individual thought and speech, under the infallible official orthodoxy—a more extensive use of the pædagogic rod and the censorial muzzle—than he had ever proposed before.

In thus taking an unwilling leave of the Sokratic family, represented by these two venerable survivors—to both of whom the students of Athenian letters and philosophy are so deeply indebted—I feel some satisfaction in the belief, that both of them died, as they were born, citizens of free Athens and of unconquered Hellas: and that neither of them was preserved to an excessive old age, like their contemporary Isokrates, to witness the extinction of Hellenic autonomy by the battle of Chæroneia.¹

¹ Compare the touching passage in Tacitus's description of the death of Agricola, c. 44-45.

"Festinatæ mortis grande solatium tulit, evasisse postremum illud tempus," &c.

Plato was born in Ægina (in which island his father enjoyed an estate as kleruch or out-settled citizen) in the month Thargelion (May) of the year B.C. 427.¹ His family, belonging to the Dême Kollytus, was both ancient and noble, in the sense attached to that word at Athens. He was son of Ariston (or, according to some admirers, of the God Apollo) and Periktionê: his maternal ancestors had been intimate friends or relatives of the law-giver Solon, while his father belonged to a Gens tracing its descent from Kodrus, and even from the God Poseidon. He was also nearly related to Charmides and to Kritias—this last the well-known and violent leader among the oligarchy called the Thirty Tyrants.² Plato was first called Aristoklês, after his grandfather; but received when he grew up the name of Plato—on account of the breadth (we are

¹ It was affirmed distinctly by Hermodôrus (according to the statement of Diogenes Laërtius, iii. 6) that Plato was twenty-eight years old at the time of the death of Sokrates: that is, in May, 399 B.C. (Zeller, *Phil. der Griech.* vol. ii. p. 39, ed. 2nd.) This would place the birth of Plato in 427 B.C. Other critics refer his birth to 428 or 429; but I agree with Zeller in thinking that the deposition of Hermodôrus is more trustworthy than any other evidence before us.

Hermodôrus was a friend and disciple of Plato, and is even said to have made money by publishing Plato's dialogues without permission (*Cic.* *Epist. ad Attic.* xiii. 21). *Suidas*, 'Ερμόδορος. He was also an author: he published a treatise *Περὶ Μαθημάτων* (*Diog. L.*, *Proem.* 2).

See the more recent Dissertation of Zeller, *De Hermodoro Ephesio et Hermodoro Platónico*, Marburg, 1859, p. 19 seq. He cites two important passages (out of the commentary of Simplicius on *Aristot. Physic.*) referring to the work of Hermodôrus ὁ Πλάτωνος ἐταῖρος—a work *Περὶ Πλάτωνος*, on Plato.

² The statements respecting Plato's relatives are obscure and perplexing: unfortunately the *domestica documenta*, which were within the knowledge of his nephew Speusippus, are no longer accessible to us. It is certain that he had two brothers, Glaukon and Adeimantus: besides which, it would appear from the *Parmenides* (126 B) that

he had a younger half-brother by the mother's side, named Antiphon, and son of Pyrilampes (compare *Charmides*, p. 158 A, and *Plut.*, *De Frat. Amore*, 12, p. 484 E). But the age, which this would assign to Antiphon, does not harmonise well with the chronological postulates assumed in the *exordium* of the *Parmenides*. Accordingly, K. F. Hermann and Stallbaum are led to believe, that besides the brothers of Plato named Glaukon and Adeimantus, there must also have been two uncles of Plato bearing these same names, and having Antiphon for their younger brother. (See Stallbaum's *Prolegg. ad Charm.* pp. 84, 85, and *Prolegg. ad Parmen.*, Part iii. pp. 304-307.) This is not unlikely: but we cannot certainly determine the point—more especially as we do not know what amount of chronological inaccuracy Plato might hold to be admissible in the *personnel* of his dialogues.

It is worth mentioning, that in the discourse of Andokides de *Mysteriis*, persons named Plato, Charmides, Antiphon, are named among those accused of concern in the sacrileges of 415 B.C.—the mutilation of the *Hermes* and the mock celebration of the mysteries. *Speusippus* is also named as among the Senators of the year (*Andokides de Myst.* p. 13-27, seq.). Whether these persons belonged to the same family as the philosopher Plato, we cannot say. He himself was then only twelve years old.

told) either of his forehead or of his shoulders. Endowed with a robust physical frame, and exercised in gymnastics, not merely in one of the palestræ of Athens (which he describes graphically in the Charmides) but also under an Argeian trainer, he attained such force and skill as to contend (if we may credit Dikæarchus) for the prize of wrestling among boys at the Isthmian festival.¹ His literary training was commenced under a schoolmaster named Dionysius, and pursued under Drakon, a celebrated teacher of music in the large sense then attached to that word. He is said to have displayed both diligence and remarkable quickness of apprehension, combined too with the utmost gravity and modesty.² He not only acquired great familiarity with the poets, but composed poetry of his own—dithyrambic, lyric, and tragic: and he is even reported to have prepared a tragic tetralogy, with the view of competing for victory at the Dionysian festival. We are told that he burned these poems, when he attached himself to the society of Sokrates. No compositions in verse remain under his name, except a few epigrams—amatory, affectionate, and of great poetical beauty. But there is ample proof in his dialogues that the cast of his mind was essentially poetical. Many of his philosophical speculations are nearly allied to poetry, and acquire their hold upon the mind rather through imagination and sentiment than through reason or evidence.

According to Diogenes³ (who on this point does not cite his authority), it was about the twentieth year of Plato's age (407 B.C.) that his acquaintance with Sokrates began. It may possibly have begun earlier, but certainly not later—since at the time of the conversation (related by Xenophon) between Sokrates and Plato's younger brother Glaukon, there was already a friendship established between Sokrates and Plato: and that time can hardly be later than 406 B.C., or the beginning of 405 B.C.⁴ From 406 B.C. down to 399

¹ Diog. L. iii. 4; Epiktétus, i. 8-13, *εἰ δὲ καλὸς ἦν Πλάτων καὶ ἰσχυρὸς*, &c.

The statement of Sextus Empiricus—that Plato in his boyhood had his ears bored and wore ear-rings—indicates the opulent family to which he belonged. (Sext. Emp. adv. Gramm. s. 258.) Probably some of the old habits of the great Athenian families,

as to ornaments worn on the head or hair, were preserved with the children after they had been discontinued with adults. See Thuc. i. 6.

² Diog. L. iii. 26.

³ Ibid. 6.

⁴ Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 1. Sokrates was induced by his friendship for Plato and for Charmides the cousin of Plato, to

B.C., when Sokrates was tried and condemned, Plato seems to have remained in friendly relation and society with him: a relation perhaps interrupted during the severe political struggles between 405 B.C. and 403 B.C., but revived and strengthened after the restoration of the democracy in the last-mentioned year.

But though Plato may have commenced at the age of twenty his acquaintance with Sokrates, he cannot have been exclusively occupied in philosophical pursuits between the nineteenth and the twenty-fifth year of his age—that is, between 409-403 B.C. He was carried, partly by his own dispositions, to other matters besides philosophy; and even if such dispositions had not existed, the exigencies of the time pressed upon him imperatively as an Athenian citizen. Even under ordinary circumstances, a young Athenian of eighteen years of age, as soon as he was enrolled on the public register of citizens, was required to take the memorable military oath in the chapel of Aglaurus, and to serve on active duty, constant or nearly constant, for two years, in various posts throughout Attica, for the defence of the country.¹ But the six years from 409-403 B.C. were years of an extraordinary character. They included the most strenuous public efforts, the severest suffering, and the gravest political revolution, that had ever occurred at Athens. Every Athenian citizen was of necessity put upon constant (almost daily) military service; either abroad, or in Attica against the Lacedæmonian garrison established in the permanent fortified post of Dekeleia, within sight of the Athenian Akropolis. So

Plato's youth—service as a citizen and soldier.

admonish the forward youth Glaukon (Plato's younger brother), who thrust himself forward obtrusively to speak in the public assembly before he was twenty years of age. The two discourses of Sokrates—one with the presumptuous Glaukon, the other with the diffident Charmides—are both reported by Xenophon.

These discourses must have taken place before the battle of Ægospotami: for Charmides was killed during the Anarchy, and Glaukon certainly would never have attempted such acts of presumption after the restoration of the democracy, at a time when the tide of public feeling had become vehemently hostile to Kritias, Charmides, and all

the names and families connected with the oligarchical rule just overthrown.

I presume the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon to have taken place in 406 B.C. or 405 B.C.: it was in 406 B.C. that the disastrous battle of Ægospotami occurred.

¹ Read the oath sworn by the Ephēbi in Pollux viii. 105. Æschines tells us that he served his two ephēbic years as *πρωτολος τῆς χώρας*, when there was no remarkable danger or foreign pressure. See Æsch. De Fals. Legat. s. 178. See the facts about the Athenian Ephēbi brought together in a Dissertation by W. Dittenberger, p. 9-12.

habitually were the citizens obliged to be on guard, that Athens, according to Thucydides,¹ became a military post rather than a city. It is probable that Plato, by his family and its place on the census, belonged to the Athenian Hippeis or Horsemen, who were in constant employment for the defence of the territory. But at any rate, either on horseback, or on foot, or on shipboard, a robust young citizen like Plato, whose military age commenced in 409, must have borne his fair share in this hard but indispensable duty. In the desperate emergency, which preceded the battle of Arginusæ (406 B.C.), the Athenians put to sea in thirty days a fleet of 110 triremes for the relief of Mitylenê; all the men of military age, freemen, and slaves, embarking.² We can hardly imagine that at such a season Plato can have wished to decline service: even if he had wished it, the Strategi would not have permitted him. Assuming that he remained at home, the garrison-duty at Athens must have been doubled on account of the number of departures. After the crushing defeat of the

¹ Thuc. vii. 27: ἀσχυράμειψανόντων τὸν ἱππικόν, &c. Cf., viii. 69. Antiphon, who is described in the beginning of the Parmenides, as devoted to ἱππικὰ, must have been either brother or uncle of Plato.

² Xen. Hell. i. 6, 24. Οἱ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι, τὰ γεγονημένα καὶ τὴν πολιορκίαν ἐπεὶ ἤκουσαν, ἐφύρισαντο βοηθεῖν ναυσὶν ἑκατὸν καὶ ἑκατά, εἰσβιβάζοντες τοὺς ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντας ἅπαντας, καὶ δούλους καὶ ἑλευθέρους· καὶ πλεονέσαντες τὰς ἑκατά καὶ ἑκατὸν ἐν τριάκοντα ἡμέραις, ἀπῆλθον· εἰσέβησαν δὲ καὶ τὸν ἱππικὸν πολλοί. In one of the anecdotes given by Diogenes (iii. 24) Plato alludes to his own military service. Aristoxenus (Diog. L. iii. 8) said that Plato had been engaged thrice in military expeditions out of Attica: once to Tanagra, a second time to Corinth, a third time to Delium, where he distinguished himself. Aristoxenus must have had fair means of information, yet I do not know what to make of this statement. All the three places named are notorious for battles fought by Athens; nevertheless chronology utterly forbids the supposition that Plato could have been present either at the battle of Tanagra or at the battle of Delium. At the battle of Delium Sokrates was present, and is said to have distinguished himself: hence there is ground for suspecting some

confusion between his name and that of Plato. It is however possible that there may have been, during the interval between 410-406 B.C. partial invasions of the frontiers of Boeotia by Athenian detachments: both Tanagra and Delium were on the Boeotian frontier. The great battle of Corinth took place in 394 B.C. Plato left Athens immediately after the death of Sokrates in 399 B.C., and visited several foreign countries during the years immediately following; but he may have been at Athens in 394 B.C., and may have served in the Athenian force at Corinth. See Mr. Clinton, Fast. Hell. ad ann. 395 B.C. I do not see how Plato could have been engaged in any battle of Delium after the battle of Corinth, for Athens was not then at war with the Boeotians.

At the same time I confess that the account given by or ascribed to Aristoxenus appears to me to have been founded on little positive information, when we compare it with the military duty which Plato must have done between 410-406 B.C.

It is curious that Antisthenes also is mentioned as having distinguished himself at the battle of Tanagra (Diog. vi. 1). The same remarks are applicable to him as have just been made upon Plato.

Athenians at *Ægospotami*, came the terrible apprehension at Athens, then the long blockade and famine of the city (wherein many died of hunger); next the tyranny of the Thirty, who among their other oppressions made war upon all free speech, and silenced even the voice of Sokrates: then the gallant combat of Thrasybulus followed by the intervention of the Lacedæmonians—contingencies full of uncertainty and terror, but ending in the restoration of the democracy. After such restoration, there followed all the anxieties, perils, of reaction, new enactments and provisions, required for the revived democracy, during the four years between the expulsion of the Thirty and the death of Sokrates.

From the dangers, fatigues, and sufferings of such an historical decad, no Athenian citizen could escape, whatever might be his feeling towards the existing democracy, or however averse he might be to public employment by natural temper. But Plato was not thus averse, during the earlier years of his adult life. We know, from his own letters, that he then felt strongly the impulse of political ambition usual with young Athenians of good family;¹ though probably not with any such premature vehemence as his younger brother Glaukon, whose impatience Sokrates is reported to have so judiciously moderated.² Whether Plato ever spoke with success in the public assembly, we do not know: he is said to have been shy by nature, and his voice was thin and feeble, ill adapted for the *Pnyx*.³ However, when the oligarchy of Thirty was established, after the capture and subjugation of Athens, Plato was not only relieved from the necessity of addressing the assembled people, but also obtained additional facilities for rising into political influence, through Kritias (his near relative) and Charmides, leading men among the new oligarchy. Plato affirms that he had always disapproved the antecedent democracy, and that he entered on the new scheme of government with full hope of seeing justice and wisdom predominant. He was soon undeceived. The government of the Thirty proved a sanguinary and rapacious tyranny,⁴ filling him with disappointment and disgust.

¹ Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 324-325.

² Xen., *Mem.* iii. 6.

³ Diogen. Laert. iii. 5: *Ταχρόφωνός*

τε ἤν, &c. iii. 26: αἰδέμενος καὶ κόσμος.

⁴ *History of Greece*, vol. viii. ch. 65.

He was especially revolted by their treatment of Sokrates, whom they not only interdicted from continuing his habitual colloquy with young men,¹ but even tried to implicate in nefarious murders, by ordering him along with others to arrest Leon the Salamian, one of their intended victims: an order which Sokrates, at the peril of his life, disobeyed.

Thus mortified and disappointed, Plato withdrew from public functions. What part he took in the struggle between the oligarchy and its democratical assailants under Thrasylbulus, we are not informed. But when the democracy was re-established, his political ambition revived, and he again sought to acquire some active influence on public affairs. Now however the circumstances had become highly unfavourable to him. The name of his deceased relative Kritias was generally abhorred, and he had no powerful partisans among the popular leaders. With such disadvantages, with anti-democratical sentiments, and with a thin voice, we cannot wonder that Plato soon found public life repulsive;² though he admits the remarkable moderation displayed by the restored Demos. His repugnance was aggravated to the highest pitch of grief and indignation by the trial and condemnation of Sokrates (399 B.C.), four years after the renewal of the democracy. At that moment doubtless the Sokratic men or companions were unpopular in a body. Plato, after having yielded his best sympathy and aid at the trial of Sokrates, retired along with several others of them to Megara. He made up his mind that for a man of his views and opinions, it was not only unprofitable, but also unsafe, to embark in active public life, either at Athens or in any other Grecian city. He resolved to devote himself to philosophical speculation,

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 2, 36; Plato, Apol. Sokrat. c. 20, p. 82.

² Elian (V. H. iii. 27) had read a story to the effect, that Plato, in consequence of poverty, was about to seek military service abroad, and was buying arms for the purpose, when he was induced to stay by the exhortation of Sokrates, who prevailed upon him to devote himself to philosophy at home.

If there be any truth in this story, it must refer to some time in the interval between the restoration of the democracy (403 B.C.) and the death of So-

krates (399 B.C.). The military service of Plato, prior to the battle of Ægospotami (405 B.C.), must have been obligatory, in defence of his country, not depending on his own free choice. It is possible also that Plato may have been for the time impoverished, like many other citizens, by the intestine troubles in Attica, and may have contemplated military service abroad, like Xenophon.

But I am inclined to think that the story is unfounded, and that it arises from some confusion between Plato and Xenophon.

and to abstain from practical politics ; unless fortune should present to him some exceptional case, of a city prepared to welcome and obey a renovator upon exalted principles.¹

At Megara Plato passed some time with the Megarian Eukleides, his fellow-disciple in the society of Sokrates, and the founder of what is termed the Megaric school of philosophers. He next visited Kyrênê, where he is said to have become acquainted with the geometrician Theodôrus, and to have studied geometry under him. From Kyrênê he proceeded to Egypt, interesting himself much in the antiquities of the country as well as in the conversation of the priests. In or about 394 B.C.—if we may trust the statement of Aristoxenus about the military service of Plato at Corinth, he was again at Athens. He afterwards went to Italy and Sicily, seeking the society of the Pythagorean philosophers, Archytas, Echekrates, Timæus, &c., at Tarentum and Lokri, and visiting the volcanic manifestations of Ætna. It appears that his first visit to Sicily was made when he was about forty years of age, which would be 387 B.C. Here he made acquaintance with the youthful Dion, over whom he acquired great intellectual ascendancy. By Dion Plato was prevailed upon to visit the elder Dionysius at Syracuse :² but that despot, offended by the free spirit of his conversation and admonitions, dismissed him with displeasure, and even caused him to be sold into slavery at Ægina in his voyage home. Though really sold, however, Plato was speedily ransomed by friends. After farther incurring some risk of his life as an Athenian citizen, in consequence of the hostile feelings of the Æginetans, he was conveyed away safely to Athens, about 386 B.C.³

It was at this period, about 386 B.C., that the continuous and

He retires
from Athens
after the
death of
Sokrates—
his travels.

¹ The above account of Plato's proceedings, perfectly natural and interesting, but unfortunately brief, is to be found in his seventh Epistle, p. 325-326.

² Plato, *Epistol.* vii. p. 324 A, 327 A.

³ *Plut.* *Dion.* c. 5 ; *Corn. Nep.*, *Dion.* ii. 8 ; *Diog. Laert.* iii. 19-20 ; *Aristides*, *Or.* xlv. *Ἐπεὶ τὸν Τερράμων*, p. 306-306, ed. Dindorf.

Cicero (*De Fin.* v. 29 ; *Tusc. Disp.* i. 17), and others, had contracted a lofty idea of Plato's Travels, more than the

reality seems to warrant. *Val. Max.* viii. 7, 8 ; *Plin. Hist. Nat.* xxx. 2.

The Sophist Himerius repeats the same general statements about Plato's early education, and extensive subsequent travels, but without adding any new particulars (*Orat.* xiv. 21-25).

If we can trust a passage of *Tzetzes*, cited by Mr. Clinton (*F. H.* ad B.C. 306) and by Welcker (*Trag. Gr.* p. 1236), Dionysius the elder of Syracuse had composed (among his various dramas) a tragi-comedy directed against Plato.

His permanent establishment at Athens—336 B.C. formal public teaching of Plato, constituting as it does so great an epoch in philosophy, commenced. But I see no ground for believing, as many authors assume, that he was absent from Athens during the entire interval between 399-386 B.C. I regard such long-continued absence as extremely improbable. Plato had not been sentenced to banishment, nor was he under any compulsion to stay away from his native city. He was not born "of an oak-tree or a rock" (to use an Homeric phrase, strikingly applied by Sokrates in his *Apology* to the *Dikasts*¹), but of a noble family at Athens, where he had brothers and other connections. A temporary retirement, immediately after the death of Sokrates, might be congenial to his feelings and interesting in many ways; but an absence of moderate length would suffice for such exigencies, and there were surely reasonable motives to induce him to revisit his friends at home. I conceive Plato as having visited Kyrênê, Egypt, and Italy during these thirteen years, yet as having also spent part of this long time at Athens. Had he been continuously absent from that city he would have been almost forgotten, and would scarcely have acquired reputation enough to set up with success as a teacher.²

The spot selected by Plato for his lectures or teaching was a garden adjoining the precinct sacred to the Hero Hekadêmus or Akadêmus, distant from the gate of Athens called Dipylon somewhat less than a mile, on the road to Eleusis, towards the north. In this precinct there were both walks, shaded by trees, and a gymnasium for bodily exercise; close adjoining, Plato either inherited or acquired a small dwelling-house and garden, his own private property.³ Here, under the name of the Academy, was founded

¹ Plato, *Apol.* p. 34 D.

² Stallbaum insists upon it as "*certum et indubium*" that Plato was absent from Athens continuously, without ever returning to it, for the thirteen years immediately succeeding the death of Sokrates. But I see no good evidence of this, and I think it highly improbable. See Stallbaum, *Prolegg. ad Platon. Politicum*, p. 38, 39. The statement of Strabo (xvii. 300), that Plato and Endoxus passed thirteen years in Egypt, is not admissible.

Ueberweg examines and criticises the statements about Plato's travels. He considers it probable that Plato passed some part of these thirteen years at Athens (*Ueber die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platon. Schrift.* p. 126, 127). Mr. Fynes Clinton thinks the same. *F. H. B.C.* 394; *Append. c.* 21, p. 366.

³ *Diog. Laert.* iii. 7, 8; *Cic. De Fin.* v. 1; C. G. Zumpt, *Ueber den Bestand der philosophischen Schulen in Athen*, p. 8 (Berlin, 1843). The Academy was

the earliest of those schools of philosophy, which continued for centuries forward to guide and stimulate the speculative minds of Greece and Rome.

We have scarce any particulars respecting the growth of the Academy from this time to the death of Plato, in 347 B.C. We only know generally that his fame as a lecturer became eminent and widely diffused: that among his numerous pupils were included Speusippus, Xenokrates, Aristotle, Democritus, Hyperides, Lykurgus, &c.: that he was admired and consulted by Perdikkas in Macedonia and Dionysius at Syracuse: that he was also visited by listeners and pupils from all parts of Greece.

Plato as a teacher—pupils numerous and wealthy, from different cities.

Among them was Eudoxus of Knidus, who afterwards became illustrious both in geometry and astronomy. At the age of twenty-three, and in poor circumstances, Eudoxus was tempted by the reputation of the Sokratic men, and enabled by the aid of friends, to visit Athens: where, however, he was coldly received by Plato. Besides preparing an octennial period or octaëtëris, and a descriptive map of the Heavens, Eudoxus also devised the astronomical hypothesis of Concentric Spheres—the earliest theory proposed to show that the apparent irregularity in the motion of the Sun and the Planets might be explained, and proved to result from a multiplicity of co-operating spheres or agencies, each in itself regular.¹ This theory of Eudoxus is said

consecrated to Athênê; there was, however, a statue of Eros there, to whom sacrifice was offered, in conjunction with Athênê. *Athenensia*, xiii. 561.

At the time when Aristophanes ascribed Sokrates in the comedy of the Nubes (423 B.C.), the Academy was known and familiar as a place for gymnastic exercise; and Aristophanes (*Nub.* 996) singles it out as the proper scene of action for the honest and muscular youth, who despises rhetoric and philosophy. Aristophanes did not anticipate that within a short time after the representation of his last comedy, the most illustrious disciple of Sokrates would select the Academy as the spot for his residence and philosophical lectures, and would confer upon the name a permanent intellectual meaning, as designating the earliest and most memorable of the Hellenic schools.

In 399 B.C., when the school of Plato

was in existence, the Athenian hoplites, marching to aid the Lacedæmonians in Peloponnesus, were ordered by Iphikrates to make their evening meal in the Academy (*Xen. Hell.* vi. 5, 49).

The garden, afterwards established by Epikurus, was situated between the gate of Athens and the Academy: so that a person passed by it, when he walked forth from Athens to the Academy (*Cic. De Fin.* i. 1).

¹ For an account of Eudoxus himself, of his theory of concentric spheres, and the subsequent extensions of it, see the instructive volume of the late lamented Sir George Cornewall Lewis, —*Historical Survey of the Ancient Astronomy*, ch. iii. sect. 2, p. 146 seq.

M. Boeckh also (in his recent publication, *Ueber die vierjährigen Sonnenkreise der Alten, vorzüglich den Eudoxischen*, Berlin, 1863) has given an account of the life and career of

to have originated in a challenge of Plato, who propounded to astronomers, in his oral discourse, the problem which they ought to try to solve.¹

Eudoxus, not with reference to his theory of concentric spheres, but to his Calendar and Lunisolar Cycles or Periods, quadrennial and octennial. I think Boeckh is right in placing the voyage of Eudoxus to Egypt at an earlier period of the life of Eudoxus; that is, about 378 B.C.; and not in 362 B.C., where it is placed by Letronne and others. Boeckh shows that the letters of recommendation from Agesilanus to Nektanebos, which Eudoxus took with him, do not necessarily coincide in time with the military expedition of Agesilanus to Egypt, but were more probably of earlier date. (Boeckh, p. 140-148.)

Eudoxus lived 53 years (406-353 B.C., about); being born when Plato was 21, and dying when Plato was 75. He was one of the most illustrious men of the age. He was born in poor circumstances; but so marked was his early promise, that some of the medical school at Knidus assisted him to prosecute his studies—to visit Athens and hear the Sophists, Plato among them—to visit Egypt, Tarentum (where he studied geometry with Archytas), and Sicily (where he studied *τὰ ἱερὰ* with Philiton). These facts depend upon the *Hieroglyphica* of Kallimachus, which are good authority. (Diog. L. viii. 86.)

After thus preparing himself by travelling and varied study, Eudoxus took up the profession of a Sophist, at Kyzikus and the neighbouring cities in the Propontis. He obtained great celebrity, and a large number of pupils. M. Boeckh says, "Dort lebte er als Sophist, sagt Sotion: das heisst, er lehrte, und hielt Vorträge. Dasselbe bezeugt Philostratos."

I wish to call particular attention to the way in which M. Boeckh here describes a Sophist of the fourth century B.C. Nothing can be more correct. Every man who taught and gave lectures to audiences more or less numerous, was so called. The Platonic critics altogether darken the history of philosophy, by using the word *Sophist* with its modern associations (and the unmeaning abstract *Sophistic* which they derive from it), to represent a supposed school of speculative and deceptive corruptors.

Eudoxus, having been coldly received when young and poor by Plato,

had satisfaction in revisiting Athens at the height of his reputation, accompanied by numerous pupils—and in showing himself again to Plato. The two then became friends. Menachmus and Helikon, geometrical pupils of Eudoxus, received instruction from Plato also; and Helikon accompanied Plato on his third voyage to Sicily (Plato, *Epist.* xiii. p. 380 D; *Plat. Dion.* c. 19). Whether Eudoxus accompanied him there also, as Boeckh supposes, is doubtful: I think it improbable.

Eudoxus ultimately returned to his native city of Knidus, where he was received with every demonstration of honour: a public vote of esteem and recognition being passed to welcome him. He is said to have been solicited to give laws to the city, and to have actually done so: how far this may be true, we cannot say. He also visited the neighbouring prince Mausolus of Karia, by whom he was much honoured.

We know from Aristotle, that Eudoxus was not only illustrious as an astronomer and geometer, but that he also proposed a theory of Ethics, similar in its general formula to that which was afterwards laid down by Epikurus. Aristotle dissents from the theory, but he bears express testimony, in a manner very unusual with him, to the distinguished personal merit and virtue of Eudoxus (*Ethic. Nikom.* x. 3, p. 1172, b. 16).

¹ Respecting Eudoxus, see Diog. L. viii. 86-91. As the life of Eudoxus probably extended from about 406-353 B.C., his first visit to Athens would be about 383 B.C., some three years after Plato commenced his school. Strabo (xvii. 806), when he visited Heliopolis in Egypt, was shown by the guides certain cells or chambers which were said to have been occupied by Plato and Eudoxus, and was assured that the two had passed thirteen years together in Egypt. This account deserves no credit. Plato and Eudoxus visited Egypt, but not together, and neither of them for so long as thirteen years. Eudoxus stayed there sixteen months (Diog. L. viii. 87). Simplicius, *Schol. ad Aristot. De Caelo*, p. 497, 498, ed. Brandis, 498, a. 45. *Καὶ πρῶτος τῶν Ἑλλήνων Εὐδόξος ὁ Κνίδιος.*

Though Plato demanded no money as a fee for admission of pupils, yet neither did he scruple to receive presents from rich men such as Dionysius, Dion, and others.¹ In the jests of Ephippus, Antiphanes, and other poets of the middle comedy, the pupils of Plato in the Academy are described as finely and delicately clad, nice in their persons even to affectation, with elegant caps and canes; which is the more to be noticed because the preceding comic poets derided Sokrates and his companions for qualities the very opposite—as prosing beggars, in mean attire and dirt.² Such students must have belonged to opulent

ὡς Εὐδήμος τε ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ τῆς Ἀστρολογικῆς Ἱστορίας ἀπεμνημόνευσε καὶ Σωσιγένης παρὰ Εὐδήμῳ τοῦτο λαβὼν, ἀψάσθαι λέγεται τῶν τοιούτων ὑποθέσεων. Πλάτωνος, ὡς φησι Σωσιγένης, πρόβλημα τοῦτο ποιησάμενον τοῖς περὶ ταῦτα ἐσπουδακῶσι—τῶν ὑποθετίων ὁμαλῶν καὶ τεταγμένων κινήσεων διασωθῇ τὰ περὶ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν πλανημένων φαινόμενα. The Scholion of Simplicius, which follows at great length, is exceedingly interesting and valuable, in regard to the astronomical theory of Eudoxus, with the modifications introduced into it by Kallippus, Aristotle, and others. All the share in it which is claimed for Plato, is, that he described in clear language the problem to be solved; and even *that* share depends simply upon the statement of the Alexandrine Sosigenes (contemporary of Julius Caesar), not upon the statement of Eudémus. At least the language of Simplicius affirms, that Sosigenes copied from Eudémus the fact, that Eudoxus was the first Greek who proposed a systematic astronomical hypothesis to explain the motions of the planets—(παρ' Εὐδήμου τοῦτο λαβὼν) not the circumstance, that Plato propounded the problem afterwards mentioned. From whom Sosigenes derived this last information, is not indicated. About his time, various fictions had gained credit in Egypt respecting the connection of Plato with Eudoxus, as we may see by the story of Strabo above cited. If Plato impressed upon others that which is here ascribed to him, he must have done so in *conversation or oral discourse*—for there is nothing in his written dialogues to that effect. Moreover, there is nothing in the dialogues to make us suppose that Plato adopted or approved the theory of

Eudoxus. When Plato speaks of astronomy, either in the Republic, or in *Leges*, or in *Epinomis*, it is in a totally different spirit—not manifesting any care to save the astronomical phenomena. Both Aristotle himself (*Metaphys. A. p. 1073 b.*) and Simplicius, make it clear that Aristotle warmly espoused and enlarged the theory of Eudoxus. Theophrastus, successor of Aristotle, did the same. But we do not hear that either Speusippus or Xenokrates (successor of Plato) took any interest in the theory. This is one remarkable point of divergence between Plato and the Platonists on one side—Aristotle and the Aristotelians on the other—and much to the honour of the latter: for the theory of Eudoxus, though erroneous, was a great step towards improved scientific conceptions on astronomy, and a great provocative to farther observation of astronomical facts.

¹ Plato, *Epistol. xiii. p. 361, 362.* We learn from this epistle that Plato received pecuniary remittances not merely from Dionysius, but also from other friends (ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων—361 C); that he employed these not only for choregies and other costly functions of his own, but also to provide dowry for female relatives, and presents to friends (363 A).

² See Meineke, *Hist. Crit. Comic. Græc. p. 288, 289*—and the extracts there given from Ephippus and Antiphanes—*apud Athenæum, xi. 509, xii. 544.* About the poverty and dirt which was reproached to Sokrates and his disciples, see the fragment of Ameipsias in Meineke, *ibid. p. 203.* Also Aristoph. *Aves, 1555; Nubes, 827; and the Fragm. of Eupolis* in Meineke, *p. 552*—Μισῶ δ' ἐγὼ καὶ Σωκράτην, τῶν πτωχῶν ἀδολέσχην.

families; and we may be sure that they required their master by some valuable present, though no fee may have been formally demanded from them. Some conditions (though we do not know what) were doubtless required for admission. Moreover the example of Eudoxus shows that in some cases even ardent and promising pupils were practically repelled. At any rate, the teaching of Plato formed a marked contrast with that extreme and indiscriminate publicity which characterised the conversation of Sokrates, who passed his days in the market-place or in the public porticoes or palæstræ; while Plato both dwelt and discoursed in a quiet residence and garden a little way out of Athens. The title of Athens to be considered the training-city of Hellas (as Perikles had called her fifty years before), was fully sustained by the Athenian writers and teachers between 390-347; especially by Plato and Isokrates, the most celebrated and largely frequented. So many foreign pupils came to Isokrates that he affirms most of his pecuniary gains to have been derived from non-Athenians. Several of his pupils stayed with him three or four years. The like is doubtless true about the pupils of Plato.¹

Visit of Plato to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse, 367 B.C. Second visit to the same —morti- fying failure.	It was in the year 367-366 that Plato was induced, by the earnest entreaties of Dion, to go from Athens to Syracuse, on a visit to the younger Dionysius, who had just become despot, succeeding to his father of the same name. Dionysius II., then very young, had manifested some dispositions towards philosophy, and prodigious admiration for Plato: who was encouraged by Dion to hope that he would have influence enough to bring about an amendment or
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Meineke thinks, that Aristophanes, in the *Ekklesiazusæ*, 646, and in the *Plutus*, 313, intends to ridicule Plato under the name of Aristyllus: Plato's name having been originally Aristokles. But I see no sufficient ground for this opinion.

¹ Perikles in the Funeral Oration (*Thuc. ii. 41*) calls Athens τῆς Ἑλλάδος αἰνεύουσα: the same eulogium is repeated, with greater abundance of words, by Isokrates in his Panegyric Oration (*Or. iv. sect. 56, p. 51*).

The declaration of Isokrates, that most of his money was acquired from

foreign (non-Athenian) pupils, and the interesting fact that many of them not only stayed with him three or four years but were even then loth to depart, will be found in *Orat. xv. De Permutatione*, sect. 93-175. *Plutarch (Vit. x. Orat. 833 E)* goes so far as to say that Isokrates never required any pay from an Athenian pupil.

Nearly three centuries after Plato's decease, Cicero sent his son Marcus to Athens, where the son spent a considerable time, frequenting the lectures of the Peripatetic philosopher Kratipus. Young Cicero, in an interesting

thorough reform of the government at Syracuse. This ill-starred visit, with its momentous sequel, has been described in my 'History of Greece'. It not only failed completely, but made matters worse rather than better: Dionysius became violently alienated from Dion, and sent him into exile. Though turning a deaf ear to Plato's recommendations, he nevertheless liked his conversation, treated him with great respect, detained him for some time at Syracuse, and was prevailed upon, only by the philosopher's earnest entreaties, to send him home. Yet in spite of such uncomfortable experience Plato was induced, after a certain interval, again to leave Athens and pay a second visit to Dionysius, mainly in hopes of procuring the restoration of Dion. In this hope too he was disappointed, and was glad to return, after a longer stay than he wished, to Athens.

It was in 359 B.C. that Dion, aided by friends in Peloponnesus, and encouraged by warm sympathy and co-operation from many of Plato's pupils in the Academy,¹ equipped an armament against Dionysius. Notwithstanding the inadequacy of his force he had the good fortune to make himself master of Syracuse, being greatly favoured by the popular discontent of the Syracusans against the reigning despot: but he did not know how to deal with the people, nor did he either satisfy their aspirations towards liberty, or realise his own engagements. Retaining in his hands a despotic power, similar in the main to that of Dionysius, he speedily became odious, and was assassinated by the treachery of Kallippus, his companion in arms as well as fellow-pupil of the Platonic Academy. The state of Syracuse, torn by the joint evils of

Expedition of Dion against Dionysius—sympathies of Plato and the Academy.

Success, misconduct, and death of Dion.

letter addressed to Tiro (Cic. Epist. Fam. xvi. 23), describes in animated terms both his admiration for the person and abilities, and his delight in the private society, of Kratippus. Several of Plato's pupils probably felt as much or more towards him.

¹ Plutarch, Dion, c. 22.

Xenokrates as well as Speusippus accompanied Plato to Sicily (Diog. L. iv. 6).

To show the warm interest taken, not only by Plato himself but also by the Platonic pupils in the Academy in

the conduct of Dion after he had become master of Syracuse, Plutarch quotes both from the letter of Plato to Dion (which now stands fourth among the Epistolæ Platonicæ, p. 320) and also from a letter which he had read, written by Speusippus to Dion; in which Speusippus exhorts Dion emphatically to bless Sicily with good laws and government, "In order that he may glorify the Academy"—ὅπως . . . εὐκλεῶς θῇται τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν (Plutarch, De Adulator. et Amic. c. 29, p. 70 A).

anarchy and despotism, and partially recovered by Dionysius, became more unhappy than ever.

The visits of Plato to Dionysius were much censured, and his motives¹ misrepresented by unfriendly critics; and these reproaches were still further embittered by the entire failure of his hopes. The closing years of his long life were saddened by the disastrous turn of events at Syracuse, aggravated by the discreditable abuse of power and violent death of his intimate friend Dion, which brought dishonour both upon himself and upon the Academy. Nevertheless he lived to the age of eighty, and died in 348-347 B.C., leaving a competent property, which he bequeathed by a will still extant.² But his foundation, the Academy, did not die with him. It passed to his nephew Speusippus, who succeeded him as teacher, conductor of the school, or Scholarch: and was himself succeeded after eight years by Xenokrates of Chalkêdon: while another pupil of the Academy, Aristotle, after an absence of some years from Athens, returned thither and established a school of his own at the Lykeum, at another extremity of the city.

The latter half of Plato's life in his native city must have been one of dignity and consideration, though not of any political activity. He is said to have addressed the Dikastery as an advocate for the accused general Chabrias: and we are told that he discharged the expensive and showy functions of Chorêgus, with funds supplied by Dion.³

Scholars
of Plato—
Aristotle.

¹ Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistes) p. 285 C; Aristides, Orat. xlv., *Ἐν τῷ τῶν Τετρακτῶν*, p. 234-235; Apuleius, *De Habit. Philos. Platon.* p. 571.

² Diog. Laert. iii. 41-42. Seneca (Epist. 58) says that Plato died on the anniversary of his birth, in the month Thargelion.

³ Plut. Aristides, c. 1; Diog. Laert. iii. 23-24. Diogenes says that no other Athenian except Plato dared to speak publicly in defence of Chabrias; but this can hardly be correct, since Aristotle mentions another *συνήγορος* named Lykoleon (*Rhet.* iii. 10, p. 1411, b. 6). We may fairly presume that the trial of Chabrias alluded to by Aristotle is the same as that alluded to by Diogenes, that which arose out of the wrongful occupation of Orôpus by the Thebans. If Plato appeared at the trial, I doubt whether it could have

occurred in 366 B.C., as Clinton supposes; Plato must have been absent during that year in Sicily.

The anecdote given by Diogenes, in relation to Plato's appearance at this trial, deserves notice. Krobylus, one of the accusers, said to him, "Are you come to plead on behalf of another? Are not you aware that the hemlock of Sokrates is in store for you also?" Plato replied: "I affronted dangers formerly, when I went on military expedition, for my country, and I am prepared to affront them now in discharge of my duty to a friend" (iii. 24).

This anecdote is instructive, as it exhibits the continuance of the antipathies at Athens among a considerable portion of the citizens, and as it goes to attest the military service rendered personally by Plato.

Out of Athens also his reputation was very great. When he went to the Olympic festival of B.C. 360, he was an object of conspicuous attention and respect: he was visited by hearers, young men of rank and ambition, from the most distant Hellenic cities; and his advice was respectfully invoked both by Perdikkas in Macedonia and by Dionysius II. at Syracuse. During his last visit to Syracuse, it is said that some of the students in the Academy, among whom Aristotle is mentioned, became dissatisfied with his absence, and tried to set up a new school; but were prevented by Iphikrates and Chabrias, the powerful friends of Plato at Athens. This story is connected with alleged ingratitude on the part of Aristotle towards Plato, and with alleged repugnance on the part of Plato towards Aristotle.¹ The fact itself—that during Plato's absence in Sicily his students sought to provide for themselves instruction and discussion elsewhere—is neither surprising nor blameable. And as to Aristotle, there is ground for believing that he passed for an intimate friend and disciple of Plato, even during the last ten years of Plato's life. For we read that Aristotle, following

Diogenes (iii. 46) gives a long list of hearers; and Athenæus (xi. 506-509) enumerates several from different cities in Greece: Euphræus of Oreus (in Eubœa), who acquired through Plato's recommendation great influence with Perdikkas, king of Macedonia, and who is said to have excluded from the society of that king every one ignorant of philosophy and geometry; Euagon of Lampsakus, Timæus of Kyzikus, Chæron of Pellênê, all of whom tried, and the last with success, to usurp the sceptre in their respective cities; Eudæmus of Cyprus; Kallippus the Athenian, fellow-learner with Dion in the Academy, afterwards his companion in his expedition to Sicily, ultimately his murderer; Herakleides and Python from Ænus in Thrace, Chion and Leonides, also Klearchus the despot from the Pontic Herakleia (Justin, xvi. 5).

Several of these examples seem to have been cited by the orator Demochæres (nephew of Demosthenes) in his speech at Athens vindicating the law proposed by Sophokles for the expulsion of the philosophers from Athens (Athenæ. xi. 508 F), a speech delivered about 306 B.C. Plutarch compliments

Plato for the active political liberators and tyrannicides who came forth from the Academy: he considers Plato as the real author and planner of the expedition of Dion against Dionysius, and expatiates on the delight which Plato must have derived from it—a supposition very incorrect (Plutarch, Non Posse Suav. p. 1097 B; adv. Kolōten, p. 1126 B-C).

¹ Aristokles, ap. Eusebium, Præp. Evang. xv. 2; Ælian, V. H. iii. 19; Aristides, Or. 46, Ὑπερ τῶν Τετράπων, vol. ii. p. 324-325, Dindorf.

The friendship and reciprocity of service between Plato and Chabrias is an interesting fact. Compare Stahr, Aristotelis, vol. i. p. 50 seqq.

Cicero affirms, on the authority of the Epistles of Demosthenes, that Demosthenes describes himself as an assiduous hearer as well as reader of Plato (Cic. Brut. 31, 121; Orat. 4, 15). I think this fact highly probable, but the epistles which Cicero read no longer exist. Among the five Epistles remaining, Plato is once mentioned with respect in the fifth (p. 1490), but this epistle is considered by most critics spurious.

speculations and principles of teaching of his own, on the subject of rhetoric, found himself at variance with Isokrates and the Isokratean school. Aristotle attacked Isokrates and his mode of dealing with the subject: upon which Kephisodórus (one of the disciples of Isokrates) retaliated by attacking Plato and the Platonic Ideas, considering Aristotle as one of Plato's scholars and adherents.¹

Such is the sum of our information respecting Plato. Scanty as it is, we have not even the advantage of contemporary authority for any portion of it. We have no description of Plato from any contemporary author, friendly or adverse. It will be seen that after the death of Sokrates we know nothing about Plato as a man and a citizen, except the little which can be learnt from his few Epistles, all written when he was very old, and relating almost entirely to his peculiar relations with Dion and Dionysius. His dialogues, when we try to interpret them collectively, and gather from them general results as to the character and purposes of the author, suggest valuable arguments and perplexing doubts, but yield few solutions. In no one of the dialogues does Plato address us in his own person. In the *Apology* alone (which is not a dialogue) is he alluded to even as present: in the *Phædon* he is mentioned as absent from illness. Each of the dialogues, direct or indirect, is conducted from beginning to end by the persons whom he introduces.² Not one of the dialogues affords any positive internal evidence showing the date of its composition. In a few there are allusions to prove that they must have been composed at a period later than others, or later than some given event of known date; but nothing more can be positively established. Nor is there any good extraneous testimony to determine the date of any one among them. For the

Little known about Plato's personal history.

¹ Numenius, ap. Euseb. *Præp. Ev.* xiv. 6, 9. οἰηθεὶς (Kephisodórus) κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην φιλοσοφεῖν, ἐπολιμῆι μὲν Ἀριστοτέλει, ἔβαλλε δὲ Πλάτωνα, &c. This must have happened in the latter years of Plato's life, for Aristotle must have been at least twenty-five or twenty-six years of age when he engaged in such polemics. He was born in 384 B.C.

² On this point Aristotle, in the dialogues which he composed, did not

follow Plato's example. Aristotle introduced two or more persons debating a question, but he appeared in his own person to give the solution, or at least to wind up the debate. He sometimes also opened the debate by a proem or prefatory address in his own person (*Cic. ad Attic. iv. 16, 2, xiii. 19, 4*). Cicero followed the manner of Aristotle, not that of Plato. His dialogues are rhetorical rather than dramatic.

All the dialogues of Aristotle are lost.

remark ascribed to Sokrates about the dialogue called *Lysis* (which remark, if authentic, would prove the dialogue to have been composed during the life-time of Sokrates) appears altogether untrustworthy. And the statement of some critics, that the *Phædrus* was Plato's earliest composition, is clearly nothing more than an inference (doubtful at best, and, in my judgment, erroneous) from its dithyrambic style and erotic subject.¹

¹ Diog. L. iii. 38. Compare the *Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος Φιλοσοφίας*, c. 24, in the Appendix *Platonica* of K. F. Hermann's edition, p. 217.

CHAPTER VI.

PLATONIC CANON, AS RECOGNISED BY THRASYLLUS.

As we know little about Plato except from his works, the first question to be decided is, Which *are* his real works? Where are we to find a trustworthy Platonic Canon?

Down to the close of the last century this question was not much raised or discussed. The catalogue recognised by the rhetor Thrasyllus (contemporary with the Emperor Tiberius) was generally accepted as including none but genuine works of Plato; and was followed as such by editors and critics, who were indeed not very numerous.¹ But the discussions carried on during the present century have taken a different turn. While editors, critics, and translators have been greatly multiplied, some of the most distinguished among them, Schleiermacher at the head, have either professedly set aside, or in practice disregarded, the Thrasylllean catalogue, as if it carried no authority and very faint presumption. They have reasoned upon each dialogue as if its title to be considered genuine were now to be proved for the first

¹ The following passage from Wytenbach, written in 1776, will give an idea of the state of Platonic criticism down to the last quarter of the last century. To provide a new Canon for Plato seems not to have entered his thoughts.

Wytenbach, *Bibliotheca Critica*, vol. i. p. 23. Review of Fischer's edition of Plato's *Philæbus* and *Symposium*. "Quæ Ciceroni obtigit interpretum et editorum felicitas, eâ adeo caruit Plato, ut non solum paucos nactus sit qui ejus scripta typis ederent—sed qui ejus orationi nitorem restitueret, eamque a corruptelarum labe purgaret, et sensus obscurus atque abditos ex in-

teriore doctrinâ patefaceret, omnino reperiret neminem. Et ex ipso hoc editionum parvo numero—nam sex omnino sunt—nulla est recentior anno superioris seculi secundo: ut mirandum sit, centum et septuaginta annorum spatium neminem ex tot viris doctis extitisse, qui ita suam crisin Platoni addiceret, ut intelligentiam ejus veræ eruditionis amantibus aperiret.

"Qui Platonem legant, pauci sunt: qui intelligant, paucissimi; qui vero, vel ex versionibus, vel ex jejuno historię philosophicæ compendio, de eo judicent et cum supercilio pronuncient, plurimi sunt."

time ; either by external testimony (mentioned in Aristotle or others), or by internal evidences of style, handling, and thoughts :¹ as if, in other words, the *onus probandi* lay upon any one who believed the printed works of Plato to be genuine—not upon an opponent who disputes the authenticity of any one or more among them, and rejects it as spurious. Before I proceed to examine the conclusions, alike numerous and discordant, which these critics have proclaimed, I shall enquire how far the method which they have pursued is warrantable. Is there any presumption at all—and if so, what amount of presumption—in favour of the catalogue transmitted from antiquity by Thrasyllus, as a canon containing genuine works of Plato and no others ?

Upon this question I hold an opinion opposite to that of the Platonic critics since Schleiermacher. The presumption appears to me particularly strong, instead of particularly weak : comparing the Platonic writings with those of other eminent writers, dramatists, orators, historians, of the same age and country.

Canon established by Thrasyllus. Presumption in its favour.

We have seen that Plato passed the last thirty-eight years of his life (except his two short visits to Syracuse) as a writer and lecturer at Athens ; that he purchased and inhabited a fixed residence at the Academy, near the city. We know, moreover, that his principal pupils, especially (his nephew) Speusippus and Xenocrates, were constantly with him in this residence during his life ; that after his death the residence became permanently appropriated as a philosophical school for lectures, study, conversation, and friendly meetings of studious men, in which capacity it served for more than two centuries ;² that his nephew Speusippus succeeded him there as teacher, and taught there for

Fixed residence and school at Athens—founded by Plato and transmitted to successors.

¹ To see that this is the general method of proceeding, we have only to look at the work of Ueberweg, one of the most recent and certainly one of the ablest among the Platonic critics. *Untersuchungen über die Aechtheit und Zeitfolge der Platonischen Schriften*, Wien, 1861, p. 130-131.

² The teaching and conversation of the Platonic School continued fixed in the spot known as the Academy until the siege of Athens by Sylla in 87 B.C. The teacher was then forced to confine himself to the interior of the city,

where he gave lectures in the gymnasium called Ptolemaeum. In that gymnasium Cicero heard the lectures of the Scholarch Antiochus, B.C. 79 : walking out afterwards to visit the deserted but memorable site of the Academy (Cic. De Fin. v. 1 ; C. G. Zumpt, Ueber den Bestand der Philosophischen Schulen in Athen, p. 14, Berlin, 1843). The ground of the Academy, when once deserted, speedily became unhealthy, and continues to be so now, as Zumpt mentions that he himself experienced in 1835.

eight years, being succeeded after his death first by Xenokrates (for twenty-five years), afterwards by Polemon, Krantor, Krates, Arkesilaus, and others in uninterrupted series; that the school always continued to be frequented, though enjoying greater or less celebrity according to the reputation of the Scholarch.

By thus perpetuating the school which his own genius had originated, and by providing for it permanent support with a fixed domicile, Plato inaugurated a new epoch in the history of philosophy: this example was followed a few years afterwards by Aristotle, Zeno, and Epikurus. Moreover the proceeding was important in another way also, as it affected the preservation and authentication of his own manuscripts and compositions. It provided not only safe and lasting custody, such as no writer had ever enjoyed before, for Plato's original manuscripts, but also a guarantee of some efficacy against any fraud or error which might seek to introduce other compositions into the list. That Plato himself was not indifferent on this head we may fairly believe, since we learn from Dionysius of Halikarnassus, that he was indefatigable in the work of correction: and his disciples, who took the great trouble of noting down themselves what he spoke in his lectures, would not be neglectful as to the simpler duty of preserving his manuscripts.¹ Now Speusippus and Xenokrates (also Aristotle, Hestiasus, the Opuntian Philippus, and the other Platonic pupils) must have had personal knowledge of all that Plato had written, whether finished dialogues, unfinished fragments, or preparatory sketches. They had perfect means of distinguishing his real compositions from forgeries passed off in his name: and they had every motive to expose such forgeries (if any were attempted) wherever they

¹ Simplicius, Schol. Aristotel. Physic. i. 32, p. 334, b. 23, Brandis: λαβοὶ δ' ἂν τις καὶ παρὰ Σπενσίππου καὶ παρὰ Ξενοκράτους, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ παρεγόντων ἐν τῇ περὶ Τάγαθου τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀποδοσί· πάντες γὰρ συνέγραψαν καὶ διέσωσαν τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ. In another passage of the same Scholia (p. 362, a. 12) Simplicius mentions Heraclides (of Pontus), Hestiasus, and even Aristotle himself, as having taken notes of the same lectures.

Hermodorus appears to have carried some of Plato's dialogues to Sicily, and

to have made money by selling them. See Cicero ad Atticum, xiii. 21: Suidas et Zenobius—λόγοισιν Ἑρμοδωρος ἐμπορεύεται. See Zeller, Dissert. De Hermodoro, p. 19. In the above-mentioned epistle Cicero compares his own relations with Atticus, to those of Plato with Hermodorus. Hermodorus had composed a treatise respecting Plato, from which some extracts were given by Derkyllides (the contemporary of Thrasyllus) as well as by Simplicius (Zeller, De Hermod. p. 20-21).

could, in order to uphold the reputation of their master. If any one composed a dialogue and circulated it under the name of Plato, the school was a known place, and its occupants were at hand to give information to all who enquired about the authenticity of the composition. The original MSS. of Plato (either in his own handwriting or in that of his secretary, if he employed one¹) were doubtless treasured up in the school as sacred memorials of the great founder, and served as originals from which copies of unquestionable fidelity might be made, whenever the Scholarch granted permission. How long they continued to be so preserved we cannot say: nor do we know what was the condition of the MSS., or how long they were calculated to last. But probably many of the students frequenting the school would come for the express purpose of reading various works of Plato (either in the original MSS., or in faithful copies taken from them) with the exposition of the Scholarch; just as we know that the Roman M. Crassus (mentioned by Cicero), during his residence at Athens, studied the Platonic Gorgias with the aid of the Scholarch Charmadas.² The presidency of Speusippus and Xenokrates (taken jointly) lasted for thirty-three years; and even when they were replaced by successors who had enjoyed no personal intimacy with Plato, the motive to preserve the Platonic MSS. would still be operative, and the means of verifying what was really Platonic would still be possessed in the school. The original MSS. would be preserved, along with the treatises or dialogues which each successive Scholarch himself composed; thus forming a permanent and increasing school-library, probably enriched more or less by works acquired or purchased from others.

It appears to me that the continuance of this school—founded by Plato himself at his own abode, permanently domiciliated, and including all the MSS. which he left in it—gives us an amount of assurance for the authenticity of the so-called Platonic compositions, such as

Security
provided by
the school
for distinguish-
ing
what were

¹ We read in Cicero, (*Academic. Priora*, II. 4, 11) that the handwriting of the Scholarch Philo, when his manuscript was brought from Athens to Alexandria, was recognised at once by his friends and pupils.

² Cicero, *De Oratore*, I. 11, 45-47: "florente Academia, quod eam Charmadas et Clitomachus et Æschines obtinebant. . . Platoni, cujus tum Athenis eam Charmadā diligentius legi Gorgiam," &c.

Plato's genuine writings. does not belong to the works of other eminent contemporary authors, Aristippus, Antisthenes, Isokrates, Lysias, Demosthenes, Euripides, Aristophanes. After the decease of these last-mentioned authors, who can say what became of their MSS.? Where was any certain permanent custody provided for them? Isokrates had many pupils during his life, but left no school or *μουσείον* after his death. If any one composed a discourse, and tried to circulate it as the composition of Isokrates, among the bundles of judicial orations which were sold by the booksellers¹ as his (according to the testimony of Aristotle)—where was the person to be found, notorious and accessible, who could say: "I possess all the MSS. of Isokrates, and I can depose that this is not among them!" The chances of success for forgery or mistake were decidedly greater, in regard to the works of these authors, than they could be for those of Plato.

Again, the existence of this school-library explains more easily how it is that unfinished, inferior, and fragmentary Platonic compositions have been preserved. That there must have existed such compositions I hold to be certain. How is it supposable that any author, even Plato, could have brought to completion such masterpieces as Republic, Gorgias, Protagoras, Symposium, &c., without tentative and preparatory sketches, each of course in itself narrow, defective, perhaps of little value, but serving as material to be worked up or worked in? Most of these would be destroyed, but probably not all. If (as I believe) it be the fact, that all the Platonic MSS. were preserved as their author left them, some would probably be published (and some indeed are said to have been published) after his death; and among them would be included more or fewer of these unfinished performances, and sketches projected but abandoned. We can hardly suppose that Plato himself would have published fragments never finished, such as Kleitophon and Kritias²—the last ending in the middle of a sentence.

¹ Dionys. Halik. de Isocrate, p. 576 R. δεσμός πάντων πολλὰς δικανικῶν λόγων Ἰσοκράτειον περιφέρεισθαι φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβλιοπωλῶν Ἀριστοτέλης.

² Straton, the Peripatetic Scholarch

who succeeded Theophrastus, B.C. 287, bequeathed to Lykon by his will both the succession to his school (διατριβή) and all his books, except what he had written himself (πλὴν ὧν αὐτοῦ γεγρα-

The second philosophical school, begun by Aristotle and perpetuated (after his death in 322 B.C.) at the Lykeum on the eastern side of Athens, was established on the model of that of Plato. That which formed the centre or consecrating point was a Museum or chapel of the Muses: with statues of those goddesses of the place, and also a statue of the founder. Attached to this Museum were a portico, a hall with seats (one seat especially for the lecturing professor), a garden, and a walk, together with a residence, all permanently appropriated to the teacher and the process of instruction.¹ Theophrastus, the friend and immediate

Peripatetic school at the Lykeum — its composition and arrangement.

former). What is to be done with these latter he does not say. Lykon, in his last will, says:—*καὶ δύο μὲν αὐτῷ (Chares, a manumitted slave) δίδωμι καὶ τὰ μὲν βιβλία τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα· τὰ δὲ ἀνέκδοτα Καλλίνῳ, ὅπως ἐπιμελήσῃ αὐτὰ ἐκδῶ.* See Diog. L. v. 62, 73. Here Lykon directs expressly that Kallinus shall edit with care his (Lykon's) unpublished works. Probably Straton may have given similar directions during his life, so that it was unnecessary to provide in the will. *τὰ ἀνεγνωσμένα* is equivalent to *τὰ ἐκδομένα*. Publication was constituted by reading the MSS. aloud before a chosen audience of friends or critics; which readings often led to such remarks as induced the author to take his work back, and to correct it for a second recitation. See the curious sentence extracted from the letter of Theophrastus to Phanias (Diog. L. v. 37). Boeckh and other critics agree that both the Kleitophon and the Kritias were transmitted from antiquity in the fragmentary state in which we now read them: that they were compositions never completed. Boeckh affirms this with assurance respecting the Kleitophon, though he thinks that it is not a genuine work of Plato; on which last point I dissent from him. He thinks that the Kritias is a real work of Plato, though uncompleted (Boeckh in Platonis Minoem, p. 11).

Compare the remarks of M. Littré respecting the unfinished sketches, treatises, and notes not intended for publication, included in the Collectio Hippocratica (Œuvres d' Hippocrate, vol. x. p. liv. seq.)

¹ Respecting the domicile of the Platonic School, and that of the Ari-

stotelian or Peripatetic school which followed it, the particulars given by Diogenes are nearly coincident: we know more in detail about the Peripatetic, from what he cites out of the will of Theophrastus. See iv. 1-6-19, v. 51-53.

The *μουσεῖον* at the Academy was established by Plato himself. Spensippus placed in it statues of the Charities or Graces. Theophrastus gives careful directions in his will about repairing and putting in the best condition, the Peripatetic *μουσεῖον*, with its altar, its statues of the Goddesses, and its statue of the founder Aristotle. The *συνά, ἐκδῶ, κήπος, περιπατός*, attached to both schools, are mentioned: the most zealous students provided for themselves lodgings close adjoining. Cicero, when he walked out from Athens to see the deserted Academy, was particularly affected by the sight of the *ερεβία*, in which Charmadas had lectured (De Fin. v. 2, 4).

There were periodical meetings, convivial and conversational, among the members both of the Academic and Peripatetic schools; and *ἐμπροσθεν νόμοι* by Xenokrates and Aristotle to regulate them (Atheniens, v. 184).

Epicurus (in his interesting testament given by Diogen. Laert. x. 16-21) bequeaths to two Athenian citizens his garden and property, in trust for his principal disciple the Mitylenæan Hermarchus, *καὶ τοῖς συμφιλοσοφούσιν αὐτῷ, καὶ οἷς ἂν Ἑρμάρχος καταλίη διαδόχοις τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐνδιατρίβειν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν.* He at the same time directs all his books to be given to Hermarchus: they would form the school-library.

successor of Aristotle, presided over the school for thirty-five years; and his course, during part of that time at least, was prodigiously frequented by students.

Moreover, the school-library at the Lykeum acquired large development and importance. It not only included all the MS. compositions, published or unpublished, of Aristotle and Theophrastus, each of them a voluminous writer—but also a numerous collection (numerous for that day) of other works besides; since both of them were opulent and fond of collecting books. The value of the school-library is shown by what happened after the decease of Theophrastus, when Straton succeeded him in the school (B.C. 287).

Theophrastus—thinking himself entitled to treat the library not as belonging to the school but as belonging to himself—bequeathed it at his death to Neleus, a favourite scholar, and a native of Sképsis (in the Troad), by whom it was carried away to Asia, and permanently separated from the Aristotelian school at Athens. The manuscripts composing it remained in the possession of Neleus and his heirs for more than a century and a half, long hidden in a damp cellar, neglected, and sustaining great damage—until about the year 100 B.C., when they were purchased by a rich Athenian named Apellikon, and brought back to Athens. Sylla, after he had captured Athens (86 B.C.), took for himself the library of Apellikon, and transported it to Rome, where it became open to learned men (Tyrannion, Andronikus, and others), but under deplorable disadvantage—in consequence of the illegible state of the MSS. and the unskilful conjectures and restitutions which had been applied, in the new copies made since it passed into the hands of Apellikon.¹

If we knew the truth, it might probably appear that the

¹ The will of Theophrastus, as given in Diogenes (v. 52), mentions the bequest of all his books to Neleus. But it is in Strabo that we read the fullest account of this displacement of the Peripatetic school-library, and the consequences which ensued from it (xiii. 608, 609). Νηλεὺς, ἀνὴρ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους ἡγεραμένος καὶ Θεοφράστου, διαδεγμένος δὲ τὴν βιβλιοθήκην τοῦ Θεοφράστου, ἐν ᾗ ἦν καὶ ἡ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους· ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αὐτοῦ

Θεοφράστου παρέδωκεν, ὅπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλειπε, πρῶτος, ὡς ἴσμεν, συναγαγὼν βιβλία, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν.

The kings of Pergamus, a few years after the death of Theophrastus, acquired possession of the town and territory of Sképsis; so that the heirs of Neleus became numbered among their subjects. These kings (from about the year B.C. 230 downwards) manifested

transfer of the Aristotelian library, from the Peripatetic school at Athens to the distant and obscure town of Skêpsis, was the result of some jealousy on the part of Theophrastus; that he wished to secure to Neleus the honourable and lucrative post of becoming his successor in the school, and conceived that he was furthering that object by bequeathing the library to Neleus. If he entertained any such wish, it was disappointed. The succession devolved upon another pupil of the school, Straton of Lampsakus. But Straton and his successors were forced to get on as well as they could without their library. The Peripatetic school at Athens suffered severely by the loss. Its professors possessed only a few of the manuscripts of Aristotle, and those too the commonest and best known. If a student came with a view to read any of the other Aristotelian works (as Crassus went to read the *Gorgias* of Plato), the Scholarch was unable to assist him: as far as Aristotle was concerned, they could only expand and adorn, in the way of lecture, a few of his familiar doctrines.¹ We hear that the character of the school was materially altered. Straton deserted the track of Aristotle, and threw himself into speculations of his own (seemingly able and ingenious), chiefly on physical topics.² The critical study, arrangement, and exposi-

Incon-
venience to
the Peri-
patetic
school from
the loss of
its library.

great eagerness to collect a library at Pergamus, in competition with that of the Ptolemies at Alexandria. The heirs of Neleus were afraid that these kings would strip them of their Aristotelian MSS., either for nothing or for a small price. They therefore concealed the MSS. in a cellar, until they found an opportunity of selling them to a stranger out of the country. (Strabo, l. c.)

This narrative of Strabo is one of the most interesting pieces of information remaining to us about literary antiquity. He had himself received instruction from Tyrannion (xii. 648): he had gone through a course of Aristotelian philosophy (xvi. 757), and he had good means of knowing the facts from the Aristotelian critics, including his master Tyrannion. Plutarch (*Vit. Sylla*, c. 26) and Athenæus (i. 3) allude to the same story. Athenæus says that Ptolemy Philadelphus purchased the MSS. from the heirs of Neleus, which cannot be correct.

Some critics have understood the narrative of Strabo, as if he had meant to affirm, that the works of Aristotle had never got into circulation until the time of Apellikon. It is against this supposition that Stahr contends (very successfully) in his work "Aristotelia". But Strabo does not affirm so much as this. He does not say anything to contradict the supposition that there were copies of various books of Aristotle in circulation, during the lives of Aristotle and Theophrastus.

¹ Strabo, xlii. 609. συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπατητῶν τοῖς μὲν πάλαι, τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν, μὴδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφικῶν πραγματικῶν, ἀλλὰ θέσεις λεκτικῶν.

² The change in the Peripatetic school, after the death of Theophrastus, is pointed out by Cicero, *Fin.* v. 5, 13. Compare *Academ. Poster.* i. 9.

tion of Aristotle was postponed until the first century before the Christian era—the Ciceronian age, immediately preceding Strabo.

This history of the Aristotelian library illustrates forcibly, by way of contrast, the importance to the Platonic school of having preserved its MSS. from the beginning, without any similar interruption. What Plato left in manuscript we may presume to have never been removed: those who came to study his works had the means of doing so: those who wanted to know whether any composition was written by him, what works he had written altogether, or what was the correct reading in a case of obscurity or dispute—had always the means of informing themselves. Whereas the Peripatetic Scholarch, after the death of Theophrastus, could give no similar information as to the works of Aristotle.¹

We thus see that the circumstances, under which Plato left his compositions, were unusually favourable (speaking by comparison with ancient authors generally) in regard to the chance of preserving them all, and of keeping them apart from counterfeits. We have now to enquire what information exists as to their subsequent diffusion.

The earliest event of which notice is preserved, is, the fact stated by Diogenes, that “Some persons, among whom is the *Grammaticus* Aristophanes, distribute the dialogues of Plato into Trilogies; placing as the first Trilogy—*Republic, Timæus, Kritias*. 2. *Sophistes, Politicus, Kratylus*. 3. *Leges, Minos, Epinomis*. *Theætétus, Euthyphron, Apology*. 5. *Kriton, Phædon, Epistolæ*.

¹ An interesting citation by Simplikios (in his commentary on the *Physica* of Aristotle, fol. 216, a. 7, p. 404, b. 11, Schol. Brandis shows us that Theophrastus, while he was resident at Athens as Peripatetic Scholarch, had custody of the original MSS. of the works of Aristotle and that he was applied to by those who wished to procure correct copies. Eudémus (of Rhodes) having only a defective copy of the *Physica*, wrote to request that

Theophrastus would cause to be written out a certain portion of the fifth book, and send it to him, *μαρτυρούντος περὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ Θεοφράστου, γράψαντος Εὐδήμου περὶ τινος αὐτοῦ τῶν διημερισμένων ἀντιγράφων· ὑπὲρ ὧν, φησὶν (sc. Theophrastus) ἐπέστελλας, κελεύων με γράφειν καὶ ἀποστείλαι ἐκ τῶν Φυσικῶν, ἅτοι ἐγὼ οὐ συνήμι, ἢ μικρόν τι πατελῶς ἔχει τοῦ ἀνάμεσον τοῦ ὅπου ἡμεῖς καλῶ τὴν ἐκινήτων μόνον.* &c.

The other dialogues they place one by one, without any regular grouping."¹

The name of Aristophanes lends special interest to this arrangement of the Platonic compositions, and enables us to understand something of the date and the place to which it belongs. The literary and critical students (*Grammatici*), among whom he stood eminent, could scarcely be said to exist as a class at the time when Plato died. Beginning with Aristotle, Herakleides of Pontus, Theophrastus, Demetrius Phalereus, &c., at Athens, during the half century immediately succeeding Plato's decease—these laborious and useful erudites were first called into full efficiency along with the large collection of books formed by the Ptolemies at Alexandria during a period beginning rather before 300 B.C. : which collection served both as model and as stimulus to the libraries subsequently formed by the kings at Pergamus and elsewhere. In those libraries alone could materials be found for their indefatigable application.

Arrangement of them into Trilogies, by Aristophanes.

Of these learned men, who spent their lives in reading, criticising, arranging, and correcting, the MSS. accumulated in a great library, Aristophanes of Byzantium was the most distinguished representative, in the eyes of men like Varro, Cicero, and Plutarch.² His life was passed at Alexandria, and seems to have been comprised between 260-184 B.C. ; as far as can be made out. During the latter portion of it he became chief librarian—an appointment

Aristophanes, librarian at the Alexandrine library.

¹ Diog. L. iii. 61-62 : "Ἐνιοὶ δὲ, ὡς ἔστι καὶ Ἀριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς, εἰς τριλογίας ἱκονοῦσι τοὺς διαλόγους : καὶ πρῶτην μὲν τιθῆσιν ἥτις ἄγεται Πολιτεία, Τίμαιος, Κριτίας· δευτέραν, Σοφιστής, Πολιτικὸς, Κράτυλος· τρίτην, Νόμοι, Μένων, Ἐπινομίς· τετάρτην, Θεαίτητος, Εὐθύφρων, Ἀπολογία· πέμπτην, Κρίτων, Φαίδων, Ἐπιστολαί· τὰ δὲ ἅλλα καθ' ἑν καὶ ἀτάκτως."

The word *γραμματικὸς*, unfortunately, has no single English word exactly corresponding to it.

Thrasylus, when he afterwards applied the classification by Tetralogies to the works of Demokritus (as he did also to those of Plato) could only include a certain portion of the works in his Tetralogies, and was forced to enumerate the remainder as *ἀσύν-*

τακτα (Diog. L. ix. 46, 47). It appears that he included all Plato's works in his Platonic Tetralogies.

² Varro, De Lingua Latina, v. 9, ed. Müller. "Non solum ad Aristophanis lucernam, sed etiam ad Cleanthis, lucubravi." Cicero, De Fin. v. 19, 50; Vitruvius, Pref. Lib. vii.; Plutarch, "Non posse suaviter vivi sec. Epicurum," p. 1095 E.

Aristophanes composed *Argumenta* to many of the Attic tragedies and comedies : he also arranged in a certain order the songs of Alkæus and the odes of Pindar. Boeckh (Præfat. ad Scholia Pindari, p. x. xi.) remarks upon the mistake made by Quintilian as well as by others, in supposing that Pindar arranged his own odes. Respecting the wide range of erudition embraced by

which he had earned by long previous studies in the place, as well as by attested experience in the work of criticism and arrangement. He began his studious career at Alexandria at an early age : and he received instruction, as a boy from Zenodotus, as a young man from Kallimachus—both of whom were, in succession, librarians of the Alexandrine library.¹ We must observe that Diogenes does not expressly state the distribution of the Platonic works into trilogies to have been *first proposed* or originated by Aristophanes (as he states that the tetralogies were afterwards proposed by the rhetor Thrasyllus, of which presently) : his language is rather more consistent with the supposition, that it was first proposed by some one earlier, and adopted or sanctioned by the eminent authority of Aristophanes. But at any rate, the distribution was proposed either by Aristophanes himself, or by some one before him and known to him.

This fact is of material importance, because it enables us to infer with confidence, that the Platonic works were included in the Alexandrine library, certainly during the lifetime of Aristophanes, and probably before it. It is there only that Aristophanes could have known them ; his whole life having been passed in Alexandria. The first formal appointment of a librarian to the Alexandrine Museum was made by Ptolemy Philadelphus, at some time after the commencement of his reign in 285 B.C., in the person of Zenodotus ; whose successors were Kallimachus, Eratosthenes, Apollonius, Aristophanes, comprising in all a period of a century.²

Aristophanes, see F. A. Wolf, *Prolegg.* in Homer. pp. 218-220, and Schneidewin, *De Hypothes. Traged. Græc.* Aristophani vindicandis, pp. 26, 27.

¹ Suidas, vv. 'Αριστοφάνης, Καλλιμάχος. Compare Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* B.C. 256-200.

² See Ritschl, *Die Alexandrinischen Bibliotheken*, pp. 16-17, &c. ; Nauck, *De Aristophanis Vita et Scriptis*, cap. I. p. 68 (Halle, 1848). "Aristophanis et Aristarchi opera, cum opibus Bibliothecæ Alexandrinæ digerendis et ad tabulas revocandis acutè conjuncta, in eo substituisse censenda est, ut scriptores, in quovis dicendi genere conspicuos, aut breviori indice comprehenderent, aut uberiore enarratione describerent," &c.

When Zenodotus was appointed, the library had already attained considerable magnitude, so that the post and title of librarian was then conspicuous and dignified. But Demetrius Phalereus, who preceded Zenodotus, began his operations when there was no library at all, and gradually accumulated the number of books which Zenodotus found. Heyne observes justly : "Primo loco Demetrius Phalereus præfuisse dicitur, *forte re verius quam nomine*, tum Zenodotus Ephesius, hic quidem sub Ptolemæo Philadelpho," &c. (Heyne, *De Genio Sæculi Ptolemæorum* in *Opuscul.* I. p. 129).

Kallimachus, born at Kyrênê, was a teacher of letters at Alexandria before he was appointed to the service and superintendence of the Alexandrine library or museum. His life seems to have terminated about 230 B.C. : he acquired reputation as a poet, by his hymns, epigrams, elegies, but less celebrity as a *Grammaticus* than Aristophanes : nevertheless the titles of his works still remaining indicate very great literary activity. We read as titles of his works :—

Kallimachus—predecessor of Aristophanes—his published Tables of authors whose works were in the library.

1. The Museum (a general description of the Alexandrine establishment).
2. Tables of the persons who have distinguished themselves in every branch of instruction, and of the works which they have composed—in 120 books.
3. Table and specification of the (Didaskalies) recorded dramatic representations and competitions ; with dates assigned, and from the beginning.
4. Table of the peculiar phrases belonging to Demokritus, and of his works.
5. Table and specification of the rhetorical authors.¹

These tables of Kallimachus (of which one by itself, No. 2, reached to 120 books) must have been an encyclopædia, far more comprehensive than any previously compiled, of Greek authors and literature. Such tables indeed could not have been compiled before the existence of the Alexandrine Museum. They described what Kallimachus had before him in that museum, as we may see by the general title *Μουσείον* prefixed : moreover we may be sure that nowhere else could he have had access to the

Large and rapid accumulation of the Alexandrine Library.

¹ See Blomfield's edition of the *Fragm. of Kallimachus*, p. 220-221. Suidas, v. *Καλλίμαχος*, enumerates a large number of titles of poetical, literary, historical, compositions of Kallimachus ; among them are—

Μουσείον. Πίνακες τῶν ἐν πάσῃ παιδείᾳ διαλαμπάντων, καὶ ὧν συνέγραψαν, ἐν βιβλίοις α' καὶ ρ'. Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν κατὰ χρόνους καὶ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς γενομένων διδασκαλιῶν. Πίναξ τῶν Δημοκρίτου γλωσσῶν καὶ συγγραμμάτων. Πίναξ καὶ ἀναγραφὴ τῶν ῥητορικῶν. See

also Athenæus, xv. 669. It appears from Dionys. Hal. that besides the Tables of Kallimachus, enumerating and reviewing the authors whose works were contained in the Alexandrine library or museum, there existed also *Περὶ γὰρ Πίνακες*, describing the contents of the library at Pergamus (Dion. H. de Adm. Vi. Dic. in Demosthene, p. 294 ; De Dinarcho, pp. 630, 653, 661).

Compare Bernhardt, *Grundriss der Griech. Litt. sect. 36. pp. 132-133 seq.*

multitude of books required. Lastly, the tables also show how large a compass the Alexandrine Museum and library had attained at the time when Kallimachus put together his compilation: that is, either in the reign of Ptolemy II. Philadelphus (285-247 B.C.), or in the earlier portion of the reign of Ptolemy III., called Euergetes (247-222 B.C.). Nevertheless, large as the library then was, it continued to increase. A few years afterwards, Aristophanes published a work commenting upon the tables of Kallimachus, with additions and enlargements: of which work the title alone remains.¹

Now, I have already observed, that the works of Plato were certainly in the Alexandrine library, at the time when Aristophanes either originated or sanctioned the distribution of them into Trilogies. Were they not also in the library at the time when Kallimachus compiled his tables? I cannot but conclude that they were in it at that time also. When we are informed that the catalogue of enumerated authors filled so many books, we may be sure that it must have descended, and we know in fact that it did descend, to names far less important and distinguished than that of Plato.² The name of Plato himself can hardly have been omitted. Demokritus and his works, especially the peculiar and technical words (*γλώσσαι*) in them, received special attention from Kallimachus: which proves that the latter was not disposed to pass over the philosophers. But Demokritus, though an eminent philosopher, was decidedly less eminent than Plato: moreover he left behind him no permanent successors, school, or *μουσεῖον*, at Athens, to preserve his MSS. or foster his celebrity. As the library was furnished at that time with a set of the works of Demokritus, so I infer that it could not have been without a set of the works of Plato. That Kallimachus was acquainted

¹ Athenæus, ix. 408. 'Αριστοφάνης ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς Καλλιμάχου πίνακας.

We see by another passage, Athenæ. viii. 336, that this work included an addition or supplement to the Tables of Kallimachus.

Compare Etymol. Magn. v. Πίναξ.

² Thus the Tables of Kallimachus included a writer named Lysimachus, a disciple of Theodorus or Theo-

phrastus, and his writings (Athenæ. vi. 252)—a rhetor and poet named Dionysius with the epithet of *χαλκοῦς* (Athenæ. xv. 669)—and even the treatises of several authors on cakes and cookery (Athenæ. xiv. 643). The names of authors absolutely unknown to us were mentioned by him (Athenæ. ii. 70). Compare Dionys. Hal. de Dinarcho, 630, 653, 661.

with Plato's writings (if indeed such a fact requires proof), we know, not only from his epigram upon the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus (whom he affirms to have killed himself after reading the Phædon), but also from a curious intimation that he formally impugned Plato's competence to judge or appreciate poets—alluding to the severe criticisms which we read in the Platonic Republic.¹

It would indeed be most extraordinary if, among the hundreds of authors whose works must have been specified in the Tables of Kallimachus as constituting the treasures of the Alexandrine Museum,² the name of Plato had not been included. Moreover, the distribution of the Platonic compositions into Trilogies, pursuant to the analogy of the Didaskaliæ or dramatic records, may very probably have originated with Kallimachus; and may have been simply approved and continued, perhaps with some modifications, by Aristophanes. At least this seems more consonant to the language of Diogenes Laërtius, than the supposition that Aristophanes was the first originator of it.

If we look back to the first commencement of the Alexandrine Museum and library, we shall be still farther convinced that the works of Plato, complete as well as genuine, must have been introduced into it before the days of Kallimachus. Strabo expressly tells us that the first stimulus and example impelling the Ptolemies to found this museum and library, were furnished by the school of Aristotle and Theophrastus at

First formation of the library—intended as a copy of the Platonic and Aristotelian *Μουσεία* at Athens.

¹ Kallimachus, Epigram. 23.

Proklos in Timæum, p. 28 C. p. 64. Schneid. *μάτην οὖν φληναφούσι Καλλιμάχος καὶ Δούρις, ὥς Πλάτωνος οὐκ ὄντος ἱκανοὺ κρίνειν ποιητάς.*

Eratosthenes, successor of Kallimachus as librarian at Alexandria, composed a work (now lost) entitled *Πλατωνικόν*, as well as various treatises on philosophy and philosophers (Eratosthenica, Bernhardt, p. 168, 187, 197; Suidas, v. *Ἐρατοσθένης*). He had passed some time at Athens, had enjoyed the lessons and conversation of Zeno the Stoic, but expressed still warmer admiration of Arkasilaus and Ariston. He spoke in animated terms of Athens as the great centre of congregation for philosophers in his day.

He had composed a treatise, *Περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν*: but Strabo describes him as mixing up other subjects with philosophy (Strabo, i. p. 15).

² About the number of books, or more properly of *rolls* (*volumina*), in the Alexandrine library, see the enquiries of Parthey, *Das Alexandrinische Museum*, p. 76-84. Various statements are made by ancient authors, some of them with very large numbers; and no certainty is attainable. Many rolls would go to form one book. Parthey considers the statement made by Epiphanius not improbable—54,800 rolls in the library under Ptolemy Philadelphus (p. 83).

The magnitude of the library at Alexandria in the time of Eratosthenes,

Athens.¹ I believe this to be perfectly true ; and it is farther confirmed by the fact that the institution at Alexandria comprised the same constituent parts and arrangements, described by the same titles, as those which are applied to the Aristotelian and Platonic schools at Athens.² Though the terms library, museum, and lecture-room, have now become familiar, both terms and meaning were at that time alike novel. Nowhere, as far as we know, did there exist a known and fixed domicile, consecrated in perpetuity to these purposes, and to literary men who took interest therein. A special stimulus was needed to suggest and enforce the project on Ptolemy Soter. That stimulus was supplied by the Aristotelian school at Athens, which the Alexandrine institution was intended to copy : *Μουσείον* (with *εξέδρα* and *περίπατος*, a covered portico with recesses and seats, and a walk adjacent), on a far larger scale and with more extensive attributions.³ We must not however imagine that when this

and the multitude of writings which he consulted in his valuable geographical works, was admitted by his opponent Hipparchus (Strabo, li. 69).

¹ Strabo, xlii. 608. ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν αὐτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῃ παρίδμεν, ὥστε καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλπει· πρῶτος, ὡν ἴσμεν, συναγωγῶν βιβλία, καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης συντάξιν.

² Strabo (xvii. 798-794) describes the Museum at Alexandria in the following terms—τῶν δὲ βασιλείων μέρος ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ Μουσείον, ἔχον περίπατον καὶ εξέδραν, καὶ οἶκον μέγαν ἐν ᾧ τὸ συσσίτιον τῶν μετεχόντων τοῦ Μουσείου φιλολόγων ἀνδρῶν, &c. Vitruvius, v. 11.

If we compare this with the language in Diogenes Laertius respecting the Academic and Peripatetic school residences at Athens, we shall find the same phrases employed—*μουσεῖον, εξέδρα, &c.* (D. L. iv. 19, v. 51-54). Respecting Speusippus, Diogenes tells us (iv. 1)—Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνέθηκεν ἐν τῷ μουσεῖῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ ἰδρυθέντι.

³ We see from hence what there was peculiar in the Platonic and Aristotelian literary establishments. They included something consecrated, permanent, and intended more or less for public use. The collection of books was not like a private library, destined

only for the proprietor and such friends as he might allow—nor was it like that of a bookseller, intended for sale and profit. I make this remark in regard to the Excursus of Bekker, in his *Charikles*, i. 206, 216, a very interesting note on the book-trade and libraries of ancient Athens. Bekker disputes the accuracy of Strabo's statement that Aristotle was the first person at Athens who collected a library, and who taught the kings of Egypt to do the like. In the literal sense of the words Bekker is right. Other persons before Aristotle had collected books (though I think Bekker makes more of the passages which he cites than they strictly deserve); one example is the youthful Euthydemus in Xenophon, *Memorab.* iv. 2; and Bekker alludes justly to the remarkable passage in the *Anabasis* of Xenophon, about books exported to the Hellenic cities in the Euxine (*Anab.* vii. 5, 14). There clearly existed in Athens regular professional booksellers; we see that the bookseller read aloud to his visitors a part of the books which he had to sell, in order to tempt them to buy, a feeble foreshadowing of the advertisements and reviews of the present day (Diogen. L. vii. 2). But there existed as yet nothing of the nature of the Platonic and Aristotelian *μουσεῖον*, whereof the collection of books, varied, permanent, and in-

new museum was first begun, the founders entertained any idea of the vast magnitude to which it ultimately attained.

Ptolemy Soter was himself an author,¹ and himself knew and respected Aristotle, not only as a philosopher but also as the preceptor of his friend and commander Alexander. To Theophrastus also, the philosophical successor of Aristotle, Ptolemy showed peculiar honour; inviting him by special message to come and establish himself at Alexandria, which invitation however Theophrastus declined.² Moreover Ptolemy appointed Straton (afterwards Scholarch in succession to Theophrastus) preceptor to his youthful son Ptolemy Philadelphus, from whom Straton subsequently received a large present of money:³ he welcomed at Alexandria the Megaric philosophers, Diodorus Kronus, and Stilpon, and found pleasure in their conversation; he not only befriended, but often confidentially consulted, the Kyrenaic philosopher Theodôrus.⁴ Kolôtes, the friend of Epikurus, dedicated a work to Ptolemy Soter. Menander, the eminent comic writer, also received an invitation from him to Egypt.⁵

These favourable dispositions, on the part of the first Ptolemy, towards philosophy and the philosophers at Athens, appear to have been mainly instigated and guided by the Phalerean Demetrius: an Athenian citizen of good station, who enjoyed for ten years at Athens (while that city was subject to Kassander) full political ascendancy, but who was expelled about 307 B.C., by the increased force of the popular party, seconded by the successful invasion of

Favour of
Ptolemy
Soter
towards the
philosophers at
Athens.

Demetrius
Phalereus—
his history
and charac-
ter.

tended for the use of inmates and special visitors, was one important fraction. In this sense it served as a model for Demetrius Phalereus and Ptolemy Soter in regard to Alexandria.

Vitruvius (v. 11) describes the *exedrae* as seats placed under a covered portico—"in quibus philosophi, rhetores, reliquique qui studiis delectantur, sedentes disputare possint".

¹ Respecting Ptolemy as an author, and the fragments of his work on the exploits of Alexander, see R. Geier, *Alexandri M. Histor. Scriptores*, p. 4-26.

² Diog. L. v. 37. Probably this invitation was sent about 306 B.C., during the year in which Theophrastus

was in banishment from Athens, in consequence of the restrictive law proposed by Sophokles against the schools of the philosophers, which law was repealed in the ensuing year.

³ Diog. L. v. 58. Straton became Scholarch at the death of Theophrastus in 287 B.C. He must have been preceptor to Ptolemy Philadelphus before this time, during the youth of the latter; for he could not have been at the same time Scholarch at Athens, and preceptor of the king at Alexandria.

⁴ Diog. L. II. 102, 111, 115. Plutarch adv. Kolôtes, p. 1107. The Ptolemy here mentioned by Plutarch may indeed be Philadelphus.

⁵ Meineke, *Menand. et Philom. Reliq. Præf. p. xxxii.*

Demetrius Poliorkêtês. By these political events Demetrius Phalereus was driven into exile: a portion of which exile was spent at Thebes, but a much larger portion of it at Alexandria, where he acquired the full confidence of Ptolemy Soter, and retained it until the death of that prince in 285 B.C. While active in politics, and possessing rhetorical talent, elegant without being forcible—Demetrius Phalereus was yet more active in literature and philosophy. He employed his influence, during the time of his political power, to befriend and protect both Xenokrates the chief of the Platonic school, and Theophrastus the chief of the Aristotelian. In his literary and philosophical views he followed Theophrastus and the Peripatetic sect, and was himself among their most voluminous writers. The latter portion of his life was spent at Alexandria, in the service of Ptolemy Soter; after whose death, however, he soon incurred the displeasure of Ptolemy Philadelphus, and died, intentionally or accidentally, from the bite of an asp.¹

The Alexandrine Museum or library first acquired celebrity under the reign of Ptolemy (II.) Philadelphus, by whom moreover it was greatly enlarged and its treasures multiplied. Hence that prince is sometimes entitled the founder. But there can be no doubt that its first initiation and establishment is due to Ptolemy (I.) Soter.² Demetrius Phalereus was his adviser and auxiliary,

¹ Diog. L. iv. 14, v. 39, 75, 80; Strabo, ix. 398; Plut., De Exil. p. 601; Apophth. p. 189; Cic., De Fin. v. 19; Pro Rab. 30.

Diogenes says about Demetrius Phalereus, (v. 80) Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ στίχων, σχεδὸν πάντας περιέλαλε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, εὐναίδεντος ὧν καὶ πολύνεκρος παρ' ὀφειρόν.

² Mr. Clinton says, Fast. Hell. App. 5, p. 380, 381:

"Athenæus distinctly ascribes the institution of the Μουσείον to Philadelphus in v. 203, where he is describing the acts of Philadelphus." This is a mistake: the passage in Athenæus does not specify which of the two first Ptolemies was the founder: it is perfectly consistent with the supposition that Ptolemy Soter founded it. The same may be said about the passage cited by Mr. Clinton from Plutarch;

that too does not determine between the two Ptolemies, which was the founder. Perizonius was in error (as Mr. Clinton points out) in affirming that the passage in Plutarch determined the foundation to the first Ptolemy: Mr. Clinton is in error by affirming that the passage in Athenæus determines it to the second. Mr. Clinton has also been misled by Vitruvius and Scaliger (p. 389), when he affirms that the library at Alexandria was not formed until after the library at Pergamus. Bernhardt (Grundriss der Griech. Litt., Part i. p. 350, 367, 368) has followed Mr. Clinton too implicitly in recognising Philadelphus as the founder: nevertheless he too admits (p. 366) that the foundations were laid by Ptolemy Soter, under the advice and assistance of Demetrius Phalereus.

The earliest declared king of the Attalid family at Pergamus acquired

the link of connection between him and the literary or philosophical world of Greece. We read that Julius Cæsar, when he conceived the scheme (which he did not live to execute) of establishing a large public library at Rome, fixed upon the learned Varro to regulate the selection and arrangement of the books.¹ None but an eminent literary man could carry such an enterprise into effect, even at Rome, when there existed the precedent of the Alexandrine library: much more when Ptolemy

the throne in 241 B.C. The library at Pergamus could hardly have been commenced before his time: and it is his successor, Eumenes II. (whose reign began in 197 B.C.), who is mentioned as the great collector and adorning of the library at Pergamus. See Strabo, xiii. 624; Clinton, Fast. Hellen. App. 6, p. 401-403. It is plain that the library at Pergamus could hardly have been begun before the close of the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus in Egypt, by which time the library of Alexandria had already acquired great extension and renown.

¹ Sueton. Jul. Cæs. c. 44. Melissus, one of the Illustres Grammatici of Rome, undertook by order of Augustus, "curam ordinandarum bibliothecarum in Octavia porticu." (Sueton. De Illust. Grammat. c. 21.)

Cicero replies in the following terms to his brother Quintus, who had written to him, requesting advice and aid in getting together for his own use a collection of Greek and Latin books. "De bibliothecâ tuâ Græcâ supplendâ, libris commutandis, Latinis comparandis—valde velim ista confici, præsertim cum ad meum quoque usum spectent. Sed ego, mihi ipse ista per quem agam, non habeo. Neque enim venalia sunt, quæ quidem placeant: et confici nisi per hominem et peritum et diligentem non possunt. Chrysippo tamen imperabo, et cum Tyrannione loquar." (Cic., Epist. ad Q. Frat. iii. 4, 5.)

Now the circulation of books was greatly increased, and the book trade far more developed, at Rome when this letter was written (about three centuries after Plato's decease) than it was at Athens during the time of Demetrius Phalereus (320-300 B.C.). Yet we see the difficulty which the two brothers Cicero had in collecting a mere private library for use of the owner simply. *Good books, in a correct*

and satisfactory condition, were not to be had for money: it was necessary to get access to the best MSS., and to have special copies made, neatly and correctly: and this could not be done, except under the superintendence of a laborious literary man like Tyrannion, by well taught slaves subordinate to him.

We may understand, from this analogy, the far greater obstacles which the collectors of the Alexandrine museum and library must have had to overcome, when they began their work. No one could do it, except a practised literary man such as Demetrius Phalereus: nor even he, except by finding out the best MSS., and causing special copies to be made for the use of the library. Respecting the extent and facility of book-diffusion in the Roman world, information will be found in the late Sir George Cornewall Lewis's *Enquiry into the Credibility of Early Roman History*, vol. i. p. 196, seq.; also, in the fifth chapter of the work of Adolf Schmidt, *Geschichte der Denk- und Glaubens-Freiheit im ersten Jahrhunderte der Kaiser-herrschaft*, Berlin, 1847; lastly, in a valuable review of Adolf Schmidt's work by Sir George Lewis himself, in Fraser's Magazine for April, 1862, pp. 432-439. Adolf Schmidt represents the multiplication and cheapness of books in that day as something hardly inferior to what it is now—citing many authorities for this opinion. Sir G. Lewis has shown, in my judgment most satisfactorily, that these authorities are insufficient, and that the opinion is incorrect: this might have been shown even more fully, if the review had been lengthened. I perfectly agree with Sir G. Lewis on the main question: yet I think he narrows the case on his own side too much, and that the number of copies of such authors as Virgil and Horace, in circulation at one time, cannot have been so small as he imagines.

commenced his operations at Alexandria, and when there were only the two *Μουσεία* at Athens to serve as precedents. Demetrius, who combined an organising head and political experience, with an erudition not inferior to Varro, regard being had to the stock of learning accessible—was eminently qualified for the task. It procured for him great importance with Ptolemy, and compensated him for that loss of political ascendancy at Athens, which unfavourable fortune had brought about.

We learn that the ardour of Demetrius Phalereus was unremitting, and that his researches were extended everywhere, to obtain for the new museum literary monuments from all countries within contemporary knowledge.¹ This is highly probable: such universality of literary interest was adapted to the mixed and cosmopolitan character of the Alexandrine population. But Demetrius was a Greek, born about the time of Plato's death (347 B.C.), and identified with the political, rhetorical, dramatic, literary, and philosophical, activity of Athens, in which he had himself taken a prominent part. To collect the memorials of Greek literature would be his first object, more especially such as Aristotle and Theophrastus possessed in their libraries. Without doubt he would procure the works of Homer and the other distinguished poets, epic, lyric, and dramatic, as well as the rhetors, orators, &c. He probably would not leave out the works of the *viri Sokratici* (Antisthenes, Aristippus, Æschines, &c.) and the other philosophers (Demokritus, Anaxagoras, Parmenides, &c.). But there are two authors, whose compositions he would most certainly take pains to obtain—Plato and Aristotle. These were the two commanding names of Grecian philosophy in that

¹ Josephus, *Antiquit.* xii. 2, 1. Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς, ὃς ἦν ἐπὶ τῶν βιβλιοθηκῶν τοῦ βασιλέως, σπουδάζων εἰ δυνατόν εἰς πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην συνάγειν βιβλία, καὶ συντινόμενος εἰς τὴν μόνον ἀκούσκειαν σπουδὴς ἄξιον ἢ ἡδύ, τῇ τοῦ βασιλέως προαιρέσει (μάλιστα γὰρ περὶ τὴν συλλογὴν τῶν βιβλίων εἶχε φιλοκάλως) συνηγωνίζετο.

What Josephus affirms here, I apprehend to be perfectly true; though he goes on to state much that is fabulous and apocryphal, respecting the incidents which preceded and

accompanied the translation of the Hebrew Scriptures. Josephus is also mistaken in connecting Demetrius Phalereus with Ptolemy Philadelphus. Demetrius Phalereus was disgraced, and died shortly after that prince's accession. His time of influence was under Ptolemy Soter.

Respecting the part taken by Demetrius Phalereus in the first getting up of the Alexandrine Museum, see Valckenaer, *Dissertat. De Aristobulo Judaico*, p. 52-57; Ritschl, *Die Alexandrin. Biblioth.* p. 17, 18; Parthey, *Das Alexandrinische Museum*, p. 70, 71 seq.

day: the founders of the two schools existing in Athens, upon the model of which the Alexandrine Museum was to be constituted.

Among all the books which would pass over to Alexandria as the earliest stock of the new library, I know nothing upon which we can reckon more certainly than upon the works of Plato.¹ For they were acquisitions not only desirable, but also easily accessible. The writings of Aristippus or Demokritus—of Lysias or Isokrates—might require to be procured (or good MSS. thereof, fit to be specially copied) at different places and from different persons, without any security that the collection, when purchased, would be either complete or altogether genuine. But the manuscripts of Plato and of Aristotle were preserved in their respective schools at Athens, the Academic and Peripatetic:² a collection complete as well as verifiable. Demetrius could obtain permission, from Theophrastus in the Peripatetic school, from Polemon or Krantor in the Academic school, to have these MSS. copied for him by careful and expert hands. The cost of such copying must doubtless have been considerable; amounting to a sum which few

Certainty that the works of Plato and Aristotle were among the earliest acquisitions made by him for the library.

¹ Stahr, in the second part of his work "Aristotelis," combats and refutes with much pains the erroneous supposition, that there was no sufficient publication of the works of Aristotle, until after the time when Apellikon purchased the MSS. from the heirs of Neleus—i.e. B.C. 100. Stahr shows evidence to prove, that the works, at least many of the works, of Aristotle were known and studied before the year 100 B.C.: that they were in the library at Alexandria, and that they were procured for that library by Demetrius Phalereus. Stahr says (Thl. ii. p. 59): "Is it indeed credible—is it even conceivable—that Demetrius, who recommended especially to his regal friend Ptolemy the study of the political works of the philosophers—that Demetrius, the friend both of the Aristotelian philosophy and of Theophrastus, should have left the works of the two greatest Peripatetic philosophers out of his consideration? May we not rather be sure that he would take care to secure their works, before all others, for his nascent library—if

indeed he did not bring them with him when he came to Alexandria?" The question here put by Stahr (and farther insisted on by Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, Introd. p. 14) is very pertinent: and I put the like question, with slight change of circumstances, respecting the works of Plato. Demetrius Phalereus was the friend and patron of Xenokrates, as well as of Theophrastus.

² In respect to the Peripatetic school, this is true only during the lifetime of Theophrastus, who died 287 B.C. I have already mentioned that after the death of Theophrastus, the MSS. were withdrawn from Athens. But all the operations of Demetrius Phalereus were carried on during the lifetime of Theophrastus; much of them, probably, in concert with Theophrastus, whose friend and pupil he was. The death of Theophrastus, the death of Ptolemy Soter, and the discredit and subsequent death of Demetrius are separated only by an interval of two or three years.

private individuals would have been either able or willing to disburse. But the treasures of Ptolemy were amply sufficient for the purpose :¹ and when he once conceived the project of founding a museum in his new capital, a large outlay, incurred for transcribing from the best MSS. a complete and authentic collection of the works of illustrious authors, was not likely to deter him. We know from other anecdotes,² what vast sums the

¹ We find interesting information, in the letters of Cicero, respecting the *librarii* or copyists whom he had in his service; and the still more numerous and effective band of *librarii* and *anagnostæ* (slaves, mostly home-born) whom his friend Atticus possessed and trained (Corn. Nep., Vit. Attici, c. 13). See Epist. ad Attic. xii. 6; xiii. 21-44; v. 12 seq.

It appears that many of the compositions of Cicero were copied, prepared for publication, and published, by the *librarii* of Atticus: who, in the case of the *Academica*, incurred a loss, because Cicero—after having given out the work to be copied and published, and after progress had been made in doing this—thought fit to alter materially both the form and the speakers introduced (xiii. 13). In regard to the Oration pro Ligario, Atticus sold it well, and brought himself home ("Ligarianum præclarè vendidisti: posthac, quicquid scripsero, tibi præconium deferam." xiii. 12). Cicero (xiii. 21) compares the relation of Atticus towards himself, with that of Hermodorus towards Plato, as expressed in the Greek verse, *λόγοισιν Ἑρμοδῶρος [ἐμκορεύεται]*. (Suidas, s. v. *λόγοισιν Ἑρμ.* ἐμκ.)

Private friends, such as Balbus and Cærellia (xiii. 21), considered it a privilege to be allowed to take copies of his compositions at their own cost, through *librarii* employed for the purpose. And we find Galen enumerating this among the noble and dignified ways for an opulent man to expend money, in a remarkable passage, *Βλέπω γὰρ σε οὐδὲ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἔργων δαπανῆσαι τολμῶντα, μὴδ' εἰς βιβλίων ἄνην καὶ κατασκευὴν καὶ τῶν γραφόντων ἄσκησιν, ἥτοι γὰρ εἰς τάχος διὰ σημείων, ἢ εἰς καλὴν ἀκρίβειαν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀναγινωσκόντων ὁρῶς.* (De Cognoscendis Curandisque Animæ Morbis, t. v. p. 48, Kühn.)

² Galen, Comm. ad Hippokrat. Ἐπιδημίας, vol. xvii. p. 606, 607, ed. Kühn.

Lykurgus, the contemporary of Demosthenes as an orator, conspicuous for many years in the civil and financial administration of Athens, caused a law to be passed, enacting that an official MS. should be made of the plays of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides. No permission was granted to represent any of these dramas at the Dionysiac festival, except upon condition that the applicant and the actors whom he employed, should compare the MS. on which they intended to proceed, with the official MS. in the hands of the authorised secretary. The purpose was to prevent arbitrary amendments or omissions in these plays, at the pleasure of the *ὕποκριται*.

Ptolemy Euergetes borrowed from the Athenians these public and official MSS. of Æschylus, Sophokles, and Euripides—on the plea that he wished to have exact copies of them taken at Alexandria, and under engagement to restore them as soon as this was done. He deposited with them the prodigious sum of fifteen talents, as a guarantee for the faithful restitution. When he got the MSS. at Alexandria, he caused copies of them to be taken on the finest paper. He then sent these copies to Athens, keeping the originals for the Alexandrine library; desiring the Athenians to retain the deposit of fifteen talents for themselves. Ptolemy Euergetes here pays, not merely the cost of the finest copying, but fifteen talents besides, for the possession of official MSS. of the three great Athenian tragedians; whose works in other manuscripts must have been in the library long before.

Respecting these official MSS. of the three great tragedians, prepared during the administration and under the auspices of the rhetor Lykurgus, see Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 841, also Boeckh, Græcæ Traged. Principia, pp. 13-15. The time when Lykurgus caused this to be done, must have been nearly coincident with the decease of

third Ptolemy spent, for the mere purpose of securing better and more authoritative MSS. of works which the Alexandrine library already possessed.

We cannot doubt that Demetrius could obtain permission, if he asked it, from the Scholarcha, to have such copies made. To them the operation was at once complimentary and lucrative; while among the Athenian philosophers generally, the name of Demetrius was acceptable, from the favour which he had shown to them during his season of political power—and that of Ptolemy popular from his liberalities. Or if we even suppose that Demetrius, instead of obtaining copies of the Platonic MSS. from the school, purchased copies from private persons or book-sellers (as he must have purchased the works of Demokritus and others)—he could, at any rate, assure himself of the authenticity of what he purchased, by information from the Scholarch.

Large expenses incurred by the Ptolemies for procuring good MSS.

My purpose, in thus calling attention to the Platonic school and the Alexandrine Museum, is to show that the chance for preservation of Plato's works complete and genuine after his decease, was unusually favourable. I think that they existed complete and genuine in the Alexandrine Museum before the time of Kallimachus, and, of course, during that of Aristophanes. If there were in the Museum any other works obtained from private vendors and professing to be Platonic, Kallimachus and Aristophanes had the means of distinguishing these from such as the Platonic school had furnished and could authenticate, and motive enough for keeping them apart from the certified Platonic catalogue. Whether there existed any spurious works of this sort in the

Catalogue of Platonic works, prepared by Aristophanes, is trustworthy.

Plato, 347 B.C. See Boeckh, *Staats-haushaltung der Athener*, vol. i. p. 468, li. p. 244; Welcker, *Griech. Trag.* iii. p. 208; Korn, *De Publico Æschyli*, etc., Exemplari, *Lykurgo Auctore Confecto*, p. 6-9, Bonn, 1863.

In the passage cited above from Galen, we are farther informed, that Ptolemy Euergetes caused inquiries to be made, from the masters of all vessels which came to Alexandria, whether there were any MSS. on board; if there were, the MSS. were brought to the library, carefully copied out, and the copies given to the owners;

the original MSS. being retained in the library, and registered in a separate compartment, under the general head of *Ta ix xaliov*, and with the name of the person from whom the acquisition had been made, annexed. Compare Wolf, *Prolegg. ad Homerum*, p. cixv. These statements tend to show the care taken by the Alexandrine librarians, not only to acquire the best MSS., but also to keep good MSS. apart from bad, and to record the person and the quarter from which each acquisition had been made.

Museum, Diogenes Laertius does not tell us; nor, unfortunately, does he set forth the full list of those which Aristophanes, recognising as Platonic, distributed either in triplets or in units. Diogenes mentions only the principle of distribution adopted, and a select portion of the compositions distributed. But as far as his positive information goes, I hold it to be perfectly worthy of trust. I consider that all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes as works of Plato are unquestionably such; and that his testimony greatly strengthens our assurance for the received catalogue, in many of those items which have been most contested by critics, upon supposed internal grounds. Aristophanes authenticates, among others, not merely the *Leges*, but also the *Epinomis*, the *Minos*, and the *Epistolæ*.

There is another point also which I conceive to be proved by what we hear about Aristophanes. He (or Kallimachus before him) introduced a new order or distribution of his own —the Trilogies—founded on the analogy of the dramatic *Didaskaliae*. This shows that the Platonic dialogues were not received into the library in any canonical or *exclusive order* of their own, or in any interdependence as first, second, third, &c., essential to render them intelligible as a system. Had there been any such order, Kallimachus and Aristophanes would no more have altered it, than they would have transposed the order of the books in the Republic and *Leges*. The importance of what is here observed will appear presently, when we touch upon the theory of Schleiermacher.

The distributive arrangement, proposed or sanctioned by Aristophanes, applied (as I have already remarked) to the materials in the Alexandrine library only. But this library, though it was the most conspicuous portion, was not the whole, of the Grecian literary aggregate. There were other great regal libraries (such as those of the kings of Pergamus and the Seleukid kings¹) commenced after the Alexandrine library had already attained importance, and intended

Other libraries and literary centres, besides Alexandria, in which spurious Platonic works might get footing.

¹ The library of Antiochus the Great, or of his predecessor, is mentioned by Suidas, *Εὐφορίων*. Euphorion was librarian of it, seemingly about 230-220 B.C. See Clinton, *Fest. Hell.* B.C. 221.

to rival it : there was also an active literary and philosophising class, in various Grecian cities, of which Athens was the foremost, but in which Rhodes, Kyrênê, and several cities in Asia Minor, Kilikia, and Syria, were included : ultimately the cultivated classes at Rome, and the Western Hellenic city of Massalia, became comprised in the number. Among this widespread literary public, there were persons who neither knew nor examined the Platonic school or the Alexandrine library, nor investigated what title either of them had to furnish a certificate authenticating the genuine works of Plato. It is not certain that even the great library at Pergamus, begun nearly half a century after that of Alexandria, had any such initiatory agent as Demetrius Phalereus, able as well as willing to go to the fountain-head of Platonism at Athens : nor could the kings of Pergamus claim aid from Alexandria, with which they were in hostile rivalry, and from which they were even forbidden (so we hear) to purchase papyrus. Under these circumstances, it is quite possible that spurious Platonic writings, though they obtained no recognition in the Alexandrine library, might obtain more or less recognition elsewhere, and pass under the name of Plato. To a certain extent, such was the case. There existed some spurious dialogues at the time when Thrasyllus afterwards formed his arrangement.

Moreover the distribution made by Aristophanes of the Platonic dialogues into Trilogies, and the order of priority which he established among them was by no means universally accepted. Some rejected altogether the dramatic analogy of Trilogies as a principle of distribution. They arranged the dialogues

Other critics, besides Aristophanes, proposed different arrange-

Galen states (Comm. in Hippok. De Nat. Hom. vol. xv. p. 106, Kühn) that the forgeries of books, and the practice of tendering books for sale under the false names of celebrated authors, did not commence until the time when the competition between the kings of Egypt and the kings of Pergamus for their respective libraries became vehement. If this be admitted, there could have been no forgeries tendered at Alexandria until after the commencement of the reign

of Euergetes (B.C. 247-222): for the competition from Pergamus could hardly have commenced earlier than 230 B.C. In the times of Soter and Philadelphus, there would be no such forgeries tendered. I do not doubt that such forgeries were sometimes successfully passed off : but I think Galen does not take sufficient account of the practice (mentioned by himself) at the Alexandrine library, to keep faithful record of the person and quarter from whence each book had been acquired.

ments of the into three classes:¹ 1. The Direct, or purely dramatic. 2. The Indirect, or narrative (diegetic). 3. The Mixed—partly one, partly the other. Respecting the order of priority, we read that while Aristophanes placed the Republic first, there were eight other arrangements, each recognising a different dialogue as first in order; these eight were, Alkibiades I., Theagès, Euthyphron, Kleitophon, Timæus, Phædrus, Theætétus, Apology. More than one arrangement began with the Apology. Some even selected the Epistolæ as the proper commencement for studying Plato's works.²

We hear with surprise that the distinguished Stoic philosopher at Athens, Panætius, rejected the Phædon as not being the work of Plato.³ It appears that he did not believe in the immortality of the soul, and that he profoundly admired Plato; accordingly, he thought it unworthy of so great a philosopher to

Panætius,
the Stoic—
considered
the Phædon
to be spuri-
ous—ear-
liest known

¹ Diog. L. iii. 49. Schonc, in his commentary on the Protagoras (pp. 8-12), lays particular stress on this division into the direct or dramatic, and indirect or diegetic. He thinks it probable, that Plato preferred one method to the other at different periods of life: that all of one sort, and all of the other sort, come near together in time.

² Diog. L. iii. 62. Albinus, *Eισαγωγή*, c. 4, in K. F. Hermann's *Appendix Platonica*, p. 149.

³ See the Epigram out of the Anthology, and the extract from the Scholia on the Categories of Aristotle, cited by Wyttienbach in his note on the beginning of the Phædon. A more important passage (which he has not cited) from the Scholia on Aristotle, is, that of Asklepius on the *Metaphysica*, p. 991; Scholia, ed. Brandis, p. 576, a. 28. "Οτι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἔστιν ὁ Φαίδων, σαφέως ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης δηλοῖ—Παναίτιος γὰρ τις ἐτόλμησε νοθεύσαι τὸν διάλογον. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔλεγεν εἶναι θνήσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐβούλετο συγκατατάσσειν τὸν Πλάτωνα· ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι σαφὲς ἀπαθαρταίει (Plato) τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν, τούτου χάριν ἐνόθευσε τὸν διάλογον." Wyttienbach vainly endeavours to elude the force of the passages cited by himself, and to make out that the witnesses did not mean to assert

that Panætius had declared the Phædon to be spurious. One of the reasons urged by Wyttienbach is—"Nec illud neglegendum, quod dicitur ὑπὸ Παναίτιου τινος, & Panætio quodam neque per contemptum dici potuisse neque a Syriano neque ab hoc anonymo; quorum neuter eā fuit doctrinæ inopia, ut Panætii laudes et præstantiam ignoraret." But in the Scholion of Asklepius on the *Metaphysica* (which passage was not before Wyttienbach), we find the very same expression Παναίτιος τις, and plainly used *per contemptum*: for Asklepius probably considered it a manifestation of virtuous feeling to describe, in contemptuous language, a philosopher who did not believe in the immortality of the soul. We have only to read the still harsher and more contemptuous language which he employs towards the Manicheans, in another Scholion, p. 666, b. 5, Brandis.

Favorinus said (Diog. iii. 37) that when Plato read aloud the Phædon, Aristotle was the only person present who remained to the end: all the other hearers went away in the middle. I have no faith in this anecdote: I consider it, like so many others in Diogenes, as a myth: but the invention of it indicates, that there were many persons who had no sympathy with the Phædon, taking at the bottom the same view as Panætius.

waste so much logical subtlety, poetical metaphor, and fable, in support of such a conclusion. Probably he was also guided, in part, by one singularity in the *Phædon*: it is the only dialogue wherein Plato mentions himself in the third person.¹ If Panætius was predisposed, on other grounds, to consider the dialogue as unworthy of Plato, he might be induced to lay stress upon such a singularity, as showing that the author of the dialogue must be some person other than Plato. Panætius evidently took no pains to examine the external attestations of the dialogue, which he would have found to be attested both by Aristotle and by Kallimachus as the work of Plato. Moreover, whatever any one may think of the cogency of the reasoning—the beauty of Platonic handling and expression is manifest throughout the dialogue. This verdict of Panætius is the earliest example handed down to us of a Platonic dialogue disallowed on internal grounds—that is, because it appeared to the critic unworthy of Plato: and it is certainly among the most unfortunate examples.

But the most elaborate classification of the Platonic works was that made by Thrasyllus, in the days of Augustus or Tiberius, near to, or shortly after, the Christian era: a rhetor of much reputation, consulted and selected as travelling companion by the Emperor Augustus.²

Classifica-
tion of Pla-
tonic works
by the
rhetor
Thrasyllus
—dramatic
—philoso-
phical.

Thrasyllus adopted two different distributions of the Platonic works: one was dramatic, the other philosophical. The two were founded on perfectly distinct principles, and had no inherent connection with each other; but Thrasyllus combined them together, and noted, in regard to each dialogue, its place in the one classification as well as in the other.

One of these distributions was into Tetralogies, or groups of four each. This was in substitution for the Trilogies introduced by Aristophanes or by Kallimachus, and was founded upon the same dramatic analogy: the

Dramatic
principle—
Tetralogies.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 59. Plato is named also in the *Apology*: but this is a report, more or less exact, of the real defence of Sokrates.

² *Diog. L.* iii. 56; *Themistius, Orat. viii.* (*Περὶ τριτοῦ*) p. 108 B.

It appears that this classification by Thrasyllus was approved, or jointly constructed, by his contemporary Derkyllides. (*Albinus, Εἰσαγωγή*, c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's *Appendix Platonica*.)

dramas, which contended for the prize at the Dionysiac festivals, having been sometimes exhibited in batches of three, or Trilogies, sometimes in batches of four, or Tetralogies—three tragedies, along with a satirical piece as accompaniment. Because the dramatic writer brought forth four pieces at a birth, it was assumed as likely that Plato would publish four dialogues all at once. Without departing from this dramatic analogy, which seems to have been consecrated by the authority of the Alexandrine Grammatici, Thrasyllus gained two advantages. First, he included ALL the Platonic compositions, whereas Aristophanes, in his Trilogies, had included only a part, and had left the rest not grouped. Thrasyllus included all the Platonic compositions, thirty-six in number, reckoning the Republic, the Leges, and the Epistolæ in bulk, each as one—in nine Tetralogies or groups of four each. Secondly, he constituted his first tetralogy in an impressive and appropriate manner—Euthyphron, Apology, Kriton, Phædon—four compositions really resembling a dramatic tetralogy, and bound together by their common bearing, on the last scenes of the life of a philosopher.¹ In Euthyphron, Sokrates appears as having been just indicted and as thinking on his defence; in the Apology, he makes his defence; in the Kriton, he appears as sentenced by the legal tribunal, yet refusing to evade the sentence by escaping from his prison; in the Phædon, we have the last dying scene and conversation. None of the other tetralogies present an equal bond of connection between

¹ Dlog. L. iii. 57. *πρώτην μὲν οὖν τετραλογίαν τίθησι τὴν κοινὴν ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσαν· παραδείξαι γὰρ βούλεται ὅποιος ἂν εἴη ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου βίος.* Albinus, *Introduct. ad Plat.* c. 4, p. 149, in K. F. Hermann's *Append. Platon.*

Thrasyllus appears to have considered the Republic as ten dialogues and the Leges as twelve, each book (of Republic and of Leges) constituting a separate dialogue, so that he made the Platonic works fifty-six in all. But for the purpose of his tetralogies he reckoned them only as thirty-six—nine groups.

The author of the *Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας* in Hermann's *Append. Platon.* pp. 218-219, gives the same account of the tetralogies, and of the connecting bond which united the four members of the first tetralogical

group: but he condemns altogether the principle of the tetralogical division. He does not mention the name of Thrasyllus. He lived after Proklos (p. 218), that is, after 480 A.D.

The argument urged by Wyttenbach and others—that Varro must have considered the Phædon as *fourth* in the order of the Platonic compositions—an argument founded on a passage in Varro, L. L. vii. 37, which refers to the Phædon under the words *Plato in quarto*—this argument becomes inapplicable in the text as given by O. Müller—not *Varro in quarto* but *Varro in quatuor fluminibus*, &c. Mullach (*Democriti Frag.* p. 98) has tried unsuccessfully to impugn Müller's text, and to uphold the word *quarto* with the inference resting upon it.

their constituent items; but the first tetralogy was probably intended to recommend the rest, and to justify the system.

In the other distribution made by Thrasyllus,¹ Plato was regarded not as a quasi-dramatist, but as a philosopher. The dialogues were classified with reference partly to their method and spirit, partly to their subject. His highest generic distinction was into:—1. Dialogues of Investigation or Search. 2. Dialogues of Exposition or Construction. The Dialogues of Investigation he sub-divided into two classes:—1. Gymnastic. 2. Agonistic. These were again subdivided, each into two sub-classes; the Gymnastic, into 1. Obstetric. 2. Peirastic. The Agonistic, into 1. Probative. 2. Refutative. Again, the Dialogues of Exposition were divided into two classes: 1. Theoretical. 2. Practical. Each of these classes was divided into two sub-classes: the Theoretical into 1. Physical. 2. Logical. The Practical into 1. Ethical. 2. Political.

The following table exhibits this philosophical classification of Thrasyllus:—

¹ The statement in Diogenes Laertius, in his life of Plato, is somewhat obscure and equivocal; but I think it certain that the classification which he gives in iii. 49, 50, 51, of the Platonic dialogues, was made by Thrasyllus. It is a portion of the same systematic arrangement as that given somewhat farther on (iii. 56-61), which is ascribed by name to Thrasyllus, enumerating the Tetralogies. Diogenes expressly states that Thrasyllus was the person who annexed to each dialogue its double denomination, which it has since borne in the published editions—*Εὐθύφρων* — *περί δόσιον* — *πειραστικός*. In the Dialogues of examination or Search, one of these names is derived from the subject, the other from the method, as in the instance of *Euthyphron* just cited: in the Dialogues of Exposition both names are derived from the subject, first the special, next the general. *Θαῖδων*, *ἢ* *περί ψυχῆς*, *ῥηϊκός*. *Παρμενίδης*, *ἢ* *περί ἰδεῶν*, *λογικός*.

Schleiermacher (in the *Einleitung* prefixed to his translation of Plato, p. 24) speaks somewhat loosely about "the well-known dialectical distribu-

tions of the Platonic dialogues, which Diogenes has preserved without giving the name of the author". Diogenes gives only *one* such dialectical (or logical) distribution; and though he does not mention the name of Thrasyllus in direct or immediate connection with it, we may clearly see that he is copying Thrasyllus. This is well pointed out in an acute commentary on Schleiermacher, by Yxem, *Logos Protreptikos*, Berlin, 1841, p. 12-13.

Diogenes remarks (iii. 50) that the distribution of the dialogues into narrative, dramatic, and mixed, is made *πραγματικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσόφως*. This remark would seem to apply more precisely to the arrangement of the dialogues into trilogies and tetralogies. His word *φιλοσόφως* belongs very justly to the logical distribution of Thrasyllus, apart from the tetralogies.

Porphyry tells us that Plotinus did not bestow any titles upon his own discourses. The titles were bestowed by his disciples; who did not always agree, but gave different titles to the same discourse (Porphyry, *Vit. Plotin.* 4).

TABLE I.

PHILOSOPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKS OF
PLATO BY THRASYLLUS.

I. DIALOGUES OF INVESTIGATION. <i>Searching Dialogues.</i> Ζητητικοί.	II. DIALOGUES OF EXPOSITION. <i>Guiding Dialogues.</i> Υφηγητικοί.
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I. DIALOGUES OF INVESTIGATION.

Gymnastic.		Agonistic.	
Μαιευτικοί. Obetric.	Πειραστικοί. Peirastic.	Ἐνδεικτικοί. Probative.	Ἀναρρηπτικοί. Refutative.
Alkibiadēs I. Alkibiadēs II. Theagēs. Lachēs. Lysis.	Charmidēs. Menon. Ion. Euthyphron.	Protagoras.	Euthydēmus. Gorgias. Hippias I. Hippias II.

II. DIALOGUES OF EXPOSITION.

Theoretical.		Practical.	
Φυσικοί. Physical.	Λογικοί. Logical.	Ἠθικοί. Ethical.	Πολιτικοί. Political.
Timæus.	Kratylus. Sophistēs. Politikus. Parmenidēs. Theætētus.	Apology. Kriton. Phædon. Phædrus. Symposion. Menexenus. Kleitophon. Epistola. Philēbus. Hipparchus. Rivales.	Republic. Kritias. Minos. Leges. Epinomis.

I now subjoin a second Table, containing the Dramatic Distribution of the Platonic Dialogues, with the Philosophical Distribution combined or attached to it.

TABLE II.

DRAMATIC DISTRIBUTION.—PLATONIC DIALOGUES, AS
ARRANGED IN TETRALOGIES BY THRASYLLUS.

Tetralogy 1.		
1. Euthyphron.....	On Holiness.....	Peirastic or Testing.
2. Apology of Sokrates	Ethical.....	Ethical.
3. Kriton.....	On Duty in Action....	Ethical.
4. Phædon.....	On the Soul.....	Ethical.
2.		
1. Kratylus.....	On Rectitude in Nam- ing	Logical.
2. Theætétus.....	On Knowledge.....	Logical.
3. Sophistês.....	On Ens or the Existent	Logical.
4. Politikus.....	On the Art of Govern- ing	Logical.
3.		
1. Parmenidês.....	On Ideas.....	Logical.
2. Philêbus.....	On Pleasure.....	Ethical.
3. Symposion.....	On Good.....	Ethical.
4. Phædrus.....	On Love.....	Ethical.
4.		
1. Alkibiadês I.	On the Nature of Man	Obstetric or Evolving.
2. Alkibiadês II.	On Prayer.....	Obstetric.
3. Hipparchus.....	On the Love of Gain..	Ethical.
4. Erastês.....	On Philosophy.....	Ethical.
5.		
1. Theagês.....	On Philosophy.....	Obstetric.
2. Charmidês.....	On Temperance.....	Peirastic.
3. Lachês.....	On Courage.....	Obstetric.
4. Lysis.....	On Friendship.....	Obstetric.
6.		
1. Euthydêmus.....	The Disputations Man	Refutative.
2. Protagoras.....	The Sophists.....	Probative.
3. Gorgias.....	On Rhetoric.....	Refutative.
4. Menon.....	On Virtue.....	Peirastic.

7.

1. Hippias I.	On the Beautiful	Refutative.
2. Hippias II.	On Falsehood.....	Refutative.
3. Ion	On the Iliad	Peirastic.
4. Menexenus	The Funeral Oration..	Ethical.

8.

1. Kleitophon	The Impulsive	Ethical.
2. Republic	On Justice.....	Political.
3. Timæus.....	On Nature	Physical.
4. Kritias.....	The Atlantid	Ethical.

9.

1. Minos.....	On Law	Political.
2. Leges	On Legislation	Political.
3. Epinomis	The Night-Assembly, or the Philosopher	Political.
4. Epistolæ XIII.....	Ethical.

The second Table, as it here stands, is given by Diogenes Laertius, and is extracted by him probably from the work of Thrasyllus, or from the edition of Plato as published by Thrasyllus. The reader will see that each Platonic composition has a place assigned to it in two classifications—1. The dramatic—2. The philosophical—each in itself distinct and independent of the other, but here blended together.

We may indeed say more. The two classifications are not only independent, but incongruous and even repugnant. The better of the two is only obscurely and imperfectly apprehended, because it is presented as an appendage to the worse. The dramatic classification, which stands in the foreground, rests upon a purely fanciful analogy, determining preference for the number *four*. If indeed this objection were urged against Thrasyllus, he might probably have replied that the group of four volumes together was in itself convenient, neither too large nor too small, for an elementary subdivision; and that the fanciful analogy was an artifice for recommending it to the feelings, better (after all) than selection of another number by haphazard. Be that as it may, however, the fiction was one which Thrasyllus inherited from Aristophanes: and it does some honour to his ability, that he has

Incongruity
and repug-
nance of the
two classifi-
cations.

built, upon so inconvenient a fiction, one tetralogy (the first), really plausible and impressive.¹ But it does more honour to his ability that he should have originated the philosophical classification; distinguishing the dialogues by important attributes truly belonging to each, and conducting the Platonic student to points of view which ought to be made known to him. This classification forms a marked improvement upon every thing (so far as we know) which preceded it.

That Thrasyllus followed Aristophanes in the principle of his classification, is manifest: that he adopted the dramatic ground and principle of classification (while amending its details), not because he was himself guided by it, but because he found it already in use and sanctioned by the high authority of the Alexandrines—is also manifest, because he himself constructed and tacked to it a better classification, founded upon principles new and incongruous with the dramatic. In all this we trace the established ascendancy of the Alexandrine library and its eminent literati. Of which ascendancy a farther illustration appears, when we read in Diogenes Laertius that editions of Plato were published, carrying along with the text the special marks of annotation applied by the Alexandrines to Homer and other poets: the obelus to indicate a spurious passage, the obelus with two dots to denote a passage which had been improperly declared spurious, the X to signify peculiar locutions, the double line or Diplê to mark important or charac-

Dramatic principle of classification—was inherited by Thrasyllus from Aristophanes.

Authority of the Alexandrine Library—editions of Plato published, with the Alexandrine critical marks.

¹ It is probable that Aristophanes, in distributing Plato into trilogies, was really influenced by the dramatic form of the compositions to put them in a class with real dramas. But Thrasyllus does not seem to have been influenced by such a consideration. He took the number four on its own merits, and adopted, as a way of recommending it, the traditional analogy sanctioned by the Alexandrine librarians.

That such was the case, we may infer pretty clearly when we learn, that Thrasyllus applied the same distribution (into tetralogies) to the works of Demokritus, which were not dramatic in form. (Diog. L. ix. 45; Mul-

lach, Democ. Frag. p. 100-107, who attempts to restore the Thrasyllian tetralogies.)

The compositions of Demokritus were not merely numerous, but related to the greatest diversity of subjects. To them Thrasyllus could not apply the same logical or philosophical distribution which he applied to Plato. He published, along with the works of Demokritus, a preface, which he entitled *Tà apò tēs anagōgēs tōv Anaxagorou βιβλίον* (Diog. L. ix. 41).

Porphry tells us, that when he undertook, as literary executor, the arrangement and publication of the works of his deceased master Plotinus, he found fifty-four discourses: which

teristic opinions of Plato—and others in like manner. A special price was paid for manuscripts of Plato with these illustrative appendages :¹ which must have been applied either by Alexandrines themselves, or by others trained in their school. When Thrasyllus set himself to edit and re-distribute the Platonic works, we may be sure that he must have consulted one or more public libraries, either at Alexandria, Athens, Rome, Tarsus, or elsewhere. Nowhere else could he find all the works together. Now the proceedings ascribed to him show that he attached himself to the Alexandrine library, and to the authority of its most eminent critics.

Probably it was this same authority that Thrasyllus followed in determining which were the real works of Plato, and in setting aside pretended works. He accepted the collection of Platonic compositions sanctioned by Aristophanes and recognised as such in the Alexandrine library. As far as our positive knowledge goes, it fully bears out what is here stated : all the compositions recognised by Aristophanes (unfortunately Diogenes does not give a complete enumeration of those which he recognised) are to be found in the catalogue of Thrasyllus. And the evidentiary value of this fact is so much the greater, because the most questionable compositions (I mean, those which modern critics reject or even despise) are expressly included in

he arranged into six Enneads or groups of nine each. He was induced to prefer this distribution, by regard to the perfection of the number six (τελειότητα). He placed in each Ennead discourses akin to each other, or on analogous subjects (Porphyry, Vit. Plotin. 24).

¹ Diog. L. iii. 65, 66. Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ σημεία τινα τοῖς βιβλίοις αὐτοῦ παρατίθενται, φέρει καὶ περὶ τούτων τι εἰρημεν, &c. He then proceeds to enumerate the σημεία.

It is important to note that Diogenes cites this statement (respecting the peculiar critical marks appended to manuscripts of the Platonic works) from Antigonos of Karystus in his Life of Zeno the Stoic. Now the date of Antigonos is placed by Mr. Fynes Clinton in B.C. 225, before the death of Ptolemy III. Euergetes (see Fasti Hellen. B.C. 225, also Appendix, 12, 80).

Antigonos must thus have been contemporary both with Kallimachus and with Aristophanes of Byzantium : he notices the marked manuscripts of Plato as something newly edited—(νεωστὶ ἐκδοθέντα) : and we may thus see that the work of critical marking must have been performed either by Kallimachus and Aristophanes themselves (one or both) or by some of their contemporaries. Among the titles of the lost treatises of Kallimachus, one is—about the γλῶσσαι or peculiar phrases of Demokritos. It is therefore noway improbable that Kallimachus should have bestowed attention upon the peculiarities of the Platonic text, and the inaccuracies of manuscripts. The library had probably acquired several different manuscripts of the Platonic compositions, as it had of the Iliad and Odyssey, and of the Attic tragedies.

the recognition of Aristophanes, and passed from him to Thrasyllus—Leges, Epinomis, Minos, Epistolæ, Sophistæ, Politikus. Exactly on those points on which the authority of Thrasyllus requires to be fortified against modern objectors, it receives all the support which coincidence with Aristophanes can impart. When we know that Thrasyllus adhered to Aristophanes on so many disputable points of the catalogue, we may infer pretty certainly that he adhered to him in the remainder. In regard to the question, Which were Plato's genuine works? it was perfectly natural that Thrasyllus should accept the recognition of the greatest library then existing: a library, the written records of which could be traced back to Demetrius Phalereus. He followed this external authority: he did not take each dialogue to pieces, to try whether it conformed to a certain internal standard—a "platonisches Gefühl"—of his own.

That the question between genuine and spurious Platonic dialogues was tried in the days of Thrasyllus, by external authority and not by internal feeling—we may see farther by the way in which Diogenes Laertius speaks of the spurious dialogues. "The following dialogues (he says) are declared to be spurious by common consent: 1. Eryxias or Erasistratus. 2. Akephali or Sisyphus. 3. Demodokus. 4. Axiochus. 5. Halkyon. 6. Midon or Hippotrophus. 7. Phæakes. 8. Chelidon. 9. Hebdomé. 10. Epimenidea."¹ There was, then, unanimity, so far as the knowledge of Diogenes Laertius reached, as to genuine and spurious.

Ten spurious dialogues, rejected by all other critics as well as by Thrasyllus—evidence that these critics followed the common authority of the Alexandrine library.

All the critics whom he valued, Thrasyllus among them, pronounced the above ten dialogues to be spurious: all of them agreed also in accepting the dialogues in the list of Thrasyllus as genuine.² Of course the ten spurious dialogues must have been talked of by some persons, or must have got footing in some editions or libraries, as real works of Plato: otherwise there could have been no trial had or sentence passed upon them.

¹ Diog. L. iii. 62: *πολλοὶ δὲ τὰς δεκάδην διαλογισμίδας.*

Compare Prolegomena τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας, in Hermann's Appendix Platonicæ, p. 219.

² It has been contended by some

modern critics, that Thrasyllus himself doubted whether the Hipparchus was Plato's work. When I consider that dialogue, I shall show that there is no adequate ground for believing that Thrasyllus doubted its genuineness.

But what Diogenes affirms is, that Thrasyllus and all the critics whose opinion he esteemed, concurred in rejecting them. We may surely presume that this unanimity among the critics, both as to all that they accepted and all that they rejected, arose from common acquiescence in the authority of the Alexandrine library.¹ The ten rejected dialogues were not in the Alexandrine library—or at least not among the rolls therein recognised as Platonic.

If Thrasyllus and the others did not proceed upon this evidence in rejecting the ten dialogues, and did not find in them any marks of time such as to exclude the supposition of Platonic authorship—they decided upon what is called internal evidence: a critical sentiment, which satisfied them that these dialogues did not possess the Platonic character, style, manner, doctrines, merits, &c. Now I think it highly improbable that Thrasyllus could have proceeded upon any such sentiment. For when we survey the catalogue of works which he recognised as genuine, we see that it includes the widest diversity of style, manner, doctrine, purpose, and merits: that the disparate epithets, which he justly applies to discriminate the various dialogues, cannot be generalised so as to leave any intelligible "Platonic character" common to all. Now since Thrasyllus reckoned among the genuine works of Plato, compositions so unlike, and so unequal in merit, as the Republic, Protagoras, Gorgias, Lysis, Parmenides, Symposium, Philébus, Menexenus, Leges, Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, Theagês, Epistolæ, &c., not to mention a composition obviously unfinished, such as the Kritias—he could have little scruple in believing that Plato also composed the Eryxias, Sisyphus, Demodokus, and Halkyon. These last-mentioned dialogues still exist, and can be appreciated.² Allowing, for the sake of argument, that we are en-

¹ Diogenes (ix. 49) uses the same phrase in regard to the spurious works ascribed to Demokritus, τὰ δ' ὁμολογούμεναι εἶναι ἀλλότρια. And I believe that he means the same thing by it: that the works alluded to were not recognised in the Alexandrine library as belonging to Demokritus, and were accordingly excluded from the tetralogies (of Demokritus) prepared by Thrasyllus.

² The Axiochus, Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Demodokus, are printed as Apocrypha annexed to most editions of Plato, together with two other dialogues entitled De Justo and De Virtute. The Halkyon has generally appeared among the works of Lucian, but K. F. Hermann has recently printed it in his edition of Plato among the Platonic Apocrypha.

titled to assume our own sense of worth as a test of what is really Plato's composition, it is impossible to deny, that if these dialogues are not worthy of the author of Republic and Protagoras, they are at least worthy of the author of the Leges, Epinomis, Hipparchus, Minos, &c. Accordingly, if the internal sentiment of Thrasyllus did not lead him to reject these last four, neither would it lead him to reject the Eryxias, Sisyphus, and Halkyon. I conclude therefore that if he, and all the other critics whom Diogenes esteemed, agreed in rejecting the ten dialogues as spurious—their verdict depended not upon any internal sentiment, but upon the authority of the Alexandrine library.¹

On this question, then, of the Canon of Plato's works (as compared with the works of other contemporary authors) recognised by Thrasyllus—I consider that its claim to trustworthiness is very high, as including all the genuine works, and none but the genuine works, of Plato: the following facts being either proved, or fairly presumable.

Results as to the trustworthiness of the Thrasyllian Canon.

1. The Canon rests on the authority of the Alexandrine library and its erudite librarians;² whose written records went

The Axiochus contains a mark of time (the mention of *Ἀναξίχης* and *Ἀνακτοῦ*, p. 367), as F. A. Wolf has observed, proving that it was not composed until the Platonic and Peripatetic schools were both of them in full establishment at Athens—that is, certainly after the death of Plato, and probably after the death of Aristotle. It is possible that Thrasyllus may have proceeded upon this evidence of time, at least as collateral proof, in pronouncing the dialogue not to be the work of Plato. The other four dialogues contain no similar evidence of date.

Favorinus affirmed that Halkyon was the work of an author named Leon.

Some said (Diog. L. iii. 37) that Philippus of Opus, one of the disciples of Plato, transcribed the Leges, which were on waxen tablets (*ἐν κηρῷ*), and that the Epinomis was his work (*τοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐρινομίαν φασὶν εἶναι*). It was probably the work of Philippus only in the sense in which the Leges were his work—that he made a fair and durable copy of parts of it from the

wax. Thrasyllus admitted it with the rest as Platonic.

¹ Mullach (Democr. Fragm. p. 100) accuses Thrasyllus of an entire want of critical sentiment, and pronounces his catalogue to be altogether without value as an evidence of genuine Platonic works—because Thrasyllus admits many dialogues, "quos doctorum nostri sæculi virorum acumen à librorum Platoniorum numero exemit".

This observation exactly illustrates the conclusion which I desire to bring out. I admit that Thrasyllus had a critical sentiment different from that of the modern Platonic commentators; but I believe that in the present case he proceeded upon other evidence—recognition by the Alexandrine library. My difference with Mullach is, that I consider this recognition (in a question of genuine or spurious) as more trustworthy evidence than the critical sentiment of modern literati.

² Suckow adopts and defends the opinion here stated—that Thrasyllus, in determining which were the genuine works of Plato and which were not

back to the days of Ptolemy Soter, and Demetrius Phalereus, within a generation after the death of Plato.

2. The manuscripts of Plato at his death were preserved in the school which he founded; where they continued for more than thirty years under the care of Speusippus and Xenokrates, who possessed personal knowledge of all that Plato had really written. After Xenokrates, they came under the care of Polemon and the succeeding Scholarcha, from whom Demetrius Phalereus probably obtained permission to take copies of them for the nascent museum or library at Alexandria—or through whom at least (if he purchased from booksellers) he could easily ascertain which were Plato's works, and which, if any, were spurious.

3. They were received into that library without any known canonical order, prescribed system, or interdependence essential to their being properly understood. Kallimachus or Aristophanes devised an order of arrangement for themselves, such as they thought suitable.

genuine, was guided mainly by the authority of the Alexandrine library and librarians (G. F. W. Suckow, *Form der Platonischen Schriften*, pp. 170-175). Ueberweg admits this opinion as just (*Untersuchungen*, p. 195).

Suckow farther considers (p. 175) that the catalogue of works of esteemed authors, deposited in the Alexandrine library, may be regarded as dating from the *Πίνακες* of Kallimachus.

This goes far to make out the presumption which I have endeavoured to establish in favour of the Canon recognised by Thrasyllus, which, however, these two authors do not fully admit.

K. F. Hermann, too (see *Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos.* p. 44), argues sometimes strongly in favour of this presumption, though elsewhere he entirely departs from it.

CHAPTER VII.

PLATONIC CANON AS APPRECIATED AND MODIFIED BY
MODERN CRITICS.

THE Platonic Canon established by Thrasyllus maintained its authority until the close of the last century, in regard to the distinction between what was genuine and spurious. The distribution indeed did not continue to be approved: the Tetralogies were neglected, and the order of the dialogues varied: moreover, doubts were intimated about Kleitophon and Epinomis. But nothing was positively removed from, or positively added to, the total recognised by Thrasyllus. The Neo-Platonists (from the close of the second century B.C., down to the beginning of the sixth century A.D.) introduced a new, mystic, and theological interpretation, which often totally changed and falsified Plato's meaning. Their principles of interpretation would have been strange and unintelligible to the rhetors Thrasyllus and Dionysius of Halikarnassus—or to the Platonic philosopher Charmadas, who expounded Plato to Marcus Crassus at Athens. But they still continued to look for Plato in the nine Tetralogies of Thrasyllus, in each and all of them. So also continued Ficinus, who, during the last half of the fifteenth century, did so much to revive in the modern world the study of Plato. He revived along with it the neo-platonic interpretation. The *Argumenta*, prefixed to the different dialogues by Ficinus, are remarkable, as showing what an ingenious student, interpreting in that spirit, discovered in them.

The Canon of Thrasyllus continued to be generally acknowledged by the Neo-Platonists, as well as by Ficinus and the succeeding critics after the revival of learning.

But the scholars of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, speaking generally—though not neglecting these neo-

platonian refinements, were disposed to seek out, wherever they could find it, a more literal interpretation of the Platonic text, correctly presented and improved. The next great edition of the works of Plato was published by Serranus and Stephens, in the latter portion of the sixteenth century.

Serranus distributed the dialogues of Plato into six groups which he called Syzygies. In his first Syzygy were comprised Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon (coinciding with the first Tetralogy of Thrasyllus), as setting forth the defence of Sokrates and of his doctrine. The second Syzygy included the dialogues introductory to philosophy generally, and impugning the Sophists—Theagæa, Erastæ, Theætétus, Sophistês, Euthydêmus, Protagoras, Hippias II.

In the third Syzygy were three dialogues considered as bearing on Logic—Kratylus, Gorgias, Ion. The fourth Syzygy contained the dialogues on Ethics generally—Philêbus, Menon, Alkibiadês I.; on special points of Ethics—Alkibiadês II., Charmidês, Lysis, Hipparchus; and on Politics—Menexenus, Politikus, Minoas, Republic, Leges, Epinomis. The fifth Syzygy included the dialogues on Physics, and Metaphysics (or Theology)—Timæus, Kritias, Parmenidês, Symposion, Phædrus, Hippias II. In the sixth Syzygy were ranged the thirteen Epistles, the various dialogues which Serranus considered spurious (Kleitophon among them, which he regarded as doubtful), and the Definitions.

Serranus, while modifying the distribution of the Platonic works, left the entire Canon very much as he found it. So it remained throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the scholars who devoted themselves to Plato were content with improvement of the text, philological illustration, and citations from the ancient commentators. But the powerful impulse, given by Kant to the speculative mind of Europe during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, materially affected the point of view from which Plato was regarded. Tennemann, both in his System of the Platonic Philosophy, and in dealing with Plato as a portion of his general history of philosophy, applied the doctrines of Kant largely and even excessively to the exposition of ancient doctrines. Much of his comment is instructive,

greatly surpassing his predecessors. Without altering the Platonic Canon, he took a new view of the general purposes of Plato, and especially he brought forward the dialogue Phædrus into a prominence which had never before belonged to it, as an index or key-note (*ἐνδόξιμον*) to the whole Platonic series. Shortly after Tennemann, came Schleiermacher, who introduced a theory of his own, ingenious as well as original, which has given a new turn to all the subsequent Platonic criticism.

Schleiermacher begins by assuming two fundamental postulates, both altogether new. 1. A systematic unity of philosophic theme and purpose, conceived by Plato in his youth, at first obscurely—afterwards worked out through successive dialogues; each dialogue disclosing the same purpose, but the later disclosing it more clearly and fully, until his old age. 2. A peremptory, exclusive, and intentional order of the dialogues, composed by Plato with a view to the completion of this philosophical scheme. Schleiermacher undertakes to demonstrate what this order was, and to point out the contribution brought by each successive dialogue to the accomplishment of Plato's premeditated scheme.

To those who understand Plato, the dialogues themselves reveal (so Schleiermacher affirms) their own essential order of sequence—their own mutual relations of antecedent and consequent. Each presupposes those which go before: each prepares for those which follow. Accordingly, Schleiermacher distributes the Platonic dialogues into three groups: the first, or elementary, beginning with Phædrus, followed by Lysis, Protagoras, Lachæa, Charmidês, Euthyphron, Parmenidês: the second, or preparatory, comprising Gorgias, Theætêtus, Menon, Euthydêmus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Symposium, Phædon, Philêbus: the third, or constructive, including Republic, Timæus, and Kritias. These groups or files are all supposed to be marshalled under Platonic authority: both the entire files as first, second, third—and the dialogues composing each file, carrying their own place in the order, imprinted in visible characters. But to each file, there is attached what

Schleiermacher—
new theory
about the
purposes of
Plato. One
philosophical
scheme, conceived
by Plato
from the
beginning
—essential
order and
interdependence
of the dia-
logues, as contrib-
uting to the
full execu-
tion of this
scheme.
Some dia-
logues not
constituent
items in the
series, but
lying along-
side of it.
Order of ar-
rangement.

Schleiermacher terms an Appendix, containing one or more dialogues, each a composition by itself, and lying not in the series, but alongside of it (*Neben-werke*). The Appendix to the first file includes *Apologia*, *Kriton*, *Ion*, *Hippias II.*, *Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Alkibiadēs II.* The Appendix to the second file consists of—*Theagēs*, *Erastēs*, *Alkibiadēs I.*, *Menexenus*, *Hippias I.*, *Kleitophon*. That of the third file consists of the *Leges*. The Appendix is not supposed to imply any common positive character in the dialogues which it includes, but simply the negative attribute of not belonging to the main philosophical column, besides a greater harmony with the file to which it is attached than with the other two files. Some dialogues assigned to the Appendixes are considered by Schleiermacher as spurious; some however he treats as compositions on special occasions, or adjuncts to the regular series. To this latter category belong the *Apologia*, *Kriton*, and *Leges*. Schleiermacher considers the *Charmidēs* to have been composed during the time of the Anarchy, B.C. 404: the *Phædrus* (earliest of all), in Olymp. 93 (B.C. 406), two years before:¹ the *Lysis*, *Protagoras*, and *Lachēs*, to lie between them in respect of date.

Such is the general theory of Schleiermacher, which presents to us Plato in the character of a Demiurgus, contemplating from the first an Idea of philosophy, and constructing a series of dialogues (like a *Kosmos* of Schleiermacher), with the express purpose of giving embodiment to it as far as practicable. We next come to Ast, who denies this theory altogether. According to Ast, there never was any philosophical system, to the exposition and communication of which each successive dialogue was deliberately intended to contribute: there is no scientific or intentional connection between the dialogues,—no progressive arrangement of first and second, of foundation and superstructure: there is no other unity or connecting principle between them than that which they involve as all emanating from the same age, country, and author, and the same general view of the world (*Welt-Ansicht*) or critical estimate of man and nature.² The dialogues

Theory of Ast—he denies the reality of any pre-conceived scheme—considers the dialogues as distinct philosophical dramas.

¹ Schleierm. vol. i. p. 72; vol. ii. p. 8. ² Ast, *Leben und Schriften Platon's*, p. 40.

are dramatic (Ast affirms), not merely in their external form, but in their internal character: each is in truth a philosophical drama.¹ Their purpose is very diverse and many-sided: we mistake if we imagine the philosophical purpose to stand alone. If that were so (Ast argues), how can we explain the fact, that in most of the dialogues there is no philosophical result at all? Nothing but a discussion without definite end, which leaves every point unsettled.² Plato is poet, artist, philosopher, blended in one. He does not profess to lay down positive opinions. Still less does he proclaim his own opinions as exclusive orthodoxy, to be poured ready-prepared into the minds of recipient pupils. He seeks to urge the pupils to think and investigate for themselves. He employs the form of dialogue, as indispensable to generate in their minds this impulse of active research, and to arm them with the power of pursuing it effectively.³ But each Platonic dialogue is a separate composition in itself, and each of the greater dialogues is a finished and symmetrical whole, like a living organism.⁴

Though Ast differs thus pointedly from Schleiermacher in the enunciation of his general principle, yet he approximates to him more nearly when he comes to detail: for he recognises three classes of dialogues, succeeding each other in a chronological order verifiable (as he thinks) by the dialogues themselves. His first class (in which he declares the poetical and dramatic element to be predominant) consists of Protagoras, Phædrus, Gorgias, Phædon. His second class, distinguished by the dialectic element, includes Theætétus, Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês, Kratylus. His third class, wherein the poetical and dialectic

His order of arrangement. He admits only fourteen dialogues as genuine, rejecting all the rest.

¹ Ast, *ib.* p. 46.

² Ast, *ibid.* p. 39.

³ Ast, *ib.* p. 42.

⁴ Ast, pp. 38, 39. The general view here taken by Ast—dwelling upon the separate individuality as well as upon the dramatic character of each dialogue—calling attention to the purpose of intellectual stimulation, and of reasoning out different aspects of ethical and dialectical questions, as distinguished from endocrinating purpose—this general view coincides more nearly with my own than that of any other critic. But Ast does not follow it out con-

sistently. If he were consistent with it, he ought to be more catholic than other critics, in admitting a large and undefinable diversity in the separate Platonic manifestations: instead of which, he is the most sweeping of all repudiators, on internal grounds. He is not even satisfied with the Parmenides as it now stands; he insists that what is now the termination was not the real and original termination; but that Plato must have appended to the dialogue an explanation of its *ἀπορία*, puzzles, and antinomies; which explanation is now lost.

element are found both combined, embraces Philébus, Symposium, Republic, Timæus, Kritias. These fourteen dialogues, in Ast's view, constitute the whole of the genuine Platonic works. All the rest he pronounces to be spurious. He rejects *Leges*, *Epinomis*, *Menon*, *Euthydémus*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Lysis*, *Alkibiadês I.* and *II.*, *Hippias I.* and *II.*, *Ion*, *Erastæ*, *Theagês*, *Kleitophon*, *Apologia*, *Kriton*, *Minos*, *Epistolæ*—together with all the other dialogues which were rejected in antiquity by *Thrasyllus*. Lastly, Ast considers the *Protagoras* to have been composed in 408 B.C., when Plato was not more than 21 years of age—the *Phædrus* in 407 B.C.—the *Gorgias* in 404 B.C.¹

Socher agrees with Ast in rejecting the fundamental hypothesis of Schleiermacher—that of a preconceived scheme systematically worked out by Plato. But on many points he differs from Ast no less than from Schleiermacher. He assigns the earliest Platonic composition (which he supposes to be *Theagês*), to a date preceding the battle of *Arginusæ*, in 406 B.C., when Plato was about 22-23 years of age.² Assuming it as certain that Plato composed dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates, he conceives that the earliest of them would naturally be the most purely Sokratic in respect of theme,—as well as the least copious, comprehensive, and ideal, in manner of handling. During the six and a half years between the battle of *Arginusæ* and the death of Sokrates, Socher registers the following succession of Platonic compositions:—*Theagês*, *Lachês*, *Hippias II.*, *Alkibiadês I.*, *Dialogus de Virtute* (usually printed with the spurious, but supposed by Socher to be a sort of preparatory sketch for the *Menon*), *Menon*, *Kratylus*, *Euthyphron*. These three last he supposes to precede very shortly the death of Sokrates. After that event, and very shortly after, were composed the *Apologia*, *Kriton*, and *Phædon*.

These eleven dialogues fill up what Socher regards as the first period of Plato's life, ending when he was somewhat more than thirty years of age. The second period extends to the commence-

¹ Ast, *Leben und Schriften Platon's*, p. 102. These critics adopt 409 B.C. as the year of Plato's birth: I think 407 p. 376.

² Socher, *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, B.C. is the true year.

ment of his teaching at the Academy, when about 41 or 42 years old (B.C. 386). In this second period were composed *Ion*, *Euthydēmus*, *Hippias I.*, *Protagoras*, *Theætētus*, *Gorgias*, *Philēbus*—in the order here set forth. During the third period of Plato's life, continuing until he was 65 or more, he composed *Phædrus*, *Menexenus*, *Symposion*, *Republic*, *Timæus*. To the fourth and last period, that of extreme old age, belongs the composition of the *Leges*.¹

Socher rejects as spurious—*Hipparchus*, *Minos*, *Kleitophon*, *Alkibiadēs II.*, *Erastæ*, *Epinomis*, *Epistolæ*, *Parmenidēs*, *Sophistēs*, *Politikus*, *Kritias*: also *Charmidēs*, and *Lysis*, these two last however not quite so decisively.

Both Ast and Schleiermacher consider *Phædrus* and *Protagoras* as among the earliest compositions of Plato. Herein Socher dissents from them. He puts *Protagoras* into the second period, and *Phædrus* into the third. But the most peculiar feature in his theory is, that he rejects as spurious *Parmenidēs*, *Sophistēs*, *Politikus*, *Kritias*.

From Schleiermacher, Ast, and Socher, we pass to K. F. Hermann²—and to Stallbaum, who has prefixed *Prolegomena* to his edition of each dialogue. Both these critics protest against Socher's rejection of the four dialogues last indicated: but they agree with Socher and Ast in denying the reality of any preconceived system, present to Plato's mind in his first dialogue, and advanced by regular steps throughout each of the succeeding dialogues. The polemical tone of K. F. Hermann against this theory, and against Schleiermacher, its author, is strenuous and even unwarrantably bitter.³ Especially the position laid

Schleiermacher and Ast both consider *Phædrus* and *Protagoras* as early compositions—Socher puts *Protagoras* into the second period, *Phædrus* into the third.

K. F. Hermann—Stallbaum—both of them consider the *Phædrus* as a late dialogue—both of them deny preconceived

¹ Socher, *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, pp. 301-459-460.

² K. F. Hermann, *Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philosophie*, p. 368, seq. Stallbaum, *Disputatio de Platonis Vita et Scriptis*, prefixed to his edition of Plato's Works, p. xxxii., seq.

³ Ueberweg (*Untersuchungen*, pp. 50-52) has collected several citations from K. F. Hermann, in which the latter treats Schleiermacher "wie einen

Sophisten, der sich in absichtlicher Unwahrhaftigkeit gefalle, mitunter fast als einen Mann, der innerlich wohl wisse, wie die Sache stehe (nämlich, dass sie so sei, wie Hermann lehrt), der sich aber, etwa aus Lust, seine überlegene Dialektik zu beweisen, Mühe gebe, sie in einem anderen Lichte erscheinen zu lassen; also—ὅς τις ἄλλος λόγους κερταίως—recht in rhetorisch sophistischer Manier."

We know well, from other and inde-

order and system—their arrangements of the dialogues—they admit new and varying philosophical points of view.

down by Schleiermacher—that Phædrus is the earliest of Plato's dialogues, written when he was 22 or 23 years of age, and that the general system presiding over all the future dialogues is indicated therein as even then present to his mind, afterwards to be worked out—is controverted by Hermann and Stallbaum no less than by Ast and Socher. All three concur in the tripartite distribution of the life of Plato. But Hermann thinks that Plato acquired gradually and successively, new points of view, with enlarged philosophical development: and that the dialogues as successively composed are expressions of these varying phases. Moreover, Hermann thinks that such variations in Plato's philosophy may be accounted for by external circumstances. He reckons Plato's first period as ending with the death of Sokrates, or rather at an epoch not long after the death of Sokrates: the second as ending with the commencement of Plato's teaching at the Academy, after his return from Sicily—about 385 B.C.: the third, as extending from thence to his old age. To the first, or Sokratic stadium, Hermann assigns the smaller dialogues: the earliest of which he declares to be—Hippias II., Ion, Alkibiadès I., Lysis, Charmidès, Lachès: after which come Protagoras and Euthydémus, wherein the batteries are opened against the Sophists, shortly before the death of Sokrates. Immediately after the last mentioned event, come a series of dialogues reflecting the strong and fresh impression left by it upon Plato's mind—Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron, Menon, Hippias I.—occupying a sort of transition stage between the first and the second period. We now enter upon the second or dialectic period; passed by Plato greatly at

pendent evidence, what Schleiermacher really was,—that he was not only one of the most accomplished scholars, but one of the most liberal and estimable men of his age. But how different would be our appreciation if we had no other evidence to judge by except the dicta of opponents, and even distinguished opponents, like Hermann! If there be any point clear in the history of philosophy, it is the uncertainty of all judgments, respecting writers and thinkers, founded upon the mere allegations of opponents. Yet the Athenian Sophists, respecting whom we have no

independent evidence (except the general fact that they had a number of approvers and admirers), are depicted confidently by the Platonic critics in the darkest colours, upon the evidence of their bitter opponent Plato—and in colours darker than even his evidence warrants. The often-repeated calumny, charged against almost all debaters—*τὸ τὸν ἥτις λόγον κρείττω ποιεῖν*—by Hermann against Schleiermacher, by Melétus against Sokrates, by Plato against the Sophists—is believed only against these last.

Megara, and influenced by the philosophical intercourse which he there enjoyed, and characterised by the composition of Theætétus, Kratylus, Sophistês, Politikus, Parmenidês.¹ To the third, or constructive period, greatly determined by the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, belong Phædrus, Menexenus, Symposium, Phædon, Philêbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias : a series composed during Plato's teaching at the Academy, and commencing with Phædrus, which last Hermann considers to be a sort of (Antritts-Programme) inauguratory composition for the opening of his school of oral discourse or colloquy. Lastly, during the final years of the philosopher, after all the three periods, come the Leges or treatise de Legibus : placed by itself as the composition of his old age.

Hermann and Stallbaum reject (besides the dialogues already rejected by Thrasyllus) Alkibiadês II., Theagês, Erastæ, Hipparchus, Minos, Epinomis : Stallbaum rejects the Kleitophon : Hermann hesitates, and is somewhat inclined to admit it, as he also admits, to a considerable extent, the Epistles.²

Steinhart, in his notes and prefaces to H. Müller's translation of the Platonic dialogues, agrees in the main with K. F. Hermann, both in denying the fundamental postulate of Schleiermacher, and in settling the general order of the dialogues, though with some difference as to individual dialogues. He considers Ion as the

They reject several dialogues.

Steinhart—agrees in rejecting Schleiermacher's fundamental postulate—his

¹ K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. u. Syst. d. Plat. Phil.*, p. 496, seq. Stallbaum (p. xxxiii.) places the Kratylus during the lifetime of Sokrates, a little earlier than Euthydêmus and Protagoras, all three of which he assigns to Olymp. 94, 402-400 B.C. See also his *Proleg. to Kratylus*, tom. v. p. 26.

Moreover, Stallbaum places the Menon and Ion about the same time—a few months or weeks before the trial of Sokrates (*Proleg. ad Menonem*, tom. vi. pp. 20, 21; *Proleg. ad Ionem*, tom. iv. p. 289). He considers the Euthyphron to have been actually composed at the moment to which it professes to refer (viz. after Melêtus had preferred his indictment against Sokrates), and with a view of defending Sokrates against the charge of impiety (*Proleg. ad Euthyphron*, tom. vi. pp. 138-139-142).

He places the composition of the Charmidês about six years before the death of Sokrates (*Proleg. ad Charm.* p. 86). He seems to consider, indeed, that the Menon and Euthydêmus were both written for the purpose of defending Sokrates : thus implying that they too were written after the indictment was preferred (*Proleg. ad Euthyphron*, p. 145).

In regard to the date of the Euthyphron, Schleiermacher also had declared, prior to Stallbaum, that it was unquestionably (unstreitig) composed at a period between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates (*Einkl. zum Euthyphron*, vol. ii. p. 53, of his *transl. of Plato*).

² Stallbaum, p. xxxiv. Hermann, pp. 424, 425.

arrangement of the dialogues—considers the Phædrus as late in order—rejects several.

earliest, followed by Hippias I., Hippias II., Alkibiadēs I., Lysis, Charmidēs, Lachēs, Protagoras. These constitute what Steinhart calls the ethico-Sokratical series of Plato's compositions, having the common attributes—That they do not step materially beyond the philosophical range of Sokrates himself—

That there is a preponderance of the mimic and plastic element—That they end, to all appearance, with unsolved doubts and unanswered questions.¹ He supposes the Charmidēs to have been composed during the time of the Thirty, the Lachēs shortly afterwards, and the Protagoras about two years before the death of Sokrates. He lays it down as incontestable that the Protagoras was not composed after the death of Sokrates.² Immediately prior to this last-mentioned event, and posterior to the Protagoras, he places the Euthydēmus, Menon, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Kratylus: preparatory to the dialectic series consisting of Parmenidēs, Theætētus, Sophistes, Politikus, the result of Plato's stay at Megara, and contact with the Eleatic and Megaric philosophers. The third series of dialogues, the mature and finished productions of Plato at the Academy, opens with Phædrus. Steinhart rejects as spurious Alkibiadēs II., Erastēs, Theagēs, &c.

Another author, also, Susemihl, coincides in the main with the principles of arrangement adopted by K. F. Hermann for the Platonic dialogues. First in the order of chronological composition he places the shorter dialogues—the exclusively ethical,

least systematic; and he ranges them in a series, indicating the progressive development of Plato's mind, with approach towards his final systematic conceptions.³ Susemihl begins this early series with Hippias II., followed by Lysis, Charmidēs, Lachēs, Protagoras, Menon, Apologia, Kriton, Gorgias, Euthyphron. The seven first, ending with the Menon, he conceives to have been published successively during the lifetime of Sokrates: the Menon itself, during the interval between his indictment and

¹ See Steinhart's Proleg. to the Protég. vol. I. p. 430, of Müller's transl. of Plato.

² Steinhart, Proleg. to Charmidēs,

p. 225.

³ F. Susemihl, Die Genetische Entwicklung der Platonischen Philosophie, Leipsic, 1855, p. 9.

his death ;¹ the *Apologia* and *Kriton*, very shortly after his death ; followed, at no long interval, by *Gorgias* and *Euthyphron*.² The *Ion* and *Alkibiadēs I.* are placed by Susemihl among the earliest of the Platonic compositions, but as not belonging to the regular series. He supposes them to have been called forth by some special situation, like *Apologia* and *Kriton*, if indeed they be Platonic at all, of which he does not feel assured.³

Immediately after *Euthyphron*, Susemihl places *Euthydēmus*, which he treats as the commencement of a second series of dialogues : the first series, or ethical, being now followed by the dialectic, in which the principles, process, and certainty of cognition are discussed, though in an indirect and preparatory way. This second series consists of *Euthydēmus*, *Kratylus*, *Theastētus*, *Phædrus*, *Sophistēs*, *Politikus*, *Parmenidēs*, *Symposion*, *Phædon*. Through all these dialogues Susemihl professes to trace a thread of connection, each successively unfolding and determining more of the general subject : but all in an indirect, negative, round-about manner. Allowing for this manner, Susemihl contends that the dialectical counter-demonstrations or Antinomies, occupying the last half of the *Parmenidēs*, include the solution of those difficulties, which have come forward in various forms from the *Euthydēmus* up to the *Sophistēs*, against Plato's theory of Ideas.⁴ The *Phædon* closes the series of dialectic compositions, and opens the way to the constructive dialogues following, partly ethical, partly physical—*Philēbus*, *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Kritias*.⁵ The *Leges* come last of all.

A more recent critic, Dr. Edward Munk, has broached a new and very different theory as to the natural order of the Platonic dialogues. Upon his theory, they were intended by Plato⁶ to depict the life and working of a philosopher, in successive dramatic exhibitions, from youth to old age. The different moments in the life of Sokrates, indicated in each dialogue, mark the

Edward Munk—adopts a different principle of arrangement, founded

¹ Susemihl, *ibid.* pp. 40-61-80.

² Susemihl, *ib.* pp. 118-125.

³ Susemihl, *ib.* p. 9.

⁴ Susemihl, *ib.* p. 355, seq.

⁵ Susemihl, pp. 466-470. The first volume of Susemihl's work ends with

the *Phædon*.

⁶ Dr. Edward Munk. *Die natürliche Ordnung der Platonischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1857. His scheme of arrangement is explained generally, pp. 25-48, &c.

upon the different period which each dialogue exhibits of the life, philosophical growth, and old age, of Sokrates—his arrangement, founded on this principle. He distinguishes the chronological order of composition from the place allotted to each dialogue in the systematic plan.

place which Plato intended it to occupy in the series. The *Parmenidês* is the first, wherein Sokrates is introduced as a young man, initiated into philosophy by the ancient *Parmenidês*: the *Phædon* is last, describing as it does the closing scene of Sokrates. Plato meant his dialogues to be looked at partly in artistic sequence, as a succession of historical dramas—partly in philosophical sequence, as a record of the progressive development of his own doctrine: the two principles are made to harmonize in the main, though sometimes the artistic sequence is obscured for the purpose of bringing out the philosophical, sometimes the latter is partially sacrificed to the former.¹ Taken in the aggregate, the dialogues from *Parmenidês* to *Phædon* form a Sokratic cycle, analogous to the historical plays of Shakespeare, from King John to Henry VIII.² But Munk at the same time contends that this natural order of the dialogues—or the order in which Plato intended them to be viewed—is not to be confounded with the chronological order of their composition.³ The *Parmenidês*, though constituting the opening Prologue of the whole cycle, was not composed first: nor the *Phædon* last. All of them were probably composed after Plato had attained the full maturity of his philosophy: that is, probably after the opening of his school at the Academy in 386 B.C. But in composing each, he had always two objects jointly in view: he adapted the tone of each to the age and situation in which he wished to depict Sokrates:⁴ he commemorated, in each, one of the past phases of his own philosophising mind.

The Cycle taken in its intentional or natural order, is distributed by Munk into three groups, after the *Parmenidês* as general prologue.⁵

1. Sokratic or Indirect Dialogues.—*Protagoras*, *Charmidês*, *Lachês*, *Gorgias*, *Ion*, *Hippias I.*, *Kratylus*, *Euthydêmus*, *Symposion*.

¹ Munk, *ib.* p. 29.

² Munk, *ib.* p. 27.

³ Munk, *ibid.* p. 27.

⁴ Munk, *ib.* p. 54; Preface, p. viii.

⁵ Munk, *ib.* p. 50.

2. Direct or Constructive Dialogues.—Phædrus, Philèbus, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.

3. Dialectic and Apologetic Dialogues.—Menon, Theætétus, Sophistês, Politikus, Euthyphron, Apologia, Kriton, Phædon.

The *Leges* and *Menexenus* stand apart from the Cycle, as compositions on special occasion. *Alkibiadês I.*, *Hippias II.*, *Lysis*, are also placed apart from the Cycle, as compositions of Plato's earlier years, before he had conceived the general scheme of it.¹

The first of the three groups depicts Sokrates in the full vigour of life, about 35 years of age: the second represents him an elderly man, about 60: the third, immediately prior to his death.² In the first group he is represented as a combatant for truth: in the second as a teacher of truth: in the third, as a martyr for truth.³

Lastly, we have another German author still more recent, Frederick Ueberweg, who has again investigated the order and authenticity of the Platonic dialogues, in a work of great care and ability: reviewing the theories of his predecessors, as well as proposing various modifications of his own.⁴ Ueberweg compares the different opinions of Schleiermacher and K. F. Hermann, and admits both of them to a certain extent, each concurrent with and limiting the other.⁵ The theory of a preconceived system and methodical series, proposed by Schleiermacher, takes its departure from the Phædrus, and postulates as an essential condition that that dialogue shall be recognised as the earliest composition.⁶ This condition Ueberweg does not admit. He agrees with Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, in referring the Phædrus to a later date (about 386 B.C.), shortly after Plato had established his school in Athens, when he was rather above forty years of age. At this period (Ueberweg thinks) Plato may be considered as having acquired methodical views which had not been present to him before; and the dialogues

Views of Ueberweg—attempt to reconcile Schleiermacher and Hermann—admits the preconceived purpose for the later dialogues, composed after the foundation of the school, but not for the earlier.

¹ Munk, *ib.* pp. 25-34.

² Munk, *ib.* p. 26.

³ Munk, *ib.* p. 81.

⁴ Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen*.

⁵ Ueberweg, p. 111.

⁶ Ueberweg, pp. 23-26.

composed after the *Phædrus* follow out, to a certain extent, these methodical views. In the *Phædrus*, the Platonic Sokrates delivers the opinion that writing is unavailing as a means of imparting philosophy: that the only way in which philosophy can be imparted is, through oral colloquy adapted by the teacher to the mental necessities, and varying stages of progress, of each individual learner: and that writing can only serve, after such oral instruction has been imparted, to revive it if forgotten, in the memory both of the teacher and of the learner who has been orally taught. For the dialogues composed after the opening of the school, and after the *Phædrus*, Ueberweg recognises the influence of a preconceived method and of a constant bearing on the oral teaching of the school: for those anterior to that date, he admits no such influence: he refers them (with Hermann) to successive enlargements, suggestions, inspirations, either arising in Plato's own mind, or communicated from without. Ueberweg does not indeed altogether exclude the influence of this non-methodical cause, even for the later dialogues: he allows its operation to a certain extent, in conjunction with the methodical: what he excludes is, the influence of any methodical or preconceived scheme for the earlier dialogues.¹ He thinks that Plato composed the later portion of his dialogues (i.e., those subsequent to the *Phædrus* and to the opening of his school), not for the instruction of the general reader, but as reminders to his disciples of that which they had already learnt from oral teaching: and he cites the analogy of Paul and the apostles, who wrote epistles not to convert the heathen, but to admonish or confirm converts already made by preaching.²

Ueberweg investigates the means which we possess, either from

¹ Ueberweg, pp. 107-110-111. "Sind beide Gesichtspunkte, der einer methodischen Absicht und der einer Selbst-Entwicklung Platon's durchweg mit einander zu verbinden, so liegt es auch in der Natur der Sache und wird auch von einigen seiner Nachfolger (insbesondere nachdrücklich von Susenmühl) anerkannt, dass der erste Gesichtspunkt vorzugsweise für die späteren Schriften von der Gründung der Schule an—der andere vorzugsweise für die früheren—gilt."

² Ueberweg, pp. 80-86. "Ist unsere

obige Deutung richtig, wonach Platon nicht für Fremde zur Belehrung, sondern wesentlich für seine Schüler zur Erinnerung an den mündlichen Unterricht, schrieb (wie die Apostel nicht für Fremde zur Bekehrung, sondern für die christlichen Gemeinden zur Stärke und Läuterung, nachdem denselben der Glaube aus der Predigt gekommen war)—so folgt, dass jede Argumentation, die auf den *Phædrus* gegründet wird, nur für die Zeit galten kann, in welcher bereits die Platonische Schule bestand."

external testimony (especially that of Aristotle) or from internal evidence, of determining the authenticity as well as the chronological order of the dialogues. He remarks that though, in contrasting the expository dialogues with those which are simply enquiring and debating, we may presume the expository to belong to Plato's full maturity of life, and to have been preceded by some of the enquiring and debating—yet we cannot safely presume *all* these latter to be of his early composition. Plato may have continued to compose dialogues of mere search, even after the time when he began to compose expository dialogues.¹ Ueberweg considers that the earliest of Plato's dialogues are, *Lysis*, *Hippias Minor*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Protagoras*, composed during the lifetime of Sokrates: next the *Apologia*, and *Kriton*, not long after his death. All these (even the *Protagoras*) he reckens among the "lesser Platonic writings".² None of them allude to the Platonic Ideas or Objective Concepts. The *Gorgias* comes next, probably soon after the death of Sokrates, at least at some time earlier than the opening of the school in 386 B.C.³ The *Menon* and *Ion* may be placed about the same general period.⁴ The *Phædrus* (as has been already observed) is considered by Ueberweg to be nearly contemporary with the opening of the school: shortly afterwards *Symposion* and *Euthydêmus*:⁵ at some subsequent time, *Republic*, *Timæus*, *Kritias*, and *Leges*. In regard to the four last, Ueberweg does not materially differ from Schleiermacher, Hermann, and other critics: but on another point he differs from them materially, *viz.*: that instead of placing the *Theætêtus*, *Sophistês*, and *Politikus*, in the Megaric period or prior to the opening of the school, he assigns them (as well as the *Phædon* and *Philêbus*) to the last twenty years of Plato's life. He places *Phædon* later than *Timæus*, and *Politikus* later than *Phædon*: he considers that *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, and *Philêbus* are among the latest compositions of Plato.⁶ He rejects *Hippias Major*, *Erastæ*, *Theagês*, *Kleitophon*, and *Parmenidês*: he is

His opinions as to authenticity and chronology of the dialogues. He rejects *Hippias Major*, *Erastæ*, *Theagês*, *Kleitophon*, *Parmenidês*: he is inclined to reject *Euthyphron* and *Menæxenus*.

¹ Ueberweg, p. 81.

² Ueberweg, pp. 100-105-296. "Eine Anzahl kleinerer Platonischer Schriften"

³ Ueberweg, pp. 249-267-296.

⁴ Ueberweg, pp. 226, 227.

⁵ Ueberweg, p. 265.

⁶ Ueberweg, pp. 204-292.

inclined to reject Euthyphron. He scarcely recognises Menexenus, in spite of the direct attestation of Aristotle, which attestation he tries (in my judgment very unsuccessfully) to invalidate.¹ He recognises the Kratylus, but without determining its date. He determines nothing about Alkibiades I. and II.

The works above enumerated are those chiefly deserving of notice, though there are various others also useful, amidst the abundance of recent Platonic criticism. All these writers, Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susseml, Munk, Ueberweg, have not merely laid down general schemes of arrangement for the Platonic dialogues, but have gone through the dialogues seriatim, each endeavouring to show that his own scheme fits them well, and each raising objections against the schemes earlier than his own. It is indeed truly remarkable to follow the differences of opinion among these learned men, all careful students of the Platonic writings. And the number of dissents would be indefinitely multiplied, if we took into the account the various historians of philosophy during the last few years. Ritter and Brandis accept, in the main, the theory of Schleiermacher: Zeller also, to a certain extent. But each of these authors has had a point of view more or less belonging to himself respecting the general scheme and purpose of Plato, and respecting the authenticity, sequence, and reciprocal illustration of the dialogues.²

By such criticisms much light has been thrown on the dialogues in detail. It is always interesting to read the different views taken by many scholars, all careful students of Plato, respecting the order and relations of the dialogues: especially as the views are not merely different but contradictory, so that the weak points of each are put before us as well as the strong. But as to the large problem which these critics have undertaken to solve—though several solutions have been proposed, in favour

¹ Ueberweg, pp. 143-176-222-250.

² Socher remarks (Ueber, Platon, p. 225) (after enumerating twenty-two dialogues of the Thrasyllean canon, which he considers the earliest) that of these twenty-two, there are *only two* which have not been declared spurious

by some one or more critics. He then proceeds to examine the remainder, among which are Sophistes, Politikos, Parmenides. He (Socher) declares these three last to be spurious, which no critic had declared before.

of which something may be urged, yet we look in vain for any solution at once sufficient as to proof and defensible against objectors.

It appears to me that the problem itself is one which admits of no solution. Schleiermacher was the first who proposed it with the large pretensions which it has since embraced, and which have been present more or less to the minds of subsequent critics, even when they differ from him. He tells us himself that he comes forward as *Restitutor Platonis*, in a character which no one had ever undertaken before.¹ And he might fairly have claimed that title, if he had furnished proofs at all commensurate to his professions. As his theory is confessedly novel as well as comprehensive, it required greater support in the way of evidence. But when I read the Introductions (the general as well as the special) in which such evidence ought to be found, I am amazed to find that there is little else but easy and confident assumption. His hypothesis is announced as if the simple announcement were sufficient to recommend it²—as if no other supposition were consistent with the recognised grandeur of Plato as a philosopher—as if any one, dissenting from it, only proved thereby that he did not understand Plato. Yet so far from being of this self-recommending character, the hypothesis is really loaded with the heaviest antecedent improbability. That in 406 B.C., and at the age of 23, in an age when schemes of philosophy elaborated in detail were unknown—Plato should conceive a vast scheme of philosophy, to be worked out underground without ever being proclaimed, through numerous Sokratic dialogues one after the other, each ushering in that which follows and each resting upon that which precedes: that he should have persisted throughout a long life in working out this scheme, adapting the sequence of his dialogues to the successive stages which he had attained, so that none of them could be properly understood unless when

The problem incapable of solution. Extent and novelty of the theory propounded by Schleiermacher—slenderness of his proofs.

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einleitung*, pp. 22-29. "Diese natürliche Folge (der Platonischen Gespräche) wieder herzustellen, dies ist, wie jedermann sieht, eine Absicht, welche sich sehr weit entfernt von allen bisherigen Ver-

suchen zur Anordnung der Platonischen Werke, &c.

² What I say about Schleiermacher here will be assented to by any one who reads his *Einleitung*, pp. 10, 11, seq.

studied immediately after its predecessors and immediately before its successors—and yet that he should have taken no pains to impress this one peremptory arrangement on the minds of readers, and that Schleiermacher should be the first to detect it—all this appears to me as improbable as any of the mystic interpretations of Jamblichus or Proklus. Like other improbabilities, it may be proved by evidence, if evidence can be produced: but here nothing of the kind is producible. We are called upon to grant the general hypothesis without proof, and to follow Schleiermacher in applying it to the separate dialogues.

Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes two parts. 1. A premeditated philosophical scheme, worked out continuously from the first dialogue to the last. 2. A peremptory canonical order, essential to this scheme, and determined thereby. Now as to the scheme, though on the one hand it cannot be proved, yet on the other hand it cannot be disproved. But as to the canonical order, I think it may be disproved. We know that no such order was recognised in the days of Aristophanes, and Schleiermacher himself admits that before those days it had been lost.¹ But

I contend that if it was lost within a century after the decease of Plato, we may fairly presume that it never existed at all, as peremptory and indispensable to the understanding of what Plato meant. A great philosopher such as Plato (so Schleiermacher argues) must be supposed to have composed all his dialogues with some preconceived comprehensive scheme: but a great philosopher (we may add), if he does work upon a preconceived scheme, must surely be supposed to take some reasonable precautions to protect the order essential to that scheme from dropping out of sight. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself admits that there are various dialogues which lie apart from the canonical order and form no part of the grand premeditated scheme. The distinction here made between these outlying compositions (*Nebenwerke*) and the members of the regular series, is indeed altogether arbitrary: but the admission of it tends still farther to invalidate the fundamental postulate of a grand *Deniurgic* universe of dia-

Schleiermacher's hypothesis includes a preconceived scheme, and a peremptory order of interdependence among the dialogues.

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einleitung*, p. 24.

logues, each dovetailed and fitted into its special place among the whole. The universe is admitted to have breaks: so that the hypothesis does not possess the only merit which can belong to gratuitous hypothesis—that of introducing, if granted, complete symmetry throughout the phenomena.

To these various improbabilities we may add another—that Schleiermacher's hypothesis requires us to admit that the *Phædrus* is Plato's earliest dialogue, composed about 406 B.C., when he was 21 years of age, on my computation, and certainly not more than 23: that it is the first outburst of the inspiration which Sokrates had imparted to him,¹ and that it embodies, though in a dim and poetical form, the lineaments of that philosophical system which he worked out during the ensuing half century. That Plato at this early age should have conceived so vast a system—that he should have imbibed it from Sokrates, who enunciated no system, and abounded in the anti-systematic negative—that he should have been inspired to write the *Phædrus* (with its abundant veins, dithyrambic,² erotic, and transcendental) by the conversation of Sokrates, which exhibited acute dialectic combined with practical sagacity, but neither poetic fervour nor transcendental fancy,—in all this hypothesis of Schleiermacher, there is nothing but an aggravation of improbabilities.

Assumptions of Schleiermacher respecting the *Phædrus* inadmissible.

Against such improbabilities (partly external partly internal) Schleiermacher has nothing to set except internal reasons: that is, when he shall have arranged the dialogues and explained the interdependence as well as the special place of each, the arrangement will impress itself upon all as being the intentional work of Plato himself.³ But these "internal reasons" (innere Gründe), which are to serve as constructive evidence (in the absence of positive declarations) of Plato's purpose, fail to produce upon other minds the

Neither Schleiermacher, nor any other critic, has as yet produced any tolerable proof for an internal theory of the Platonic dialogues.

¹ See Schleiermacher's *Einleitung* to the *Phædrus*: "Der Phaidros, der erste Ausbruch seiner Begeisterung vom Sokrates".

² If we read Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*De Admirab. VI* Dic. in *Demosth.* pp. 968-971, Baiske), we shall find that rhetor pointing out the

Phædrus as a signal example of Plato's departure from the manner and character of Sokrates, and as a specimen of misplaced poetical exaggeration. Dikæarchus formed the same opinion about the *Phædrus* (*Diog. L.* iii. 38).

³ See the general *Einleitung*, p. 11.

effect which Schleiermacher demands. If we follow them as stated in his Introductions (prefixed to the successive Platonic dialogues), we find a number of approximations and comparisons, often just and ingenious, but always inconclusive for his point : proving, at the very best, what Plato's intention may possibly have been—yet subject to be countervailed by other “internal reasons” equally specious, tending to different conclusions. And the various opponents of Schleiermacher prove just as much and no more, each on behalf of his own mode of arrangement, by the like constructive evidence—appeal to “internal reasons”. But the insufficient character of these “internal reasons” is more fatal to Schleiermacher than to any of his opponents : because his fundamental hypothesis—while it is the most ambitious of all and would be the most important, if it could be proved—is at the same time burdened with the strongest antecedent improbability, and requires the amplest proof to make it at all admissible.

Dr. Munk undertakes the same large problem as Schleiermacher. He assumes the Platonic dialogues to have been composed upon a preconceived system, beginning when Plato opened his school, about 41 years of age. This has somewhat less antecedent improbability than the supposition that Plato conceived his system at 21 or 23 years of age. But it is just as much destitute of positive support. That Plato intended his dialogues to form a fixed series, exhibiting the successive gradations of his philosophical system—that he farther intended this series to coincide with a string of artistic portraits, representing Sokrates in the ascending march from youth to old age, so that the characteristic feature which marks the place and time of each dialogue, is to be found in the age which it assigns to Sokrates—these are positions for the proof of which we are referred to “internal reasons”; but which the dialogues do not even suggest, much less sanction.

In many dialogues, the age assigned to Sokrates is a circumstance neither distinctly brought out, nor telling on the debate. It is true that in the *Parmenidès* he is noted as young, and is made to conduct himself with the deference of youth, receiving hints and admoni-

Munk's theory is the most ambitious, and the most gratuitous, next to Schleiermacher's.

The age assigned to Sokrates in any dialogue is a

tions from the respected veteran of Elea. So too in the Protagoras, he is characterised as young, but chiefly in contrast with the extreme and pronounced old age of the Sophist Protagoras: he does not conduct himself like a youth, nor exhibit any of that really youthful or deferential spirit which we find in the Parmenidès; on the contrary, he stands forward as the rival, cross-examiner, and conqueror of the ancient Sophist. On the contrary, in the Euthydémus,¹ Sokrates is announced as old; though that dialogue is indisputably very analogous to the Protagoras, both of them being placed by Munk in the earliest of his three groups. Moreover in the Lysis also, Sokrates appears as old;—here Munk escapes from the difficulty by setting aside the dialogue as a youthful composition, not included in the consecutive Sokratic Cycle.² What is there to justify the belief, that the Sokrates depicted in the Phædrus (which dialogue has been affirmed by Schleiermacher and Ast, besides some ancient critics, to exhibit decided marks of juvenility) is older than the Sokrates of the Symposium? or that Sokrates in the Philèbus and Republic is older than in the Kratylus or Gorgias? It is true that the dialogues Theætétus and Euthyphron are both represented as held a little before the death of Sokrates, after the indictment of Melétus against him had already been preferred. This is a part of the hypothetical situation, in which the dialogists are brought into company. But there is nothing in the two dialogues themselves (or in the Menon, which Munk places in the same category) to betoken that Sokrates is old. Holiness, in the Euthyphron—Knowledge, in the Theætétus—is canvassed and debated just as Temperance and Courage are debated in the Charmidès and Lachès. Munk lays it down that Sokrates appears as a Martyr for Truth in the Euthyphron, Menon, and Theætétus—and as a Combatant for Truth in the Lachès, Charmidès, Euthydémus, &c. But the two groups of dialogues, when compared with each other, will not be found to warrant this distinctive appellation. In the Apologia, Kriton, and Phædon, it may be said with propriety that Sokrates is represented as a martyr for truth: in all three he appears not

¹ Euthydémus, c. 4, p. 272.

² Lysis, p. 223, ad fin. *γεγόναιεν ἰσὺ τε, γέρον ἀνὴρ, καὶ ὑμεῖς.* See Munk, p. 25.

merely as a talker, but as a personal agent : but this is not true of the other dialogues which Munk places in his third group.

I cannot therefore accede to this "natural arrangement of the Platonic dialogues," assumed to have been intended by Plato, and founded upon the progress of Sokrates as he stands exhibited in each, from youth to age—which Munk has proposed in his recent ingenious volume. It is interesting to be made acquainted with that order of the Platonic dialogues which any critical student conceives to be the "natural order". But in respect to Munk as well as to Schleiermacher, I must remark that if Plato had conceived and predetermined the dialogues, so as to be read in one natural peremptory order, he would never have left that order so dubious and imperceptible, as to be first divined by critics of the nineteenth century, and understood by them too in several different ways. If there were any peremptory and intentional sequence, we may reasonably presume that Plato would have made it as clearly understood as he has determined the sequence of the ten books of his Republic.

The principle of arrangement proposed by K. F. Hermann (approved also by Steinhart and Susemihl) is not open to the same antecedent objection. Not admitting any preconceived, methodical, intentional, system, nor the maintenance of one and the same philosophical point of view throughout—Hermann supposes that the dialogues as successively composed represent successive phases of Plato's philosophical development and variations in his point of view. Hermann farther considers that these variations may be assigned and accounted for : first pure Sokratism, next the modifications experienced from Plato's intercourse with the Megaric philosophers,—then the influence derived from Kyrênê and Egypt—subsequently that from the Pythagoreans in Italy—and so forth. The first portion of this hypothesis, taken generally, is very reasonable and probable. But when, after assuming that there must have been determining changes in Plato's own mind, we proceed to inquire what these were, and whence they arose, we find a sad lack of evidence for the answer to the question. We

No intentional sequence or interdependence of the dialogues can be made out.

Principle of arrangement adopted by Hermann is reasonable—successive changes in Plato's point of view : but we cannot explain either the order or the causes of these changes.

neither know the order in which the dialogues were composed,—nor the date when Plato first began to compose,—nor the primitive philosophical mind which his earliest dialogues represented,—nor the order of those subsequent modifications which his views underwent. We are informed, indeed, that Plato went from Athens to visit Megara, Kyrênê, Egypt, Italy; but the extent or kind of influence which he experienced in each, we do not know at all.¹ I think it a reasonable presumption that the points which Plato had in common with Sokrates were most preponderant in the mind of Plato immediately after the death of his master: and that other trains of thought gradually became more and more intermingled as the recollection of his master became more distant. There is also a presumption that the longer, more elaborate, and more transcendental dialogues (among which must be ranked the Phædrus), were composed in the full maturity of Plato's age and intellect: the shorter and less finished may have been composed either then or earlier in his life. Here are two presumptions, plausible enough when stated generally, yet too vague to justify any special inferences: the rather, if we may believe the statement of Dionysius, that Plato continued to "comb and curl his dialogues until he was eighty years of age".²

If we compare K. F. Hermann with Schleiermacher, we see

¹ Bonitz (in his instructive volume, *Platonische Studien*, Wien, 1858, p. 5) points out how little we know about the real circumstances of Plato's intellectual and philosophical development: a matter which most of the Platonic critics are apt to forget.

I confess that I agree with Strümpell, that it is impossible to determine chronologically, from Plato's writings, and from the other scanty evidence accessible to us, by what successive steps his mind departed from the original views and doctrines held and communicated by Sokrates (Strümpell, *Gesch. der Praktischen Philosophie der Griechen*, p. 294, Leipzig, 1861).

² Dionys. Hal. *De Comp. Verbor.* p. 208; *Diog. L.* iii. 37; *Quintilian.* viii. 6.

F. A. Wolf, in a valuable note upon the *διασκευαί* (Proleg. ad *Homer. p. ciii.*), declares, upon this ground, that it is impossible to determine the time when Plato composed his best dialogues. "Ex his collatis apparet

διασκευαί a veteribus magistris adscitum esse in potestatem verbi *ἐπιδιασκευαί*: ut in Scenicis propé idem esset quod *ἀναδιδάσκειν*—h. e. repetito committere fabulam, sed mutando, addendo, detrahendo, emendatam, refectam, et secundis curis elaboratam. Id enim facere solebant illi poete sepius: mox etiam alii, ut Apollonius Rhodius. Neque aliter Plato fecit in optimis dialogis suis: quam ob causam exquirere non licet, quando quisque composuit sit: quum in scenicis fabulis saltem ex didascalis plerumque notum sit tempus, quo editæ sunt."

Preller has a like remark (*Hist. Phil. ex Font. Loc. Context.*, sect. 250).

In regard to the habit of correcting compositions, the contrast between Plato and Plotinus was remarkable. Porphyry tells us that Plotinus, when once he had written any matter, could hardly bear even to read it over—much less to review and improve it (*Porphy. Vit. Plotini*, 8).

Hermann's view more tenable than Schleiermacher's. that Hermann has amended his position by abandoning Schleiermacher's gratuitous hypothesis, of a preconceived Platonic system with a canonical order of the dialogues adapted to that system—and by admitting only a chronological order of composition, each dialogue being generated by the state of Plato's mind at the time when it was composed. This, taken generally, is indisputable. If we perfectly knew Plato's biography and the circumstances around him, we should be able to determine which dialogues were first, second, and third, &c., and what circumstances or mental dispositions occasioned the successive composition of those which followed. But can we do this with our present scanty information? I think not. Hermann, while abandoning the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, has still accepted the large conditions of the problem first drawn up by Schleiermacher, and has undertaken to decide the real order of the dialogues, together with the special occasion and the phase of Platonic development corresponding to each. Herein, I think, he has failed.

It is, indeed, natural that critics should form some impression as to earlier and later in the dialogues. But though there are some peculiar cases in which such impression acquires much force, I conceive that in almost all cases it is to a high degree uncertain. Several dialogues proclaim themselves as subsequent to the death of Sokrates. We know from internal allusions that the *Theætétus* must have been composed after 394 B.C., the *Menexenus* after 387 B.C., and the *Symposium* after 385 B.C. We are sure, by Aristotle's testimony, that the *Leges* were written at a later period than the *Republic*; Plutarch also states that the *Leges* were composed during the old age of Plato, and this statement, accepted by most modern critics, appears to me trustworthy.¹ The *Sophistês* proclaims itself as a second meeting, by mutual agreement, of the same persons who had conversed in the *Theætétus*, with the addition of a new companion, the Eleatic stranger. But we must remark that the subject of the *Theætétus*, though left unsettled at the close of that dialogue, is not resumed in the *Sophistês*: in which last,

Small number of certainties, or even reasonable pre-suppositions, as to date or order of the dialogues.

¹ Plutarch, *Isid. et Osirid.* c. 48, p. 370.

moreover, Sokrates acts only a subordinate part, while the Eleatic stranger, who did not appear in the *Theætétus*, is here put forward as the prominent questioner or expositor. So too, the *Politikus* offers itself as a third of the same triplet: with this difference, that while the Eleatic stranger continues as the questioner, a new respondent appears in the person of Sokrates Junior. The *Politikus* is not a resumption of the same subject as the *Sophistês*, but a second application of the same method (the method of logical division and subdivision) to a different subject. Plato speaks also as if he contemplated a third application of the same method—the *Philosophus*: which, so far as we know, was never realised. Again, the *Timæus* presents itself as a sequel to the *Republic*, and the *Kritias* as a sequel to the *Timæus*: a fourth, the *Hermokratea*, being apparently announced, as about to follow—but not having been composed.

Here then are two groups of three each (we might call them *Trilogies*, and if the intended fourth had been realised, *Trilogies* *Tetralogies*), indicated by Plato himself. A certain relative chronological order is here doubtless evident: the *Sophistês* must have been composed after the *Theætétus* and before the *Politikus*, the *Timæus* after the *Republic* and before the *Kritias*. But this is all that we can infer: for it does not follow that the sequence must have been immediate in point of time: there may have been a considerable interval between the three forming the so-called *Trilogy*.¹ We may add, that neither in the *Theætétus* nor in the *Republic*, do we find indication that either of them is intended as the first of a *Trilogy*: the marks

¹ It may seem singular that Schleiermacher is among those who adopt this opinion. He maintains that the *Sophistês* does not follow immediately upon the *Theætétus*; that Plato, though intending when he finished the *Theætétus* to proceed onward to the *Sophistês*, altered his intention, and took up other views instead: that the *Menon* (and the *Euthydêmus*) come in between them, in immediate sequel to the *Theætétus* (*Einleitung zum Menon*, vol. iii. p. 326).

Here Schleiermacher introduces a new element of uncertainty, which invalidates yet more seriously the grounds for his hypothesis of a preconceived sequence throughout all the dialogues.

In a case where Plato directly intimates an intentional sequence, we are called upon to believe, on "internal grounds" alone, that he altered his intention, and introduced other dialogues. He may have done this: but how are we to prove it? How much does it attenuate the value of his intentions, as proofs of an internal philosophical sequence? We become involved more and more in unsupported hypothesis. I think that K. F. Hermann's objections against Schleiermacher, on the above ground, have much force; and that Ueberweg's reply to them is unsatisfactory. (Hermann, *Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil.* p. 350. Ueberweg, *Untersuchungen*, p. 82. seq.)

proving an intended Trilogy are only found in the second and third of the series.

While even the relative chronology of the dialogues is thus faintly marked in the case of a few, and left to fallible conjecture in the remainder—the positive chronology, or the exact year of composition, is not directly marked in the case of any one. Moreover, at the very outset of the enquiry, we have to ask, At what period of life did Plato begin to publish his dialogues? Did he publish any of them during the lifetime of Sokrates? and if so, which? Or does the earliest of them date from a time after the death of Sokrates?

Amidst the many dissentient views of the Platonic critics, it is remarkable that they are nearly unanimous in their mode of answering this question.¹ Most of them declare, without hesitation, that Plato published several dialogues before the death of Sokrates—that is, before he was 28 years of age—though they do not all agree in determining which these dialogues were. I do not perceive that they produce any external proofs of the least value. Most of them disbelieve (though Stallbaum and Hermann believe) the anecdote about Sokrates and his criticism on the dialogue *Lysis*.² In spite of their unanimity, I cannot but adopt the

¹ Valentine Rose (*De Aristotelis Librorum ordine*, p. 25, Berlin, 1854), Mullach (*Democriti Fragm.* p. 99), and R. Schöne (in his Commentary on the Platonic Protagoras), are among the critics known to me, who intimate their belief that Plato published no Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates. In discussing the matter, Schöne adverts to two of the three lines of argument brought forward in my text:—1. The too early and too copious "productivity" which the received supposition would imply in Plato. 2. The improbability that the name of Sokrates would be employed in written dialogues, as spokesman, by any of his scholars during his lifetime.

Schöne does not touch upon the improbability of the hypothesis, arising out of the early position and aspirations of Plato himself (Schöne, *Ueber Platon's Protagoras*, p. 64, Leipsic, 1862).

² Diog. Laert. iii. 35; Stallbaum,

Prolegg. ad Plat. *Lys.* p. 90; K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. u. Syst. der Plat. Phil.* p. 370. Schleiermacher (*Einkl. zum Lysis*, i. p. 175) treats the anecdote about the *Lysis* as unworthy of credence. Diogenes (iii. 35) mentions that some considered the *Phædrus* as Plato's earliest dialogue; the reason being that the subject of it was something puerile: λόγος δὲ πρῶτον γράφει αὐτὸν τὸν Φαῖδρον· καὶ γὰρ ἔχει μαιρακιδῶδες τι τὸ πρόβλημα. Δικαιάρχος δὲ καὶ τὸν τρῶτον τῆς γραφῆς ὅλον ἐπιμέμφεται ὡς φορτικόν. Olympiodorus also in his life of Plato mentions the same report, that the *Phædrus* was Plato's earliest composition, and gives the same ground of belief, "its dithyrambic character". Even if the assertion were granted, that the *Phædrus* is the earliest Platonic composition, we could not infer that it was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that assertion cannot be granted. The two statements,

opposite conclusion. It appears to me that Plato composed no Sokratic dialogues during the lifetime of Sokrates.

All the information (scanty as it is) which we obtain from the rhetor Dionysius and others respecting the composition of the Platonic dialogues, announces them to have cost much time and labour to their author: a statement illustrated by the great number of inversions of words which he is said to have introduced successively in the first sentence of the Republic, before he was satisfied to let the sentence stand.

Reasons for this opinion. Labour of the composition—does not consist with youth of the author.

This corresponds, too, with all that we read respecting the patient assiduity both of Isokrates and Demosthenes.¹ A first-rate Greek composition was understood not to be purchasable at lower cost. I confess therefore to great surprise, when I read in Ast the affirmation that the Protagoras was composed when Plato was only 22 years old—and when I find Schleiermacher asserting, as if it were a matter beyond dispute, that Protagoras, Phædrus, and Parmenidês, all bear evident marks of Plato's youthful age (Jugendlichkeit). In regard to the Phædrus and Parmenidês, indeed, Hermann and other critics contest the view of Schleiermacher; and detect, in those two dialogues, not only no marks of "juvenility," but what they consider plain proofs of maturity and even of late age. But in regard to the Protagoras, most of them agree with Schleiermacher and Ast, in declaring it to be a work of Plato's youth, some time before the death of Sokrates.

above cited, give it only as a report, suggested to those who believed it by the character and subject-matter of the dialogue. I am surprised that Dr. Volquardsen, who in a learned volume, recently published, has undertaken the defence of the theory of Schleiermacher about the Phædrus (Phädrus, Erste Schrift Platon's, Kiel, 1862), can represent this as a "*feste historische Ueberlieferung*"—the rather as he admits that Schleiermacher himself placed no confidence in it, and relied upon other reasons (pp. 90-92-93). Comp. Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Phaidros, p. 76.

Whoever will read the Epistle of Dionysius of Halikarnassus, addressed to Cneius Pompeius (pp. 751-766, Reiske), will be persuaded that Dionysius can neither have known, nor even believed, that the Phædrus was the first com-

position, and a youthful composition, of Plato. If Dionysius had believed this, it would have furnished him with the precise excuse which his letter required. For the purpose of his letter is to mollify the displeasure of Cn. Pompey, who had written to blame him for some unfavourable criticisms on the style of Plato. Dionysius justifies his criticisms by allusions to the Phædrus. If he had been able to add, that the Phædrus was a first composition, and that Plato's later dialogues were comparatively free from the like faults—this would have been the most effective way of conciliating Cn. Pompey.

¹ Timæus said that Alexander the Great conquered the Persian empire in less time than Isokrates required for the composition of his panegyric oration (Longinus, De Sublim. c. 4).

Now on this point I dissent from them: and since the decision turns upon "internal grounds," each must judge for himself. The Protagoras appears to me one of the most finished and elaborate of all the dialogues: in complication of scenic arrangements, dramatic vivacity, and in the amount of theory worked out, it is surpassed by none—hardly even by the Republic.¹ Its merits as a composition are indeed extolled by all the critics; who clap their hands, especially, at the humiliation which they believe to be brought upon the great Sophist by Sokrates. But the more striking the composition is acknowledged to be, the stronger is the presumption that its author was more than 22 or 24 years of age. Nothing short of good positive testimony would induce me to believe that such a dialogue as the Protagoras could have been composed, even by Plato, before he attained the plenitude of his powers. No such testimony is produced or producible. I extend a similar presumption, even to the Lysis, Lachès, Charmidès, and other dialogues: though with a less degree of confidence, because they are shorter and less artistic, not equal to the Protagoras. All of them, in my judgment, exhibit a richness of ideas and a variety of expression, which suggest something very different from a young novice as the author.

But over and above this presumption, there are other reasons which induce me to believe, that none of the Platonic dialogues were published during the lifetime of Sokrates. My reasons are partly connected with Sokrates, partly with Plato.

First, in reference to Sokrates—we may reasonably doubt whether any written reports of his actual conversations were published during his lifetime. He was the most constant, public, and indiscriminate of all talkers: always in some frequented place, and desiring nothing so much as a respondent with an audience. Every one who chose to hear him, might do so without payment and with the utmost facility. Why then should any one wish to read written reports of his conversations? especially when we know that the strong interest which they excited in the hearers depended much upon the spontaneity of his

Reasons,
founded on
the person-
ality of
Sokrates,
and his
relations
with Plato.

¹ "Als aesthetisches Kunstwerk ist hafter unter den Werken Platon's der Dialog Protagoras das meister- (Socher, Ueber Platon, p. 226.)"

inspirations, and hardly less upon the singularity of his manner and physiognomy. Any written report of what he said must appear comparatively tame. Again, as to fictitious dialogues (like the Platonic) employing the name of Sokrates as spokesman—such might doubtless be published during his lifetime by derisory dramatists for the purpose of raising a laugh, but not surely by a respectful disciple and admirer for the purpose of giving utterance to doctrines of his own. The greater was the respect felt by Plato for Sokrates, the less would he be likely to take the liberty of making Sokrates responsible before the public for what Sokrates had never said.¹ There is a story in Diogenes—to the effect that Sokrates, when he first heard the Platonic dialogue called *Lysis*, exclaimed—"What a heap of falsehoods does the young man utter about me!"² This story merits no credence as a fact: but it expresses the displeasure which Sokrates would be likely to feel, on hearing that one of his youthful companions had dramatised him as he appears in the *Lysis*. Xenophon tells us, and it is very probable, that inaccurate oral reports of the real colloquies of Sokrates may have got into circulation. But that the friends and disciples of Sokrates, during his lifetime, should deliberately publish fictitious dialogues, putting their own sentiments into his mouth, and thus contribute to mislead the public—is not easily credible. Still less credible is it that Plato, during the lifetime of Sokrates, should have published such a dialogue as the *Phædrus*, wherein we find ascribed to Sokrates, poetical and dithyrambic effusions utterly at variance with the real manifestations which Athenians might hear every day from Sokrates in the market-place.³ So-

¹ Valentine Rose observes, in regard to a dialogue composed by some one else, wherein Plato was introduced as one of the interlocutors, that it could not have been composed until after Plato's death, and that the dialogues of Plato were not composed until after the death of Sokrates. "*Platonis autem sermones antequam mortuus fuerit, scripto neminem tradidisse, neque magistri viventis personâ in dialogis abusus fuisse (non magis quam vivum Socratem induxerunt Xenophon, Plato, ceteri Socratici), hoc veterum mori et religioni quivis facile concedet,*" &c. (V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, pp. 57, 74,

Leipsic, 1863.)—Val. Rose expresses the same opinion (that none of the Socratic dialogues, either by Plato or the other companions of Sokrates, were written until after the death of Sokrates) in his earlier work, *De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine et Auctoritate*, p. 25.

² Diog. L. iii. 35.

³ In regard to the theory (elaborated by Schleiermacher, recently again defended by Volquardsen), that the *Phædrus* is the earliest among the Platonic dialogues, composed about 400 B.C., it appears to me inconsistent also with what we know about *Lysias*. In the Platonic *Phædrus*, *Lysias* is pre-

krates in the Platonic Apology, complains of the comic poet Aristophanes for misrepresenting him. Had the Platonic Phædrus been then in circulation, or any other Platonic dialogues, he might with equally good reason have warned the Dikasts against judging of him, a real citizen on trial, from the titular Sokrates whom even disciples did not scruple to employ as spokesman for their own transcendental doctrine, and their own controversial sarcasms.

Secondly, in regard to Plato, the reasons leading to the same conclusion are yet stronger. Unfortunately, we know little of the life of Plato before he attained the age of 28, that is, before the death of Sokrates: but our best means of appreciating it are derived from three sources. 1. Our knowledge of the history of Athens from 409-399 B.C., communicated by Thucydides, Xenophon, &c. 2. The seventh Epistle of Plato himself, written four or five years before his death (about 352 B.C.). 3. A few hints from the Memorabilia of Xenophon.

To these evidences about the life of Plato, it has not been customary to pay much attention. The Platonic critics seem to regard Plato so entirely as a spiritual person ("like a blessed spirit, visiting earth for a short time," to cite a poetical phrase applied to him by Göthe), that they disdain to take account of his relations with the material world, or with society around him. Because his mature life was consecrated to philosophy, they presume that his youth must have been so likewise. But this is a hasty assumption. You cannot thus abstract *any* man from

Reasons, founded the early life, character, and position of Plato.

sented as a λογογράφος of the highest reputation and eminence (p. 228 A, 257 C, and indeed throughout the whole dialogue). Now this is quite inconsistent with what we read from Lysias himself in the indictment which he preferred against Eratosthenes, not long after the restoration of the democracy, 403 B.C. He protests therein strenuously that he had never had judicial affairs of his own, nor meddled with those of others; and he expresses the greatest apprehension from his own ἀρετή (sects. 4-6). I cannot believe that this would be said by a person whom Phædrus terms δεινότατος ὁν τὸν νῦν γράφειν. Moreover, Lysias, in that same discourse, describes his own

position at Athens, anterior to the Thirty: he belonged to a rich metic family, and was engaged along with his brother Polemarchus in a large manufactory of shields, employing 120 slaves (s. 20). A person thus rich and occupied was not likely to become a professed and notorious λογογράφος, though he may have been a clever and accomplished man. Lysias was plundered and impoverished by the Thirty; and he is said to have incurred much expense in aiding the efforts of Thrasybulus. It was after this change of circumstances that he took to rhetoric as a profession; and it is to some one of these later years that the Platonic Phædrus refers.

the social medium by which he is surrounded. The historical circumstances of Athens from Plato's nineteenth year to his twenty-sixth (409-403 B.C.) were something totally different from what they afterwards became. They were so grave and absorbing, that had he been ever so much inclined to philosophy, he would have been compelled against his will to undertake active and heavy duty as a citizen. Within those years (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) fell the closing struggles of the Peloponnesian war; in which (to repeat words already cited from Thucydides) Athens became more a military post than a city—every citizen being almost habitually under arms: then the long blockade, starvation, and capture of the city, followed by the violences of the Thirty, the armed struggle under Thrasybulus, and the perilous, though fortunately successful and equitable, renovation of the democracy. These were not times for a young citizen, of good family and robust frame, to devote himself exclusively to philosophy and composition. I confess myself surprised at the assertion of Schleiermacher and Steinhart, that Plato composed the Charmides and other dialogues under the Anarchy.¹ Amidst such disquietude and perils he could not have renounced active duty for philosophy, even if he had been disposed to do so.

Plato's
early life—
active by
necessity,
and to
some extent
ambitious.

But, to make the case stronger, we learn from Plato's own testimony, in his seventh Epistle, that he was not at that time disposed to renounce active political life. He tells us himself, that as a young man he was exceedingly eager, like others of the same age, to meddle and distinguish himself in active politics.² How natural such eagerness was, to a young citizen of his family and condition, may be seen by the analogy of his younger brother Glaukon, who was prematurely impatient to come forward: as

¹ Steinhart, Einl. zum Laches, vol. i. p. 368, where he says that Plato composed the Charmides, Laches, and Protagoras, all in 404 B.C. under the Thirty. Schleiermacher, Einleitung zum Charmides, vol. ii. p. 8.

The lines of Lucretius (l. 41) bear emphatically upon this trying season:

Nam neque nos agere hoc patriai
tempore iniquo

Possumus sequo animo nec Memmi
clara propago
Talibus in rebus communi desse
saluti.

² Plato, Epist. vii. p. 324 C. Νέος
ἐγώ ποτε ὦν πολλοῖς δὴ ταῦτ' ἐπαθόν·
ψῆθην, εἰ θάπτον ἐμαυτοῦ γενοίμην
κύριος, ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐθύς
ἵεναι. Again, 325 E: ὥστε με, τὸ πρῶ-
τον πολλὰς μεστὸν ὄντα ὁρμῆς ἐπὶ τὸ
εὐάττειν τὰ κοινὰ, &c.

well as by that of his cousin Charmides, who had the same inclination, but was restrained by exaggerated diffidence of character. Now we know that the real Sokrates (very different from the Platonic Sokrates in the *Gorgias*) did not seek to deter young men of rank from politics, and to consign them to inactive speculation. Sokrates gives¹ earnest encouragement to Charmides; and he does not discourage Glaukon, but only presses him to adjourn his pretensions until the suitable stock of preliminary information has been acquired. We may thus see that assuming the young Plato to be animated with political aspirations, he would certainly not be dissuaded,—nay, he would probably be encouraged—by Sokrates.

Plato farther tells us that when (after the final capitulation of Athens) the democracy was put down and the government of the Thirty established, he embarked in it actively under the auspices of his relatives (Kritias, Charmides, &c., then in the ascendant), with the ardent hopes of youth² that he should witness and promote the accomplishment of valuable reforms. Experience showed him that he was mistaken. He became disgusted with the enormities of the Thirty, especially with their treatment of Sokrates; and he then ceased to co-operate with them. Again, after the year called the Anarchy, the democracy was restored, and Plato's political aspirations revived along with it. He again put himself forward for active public life, though with less ardent hopes.³ But he became dissatisfied with the march of affairs, and his relationship with the deceased Kritias was now a formidable obstacle to popularity. At length, four years after the restoration of the democracy, came the trial and condemnation of Sokrates. It was that event which finally shocked and disgusted Plato, converting his previous dissatisfaction into an utter despair of obtaining any good results from existing govern-

¹ See the two interesting colloquies of Sokrates, with Glaukon and Charmides (Xenoph. Mem. iii. 6, 7).

Charmides was killed along with Kritias during the eight months called The Anarchy, at the battle fought with Thrasybulus and the democrats (Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 19). The colloquy of Sokrates with Charmides, recorded by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*, must have taken

place at some time before the battle of Ægospotami; perhaps about 407 or 406 B.C.

² Plato, Epist. vii. 324 D. Καὶ ἐγὼ θανούσαντων οὐδὲν ἔπαυον ὑπὸ νεότητος, &c.

³ Plato, Epist. vii. 325 A. Πάλιν δέ, βραδύτερον μὲν, εἴλακε δέ με ὅμως ἡ περὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ κοινὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ ἐπιθυμία.

ments. From thenceforward, he turned away from practice and threw himself into speculation.¹

This very natural recital, wherein Plato (at the age of 75) describes his own youth between 21 and 28—taken in conjunction with the other reasons just enumerated—impresses upon me the persuasion, that Plato did not devote himself to philosophy, nor publish any of his dialogues, before the death of Sokrates: though he may probably have composed dramas, and the beautiful epigrams which Diogenes has preserved. He at first frequented the society of Sokrates, as many other aspiring young men frequented it (likewise that of Kratylus, and perhaps that of various Sophists²), from love of

Plato did not retire from political life until after the restoration of the democracy, nor devote himself to philosophy until after the death of Sokrates.

Plato, Epist. vii. 325 C: *Σκοπεῖν δὲ μοι ταῦτά τε καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πολιτικά, &c.* 325 E: *Καὶ τοῦ μὲν σκοπεῖν μὴ ἀποστῆναι, πῇ ποτὶ ἄμεινον ἂν γέγοντο περὶ τε αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τὴν πάσαν πολιτείαν, τοῦ δὲ πράττειν αὐτὸ περιμένειν αἰεὶ καιροῦς, τελευτῶντα δὲ νοῆσαι περὶ πασῶν τῶν νῦν πόλεων ὅτι κακῶς ἔχουσιναι πολιτεύονται.*

I have already stated in the 84th chapter of my History, describing the visit of Plato to Dionysius in Sicily, that I believe the Epistles of Plato to be genuine, and that the seventh Epistle especially contains valuable information. Some critics undoubtedly are of a different opinion, and consider them as spurious. But even among these critics, several consider that the author of the Epistles, though not Plato himself, was a contemporary and well informed: so that his evidence is trustworthy. See K. F. Hermann, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, pp. 282-283. The question has been again discussed recently by Ueberweg (*Untersuch. über d. Aelth. u. Zeitf. d. Plat. Schriften*, pp. 120-123-125-129), who gives his own opinion that the letters are not by Plato, and produces various arguments to the point. His arguments are noway convincing to me: for the mysticism and pedantry of the Epistles appear to me in full harmony with the *Timæus* and *Leges*, and with the Pythagorean bias of Plato's later years, though not in harmony with the *Protagoras*, and various other dialogues. Yet Ueberweg also declares his full belief that the seventh Epistle is the composition of a well-informed contemporary, and per-

fectedly worthy of credit as to the facts; and K. F. Hermann declares the same! This is enough for my present purpose.

The statement, trusted by all the critics, that Plato's first visit to Syracuse was made when he was about 40 years of age, depends altogether on the assertion of the seventh Epistle. How numerous are the assertions made by Platonic critics respecting Plato, upon evidence far slighter than that of these Epistles! Boeckh considers the seventh Epistle as the genuine work of Plato. Valentine Rose also pronounces it to be genuine, though he does not consider the other Epistles to be so (*De Aristotelis Librorum Ordine*, p. 25, p. 114, Berlin, 1854). Tennemann admits the Epistles generally to be genuine (*System der Platon. Philos.* i. p. 100).

It is undeniable that these Epistles of Plato were recognised as genuine and trusted by all the critics of antiquity from Aristophanes downwards. Cicero, Plutarch, Aristides, &c., assert facts upon the authority of the Epistles. Those who declare the Epistles to be spurious and worthless, ought in consistency to reject the statements which Plutarch makes on the authority of the Epistles: they will find themselves compelled to discredit some of the best parts of his life of Dion. Compare Aristides, *Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς* Or. 45, pp. 90-106, Dindorf.

² Compare Plat. *Protag.* 312 A-B, 315 A, where the distinction is pointed out between one who visited *Protagoras ἐπὶ τέχνη, ὡς δημιουργὸς ἰσόμενος*, and others who came simply *ἐπὶ παιδείᾳ, ὡς τὸν ἰδιώτην καὶ τὸν ἐλευθερον κρείττε*.

ethical debate, admiration of dialectic power, and desire to acquire a facility of the same kind in his own speech: not with any view to take up philosophy as a profession, or to undertake the task either of demolishing or constructing in the region of speculation. No such resolution was adopted until after he had tried political life and had been disappointed:—nor until such disappointment had been still more bitterly aggravated by the condemnation of Sokrates. It was under this feeling that Plato first consecrated himself to that work of philosophical meditation and authorship,—of inquisitive travel and converse with philosophers abroad,—and ultimately of teaching in the Academy,—which filled up the remaining fifty years of his life. The death of Sokrates left that venerated name open to be employed as spokesman in his dialogues: and there was nothing in the political condition of Athens after 399 B.C., analogous to the severe and perilous struggle which tasked all the energies of her citizens from 409 B.C. down to the close of the war.

I believe, on these grounds, that Plato did not publish any dialogues during the life of Sokrates. An interval of fifty-one years separates the death of Sokrates from that of Plato. Such an interval is more than sufficient for all the existing dialogues of Plato, without the necessity of going back to a more youthful period of his age. As to distribution of the dialogues, earlier or later, among these fifty-one years, we have little or no means of judging. Plato has kept out of sight—with a degree of completeness which is really surprising—not merely his own personality, but also the marks of special date and the determining circumstances in which each dialogue was composed. Twice only does he mention his own name, and that simply in passing, as if it were the name of a third person.¹ As to the point

All Plato's dialogues were composed during the fifty-one years after the death of Sokrates.

¹ In the *Apologia*, c. 28, p. 38, Sokrates alludes to Plato as present in court, and as offering to become guarantee, along with others, for his fine. In the *Phædon*, Plato is mentioned as being sick; to explain why he was not present at the last scene of Sokrates (*Phædon*, p. 59 B). *Diog. L. iii. 37.*

The pathos as well as the detail of the narrative in the *Phædon* makes one imagine that Plato really was present

at the scene. But being obliged, by the uniform scheme of his compositions, to provide another narrator, he could not suffer it to be supposed that he was himself present.

I have already remarked that this mention of Plato in the third person (*Πλάτων δέ, οἷμαί, ἡσθέρει*) was probably one of the reasons which induced Parnetius to declare the *Phædon* not to be the work of Plato.

of time to which he himself assigns each dialogue, much discussion has been held how far Plato has departed from chronological or historical possibility; how far he has brought persons together in Athens who never could have been there together, or has made them allude to events posterior to their own decease. A speaker in Athenæus¹ dwells, with needless acrimony, on the anachronisms of Plato, as if they were gross faults. Whether they are faults or not, may fairly be doubted: but the fact of such anachronisms cannot be doubted, when we have before us the Menexenus and the Symposium. It cannot be supposed, in the face of such evidence, that Plato took much pains to keep clear of anachronisms: and whether they be rather more or rather less numerous, is a question of no great moment.

I now conclude my enquiry respecting the Platonic Canon. The presumption in favour of that Canon, as laid down by Thrasyllus, is stronger (as I showed in the preceding chapter) than it is in regard to ancient authors generally of the same age: being traceable, in the last resort, through the Alexandrine Museum, to authenticating manuscripts in the Platonic school, and to members of that school who had known and cherished Plato himself.² I have reviewed the doctrines of several recent critics who discard this Canon as unworthy of trust, and who set up for themselves a type of what Plato *must have* been, derived from a certain number of items in the Canon—rejecting the remaining items as unconformable to their hypothetical type. The different theories which they have laid down respecting general and systematic purposes of Plato (apart from the purpose of each separate composition), appear

The Thrasyllian Canon is more worthy of trust than the modern critical theories by which it has been condemned.

¹ Athenæus, v. pp. 220, 221. Didymus also attacked Plato as departing from historical truth—*ἐκτρέφόμενος τῷ Πλάτῳ*: *ἐκ τῆς ἀποστολῆς*—against which the scholiast (ad Leges, i. p. 630) defends him. Groen van Prinsterer, Prosopogr. Plat. p. 16. The rhetor Aristides has some remarks of the same kind, though less acrimonious (Orat. xlvii. p. 435, Dind.) than the speaker in Athenæus.

² I find this position distinctly asserted, and the authority of the Thrasyllian catalogue, as certifying the

genuine works of Plato, vindicated, by Yxem, in his able dissertation on the Kleitophon of Plato (pp. 1-3, Berlin, 1846). But Yxem does not set forth the grounds of this opinion so fully as the present state of the question demands. Moreover, he combines it with another opinion, upon which he insists even at greater length, and from which I altogether dissent—that the tetralogies of Thrasyllus exhibit the genuine order established by Plato himself among the Dialogues.

to me uncertified and gratuitous. The "internal reasons," upon which they justify rejection of various dialogues, are only another phrase for expressing their own different theories respecting Plato as a philosopher and as a writer. For my part I decline to discard any item of the Thrasylllean Canon, upon such evidence as they produce: I think it a safer and more philosophical proceeding to accept the entire Canon, and to accommodate my general theory of Plato (in so far as I am able to frame one) to each and all of its contents.

Considering that Plato's period of philosophical composition extended over fifty years, and that the circumstances of his life are most imperfectly known to us—it is surely hazardous to limit the range of his varieties, on the faith of a critical repugnance, not merely subjective and fallible, but withal entirely of modern growth: to assume, as basis of reasoning, the admiration raised by a few of the finest dialogues—and then to argue that no composition inferior to this admired type, or unlike to it in doctrine or handling, can possibly be the work of Plato. "The *Minos*, *Theagêa*, *Epistolæ*, *Epinomis*, &c., are unworthy of Plato: nothing so inferior in excellence can have been composed by him. No dialogue can be admitted as genuine which contradicts another dialogue, or which advocates any low or incorrect or un-Platonic doctrine. No dialogue can pass which is adverse to the general purpose of Plato as an improver of morality, and a teacher of the doctrine of Ideas." On such grounds as these we are called upon to reject various dialogues: and there is nothing upon which, generally speaking, so much stress is laid as upon inferior excellence. For my part, I cannot recognise any of them as sufficient grounds of exception. I have no difficulty in believing, not merely that Plato (like Aristophanes) produced many successive novelties, "not at all similar one to the other, and all clever"¹—but also that among these novelties, there were inferior dialogues as well as superior: that in different dialogues he worked out different, even contradictory, points of view—and among them some which critics declare to be low and objection-

¹ Aristophan. *Nubes*, 547-8.
 'Αλλ' αἱ καινὰς ιδέας εἰσφέρων σοφίζομαι,

Οὐδὲν ἀλλήλαισιν ὁμοίας, καὶ πάσας
 δεξιάς.

able: that we have among his works unfinished fragments and abandoned sketches, published without order, and perhaps only after his death.

It may appear strange, but it is true, that Schleiermacher, the leading champion of Plato's central purpose and systematic unity from the beginning, lays down a doctrine to the same effect. He says, "Truly, nothing can be more preposterous, than when people demand that all the works even of a great master shall be of equal perfection—or that such as are not equal, shall be regarded as not composed by him". Zeller expresses himself in the same manner, and with as little reserve.¹ These eminent critics here proclaim a general rule which neither they nor others follow out.

Opinions of Schleiermacher, tending to show this.

I find elsewhere in Schleiermacher, another opinion, not less important, in reference to disallowance of dialogues, on purely

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Menon*, vol. iii. p. 337. "Und wahrlich, nichts ist wohl wunderlicher, als wenn man verlangt, dass alle Werke auch eines grossen Meisters von gleicher Vollkommenheit seyn sollten—oder die es nicht sind, soll er nicht verfertigt haben."

Compare Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.*, vol. ii. p. 322, ed. 2nd.

It is to be remembered that this opinion of Schleiermacher refers only to *completed works* of the same master. You are not authorised in rejecting any completed work as spurious, on the ground that it is not equal in merit to some other. Still less, then, are you authorised in rejecting, on the like ground, an uncompleted work—a professed fragment, or a preliminary sketch. Of this nature are several of the minor items in the Thrasylean canon.

M. Boeckh, in his *Commentary on the dialogue called Minos*, has assigned the reasons which induce him to throw out that dialogue, together with the Hipparchus, from the genuine works of Plato (and farther to consider both of them, and the pseudo-Platonic dialogues *De Justo* and *De Virtute*, as works of Σίμων ὁ σκυρεύς: with this latter hypothesis I have here no concern). He admits fully that the *Minos* is of the Platonic age and irreproachable in style—"veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores totius denique character, spondent" (p. 32). Next, he not only admits that

it is like Plato, but urges the *too great likeness* to Plato as one of the points of his case. He says that it is a bad, stupid, and unskilful imitation of different Platonic dialogues: "Pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ argumentationis, eamque etiam firmiorem, de *similitudine* Platoniorum aliquot locorum. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari: ni forté quis dubitet de sanæ ejus mente" (p. 23). In the sense which Boeckh intends, I agree that Plato did not imitate himself: in another sense, I think that he did. I mean that his consummate compositions were preceded by shorter, partial, incomplete sketches, which he afterwards worked up, improved, and remodelled. I do not understand how Plato could have composed such works as *Republic*, *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Symposium*, *Phædrus*, *Phædon*, &c., without having before him many of these preparatory sketches. That some of these sketches should have been preserved is what we might naturally expect; and I believe *Minos* and *Hipparchus* to be among them. I do not wonder that they are of inferior merit. One point on which Boeckh (pp. 7, 8) contends that *Hipparchus* and *Minos* are unlike to Plato is, that the *collocutor* with *Socrates* is anonymous. But we find anonymous talkers in the *Protagoras*, *Sophistes*, *Politikus*, and *Leges*.

internal grounds. Take the *Gorgias* and the *Protagoras*. both these two dialogues are among the most renowned of the catalogue both have escaped all suspicion as to legitimacy, even from Ast and Socher, the two boldest of all disfranchising critics. In the *Protagoras*, Sokrates maintains an elaborate argument to prove, against the unwilling *Protagoras*, that the Good is identical with the Pleasurable, and the Evil identical with the Painful. in the *Gorgias*, Sokrates holds an argument equally elaborate, to show that Good is essentially different from Pleasurable, Evil from Painful. What the one affirms, the other denies. Moreover, Schleiermacher himself characterises the thesis vindicated by Sokrates in the *Protagoras*, as "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic".¹ If internal grounds of repudiation are held to be available against the *Thrasyllean* canon, how can such grounds exist in greater force than those which are here admitted to bear against the *Protagoras*—That it exhibits Sokrates as contradicting the Sokrates of the *Gorgias*—That it exhibits him farther as advancing and proving, at great length, a thesis "entirely un-Sokratic and un-Platonic"? Since the critics all concur in disregarding these internal objections, as insufficient to raise even a suspicion against the *Protagoras*, I cannot concur with them when they urge the like objections as valid and irresistible against other dialogues.

I may add, as farther illustrating this point, that there are few dialogues in the list against which stronger objections on internal grounds can be brought, than *Leges* and *Menexenus*. Yet both of them stand authenticated, beyond all reasonable dispute, as genuine works of Plato, not merely by the Canon of *Thrasyllos*, but also by the testimony of Aristotle.²

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einf. zum Protag.* vol. i. p. 232. "Jene ganz unsokratische und unplatonsche Ansicht, dass das Gute nichts anderes ist als das Angenehme."

So also, in the *Parmenides*, we find a host of unsolved objections against the doctrine of Ideas, upon which in other dialogues Plato so emphatically insists. Accordingly, Socher, resting upon this discrepancy as an "internal ground," declares the *Parmenides* not to be the work of Plato. But the other critics refuse to go along with this in-

ference. I think they are right in so refusing. But this only shows how little such internal grounds are to be trusted, as evidence to prove spuriousness.

² See Ast, *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 384: and still more, Zeller, *Plat. Studien*, pp. 1-131, Tübingen, 1839. In that treatise, where Zeller has set forth powerfully the grounds for denying the genuineness of the *Leges*, he relied so much upon the strength of this negative case, as to discredit the direct testimony of Ari-

While adhering therefore to the Canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of fifty years during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much this type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonise. Such sacrifice of the inherent diversity, and separate individuality, of the dialogues, to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or purpose, appears to me an error. In fact,¹ there exists, for us, no personal Plato any more than

Any true theory of Plato must recognise all his varieties, and must be based upon all the works in the Canon, not upon some to the exclusion of the rest.

stotle affirming the *Leges* to be genuine. In his *Phil. d. Griech.* Zeller altered this opinion, and admitted the *Leges* to be genuine. But Strümpell adheres to the earlier opinion given by Zeller, and maintains that the partial recantation is noway justified. (*Gesch. d. Prakt. Phil. d. Griech.* p. 457.)

Suckow mentions (*Form. der Plat. Schriften*, 1855, p. 135) that Zeller has in a subsequent work reverted to his former opinion, denying the genuineness of the *Leges*. Suckow himself denies it also; relying not merely on the internal objections against it, but also on a passage of *Isokrates* (*ad Philippum*, p. 84), which he considers to sanction his opinion, but which (in my judgment) entirely fails to bear him out.

Suckow attempts to show (p. 55), and Ueberweg partly countenances the same opinion, that the two passages in which Aristotle alludes to the *Menexenus* (*Rhet. i. 9, 30; iii. 14, 11*) do not prove that he (Aristotle) considered it as a work of Plato, because he mentions the name of *Sokrates* only, and not that of Plato. But this is to require from a witness such precise specification as we cannot reasonably expect. Aristotle, alluding to the *Menexenus*, says, *Σωκράτης ἐν τῷ Ἐπιγραφῷ*: just as, in alluding to the *Gorgias* in another place (*Sophist. Elench. 12*, p. 173), he says, *Καλλικλῆς ἐν τῷ Γοργίῳ*: and

again, in alluding to the *Phædon*, *ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης* (*De Gen. et Corrupt. ii. 9*, p. 335): not to mention his allusions in the *Politica* to the Platonic Republic, under the name of *Sokrates*. No instance can be produced in which Aristotle cites any Sokratic dialogue, composed by Antisthenes, *Æschines*, &c., or any other of the Sokratic companions except Plato. And when we read in Aristotle's *Politica* (*ii. 3, 3*) the striking compliment paid—*Τὸ μὲν οὖν περιττὸν ἔχουσι πάντες οἱ τοῦ Σωκράτους λόγοι, καὶ τὸ κομψόν, καὶ τὸ καινότομον, καὶ τὸ ζητητικόν*—καλῶς δὲ πάντα ἴσως χαλεπόν—we cannot surely imagine that he intends to designate any other dialogues than those composed by Plato.

¹ The only manifestation of the personal Plato is in the *Epistole*. I have already said that I accept these as genuine, though most critics do not. I consider them valuable illustrations of his character, as far as they go. They are all written after he was more than sixty years of age. And most of them relate to his relations with Dionysius the younger, with Dion, and with Sicilian affairs generally. This was a peculiar and outlying phase of Plato's life, during which (through the instigation of Dion, and at the sacrifice of his own peace of mind) he became involved in the world of political action: he had to deal with

there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato (except in the *Epistolæ*) never appears before us, nor gives us any opinion as his own : he is the unseen prompter of different characters who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas—each drama a separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps constantly in the dark—who delights to dive, and hide himself, not less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue called *Sophistês*—I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues, each and all : and above all, it must be such as to include and acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and contradictions.¹

real persons, passions, and interests—with the feeble character, literary vellicities, and jealous apprehensions of Dionysius—the reforming vehemence and unpopular harshness of Dion—the courtiers, the soldiers, and the people of Syracuse, all moved by different passions of which he had had no practical experience. It could not be expected that, amidst such turbulent elements, Plato as an adviser could effect much : yet I do not think that he turned his chances, doubtful as they were, to the best account. I have endeavoured to show this in the tenth volume of my *History of Greece*, c. 84. But at all events, these operations lay apart from Plato's true world—the speculation, dialectic, and lectures of the Academy at Athens. The *Epistolæ*, however, present some instructive points, bearing upon Plato's opinions about writing as a medium of philosophical communication and instruction to learners, which I shall notice in the suitable place.

¹ I transcribe from the instructive work of M. Ernest Renan, *Averroës et l'Averroïsme*, a passage in which he deprecates the proceeding of critics who presume uniform consistency throughout the works of Aristotle, and make out their theory partly by forcible exegesis, partly by setting aside as spurious all those compositions which oppose them. The remark applies more forcibly to the dialogues of Plato, who is much less systematic than Aristotle :—

"On a combattu l'interprétation d'Ibn-Roschd (Averroës), et soutenu que l'intellect actif n'est pour Aristote qu'

une faculté de l'âme. L'intellect passif n'est alors que la faculté de recevoir les *φαινόμενα* : l'intellect actif n'est que l'induction s'exerçant sur les *φαινόμενα* et en tirant les idées générales. Ainsi l'on fait concorder la théorie exposée dans le troisième livre du *Traité de l'Âme*, avec celle des *Seconds Analytiques*, où Aristote semble réduire le rôle de la raison à l'induction généralisant les faits de la sensation. Certes, je ne me dissimule pas qu'Aristote paraît souvent envisager le *vois* comme personnel à l'homme. Son attention constante à répéter que l'intellect est identique à l'intelligible, que l'intellect passe à l'acte quand il devient l'objet qu'il pense, est difficile à concilier avec l'hypothèse d'un intellect séparé de l'homme. Mais il est dangereux de faire ainsi coïncider de force les différents aperçus des anciens. Les anciens philosophaient souvent sans se limiter dans un système, traitant le même sujet selon les points de vue qui s'offraient à eux, ou qui leur étaient offerts par les écoles antérieures, sans s'inquiéter des dissonances qui pouvaient exister entre ces divers tronçons de théorie. Il est puéril de chercher à les mettre d'accord avec eux-mêmes, quand eux-mêmes s'en sont peu souciés. Autant vaudrait, comme certains critiques Allemands, déclarer interpolés tous les passages que l'on ne peut concilier avec les autres. Ainsi, la théorie des *Seconds Analytiques* et celles du troisième livre de l'Âme, sans se contredire expressément, représentent deux aperçus profondément distincts et d'origine différente, sur le fait de l'intelli-

gence." (Averroès et l'Averroïsme, p. 96-98, Paris, 1852.)

There is also in Strümpell (*Gesch. der Prakt. Phil. der Griech. vor Aristot.* p. 200) a good passage to the same purpose as the above from M. Renan: disapproving this presumption, —that the doctrines of every ancient philosopher must of course be systematic and coherent with each other

—as "a phantom of modern times": and pointing out that both Plato and Aristotle founded their philosophy, not upon any one governing ἀρχή alone, from which exclusively consequences are deduced, but upon several distinct, co-ordinate, independent, points of view: each of which is by turns followed out, not always consistently with the others.

CHAPTER VIII.

PLATONIC COMPOSITIONS GENERALLY.

ON looking through the collection of works enumerated in the Thrasyllean Canon, the first impression made upon us respecting the author is, that which is expressed in the epithets applied to him by Cicero—"varius et multiplex et copiosus". Such epithets bring before us the variety in Plato's points of view and methods of handling—the multiplicity of the topics discussed—the abundance of the premisses and illustrations suggested:¹ comparison being taken with other literary productions of the same age. It is scarcely possible to find any one predicate truly applicable to all of Plato's works. Every predicate is probably true in regard to some:—none in regard to all.

Several critics of antiquity considered Plato as essentially a sceptic—that is, a Searcher or Enquirer, not reaching any assured or proved result. They denied to him the character of a dogmatist: they maintained that he neither established nor enforced any affirmative doctrines.² This latter statement is carried too far. Plato is sceptical in some dialogues, dogmatical in others. And the catalogue of Thrasyllus shows that the sceptical dialogues (Dialogues of Search or Investigation) are more numerous than the dogmatical (Dialogues of Exposition)—as they are also, speaking generally, more animated and interesting.

¹ The rhetor Aristides, comparing Plato with Æschines (i.e. Æschines Socraticus, disciple of Sokrates also), remarks that Æschines was more likely to report what Sokrates really said, from being inferior in productive ima-

gination. Plato (as he truly says *Orat.* xli. *Ὑπερ τῶν Τερράμων*, p. 295, *Dindorf*) τῆς φύσεως χρηταί περιουσίαι, &c.

² *Diogen. Laert.* iii. 52. *Prolegom.* *Platon. Philosoph.* c. 10, vol. vi. 205, of *K. F. Hermann's* edition of Plato.

Again, Aristotle declared the writing of Plato to be something between poetry and prose, and even the philosophical doctrine of Plato respecting Ideas, to derive all its apparent plausibility from poetic metaphors. The affirmation is true, up to a certain point. Many of the dialogues display an exuberant vein of poetry, which was declared—not by Aristotle alone, but by many other critics contemporary with Plato—to be often misplaced and excessive—and which appeared the more striking because the dialogues composed by the other Sokratic companions were all of them plain and unadorned.¹ The various mythæ, in the *Phædrus* and elsewhere, are announced expressly as soaring above the conditions of truth and logical appreciation. Moreover, we find occasionally an amount of dramatic vivacity, and of artistic antithesis between the speakers introduced, which might have enabled Plato, had he composed for the drama as a profession, to contend with success for the prizes at the Dionysiac festivals. But here again, though this is true of several dialogues, it is not true of others. In the *Parmenidês*, *Timæus*, and the *Leges*, such elements will be looked for in vain. In the *Timæus*, they are exchanged for a professed cosmical system, including much mystic and oracular affirmation, without proof to support it, and without opponents to test it: in the *Leges*, for ethical

Poetical vein predominant in some compositions, but not in all.

¹ See Dionys. Hal. *Epist. ad Cn. Pomp.* 756, *De Adm. VI Dic. Dem.* 956, where he recognises the contrast between Plato and τὸ Σωκρατικὸν διδασκαλεῖον πᾶν. His expression is remarkable: Ταῦτα γὰρ οἱ τε κατ' αὐτὸν γενόμενοι πάντες ἐπιτιμῶσιν ὅν τὰ ὀνόματα οὐδὲν δεῖ με λέγειν. *Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp.* p. 761; also 757. See also *Diog. L. iii.* 37; *Aristotel. Metaph. A.* 991, a. 22.

Cicero and Quintilian say the same about Plato's style: "Multum supra prosam orationem, et quam pedestrem Græci vocant, surgit: ut mihi non hominis ingenio, sed quodam Delphico videatur oraculo instinctus". *Quintil. x. 1.* 81. *Cicero, Orator. c. 20.* *Lucian, Piscator, c. 22.*

Sextus Empiricus designates the same tendency under the words τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀπειδωλοποιήσιν. *Pyrrhon. Hypotyp. iii.* 189.

The Greek rhetors of the Augustan age—Dionysius of Halikarnassus and

Kækilus of Kalaktê—not only blamed the style of Plato for excessive, overstrained, and misplaced metaphor, but Kækilus goes so far as to declare a decided preference for Lysias over Plato. (*Dionys. Hal. De VI Demosth. pp.* 1025-1037, *De Comp. Verb. p.* 196 B; *Longinus, De Sublimitat. c. 32.*) The number of critics who censured the manner and doctrine of Plato (critics both contemporary with him and subsequent) was considerable (*Dionys. H. Ep. ad Pomp. p.* 757). Dionysius and the critics of his age had before their eyes the contrast of the Asiatic style of rhetoric, prevalent in their time, with the Attic style represented by Demosthenes and Lysias. They wished to uphold the force and simplicity of the Attic, against the tumid, wordy, pretensive Asiatic: and they considered the *Phædrus*, with other compositions of Plato, as falling under the same censure with the Asiatic. See Theoph. Burckhardt, *Cæcili Rhet. Frag.*, Berlin, 1863, p. 15.

sermons, and religious fulminations, proclaimed by a dictatorial authority.

One feature there is, which is declared by Schleiermacher and others to be essential to all the works of Plato—the form of dialogue. Here Schleiermacher's assertion, literally taken, is incontestable. Plato always puts his thoughts into the mouth of some spokesman : he never speaks in his own name. All the works of Plato which we possess (excepting the Epistles, and the Apology, which last I consider to be a report of what Sokrates himself said) are dialogues. But under this same name, many different realities are found to be contained. In the *Timæus* and *Kritias* the dialogue is simply introductory to a continuous exposition—in the *Menexenus*, to a rhetorical discourse : while in the *Leges*, and even in *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, and others, it includes no antithesis nor interchange between two independent minds, but is simply a didactic lecture, put into interrogatory form, and broken into fragments small enough for the listener to swallow at once : he by his answer acknowledging the receipt. If therefore the affirmation of Schleiermacher is intended to apply to all the Platonic compositions, we must confine it to the form, without including the spirit, of dialogue.

It is in truth scarcely possible to resolve all the diverse manifestations of the Platonic mind into one higher unity ; or to predicate, about Plato as an intellectual person, anything which shall be applicable at once to the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Parmenidês*, *Phædrus*, *Symposium*, *Philêbus*, *Phædon*, *Republic*, *Timæus*, and *Leges*. Plato was sceptic, dogmatist, religious mystic and inquirer, mathematician, philosopher, poet (erotic as well as satirical), rhetor, artist—all in one : ¹ or at least, all in succession, through-

¹ Dikæarchus affirmed that Plato was a compound of Sokrates with Pythagoras. Plutarch calls him also a compound of Sokrates with Lykurgus. (Plutarch, *Symposiac* viii. 2, p. 718 B.)

Nemesius the Platonist (Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 5-7-8) repeats the saying of Dikæarchus, and describes Plato as midway between Pythagoras

and Sokrates ; μεσέων Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους. No three persons could be more disparate than Lykurgus, Pythagoras, and Sokrates. But there are besides various other attributes of Plato, which are not included under either of the heads of this tripartite character.

The Stoic philosopher Sphærus composed a work in three books—*Περί*

out the fifty years of his philosophical life. At one time his exuberant dialectical impulse claims satisfaction, manifesting itself in a string of ingenious doubts and unsolved contradictions: at another time, he is full of theological antipathy against those who libel Helios and Selênê, or who deny the universal providence of the Gods: here, we have unqualified confessions of ignorance, and protestations against the false persuasion of knowledge, as alike widespread and deplorable—there, we find a description of the process of building up the Kosmos from the beginning, as if the author had been privy to the inmost purposes of the Demiurgus. In one dialogue the erotic fever is in the ascendant, distributed between beautiful youths and philosophical concepts, and confounded with a religious inspiration and *furor* which supersedes and transcends human sobriety (Phædrus): in another, all vehement impulses of the soul are stigmatised and repudiated, no honourable scope being left for anything but the calm and passionless Nous (Philêbus, Phædon). Satire is exchanged for dithyramb, and mythe,—and one ethical point of view for another (Protagoras, Gorgias). The all-sufficient dramatising power of the master gives full effect to each of these multifarious tendencies. On the whole—to use a comparison of Plato himself¹—the Platonic sum total somewhat resembles those fanciful combinations of animals imagined in the Hellenic mythology—an aggregate of distinct and disparate individualities, which look like one because they are packed in the same external wrapper.

Furthermore, if we intend to affirm anything about Plato as a whole, there is another fact which ought to be taken into account.² We know him only from his dialogues, and

Λουκίον και Σωκράτους—(Diog. La. vii. 178). He probably compared therein the Platonic Republic with the Spartan constitution and discipline.

¹ Plato, Republ. ix. 588 C. Οἱ μὲν θολογούντες παλαιὰ γενέσθαι φύσεις, ἢ τε Χιμαίρας καὶ ἢ Σκύλλης καὶ Κερβίρου, καὶ ἄλλαι τινὲς συχναὶ λέγονται ἐμπροσθεν ἰδεαὶ πολλὰ εἰς ἓν γενέσθαι . . . Περιπλεσσόν δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐξωθεν ἰνὸς εἰκόνα, τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε τῷ μὴ δυναμένῳ τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξω μόνον ἐλκτρον ὁρᾶν, ἐν ζῶνι φαίνεσθαι—ἀνθρώπον.

² Trendelenburg not only adopts Schleiermacher's theory of a pre-conceived and systematic purpose connecting together all Plato's dialogues, but even extends this purpose to Plato's oral lectures: "Id pro certo habendum est. sicut prioribus dialogis quasi preparat (Plato) posteriores, posterioribus evolvit priores—ita et in scholis continuasse dialogos; quæ reliquerit, ab-solvissæ; atque omnibus ad summa principia perductis, intima quasi nemina aperuisse". (Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 6.)

from a few scraps of information. But Plato was not merely a composer of dialogues. He was lecturer, and chief of a school, besides. The presidency of that school, commencing about 386 B.C., and continued by him with great celebrity for the last half (nearly forty years) of his life, was his most important function. Among his contemporaries he must have exercised greater influence through his school than through his writings.¹ Yet in this character of school-teacher and lecturer, he is almost unknown to us: for the few incidental allusions which have descended to us, through the Aristotelian commentators, only raise curiosity without satisfying it. The little information which we possess respecting Plato's lectures, relates altogether to those which he delivered upon the *Ipsium Bonum* or *Summum Bonum* at some time after Aristotle became his

The real Plato was not merely a writer of dialogues, but also lecturer and president of a school. In this last important function he is scarcely at all known to us. Notes of his lectures taken by Aristotle.

This opinion is surely not borne out—it seems even contradicted—by all the information which we possess (very scanty indeed) about the Platonic lectures. Plato delivered therein his Pythagorean doctrines, merging his Ideas in the Pythagorean numerical symbols: and Aristotle, far from considering this as a systematic and intended evolution of doctrine at first imperfectly unfolded, treats it as an additional perversion and confusion, introduced into a doctrine originally erroneous. In regard to the transition of Plato from the doctrine of Ideas to that of Ideal Numbers, see Aristotle, *Metaphys.* M. 1078, b. 9, 1080, a. 12 (with the commentary of Bonitz, pp. 539-541), A. 987, b. 20.

M. Boeckh, too, accounts for the obscure and enigmatical speaking of Plato in various dialogues, by supposing that he cleared up all the difficulties in his oral lectures. "Platon deutet nur an—spricht meinethalben räthselhaft (in den Gesetzen); aber gerade so räthselhaft spricht er von diesen Sachen im *Timæus*: er pflegt mathematische Theoreme nur anzudeuten, nicht zu entwickeln: ich glaube, weil er sie in den Vorträgen ausführte," &c. (*Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon*, p. 50.)

This may be true about the mathematical theorems; but I confess that I see no proof of it. Though Plato ad-

mits that his doctrine in the *Timæus* is ἀόφητος λόγος, yet he expressly intimates that the hearers are instructed persons, able to follow him (*Timæus*, p. 53 C.).

¹ M. Renan, in his work, '*Averroès et l'Averroïsme*,' pp. 257-325, remarks that several of the Italian professors of philosophy, at Padua and other universities, exercised far greater influence through their lectures than through their published works. He says (p. 325-6) respecting Cremonini (Professor at Padua, 1590-1620):—"Il a été jusqu'ici apprécié d'une manière fort incomplète par les historiens de la philosophie. On ne l'a jugé que par ses écrits imprimés, qui ne sont que des dissertations de peu d'importance, et ne peuvent en aucune manière faire comprendre la renommée colossale à laquelle il parvint. Cremonini n'est qu'un professeur: ses cours sont sa véritable philosophie. Aussi, tandis que ses écrits imprimés se vendaient fort mal, les rédactions de ses leçons se répandaient dans toute l'Italie et même au delà des monts. On sait que les élèves préfèrent souvent aux textes imprimés, les cahiers qu'ils ont ainsi recueillis de la bouche de leurs professeurs. . . En général, c'est dans les cahiers, beaucoup plus que dans les sources imprimées, qu'il faut étudier l'école de Padoue. Pour Cremonini, cette tâche est facile; car les copies de ses cours sont innombrables dans le nord de l'Italie."

pupil—that is, during the last eighteen years of Plato's life. Aristotle and other hearers took notes of these lectures: Aristotle even composed an express work now lost (*De Bono* or *De Philosophiâ*), reporting with comments of his own these oral doctrines of Plato, together with the analogous doctrines of the Pythagoreans. We learn that Plato gave continuous lectures, dealing with the highest and most transcendental concepts (with the constituent elements or factors of the Platonic Ideas or Ideal Numbers: the first of these factors being The One—the second, The Indeterminate Dyad, or The Great and Little, the essentially indefinite), and that they were mystic and enigmatical, difficult to understand.¹

One remarkable observation, made upon them by Aristotle, has been transmitted to us.² There were lectures announced to be, On the Supreme Good. Most of those who came to hear, expected that Plato would enumerate and compare the various matters usually considered good—
i.e. health, strength, beauty, genius, wealth, power, Plato's lectures on De Bono obscure and

¹ Aristotle (*Physic.* iv. p. 209, b. 34) alludes to τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγραφα δόγματα of Plato, and their discordance on one point with the Timæus.

Simplikius ad Aristot. *Physic.* f. 104 b. p. 362, a. 11. Brandis. Ἀρχάς γὰρ καὶ τῶν εἰσθητῶν τὸ ἐν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστον φασὶ δυνάει λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα. Τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυνάει καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεῖς ἀπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν, καὶ τὸ μέγα δὲ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ἀρχὰς τιθεῖς ἀπειρα εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ Τάγαθου λόγοις, οἷς δ' Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑσταιός καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ βηθέντα, αἰνιγματωδῶς ὡς ἔρρηθη. Πορφύριος δὲ διαβροῦν αὐτὰ ἐπαγγελλόμενος τάς περὶ αὐτῶν γέγραπεν ἐν τῇ Φιλιββ. Compare another passage of the same Scholia, p. 334, b. 28, p. 371, b. 26. Τὰς ἀγράφους συνουσίας τοῦ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπεγράφει. 372, a. Τὸ μεθεκτικὸν ἐν μὴν ταῖς περὶ Τάγαθου συνουσίαις μέγα καὶ μικρὸν ἐκάλε, ἐν δὲ τῇ Τιμαίῳ ὤλην, ἦν καὶ χώρα καὶ τόπον ὠνόμαζε. Comp 371, a. 5, and the two extracts from Simplikius, cited by Zeller, *De Hermodoro*, pp. 20, 21. By ἀγραφα δόγματα, or ἀγραφοὶ συνουσίαι, we are to understand opinions or colloquies not written down (or not communicated to others as writings) by Plato himself: thus dis-

tinguished from his written dialogues. Aristotle, in the treatise, *De Anima*, i. 2, p. 404, b. 18, refers to ἐν τοῖς περὶ Φιλοσοφίας: which Simplikius thus explains περὶ φιλοσοφίας νῦν λέγει τὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἀγαθοῦ αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς Πλάτωνος ἀναγεγραμμένα συνουσίας, ἐν οἷς ἱστορεῖ τὰς τε Πυθαγορείους καὶ Πλατωνικάς περὶ τῶν ὄντων δόξας. Philoponus reports the same thing: see Trendelenburg's *Comm.* on *De Anima*, p. 228. Compare Alexand. ad Aristot. *Met.* A. 992, p. 581, a. 2, Schol. Brandis.

² Aristoxenus, *Harmon.* ii. p. 30. Καθὰ περ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀεὶ διηγείτο τοὺς πλείστους τῶν ἀκουσάντων παρὰ Πλάτωνος τὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀκρόασιν παθεῖν· προσεῖναι γὰρ ἑκάστον ὑπολαμβάνοντα λήψεσθαι τῶν νομιζομένων ἀνθρωπίνων ἀγαθῶν.—ὅτι δὲ φανεῖται οἱ λόγοι περὶ μαθημάτων καὶ ἀριθμῶν καὶ γεωμετρίας καὶ ἀστρολογίας, καὶ τὸ πῆρας ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἴσθαι ἐν, παντελὲς οἶμαι παράδοξον ὀφείνεται αὐτοῖς.

Compare Themistius, *Orat.* xxi. p. 245 D. Proklus also alludes to this story, and to the fact that most of the πολὺν καὶ παντοῖος ὄχλος, who were attracted to Plato's ἀκρόασις περὶ Τάγαθου, were disappointed or unable to understand him, and went away. (Proklus ad Platon. *Farmen.* p. 92, Cousin. 523, Stallb.)

transcendental. Effect which they produced on the auditors.

&c. But these hearers were altogether astonished at what they really heard: for Plato omitting the topics expected, descanted only upon arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy; and told them that The Good was identical with The One (as contrasted with the Infinite or Indeterminate which was Evil).

We see farther from this remark:—First, that Plato's lectures were often above what his auditors could appreciate—a fact which we learn from other allusions also: Next, that they were not confined to a select body of advanced pupils, who had been worked up by special training into a state fit for comprehending them.¹ Had such been the case, the surprise which Aristotle mentions could never have been felt. And we see farther, that the transcendental doctrine delivered in the lectures De Bono (though we find partial analogies to it in Philêbus, Epinomis, and parts of Republic) coincides more with what Aristotle states and comments upon as Platonic doctrine, than with any reasonings which we find in the Platonic dialogues. It represents the latest phase of Platonism: when the Ideas originally conceived by him as Entities in themselves, had become merged or identified in his mind with the Pythagorean numbers or symbols.

¹ Respecting Plato's lectures, see Brandis (Gesch. der Griech.-Rom. Phil. vol. ii. p. 180 seq., 306-319); also Trendelenburg, *Platonis De Ideis et Numeris Doctrina*, pp. 3, 4, seq.

Brandis, though he admits that Plato's lectures were continuous discourses, thinks that they were intermingled with discussion and debate: which may have been the case, though there is no proof of it. But Schleiermacher goes further, and says (*Einführung*, p. 18), "Any one who can think that Plato in these oral *Vorträge* employed the Sophistical method of long speeches, shows such an ignorance as to forfeit all right of speaking about Plato". Now the passage from Aristoxenus, given in the preceding note, is our only testimony; and it distinctly indicates a continuous lecture to an unprepared auditory, just as Protagoras or Prodikos might have given. K. F. Hermann protests, with good rea-

son, against Schleiermacher's opinion. (Ueber Plato's schriftstellerische Motive, p. 289.)

The confident declaration just produced from Schleiermacher illustrates the unsound basis on which he and various other Platonic critics proceed. They find, in some dialogues of Plato, a strong opinion proclaimed, that continuous discourse is useless for the purpose of instruction. This was a point of view which, at the time when he composed these dialogues, he considered to be of importance, and desired to enforce. But we are not warranted in concluding that he must always have held the same conviction throughout his long philosophical life, and in rejecting as un-platonic all statements and all compositions which imply an opposite belief. We cannot with reason bind down Plato to a persistence in one and the same type of compositions.

This statement of Aristotle, alike interesting and unquestionable, attests the mysticism and obscurity which pervaded Plato's doctrine in his later years. But whether this lecture on *The Good* is to be taken as a fair specimen of Plato's lecturing generally, and from the time when he first began to lecture, we may perhaps doubt:¹ since we know that as a lecturer and converser he acquired extraordinary ascendancy over ardent youth. We see this by the remarkable instance of Dion.²

The lectures De Bono may perhaps have been more transcendental than Plato's other lectures.

The only occasions on which we have experience of Plato as speaking in his own person, and addressing himself to definite individuals, are presented by his few Epistles; all of them (as I have before remarked) written after he was considerably above sixty years of age, and nearly all addressed to Sicilians or Italians—Dionysius II., Dion, the friends of Dion after the death of the latter, and Archytas.³ In so far as these letters bear upon Plato's

Plato's Epistles.—In them only he speaks in his own person.

¹ Themistius says (Orat. xxi. p. 245 D) that Plato sometimes lectured in the Piræus, and that a crowd then collected to hear him, not merely from the city, but also from the country around: if he lectured De Bono, however, the ordinary hearers became tired and dispersed, leaving only τοὺς συνήθεις ἀμειβόμενοι.

It appears that Plato in his lectures delivered theories on the principles of geometry. He denied the reality of geometrical points—or at least admitted them only as hypotheses for geometrical reasoning. He maintained that what others called a point ought to be called "an indivisible line". Xenokrates maintained the same doctrine after him. Aristotle controverts it (see Metaphys. A., 992, b. 20). Aristotle's words in citing Plato's opinion (τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν τῷ γένει καὶ διαμάχεται Πλάτων ὡς ὅτι γεωμετρικὴ δόγματι, ἀλλ' ἐκάλεσε ἀρχὴν γραμμῆς· τοῦτο δὲ πολλάκις ἐτίθει τὰς ἀπόψεις γραμμῆς) must be referred to Plato's oral lectures; no such opinion occurs in the dialogues. This is the opinion both of Bonitz and Schwegler in their comments on the passage: also of Trendelenburg, De Ideis et Numeris Platonis, p. 66. That geometry and arithmetic were matters of study and reflection both to Plato himself and to many of his pupils in the Academy, appears certain; and perhaps Plato

may have had an interior circle of pupils, to which he applied the well-known exclusion—*μηδεὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσέρτω*. But we cannot make out clearly what was Plato's own proficiency, or what improvements he may have introduced, in geometry, nor what there is to justify the comparison made by Montucla between Plato and Descartes. In the narrative respecting the Delian problem—the duplication of the cube—Archytas, Menechmus, and Eudoxus, appear as the inventors of solutions, Plato as the superior who prescribes and criticises (see the letter and epigram of Eratosthenes: Bernhardt, Eratosthenica, pp. 176-184). The three are said to have been blamed by Plato for substituting instrumental measurement in place of geometrical proof (Plutarch, Problem. Sympos. viii. 2, pp. 718, 719; Plutarch, Vit. Marcelli, c. 14). The geometrical construction of the *Kóσμος*, which Plato gives us in the *Timæus*, seems borrowed from the Pythagoreans, though applied probably in a way peculiar to himself (see Finger, De Primordiis Geometriæ ap. Græcos, p. 38, Heidelberg. 1831).

² See Epist. vii. pp. 327, 328.

³ Of the thirteen Platonic Epistles, Ep. 2, 3, 13, are addressed to the second or younger Dionysius; Ep. 4 to Dion; Ep. 7, 8, to the friends and relatives of Dion after Dion's death. The 13th

manner of lecturing or teaching, they go to attest, first, his opinion that direct written exposition was useless for conveying real instruction to the reader—next, his reluctance to publish any such exposition under his own name, and carrying with it his responsibility. When asked for exposition, he writes intentionally with mystery, so that ordinary persons cannot understand.

Knowing as we do that he had largely imbibed himself with the tenets of the Pythagoreans (who designedly adopted a symbolical manner of speaking—published no writings—for Philolaus is cited as an exception to their rule—and did not care to be understood, except by their own adepts after a long apprenticeship) we cannot be surprised to find Plato holding a language very similar. He declares that the highest principles of his

Intentional
obscurity of
his Epistles
in reference
to philoso-
phical doc-
trine.

Epistle appears to be the earliest of all, being seemingly written after the first voyage of Plato to visit Dionysius II. at Syracuse, in 367-366 B.C., and before his second visit to the same place and person, about 363-362 B.C. Epistles 2 and 3 were written after his return from that second visit, in 360 B.C., and prior to the expedition of Dion against Dionysius in 357 B.C. Epistle 4 was written to Dion shortly after Dion's victorious career at Syracuse, about 355 B.C. Epistles 7 and 8 were written not long after the murder of Dion in 354 B.C. The first in order, among the Platonic Epistles, is not written by Plato, but by Dion, addressed to Dionysius, shortly after the latter had sent Dion away from Syracuse. The fifth is addressed by Plato to the Macedonian prince Perdikkas. The sixth, to Hermias of Atarneus, Erastus, and Koriskus. The ninth and twelfth, to Archytas of Tarentum. The tenth, to Aristodorus. The eleventh, to Laoдамас. I confess that I see nothing in these letters which compels me to depart from the judgment of the ancient critics, who unanimously acknowledged them as genuine. I do not think myself competent to determine *a priori* what the style of Plato's letters must have been; what topics he must have touched upon, and what topics he could not have touched upon. I have no difficulty in believing that Plato, writing a letter on philosophy, may have expressed himself with as much

mysticism and obscurity as we now read in Epist. 2 and 7. Nor does it surprise me to find Plato (in Epist. 13) alluding to details which critics, who look upon him altogether as a spiritual person, disallow as mean and unworthy. His recommendation of the geometer, Helikon of Kyzikus, to Dionysius and Archytas, is to me interesting: to make known the theorems of Eudoxus, through the medium of Helikon, to Archytas, was no small service to geometry in those days. I have an interest in learning how Plato employed the money given to him by Dionysius and other friends: that he sent to Dionysius a statue of Apollo by a good Athenian sculptor named Leochares (this sculptor executed a bust of Isokrates also, Plut. Vit. x. Orat. p. 838); and another statue by the same sculptor for the wife of Dionysius, in gratitude for the care which she had taken of him (Plato) when sick at Syracuse; that he spent the money of Dionysius partly in discharging his own public taxes and liturgies at Athens, partly in providing dowries for poor maidens among his friends; that he was so beset by applications, which he could not refuse, for letters of recommendation to Dionysius, as to compel him to signify, by a private mark, to Dionysius, which among the letters he wished to be most attended to. "These latter" (he says) "I shall begin with *θεός* (sing. number), the others I shall begin with *θεοί* (plural)." (Epist. xiii. 361, 362, 363.)

philosophy could not be set forth in writing so as to be intelligible to ordinary persons: that they could only be apprehended by a few privileged recipients, through an illumination kindled in the mind by multiplied debates and much mental effort: that such illumination was always preceded by a painful feeling of want, usually long-continued, sometimes lasting for nearly thirty years, and exchanged at length for relief at some unexpected moment.¹

Plato during his second visit had had one conversation, and only one, with Dionysius respecting the higher mysteries of philosophy. He had impressed upon Dionysius the prodigious labour and difficulty of attaining truth upon these matters. The despot professed to thirst ardently for philosophy, and the conversation turned upon the *Natura Primi*—upon the first and highest principles of Nature.² Dionysius, after this conversation with Plato, intimated that he had already conceived in his own mind the solution of these difficulties, and the truth upon philosophy in its greatest mysteries. Upon which Plato expressed his satisfaction that such was the case,³ so as to relieve him from the necessity of farther explanations, though the like had never happened to him with any previous hearer.

But Dionysius soon found that he could not preserve the explanation in his mind, after Plato's departure—that difficulties again crowded upon him—and that it was necessary to send a confidential messenger to Athens to entreat farther elucidations. In reply, Plato sends back by the messenger what is now numbered as the second of his Epistles. He writes avowedly in enigmatical language, so that, if the letter be lost, the finder will not be able to understand it; and he enjoins Dionysius to burn it after frequent perusal.⁴ He expresses his hope that when Dionysius has debated the

Letters of Plato to Dionysius II. about philosophy. His anxiety to confine philosophy to discussion among select and prepared minds.

¹ Plato, Epist. II. pp. 313, 314.

² Plat. Epist. II. 312: *περὶ τῆς τοῦ πρώτου φύσεως*. Epist. VII. 344: *τῶν περὶ φύσεως ἄκρων καὶ πρώτων*.—One conversation only—Epist. VII. 345.

³ Plato, Epist. II. 313 B. Plato asserts the same about Dionysius in Epist. VII. 341 B.

⁴ Plat. Epist. II. 312 E: *φραστῆρον δὲ σοὶ δι' αἰνιγμάτων ἢν ἂν τι ἢ δέλτος ἢ πόντου ἢ γῆς ἐν πτυχαῖς πάθῃ, ὃ ἀναγνούς μὴ γνῇ*. 314 C: *ἔρρωσο καὶ πείδου, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστολὴν ταύτην νῦν πρώτον πολὺ λάκεις ἀναγνούς κατάκαινον*.

Proklus, in his Commentary on the *Timæus* (pp. 40, 41), remarks the fondness of Plato for τὸ αἰνιγματωδές.

matter often with the best minds near him, the clouds will clear away of themselves, and the moment of illumination will supervene.¹ He especially warns Dionysius against talking about these matters to unschooled men, who will be sure to laugh at them; though by minds properly prepared, they will be received with the most fervent welcome.² He affirms that Dionysius is much superior in philosophical debate to his companions; who were overcome in debate with him, not because they suffered themselves designedly to be overcome (out of flattery towards the despot, as some ill-natured persons alleged), but because they could not defend themselves against the Elenchus as applied by Dionysius.³ Lastly, Plato advises Dionysius to write down nothing, since what has once been written will be sure to disappear from the memory; but to trust altogether to learning by heart, meditation, and repeated debate, as a guarantee for retention in his mind. "It is for that reason" (Plato says) "that I have never myself written anything upon these subjects. There neither is, nor shall there ever be, any treatise of Plato. The opinions called by the name of Plato are those of Sokrates, in his days of youthful vigour and glory."

Such is the language addressed by Plato to the younger Dionysius, in a letter written seemingly between 362-357 B.C. In another letter, written about ten years afterwards (353-352 B.C.), to the friends of Dion (after Dion's death), he expresses the like repugnance to the idea of furnishing any written authoritative exposition of his principal doctrines. "There never shall be any expository treatise of mine upon them" (he declares). "Others have tried, Dionysius among the number, to write them down; but they do not know what they attempt. I

He refuses to furnish any written, authoritative exposition of his own philosophical doctrine.

¹ Plat. Epist. ii. 313 D.

² Plat. Epist. ii. 314 A. εὐλαβῶ μέντοι μή ποτε ἐκπέσῃ ταῦτα εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀπαιδευμένους.

³ Plat. Epist. ii. 314 D.

⁴ Plat. Epist. ii. 314 C. μεγίστη δὲ φυλακὴ τὸ μὴ γράφειν ἀλλ' ἐκμανθάνειν· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὰ γραφέντα μὴ οὐκ ἐκπεσεῖν. διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν πώποτε ἔγωγε περὶ τούτων γεγραφαί, οὐδ' ἐστι συγ-

γραμμα Πλάτωνος οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἐστὶν· τὰ δὲ νῦν λεγόμενα, Σωκράτους ἐστὶ καλοῦ καὶ νέου γεγονότος.

"Addamus ad superiora" (says Wesseling, Epist. ad Venemam, p. 41, Utrecht, 1748), "Platonem videri semper voluisse, dialogos, in quibus de Philosophia, deque Republica atque ejus Legibus, inter confabulantes actum fuit, non sui ingenii sed Socratici, fectus esse".

could myself do this better than any one, and I should consider it the proudest deed in my life, as well as a signal benefit to mankind, to bring forward an exposition of Nature luminous to all.¹ But I think the attempt would be nowise beneficial, except to a few, who require only slight direction to enable them to find it for themselves: to most persons it would do no good, but would only fill them with empty conceit of knowledge, and with contempt for others.² These matters cannot be communicated in words as other sciences are. Out of repeated debates on them, and much social intercourse, there is kindled suddenly a light in the mind, as from fire bursting forth, which, when once generated, keeps itself alive."³

Plato then proceeds to give an example from geometry, illustrating the uselessness both of writing and of direct exposition. In acquiring a knowledge of the circle, he distinguishes five successive stages. 1. The Name. 2. The Definition, a proposition composed of nouns and verbs. 3. The Diagram. 4. Knowledge, Intelligence, True Opinion, *Noûs*. 5. The Noumenon—*Αὐτὸ-Κύκλος*—ideal or intelligible circle, the only true object of knowledge.⁴ The fourth stage is a purely mental result, not capable of being exposed either in words or figure: it presupposes the three first, but is something distinct from them; and it is the only mental condition immediately cognate and similar to the fifth stage, or the self-existent idea.⁵

He illustrates his doctrine by the successive stages of geometrical teaching. Difficulty to avoid the creeping in of error at each of these stages.

¹ Plato, *Epist.* vii. 341, B, C. *τί τοῦτον καλλίον ἐπιπρακτ' ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῖς τε ἀνθρώποισι μέγα ὄφελος γράψαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἰς φῶς παῖσι προαγαγεῖν;*

² *Plat. Epist.* vii. 341 E.

³ *Plato, Epist.* vii. 341 C. *οὐκ οὐκ ἐμὸν γε περὶ αὐτῶν εἶσι σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μή ποτε γένηται· ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς εἶστιν ὥς ἄλλα μαθήματα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γινόμενης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ καὶ τοῦ συζῆν, ἐξαίφνης, ὅσον ἀπὸ πυρὸς πηδῆσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς, ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ταυτὸ ἦδη τρέφει.*

This sentence, as a remarkable one, I have translated literally in the text: that which precedes is given only in substance.

We see in the Republic that Sokrates, when questioned by Glaukon, and

urged emphatically to give some solution respecting ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα, and ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, answers only by an evasion or a metaphor (*Republic*, vi. 506 E, vii. 633 A). Now these are much the same points as what are signified in the letter to Dionysius, under the terms *τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀκρὰ τῆς φύσεως*—ἡ τοῦ πρῶτου φύσις (312 E): as to which Plato, when questioned, replies in a mystic and unintelligible way.

⁴ *Plato, Epist.* vii. 342 A, B. The geometrical illustration which follows is intended merely as an illustration, of general principles which Plato asserts to be true about all other enquiries, physical or ethical.

⁵ *Plat. Epist.* vii. 342 C. *ὥς δὲ ἐν τούτῳ αὐτὸ παν θεῖον, οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς*

Now in all three first stages (Plato says) there is great liability to error and confusion. The name is unavoidably equivocal, uncertain, fluctuating: the definition is open to the same reproach, and often gives special and accidental properties along with the universal and essential, or instead of them: the diagram cannot exhibit the essential without some variety of the accidental, nor without some properties even contrary to reality, since any circle which you draw, instead of touching a straight line in one point alone, will be sure to touch it in several points.¹ Accordingly no intelligent man will embody the pure concepts of his mind in fixed representation, either by words or by figures.² If we do this, we have the *quid* or essence, which we are searching for, inextricably perplexed by accompaniments of the *quale* or accidents, which we are not searching for.³ We acquire only a confused cognition, exposing us to be puzzled, confuted, and humiliated, by an acute cross-examiner, when he questions us on the four stages which we have gone through to attain it.⁴ Such confusion does not arise from any fault in the mind, but from the defects inherent in each of the four stages of progress. It is only by painful effort, when each of these is naturally good—when the mind itself also is naturally good, and when it has gone through all the stages up and down, dwelling upon each—that true knowledge can be acquired.⁵ Persons whose minds are naturally bad, or have become corrupt, morally or intellectually, cannot be taught to see even by Lynkeus himself. In a word, if the mind itself be not cognate to the matter studied, no quickness in learning nor force of memory

οὐδ' ἐν σωμαίων σχήμασιν ἀλλ' ἐν ψυχαῖς ἑνόν, ἢ ὅλον ἕτερόν τε ὃν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως, τῶν τε ἐμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν. τούτων δὲ ἐγγύτατα μὲν ἐγγενείᾳ καὶ ὁμοιώτητι, τοῦ πέμπτου (i. e. τοῦ αὐτοῦ κύκλου) νοῦς (the fourth stage) πλησιέστερα, τὰλλα δὲ πλέον ἀπέχει.

In Plato's reckoning, ὁ νοῦς is counted as the fourth, in the ascending scale, from which we ascend to the fifth, τὸ νοούμενον, or νοητόν. Ὁ νοῦς and τὸ νοούμενον are cognate or homogeneous—according to a principle often insisted on in ancient metaphysics—like must be known by like. (Aristot. De Animā i. 2, 404, b. 15.)

¹ Plat. Epist. vii. 343 B. This illustrates what is said in the Republic about the geometrical hypotheses (vi. 510 E, 511 A; vii. 533 B.)

² Plat. Epist. vii. 343 A. ὃν ἔνεκα νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ποτὲ εἰς αὐτὸ τιθεῖναι τὰ νοηόμενα, καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμετακίνητον, ὃ δὲ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις.

³ Plat. Epist. vii. 343 C.

⁴ Plat. Epist. vii. 343 D.

⁵ Plato, Epistol. vii. 343 E. ἢ δὲ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν διαγωγῇ, ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαίνουσα ἐφ' ἑκάστον, μόγις ἐπιστάμην ἐνέτεκεν εὐ πεφυκότος εὐ πεφυκότι.

will suffice. He who is a quick learner and retentive, but not cognate or congenial with just or honourable things—he who, though cognate and congenial, is stupid in learning or forgetful—will never effectually learn the truth about virtue or wickedness.¹ These can only be learnt along with truth and falsehood as it concerns entity generally, by long practice and much time.² It is only with difficulty,—after continued friction, one against another, of all the four intellectual helps, names and definitions, acts of sight and sense,—after application of the Elenchus by repeated question and answer, in a friendly temper and without spite—it is only after all these preliminaries, that cognition and intelligence shine out with as much intensity as human power admits.³

For this reason, no man of real excellence will ever write and publish his views, upon the gravest matters, into a world of spite and puzzling contention. In one word, when you see any published writings, either laws proclaimed by the law-giver or other compositions by others, you may be sure that, if he be himself a man of worth, these were not matters of first-rate importance in his estimation. If they really were so, and if he has published his views in writing, some evil influence must have destroyed his good sense.⁴

No written exposition can keep clear of these chances of error.

We see by these letters that Plato disliked and disapproved the idea of publishing, for the benefit of readers generally, any written exposition of *philosophia prima*, carrying his own name, and making him responsible for it. His writings are altogether dramatic. All opinions on philosophy are enunciated through one or other of his spokesmen: that portion of the Athenian drama called the Parabasis, in which the Chorus addressed the audience directly and avowedly in the name of the poet, found no favour with Plato. We read indeed in several of his

Relations of Plato with Dionysius II. and the friends of the deceased Dion. Pretensions of Dionysius to understand and expound Plato's doctrines.

¹ Plato, Epistol. vii. 344 A.

² Plato, Epist. vii. 344 B. ἅμα γὰρ αὐτὰ ἀνάγκη μαθάνειν, καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἅμα καὶ ἀληθείας τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας.

³ Plat. Epist. vii. 344 B. μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἀλλήλα αὐτῶν ἐκαστα,

ονόματα καὶ λόγοι, ὅψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις, ἐν εὐμενέσειν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἀνεν φθόνων ἐρωτηρεσι καὶ ἀποκρίσεσι χρωμένων, ἐξελαμψε ὁρόησις περὶ ἐκαστον καὶ νοῦς, συντείνων οὐ μάλιστ' εἰς δυνάμιν ἀνθρωπίνην.

⁴ Plat. Epist. vii. 344, C-D.

dialogues (Phædon, Republic, Timæus, and others) dogmas advanced about the highest and most recondite topics of philosophy: but then they are all advanced under the name of Sokrates, Timæus, &c.—*Οὐκ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος*, &c. There never was any written programme issued by Plato himself, declaring the *Symbolum Fidei* to which he attached his own name.¹ Even in the *Leges*, the most dogmatical of all his works, the dramatic character and the borrowed voice are kept up. Probably at the time when Plato wrote his letter to the friends of the deceased Dion, from which I have just quoted—his aversion to written expositions was aggravated by the fact, that Dionysius II., or some friend in his name, had written and published a philosophical treatise of this sort, passing himself off as editor of a Platonic philosophy, or of improved doctrines of his own built thereupon, from oral communication with Plato.² We must remember that Plato himself (whether with full sincerity or not) had complimented Dionysius for his natural ability and aptitude in philosophical debate:³ so that the pretension of the latter to come forward as an expositor of Plato appears the less preposterous. On the other hand, such pretension was calculated to raise a belief that Dionysius had been among the most favoured and confidential companions of Plato: which belief Plato, writing as he was to the surviving friends of Dion the enemy of Dionysius, is most anxious to remove, while on the other hand he extols the dispositions and extenuates the faults of his friend Dion. It is to vindicate himself from misconception of his own past proceedings, as well as to exhort with regard to the future, that Plato transmits to Sicily his long seventh and eighth Epistles, wherein are embodied his objections against the usefulness of written exposition intended for readers generally.

¹ The Platonic dialogue was in this respect different from the Aristotelian dialogue. Aristotle, in his composed dialogues, introduced other speakers, but delivered the principal arguments in his own name. Cicero followed his example, in the *De Finibus* and elsewhere: "Quæ his temporibus scripsi, 'Aristotelis' morem habent: in quo sermo ita inducitur cæterorum, ut penes ipsum sit principatus". (Cic. ad Att. xiii. 19.)

Herakleides of Pontus (Cicero, *ibid.*), in his composed dialogues, introduced himself as a *κωφὸν πρόσωπον*. Plato does not even do thus much.

² We see this from *Epist.* vii. 341 B, 344 D, 345 A. Plato speaks of the impression as then prevalent (when he wrote) in the mind of Dionysius:—*πότερον Διονυσίους ἀκούσας μόνον ἀπ' αὐτῶς εἰδέναι τε οἰεῖται καὶ ἰσχυρῶς οἶδεν*, &c.

³ *Plat. Epist.* ii. 314 D.

These objections (which Plato had often insisted on,¹ and which are also, in part, urged by Sokrates in the Phædrus) have considerable force, if we look to the way in which Plato conceives them. In the first place, Plato conceives the exposition as not merely written but published : as being, therefore, presented to all minds, the large majority being ignorant, unprepared, and beset with that false persuasion of knowledge which Sokrates regarded as universal. In so far as it comes before these latter, nothing is gained, and something is lost ; for derision is brought upon the attempt to teach.² In the next place, there probably existed, at that time, no elementary work whatever for beginners in any science : the Elements of Geometry by Euclid were published more than a century after Plato's death, at Alexandria. Now, when Plato says that written expositions, then scarcely known, would be useless to the student—he compares them with the continued presence and conversation of a competent teacher ; whom he supposes not to rely upon direct exposition, but to talk much “about and about” the subject, addressing the pupil with a large variety of illustrative interrogations, adapting all that was said to his peculiar difficulties and rate of progress, and thus evoking the inherent cognitive force of the pupil's own mind. That any Elements of Geometry (to say nothing of more complicated inquiries) could be written and published, such that an *ἀγεωμέτρητος* might take up the work and learn geometry by means of it, without being misled by equivocal names, bad definitions, and diagrams exhibiting the definition as clothed with special accessories—this is a possibility which Plato contests, and which we cannot wonder at his contesting.³ The combination of a written treatise, with the oral

Impossibility of teaching by written exposition assumed by Plato ; the assumption intelligible in his day.

¹ Plato, Epist. vii. 342. λόγος ἀληθής, πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ' ἐμοῦ καὶ πρόσθεν ῥηθείς, &c.

² Plato (Epist. ii. 314 A) remarks this expressly : also in the Phædrus, 275 E, 276 A.

³ Ἀθρεῖ δὲ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμνηστῶν ἰσακούσῃ, is the language of the Platonic Sokrates as a speaker in the Theætétus (156 E).

⁴ Some just and pertinent remarks, bearing on this subject, are made by

Condorcet, in one of his Academic Éloges : “Les livres ne peuvent remplacer les leçons des maîtres habiles, lorsque les sciences n'ont pas encore fait assez de progrès, pour que les vérités, qui en forment l'ensemble, puissent être distribuées et rapprochées entre elles suivant un ordre systématique : lorsque la méthode d'en chercher de nouvelles n'a pas été réduite à des procédés exacts et simples, à des règles sûres et précises. Avant cette

exposition of a tutor, would have appeared to Plato not only useless but inconvenient, as restraining the full liberty of adaptive interrogation necessary to be exercised, different in the case of each different pupil.

Lastly, when we see by what standard Plato tests the efficacy of any expository process, we shall see yet more clearly how he came to consider written exposition unavailing. The standard which he applies is, that the learner shall be rendered able both to apply to others, and himself to endure from others, a Sokratic Elenchus or cross-examination as to the logical difficulties involved in all the steps and helps to learning. Unless he can put to others and follow up the detective questions—unless he can also answer them, when put to himself, pertinently and consistently, so as to avoid being brought to confusion or contradiction—Plato will not allow that he has attained true knowledge.¹ Now, if we try knowledge by a test so severe

Standard by which Plato tested the efficacy of the expository process—Power of sustaining a Sokratic cross-examination.

époque, il faut être déjà consommé dans une science pour lire avec utilité les ouvrages qui en traitent : et comme cette espèce d'enfance de l'art est le temps où les préjugés y règnent avec le plus d'empire, où les savants sont les plus exposés à donner leurs hypothèses pour de véritables principes, on risquerait encore de s'égarer si l'on se bornait aux leçons d'un seul maître, quand même on aurait choisi celui que la renommée place au premier rang ; car ce temps est aussi celui des réputations usurpées. Les voyages sont donc alors le seul moyen de s'instruire, comme ils l'étaient dans l'antiquité et avant la découverte de l'imprimerie." (Condorcet, *Eloge de M. Margraaf*, p. 349, *Œuvres Complètes*, Paris, 1804, *Eloges*, vol. II. Or Ed. Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1847, vol. II. pp. 598-9.)

¹ Plato, *Epist.* vii. 343 D. The difficulties which Plato had here in his eye, and which he required to be solved as conditions indispensable to real knowledge—are jumped over in geometrical and other scientific expositions, as belonging not to geometry, &c., but to logic. M. Jouffroy remarks, in the Preface to his translation of Reid's works (p. clxiv.) :—"Toute science particulière qui, au lieu de prendre pour accordées les données d'*priori* qu'elle implique, discute l'auto-

rité de ces données—ajoute à son objet propre celui de la logique, confond une autre mission avec la sienne, et par cela même compromet la sienne : car nous verrons tout à l'heure, et l'histoire de la philosophie montre, quelles difficultés présentent ces problèmes qui sont l'objet propre de la logique ; et nous demeurerons convaincus que, si les différentes sciences avaient eu la prétention de les éclaircir avant de passer outre, toutes peut-être en seraient encore à cette *préface*, et aucune n'aurait entamé sa véritable tâche."

Remarks of a similar bearing will be found in the second paragraph of Mr. John Stuart Mill's *Essay on Utilitarianism*. It has been found convenient to distinguish the logic of a science from the expository march of the same science. But Plato would not have acknowledged *ἐπιστήμη*, except as including both. Hence his view about the uselessness of written expository treatises.

Aristotle, in a remarkable passage of the *Metaphysica* (Γ. p. 1006, a. 20 seqq.) takes pains to distinguish the Logic of Mathematics from Mathematics themselves—as a separate province and matter of study. He claims the former as belonging to *Philosophia Prima* or Ontology. Those principles which mathematicians called *Axioms*

as this, we must admit that no reading of written expositions will enable the student to acquire it. The impression made is too superficial, and the mind is too passive during such a process, to be equal to the task of meeting new points of view, and combating difficulties not expressly noticed in the treatise which has been studied. The only way of permanently arming and strengthening the mind, is (according to Plato) by long-continued oral interchange and stimulus, multiplied comment and discussion from different points of view, and active exercise in dialectic debate: not aiming at victory over an opponent, but reasoning out each question in all its aspects, affirmative and negative. It is only after a long course of such training—the living word of the competent teacher, applied to the mind of the pupil, and stimulating its productive and self-defensive force—that any such knowledge can be realised as will suffice for the exigencies of the Socratic Elenchus.¹

Since we thus find that Plato was unconquerably averse to

were not peculiar to Mathematics (he says), but were affirmations respecting *Ens quatenus Ens*: the mathematician was entitled to assume them so far as concerned his own department, and his students must take them for granted: but if he attempted to explain or appreciate them in their full bearing, he overstepped his proper limits, through want of proper schooling in *Analytica* (*ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαδεικσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν*: *δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἔχειν προεπισταμένους, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν*—p. 1005, b. 2.) We see from the words of Aristotle that many mathematical enquirers of his time did not recognise (any more than Plato recognised) the distinction upon which he here insists: we see also that the term *Axioms* had become a technical one for the *principia* of mathematical demonstration (*περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθημασὶ καλουμένων αξιωμάτων*—p. 1005, a. 20): I do not concur in Sir William Hamilton's doubts on this point. (Disquisitions on Reid's Works, note A. p. 704.)

The distinction which Aristotle thus brings to notice, seemingly for the first time, is one of considerable importance.

¹ This is forcibly put by Plato,

Epistol. vii. 344 B. Compare Plato, *Republic*, vi. 499 A. *Phædrus*, 276 A-E. *τὸν τοῦ εἰδότος λόγον ζῶντα καὶ ἐμψυχον*, &c.

Though Plato, in the *Phædrus*, declares oral teaching to be the only effectual way of producing a permanent and deep-seated effect—as contrasted with the more superficial effect produced by reading a written exposition: yet even oral teaching, when addressed in the form of continuous lecture or sermon (*ἀνευ ἀνακρίσεως καὶ διδαγῆς*, *Phædrus*, 277 E; *τὸ νοουθητικὸν εἶδος*, *Sophistês*, p. 230), is represented elsewhere as of little effect. To produce any permanent result, you must diversify the point of view—you must test by circumlocutory interrogation—you must begin by dispelling established errors, &c. See the careful explanation of the passage in the *Phædrus* (277 E), given by Ueberweg, *Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift.* pp. 16-22. Direct teaching, in many of the Platonic dialogues, is not counted as capable of producing serious improvement.

When we come to the *Menon* and the *Phædon*, we shall hear more of the Platonic doctrine—that knowledge was to be evolved out of the mind, not poured into it from without.

Plato never published any of the lectures which he delivered at the Academy. publication in his own name and with his own responsibility attached to the writing, on grave matters of philosophy—we cannot be surprised that, among the numerous lectures which he must have delivered to his pupils and auditors in the Academy, none were ever published. Probably he may himself have destroyed them, as he exhorts Dionysius to destroy the Epistle which we now read as second, after reading it over frequently. And we may doubt whether he was not displeased with Aristotle and Hestæus¹ for taking extracts from his lectures *De Bono*, and making them known to the public: just as he was displeased with Dionysius for having published a work purporting to be derived from conversations with Plato.

That Plato would never consent to write for the public in his own name, must be taken as a fact in his character; probably arising from early caution produced by the fate of Sokrates, combined with preference for the Socratic mode of handling. But to what extent he really kept back his opinions from the public, or whether he kept them back at all, by design—I do not undertake to say. The borrowed names under which he wrote, and the veil of dramatic fiction, gave him greater freedom as to the thoughts enunciated, and were adopted for the express purpose of acquiring greater freedom. How far the lectures which he delivered to his own special auditory differed from the opinions made known in his dialogues to the general reader, or how far his conversation with a few advanced pupils differed from both—are questions which we have no sufficient means of answering. There probably was a considerable difference. Aristotle alludes to various doctrines of Plato which we cannot find in the Platonic writings: but these doctrines are not such as could have given peculiar offence, if published; they are, rather abstruse and hard to understand. It may also be true (as Tennemann says) that Plato had two distinct modes of handling philo-

¹ Themistius mentions it as a fact recorded (I wish he had told us where or by whom) that Aristotle stoutly opposed the Platonic doctrine of Objective Ideas, even during the lifetime of

Plato. *ιστορεῖται δὲ ὅτι καὶ ζῶντος τοῦ Πλάτωνος κατεργώματα περὶ τοῦτου τοῦ δόγματος ἐνίστην ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ Πλάτῳ.* (Scholia ad Aristotel. *Analyt. Poster.* p. 228 b. 16 Brandis.)

sophy—a popular and a scientific : but it cannot be true (as the same learned author¹ asserts) that his published dialogues contained the popular and not the scientific. No one surely can regard the *Timæus*, *Parmenidês*, *Philêbus*, *Theætétus*, *Sophistês*, *Politikus*, &c., as works in which dark or difficult questions are kept out of sight for the purpose of attracting the ordinary reader. Among the dialogues themselves (as I have before remarked) there exist the widest differences ; some highly popular and attractive, others altogether the reverse, and many gradations between the two. Though I do not doubt therefore that Plato produced powerful effect both as lecturer to a special audience, and as talker with chosen students—yet in what respect such lectures and conversation differed from what we read in his dialogues, I do not feel that we have any means of knowing.

In judging of Plato, we must confine ourselves to the evidence furnished by one or more of the existing Platonic compositions, adding the testimony of Aristotle and a few others respecting Platonic views not declared in the dialogues. Though little can be predicated respecting the dialogues collectively, I shall say something about the various groups into which they admit of being thrown, before I touch upon them separately and *seriatim*.

Groups into which the dialogues admit of being thrown.

The scheme proposed by Thrasyllus, so far as intended to furnish a symmetrical arrangement of all the Platonic works, is defective, partly because the apportionment of the separate works between the two leading classes is in several cases erroneous—partly because the discrimination of the two leading classes, as well as the sub-division of one of the two, is founded on diversity of Method, while the sub-division of the other class is founded on diversity of Subject. But the scheme is nevertheless useful, as directing our attention to real and im-

Distribution made by Thrasyllus defective, but still useful—Dialogues of Search, Dialogues of Exposition.

¹ See Tennemann, *Gesch. d. Phil.* vol. ii. p. 206, 215, 221 seq. This portion of Tennemann's History is valuable, as it takes due account of the seventh Platonic Epistle, compared with the remarkable passage in the *Phædrus* about the inefficacy of written exposition for the purpose of teaching.

But I cannot think that Tennemann rightly interprets the *Epistol. vii.* I

see no proof that Plato had any secret or esoteric philosophy, reserved for a few chosen pupils, and not proclaimed to the public from apprehension of giving offence to established creeds : though I believe such apprehension to have operated as one motive, deterring him from publishing any philosophical exposition under his own name—any *Πλάτωνος σύγγραμμα*.

portant attributes belonging in common to considerable groups of dialogues. It is in this respect preferable to the fanciful dramatic partnership of trilogies and tetralogies, as well as to the mystical interpretation and arrangement suggested by the Neo-platonists. The Dialogues of Exposition—in which one who knows (or professes to know) some truth, announces and develops it to those who do not know it—are contrasted with those of Search or Investigation, in which the element of knowledge and affirmative communication is wanting. All the interlocutors are at once ignorant and eager to know; all of them are jointly engaged in searching for the unknown, though one among them stands prominent both in suggesting where to look and in testing all that is found, whether it be really the thing looked for. Among the expository dialogues, the most marked specimens are *Timæus* and *Epinomis*, in neither of which is there any searching or testing debate at all. *Republic*, *Phædon*, *Philébus*, exhibit exposition preceded or accompanied by a search. Of the dialogues of pure investigation, the most elaborate specimen is the *Theætétus*: *Menon*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Lysis*, *Euthyphron*, &c., are of the like description, yet less worked out. There are also several others. In the *Menon*, indeed,¹ Sokrates goes so far as to deny that there can be any real teaching, and to contend that what appears teaching is only resuscitation of buried or forgotten knowledge.

Of these two classes of Dialogues, the Expository are those which exhibit the distinct attribute—an affirmative result or doctrine, announced and developed by a person professing to know, and proved in a manner more or less satisfactory. The other class—the Searching or Investigative—have little else in common except the absence of this property. We find in them debate, refutation, several points of view canvassed and some shown to be untenable; but there is no affirmative result established, or even announced as established, at the close. Often there is even a confession of disappointment. In other respects, the dialogues of this class are greatly diversified among one another: they have only the one

Dialogues of
Exposition
—present
affirmative
result.
Dialogues
of Search
are wanting
in that at-
tribute.

¹ Plato, *Menon*, p. 81-82.

common attribute—much debate, with absence of affirmative result.

Now the distribution made by Thrasyllus of the dialogues under two general heads (1. Dialogues of Search or Investigation. 2. Dialogues of Exposition) coincides, to a considerable extent, with the two distinct intellectual methods recognised by Aristotle as Dialectic and Demonstrative : Dialectic being handled by Aristotle in the *Topica*, and Demonstration in the *Posterior Analytica*. "Dialectic" (says Aristotle) "is tentative, respecting those matters of which philosophy aims at cognizance." Accordingly, Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) embraces all matters without exception, but in a tentative and searching way, recognising arguments *pro* as well as *con*, and bringing to view the antithesis between the two, without any preliminary assumption or predetermined direction, the questioner being bound to proceed only on the answers given by the respondent : while philosophy comes afterwards, dividing this large field into appropriate compartments, laying down authoritative *principia* in regard to each, and deducing from them, by logical process, various positive results.¹ Plato does not use the term Dialectic exactly in the same sense as Aristotle. He implies by it two things :—1. That the process shall be colloquial, two or more minds engaged in a joint research, each of them animating and stimulating the others. 2. That the matter investigated shall be general—some general question or proposition : that the premisses shall all be general truths, and that the objects kept before the mind shall be Forms or Species, apart from particulars.² Here it stands in

The distribution coincides mainly with that of Aristotle—Dialectic, Demonstrative.

¹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* Γ. 1004, b. 25. ἵσται δὲ ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ, περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστικὴ. Compare also *Rhet.* I. 2, p. 1356, a. 33, I. 4, p. 1359, b. 12, where he treats Dialectic (as well as Rhetoric) not as methods of acquiring instruction on any definite matter, but as inventive and argumentative aptitudes—powers of providing premisses and arguments—*δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσασθαι λόγους*. If (he says) you try to convert Dialectic from a method of discussion into a method of cognition, you will insensibly eliminate its true nature and character :—ὅσῳ δ' ἂν τις ἡ τὴν δια-

λεκτικὴν ἢ ταύτην, μὴ καθάπερ ἂν δυνάμεις ἀλλ' ἐπιστήμης πειράται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας, τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων εἰς ἐπιστήμης ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον λόγων.

The Platonic Dialogues of Search are *δυνάμεις τοῦ πορίσασθαι λόγους*. Compare the *Proemium* of Cicero to his *Paradoxa*.

² Plato, *Republ.* vi. 511, vii. 532. Respecting the difference between Plato and Aristotle about Dialectic, see Ravaisson—*Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*—iii. 1, 2, p. 248.

contrast with Rhetoric, which aims at the determination of some particular case or debated course of conduct, judicial or political, and which is intended to end in some immediate practical verdict or vote. Dialectic, in Plato's sense, comprises the whole process of philosophy. His Dialogues of Search correspond to Aristotle's Dialectic, being machinery for generating arguments and for ensuring that every argument shall be subjected to the interrogation of an opponent: his Dialogues of Exposition, wherein some definite result is enunciated and proved (sufficiently or not), correspond to what Aristotle calls Demonstration.

If now we take the main scheme of distributing the Platonic Dialogues, proposed by Thrasyllus—1. Dialogues of Exposition, with an affirmative result; 2. Dialogues of Investigation or Search, without an affirmative result—and if we compare the number of Dialogues (out of the thirty-six in all), which he specifies as belonging to each—we shall find twenty-two specified under the former head, and fourteen under the latter. Moreover, among the twenty-two are ranked *Republic* and *Leges*: each of them greatly exceeding in bulk any other composition of Plato. It would appear thus that there is a preponderance both in number and bulk on the side of the Expository. But when we analyse the lists of Thrasyllus, we see that he has unduly enlarged that side of the account, and unduly contracted the other. He has enrolled among the Expository—1. The *Apology*, the *Epistolæ*, and the *Menexenus*, which ought not properly to be ranked under either head. 2. The *Theætétus*, *Parmenidês*, *Hipparchus*, *Erastæ*, *Minos*, *Kleitophon*—every one of which ought to be transferred to the other head. 3. The *Phædrus*, *Symposium*, and *Kratylus*, which are admissible by indulgence, since they do indeed present affirmative exposition, but in small proportion compared to the negative criticism, the rhetorical and poetical ornament: they belong in fact to both classes, but more preponderantly to one. 4. The *Republic*. This he includes with perfect justice, for the eight last books of it are expository. Yet the first book exhibits to us a specimen of negative and refutative dialectic which is not surpassed by anything in Plato.

On the other hand, Thrasyllus has placed among the Dialogues

**Classifi-
cation of
Thrasyllus
in its
details. He
applies his
own prin-
ciples erro-
neously.**

of Search one which might, with equal or greater propriety, be ranked among the Expository—the Protagoras. It is true that this dialogue involves much of negation, refutation, and dramatic ornament: and that the question propounded in the beginning (Whether virtue be teachable?) is not terminated. But there are two portions of the dialogue which are, both of them, decided specimens of affirmative exposition—the speech of Protagoras in the earlier part (wherein the growth of virtue, without special teaching or professional masters, is elucidated)—and the argument of Sokrates at the close, wherein the identity of the Good and the Pleasurable is established.¹

If then we rectify the lists of Thrasyllus, they will stand as follows, with the Expository Dialogues much diminished in number:—

The classification, as it would stand, if his principles were applied correctly.

Dialogues of Investigation or Search.

Ζητητικοί.

1. Theætétus.
2. Parmenidés.
3. Alkibiadés I.
4. Alkibiadés II.
5. Theagés.
6. Lachés.
7. Lysis.
8. Charmidés.
9. Menon.
10. Ion.
11. Euthyphron.
12. Euthydémus.
13. Gorgias.
14. Hippias I.
15. Hippias II.
16. Kleitophon.
17. Hipparchus.
18. Erastæ.
19. Minos.

Dialogues of Exposition.

Ὑποθητικοί.

1. Timæus.
2. Leges.
3. Epinomia.
4. Kritias.
5. Republic.
6. Sophistês.
7. Politikus.
8. Phædon.
9. Philêbus.
10. Protagoras.
11. Phædrus.
12. Symposion.
13. Kratylus.
14. Kriton.

The Apology, Menexenus, Epistolæ, do not properly belong to either head.

¹ We may remark that Thrasyllus, though he enrols the Protagoras under the class Investigative, and the sub-class Agonistic, places it alone in a still lower class which he calls Ἐνδεικτικός. Now, if we turn to the Pla-

tonic dialogue Euthydémus, p. 278 D, we shall see that Plato uses the words ἐνδεικτικός and ὑποθητικός as exact equivalents: so that ἐνδεικτικός would have the same meaning as ὑποθη-

It will thus appear, from a fair estimate and comparison of lists, that the relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a searcher, tester, and impugner, than that of an expositor and dogmatist—though he undertakes both the two functions: more negative than affirmative—more ingenious in pointing out difficulties, than successful in solving them. I must again repeat that though this classification is just, as far as it goes, and the best which can be applied to the dialogues, taken as a whole—yet the dialogues have much which will not enter into the classification, and each has its own peculiarities.

Preponderance of the searching and testing dialogues over the expository and dogmatical.

The Dialogues of Search, thus comprising more than half of the Platonic compositions, are again distributed by Thrasyllus into two sub-classes—Gymnastic and Agonistic: the Gymnastic, again, into Obstetric and Peirastic; the Agonistic, into Probative and Refutative. Here, again, there is a pretence of symmetrical arrangement, which will not hold good if we examine it closely. Nevertheless, the epithets point to real attributes of various dialogues, and deserve the more attention, inasmuch as they imply a view of philosophy foreign to the prevalent way of looking at it. Obstetric and Tentative or Testing (Peirastic) are epithets which a reader may understand; but he will not easily see how they bear upon the process of philosophy.

Dialogues of Search—sub-classes among them recognised by Thrasyllus—Gymnastic and Agonistic, &c.

The term *philosopher* is generally understood to mean something else. In appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, What authoritative creed has he proclaimed, for disciples to swear allegiance to? What positive system, or positive truths previously unknown or unproved, has he established? Next, by what arguments has he enforced or made them good? This is the ordinary proceeding of an historian of philosophy, as he calls up the roll of successive names. The philosopher is assumed to speak as one having authority; to have already made up his mind; and to be prepared to explain what his mind is. Readers require positive results announced, and positive evidence set before them, in a clear and straightforward manner. They are intolerant of all that is prolix, circuitous, not essential to the

Philosophy, as now understood, includes authoritative teaching, positive results, direct proofs.

proof of the thesis in hand. Above all, an affirmative result is indispensable.

When I come to the *Timæus*, and *Republic*, &c., I shall consider what reply Plato could make to these questions. In the meantime, I may observe that if philosophers are to be estimated by such a scale, he will not stand high on the list. Even in his expository dialogues, he cares little about clear proclamation of results, and still less about the shortest, straightest, and most certain road for attaining them.

But as to those numerous dialogues which are not expository, Plato could make no reply to the questions at all. There are no affirmative results:—and there is a process of enquiry, not only fruitless, but devious, circuitous, and intentionally protracted. The authoritative character of a philosopher is disclaimed. Not only Plato never delivers sentence in his own name, but his principal spokesman, far from speaking with authority, declares that he has not made up his own mind, and that he is only a searcher along with others, more eager in the chase than they are.¹ Philosophy is conceived as the search for truth still unknown; not as an explanation of truth by one who knows it, to others who do not know it. The process of search is considered as being in itself profitable and invigorating, even though what is sought be not found. The ingenuity of Sokrates is shown, not by what he himself produces, for he avows himself altogether barren—but by his obstetric aid: that is, by his being able to evolve, from a youthful mind, answers of which it is pregnant, and to test the soundness and trustworthiness of those answers when delivered: by his power, besides, of exposing or refuting unsound answers, and of convincing others of the fallacy of that which they confidently believed themselves to know.

To eliminate affirmative, authoritative exposition, which proceeds upon the assumption that truth is already known—and to consider philosophy as a search for unknown truth, carried on by several interlocutors all of them

The Platonic Dialogues of Search disclaim authority and teaching—assume truth to be unknown to all alike—follow a process devious as well as fruitless.

The questioner has no predetermined

¹ In addition to the declarations of Sokrates to this effect in the Platonic *Apology* (pp. 21-23), we read the like in many Platonic dialogues. *Gorgias*, 506 A. οὐδὲ γὰρ τοι εἶρω εἰδῶς λέγω ἃ λέγω, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ' ὑμῶν (see Routh's note); and even in the *Republic*, in many parts of which there is much

course, but follows the lead given by the respondent in his answers. ignorant—this is the main idea which Plato inherited from Sokrates, and worked out in more than one-half of his dialogues. It is under this general head that the subdivisions of Thrasyllus fall—the Ob-
stetric, the Testing or Verifying, the Refutative. The process is one in which both the two concurrent minds are active, but each with an inherent activity peculiar to itself. The questioner does not follow a predetermined course of his own, but proceeds altogether on the answer given to him. He himself furnishes only an indispensable stimulus to the parturition of something with which the respondent is already pregnant, and applies testing questions to that which he hears, until the respondent is himself satisfied that the answer will not hold. Throughout all this, there is a constant appeal to the free, self-determining judgment of the respondent's own mind, combined with a stimulus exciting the intellectual productiveness of that mind to the uttermost.

What chiefly deserves attention here, as a peculiar phase in the history of philosophy, is, that the relation of teacher and learner is altogether suppressed. Sokrates not only himself disclaims the province and title of a teacher, but treats with contemptuous banter those who assume it. Now "the learner" (to use a memorable phrase of Aristotle¹) "is under obligation to believe": he must be a passive recipient of that which is communicated to him by the teacher. The relation between the two is that of authority on the one side, and of belief generated by authority on the other. But Sokrates requires from no man implicit trust: nay he deprecates it as dangerous.² It is one peculiarity in these Sokratic dialogues, that the sentiment of authority, instead of being invoked and worked up, as is generally done in philosophy, is formally disavowed and practically set aside. "I have not made up my mind: I am not prepared to swear allegiance to any creed: I give you the reasons for and against each: you must decide for yourself."³

dogmatism and affirmation: v. p. 460 E. ix. p. 165, b. 2. *οὐ γὰρ πιστεύειν τὸν ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἅμα τοὺς μαθητὰν.*

ἀλόγους ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ ἔρω, &c.

¹ Aristot. De Sophist. Elenchis, Top.

² Plato, Protagor. p. 314 B.

³ The sentiment of the Academic

This process—the search for truth as an unknown—is in the modern world put out of sight. All discussion is conducted by persons who profess to have found it or learnt it, and to be in condition to proclaim it to others. Even the philosophical works of Cicero are usually pleadings by two antagonists, each of whom professes to know the truth, though Cicero does not decide between them: and in this respect they differ from the groping and fumbling of the Platonic dialogues. Of course the search for truth must go on in modern times, as it did in ancient: but it goes on silently and without notice. The most satisfactory theories have been preceded by many infructuous guesses and tentatives. The theorist may try many different hypotheses (we are told that Kepler tried nineteen) which he is forced successively to reject; and he may perhaps end without finding any better. But all these tentatives, verifying tests, doubts, and rejections, are confined to his own bosom or his own study. He looks back upon them without interest, sometimes even with disgust; least of all does he seek to describe them in detail as objects of interest to others. They are probably known to none but himself: for it

In the modern world the search for truth is put out of sight. Every writer or talker professes to have already found it, and to proclaim it to others.

sect—descending from Sokrates and Plato, not through Xenokrates and Polemon, but through Arkesilaus and Karneades—illustrates the same elimination of the idea of authority. "Why are you so curious to know what *I myself* have determined on the point? Here are the reasons *pro* and *con*: weigh the one against the other, and then judge for yourself."

See Sir William Hamilton's *Discussions on Philosophy*—Appendix, p. 681—about mediæval disputations: also Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* iv. 4-7. "Sed defendat quod quisque sentit: sunt enim iudicia libera: nos institutum tenebimus, nulliusque unius discipline legibus adstricti, quibus in philosophia necessario pareamus, quid sit in quaque re maxime probabile, semper requiremus."

Again, Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* i. 5, 10-13. "Qui autem requirunt, quid quæque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est. Non enim tam auctoritatis in disputando quam

rationis momenta querenda sunt. Quin etiam obest plurimque his, qui discere volunt, auctoritas eorum qui se docere profitentur; desinunt enim sum iudicium adhibere; id habent ratum, quod ab eo quem probant iudicatum vident. . . . Si singulas disciplinas percipere magnum est, quanto majus omnes? Quod facere his necesse est, quibus propositum est, veri reperiendi causa, et contra omnes philosophos et pro omnibus dicere. . . . Nec tamen fieri potest, ut qui hac ratione philosophentur, si nihil habeant quod sequantur. . . . Non enim sumus si quibus nihil verum esse videatur, sed si, qui omnibus veris falsa quedam adjuncta esse dicamus, tantâ similitudine ut in his nulla insit certa iudicandi et assentiendi nota. Ex quo existit illud, multa esse probabilia, quæ quanquam non perciperentur, tamen quia visum haberent quandam insignem et illustrem, his sapientia vita regeatur."

Compare Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* ii. sect. 2-3-5-9. Quintilian, xii. 2-25.

does not occur to him to follow the Platonic scheme of taking another mind into partnership, and entering upon that distribution of active intellectual work which we read in the *Theæstetus*. There are cases in which two chemists have carried on joint researches, under many failures and disappointments, perhaps at last without success. If a record were preserved of their parley during the investigation, the grounds for testing and rejecting one conjecture, and for selecting what should be tried after it—this would be in many points a parallel to the Platonic process.

But at Athens in the fourth century, B.C., the search for truth by two or more minds in partnership was not so rare a phenomenon. The active intellects of Athens were distributed between Rhetoric, which addressed itself to multitudes, accepted all established sentiments, and handled for the most part particular issues—and Dialectic, in which a select few debated among themselves general questions.¹ Of this Dialectic, the real Sokrates was the greatest master that Athens ever saw: he could deal as he chose (says Xenophon²) with all disputants: he turned them round his finger. In this process, one person set up a thesis, and the other cross-examined him upon it: the most irresistible of all cross-examiners was the real Sokrates. The nine books of Aristotle's *Topica* (including the book *De Sophisticis Elenchis*) are composed with the object of furnishing suggestions, and indicating rules, both to the cross-examiner and to the respondent, in such Dialectic debates. Plato does not lay down any rules: but he has given us, in his dialogues of search, specimens of dialectic procedure shaped in his own fashion. Several of his contemporaries, companions of

¹ The habit of supposing a general question to be undecided, and of having it argued by competent advocates before auditors who have not made up their minds—is now so disused (everywhere except in a court of law), that one reads with surprise Galen's declaration that the different competing medical theories were so discussed in his day. His master Pelops maintained a disputation of two days with a rival;—*ἡνικά Πέλοψ μετὰ Φιλίππου τοῦ ἔμπει-*

ρικοῦ διελέχθη δυοῖν ἡμερῶν· τοῦ μὲν Πέλοπος, ὡς μὴ δυναμένης τῆς ἰατρικῆς δι' ἐμπειρίας μόνης συστήναι, τοῦ Φιλίππου δὲ ἐπιδεικνύοντος δύνασθαι. (Galen, *De Propriis Libris*, c. 2, p. 16, Kühn.)

Galen notes (*ib.* 2, p. 21) the habit of literary men at Rome to assemble in the temple of Pax, for the purpose of discussing logical questions, prior to the conflagration which destroyed that temple.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* l. 2.

Sokrates, like him, did the same each in his own way : but their compositions have not survived.¹

Such compositions give something like fair play to the negative arm of philosophy ; in the employment of which the Eleate Zeno first became celebrated, and the real Sokrates yet more celebrated. This negative arm is no less essential than the affirmative, to the validity of a body of reasoned truth, such as philosophy aspires to be. To know how to disprove is quite as important as to know how to prove : the one is co-ordinate and complementary to the other. And the man who disproves what is false, or guards mankind against assenting to it,² renders a service to philosophy, even though he may not be able to render the ulterior service of proving any truth in its place.

By historians of ancient philosophy, negative procedure is generally considered as represented by the Sophists and the Megarici, and is the main ground for those harsh epithets which are commonly applied to both of them. The negative (they think) can only be tolerated in small doses, and even then merely as ancillary to the affirmative. That is, if you have an affirmative theory to propose, you are allowed to urge such objections as you think applicable against rival theories, but only in order to make room for your own. It seems to be assumed as requiring no proof that the confession of ignorance is an intolerable condition ; which every man ought to be ashamed of in himself, and which no man is justified in

Negative procedure supposed to be represented by the Sophists and the Megarici discouraged and censured by historians of philosophy.

¹ The dialogues composed by Aristotle himself were in great measure dialogues of search, exercises of argumentation *pro* and *con* (Cicero, *De Finib.* v. 4). "Aristoteles, ut solet, querendi gratia, quædam subtilitatis sue argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo," &c. (Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* ii. 17.)

Bernays indicates the probable titles of many among the lost Aristotelian Dialogues (*Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, pp. 132, 133, Berlin, 1863), and gives in his book many general remarks upon them.

The observations of Aristotle in the *Metaphys.* (A. *ἐλάττω* 993, b. 1-16) are conceived in a large and just spirit. He says that among all the searchers for truth, none completely succeed, and none completely fail : those, from whose

conclusions we dissent, do us service by exercising our intelligence—*τίς γὰρ ἴδιον προήσκησεν ἡμῶν*. The enumeration of *ἀρεταί* in the following book B of the *Metaphysica* is a continuation of the same views. Compare Scholia, p. 604, b. 29, Brand's.

² The Stoics had full conviction of this. In Cicero's summary of the Stoic doctrine (*De Finibus*, iii. 21, 72) we read :—"Ad easque virtutes, de quibus disputatum est, Dialecticam etiam adiungunt (Stoici) et Physicam : easque ambas virtutum nomine appellant : alteram (*sc.* Dialecticam), quod habet rationem, ne cui falso adsentiamur, neve unquam captiosâ probabilitate fallamur ; eaque, quæ de bonis et malis didicerimus, ut tenere tuerique possimus."

inflicting on any one else. If you deprive the reader of one affirmative solution, you are required to furnish him with another which you are prepared to guarantee as the true one. "Le Roi est mort—Vive le Roi": the throne must never be vacant. It is plain that under such a restricted application, the full force of the negative case is never brought out. The pleadings are left in the hands of counsel, each of whom takes up only such fragments of the negative case as suit the interests of his client, and suppresses or slurs over all such other fragments of it as make against his client. But to every theory (especially on the topics discussed by Sokrates and Plato) there are more or less of objections applicable—even the best theory being true only on the balance. And if the purpose be to ensure a complete body of reasoned truth, all these objections ought to be faithfully exhibited, by one who stands forward as their express advocate, without being previously retained for any separate or inconsistent purpose.

How much Plato himself, in his dialogues of search, felt his own vocation as champion of the negative procedure, we see marked conspicuously in the dialogue called *Parmenidês*. This dialogue is throughout a protest against forward affirmation, and an assertion of independent *locus standi* for the negationist and objector. The claims of the latter must first be satisfied, before the affirmant can be considered as solvent. The advocacy of those claims is here confided to the veteran *Parmenides*, who sums them up in a formidable total: Sokrates being opposed to him under the unusual disguise of a youthful and forward affirmant. *Parmenides* makes no pretence of advancing any rival doctrine. The theories which he selects for criticism are the Platonic theory of intelligible Concepts, and his own theory of the *Unum*: he indicates how many objections must be removed—how many contradictions must be solved—how many opposite hypotheses must be followed out to their results—before either of these theories can be affirmed with assurance. The exigencies enumerated may and do appear insurmountable:¹ but of that Plato takes no account. Such laborious

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 136 B. δεῖ χανον, ἐφ' ἣ, λέγεις, ὃ *Parmenidês*, πραγμασκεῖν—εἰ μέλλεις τελῶς γυμνασά-ματιαν, &c. Aristotle declares that no man can
μενος κυρίως διόψεσθαι τὸ ἀληθές. Ἀμή.

exercises are inseparable from the process of searching for truth, and unless a man has strength to go through them, no truth, or at least no reasoned truth, can be found and maintained.¹

It will thus appear that among the conditions requisite for philosophy, both Sokrates and Plato regarded the negative procedure as co-ordinate in value with the affirmative, and indispensable as a preliminary stage. But Sokrates went a step farther. He assigned to the negative an intrinsic importance by itself, apart from all implication with the affirmative; and he rested that opinion upon a psychological ground, formally avowed, and far larger than anything laid down by the Sophists. He thought that the natural state of the human mind, among established communities, was not simply ignorance, but ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge—false or uncertified

Sokrates considered the negative procedure to be valuable by itself, and separately. His theory of the natural state of the human mind; not ignorance, but false persuasion of knowledge.

be properly master of any affirmative truth without having examined and solved all the objections and difficulties—the negative portion of the enquiry. To go through all these *ἀπορίαι* is the indispensable first stage, and perhaps the enquirer may not be able to advance farther, see *Metaphysic. B. 995, a. 26, 996, a. 16*—one of the most striking passages in his works. Compare also what he says, *De Caelo, II. 294, b. 10, διὰ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα καλῶς ζητήσκειν ἐπιστατικὸν εἶναι διὰ τῶν οἰκείων ἐπιστάσεων τῷ γίγναι, τούτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκ τοῦ πάσας τεθεωρημέναι τὰς διαφορὰς.*

¹ That the only road to trustworthy affirmation lies through a string of negations, unfolded and appreciated by systematic procedure, is strongly insisted on by Bacon, *Novum Organum, II. 15, "Omnino Deo (formarum inditori et opifici), aut fortasse angelis et intelligentiis competit formas per affirmationem immediate nosse, atque ab initio contemplationis. Sed certe supra hominem est: cui tantum conceditur, procedere primo per negativas, et postremo loco desinere in affirmativas, post omnimodam exclusionem."* Compare another Aphorism, i. 46.

The following passage, transcribed from the Lectures of a distinguished physical philosopher of the present day, is conceived in the spirit of the Platonic Dialogues of Search, though

Plato would have been astonished at such patient multiplication of experiments:—

"I should hardly sustain your interest in stating the difficulties which at first beset the investigation conducted with this apparatus, or the numberless precautions which the exact balancing of the two powerful sources of heat, here resorted to, rendered necessary. I believe the experiments, made with atmospheric air alone, might be numbered by tens of thousands. Sometimes for a week, or even for a fortnight, coincident and satisfactory results would be obtained: the strict conditions of accurate experimenting would appear to be found, when an additional day's experience would destroy this hope and necessitate a recommencement, under changed conditions, of the whole inquiry. It is this which daunts the experimenter. It is this preliminary fight with the entanglements of a subject so dark, so doubtful, so uncheering, without any knowledge whether the conflict is to lead to anything worth possessing, that renders discovery difficult and rare. But the experimenter, and particularly the young experimenter, ought to know that as regards his own moral manhood, he cannot but win, if he only contend aright. *Even with a negative result, the consciousness that he has gone fairly to the bottom of his subject, as far*

belief—false persuasion of knowledge. The only way of dissipating such false persuasion was, the effective stimulus of the negative test, or cross-examining Elenchus; whereby a state of non-belief, or painful consciousness of ignorance, was substituted in its place. Such second state was indeed not the best attainable. It ought to be preliminary to a third, acquired by the struggles of the mind to escape from such painful consciousness; and to rise, under the continued stimulus of the tutelary Elenchus, to improved affirmative and defensible beliefs. But even if this third state were never reached, Sokrates declared the second state to be a material amendment on the first, which he deprecated as alike pernicious and disgraceful.

The psychological conviction here described stands proclaimed by Sokrates himself, with remarkable earnestness and emphasis, in his Apology before the Dikasts, only a month before his death. So deeply did he take to heart the prevalent false persuasion of knowledge, alike universal among all classes, mischievous, and difficult to correct—that he declared himself to have made war against it throughout his life, under a mission imposed upon him by the Delphian God; and to have incurred thereby wide-spread hatred among his fellow-citizens. To convict men, by cross-examination, of ignorance in respect to those matters which each man believed himself to know well and familiarly—this was the constant employment and the mission of Sokrates: not to teach—for he disclaimed the capacity of teaching—but to make men feel their own ignorance instead of believing themselves to know. Such cross-examination, conducted usually before an audience, however it might be salutary and indispensable, was intended to humiliate the respondent, and could hardly fail to offend and exasperate him. No one felt satisfaction except some youthful auditors, who admired the acuteness with which it was conducted. "I (declared Sokrates) am distinguished from others, and superior to others, by this character only—that I am conscious of my own

Declaration of Sokrates in the Apology; his constant mission to make war against the false persuasion of knowledge.

as his means allowed—the feeling that he has not shunned labour, though that labour may have resulted in laying bare the nakedness of his case—re-acts upon his own mind, and gives it firmness for future work." (Tyndall, Lectures on Heat, considered as a Mode of Motion, Lect. x. p. 332.)

ignorance: the wisest of men would be he who had the like consciousness; but as yet I have looked for such a man in vain."¹

In delivering this emphatic declaration, Sokrates himself intimates his apprehension that the Dikasts will treat his discourse as mockery; that they will not believe him to be in earnest; that they will scarcely have patience to hear him claim a divine mission for so strange a purpose.² The declaration is indeed singular, and probably many of the Dikasts did so regard it; while those who thought it serious, heard it with repugnance.

Opposition of feeling between Sokrates and the Dikasta.

The separate value of the negative procedure or Elenchus was never before so unequivocally asserted, or so highly estimated. To disabuse men of those false beliefs which they mistook for knowledge, and to force on them the painful consciousness that they knew nothing—was extolled as the greatest service which could be rendered to them, and as rescuing them from a degraded and slavish state of mind.³

To understand the full purpose of Plato's dialogues of search—testing, exercising, refuting, but not finding or providing—we must keep in mind the Sokratic Apology. Whoever, after reading the Theætétus, Lachés, Charmidés, Lysis, Parmenidés, &c., is tempted to exclaim—"But, after all, Plato *must* have had in his mind some ulterior doctrine of conviction which he wished to impress, but which he has not clearly intimated," will see, by the Sokratic Apology, that such a presumption is noway justifiable. Plato is a searcher, and has not yet made up his own mind: this is what he himself tells us, and what I literally believe, though few or none of his critics will admit it. His purpose in the dialogues of search,

The Dialogues of Search present an end in themselves. Mistake of supposing that Plato had in his mind an ulterior affirmative end, not declared.

¹ Plat. Apol. S. pp. 23-29. It is not easy to select particular passages for reference; for the sentiments which I have indicated pervade nearly the whole discourse.

² Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20-38.

³ Aristotle, in the first book of *Metaphysics* (982, b. 17), when repeating a statement made in the Theætétus of Plato (155 D), that wonder is the

beginning, or point of departure, of philosophy—explains the phrase by saying, that wonder is accompanied by a painful conviction of ignorance and sense of embarrassment. ὁ δὲ ἀνθρώπος καὶ θαυμάζειν οἷεται ἀγνοεῖν . . . διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἀγνοίαν ἐφιλοσώφισαν . . . οὐ χρήσεως τιπὸς ἐνεκεν. This painful conviction of ignorance is what Sokrates sought to bring about.

is plainly and sufficiently enunciated in the words addressed by Sokrates to Theætétus—"Answer without being daunted: for if we prosecute our search, one of two alternatives is certain—either we shall find what we are looking for, or we shall get clear of the persuasion that we know what in reality we do not yet know. Now a recompense like this will leave no room for dissatisfaction."¹

What those topics were, in respect to which Sokrates found

False persuasion of knowledge—had reference to topics social, political, ethical.

this universal belief of knowledge, without the reality of knowledge—we know, not merely from the dialogues of Plato, but also from the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. Sokrates did not touch upon recondite matters—upon the *Kosmos*, astronomy, meteorology. Such studies he discountenanced as useless, and even

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* 187 C. *ἴδω γὰρ οὕτω δράμεν, δοῖν θάτερον—ἢ εὐρησμεν ἐφ' ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἥττον οἰησόμεθα εἶδέναι δ' μηδαμῇ ἴσμεν· καίτοι οὐκ ἂν εἰς μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος.* Bonitz (in his *Platonische Studien*, pp. 8, 9, 74, 76, &c.) is one of the few critics who deprecate the confidence and boldness with which recent scholars have ascribed to Plato affirmative opinions and systematic purpose which he does not directly announce. Bonitz vindicates the separate value and separate *locus standi* of the negative process in Plato's estimation, particularly in the example of the *Theætétus*. Susemihl, in the preface to his second part, has controverted these views of Bonitz—in my judgment without any success.

The following observations of recent French scholars are just, though they imply too much the assumption that there is always some affirmative jewel wrapped up in Plato's complicated folds. M. Egger observes (*Histoire de la Critique chez les Grecs*, Paris, 1849, p. 84, ch. ii. sect. 4):

"La philosophie de Platon n'offre pas, en général, un ensemble de parties très rigoureusement liées entre elles. D'abord, il ne l'expose que sous forme dialoguée: et dans ses dialogues, où il ne prend jamais de rôle personnel, on ne voit pas clairement auquel des interlocuteurs il a confié la défense de ses propres opinions. Parmi ces interlocuteurs, Socrate lui-même, le plus naturel et le plus ordinaire inter-

prète de la pensée de son disciple, use fort souvent des libertés de cette forme toute dramatique, pour se jouer dans les distinctions subtiles, pour exagérer certains arguments, pour couper court à une discussion embarrassante, au moyen de quelque plaisanterie, et pour se retirer d'un débat sans conclure; en un mot, il a—ou, ce qui est plus vrai, Platon a, sous son nom—des opinions de circonstance et des ruses de dialectique, à travers lesquelles il est souvent difficile de retrouver le fond sérieux de sa doctrine. Heureusement ces difficultés ne touchent pas aux principes généraux du Platonisme. La critique Platonicienne en particulier dans ce qu'elle a de plus original, et de plus élevé, se rattache à la grande théorie des idées et de la *réminiscence*. On la retrouve exposée dans plusieurs dialogues avec une clarté qui ne permet ni le doute ni l'incertitude."

I may also cite the following remarks made by M. Vacherot (*Histoire Critique de l'Ecole d'Alexandrie*, vol. ii. p. 1, Pt. ii. Bk. ii. ch. i) after his instructive analysis of the doctrines of Plotinus. I think the words are as much applicable to Plato as to Plotinus: the rather, as Plato never speaks in his own name, Plotinus always:—"Combien faut-il prendre garde d'ajouter à la pensée du philosophe, et de lui prêter un arrangement artificiel! Ce génie, plein d'enthousiasme et de fougue, n'a jamais connu ni mesure ni plan: jamais il ne s'est astreint à développer régulièrement une théorie, ni à exposer avec

as irreligious.¹ The subjects on which he interrogated were those of common, familiar, every-day talk: those which every one believed himself to know, and on which every one had a confident opinion to give: the respondent being surprised that any one could put the questions, or that there could be any doubt requiring solution. What is justice? what is injustice? what are temperance and courage? what is law, lawlessness, democracy, aristocracy? what is the government of mankind, and the attributes which qualify any one for exercising such government? Here were matters upon which every one talked familiarly, and would have been ashamed to be thought incapable of delivering an opinion. Yet it was upon these matters that Sokrates detected universal ignorance, coupled with a firm, but illusory, persuasion of knowledge. The conversation of Sokrates with Euthydémus, in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*²—the first *Alkibiadês*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Euthyphron*, &c., of Plato—are among the most marked specimens of such cross-examination or *Elenchus*—a string of questions, to which there are responses in indefinite number successively given, tested, and exposed as unsatisfactory.

The answers which Sokrates elicited and exposed were simple

suite un ensemble de théories, de manière à en former un système. Fort incertain dans sa marche, il prend, quitte, et reprend le même sujet, sans jamais paraître avoir dit son dernier mot: toujours il répand de vives et abondantes clartés sur les questions qu'il traite, mais rarement il les conduit à leur dernière et définitive solution; sa rapide pensée n'effleure pas seulement le sujet sur lequel elle passe, elle le pénètre et le creuse toujours, sans toutefois l'épuiser. Fort inégal dans ses allures, tantôt ce génie s'échappe en inspirations rapides et tumultueuses, tantôt il semble se traîner péniblement, et se perdre dans une dédale de subtiles abstractions, &c."

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 1.

² Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2. A passage from Paley's preface to his "Principles of Moral Philosophy," illustrates well this Socratic process: "Concerning the principle of morals, it would be premature to speak: but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that principle, I have somewhat which

I wish to be remarked. An experience of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the Universities, and in that department of education to which these sections relate, afforded me frequent opportunity to observe, that in discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it required much more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than to understand the solution: that unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt, before any explanation was entered upon—in other words, unless some curiosity was excited, before it was attempted to be satisfied—the teacher's labour was lost. When information was not desired, it was seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in the following work: that is, I have endeavoured, before I suffered myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete possession of the question: and to do it in a way that I thought most likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it."

To those topics, on which each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and traditional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never formally proclaimed or taught, but is enforced unconsciously by every one upon every one else. Omnipotence of King Nomos.

expressions of the ordinary prevalent belief upon matters on which each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, fashions, points of view, &c., belonging to itself. When Herodotus passed over to Egypt, he was astonished to find the judgment, feelings, institutions, and practices of the Egyptians, contrasting most forcibly with those of all other countries. He remarks the same (though less in degree) respecting Babylonians, Indians, Scythians, and others; and he is not less impressed with the veneration of each community for its own creed and habits, coupled with indifference or antipathy towards other creeds, disparate or discordant, prevailing elsewhere.¹

This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical, religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false, probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly, decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obliga-

¹ Herodot. II. 35-36-64; III. 38-94, seq. I. 196; IV. 76-77-80. The discordance between the various institutions established among the separate aggregations of mankind, often proceeding to the pitch of reciprocal antipathy—the imperative character of each in its own region, assuming the appearance of natural right and propriety—all this appears brought to view by the inquisitive and observant Herodotus, as well as by others (Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* I. 3-18): but many new facts, illustrating the same thesis, were noticed by Aristotle and the Peripatetics, when a larger extent of the globe became opened to Hellenic survey. Compare Aristotle, *Ethic. Nik.* I. 3, 1094, b. 15; Sextus *Empiric. Pyrr.* *Hypotyp.* I. sect. 145-156, III. sect. 198-234; and the remarkable extract from Bardesanes Syrus, cited by Eusebius, *Præp. Evang.* VI., and published in Orelli's collection, pp. 202-219, *Alexandri Aphrodis. et Aliorum De Fato*, Zurich, 1824.

Many interesting passages in illustration of the same thesis might be borrowed from Montaigne, Pascal, and

others. But the most forcible of all illustrations are those furnished by the Oriental world, when surveyed or studied by intelligent Europeans, as it has been more fully during the last century. See especially Sir William Sleeman's *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official*: two volumes which unfold with equal penetration and fidelity the manifestations of established sentiment among the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Vol. I. ch. IV., describing a Sutte on the Nerbudda, is one of the most impressive chapters in the work: the rather as it describes the continuance of a hallowed custom, transmitted even from the days of Alexander. I transcribe also some valuable matter from an eminent living scholar, whose extensive erudition comprises Oriental as well as Hellenic philosophy.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (*Premier Mémoire sur le Sankhya*, Paris, 1862, pp. 392-396) observes as follows respecting the Sanscrit system of philosophy called *Sāṅkhya*, the doctrine expounded and enforced by the philosopher Kapila—and respecting Buddha

tory to avoid, respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society, respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation—this is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a part of each person's nature—a standing habit of mind, or fixed set of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is

and Buddhism which was built upon the Sankhya, amending or modifying it. Buddha is believed to have lived about 547 B.C. Both the system of Buddha, and that of Kapila, are atheistic, as described by M. St. Hilaire.

“Le second point où Bouddha se sépare de Kapila concerne la doctrine. L'homme ne peut rester dans l'incertitude que Kapila lui laisse encore. L'âme délivrée, selon les doctrines de Kapila, peut toujours renaître. Il n'y a qu'un moyen, un seul moyen, de le sauver, c'est de l'anéantir. Le néant seul est un sûr asile : on ne revient pas de celui là.—Bouddha lui promet le néant ; et c'est avec cette promesse inouïe qu'il a passionné les hommes et converti les peuples. Que cette monstrueuse croyance, partagée aujourd'hui par trois cents millions de sectateurs, révolte en nous les instincts les plus énergiques de notre nature—qu'elle soulève toutes les répugnances et toutes les horreurs de notre âme—qu'elle nous paraisse aussi incompréhensible que hideuse—peu importe. Une partie considérable de l'humanité l'a reçue,—prête même à la justifier par toutes les subtilités de la métaphysique la plus raffinée, et à la confesser dans les tortures des plus affreux supplices et les austérités homicides d'un fanatisme aveugle. Si c'est une gloire que de dominer souverainement, à travers les âges, la foi des hommes,—jamais fondateur de religion n'en eut une plus grande que le Bouddha : car aucun n'eut de prosélytes plus fidèles ni plus nombreux. Mais je me trompe : le Bouddha ne prétendait jamais fonder une religion. Il n'était que philosophe ; et instruit dans toutes les sciences des Brahmanes, il ne voulut

personnellement que fonder, à leur exemple, un nouveau système. Seulement, les moyens qu'il employait durent mener ses disciples plus loin qu'il ne comptait aller lui-même. En s'adressant à la foule, il faut bientôt la discipliner et la régler. De là, cette ordination religieuse que le Bouddha donnait à ses adeptes, la hiérarchie qu'il établissait entre eux, fondée uniquement, comme la science l'exigeait, sur le mérite divers des intelligences et des vertus—la douce et sainte morale qu'il prêchait,—le détachement de toutes choses en ce monde, si convenable à des ascètes qui ne pensent qu'au salut éternel—le vœu de pauvreté, qui est la première loi des Bouddhistes—et tout cet ensemble de dispositions qui constituent un gouvernement au lieu d'une école.

“Mais ce n'est là que l'extérieur du Bouddhisme : c'en est le développement matériel et nécessaire. Au fond, son principe est celui du Sankhya : seulement, il l'applique en grand.—C'est la science qui délivre l'homme : et le Bouddha ajoute—Pour que l'homme soit délivré à jamais, il faut qu'il arrive au Nirvana, c'est à dire, qu'il soit absolument anéanti. Le néant est donc le bout de la science : et le salut éternel, c'est l'anéantissement.”

The same line of argument is insisted on by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire in his other work—Bouddha et sa religion, Paris, 1862, ed. 2nd : especially in his Chapter on the Nirvana : wherein moreover he complains justly of the little notice which authors take of the established beliefs of those varieties of the human race which are found apart from Christian Europe.

interpreted and particular persons appreciated.¹ It is not set forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate, despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their hatred manifests itself in different ways at different times and occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by banishment or interdiction² from fire and water; at the very least, by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of authority and contagion—as they have adopted it themselves: as they have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates—"Sokrates commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs," &c.³ "Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All" (to borrow the phrase which Herodotus cites from Pindar⁴), exercises

¹ This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic, "ut est in omni historia curiosus," had collected striking examples of these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent elsewhere. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 45, 108.)

² See the description of the treatment of Aristodēmus, one of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person excommunicated,

that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i. 16, 9, 10.)

³ Xenophon. Memor. i. 1, l. 'Αδικεῖ Σωκράτης, οὐς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἑτέρα δὲ καὶνὰ δαίμόνια εἰσφέρειν, &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero (Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid καὶνὰ δαίμόνια, "separatim nemo habebat Deos," &c.

⁴ Νόμος πάντων βασιλεὺς (Herodot. iii. 38). It will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea really intended to be expressed by the word Νόμος is much larger than what is now commonly understood by Law. It is equivalent to that which Epik-

plenary power, spiritual as well as temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as well as the intellect according to the local type—determining the sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new matters tendered for belief, of every one—fashioning thought, speech, and points of view, no less than action—and reigning under the appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic variety. But even

tôtus calls τὸ δόγμα—πανταχοῦ ἀνέστη-
τον τὸ δόγμα (Epiktet. iii. 16). It in-
cludes what is meant by τὸ νόμιμον
(Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), τὰ νό-
μιμα, τὰ νομιζόμενα, τὰ πάτρια, τὰ νό-
μιμα, including both positive morality,
and social æsthetical precepts, as well
as civil or political, and even personal
habits, such as that of abstinence from
spitting or wiping the nose (Xenoph.
Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case which
Herodotus quotes to illustrate his gene-
ral thesis is the different treatment
which, among different nations, is con-
sidered dutiful and respectful towards
senior relatives and the corpses of de-
ceased relatives; which matters come
under τὰ γράμματα κἀσφαλὴ Θεῶν Νόμιμα
(Soph. Antig. 440)—of immemorial an-
tiquity;—

Οὐ γὰρ τι νῦν γε κἀχθεῖ ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ποτε
Ζῆ ταῦτα, κοῦδεῖς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη.

Nómos and ἐπιτήδευμα run together in
Plato's mind, dictating every hour's
proceeding of the citizen through life
(Leges, vii. 807-808-823).

We find Plato, in the Leges, which
represents the altered tone and com-
pressive orthodoxy of his old age, ex-
celling the simple goodness (εὐθεία)
of our early forefathers, who believed
implicitly all that was told them, and
were not clever enough to raise doubts,
ὥσπερ τανῦν (Legg. iii. 679, 680).
Plato dwells much upon the danger
of permitting any innovation on the
fixed modes of song and dance (Legg.
v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it
under heavy penalties. He says that
the lawgiver both can consecrate com-
mon talk, and ought to consecrate it
—καθιερώσαι τὴν φήμην (Legg. 838),
the dicta of Νόμος Βασιλεὺς.

Pascal describes, in forcible terms,
the wide-spread authority of Νόμος
Βασιλεὺς:—"Il ne faut pas se mécon-

naître, nous sommes automates autant
qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instru-
ment, par lequel la persuasion se fait,
n'est pas la seule démonstration. Com-
bien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées!
Les preuves ne convainquent que
l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves
les plus fortes et les plus crues: elle
incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit
sans qu'il y pense. Qui a démontré qu'il
sera demain jour, et que nous mour-
rons—et qu'y a-t-il de plus cru?
C'est donc la coutume qui nous en
persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de
Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait les Turcs
les Païens, les métiers, les soldats, &c.
Enfin, il faut avoir recours à elle quand
une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité,
afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre
de cette créance, qui nous échappe à
toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours
les preuves présentes, c'est trop d'affaire.
Il faut acquiescer une créance plus facile,
qui est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans
violence, sans art, sans argument, nous
fait croire les choses, et incline toutes
nos puissances à cette croyance, en
sorte que notre âme y tombe naturelle-
ment. Quand on ne croit que par la
force de la conviction, et que l'auto-
mate est incliné à croire le contraire,
ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, Pensées,
ch. xi. p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris,
1854.)

Herein Pascal coincides with Mon-
taigne, of whom he often speaks
harshly enough: "Comme de vray
nous n'avons autre mire de la vérité
et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée
des opinions et usances du pais où nous
sommes: là est tousiours la parfaite
religion, la parfaite police, parfait
et accompli usage de toutes choses."
(Essais de Montaigne, liv. i. ch. 30.)
Compare the same train of thought in
Descartes (Discours sur la Méthode,
pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).

where no such special officers exist, we find Plato himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)¹ the working of that spontaneous ever-present police by whom the authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail—a police not the less omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised title.

There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth these minds must have gone through

Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not yield to the esta-

¹ Plat. Protag. 320-328. The large sense of the word *Nómos*, as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés—il en résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister de ce peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux appellent la *torà*, la loi ou la constitution publique—en prenant ce mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador, *Histoire des Institutions de Moïse*, liv. I. ch. II. p. 95.)

Compare also about the sense of the word *Lex*, as conceived by the Arabs, M. Renan, *Averroès*, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (*Hist. of India*, ch. iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same style, and laid down with

the same authority, as the rules for the distribution of justice."

Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on *Ancient Law*, notes both the all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called *Law* in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary condition of the human race is the rule—the progressive condition the exception—a rare exception in the history of the world" (*Chap. I. pp. 16-18-19; chap. II. pp. 22-24.*)

Again, Mr. Maine observes:—"The other liability, to which the infancy of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising chiefly from its early association and identification with religion, has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity; and grafts from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. If intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from their literal tenor." (Maine, *Ancient Law*, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)

the ordinary influences,¹ but without the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special mission from the Gods—in one way or other the imperative character of the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated (*ἐξαλλαγῇ τῶν εἰωθότων νομίμων*),² and assertion of the right of self-judgment, on the part of a small

blished orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own judgment.

¹ Cicero, *Tusc. D.* iii. 2; Aristot. *Éthic. Nikom.* x. 10, 1179, b. 23. ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ διδασκὴ μὴ ποτ' οὐκ ἐν ἀπασιν ἰσχύει, ἀλλὰ δὲν προδιεργάσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς τὴν τοῦ ἀρεστού ψυχὴν πρὸς τὸ καλὸς χαίρειν καὶ μισεῖν, ὥστε γὰρ τὴν θείψουσιν τὸ σκόμμα. To the same purpose Plato, *Republ.* iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 663 B, 669 E, Plato and Aristotle (and even Xenophon, *Cyrop.* i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they saw around them—require to have the means of shaping the early sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to their own ultimate views. This is exactly what Νόμος Βασιλεὺς does effectively in existing societies, without need of special provision for the purpose. See Plato, *Protagor.* 325, 326.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, 265 A. See Sir Will. Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic*, Lect. 29, pp. 88-90. In the *Timæus* (p. 40 E) Plato interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. ἀδύνατον οὐδ' ὅταν πασις ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἄνεν τε εἰκότων καὶ ἀναγκαίων ἀποδείξαιον λόγους, ἀλλ' ὅς οἱ οἰκία φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν ἐπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστεύουσιν.

Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure for

philosophical theory:—"On one hand we are now called upon to find some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the political constitution, of any people, are in full force—so long as each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all—no one raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds his destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of his own mind. On the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and laws—he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise to the question—What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To what ought he to conform—what shall he aim at? An *ideal* is thus set up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise

minority of *ἰδιωγνόμοι*,¹ is the first condition of existence for philosophy or "reasoned truth".

Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied productive impulse—as well as amidst the Gnostic philosophers, the best of whom were also poets—there are not a few manifestations of such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives about the Gods and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras, &c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion. These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle²) had

Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or freethinkers in Greece.

Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character." (Hegel, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)

¹ This is an expression of the learned Huet, Bishop of Avranches:—"Si quelqu'un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes, puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni Eclectiques, ni d'aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que nous sommes nôtres—c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroît s'approcher plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par moquerie ou par flatterie, nous appelle *ἰδιωγνόμοι*—c'est à dire, attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet, *Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain*, liv. ii. ch. xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)

² Aristotle, *Metaphys.* A. 987, b. 32. Eusebius, having set forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform tradition from father to son, from the first generation of man—ἀπὸ πρώτης ἀρχαιοσύνης. (Præp. Ev. xiv. 3.)

Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled *Hortensius*—set forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to prove that it was not "*vera sapientia*," was, that it was both a human invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition a *principio*, therefore not natural to man. "*Quæ si secundum hominis naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est, nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?*" (Lactantius, *Inst. Divin.* iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (Philosophy *versus* Consecrated Tradition) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin seem to have used it largely.

The Hermotimus of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Socratic acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all speculative philosophy. The respondent Hermotimus happens to be a Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. Hermotimus is advised to

no concern with Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates.

Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law. Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive, impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented—the negative and the affirmative—became both prevalent and interesting.

Rise of Dialectic—
Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.

I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine,

Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social topics by Sokrates.

desist from philosophy, to renounce *καὶ ὁ σε παραπέμψαι ἐς τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου, τὰ κοινὰ ταῦτα φρονεῖντα*, c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations Lucian ranks geometry: the geometrical definitions (point and line) he declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).

life (*ἀξίω πράττειν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων*,

but by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently enunciated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were shown to be incapable of defending it, when tested by an acute cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "*Nemo adhuc tantæ mentis constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit, theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries.*"¹

Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment ("*ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus*") being thrown upon their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the *Apology*, Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual æstus in the belief (doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the *Gorgias*, the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do *not* agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, to agree with *me*."² The autonomy or inde-

Emphatic
assertion by
Sokrates of
the right of
satisfaction
for his own
individual
reason.

Bacon, *Nov. Org. Aph.* 97. I have already cited this passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp. 612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and misapprehensions of the "*intellectus sibi pernixus*". In that note, and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the same view of

the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 472 A. καὶ νῦν, περὶ ὧν σὺ λέγεις, ὀλίγον σοὶ πάντες συμφήσουσι ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ οἱ ξένοι, ἐὰν βούλῃ κατ' ἐμοῦ μάρτυρας παρασχίσθαι, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγω· μαρτυρήσουσί σοι, ἐὰν μὲν βούλῃ, Νικίας ὁ Νικηράτου καὶ οἱ ἀδελφοὶ μετ' αὐτοῦ—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, Ἀριστοκράτης ὁ Σκελλίου—ἐὰν δὲ βούλῃ, ἡ Περιμελῆους ὅλη οἰκία

pendence of individual reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates.

With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks proof) afterwards.¹ This mental tendency is farther confirmed by the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or reconcile those opinions.² They disapprove especially that

Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.

ἡ ἅλλα συγγένεια, φησὶν ἂν βούλη τῶν ἐνθαδε ἐκλεῖσθαι. 'Ἄλλ' ἐγὼ σοι εἶς ὢν οὐκ ὁμολογῶ· οὐ γὰρ με οὐδ' ἀναγκάζεις, &c.

¹ See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp. 505-538.]

² This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion—between the speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the established traditional convictions of the public—is nowhere more strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation. See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493.

The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality (especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of Sokrates) are received in a community—are

noticed by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39:—

"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation? Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above others, really arises in regard to all standards. It arises in fact whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated, is the only one which presents it-self to the mind with the feeling of being *in itself* obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe that this morality *derives* its obligation from

dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing worthy of being called *reasoned truth* can exist, without full and equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative.

These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the *Apology* of Sokrates,—nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than the *Platonic Parmenidês*: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato in his *Republic*. The charges which historians of philosophy urge against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the Sophists—such as corruption of youth—perversion of truth and morality, by making the worse appear the better reason—subversion of established beliefs—innovation as well as deception—all these were urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,¹ and

The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual with an orthodox public.

some general principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a more binding force than the original theorem: the superstructure seems to stand better without than with what is represented as its foundation.

The difficulty has no peculiar application to the doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse morality, and reduce it to principles: which, unless the principle is already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their sanctity."

Epiktétus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold on his conviction, which

the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. Διὰ τί οὖν ἐκείνοι (οἱ πολλοί, οἱ ἰδιῶται) ὑμῶν (τῶν φιλοσόφων) ἰσχυρότεροι; Ὅτι ἐκείνοι μὲν τὰ σαφῆ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλοῦσιν; ὑμεῖς δὲ τὰ κομψὰ ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν. . . . Οὕτως ὑμᾶς οἱ ἰδιῶται νικᾶσι. Πανταχοῦ γὰρ ἰσχυρὸν τὸ δόγμα· ἀνίστηται τὸ δόγμα. (Epiktétus, iii. 16.)

¹ Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have been aimed at all the philosophers successively—Sokrates, Plato, Aristotle, Theophrastus. Ὁ γὰρ σοφιστὴς καὶ ἀλαζὼν καὶ καινότομος πρῶτον μὲν Σωκράτους ἐνεῖδεν ἦν, ἔπειτα Πλάτωνος ἐφεξῆς, εἰθ' ὕστερον Ἀριστοτέλους

indeed against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we learn

καὶ Θεοφράστου. (Orat. xxiii. p. 346. Dindorf.)

We read in Zeller's account of the Platonic philosophy (Phil. der Griechen. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd):

"Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden. Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Bräut und Festes gegolten hatten, dialektisch zerlegt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das negative Resultat der Sophistik. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist, kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden."

Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny, those hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first principles not to be disputed.

I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did *not* do what Zeller affirms, and that Sokrates (and Plato after him) *did* do it. The negative analysis was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydēmus (Memor. iv. 2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success.

I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him (for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and his history, which

is the best that I know, merely repeats the ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract "*Sophistik*," given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert the word "*Sokratik*," if we are to have any abstract term at all.

Again—The negative analysis, which these authors call "*Sophistik*," they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of philosophy or "*reasoned truth*."

Professor Charles Thurot (in his *Études sur Aristote*, Paris, 1800, p. 119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato and the Sophists. ("Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). "Les Sophistes, comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique, s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent en rendre raison. . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode, pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir et de diviser."

M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or adorned the received common-places—that Plato denied these authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp. 91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made money by deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).

from Sokrates himself in the *Apology*.¹ They are outbursts of feeling natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these speculative, freethinking innovations of theory, which challenges the prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these matters he holds already settled persuasions, acquired from his fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic authorities, spiritual and temporal;² who are to him exponents of the creed guaranteed by tradition:—

“Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo
Esse quod Arceas etrumnosque Solones.”

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 23 D. ἵνα δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρᾶξεις ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοῦς μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥττω λόγον κρεῖττω ποιεῖν, &c.

Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 2, 31. τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον. The rich families in Athens severely reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates. Xenophon, *Sympos.* iv. 32.

² See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, *Politicus*, 299: also Plutarch, *Ερωτικὸς*, c. 13, 756 A.

This is the “*auctoritas majorum*,” put forward by Cotta in his official character of *Pontifex*, as conclusive *per se*; when reasons are produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cic. *Nat. Deor.* iii. 3, 5, 6, 9.)

The “*auctoritas majorum*,” claimed by the Pontifex Cotta, may be illustrated by what we read in Father Paul's History of the Council of Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of Scripture:—“Lorsqu'on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous se rendirent à l'avis du Cardinal Pacheco, qui représenta: Que l'Ecriture ayant été expliquée par tant

de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine, l'on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les nouvelles Hérésies étant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu'on avoit donnés à l'Ecriture, il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter la licence des esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les Anciens et par l'Eglise: Et que si quelqu'un naissoit avec un esprit singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même, et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu'il pensoit.” (Fra Paolo, *Histoire du Concile de Trente*, traduction Française, par Le Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.)

P. 289. “Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir l'Edition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d'expliquer la Saint Ecriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Eglise notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien même on auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les Ordinaires.”

He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated traditions. he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties :¹ he cannot tolerate the nice discourses, ingenious hair-splitters, priests of subtleties and trifles—dissenters from the established opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,² and to cheat their creditors—mischievous

¹ Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21.

Ἦστι δὲ φύλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισι μεταίω-
τατον.

Ὅστις αἰσχύνων ἐπιχώρια παπταίνει τὰ
πύρρω, *Μεταμύνια* θηρεύων ἀκράντοις ἐλπίσιν.

² Οὐδὲν σοφίζεσθαι τοῖσι δαίμοσι·

Πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἃς θ' ὁμήλικας
χρόνῳ
Ἐκτῆμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος,
Οὐδ' εἰ δὲ ἀκρων τὸ σοφὸν πύρρηται
φρενῶν.

(Euripides, *Bacchæ*, 200.)

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne fortè
rearis

Impia te rationis inire elementa,
viamque

Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, l. 85.)

Compare Valckenæer, *Diatrib. Eurip.*
pp. 33, 39, cap. 5.

About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see Xenoph. *Memor.* l. 2, 52; Plato, *Gorgias*, 522 B, p. 79, *Memor.* p. 70. A touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* iii. 1, 39, where the father of Tigranes puts to death the σοφιστής who had taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment to the σοφιστής than to his own father.

Xenophon, *Memor.* l. 2, 9; l. 2, 49. *Apolog.* So. a. 20; compare the speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, *Politikus*, p. 299 E.

Timon in the *Silli* bestows on Sokrates and his successors the title of ἀκριβόλογοι. Diog. Laert. ii. 19. Sext. *Emp. adv. Mathem.* vii. 8. Aristophan. *Nubes*, 130, where Strepsiades says—

πῶς οὖν γερὼν ὦν καπιλήσμων καὶ βραδὺς
λόγων ἀκριβῶν σχιναλάμου μαθήσομαι;
Compare 320-359 of the same comedy

—ὅς τε λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερῷ—also *Ranæ*, 149, b.

When Euripides (ὁ σεληνὸς φιλό-
σοφος) went down to Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions among the malefactors there, with great success and applause. *Ranæ*, 771—

Ὅτε δὲ κατ' ἄλ' Εὐριπίδης, ἐπεδείκνυτο
τοῖς λυποδύταις καὶ τοῖς βαλάντι-
τόμοις
ὅπερ ἐστ' ἐν ἄδου πλῆθος· οἱ δ' ἀκρο-
μενοὶ
τῶν ἀντιλογιῶν καὶ λυγισμῶν καὶ στο-
φῶν
ὑπερμάνησαν, κἀνόμισαν σοφώτατον.

These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent conversations with Sokrates. *Ranæ*, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. *Ars Rhet.* p. 301-355. Valckenæer, *Diatribæ* in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palestra (*Nubes*, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, *Fragm. Incert.* ix. ed. Meineke). The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, ἄδο-
λεσχεῖν αὐτὸν ἐκδίδασιν, ὡ σοφιστά) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on Sokrates, see Lucian, *Piscat.* c. 25.

The rhetor Aristides (*Orat.* xlv. Ὑπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων, pp. 406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general manner in which the title Σοφιστής was applied among the Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras), mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as τοὺς ἑπτὰ σοφιστάς, but also called Sokrates σοφιστὴν τούτων τῶν πάντων: that Lysias called Plato σοφιστήν, and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same

instructors, whose appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.¹ Such feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy and dialectic—against the *libertas philosophandi*—counts as a branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor, oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato (the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens with opinions hostile to the laws.² How much courage is required in any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his compositions.³ He (and Aristotle after

title; that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like himself, as φιλοσόφους, while he termed the dialecticians and critics σοφιστάς. Nothing could be more indeterminate than these names, σοφιστής and φιλόσοφος. It was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name σοφιστής (ὁ μάλιστα ἐπανάστας τῷ ὀνόματι); but others had tried to discredit φιλόσοφος and τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν in like manner. It deserves notice that in the restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are designated as σοφισταί. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ νόμος Ἀττικὸς κατὰ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων γραφεῖς, ὃν Σοφοκλῆς Ἀμφικλείδου Σουνίου εἶπεν, ἐν ᾧ τινα κατὰ αὐτῶν προειπὼν, ἐπῆγγαγε, μὴ ἐξήκειαι μηδενὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν διατριβεῖν κατασκευάσασθαι.

¹ Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. Ἀθῆναιος γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἰωται εἶναι, μὴ μόντοι διδασκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὃν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἰωται κοινὴν τοιούτου, θυμωσῆναι, εἰτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

² Plato, Menon pp. 90-92. The

antipathy manifested here by Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feeling which led him to indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor to hate the character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato, 23: ὅλως φιλοσοφίᾳ προσκεκρονκώς, καὶ πᾶσαν Ἑλληνικὴν μουσικὴν καὶ παιδείαν ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας προπηλακίζων· ὅς γε καὶ Σκαράτῃ φησὶ λόλον καὶ βίαιον γεγόμενον ἐπιχειρεῖν, ᾧ τρόπῳ δυνατόν ἦν, τυραννεῖν τῆς πατρίδος, καταλύοντα τὰ ἔθνη, καὶ πρὸς ἐναντίας τοῖς νόμοις βίβας ἔλκοντα καὶ μεθίσταντα τοὺς πολίτας. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap. Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.

³ Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. οὐν δὲ ἀνθρώπου τολμηροῦ κινδυνεύει δεῖσθαι τινος, ὃς παρρησίαν διαφερόντως τιμῶν ἐρεῖ τὰ δοκούντα ἀρίστ' εἶναι πόλει καὶ πολίταις, ἐν ψυχαῖς διεσθαρμέναις τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἐπόμενον πάσῃ τῇ πολιτείᾳ τάττων, ἐναντία λέγων ταῖς μεγίσταισιν ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ οὐκ ἔχων βοηθὸν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα, λόγῳ ἐπόμενος μόνῳ μόνος.

Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of with respect: compare the contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 831 A. and in the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic, referred to in a previous note (vi. 492), Plato declares the lessons taught by the multitude—the contagion

him), far from recognising the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough¹ to try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new *Nómos* of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of Politics—a notion which would not have been understood by Themistokles or Aristeidea.

The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel, but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.² The name of Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations: moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon reluctant hearers.³ That he could have been allowed to persist in this course of life for thirty years,

Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating Plato's Dialogues of Search.

of established custom and tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers—to be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.

¹ In the dialogue called *Politikus*, Plato announces formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted before him, *Xen. Mem. iii. 9*, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the *Βασιλεὺς Τεχνικὸς* (representing political science, art, or theory) to rule mankind—the illusory nature of all other titles to rule—and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same view is developed in the *Republic* and the *Leges*. Compare also *Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b, 27 ad fin.*

In a remarkable passage of the *Leges* (l. 687 D, 688 C), Plato observes, in touching upon the discrepancy between different local institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos, Tarentum, &c.:—"If natives of different cities argue

with each other about their respective institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is the custom with us; with you perhaps it is different. But we, who are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine whether his laws are good or bad." *ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.* King Nomos was not at all pleased to be thus put upon his trial.

² Cicero, *Tusc. Disp. ii. 3*. "Est enim philosophia paucis contenta iudicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et suspecta et invisa." &c.

The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (*Orat. xxvi. p. 384*, ὕπερ τοῦ λόγου) as aggravating the displeasure of the public against him.

³ Xenophon, *Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40*.

when we read his own account (in the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked—and when we recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under an interdict—is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of Athenian practice.

However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enunciates to the Dikasts. "False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds, both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue." The modern reader must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,¹ even though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions, several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.² But Plato presumes that the

¹ Aristotel. *Topica*, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, having been exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol. Brandis; also Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.

² A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias, addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and free antithesis of opposite opinions were accounted as es-

sential to the process τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν—καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν ἤμην φιλοσοφούντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ ἀντίλεγον, ἀλλ' ἀντίπαρτον. (*Lysias*, Or. viii. *Kakologion*, s. 12, p. 273; compare *Plat. Apolog.* p. 28 E.)

Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which illustrate the Platonic διάλογος ζητητικός,—the character of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the confident affirmer and expositor:—"Me ipsum autem ad veritatis contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabricatum deprehendi, ut qui mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maxi-

search will be renewed, either by the same interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the youthful subject; he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise itself to farther pursuit—men who, having listened to the working out of different points of view, will meditate on these points for themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never presented themselves again—were despised by Sokrates as lazy and stupid.¹

mum est) agnoscendum satis mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et intentam habere—qui et *querendi desiderium*, et *dubitandi patientiam*, et *meditandi voluptatem*, et *asserendi cunctationem*, et *respicendi facilitatem*, et *disponendi sollicitudinem tenerem*—quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quandam familiaritatem et cognationem habere judicavi." (Impetus Philosophici, De Interpretatione Naturæ Proœmium.)

Σοκράτης εἰς ἑκάστην is the phrase of Cicero, ad Atticum. ii. 3.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his *Essay on Liberty*, has the following remarks, illustrating Plato's *Dialogues of Search*. I should have been glad if I could have transcribed here many other pages of that admirable *Essay*: which stands almost alone as an unreserved vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence, against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):—

"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dis-

sentient champion eager for his conversion.

"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost those they formerly had. The Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion, that he did not understand the subject—that he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it—and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the premises appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici viri'. But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other. . . . It is the fashion of the

For him, as well as for Plato, the search after truth counted as the main business of life.

Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of Search. We must understand how Plato

Result called *knowledge*, which Plato aspires to. Power of going through a Sokratic cross-examination: not attainable except through the Platonic process and method.

conceived the goal towards which they tend. that is, the state of mind which he calls *knowledge* or *cognition*. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner

exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.¹ Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct, demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and analogies: he must have had before him objections with their refutation, and

present time to disparage negative logic—that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has

either had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an active controversy with opponents."

¹ See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about *ταπεινά*, as developing τὴν ἐννοήσαν ἐκάστου δύναμιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ; and 534, about ἐπιστήμη, with its test, τὸ δοῦναι καὶ δεῖξασθαι λόγον. Compare also Republic, v. 477, 478, with Theaetét. 175, C, D; Phaedon, 76, B; Phaedrus, 276; and Sympos. 202 A. τὸ ἀπὸ δεξιᾶν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι, οὐκ ὁλοσ' ὅτι οὕτε ἐπιστάσθαι ἐστιν; ἀλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἶη ἐπιστήμη;

the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the theorem, but do not really prove it:¹ he must be introduced to the principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is, that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).² The Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the Platonic result, as described and pursued.

Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political: matters especially human³ (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself) familiar to every man,—handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the assembly, pleaders in the *dikastery*, dramatists in the

Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics—man and society.

¹ On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic. I borrow a passage from the treatise of M. Hauréau, *De la Phil. Scolastique*, vol. ii. p. 190.

"Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments, réputés invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité, il faut, en outre, répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la parfaite concordance

de la conclusion énoncée et des conclusions précédentes ou subséquentes; il faut reproduire, à l'occasion de tout problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est déclaré."

² Longinus, *De Sublim.* a. 6. καίτοι τὸ πρᾶγμα δύσληπτον· ἡ γὰρ τῶν λόγων ἐπίσις πολλῆς ἐστὶ ψείρας τελευταίου ἐπιγίνωγμα. Compare what is said in a succeeding chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see also Sir W. Hamilton's *Lectures on Logic*, Lect. 35, p. 224.

³ Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the following passage from an article in the *Edinburgh Review* (April, 1866, pp. 325-326), on the first

theatre. Now it is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting, varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary circumstances;

edition of the present work: an article not merely profound and striking as to thought, but indicating the most comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic writings:—

“The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and the warfare against whom was the incessant occupation of his life and writings, was—not Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the term, but—*Commonplace*. It was the acceptance of traditional opinions and current sentiments as an ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract terms which express approbation and disapprobation, desire and aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a meaning thoroughly understood and universally assented to. The men of his day (like those of ours) thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and Unjust, Honourable and Shameful, were—because they could use the words glibly, and affirm them of this or that, in agreement with existing custom. But what the property was, which these several instances possessed in common, justifying the application of the term, nobody had considered; neither the Sophists, nor the rhetoricians, nor the statesmen, nor any of those who set themselves up, or were set up by others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this question was wandering in darkness—had no standard by which his judgments were regulated, and which kept them consistent with one another—no rule which he knew and could stand by for the guidance of his life. Not knowing what Justice and Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and virtuous: not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it, but are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a condition, to any one capable of thought, made life not worth having. The grand business of human intellect ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most

rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that lie at the bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done and real knowledge attained, it is already no small benefit to expel the false opinion of knowledge: to make men conscious of the things most needful to be known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their own state, and rouse a pungent internal stimulus, summoning up all their energies to attack these greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato's notion of the condition of the human mind in his time, and of what philosophy could do to help it: and any one who does not think the description applicable, with slight modifications, to the majority of educated minds in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly has not brought either the teachers or the practical men of any time to the Platonic test.”

The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive description by a valuable citation from Max Müller to the same purpose (*Lectures on the Science of Language*, Second Series, pp. 526-527). “Such terms as Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church, State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed about in the war of words as if every body knew what they meant, and as if every body used them exactly in the same sense; whereas most people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest conceptions, adding to them from time to time—perhaps correcting likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors—but never taking stock, never either enquiring into the history of the terms which they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their meaning according to the strict rules of logical definition.”

they are liable to exception, if those circumstances undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by objections available against each, included a large and instructive survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings.

The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing Sokrates) assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application: while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises to his readers; but he has

nowhere provided a key to the solution of them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in *Timæus*), the negative altogether disappears. *Timæus* is made to proclaim the most sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic Sokrates hears them with respect-

Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties which he has raised. The affirmative an negative veins are in him completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations *a priori* of some impressive sentiment.

ful silence, and commends afterwards. The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a teacher—that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them—this declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally true.¹ The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up all difficulties—not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas are altogether *a priori*: they enunciate preconceptions or hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep and solemn sentiment of some kind or other—religious, ethical, æsthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or exactness, &c. The dogmas are enunciations of some grand sentiment of the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,² which Plato follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is therefore a mistake to suppose³ that Plato ties knots in one

¹ See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates. (Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)

² Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above human investigation and evidence—the transcendental: *καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος (Plato) τὰ δόγματα οὐκ αὐτὸς ἀποφαίνεται, εἶτα περὶ αὐτῶν διαγινώσκειται· ἀλλ' ἐν μέσῳ τὴν ζήτησιν ποιῶμενος πρὸς τοὺς διαλεγόμενους, ἐπὶ ἑκάστῳ τὸ δέον δόγμα, ἢ φιλοσοφικὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται· πλὴν ὅσα περὶ τῶν κρείττονων, ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς, λέγεται.* (Dion. Hal. Ars Rhet. c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.)

M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:—

Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel. "De ces deux explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l'une s'appelle la théorie de l'émission; l'autre est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits

d'Empédocle. Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses adhérents Képler, Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans moins illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler, l'avaient adopté.

"Au reste, si l'on s'étonnait de voir d'aussi grands génies ainsi divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question on litige ne pouvait être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu'alors les divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non des *déductions logiques des faits*, mais, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de *simples vérités de sentiment*; qu'enfin, le don de l'infaillibilité n'est pas accordé même aux plus habiles, des qu'en sortant du domaine des observations, et se jetant dans celui des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès."

³ Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and

dialogue only with a view to untie them in another ; and that the doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind, only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself.

Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues—look for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures : that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system (*der Kern*) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally

Hypothesis
—that Plato
had solved
all his own
difficulties
for himself ;
but that he
communicated
the solution
only to a
few select
auditors
in oral
lectures
untenable.

Munk treats the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. "Plato (he observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of pedagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question ; he proposes, in propædæutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has not yet solved them himself ; and all this for the praiseworthy (*ironically said*) purpose of correcting in their minds the false persuasion of knowledge." (*Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon. Schrift.* p. 515.)

That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it as ridiculous ; but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic Sokrates disclaims the pedagogic function, describing himself as nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, *Philos. der Griech.* vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the *Parmenides*, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion, altogether conjectural ; for there is no solution of them given in any of

Plato's writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (*Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften*, p. 103-104) ; that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues, though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors. "The special talent and dexterity (*Virtuosität*) which Sokrates displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain conviction on the question discussed."

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere (*Platonische Welt-seele*, p. 69-70)—That the Platonic *Ideenlehre* was altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles, if he has the answer ready

written so as to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed to them : that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full, direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.¹ I have already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and unprepared audience : while among the written dialogues, there are some which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding, are highly perplexing and abstruse. The *Timæus* does not confine itself to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the super-sensible world : though they are of a mystical cast, as we know that the oral lectures *De Bono* were also.

Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in his own name ; whereas he never published any written composition in his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures, delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils. Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to controvert what was said in the last page—that Plato's affirmative

Characteristic of the oral lectures—That they were delivered in Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed from the dialogues, we cannot say.

drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often repeated, of Sokrates ; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates (even in the *Republic*, one of his most expository compositions) see a remarkable passage, *Rep.* v. p. 460 E. ἀπιστοῦντα δὲ καὶ ζητοῦντα ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου νοεῖσθαι, ὃ δὲ ἐνὶ ὄντι, &c.

¹ Tannemann, *Gesch. der Philos.* ii. pp. 205-220. Hermann, *Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller.* Motive, pp. 290-294.

Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the authority of a passage in the *Theætétus* (152 C), which does not at all sustain his allegation.

Hermann considers "die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und Schlussstein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit principieller Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste, etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren" (p. 293).

philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle tells us¹) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of philosophy was an ascending one toward the *principia* (ἀρχαί), or a descending one down from the *principia*. A good philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in Plato's philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode of participation (μέθεξις) between the two disparate worlds—intellect and sense. The *principia* of Plato take an impressive hold on the imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties; and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear against them.

With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue—of threads which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and “passages which lead to nothing”—of much talk “about it and about it,” without any peremptory decision from an authorised judge—with such complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the process of enquiry, in the debate *per se*: and he presumes a like interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.² On the contrary, he claims it as the privilege of phi-

Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the process of search and debate *per se*. Protracted enquiry is a valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.

¹ Aristot. Eth. Nik. I. 4, 5. εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπείρεται τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήκει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἵσταται ἢ ὀδῶς.

² As an illustration of that class of minds which take delight in the search for truth in different directions, I copy the following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern scientific biography. “Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not venerable—and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in science—that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions to an extent

not easily sympathised with by minds of a different order. Some men love to rest in truth, or at least in settled opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency, even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand, was a follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all his life long pursuing, not resting in it.

On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done, disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other, or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . . I think it must be acknowledged by all who have

losophical research, that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock to measure the length of each speech, are under slavish dependence on the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep strictly to the point.¹ Whoever desires accurate training of mind must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.² Plato regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other: he also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the result.³ Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue, not

studied his writings, that in his scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far; and that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify him in renewing the pursuit of truth, and thus led him completely astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop."

(Dr. Geo. Wilson—Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 172.

² Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. μέτρον δὲ γ', ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὁ Γλαῦκων, τοιοῦτων λόγων ἀκούειν, ὅλος ὁ βίος νουνέχουσιν. vi. 504 D. Τὴν μακροτέραν περίετον τῇ τοιοῦτῃ, καὶ οὐχ ἥττον μανθάνοντι ποιητέον ἢ γυμναζομένην. Also Phædrus, 274 A; Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D. ἐμύχανον πραγματείαν—ἀδολεσχίας, &c. Compare Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him.

In the Hermotimus of Lucian, the assailing of philosophy draws one of his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine the doctrines of all the philosophical sects: the whole of life would be insufficient (Lucian, Hermot. c. 47-48). The passages above cited, especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not have been discouraged by this protracted work.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. Μαρτυροῦμαι (says Glaukon) σκοπεῖσθαι σε, εἴτε παραβέξομεθα τραγῳδίαν τε καὶ κωμῳδίαν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, εἴτε καὶ οὐ. Ἰσως (says Sokrates) καὶ πλείον ἐστὶ τούτων· οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγώ γε πᾶσι οἷδα, ἀλλ' ὅσῃ ἂν ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ πνεῦμα φέρη, ταύτην ἵκται. Καὶ καλῶς γ', ἔφη, λέγεις.

The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository.

We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he continued enquiring, the more his own mind would become armed for the better appreciation of truth—and in which he strongly protests against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry.

"Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sentés parmi les Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me sembleroit que le plus utile étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que, pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient; non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos mœurs, il y a peu de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient—mais aussi à cause que plusieurs l'ignorent eux mêmes; car l'action de la pensée, par laquelle on croit une chose étant différente de celle par laquelle on connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre. Et entre plusieurs opinions

merely as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship, whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to Isokrates. He went on "combing and curling it" (to use the phrase of Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition of the Panegyric Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this respect between one dialogue and another.

But amidst all these differences—and partly indeed by reason of these differences—Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings from the terrible shipwreck which has overtaken so much of the abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his principle titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian writings: whether for the other *virī Socratici* his contemporaries, or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and instructed all; so that they were

Plato has done more than any one else to make the process of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself.

également reçues, je ne choisissois que les plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures—tous excès ayant coutume d'être mauvais—comme aussi afin de me détourner moins du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eût fallu suivre.

"Et particulièrement, je mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté; non que je désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la sûreté du commerce, quelque dessein

qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on fasse des vœux ou des contrats qui obligent à y persévérer: mais à cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en même état, et que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de perfectionner de plus en plus mes jugemens, et non point de les rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque chose, je me fusse obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle." Discours de la Méthode, part. iii. p. 147-148, Cousin edit.; p. 16, Simon edit.

read not merely by disciples and admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.¹ The process of philosophising is one not naturally attractive except to a few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and suggestive influence exercised by Plato—the variety of new roads pointed out to the free enquiring mind—are in themselves sufficiently valuable: whatever we may think of the positive results in which he himself acquiesced.²

I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange. Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an enquiry without any result—a story without an end. Respecting the Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood. Whether the exposition be clear or obscure—orderly or confused—true or false—we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character: as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).³

A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice, directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the variable and accidental, are turned

Process of
generalisa-
tion always
kept in view
and illus-
trated
throughout
the Platonic
Dialogues of
Search—ge-

¹ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8.

Cicero farther commends the Stoic Panætius for having relinquished the "tristitiam atque asperitatem" of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno, Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his students (De Fin. iv. 23, 79).

² The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is applicable to the

Platonic writings also. "Philosophiam multis locis inchoasti: ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum" (Academ. Poster. i. 3, 9).

I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon; an unfinished dialogue, which takes up the point of view here indicated by Cicero.

³ See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of this chapter.

and returned in a thousand different ways. The principles of classification, with the breaking down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and particular cases—is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention and analysis: and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers.

After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system—nor as occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one preconceived scheme—nor as successive manifestations of change, knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author at unknown times and under unknown specialities of circumstance. Of course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible.

The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues

neral terms and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.

The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable interdependence.

Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges, Epinomis, last.

coincides to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon. First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before his death, when Plato was 28 years of age.

Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's most advanced age—Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel, Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the affirmative pole of philosophy.

Between the Apology and the dialogues named as last—I shall examine the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said) that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and Philébus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive combinations. In the Sophistês and Politikus, Sokrates appears only in the character of a listener: in the Parmenidês also, the part assigned to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious,

Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any determinate order.

is subordinate to that of Parmenidēs and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand, Kriton and Euthyphron have an immediate bearing upon the trial of Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in immediate sequel to the Apology.

For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to former and later, I shall give it when the case arises.

CHAPTER IX.

APOLOGY OF SOKRATES.

ADOPTING the order of precedence above described, for the review of the Platonic compositions, and taking the point of departure from Sokrates or the Sokratic point of view, I begin with the memorable composition called the Apology.

I agree with Schleiermacher¹—with the more recent investigations of Ueberweg—and with what (until recent times) seems to have been the common opinion,—that this is in substance the real defence pronounced by Sokrates; reported, and of course dressed up, yet not intentionally transformed, by Plato.² If such be the case, it is likely to have been put together shortly after the trial, and may thus be ranked among the earliest of the Platonic compositions: for I have already intimated my belief that Plato composed no

The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional transformation.

¹ Zeller is of opinion that the Apology, as well as the Kriton, were put together at Megara by Plato, shortly after the death of Sokrates. (Zeller, *De Hermodoro Ephesio*, p. 19.)

Schleiermacher, *Einf. zur Apologie*, vol. ii. pp. 182-185. Ueberweg, *Ueber die Aechtheit der Plat. Schrift.* p. 246.

Steinhart thinks (*Einführung*, pp. 236-238) that the Apology contains more of Plato, and less of Sokrates: but he does not make his view very clear to me. Ast, on the contrary, treats the Apology as spurious and unworthy of Plato. (*Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 477, seq.) His arguments are rather objections against the merits of the composition, than reasons for believing it not to be the work of Plato. I dissent from them entirely: but they show that an

acute critic can make out a plausible case, satisfactory to himself, against any dialogue. If it be once conceded that the question of genuine or spurious is to be tried upon such purely internal grounds of critical admiration and complete harmony of sentiment, Ast might have made out a case even stronger against the genuineness of the *Phædrus*, *Symposium*, *Philebus*, *Parmenides*.

² See chapter lxxviii. of my *History of Greece*.

The reader will find in that chapter a full narrative of all the circumstances known to us respecting both the life and the condemnation of Sokrates.

A very admirable account may also be seen of the character of Sokrates, and his position with reference to the Athenian people, in the article entitled

dialogues under the name of Sokrates, during the lifetime of Sokrates.

Such, in my judgment, is the most probable hypothesis respecting the Apology. But even if we discard this hypothesis; if we treat the Apology as a pure product of the Platonic imagination (like the dialogues), and therefore not necessarily connected in point of time with the event to which it refers—still there are good reasons for putting it first in the order of review. For it would then be Plato's own exposition, given more explicitly and solemnly than anywhere else, of the Socratic point of view and life-purpose. It would be an exposition embodying that union of generalising impulse, mistrust of established common-places, and aggressive cross-examining ardour—with eccentric religious persuasion, as well as with perpetual immersion in the crowd of the palæstra and the market-place: which immersion was not less indispensable to Sokrates than repugnant to the feelings of Plato himself. An exposition, lastly, disavowing all that taste for cosmical speculation, and that transcendental dogmatism, which formed one among the leading features of Plato as distinguished from Sokrates. In whichever way we look at the Apology, whether as a real or as an imaginary defence, it contains more of pure Sokratism than any other composition of Plato, and as such will occupy the first place in the arrangement which I adopt.¹

Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally first in the review of his dialogues.

Sokrates und Sein Volk, Akademischer Vortrag, by Professor Hermann Köchly; a lecture delivered at Zurich in 1855, and published with enlargements in 1859.

Professor Köchly's article (contained in a volume entitled *Akademische Vorträge*, Zurich, 1859) is eminently deserving of perusal. It not only contains a careful summary of the contemporary history, so far as Sokrates is concerned, but it has farther the great merit of fairly estimating that illustrious man in reference to the actual feeling of the time, and to the real public among whom he moved. I feel much satisfaction in seeing that Professor Köchly's picture, composed without any knowledge of my History of Greece, presents substantially the same view of Sokrates and his contemporaries

as that which is taken in my sixty-eighth chapter.

Köchly considers that the Platonic Apology preserves the Socratic character more faithfully than any of Plato's writings; and that it represents what Sokrates said, as nearly as the "dichterliche Natur" of Plato would permit. (Köchly, pp. 302-364.)

¹ Dionysius Hal. regards the Apology, not as a report of what Sokrates really said, nor as approximating thereunto, but as a pure composition of Plato himself, for three purposes combined:—1. To defend and extol Sokrates. 2. To accuse the Athenian public and Dikasta. 3. To furnish a picture of what a philosopher ought to be.—All these purposes are to a certain extent included and merged in a fourth, which I hold to be the true

In my History of Greece, I have already spoken of this impressive discourse as it concerns the relations between Sokrates himself and the Dikasts to whom he addressed it. I here regard it only as it concerns Plato; and as it forms a convenient point of departure for entering upon and appreciating the Platonic dialogues.

The Apology of Sokrates is not a dialogue, but a continuous discourse addressed to the Dikasts, containing nevertheless a few questions and answers interchanged between him and the accuser Melétus in open court. It is occupied, partly, in rebutting the counts of the indictment (*viz.*, 1. That Sokrates did not believe in the Gods or in the Dæmons generally recognised by his countrymen: 2. That he was a corruptor of youth¹)—partly in setting forth those proceedings of his life out of which such charges had grown, and by which he had become obnoxious to a wide-spread feeling of personal hatred. By his companions, by those who best knew him, and by a considerable number of ardent young men, he was greatly esteemed and admired: by the general public, too, his acuteness as well as his self-sufficing and independent character, were appreciated with a certain respect. Yet he was at the same time disliked, as an aggressive disputant who “tilted at all he met”—who raised questions novel as well as perplexing, who pretended to special intimations from the Gods—and whose views no one could distinctly make out.² By the eminent citizens of all varieties—politicians, rhetors, Sophists, tragic and comic poets, artisans, &c.—he had made himself both hated and feared.³ He empha-

one,—to exhibit what Sokrates was and had been, in relation to the Athenian public.

The comparison drawn by Dionysius between the Apology and the oration De Coronâ of Demosthenes, appears to me unsuitable. The two are altogether disparate, in spirit, in purpose, and in execution. (See Dion H. Ars Rhet. pp. 295-298: De Adm. VI Dic. Demosth. p. 1026.)

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 1. Ἰδὲ αὖτε Σωκράτης, οὐκ μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων· ἕτερα δὲ καὶνὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν· ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖραι.

Plato, Apolog. c. 3, p. 19 B. Σωκράτης ἀδικεῖ καὶ περιεργάζεσθαι, ζητῶν τὰ τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια, καὶ τὸν ἥτις λόγον κρείττω ποιῶν, καὶ ἄλλους ταῦτά ταῦτα διδάσκων.

The reading of Xenophon was conformable to the copy of the indictment preserved in the Metrôon at Athens in the time of Favorinus. There were three distinct accusers—Melétus, Anytus, and Lykon. Plat. Apol. p. 23-24 B.

² Plato, Apol. c. 28, p. 38 A; c. 23, p. 35 A.

³ Plato, Apol. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23. ἐκ ταυτησὶ δὴ τῆς ἐξετάσεως πολλοὶ μὲν ἀπέχθεται μοι γεγονόσι καὶ οἶαι χαλε-

tically denies the accusation of general disbelief in the Gods, advanced by Melétus: and he affirms generally (though less distinctly) that the Gods in whom he believed, were just the same as those in whom the whole city believed. Especially does he repudiate the idea, that he could be so absurd as to doubt the divinity of Helios and Selênê, in which all the world believed; ¹ and to adopt the heresy of Anaxagoras, who degraded these Divinities into physical masses. Respecting his general creed, he thus puts himself within the pale of Athenian orthodoxy. He even invokes that very sentiment (with some doubt whether the Dikasts will believe him ²) for the justification of the obnoxious and obtrusive peculiarities of his life; representing himself as having acted under the mission of the Delphian God, expressly transmitted from the oracle.

According to his statement, his friend and earnest admirer Chærephon, had asked the question at the oracle of Delphi, whether any one was wiser than Sokrates? The reply of the oracle declared, that no one was wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority, Sokrates was greatly perplexed: for he was conscious to himself of not being wise upon any matter, great or small.³ He at length concluded that the declaration of the oracle could be proved true, only on the hypothesis that other persons were less wise than they seemed to be or fancied themselves. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks — political men, rhetors, Sophists, poets, artisans. On applying his *Elenchus*, and putting to them testing interrogations, he found them all without exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they *were* wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The artisans indeed did

Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the citizens generally—The oracle is proved to be true.

πάταται καὶ βαρύνεται, ὥστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γηγόναι, ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι.

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 14, p. 26 D. ὁ θανμάσι Μέλπτε, ἵνα τί ταῦτα λέγεις; οὐδὲ ἥλιον οὐδὲ σελήνην ἀρα νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι;

² Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D.

³ Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἐνεθυμούμην οὕτως, τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεὸς καὶ τί ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὐτὴ μέγα οὐτὴ μικρόν εὖ νοῶμαι ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν· τί οὖν ποτε λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δῆπου ψεύδεται γέ· οὐ γὰρ θέμις αὐτῷ. Καὶ πολλὴν μὲν χρόνον ἠπόρουν, &c.

really know each his own special trade ; but then, on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own compositions ; but on being questioned respecting these very compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent explanations : so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than Sokrates : but *he* was aware of his own deficiency ; while *they* were fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other persons, was destitute of wisdom ; but he was the only one who knew, or could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.¹

This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, imposed upon him by the Delphian oracle, and in which he passed the mature portion of his life : to cross-examine every one, to expose that false persuasion of knowledge which every one felt, and to demonstrate the truth of that which the oracle really meant by declaring the superior wisdom of Sokrates. "People suppose me to be wise myself (says Sokrates) on those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of others.² But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise : and his oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employing the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth worthless so far as wisdom is concerned.³ The really disgraceful ignorance is—to think that you know what you do not really know."⁴

"The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in the

¹ Plato, Apolog. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23.

² Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A. οἰοῦνται γὰρ με ἐκάστωτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφόν, ἃ ἂν ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω.

³ Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A ; c. 17, p.

28 E.

⁴ Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία ἐστὶν αὐτῇ ἢ ἐπανειδίστος, ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἶδέναι ἃ οὐκ οἶδεν ;

search for wisdom, cross-examining myself as well as others : I shall be disgraced, if I desert that post from fear either of death or of any other evil."¹ "Even if you Dikaste acquit me, I shall not alter my course : I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I meet"²—You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and glory, in the greatest possible quantity ; while you take neither thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of goodness for your mind ? If any one denies the charge, and professes that he *does* take thought for these objects,—I shall not let him off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.³ And if he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen : most of all with you citizens, because you are most nearly connected with me. For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not the fruit of wealth,—but that wealth, together with all the other things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of virtue.⁴ If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these discourses that I corrupt them : and if any one gives a different version of my discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you plainly :—decide with Anytus, or not,—acquit me or not—I shall do nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many times over for it."

Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining mission imposed upon him by the God.

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E.

² Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 D. οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοσοφῶν καὶ ὑμῖν παρακαλεῦνόμενός τε καὶ ἐνδοκινούμενος, ὅπως ἂν αἰεὶ ἐντυγχάνω ὑμῶν, λέγων ὁλίπερ εἰσθα, &c.

³ Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 E. καὶ εἰάν τις ὑμῶν ἀμφισβητήσῃ καὶ φῇ ἐπιμελείσ-

θαι, οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφήσω αὐτὸν οὐδ' ἀπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εἰάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κερήσθαι ἀρετὴν, φάναι δέ, δυνείδω, &c.

⁴ Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 30 B. λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀπαντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ.

Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own profession and standing purpose, imposed upon him as a duty by the Delphian God. He neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance, or for the public service; he devoted himself, from morning till night, to the task of stirring up the Athenian public, as the gadfly worries a large and high-bred but oversleek horse :¹ stimulating them by interrogation, persuasion, reproach, to render account of their lives and to seek with greater energy the path of virtue. By continually persisting in such universal cross-examination, he had rendered himself obnoxious to the Athenians generally ;² who were offended when called upon to render account, and when reproached that they did not live rightly. Sokrates predicts that after his death, younger cross-examiners, hitherto kept down by his celebrity, would arise in numbers,³ and would pursue the same process with greater keenness and acrimony than he had done.

He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission, and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger.

While Sokrates thus extols, and sanctifies under the authority of the Delphian God, his habitual occupation of interrogating, cross-examining, and stimulating to virtue, the Athenians indiscriminately—he disclaims altogether the function of a teacher. His disclaimer on this point is unequivocal and emphatic. He cannot teach others, because he is not at all wiser than they. He is fully aware that he is not wise on any point, great or small—that he knows nothing at all, so to speak.⁴ He can convict others, by their own answers, of real though unconscious ignorance, or

He disclaims the function of a teacher—he cannot teach, for he is not wiser than others. He differs from others by being conscious of his own ignorance.

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 E. ἀτεχνῶς, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπεῖν, προσκειμένον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὥσπερ ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μύῳ πρὸς τίνος· ὅλον δὲ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιοῦτόν τινα, ὃς ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἕνα ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην παταχῶ προσκαθίζων. Also c. 26, p. 36 D.

² Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 D ; c. 16, p. 28 A ; c. 30, p. 39 C.

³ Plato, Apol. c. 30, p. 39 C. νῦν γὰρ

τοῦτο εἰργασθε (I. ο. ἐμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε) οἰόμενοι ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχόν τοῦ βίου. τὸ δὲ ὑμῖν πολὺ ἐναντίον ἀποβήσεται, ὥς ἐγὼ φημι. πλείους ἔσονται ὑμᾶς οἱ ἐλεγχοντες, οὐς νῦν ἐγὼ κατείχομαι, ὑμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ᾔσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπώτεροι ἔσονται ὅσῳ νεώτεροί εἰσι, καὶ ὑμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε, &c.

I have already remarked (in chapter lxviii. of my general History of Greece relating to Sokrates) that this prediction was not fulfilled.

⁴ Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν ξυνόμιδα

(under another name) false persuasion of knowledge : and because he can do so, he is presumed to possess positive knowledge on the points to which the exposure refers. But this presumption is altogether unfounded : he possesses no such positive knowledge. Wisdom is not to be found in any man, even among the most distinguished : Sokrates is as ignorant as others ; and his only point of superiority is, that he is fully conscious of his own ignorance, while others, far from having the like consciousness, confidently believe themselves to be in possession of wisdom and truth.¹ In this consciousness of his own ignorance Sokrates stands alone ; on which special ground he is proclaimed by the Delphian God as the wisest of mankind.

Being thus a partner in the common ignorance, Sokrates cannot of course teach others. He utterly disclaims having ever taught, or professed to teach. He would be proud indeed, if he possessed the knowledge of human and social virtue : but he does not know it himself, nor can he find out who else knows it.² He is certain that there cannot be more than a few select individuals who possess the art of making mankind wiser or better—just as in the case of horses, none but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.³ But where any such select few are to be found, who alone can train men—Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others ; he cannot divine for himself.⁴ He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of cross-examination, in search of a wise man : but he can find only those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes as pretenders.⁵

He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He is perpetually seeking for them, but in vain.

ἑαυτῷ σοφὸς ὢν, &c. c. 8, p. 22 D. ἑαυτῷ γὰρ συγγέειν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ, ὡς ἔπος εἰπείν.

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A-B. Οἷός τις ὅμων, ὡς ἄνθρωποι, σοφώτατός ἐστιν, ὅστις ὥστερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἀξίός ἐστι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν.

² Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 30 B-C. τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ πολιτικῆς, ἐπιστήμων ἐστίν ; . . . ἐγὼ γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκαλλυνόμενός τε καὶ ἥβρυν

όμενός τε, εἰ ἠπιστάμην ταῦτα· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι.

c. 21, p. 33 A. ἐγὼ δὲ διδάσκαλος μὲν οὐδεὶς πώποτ' ἐγενόμην. c. 4, p. 19 E.

³ Plato, Apol. c. 12, p. 25 B.

⁴ Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20

⁵ Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 B. ταῦτ' οὐδὲν ἐγὼ μὲν ἔτι καὶ νῦν περιῶν ζητῶ καὶ ἀρευνῶ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀσάντων καὶ τῶν ξένων ἂν τινα οἰώμαι σοφὸν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ.

This then is the mission and vocation of Sokrates—1. To cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them, and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom and virtue.¹

But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them what WISDOM OR VIRTUE is.

Such is the substance of the Platonic Apology of Sokrates. How strong was the impression which it made, on many philosophical readers, we may judge from the fact, that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, being a native of Kition in Cyprus, derived from the perusal of the Apology his first inducement to come over to Athens, and devote himself to the study and teaching of philosophy in that city.² Sokrates depicts, with fearless sincerity, what he regards as the intellectual and moral deficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the unpalatable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which that treatment was confined.

But neither of his two most eminent companions can endure to restrict his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon³ affirms that Sokrates was assiduous in communicating useful instruction and positive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, though more rarely, intimates the same: but for the most part, and in the Dialogues of Search throughout, he keeps

τῇ θεῇ βοῇ ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι σοφός. c. 32, p. 41 B.

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E.

² Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistês) p. 357, Dindorf. Τὰ δὲ ἀμφὶ Ζήνωνος ἀριθμῶντά τε ἔστι καὶ γένομενα ὑπὸ πολλῶν, ὅτι αὐτὸν ἡ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία ἐκ Φουρίων ἤγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ποικίλην.

This statement deserves full belief: it probably came from Zeno himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read, Sokratic books among them. Diogen. Laert. vii. 31.

Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do not feel so certain. He says that the accusatory discourse pronounced against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by Polykrates, as a λογογράφος, and paid for. This may be the fact: but the words of Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the *κατηγορία* Σωκράτους composed by Polykrates was a sophistical exercise, composed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse really delivered in the Dikastery.

³ Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, G4; i. 3, 1: i. 4, 2; iv. 2, 40; iv. 3, 4.

Sokrates within the circle of procedure which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify in detail the aggressive operations, announced therein by Sokrates in general terms as his missionary life-purpose, against contemporaries of note, very different from each other—against aspiring youths, statesmen, generals, Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets, rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of humiliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to be able to furnish, any solution of his own difficulties. Many of the persons cross-examined bear historical names: but I think it necessary to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.¹

the Dialogues of Search—Xenophon and Plato enlarge it.

The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates,—that he possessed neither positive knowledge nor wisdom in his own person,—was frequently treated by his contemporaries as ironical. He was not supposed to be in earnest when he made it. Every one presumed that he must himself know that which he proved others not to know, whatever motive he might have for affecting ignorance.² His personal manner and homely vein of illustration seemed to favour the supposition that he was bantering. This interpreta-

Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive teacher, employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of his own.

¹ It might seem superfluous to give such a warning; but many commentators speak as if they required it. They denounce the Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no pertinence, unless supposed to be applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and feelings.

It is useless to enjoin us, as Stallbaum and Steinhart do, to mark the aristocratical conceit of Menon!—the pompous ostentation and pretensive verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias!—the exorbitant selfishness of Polus and Kalliklēs!—the impudent brutality of Thrasymachos!—when all these persons speak entirely under the prompting of Plato himself.

You might just as well judge of Sokrates by what we read in the Nubes of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we find in the Aves, as describe the historical characters of the above-named personages out of the Platonic dialogues. They ought to be appreciated as dramatic pictures, drest up

by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such opinions as he assigns to them—whether he intends them to be refuted by others, or not.

² Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D; c. 9, p. 23 A.

Aristeides the Rhetor furnishes a valuable confirmation of the truth of that picture of Sokrates, which we find in the Platonic Apology. All the other companions of Sokrates who wrote dialogues about him (not preserved to us), presented the same general features. 1. Avowed ignorance. 2. The same declaration of the oracle concerning him. 3. The feeling of frequent signs from τὸ δαιμόνιον.

Ὁμολογεῖται μὲν γὰρ λέγειν αὐτὸν (Sokrates) ὡς ἀρὰ οὐδὲν εἰσέτατο, καὶ πάντες τοῦτο φασιν οἱ συγγενόμενοι· ὁμολογεῖται δ' εὖ καὶ τοῦτο, σφώτατον εἶναι Σωκράτη τὴν Πυθίαν εἰρηκεῖναι, &c.

(Aristeides, Orat. xlv. Περὶ Ἡγορικῆς, pp. 23, 24, 25, Dindorf.)

tion of the character of Sokrates appears in the main to be preferred by modern critics. Of course (they imagine) an able man who cross-questions others on the definitions of Law, Justice, Democracy, &c., has already meditated on the subject, and framed for himself unimpeachable definitions of these terms. Sokrates (they suppose) is a positive teacher and theorist, employing a method, which, though indirect and circuitous, is nevertheless calculated deliberately beforehand for the purpose of introducing and inculcating premeditated doctrines of his own. Pursuant to this hypothesis, it is presumed that the positive theory of Sokrates is to be found in his negative cross-examinations,—not indeed set down clearly in any one sentence, so that he who runs may read—yet disseminated in separate syllables or letters, which may be distinguished, picked out, and put together into propositions, by an acute detective examiner. And the same presumption is usually applied to the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues: that is, to Plato employing Sokrates as spokesman. Interpreters sift with microscopic accuracy the negative dialogues of Plato, in hopes of detecting the ultimate elements of that positive solution which he is supposed to have lodged therein, and which, when found, may be put together so as to clear up all the antecedent difficulties.

I have already said (in the preceding chapter) that I cannot take this view either of Sokrates or of Plato. Without doubt, each of them had affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But the affirmative vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely distinct from the negative. The affirmative theory has its roots *aliunde*, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a view to reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the negative Elenchus has exposed. That exposure does indeed render the embarrassed respondent painfully conscious of the want of some rational, consistent, and adequate theoretical explanation: it farther stimulates him to make efforts of his own for the supply of that want. But such efforts must be really his own; the Elenchus gives no farther help: it furnishes problems, but no solutions, nor even any assurance that the problems as presented,

Incorrectness of such assumption—the Sokratic Elenchus does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the respondent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own.

admit of affirmative solutions. Whoever expects that such consummate masters of the negative process as Sokrates and Plato, when they come to deliver affirmative dogmas of their own, will be kept under restraint by their own previous Elenchus, and will take care that their dogmas shall not be vulnerable by the same weapons as they had employed against others—will be disappointed. They do not employ any negative test against themselves. When Sokrates preaches in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*, or the Athenian Stranger in the *Platonic Leges*, they jump over, or suppose to be already solved, the difficulties under the pressure of which other disputants had been previously discredited: they assume all the undefinable common-places to be clearly understood, and all the inconsistent generalities to be brought into harmony. Thus it is that the negative cross-examination, and the affirmative dogmatism, are (both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected operations of thought: the one does not lead to, or involve, or verify, the other.

Those who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such attack—cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by passive association as ethics and æsthetics,—and that they should endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard—would be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this result. Plato followed in the same track, not of pouring new matter of knowledge into the pupil, but of eliciting new thoughts and beliefs out of him, by kindling the latent forces of his intellect. A large proportion of Plato's dialogues have no other purpose or

Value and importance of this process—stimulating active individual minds to theories each for itself.

value. And in entering upon the consideration of these dialogues, we cannot take a better point of departure than the Apology of Sokrates, wherein the speaker, alike honest and decided in his convictions, at the close of a long cross-examining career, re-asserts expressly his devoted allegiance to the negative process, and disclaims with equal emphasis all power over the affirmative.

In that touching discourse, the Universal Cross-Examiner declares a thorough resolution to follow his own individual conviction and his own sense of duty—whether agreeing or disagreeing with the convictions of his countrymen, and whether leading to danger or to death for himself. “Where a man may have posted himself—either under his own belief that it is best, or under orders from the magistrate—there he must stay and affront danger, not caring for death or anything else in comparison with disgrace.”¹ As to

View taken
by Sokrates
about death.
Other men
profess to
know what
it is, and
think it a
great mis-
fortune:
he does
not know.

death, Sokrates knows very little what it is, nor whether it is good or evil. The fear of death, in his view, is only one case of the prevalent mental malady—men believing themselves to know that of which they really know nothing. If death be an extinction of all sensation, like a perpetual and dreamless sleep, he will regard it as a prodigious benefit compared with life: even the Great King will not be a loser by the exchange.² If on the contrary death be a transition into Hades, to keep company with those who have died before—Homer, Hesiod, the heroes of the Trojan war, &c.—Sokrates will consider it supreme happiness to converse with and cross-examine the potentates and clever men

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D.

² Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 A. c. 32, p. 40 D: καὶ εἴτε δὴ μηδὲμία αἰσθησις ἔστιν, ἀλλ’ ὅλον ὕπνος, ἐπειδὴν τις καθενὸν μὴδ’ ὄναρ μὴδὲν ὀφεί, θαυμάσιον κέρδος ἂν εἴη ὁ θάνατος.

Ast remarks (Plat. Leb. und Schrift. p. 488) that the language of doubt and uncertainty in which Sokrates here speaks of the consequences of death, is greatly at variance with the language which he is made to hold in the Phædon. Ast adduces this as one of his arguments for disallowing the authenticity of the Apology. I do not admit the inference. I am prepared for divergence between the opinions

of Sokrates in different dialogues; and I believe, moreover, that the Sokrates of the Phædon is spokesman chosen to argue in support of the main thesis of that dialogue. But it is impossible to deny the variance which Ast points out, and which is also admitted by Stallbaum. Steinhart indeed (Einleitung, p. 246) goes the length of denying it, in which I cannot follow him. The sentiment of Sokrates in the Apology embodies the same alternative uncertainty, as what we read in Marcus Antoninus, v. 33. Τί οὖν; περιμένεις ἵλεως τὴν εἴτε σβίβειν εἴτε μεράσασθαι, &c.

of the past—Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus ; thus discriminating which of them are really wise, and which of them are only unconscious pretenders. He is convinced that no evil can ever happen to the good man ; that the protection of the Gods can never be wanting to him, whether alive or dead.¹ "It is not lawful for a better man to be injured by a worse. He may indeed be killed, or banished, or disfranchised ; and these may appear great evils, in the eye of others. But I do not think them so. It is a far greater evil to do what Melétus is now doing—trying to kill a man unjustly."²

Sokrates here gives his own estimate of comparative good and evil. Death, banishment, disfranchisement, &c., are no great evils : to put another man to death unjustly, is a great evil to the doer : the good man can suffer no evil at all. These are given as the judgments of Sokrates, and as dissentient from most others. Whether they are Sokratic or Platonic opinions, or common to both—we shall find them reappearing in various other Platonic dialogues, hereafter to be noticed. We have also to notice that marked feature in the character of Sokrates³—the standing upon his own individual reason and measure of good and evil : nay, even pushing his confidence in it so far, as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him. This reliance on the individual reason is sometimes recognised, at other times rejected, in the Platonic dialogues. Plato rejects

Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether agreeing or disagreeing with others. ✓

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 32, p. 41 A-B.

² Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 D.

³ Plat. Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D. οὐδ' ἂν τις αὐτὸν τάττῃ ἢ ἡγησάμενος βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ ὑπ' ἀρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δέι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κινδυνεύειν, &c.

Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 8, 11. φρόνιμος δέ, ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτάνειν κρίνων τὰ βέλτιον καὶ τὰ χεῖρω, μηδὲ ἄλλου προσδέεσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτάρακτος εἶναι πρὸς τῶν τούτων γνώσιν, &c.

Compare this with Memor. i. 1, 3-4-5, and the Xenophontic Apology, 4, 5, 13, where this αὐτάρακτος finds for itself a justification in the hypothesis of a divine monitor without.

The debaters in the treatise of Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, upon the question of the Sokratic δαίμωνιον, insist upon this resolute persuasion and self-determination as the most indis-

putable fact in the case (c. 11, p. 581 C). Αἱ δὲ Σωκράτους ὁρμαὶ τὸ βέλαιον ἔχουσαι καὶ σφοδρότητα φαίνονται πρὸς πάντα, ὡς ἂν ἐξ ὁρῆς καὶ ἰσχυρᾶς ἀπειμῖναι κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς. Compare p. 589 E. The speculations of the speakers upon the οὐσία and δύναμις τοῦ Σωκράτους δαίμονιον, come to little result.

There is a curious passage in Plutarch's life of Coriolanus (c. 82), where he describes the way in which the Gods act upon the minds of particular men, under difficult and trying circumstances. They do not inspire new resolutions or volitions, but they work upon the associative principle, suggesting new ideas which conduct to the appropriate volition—οὐδ' ὁρμᾶς ἐνπνεύζομενον, ἀλλὰ φαντασίας ὁρμῶν ἀγωγούς, &c.

it in his comments (contained in the dialogue *Theætétus*) on the doctrine of Protagoras : he rejects it also in the constructive dialogues, *Republic* and *Leges*, where he constitutes himself despotic legislator, prescribing a standard of orthodox opinion ; he proclaims it in the *Gorgias*, and implies it very generally throughout the negative dialogues.

Lastly, we find also in the *Apology* distinct notice of the formidable efficacy of established public impressions, generated without any ostensible author, circulated in the common talk, and passing without examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith. "My accusers Melétus and Anytus (says Sokrates) are difficult enough to deal with : yet far less difficult than the prejudiced public, who have heard false reports concerning me for years past, and have contracted a settled belief about my character, from nameless authors whom I cannot summon here to be confuted."¹

It is against this ancient, established belief, passing for knowledge—communicated by unconscious contagion without any rational process—against the "procès jugé mais non plaidé," whereby King *Nomos* governs—that the general mission of Sokrates is directed. It is against the like belief, in one of its countless manifestations, that he here defends himself before the *Dikastery*.

¹ Plato, *Apol.* c. 2, p. 18 C-D.

CHAPTER X.

KRITON.

THE dialogue called Kriton is, in one point of view, a second part or sequel—in another point of view, an antithesis or corrective—of the Platonic Apology. For that reason, I notice it immediately after the Apology: though I do not venture to affirm confidently that it was composed immediately after: it may possibly have been later, as I believe the Phædon also to have been later.¹

General
purpose of
the Kriton.

The Kriton describes a conversation between Sokrates and his friend Kriton in the prison, after condemnation, and two days before the cup of hemlock was administered. Kriton entreats and urges Sokrates (as the sympathising friends had probably done frequently during the thirty days of imprisonment) to make his escape from the prison, informing him that arrangements have already been made for enabling him to escape with ease and safety, and that money as well as good recommendations will be provided, so that he may dwell comfortably either in Thessaly, or wherever else he pleases. Sokrates ought not, in justice to his children and his friends, to refuse the opportunity offered, and thus to throw away his life. Should he do so, it will appear to every one as if his friends had shamefully failed in their duty, when intervention on their part might easily have saved him. He might have avoided the trial altogether: even when on trial, he might easily

Subject of
the dialogue
—inter-
locutors.

¹ Steinhart affirms with confidence (Einleitung, p. 308). The fact may be so, but I do not feel thus confident that the Kriton was composed immediately after the Apology, and of it when I look to the analogy of the shortly after the death of Sokrates later Phædon.

have escaped the capital sentence. Here is now a third opportunity of rescue, which if he declines, it will turn this grave and painful affair into mockery, as if he and his friends were impotent simpletons.¹ Besides the mournful character of the event, Sokrates and his friends will thus be disgraced in the opinion of every one.

"Disgraced in the opinion of every one," replies Sokrates?

Answer of
Sokrates
to the
appeal
made by
Kriton.

That is not the proper test by which the propriety of your recommendation must be determined. I am now, as I always have been, prepared to follow nothing but that voice of reason which approves itself to me in discussion as the best and soundest.²

We have often discussed this matter before, and the conclusions on which we agreed are not to be thrown aside because of my impending death. We agreed that the opinions general among men ought not to be followed in all cases, but only in some: that the good opinions, those of the wise men, were to be followed—the bad opinions, those of the foolish men, to be disregarded. In the treatment and exercise of the body, we must not attend to the praise, the blame, or the opinion of every man, but only to those of the one professional trainer or physician. If we disregard this one skilful man, and conduct ourselves according to the praise or blame of the unskilful public, our body will become corrupted and disabled, so that life itself will not be worth having.

In like manner, on the question what is just and unjust, He declares that the judgment of the general honourable or base, good or evil, to which our present subject belongs—we must not yield to the praise and censure of the many, but only to that of the one,

¹ Plato, *Krito*. c. 5, p. 45 E. *ὡς ἔργου καὶ ὑπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδεύειν αἰσχύνομαι, μὴ δόξῃ ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ περὶ σέ ἀνδρείῳ τινὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπραχθῆαι, καὶ ἡ εἰσδοὺς τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικαστήριον, ὡς εἰσηλθεὶς, εἶδόν μὴ εἰσελθεῖν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἀγων τῆς δίκης ὡς ἐγίνετο, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον δὴ τούτῳ, ὥσπερ καταγίλως τῆς πράξεως, κακίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ διαπεφηνεῖναι ἡμᾶς δοκεῖν, οἷον τίς σε οὐχὶ ἐσώσαμεν οὐδὲ σὺ σπαντὸν, οἷον τε δὴν καὶ δυνατόν, εἴ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἡμῶν ὄφελος ἦν.*

This is a remarkable passage, as

evinced that both the trial and the death of Sokrates, even in the opinion of his own friends, might have been avoided without anything which they conceived to be dishonourable to his character.

Professor Köchly puts this point very forcibly in his *Portrag*, referred to in my notes on the *Platonic Apology*, p. 410 seq.

² Plato, *Krito*. c. 6, p. 46 B. *ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τοιούτου, ὅλος τῶν ἡμῶν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ πείθεσθαι ἢ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅς ἂν μοι λογιζομένη βέλτιστος φαίνεται.*

whoever he may be, who is wise on these matters.¹ We must be afraid and ashamed of him more than of all the rest. Not the verdict of the many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust, and that of truth itself, must be listened to. Otherwise we shall suffer the like debasement and corruption of mind as of body in the former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True—the many may put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to live, but to live well, justly, honourably.²

Sokrates thus proceeds :—

The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline, but whether it will be just or unjust—right or wrong—if I comply ; that is, if I consent to escape from prison against the will of the Athenians and against the sentence of law.

To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand unshaken now.³

We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.⁴

This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very few persons hold it, or ever will hold it. Most men say the contrary—that when other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do wrong or harm to them in return. This is a cardinal point. Between those who affirm it, and those who

public is not worthy of trust : he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is wise on the matter in debate.

Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust? Never in any case to act unjustly.

Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and

¹ Plato, Krito. c. 7, p. 47 C-D. και δη και περι των δικαίων και αδικίων, και αισχρών και καλών, και αγαθών και κακών, περι ὧν νῦν ἡ βουλή ἡμῖν ἐστίν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπιτεθεῖσθαι και φοβεῖσθαι αὐτήν, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἰ τίς ἐστιν ἰσχυρὸν, ὃν δεῖ και αἰσχυρῶσθαι και φοβεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ξύμπαντας τοὺς ἄλλους ;

c. 8, p. 48 A. Οὐκ ἔρα πάνν ἡμῖν

οὕτω φροντιστέον δ, τι ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ἡμᾶς, ἀλλ' ὅ, τι ὁ ἰσχυρὸν περι των δικαίων και αδικίων, ὁ εἰς, και αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλήθεια.

² Plato, Krito. c. 7-8, pp. 47-48.

³ Plato, Krito. c. 9, p. 48 E. ὅρα δὲ δη τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ὅτι

⁴ Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 B. Οὐδὲ ἀδικούμενοι ἔρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ οἰοῦνται, ἐπειδὴ γε εὐδαμῶς δεῖ ἀδικεῖν, &c.

that most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point is cardinal.

Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to Sokrates, demanding from him implicit obedience.

deny it, there can be no common measure or reasoning. Reciprocal contempt is the sentiment with which, by necessity, each contemplates the other's resolutions.¹

Sokrates then delivers a well-known and eloquent pleading, wherein he imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with him on his purpose of secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally pronounced. By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he has entered into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no right of redress against them—neither by open disobedience, nor force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled public: but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been distinguished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.²

This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly described, appears intended by Plato—as far as I can pretend to guess at his purpose—to set forth the personal character and dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the

¹ Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 D. Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι δαίμοις νισὶ ταῦτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δοξεῖ. Οἷς οὖν οὕτω δίδοται καὶ οἷς μὴ, τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ βουλή, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη τοὺς ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὁρῶντας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλευόμενα. Σκόπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐν μάλα, πότερον κοινωρεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖ σοι· καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν βουλευόμενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὁρθῶς ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικεῖν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικεῖν, οὔτε κα-

κὼς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς.

Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in the speech of Alkibiades at Sparta after he had been exiled by the Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. τὸ τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ἀσφαλὲς ἐπολιτεύθην.

² Plato, Krito. c. 11-17, pp. 50-54.

Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen: he warned them against condemning him, because his condemnation would be a mischief, not to him, but to them—and because by doing so they would repudiate and maltreat the missionary sent to them by the Delphian God as a valuable present.¹ In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts, Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they justified by some of his public remarks. He had manifested by unmistakable language the same contempt for the Athenian constitution as that which had been displayed in act by Kritias and Alkibiades,² with whom his own name was associated as teacher and companion.³ Xenophon in

of Sokrates in a light different from that which the Apology had presented—unqualified submission instead of defiance

¹ Plato, Apol. c. 17-18, p. 29-30.

² This was among the charges urged against Sokrates by Anytus and the other accusers (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. *ὡς ποτὶν ἰσχυροῖς τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμων τοὺς ἀνθρώπους*). It was also the judgment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor, the elder Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato.—Plutarch, Cato c. 23, a passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding.

The accusation of "putting himself above the laws," appears in the same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1036-1400, &c. :-

ὅς ἔδδ' καινοῖς πρᾶγμασι καὶ δεξιοῖς
ὀμᾶσιν
καὶ τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμων ὥς ποτὶν
φρονεῖν δύνασθαι.

Compare the rhetor Aristides—*Υπερ τῶν Τετράρων*, p. 133; vol. iii. p. 480, Dindorf.

³ The dramatic position of Sokrates has been compared by Köchly, p. 332, very suitably with that of Antigone, who, in burying her deceased brother,

acts upon her own sense of right and family affections, in defiance of an express interdict from sovereign authority. This tragical conflict of obligations, indicated by Aristotle as an ethical question suited for dialectic debate (Topic. i. p. 105, b. 22), was handled by all the three great tragedians; and has been ennobled by Sophokles in one of his best remaining tragedies. The Platonic Apology presents many points of analogy with the Antigone, while the Platonic Kriton carries us into an opposite vein of sentiment. Sokrates after sentence, and Antigone after sentence, are totally different persons. The young maiden, though adhering with unshaken conviction to the rectitude of her past disobedience, cannot submit to the sentence of death without complaint and protestation. Though above all fear she is clamorous in remonstrances against both the injustice of the sentence and the untimely close of her career: so that she is obliged to be dragged away by the officers (Soph. Antig. 870-877; compare 497-508, with Plato, Krito. p. 49 C; Apolog. p. 28 D, 29 C). All these points enhance the interest of the piece, and are suited to a destined bride in the flower of her age. But an old philosopher of

his *Memorabilia* recognises this impression as prevalent among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the *Kriton*.

This dialogue puts into the mouth of Sokrates a rhetorical harangue forcible and impressive, which he supposes himself to hear from personified *Nomos* or *Athens*, claiming for herself and her laws plenary and unmeasured obedience from all her citizens, as a covenant due to her from each. He declares his own heartfelt adhesion to the claim. Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language of a devoted democratical patriot. His doctrine is one which every Athenian audience would warmly applaud—whether heard from speakers in the assembly, from litigants in the *Dikastery*, or from dramatists in the theatre. It is a doctrine which orators of all varieties (*Perikles*, *Nikias*, *Kleon*, *Lysis*, *Isokrates*, *Demosthenes*, *Æschines*, *Lykurgus*) would be alike emphatic in upholding: upon which probably Sophists habitually displayed their own eloquence, and tested the talents of their pupils. It may be considered as almost an Athenian common-place. Hence it is all the better fitted for Plato's purpose of restoring Sokrates to harmony with his fellow-citizens. It serves as his protestation of allegiance to Athens, in reply to the adverse impressions prevalent against him. The only singularity which bestows special pertinence on that which is in substance a discourse of venerated common-place, is—that Sokrates proclaims and applies his doctrine of absolute submis-

seventy years of age has no such attachment to life remaining. He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason: he has not only silenced "the child within us who fears death" (to use the remarkable phrase of Plato, *Phædon*, p. 77 E), but he knows well that what remains to him of life must be short; that it will probably be of little value, with diminished powers, mental as well as bodily; and that if passed in exile, it will be of no value at all. To close his life with dignity is the best thing which can happen to him. While by escape from the prison he

would have gained little or nothing; he is enabled, by refusing the means of escape, to manifest an ostentatious deference to the law, and to make peace with the Athenian authorities after the opposition which had been declared in his *Apology*. Both in the *Kriton* and in the *Phædon*, Sokrates exhibits the specimen of a man adhering to previous conviction, unaffected by impending death, and by the apprehensions which that season brings upon ordinary minds; estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and independent reason.

sion, under the precise circumstances in which many others, generally patriotic, might be disposed to recede from it—where he is condemned (unjustly, in his own persuasion) to suffer death—yet has the opportunity to escape. He is thus presented as a citizen not merely of ordinary loyalty but of extraordinary patriotism. Moreover his remarkable constancy of residence at Athens is produced as evidence, showing that the city was eminently acceptable to him, and that he had no cause of complaint against it.¹

Throughout all this eloquent appeal addressed by Athens to her citizen Sokrates, the points insisted on are those common to him with other citizens: the marked specialties of his character being left unnoticed. Such are the points suitable to the purpose (rather Xenophontic than Platonic, herein) of the Kriton; when Sokrates is to be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when we read the language of Sokrates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a dissenter, not only departing altogether from the character and purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was. The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy: yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric imbued with the most genuine spirit of constitutional democracy. It is the compromise of his long-standing dissent with the reigning orthodoxy, just before his death *Ἐν εὐφημίᾳ καὶ τελευτᾷ*.²

The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with other citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character.

Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence pronounced

Still Sokrates is represented as adopting

¹ Plato, *Krito*. c. 14, p. 52 B. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμεις, τί μή σοι διαφερόντως ἤρεσκε. c. 12, p. 50

D. φέρε γάρ, τί ἐγκαλῶν ἦλιν τε καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλύουσαι;

² Plato, *Phædon*, p. 117 D.

the resolution to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him, but which would not weigh with others.

against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case; not even in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. "This (says Sokrates) is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning. Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do accept it, and those who do not—there can be no common counsel: by necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the reasonings of the other, with contempt."¹

This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive *per se*, in its application to the actual case, and might have been made to conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:—which, however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates, but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct elements—constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality.

Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of individual reason and conscience; for the individual himself—but for him alone. "This (says Sokrates) is, and has long been *my* conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and between those who do and those who do not, there can be no common deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other."¹ Here we have the Protagorean dogma, *Homo Mensura*—which Sokrates will be found combating in the Theætétus—proclaimed by

The language is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason, but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.

Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason and conscience, for the individual himself.

¹ Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.

Sokrates himself. As things appear to me, so they are to me : as they appear to you, so they are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me : yours for you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine.

I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues, particularly the *Theætétus*.

I have already observed that the tone of the *Kriton* is rhetorical, not dialectical—especially the harangue ascribed to Athens. The business of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of persuasion, whether as to a general resolution or a particular fact, in the bosoms of certain auditors before him : hence he gives prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or discrediting others, and especially keeping out of sight all the difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable conclusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best. Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought fully into view and discussed : until this has been done, the process is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is attainable or not.

The *Kriton* is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference between Rhetoric and Dialectic.

Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the *Gorgias*, greatly depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion : elsewhere he employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we read in the *Kriton* is one of his best specimens : appealing to pre-established and widespread emotions, veneration for parents, love of country, respect for covenants—to justify the resolution of Sokrates in the actual case : working up these sentiments into fervour, but neglecting all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations : assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are perfectly understood and indisputable.

But these last-mentioned elements—difficulties, qualifications, necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words—would have been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real habit and genius. He was perpetually engaged (says

The *Kriton* makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but overlooks

the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be solved. Xenophon¹) in dialectic enquiry. "What is the Holy, what is the Unholy? What is the Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c."

Now in the rhetorical appeal embodied in the Kriton, the important question, What is the Just and the Unjust (i.e. Justice and Injustice in general), is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a particular case, as if we already knew what justice and injustice meant generally: to inquire about modifications of justice, before we have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption involved in the rhetorical process; which assumption we shall find Plato often deprecating as unphilosophical and preposterous.

So far indeed Sokrates goes in this dialogue, to affirm a

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16. Αὐτὸς δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων ἀεὶ διελέγετο, σκοπεῖν, τί εὐσεβές, τί ἀσεβές· τί καλόν, τί αἰσχρόν· τί δίκαιον, τί ἀδίκον· τί σωφροσύνη, τί μανία· τί ἀνδρεία, τί δειλία· τί πόλις, τί πολιτικός· τί ἀρχὴ ἀνθρώπων, τί ἀρχιεὺς ἀνθρώπων, &c.

We see in Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 40-46, iv. 2, 37, in the Platonic dialogue *Minos* and elsewhere, the number of dialectic questions which Sokrates might have brought to bear upon the harangue in the *Kriton*, had it been delivered by any opponent whom he sought to perplex or confute. What is a law? What are the limits of obedience to the laws? Are there no limits (as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)? While the oligarchy of Thirty were the constituted authority at Athens, they ordered Sokrates himself, together with four other citizens, to go and arrest a citizen whom they considered dangerous to the state, the Salaminian Leon. The other four obeyed the order; Sokrates alone disobeyed, and takes credit for having done so, considering Leon to be innocent. Which was in the right here? the four obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? Might not the four have used substantially the same arguments to justify their obedience, as those which Sokrates hears from personified Athens in the *Kriton*? We must remember that the Thirty had come into authority by resolutions passed under constitutional forms, when fear of

foreign enemies induced the people to sanction the resolutions proposed by a party among themselves. The Thirty also ordered Sokrates to abstain from discourse with young men; he disobeyed (*Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 3*). Was he right in disobeying?

I have indicated briefly these questions, to show how completely the rhetorical manner of the *Kriton* submerges all those difficulties, which would form the special matter of genuine Socratic dialectics.

Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum *Kriton*, pp. 233, 234) considers the *Kriton* as a composition of special occasion—*Gelegenheitschrift*—which I think is true; but which may be said also, in my judgment, of every Platonic dialogue. The term, however, in Schleiermacher's writing, has a peculiar meaning, viz. a composition for which there is no place in the regular rank and file of the Platonic dialogues, as he marshals them. He remarks the absence of dialectic in the *Kriton*, and he adduces this as one reason for supposing it not to be genuine.

But it is no surprise to me to find Plato rhetorical in one dialogue, dialectical in others. Variety, and want of system, seem to me among his most manifest attributes.

The view taken of the *Kriton* by Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in the first page of his very rhetorical Introduction, coincides pretty much with mine.

positive analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and strength are to the body:—Unjust and Base, what distemper and weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the general public are incompetent to determine what is just or honourable—as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or unwholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to advise.¹

Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey of the dialogues. The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect reply to the great Sokratic problem—What is Justice? What is Injustice? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to the exposition of many passages in which Plato is yet more obscure. The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues—"The one specially instructed, professional, theorizing, Expert—*versus* (the *idōrai* of the time and place, or) common sense, common sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice," &c. (all these names meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is alluding). This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the question—What is the ultimate authority? where does the right of final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political, æsthetical? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent.

I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here I shall merely notice the application which Sokrates makes (in the *Kriton*) of the general doctrine. We might anticipate that after having declared that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, except a professional Expert,—he would have proceeded to name some person corresponding to that designation—to justify the title of that person to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues—and then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand. This is what Sokrates would have done, if the

Incompetence of the general public or *idōrai*—appeal to the professional Expert.

Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been declared—he does not name who the trustworthy Expert is.

¹ Plato, *Kriton*, c. 7, p. 47 D. τοῦ ἰδὸς, εἰ τίς ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ, &c.

case had been one of health or sickness. He would have said—"I appeal to Hippokrates, Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine: they have given proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing, teaching, &c.: they pronounce so and so". He would not have considered himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his own.

But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, the conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He specifies no professional Expert, and he proceeds to lay down a dogma of his own; in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is fundamental, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act himself the part of professional Expert, though he does not openly assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to reside with some unnamed Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is.

The analogy here produced by Plato—of questions about health and sickness—is followed out only in its negative operation; as it serves to scare away the multitude, and discredit the Vox Populi. But when this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated. In other dialogues, we shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him. In the Kriton, he undertakes the duty himself; unmindful of the many emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and taken credit for confessing it without reserve.

Sokrates
acts as the
Expert
himself:
he finds
authority
in his own
reason and
conscience.

CHAPTER XI.

EUTHYPHRON.

THE dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in immediate sequel to the *Apology* and the *Kriton*.

The indictment by Melétus against Sokrates is assumed to have been formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful theological points, and prophesying future events.¹

Situation supposed in the dialogue — interlocutors.

What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment against you?

Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melétus. He takes commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient Gods.

Indictment by Melétus against Sokrates — Antipathy of the Athenians towards those who spread heretical opinions.

Euthyph.—I understand: it is because you talk about the Dæmon or Genius often communicating with you, that Melétus calls you an innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready

¹ Plato, *Euthyphr.* c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.

admission with most minds.¹ So also, people laugh at me, when I talk about religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It must be from jealousy ; because all that I have predicted has come true.

Sokr.—To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to teach his wisdom to others : but when they regard him besides, as likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously angry with him—be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one : for my part, I delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.²

Socrates now learns what is Euthyphron's business at the archontic office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King Archon, against his own father ; as having caused the death of a dependent workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a ditch : at the same time sending to the Exégetês (the canonical adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the messenger was sent to the Exégetês at Athens : before he could return, the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of the prisoner : who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens, in obtaining the answer of the Exégetês, and in returning to Naxos.

¹ Plato, *Euthyphr.* c. 2, p. 3 B : φησὶ γὰρ με ποιητὴν εἶναι θεῶν καὶ ὡς καινοῦς ποιοῦντα θεοῦς, τοὺς δ' ἀρχαίους οὐ νομίζοντα, ἐγράψατο τοῦτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα, ὡς φησιν. c. 5, p. 5 A : αὐτοσχεδιάζοντα καὶ καιροτομοῦντα περὶ τῶν θείων ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

² Plato, *Euthyphr.* c. 3, p. 3 C-D. Ἀθηναῖοις γὰρ οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἂν τινα δεινὸν οἰωνται εἶναι, μὴ μόντοι διδάσκαλικὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ἐν δ' ἂν καὶ ἄλλους οἰωνται ποιεῖν τοιοῦτους, θυμούνται, εἰτ' οὖν φόβον, ὡς σὺ λέγεις, εἴτε δὲ ἄλλο τι.

My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my father did not kill the man :¹ that even if he had, the man had committed murder : lastly, that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or unjustly. If justly there is nothing to be said ; if unjustly, then my father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every one else, who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the same table with him, come under the like curse ; unless I purify myself by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they, what holiness is and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.²

I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,³ and I shall be grateful if you will teach me : the rather as I shall be able to defend myself better against Melétus. Tell me what is the general constituent feature of *Holiness*? What is that common essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all holy or pious acts? What is that common opposite essence, which distinguishes all unholy or impious acts?⁴

Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks him — What is Holiness?

¹ According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in case any one of his relatives (μέχρις ἀντιπαιδῶν) or any member of his household (οἰκίτης) had been put to death, to come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding upon the citizen alike in law and in religion.

Demosthen. cont. Euerget. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux, viii. 118.

Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety, if the person indicted had been a stranger.

² Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the *μίσσημα*, which a person who had committed criminal homicide was supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10: iii. a. 7, p. 116; and De Herodis Cæde

a. 81, p. 139. The argument here employed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father, or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.

³ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. τί γὰρ καὶ φήσομεν, εἰ γε καὶ αὐτοὶ ὁμολογοῦμεν περὶ αὐτῶν μηδὲν εἶδέναι;

⁴ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 D. Among the various reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by

It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing. to bring to justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege or any other such crime, whoever he be—even though it be your own father. The examples of the Gods teach us this. Kronus punished his father

Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son Kronus, and of Kronus by his son Zeus.

Uranus for wrong-doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the best and justest of the Gods, did the like by his father Kronus. I only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict themselves when they talk about the Gods

and about me.¹

Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much circulation.

Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods, which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my part, I have some repugnance in believing them;² it is for this reason probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I pretend to no knowledge whatever about them.

I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me repeat my question to you respecting holiness.³

Ueberweg (Untermuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the Euthyphron, one is that τὸ ἀνόσιον is reckoned as an εἶδος as well as τὸ ὅσιον. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd, since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly gives τὸ ἄδικον as an εἶδος, along with τὸ δίκαιον (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive Ideas corresponding to negative terms—τῶν ἀποφαστικῶν ἰδέας. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of Alexander, p. 565, a. 81 r.

¹ Plato, Euthyphron, p. 6-6.

We see here that Euthyphron is made to follow out the precept delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætetus and elsewhere—to make himself as like to the Gods as possible—(ὁμοιωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. Theætēt. p. 176 B; compare Phædrus, 252 C)—only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods differently from Sokrates.

² Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 A.

* Ἀρὰ γε τοῦτ' ἴσθιν, ὃ ἔνεκα τὴν γραφὴν φεύγω, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπιτιθεῖν τις περὶ τῶν θεῶν λίγη εὐσεβείᾳ πως ἀποδύχεται; δι' ἃ δὲ, ὡς εἶπες, φήσει τις με ἐξαμαρτάνειν.

³ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 C.

Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and incredulous. "He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city believes, but introduces religious novelties"—to use the words of the indictment preferred against him by Melétus. The Athenian public felt the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such as those of Zeus and Kronus,¹ called in question or criticised in an ethical spirit different from their own—as is felt by Jews or Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is seized with misgivings, and prays that Gods and heroes will not be offended with him.² The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is these men who are depicted by orthodox opponents as committing lawless acts, and justifying themselves by precedents

Bearing of this dialogue on the relative positions of Sokrates and the Athenian public.

¹ I shall say more about Plato's views on the theological legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise when he says "that Plato rejected all the opinions of his countrymen concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity"—ὅπως τε πάσας τὰς πατρίους περὶ τῶν θεῶν ὑπολήψεις ἤθετε, καὶ τὴν ἀποτίαν αὐτῶν διήλεγχεν (Præp. Evan. xiii. 1)—the very same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melétus against Sokrates.

² Herodot. ii. 65: τῶν δὲ εἰρηκεν ἀνείτας τὰ ἱρὰ, εἰ λεγοίμην, καταβαίην ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐς τὰ θεῖα πρῆγματα, τὰ ἐγὼ φεύγω μάλιστα ἀπηγείσθαι. τὰ δὲ καὶ εἴρηκα αὐτῶν ἐτίψαντας, ἀναγκαίῃ καταλαμβάνόμενος εἶπον . . . 45. Λέγουσι δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ἄλλα ἀπιστικέως οἱ Ἕλληνες· εὐήθης δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ ὁδε ὁ μῦθος ἐστί, τὸν περὶ τοῦ Ἡρακλέους λέγουσι . . . ἐτι δὲ εἶνα πάντα τὸν Ἡρακλέα, καὶ ἐτι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς δὴ ὄασι, αὖς φύσιν ἔχει πολλὰς μυριάδας φονεύσαι; καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων τοσαῦτα ἡμῖν εἰπούσι, καὶ παρὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ παρὰ τῶν ἡρώων εὐμένεια εἶη.

About the ἱροὶ λόγοι which he keeps back. see cap. 51, 61, 62, 81, 170, &c.

drawn from the proceedings of Zeus.¹ They are, besides, especially accused of teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.²

Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack. Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer. He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed respecting the Gods, but more besides.³ His faith is so implicit, that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with inconsistency and shortcoming, and disregarding the judgment of the multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.⁴ Euthyphron stands forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he may.⁵ These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public, there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus invoking upon his father the severest penalties of law. It would probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, "See the consequences to which free-thinking and the new system of education lead"—the son Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronos"—we may take the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral, propounded by a defender of Sokrates, "See the consequences to which consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron indicts his own

¹ Aristoph. Nubes, 905-1080.
² Aristoph. Nubes, 994-1333-1444.
 Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 49. Σωκράτης—
 τοὺς πατέρας προσηλακίζεον ἐδίδασκε
 (accusation by Melétus).

³ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. E.
 καὶ ἐπὶ γε τούτων θαυμασιώτερα, ἃ οἱ
 πολλοὶ οὐκ ἴσασιν.

Euthyphron belonged to the class
 described in Euripides, Hippol. 45:—

Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν γραφάς τε τῶν παλαι-
 τέρων

ἔχουσιν, αὐτοὶ ἂν εἰσὶν ἐν μοῦσαις
 δέ,

ἴσασιν, &c.

Compare also Euripid. Herakleidae,
 404.

⁴ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 5 A;
 c. 6, p. 6 A.

⁵ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 E.
 μὴ ἐκτρέψαι τὴν ἀσεβοῦντι μὴδ' ἂν ὁ-
 τισὺν τυγχάνῃ ὢν.

⁶ Aristoph. Nubes, 937. τὴν κεινὴν
 παιδεύουσιν, &c.

father for homicide; he vindicates the step as conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to approve."¹

¹ Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. II. pp. 51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur; but his conception of its "unverkennbare apologetische Absicht" is very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man "der sich besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die rechtgläubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe tapfer verteidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlasste, in Gegensatz zu bringen—war ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke" (p. 54). But when Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed (unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates,—and when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him altogether, though Steinhart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either "a natural out-growth of the Protagoras," or "an approximation and preparation for the Parmenides" (p. 52). Still less do I feel the force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine work of Plato.

I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates. But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p. 250), though I do not share his doubts of the authenticity of the dialogue.

The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. "Constat enim Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium confutum, ut ei iudicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus id

egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitiae et ignorantiae coargueret. Nam Euthyphronem novimus, ad vates ignorantiae rerum gravissimarum convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agitur, ut sophistas et viros civiles non scientiæ atque arte, sed cæco quodam impetu mentis et sorte divinâ duci demonstraretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur. . . . Nam Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis causa hand ita pridem in iudicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sanè verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, cuius simile argumentum et consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse." Stallbaum, Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. IV. [Comp. Stallb. ibid., 2nd ed. pp. 339-341].

"Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati quidem inimici, sed ejusdem superstitioni, vel ut hodie loquuntur, orthodoxi, qualis Athenis vulgò esset religionia conditio, declarare instituit. Ex quo nobis quidem clarissimè videtur apparere Platonem hoc unum spectavisse, ut iudices admonerentur, ne populari superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent." Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. VI. p. 146.

Steinhart also (in his Einleitung, p. 190) calls Euthyphron "ein rechtgläubiger von reinsten Wasser—ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer, Mann," &c.

In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it. Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of the other Socratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict of guilty; which is probably true about Plato, and would have been borne out by the event if

I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in the dialogue—the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy?—he replied, “That which I am now doing.”—*Sokr.* That may be: but many other things besides are also holy.—*Euthyphr.* Certainly.—*Sokr.* Then your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular holy act, among many. But the question asked was—What is Holiness generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether the case deserves to be called holy or not.¹

Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in which Xenophon affirms² Sokrates to have passed his life, and which Plato prosecutes under his master’s name. The question is generalised much more than in the Kriton.

It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence—one objective characteristic or fact—common to all things called Holy. The purpose of the questioner is, to determine what this Idea is: to provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the respondent is, that he names simply one particular case, coming under the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often corrected in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question was first put, its bearing

Sequel of the dialogue—Euthyphron gives a particular example as the reply to a general question.

Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.

Sokrates had made a different defence. But this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring out; for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic Apology (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates

there expressed his surprise at the verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had expected that it would pass by a larger majority.

¹ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 E.

² Xenoph. Memor. I. 1, 16.

would not be properly conceived. And even if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then, and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to all.

Euthyphron next replies—That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy : that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is unholy.—*Sokr.* That is the sort of answer which I desired to have : now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity—for such questions can be determined by calculation and measurement : nor about questions of weight—for there the balance may be appealed to. The questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another ; and each of us fights for his own opinions.¹ We all indeed agree that the wrong-doer ought to be punished : but we do not agree *who* the wrong-doer is, nor what is wrong-doing. The same action which some of us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.²

First general answer given by Euthyphron—that which is pleasing to the Gods is Holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon.

So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same matters—just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God, is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and displeasing to the Gods.

¹ Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 C-D. *Περὶ τίς τις δὲ διενεχθέντες καὶ ἐπὶ τίνα κρίσιν οὐ δυνάμενοι ἀφικέσθαι ἐχθροὶ γε ἂν ἀλλήλους εἴμεν καὶ ὀργιζομεθα; ἴσως οὐ πρόχειρόν σοι ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει, εἰ τὰς ἔστι τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀδίκον, καὶ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Ἄρ' οὐ ταῦτα ἔστι περὶ ὧν διενεχθέντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐπὶ ἱκανῇ κρίσει αὐτῶν εἶλθιν ἐχθροὶ ἀλλήλους γιγνώμεθα, ὅταν*

γιγνώμεθα, καὶ ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι πάντες;

² Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. *Οὐκ ἄρα ἐκεῖνό γε ἀμφισβητοῦσιν, ὥς οὐ τὸν ἀδικοῦντα δεῖ διδόναι δίκην· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο ἴσως ἀμφισβητοῦσι, τὸ τίς ἔστιν ὁ ἀδικῶν καὶ τί δρῶν, καὶ πότε; Πράξεως τινος περὶ διαφερόμενοι, οἱ μὲν δίκαιως φασὶν αὐτὴν πεπραχθαι, οἱ δὲ ἀδίκως.*

According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.¹

Euthyph.—I am convinced that there are some things which *all* the Gods love, and some things which *all* the Gods hate. That which I am doing, for example—indicting my father for homicide—belongs to the former category. Now that which all the Gods love is the holy: that which they all hate, is the unholy.²

Sokr.—Do the Gods love the holy, because it is holy? Or is it holy for this reason, because they do love it?

To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the Holy—they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.

Euthyph.—They love it because it is holy.³ *Sokr.*—Then the holiness is one thing; the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is, by virtue of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to be the subject of various other attributes.⁴

Euthyph.—I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every way. *Sokr.*—If I am

¹ In regard to Plato's ethical enquiries generally, and to what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is here laid down,—that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong, honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat differently, in the *Kriton*, that on these matters, though the judgment of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future comment.

² Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 11, p. 9.

³ Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which Sokrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. Οὐκ ἔρα διότι ὁρῶμενόν γ' ἐστὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁράται, ἀλλὰ τούναντιον διότι ὁράται, διὰ τοῦτο ὁρῶμενόν· οὐδὲ διότι ἀγόμενόν ἐστι, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγεται, ἀλλὰ διότι ἀγεται, διὰ τοῦτο ἀγόμενόν· οὐδὲ

διότι φερόμενον, φέρεται, ἀλλὰ διότι φέρεται, φερόμενον.

The difference between the meaning of *φέρεται* and *φερόμενόν ἐστι* is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance; but in this case the inference would not necessarily follow.

Compare *Aristotel. Physica*, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of Simplicius, p. 330, a. 2nd ed. Bekk. where *βαδίζων ἐστι* is recognised as equivalent to *βαδίζει*.

⁴ Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 13, p. 11 A. κινδυνεύεις, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ ὅσιον, ὃ, τί ποτ' ἐστίν, τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλώσαι, πάθος δέ τι περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ, τι πέπονθε τοῦτο τὸ ὅσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων τῶν θεῶν· ὃ, τι δὲ ὄν, οὐπω εἴπεις. . . . πάλιν εἰπὲς ἐξ ἀρχῆς, τί ποτε ὄν τὸ ὅσιον εἴτε φιλεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν, εἴτε ὅτι δη πείσχει.

ingenious, it is against my own will ;¹ for I am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken. But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that is just necessarily holy ?

Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with reference to each other : the former embracing all that the latter embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples, illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out, at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.² So much therefore is made out—That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what part ? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of the just ? Euthyphron answers. The holy is that portion or branch of the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods : the remaining branch of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.³

Socrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or variety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by men to the Gods.

Sokr.—What sort of ministration ? Other ministrations, to horses, dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit of those to whom they are rendered :—besides, they can only be rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does the ministration, called *holiness*, benefit or improve the Gods ?
Euthyph.—In no way : it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters. *Sokr.*—You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me—to what end does the work conduce ? What is that end which the Gods accomplish, through our agency as workmen ? Physicians employ their slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health : shipbuilders put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great works which the Gods bring about by our agency ?
Euthyph.—Their works are numerous and great. *Sokr.*—The like may be

Ministration to the Gods ? How ? To what purpose ?

¹ Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 13, p. 11 D. ἄκων εἰμι σοφός, &c.

² Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 13-14, p. 12.

³ Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 14, p. 12 E.

τὸ μέρος τοῦ δικαίου εἶναι εὐσεβείας τε καὶ ὁσίων, τὸ περὶ τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν· τὸ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ λοιπὸν εἶναι τοῦ δικαίου μέρος.

said of generals : but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is—to assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman : but the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth. State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods perform through our agency.¹

Euthyph.—It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully. But so much I tell you in plain terms. Holiness—rectitude in sacrifice and prayer—right traffic between men and the Gods. If a man, when sacrificing and praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the Gods, that is holiness : this it is which upholds the security both of private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness, which subverts and ruins them.² *Sokr.*—Holiness, then, is the knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods ; that is, of giving to them, and asking from them. To ask rightly, is to ask what we want from them : to give rightly, is to give to them what they want from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear enough ; but what do they gain on their side ?

Euthyph.—The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. *Sokr.*—The holy, then, is that which obtains favour from the Gods : not that which is gainful to them, nor that which they love. *Euthyph.*—Nay : I think they love it especially. *Sokr.*—Then it appears that the holy is what the Gods love ? *Euthyph.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a short time ago as untenable.³ It was agreed between us, that to be loved by the Gods was

¹ Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 16, pp. 13, 14.

² Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third unsuccessful answer of *Euthyphron* with the third answer assigned to *Hippias* (*Hipp. Maj.* 291 C-E). Both of them appear length-

ened, emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become vexatious.

³ Plato, *Euthyphron*, c. 19, p. 15 C. μέμνησαι γάρ που, ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἐμπροσθεν τό τε δοῖον καὶ τὸ θεοφιλὲς οὐ ταῦτόν ἡμῖν ἀφάνη, ἀλλ' ἕτερα ἀλλήλων.

not of the essence of holiness, and could not serve as an explanation of holiness : though it might be truly affirmed thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know, you are indicting your own father for homicide.

Euthyph.—"The investigation must stand over to another time, I have engagements now which call me elsewhere."

So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly Sokratic spirit :—an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as orthodoxy : warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments and confused notions have grown up by association in every one's mind, without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief. Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance, soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction in that which is given to him for instruction.

We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Euthyphron. The talent of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself—with deep regret that he can do no more. "Sokrates" (says Aristotle¹) "put questions, but gave no answers : for he professed not to know." In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more (there also, against his own will

which is pleasing to the Gods.

This is the same explanation which was before declared insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He breaks off the dialogue.

Sokratic spirit of the dialogue—confessed ignorance applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge.

The questions always difficult, often impossible to answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad answers of others.

¹ Aristotel. *Sophist. Elench.* p. 183, καὶ οὐκ ἀπεκρίνετο· ἀπολόγους γὰρ οὐκ ἔπει καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Σωκράτης ἦν ὅτι εἰδέναι.

and protest, as in the *Philébus* and *Republic*), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the part of Sokrates was altogether simulated : as if he was himself,¹ from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions, but refrained designedly from announcing it : nay, sometimes, as if the answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar topics, are always difficult : they are often even impossible to answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial, but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates directs his questions : the fact belongs to our days no less than to his.²

The assumptions of some Platonic commentators—that Sokrates and Plato of course knew the answers to their own questions—that an honest and pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in his heart, though he cannot put it in words—these assumptions were also made by many of Plato's contemporaries, who depreciated his questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in age), thus criticised Plato's requirement, that these familiar terms should be defined : "What ! (said he) have none of us before your time talked about

¹ See Stallbaum, *Prolegg. ad Euthyphron*, p. 140.

² Adam Smith observes, in his *Essay on the Formation of Languages* (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), "Ask a man what relation is expressed by the preposition *of* : and if he has not beforehand employed his

thoughts a good deal upon these subjects, you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer".

The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer, but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the *Elenchus* of Sokrates.

the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as empty and unmeaning sounds?"¹ Theopompus was the scholar of Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the definition of familiar ethical or political words.² They considered that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused, wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton) which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual problems have already been solved.

All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view: the distinction between the essential constituent and the accidental accompaniment,³ and the search for a definition corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by Sokrates (as Aristotle⁴ points out) and was taken up from him by Plato. It was Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the objective, intellectual, scientific view of ethics—as distinguished from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so as to create the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for this requirement.

Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (i.e. emotional meaning). Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and the same emotion, similar in

Objective
view of
Ethics, dis-
tinguished
by Sokrates
from the
subjective.

Subjective
unanimity
coincident
with ob-
jective
dissent.

¹ Epiktétus, II. 17, 5-10. Τὸ δ' ἐξαπατῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτι καὶ Θεόπομπον τὸν ῥήτορα ὃς πον καὶ Πλάτωνι ἐγκαλεῖ ἐπὶ τῷ βούλεισθαι ἕκαστα ὀρίεσθαι. Τί γὰρ λέγει; Οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν πρὸ σοῦ ἔλεγεν ἀγαθὸν ἢ δίκαιον; ἢ μὴ παρακολουθοῦντες τί ἐστὶ τούτων ἕκαστον, ἀσέμνως καὶ κενῶς ἐφθεγγόμεθα τὰς φωνάς;

Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Gn. Pompeium

de Platone, p. 757; also De Princ. Historicis, p. 782.

² Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 90.

These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every appearance of being intended to allude to them.

³ This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron, p. 11 A.

⁴ Aristot. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2; M. 1078, b. 28.

character, though not equal in force—was felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another, except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism,—that such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the widest objective and intellectual dissension.¹

As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron—all men agree that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute very much *who it is* that acts unjustly—which of his actions are unjust—or under *what* circumstances they are so. The emotion in each man's mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the same:² but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each, although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon

Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental condition by Sokrates—Position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to it.

¹ It is this distinction between the subjective and the objective which is implied in the language of Epiktétus, when he proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (note¹ p. 451): Τίς γάρ σοι λέγει, θεόπομπου, ὅτι ἄνομιός σου εἶχονεν ἕκαστον τούτων φυσικός καὶ προλήψεις; Ἄλλ' οὐχ οἷόν τε ἐφαρμόζειν τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς καταλλήλοις οὐσίαις, μὴ διαρθρώσαντα αὐτάς, καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σκεψάμενον, ποῖαν τιμὴν ἕκαστη αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὑποτακτέον.

To the same purpose Epiktétus, in another passage, i. 22, 4-9: Ἀνὴρ ἴσθις ἢ τῶν Ἰουδαίων, καὶ Χύρων, καὶ Αἰγυπτίων, καὶ Ῥωμαίων μάχη· οὐ περὶ τοῦ, ὅτι τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προτιμυτέον, καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδικατέον—ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἴσθις ὅσιον τοῦτο, τὸ χειροῦ φαγεῖν, ἢ ἀπόσιον.

Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v. p. 263, ed. Spencer; i. p. 614 ed. Delarue), observes that the name *Justice* is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the emotional associations inseparable from it), but that the thing designated was very different, according to those who pronounced it:—λεκτέον, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης ὄνομα ταῦτόν μὲν ἴσθις παρὰ πᾶσιν Ἑλλήσιν· ἥδη δὲ ἀποδιδέσθαι ἄλλη μὲν ἢ κατ' Ἐπικουρον δικαιοσύνην, ἄλλη δὲ ἢ κατὰ

τοὺς δὲ τῆς Στωῆς, ἀντικειμένην τὸν τρυφερόν τῆς ψυχῆς, ἄλλη δὲ κατὰ τοὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος, ὑποπραγίας τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν δικαιοσύνην. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄλλῃ μὲν ἢ Ἐπικουρὸν ἀνδρία, &c.

"J'en aime point les mots nouveaux" (said Saint-Just, in his Institutions, composed during the sitting of the French Convention, 1795), "je ne connais que le juste et l'injuste: ces mots sont entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les définitions à la conscience: l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les vertus à l'échafaud." (Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution Française, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which honest and vehement ἰδιώται of Athens would hold towards Sokrates and Plato.

² Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D, Euripides, Phœnissæ, 490—

εἰ πᾶσι ταῦτ' ἀπὸν ἐφ' ἑνὶ σφόνδ' ὁ
ἄμα,
οὐκ ἔν' ἂν ἀμφιλεκτὸς ἀνθρώποις ἔρις·
νῦν δ' οὐδ' ὅμοιον οὐδὲν οὐτ' ἴσον
βρότοις,
πλὴν ὀνομάσαι· τὸ δ' ἔργον οὐκ ἴσθις
τόδε.

Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective similarity

this disconformity that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates required them to define the general word—to assign some common objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther, according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic, common to all the particulars—he objectivised¹ the word itself: that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its own—yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms, Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only realities.

co-existent with great objective dissimilarity among mankind.

"For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and considereth what he does when he does *think, opine, reason, hope, fear, &c.*, and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like occasions. I say the similitude of *passions*, which are the same in all men, *desire, fear, hope, &c.*, not the

similitude of the *objects* of the passions, which are the things *desired, feared, hoped, &c.*, for these the constitution individual, and particular education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts."—Introduction to *Leviathan*.

¹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* M. 1078, b. 30, 1086, b. 4.

In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic world, of self-existent Forms—objects of conception—concepts detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy (and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one and the same in all these particulars.¹ What is that something—the common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it prove failures.

The definition of the Holy—that it is what the Gods love—is suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent fact, and the Gods love it because it is Holy. The Holy is thus an essence, *per se*, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and things.

So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian oracle on similar questions—You will act piously by conforming to the law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.² It is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local, dis-

Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the Holy—different from those of the Platonic Sokrates—he disallows any common absolute general type of the Holy—he recognises an indefinite variety of types, discordant and relative.

¹ Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E.

² Compare Xen. Mem. I. 2, 1. ἥ τε γὰρ Πυθία νόμῳ πόλεως ἀναγείρει ποιοῦντας εὐσεβῆς ἂν ποιεῖν· Σωκράτης τε οὕτως

καὶ αὐτὸς ἐποίει καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις παρήγει, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως πως ποιοῦντας περιέρχουσε καὶ ματαίους ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι.

cordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos. The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato, and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as political—a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love and must love. In this respect, as in others, he is in marked contrast with Herodotus—a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own way, curious in comparing the actual practices consecrated among different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon of his own.

Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence, partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of Sokrates—that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the Just—is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more general, and requiring to be parted off by some *differentia* from the rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at some length;¹ and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had at that time received neither special attention nor special names—however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice.

The Holy a branch of the Just—not tenable as a definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of logical terms.

What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true

¹ Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.

The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the charge of impiety preferred by Melétus against Sokrates—comparison with Xenophon's way of replying.

about the Euthyphron. It represents Plato's manner of replying to the charge of impiety advanced by Melétus and his friends against Sokrates, just as the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon's manner of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the accusers,—describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by the Dikasts.¹ Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same accusation against another person—and as he does in fact deal with Melétus, in the Platonic Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against his own father.* The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic interrogatories, applicable to Melétus no less than to Euthyphron. "Of course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and do better for the future.² Tell me, what is the characteristic essence of piety as well as impiety?" It turns out that the accuser can make no satisfactory answer:—that he involves himself in confusion and contradiction:—that he has brought capital indictments against citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real Sokrates deals with Melétus:⁴ rendering the questions instrumental to two larger purposes—first, to his habitual crusade against the false per-

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 4; also iv. 8, 11.

² Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.

³ Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates with Kritias and Chariklès—Memorab. i. 2, 32-38:

and his cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato's brother (Mem. iii. 7).

⁴ Plato, Apol. c. 11, p. 24 C. δὲ αὐτὸν φημι Μέλητρον, ὅτι σπουδῇ χαριεντίζεται, ῥαδίως εἰς ἀγῶνας καθίστας ἀδελφόνους, &c.

suation of knowledge—next, to the administering of a logical or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.¹

¹ Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 190) agrees with the opinion of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to the death of Sokrates. I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before the death of Sokrates.

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
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BY

GEORGE GROTE,

AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.

A NEW EDITION.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

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PLATO.

CHAPTER XII.

ALKIBIADES I. AND II.

ALKIBIADES I.—ON THE NATURE OF MAN.

THIS dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Alkibiades. It introduces Alkibiades as about twenty years of age, having just passed through the period of youth, and about to enter on the privileges and duties of a citizen. The real dispositions and circumstances of the historical Alkibiades (magnificent personal beauty, stature, and strength, high family and connections,—great wealth already possessed, since his father had died when he was a child,—a full measure of education and accomplishments—together with exorbitant ambition and insolence, derived from such accumulated advantages) are brought to view in the opening address of Sokrates. Alkibiades, during the years of youth which he had just passed, had been surrounded by admirers who tried to render themselves acceptable to him, but whom he repelled with indifference, and even with scorn. Sokrates had been among them, constantly present and near to Alkibiades, but without ever addressing a word to him. The youthful beauty being now exchanged for manhood, all these admirers had retired; and Sokrates alone remains. His attachment is to Alkibiades himself:—to promise of mind rather than to attractions of person. Sokrates has been always hitherto restrained,

Situation
supposed in
the dia-
logue.

Persons—
Sokrates
and Alki-
biades.

by his divine sign or Dæmon, from speaking to Alkibiades. But this prohibition has now been removed; and he accosts him for the first time, in the full belief that he shall be able to give improving counsel, essential to the success of that political career upon which the youth is about to enter.¹

You are about to enter on public life (says Sokrates to Alkibiades) with the most inordinate aspirations for glory and aggrandisement. You not only thirst for the acquisition of ascendancy such as Perikles possesses at Athens, but your ambition will not be satisfied unless you fill Asia with your renown, and put yourself upon a level with Cyrus and Xerxes. Now such aspirations cannot be gratified except through my assistance. I do not deal in long discourses such as you have been accustomed to hear from others: I shall put to you only some short interrogatories, requiring nothing more than answers to my questions.²

Sokr.—You are about to step forward as adviser of the public assembly. Upon what points do you intend to advise them? Upon points which you know better than they? *Alk.*—Of course. *Sokr.*—All that you know, has been either learnt from others or found out by yourself. *Alk.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—But you would neither have learnt any thing, nor found out any thing, without the desire to learn or find out: and you would have felt no such desire, in respect to that which you believed yourself to know already. That which you now know, therefore, there was a time when you believed yourself not

Questions put by Sokrates, in reference to Alkibiades in his intended function as adviser of the Athenians. What does he intend to advise them upon? What has

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 103, 104, 105. Perikles is supposed to be still alive and political leader of Athens—104 B.

I have briefly sketched the imaginary situation to which this dialogue is made to apply. The circumstances of it belong to Athenian manners of the Platonic age.

Some of the critics, considering that the relation supposed between Sokrates and Alkibiades is absurd and unnatural, allege this among their reasons for denying the authenticity of the dialogue. But if any one reads the concluding part of the *Symposium*—the authenticity of which has never yet been denied by any critic—he will find something a great deal more ab-

normal in what is there recounted about Sokrates and Alkibiades.

In a dialogue composed by Æschines Socraticus (cited by the rhetor Aristides—*Ἐπεὶ Περὶ Περικλέους*, Or. xiv. p. 23-24), expressions of intense love for Alkibiades are put into the mouth of Sokrates. Æschines was younger than Perikles, not less than Plato. The different companions of Sokrates thus agreed in their picture of the relation between him and Alkibiades.

² Plato, *Alkib.* i. 106 B. Ἄρα ἰσχυρὸς εἰ τίνα ἔχει εἰς τὴν πόλιν μακρὴν, εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν αἰσῶν; ἐπὶ τίς ἔστιν ἐκείνου εἰς ἡμᾶς. I give here, as elsewhere, not an exact translation, but an abstract.

to know? *Alk.*—Necessarily so. *Sokr.*—Now all that you have learnt, as I am well aware, consists of three things—letters, the harp, gymnastics. Do you intend to advise the Athenians when they are debating about letters, or about harp-playing, or about gymnastics? *Alk.*—Neither of the three. *Sokr.*—Upon what occasions, then, do you propose to give advice? Surely, not when the Athenians are debating about architecture, or prophetic warnings, or the public health: for to deliver opinions on each of these matters, belongs not to you but to professional men—architects, prophets, physicians; whether they be poor or rich, high-born or low-born? If not *then*, upon what other occasions will you tender your counsel? *Alk.*—When they are debating about affairs of their own.

Sokr.—But about what affairs of their own? Not about affairs of shipbuilding: for of that you know nothing. *Alk.*

—When they are discussing war and peace, or any other business concerning the city. *Sokr.*—You mean when they are discussing the question with whom they shall make war or peace, and in what manner?

But it is certain that we must fight those whom it is best to fight—also *when* it is best—and *as long* as it is best. *Alk.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—Now, if the Athenians wished to know whom it was best to wrestle with, and when or how long it was best—which of the two would be most competent to advise them, you or the professional trainer? *Alk.*—The trainer, undoubtedly. *Sokr.*—So, too, about playing the harp or singing. But when you talk about *better*, in wrestling or singing, what standard do you refer to? Is it not to the gymnastic or musical art? *Alk.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Answer me in like manner about war or peace, the subjects on which you are going to advise your countrymen, whom, and at what periods, it is *better* to fight, and *better* not to fight? What in this last case do you mean by *better*? To what standard, or to what end, do you refer?¹ *Alk.*—I cannot say. *Sokr.*—But is it not a disgrace,

Alkibiades intends to advise the Athenians on questions of war and peace.

Questions of Socrates thereupon. We must fight those whom it is better to fight—to what standard does better refer? To just and unjust.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 108 E—109 A.
 ἴδι δὲ, καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολέμῳ βέλ- τὸ βέλτιον τί βρομᾷς; ὥστερ' ἐκεῖ-
 τιον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο ἐστὶν ἐκείνων διαγὰρ τὸ ἀμείνων, ἐπὶ
 μουνικώτερον, καὶ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀντιπῶ, ἐπὶ

since you profess to advise your countrymen when and against whom it is better for them to war,—not to be able to say to what end your *better* refers? Do not you know what are the usual grounds and complaints urged when war is undertaken? *Alk.*—Yes: complaints of having been cheated, or robbed, or injured. *Sokr.*—Under what circumstances? *Alk.*—You mean, whether justly or unjustly? That makes all the difference. *Sokr.*—Do you mean to advise the Athenians to fight those who behave justly, or those who behave unjustly? *Alk.*—The question is monstrous. Certainly not those who behave justly. It would be neither lawful nor honourable. *Sokr.*—Then when you spoke about *better*, in reference to war or peace, what you meant was *juster*—you had in view justice and injustice? *Alk.*—It seems so.

Sokr.—How is this? How do you know, or where have you learnt, to distinguish just from unjust? Have you frequented some master, without my knowledge, to teach you this? If you have, pray introduce me to him, that I also may learn it from him. *Alk.*—You are jesting. *Sokr.*—Not at all: I love you too well to jest. *Alk.*—But what if I had no master? Cannot I know about justice and injustice, without a master? *Sokr.*—Certainly: you might find out for yourself, if you made search and investigated. But this you would not do, unless you were under the persuasion that you did not already know. *Alk.*—

Was there not a time when I really believed myself not to know it? *Sokr.*—Perhaps there may have been: tell me *when* that time was. Was it last year? *Alk.*—No: last year I thought that I knew. *Sokr.*—Well, then—two years, three years, &c., ago? *Alk.*—No: the case was the same—then, also, I thought that I knew. *Sokr.*—But before that, you were a mere boy; and during your boyhood you certainly believed yourself to know what was just and unjust; for I well recollect hearing you then complain confidently of other boys, for acting unjustly towards you. *Alk.*—Certainly: I was not then ignorant on the point: I knew distinctly that they were acting unjustly towards me.

γυναιστικώτερον· περὶ δὲ καὶ ἐνταῦθα μένουν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ πολευαίᾳ οἷς δεῖ;
 ὅτι λέγειν τὸ βέλαιον . . . πρὸς Ἀλκίβ. Ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν οὐ δύναμαι ἐν-
 τί τούτοις τὸ ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ τε εἶναι νοῆσαι.

Sokr.—You knew, then, even in your boyhood, what was just and what was unjust? *Alk.*—Certainly: I knew even then.

Sokr.—At what moment did you first find it out? Not when you already believed yourself to know: and what time was there when you did not believe yourself to know? *Alk.*—Upon my word, I cannot say.

Sokr.—Since, accordingly, you neither found it out for yourself, nor learnt it from others, how come you to know justice or injustice at all, or from what quarter?

Alk.—I was mistaken in saying that I had not learnt it. I learnt it, as others do, from the multitude.¹

Sokr.—Your teachers are none of the best: no one can learn from them even such small matters as playing at draughts: much less, what is just and unjust. *Alk.*—I learnt it from them as I learnt to speak Greek, in which, too, I never had any special teacher.

Sokr.—Of that the multitude are competent teachers, for they are all of one mind. Ask which is a tree or a stone,—a horse or a man,—you get the same answer from every one. But when you ask not simply which are *horses*, but also which horses are fit to run well in a race—when you ask not merely which are *men*, but which men are healthy or unhealthy—are the multitude all of one mind, or all competent to answer? *Alk.*—Assuredly not. *Sokr.*—When you see the multitude differing among themselves, that is a clear proof that they are not competent to teach others. *Alk.*—It is so. *Sokr.*—Now, about the question, What is just and unjust—are the multitude all of one mind, or do they differ among themselves? *Alk.*—They differ prodigiously: they not only dispute, but quarrel and destroy each other, respecting justice and injustice, far more than about health and sickness.²

Sokr.—How, then, can we say that the multitude know what is just and unjust, when they thus fiercely dispute about it among themselves? *Alk.*—I now perceive that we cannot say so. *Sokr.*—

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 110 D-E. ἔμαθον, ἀνθρώπων καὶ πραγμάτων, οἱ πολλοὶ δοκοῦσί σοι ἡμολογῶντες αὐτοὶ ταυτοῖς ἢ ἀλλήλοις; *Alkib.* "Ἡμιστά, ῥῆ Δί", ὁ Σάπραιες. *Sokr.* Τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν δὲ θεῶ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν διαφέρουσιν; *Alkib.* πολλὰ γὰρ.

² Plato, *Alkib.* i. 112 A. *Sokr.* Τί δὲ; ἡμιστά, ῥῆ Δί", ὁ Σάπραιες. *Sokr.* Τί δέ; μάλιστα περὶ αὐτῶν δὲ θεῶ; νῦν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν διαφέρουσιν; *Alkib.* πολλὰ γὰρ.

How can we say, therefore, that they are fit to teach others : and how can you pretend to know, who have learnt from no other teachers? *Alk.*—From what you say, it is impossible.

Sokr.—No : not from what *I* say, but from what *you* say yourself. I merely ask questions : it is you who give all the answers.¹ And what you have said amounts to this—that Alkibiades knows nothing about what is just and unjust, but believes himself to know, and is going to advise the Athenians about what he does not know himself?

Alk.—But, Sokrates, the Athenians do not often debate about what is just and unjust. They think that question self-evident : they debate generally about what is expedient or not expedient. Justice and expediency do not always coincide. Many persons commit great crimes, and are great gainers by doing so : others again behave justly, and suffer from it.² *Sokr.*—Do you then profess to know what is expedient or inexpedient? From whom have you learnt—or when did you find out for yourself? I might ask you the same round of questions, and you would be compelled to answer in the same manner. But we will pass to a different point. You say that justice and expediency are not coincident. Persuade *me* of this, by interrogating me as I interrogated you. *Alk.*—That is beyond my power. *Sokr.*—But when you rise to address the assembly, you will have to persuade *them*. If you can persuade them, you can persuade me. Assume *me* to be the assembly, and practise upon me.³ *Alk.*—You are too hard upon me, Sokrates. It is for you to speak, and prove the point. *Sokr.*—No : I can only question : you must answer. You will be most surely persuaded when the point is determined by your own answers.⁴

Such is the commencing portion (abbreviated or abstracted)

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 112-113.

² Plato, *Alkib.* i. 113 D. Οἷμαι μὲν δαιμόνιος ἄθροιστος βουλεύεσθαι σόφους δικαιότερα ἢ ἀδικοῦτερά· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ποιεῖντα ἡγοῦνται ὅλα εἶναι, &c.

³ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 114 B-C. This

same argument is addressed by Sokrates to Glaukon, in *Xenoph. Memor.* iii. 6, 14-15.

⁴ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 114 E.

Ὅσοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθ' ὁσῶς ἔχει, μάλιστα ἂν εἴης πεπεισμένος;

of Plato's First Alkibiadēs. It exhibits a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic method: both in its negative and positive aspect. By the negative, false persuasion of knowledge is exposed. Alkibiades believes himself competent to advise about just and unjust, which he has neither learnt from any teacher nor investigated for himself—which he has picked up from the multitude, and supposes to be clear to every one, but about which nevertheless there is so much difference of appreciation among the multitude, that fierce and perpetual quarrels are going on. On the positive side, Sokrates restricts himself to the function of questioning: he neither affirms nor denies any thing. It is Alkibiades who affirms or denies every thing, and who makes all the discoveries for himself out of his own mind, instigated indeed, but not taught, by the questions of his companion.

Comment on the preceding. Sokratic method—the respondent makes the discoveries for himself.

By a farther series of questions, Sokrates next brings Alkibiades to the admission that what is just, is also honourable, good, expedient—what is unjust, is dishonourable, evil, inexpedient: and that whoever acts justly, and honourably, thereby acquires happiness. Admitting, first, that an act which is good, honourable, just, expedient, &c., considered in one aspect or in reference to some of its conditions—may be at the same time bad, dishonourable, unjust, inexpedient, &c., considered in another aspect or in reference to other conditions; Sokrates nevertheless brings his respondent to admit, that every act, *in so far as it is just and honourable*, is also good and expedient.¹ And he contends farther, that whoever acts honourably, does well: now every man who does well, becomes happy, or secures good things thereby: there-

Alkibiades is brought to admit that whatever is just, is good, honourable, expedient: and that whoever acts honourably, both does well, and procures for himself happiness thereby. Equivocal reasoning of Sokrates.

¹ Plato, Alkib. I. 115 B—116 A.

Οὐκ οὐκ τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς θέλεις· τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ἀνδρεία· . . . κακὴν δὲ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ τὰ ἔλλαττα . . .

Οὐκ οὐκ ἀδὲ δίκαιον προσεγορεύειν ἀέστερον τῶν πράξεων· εἴπερ ἡ κακὴ ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλῆς, καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὴ ἀγαθὴν κλητέον.

Αἱ οὖν καὶ ἡ ἀγαθὴ καλὴν,—ἡ δὲ κακὴν εἰσέρχεται· καί.

Compare Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, where he maintains that in every particular case, what is just, honourable, virtuous, &c., is also unjust, dishonourable, vicious, &c. Nothing remains unchanged, nor excludes the contrary, except the pure, self-existent, Idea or general Concept.—ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιόν τε, &c.

fore the just, the honourable, and the good or expedient, coincide.¹ The argument, whereby this conclusion is here established, is pointed out by Heindorf, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, as not merely inconclusive, but as mere verbal equivocation and sophistry—the like of which, however, we find elsewhere in Plato.²

Alkibiades is thus reduced to a state of humiliating embarrassment, and stands convicted, by his own contradictions and confession, of ignorance in its worst form: that is, of being ignorant, and yet confidently believing himself to know.³ But other Athenian statesmen are no wiser. Even Perikles is proved to be equally deficient—by the fact that he has never been able to teach or improve any one else, not even his own sons and those whom he loved best.⁴ "At any rate" (contends Alkibiades) "I am as good as my competitors, and can hold my ground against them." But Sokrates reminds him that the real competitors with whom he ought to compare himself, are foreigners, liable to become the enemies of Athens, and against whom he, if he pretends to lead Athens, must be able to contend. In an harangue of unusual length, Sokrates shows that the kings of Sparta and Persia are of nobler breed, as well as more highly and carefully trained, than the Athenian statesmen.⁵ Alkibiades must be rescued from his present ignorance, and exalted, so as to be capable of competing with these kings: which object cannot be attained except through the auxiliary interposition of Sokrates. Not that Sokrates professes to be himself already on this elevation, and to stand in need of no farther improvement. But he can, nevertheless, help others to attain it for themselves, through the discipline and stimulus of his interrogatories.⁶

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 116 E.

² The words *ἐὶς ἑαυτὸν*—*ἐν ἑαυτῷ* have a double sense, like our "doing well." Stallbaum, *Proleg.* p. 175; Steinhart, *Einl.* p. 140.

We have, p. 116 B, the equivocation between *καλῶς*, *ἐπ' αὐτὸν* and *ἐν ἑαυτῷ*, also with *καλῶς* *ἐπ' αὐτὸν*, p. 124 A, 126

A; compare Heindorf ad *Platon. Charmid.* p. 172 A, p. 174 B; also *Platon. Gorgias*, p. 507 C, where similar equivocal meanings occur.

³ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 118.

⁴ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 118-119.

⁵ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 120-124.

⁶ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 124.

The dialogue then continues. *Sokr.*—We wish to become as good as possible. But in what sort of virtue? *Alk.*—In that virtue which belongs to good men. *Sokr.*—Yes, but *good*, in what matters? *Alk.*—Evidently, to men who are good in transacting business. *Sokr.*—Ay, but what kind of business? business relating to horses, or to navigation? If that be meant, we must go and consult horse-trainers or mariners? *Alk.*—No, I mean such business as is transacted by the most esteemed leaders in Athens. *Sokr.*—You mean the intelligent men. Every man is good, in reference to that which he understands: every man is bad, in reference to that which he does not understand. *Alk.*—Of course. *Sokr.*—The cobbler understands shoemaking, and is therefore good at *that*: he does not understand weaving, and is therefore bad at that. The same man thus, in your view, will be both good and bad? ¹ *Alk.*—No: that cannot be. *Sokr.*—Whom then do you mean, when you talk of *the good*? *Alk.*—I mean those who are competent to command in the city. *Sokr.*—But to command whom or what—horses or men? *Alk.*—To command men. *Sokr.*—But what men, and under what circumstances? sick men, or men on shipboard, or labourers engaged in harvesting, or in what occupations? *Alk.*—I mean, men living in social and commercial relation with each other, as we live here; men who live in common possession of the same laws and government. *Sokr.*—When men are in communion of a sea voyage and of the same ship, how do we name the art of commanding them, and to what purpose does it tend? *Alk.*—It is the art of the pilot; and the purpose towards which it tends, is, bringing them safely through the dangers of the sea. *Sokr.*—When men are in social and political communion, to what purpose does the art of commanding them tend? *Alk.*—Towards the better preservation and administration of the city.² *Sokr.*—But what do you mean by *better*? What is that, the presence or absence of which makes *better* or *worse*? If in regard to the

But good—
for what
end, and
under what
circum-
stances?
Abundant
illustrative
examples.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 125 B.

Ὁ αὐτὸς ἀρα τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ λόγῳ καλὸς τε καὶ ἀγαθός.

Plato alludes unconsciously here, as in other parts of his reasonings, *ad dictum simpliciter*, *secundum quid*, *ad dictum simpliciter*.

² Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 126 A. *τί δέ; ἢν* οὐ καλεῖς εὐβουλίαν, εἰς τὴν ἔστιν; *Alk.* Εἰς τὸ ἀμεινον τὴν πόλιν διοικεῖν καὶ σώζεσθαι. *Sokr.* Ἀμεινον δὲ διοικεῖται καὶ σώζεται τίνας παραγγελλόμενον ἢ ἀπαγγελλόμενον;

management of the body, you put to me the same question, I should reply, that it is the presence of health, and the absence of disease. What reply will you make, in the case of the city?

Alk.—I should say, when friendship and unanimity among the citizens are present, and when discord and antipathy are absent.

Sokr.—This unanimity, of what nature is it? Respecting what subject? What is the art or science for realising it? If I ask you what brings about unanimity respecting numbers and measures, you will say the arithmetical and the metrical art.

Alk.—I mean that friendship and unanimity which prevails between near relatives, father and son, husband and wife.

Sokr.—But how can there be unanimity between any two persons, respecting subjects which one of them knows, and the other does not know? For example, about spinning and weaving, which the husband does not know,—or about military duties, which the wife does not know,—how can there be unanimity between the two?

Alk.—No: there cannot be.

Sokr.—Nor friendship, if unanimity and friendship go together?

Alk.—Apparently there cannot.

Sokr.—Then when men and women each perform their own special duties, there can be no friendship between them.

Nor can a city be well administered, when each citizen performs his own special duties? or (which is the same thing) when each citizen acts justly?

Alk.—Not so: I think there may be friendship, when each person performs his or her own business.

Sokr.—Just now you said the reverse. What is this friendship or unanimity which we must understand and realise, in order to become good men?

Alk.—In truth, I am puzzled myself to say. I find myself in a state of disgraceful ignorance, of which I had no previous suspicion.

Alkibiades, puzzled and humiliated, confesses his ignorance. Encouragement given by Sokrates. —It is an advantage to make such discovery in youth.

Sokr.—Do not be discouraged. If you had made this discovery when you were fifty years old, it would have been too late for taking care of yourself and applying a remedy: but at your age, it is the right time for making the discovery.

Alk.—What am I to do, now that I have made it?

Sokr.—You must answer my questions. If my auguries are just, we shall soon be both of us better for the process.¹

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 127 D-E. *Alk.* *τι λέγω, κινδυνεύω δὲ καὶ πάσαι λεληθέναι. Ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτ' ἐσέτι, οὐδ' αὐτὸς οἷα δ' ἐμαυτὸν εἰσάχιστ' ἔχων.*

Here we have again, brought into prominent relief, the dialectic method of Plato, under two distinct aspects : 1. Its actual effects, in exposing the false supposition of knowledge, in forcing upon the respondent the humiliating conviction, that he does not know familiar topics which he supposed to be clear both to himself and to others. 2. Its anticipated effects, if continued, in remedying such defect : and in generating out of the mind of the respondent, real and living knowledge. Lastly, it is plainly intimated that this shock of humiliation and mistrust, painful but inevitable, must be undergone in youth.

Platonic Dialectic—its actual effect—its anticipated effect—applicable to the season of youth.

The dialogue continues, in short questions and answers, of which the following is an abstract. *Sokr.*—What is meant by a man *taking care of himself*? Before I can take care of myself, I must know what *myself* is : I must *know myself*, according to the Delphian motto. I cannot make myself better, without knowing what *myself* is.¹ That which belongs to me is not *myself* : my body is not myself, but an instrument governed by myself.² My mind or soul only, is myself. To take care of myself is, to take care of my mind. At any rate, if this be not strictly true,³ my mind is the most important and dominant element within me. The physician who knows his own body, does not for that reason know himself : much less do the husbandman or the tradesman, who know their own properties or crafts, know themselves, or perform what is truly their own business.

Know Thyself—Delphian maxim—its urgent importance—What is myself? My mind is myself.

Since temperance consists in self-knowledge, neither of these professional men, as such, is temperate : their professions are of a vulgar cast, and do not belong to the

I cannot know my-

Sokr. Ἀλλὰ χρὴ θαρρεῖν· εἰ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸ ἦσθαι πεπονηθὲς πενηκονταετής, χαλεπὸν ἂν ἦν σοι ἐπιμελεῖσθαι σαυτοῦ· τὸν δὲ ἦν ἔχεις ἡλικίαν, αὕτη ἐστίν, ἐν ᾗ δεῖ αὐτὸ αἰσθῆσθαι.

Alk. Τί σὺν τὸν αἰσθόμενον χρὴ ποιεῖν;

Sokr. Ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὰ ἐρωτώμενα· καὶ εἰ δὲν τοῦτο ποιῇς, ἂν θεός σε δόλῃ, εἰ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαρτυρῇ πιστεῦναι, σὺ τε καὶ πᾶς βελτιώμενος σῶμα.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 129 B. τίς ἄν τράπον εὐρεθείη αὐτὰ τὰ αὐτὸς;

² Plato, *Alkib.* i. 128-130. All this is greatly expanded in the dialogue—p. 128 D : Οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμέλει; This same antithesis is employed by Isocrates, *De Permutatione*, sect. 309, p. 492, Bekker. He recommends αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ ποιῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν.

³ Plato considers this point to be not clearly made out. *Alkib.* i. 130.

self, except by looking into another mind. Self-knowledge is temperance. Temperance and Justice are the conditions both of happiness and of freedom.

virtuous life.¹ How are we to know our own minds? We know it by looking into another mind, and into the most rational and divine portion thereof: just as the eye can only know itself by looking into another eye, and seeing itself therein reflected.² It is only in this way that we can come to know ourselves, or become temperate: and if we do not know ourselves, we cannot even know what belongs to ourselves, or what belongs to others: all these are branches of one and the same cognition. We can have no knowledge of affairs, either public or private: we shall go wrong, and shall be unable to secure happiness either for ourselves or for others. It is not wealth or power which are the conditions of happiness, but justice and temperance. Both for ourselves individually, and for the public collectively, we ought to aim at justice and temperance, not at wealth and power. The evil and unjust man ought to have no power, but to be the slave of those who are better than himself.³ He is fit for nothing but to be a slave: none deserve freedom except the virtuous.

Alkibiades feels himself unworthy to be free, and declares that he will never quit Sokrates.

Sokr.—How do you feel your own condition now, Alkibiades. Are you worthy of freedom? *Alk.*—I feel but too keenly that I am not. I cannot emerge from this degradation except by your society and help. From this time forward I shall never leave you.⁴

ALKIBIADES II.

The other Platonic dialogue, termed the Second Alkibiades, introduces Alkibiades as about to offer prayer and sacrifice to the Gods.

Second Alkibiades—situation supposed.

Danger of mistake in praying to the Gods for gifts

Sokr.—You seem absorbed in thought, Alkibiades, and not unreasonably. In supplicating the Gods, caution is required not to pray for gifts which are really mischievous. The Gods sometimes grant men's prayers, even when ruinously destructive; as they

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 131 B.

² Plato, *Alkib.* i. 133.

³ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 134-135 B-C.

Πρην δὲ γὰρ ἀπερὴν ἔχειν, τὸ ἀρκεσθαι.

ἔμεινον ὅτι τοῦ βελτίονος ἢ τὸ ἄρχειν ἀνδρὶ, οὐ μόνον παιδί. . . . Πρώται δὲ τῇ κακῇ δουλεύουσιν· ἔμεινον γάρ.

⁴ Plato, *Alkib.* i. 135.

granted the prayers of Œdipus, to the destruction of his own sons. *Alk.*—Œdipus was mad: what man in his senses would put up such a prayer? *Sokr.*—You think that madness is the opposite of good sense or wisdom. You recognise men wise and unwise: and you farther admit that every man must be one or other of the two,—just as every man must be either healthy or sick: there is no third alternative possible?

which may prove mischievous. Most men are unwise. Unwise is the generic word: madmen, a particular variety under it.

Alk.—I think so. *Sokr.*—But each thing can have but one opposite:¹ to be unwise, and to be mad, are therefore identical?

Alk.—They are. *Sokr.*—Wise men are only few, the majority of our citizens are unwise: but do you really think them mad?

How could any of us live safely in the society of so many madmen? *Alk.*—No: it cannot be so: I was mistaken. *Sokr.*—

Here is the illustration of your mistake. All men who have gout, or fever, or ophthalmia are sick; but all sick men have not gout, or fever, or ophthalmia. So, too, all carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors, are craftsmen; but all craftsmen are not carpenters, or shoemakers, or sculptors. In like manner, all mad men are unwise; but all unwise men are not mad. *Unwise* comprises many varieties and gradations—of which the extreme is, being mad: but these varieties are different among themselves, as one disease differs from another, though all agree in being disease—and one art differs from another, though all agree in being art.²

(We may remark that Plato here, as in the Euthyphron, brings under especial notice one of the most important distinctions in formal logic—that between a generic term and the various specific terms comprehended under it. Possessing as yet no technical language for characterising this distinction, he makes it understood by an induction of several separate but analogous cases. Because the distinction is familiar now to instructed men, we must not suppose that it was familiar then.)

Relation between a generic term, and the specific terms comprehended under it, was not then familiar.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 139 B.

Καὶ μὴν δύο γε ὑπερσθέντα ἐνὶ πράγματι πᾶσι ἀντίστοιχα;

That each thing has one opposite,

and no more, is asserted in the *Protagoras* also, p. 192-193.

² Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 139-140 A. B.

Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὑπερσθέντες πάντες ποσού-

Sokr.—Whom do you call wise and unwise? Is not the wise man, he who knows what it is proper to say and do— and the unwise man, he who does not know? *Alk.*— Yes. *Sokr.*—The unwise man will thus often unconsciously say or do what ought not to be said or done? Though not mad like *Cædipus*, he will nevertheless pray to the Gods for gifts, which will be hurtful to him if obtained. You, for example, would be overjoyed if the Gods were to promise that you should become despot not only over Athens, but also over Greece. *Alk.*—Doubtless I should: and every one else would feel as I do. *Sokr.*—But what if you were to purchase it with your life, or to damage yourself by the employment of it? *Alk.*—Not on those conditions.¹ *Sokr.*—But you are aware that many ambitious aspirants, both at Athens and elsewhere (among them, the man who just now killed the Macedonian King Archelaus, and usurped his throne), have acquired power and aggrandisement, so as to be envied by every one: yet have presently found themselves brought to ruin and death by the acquisition. So, also, many persons pray that they may become fathers; but discover presently that their children are the source of so much grief to them, that they wish themselves again childless. Nevertheless, though such reverses are perpetually happening, every one is still not only eager to obtain these supposed benefits, but importunate with the Gods in asking for them. You see that it is not safe even to accept without reflection boons offered to you, much less to pray for boons to be conferred.² *Alk.*—I see now how much mischief ignorance produces. Every one thinks himself competent to pray for what is beneficial to himself; but ignorance makes him unconsciously imprecate mischief on his own head.

Sokr.—You ought not to denounce ignorance in this unqualified manner. You must distinguish and specify— Ignorance of what? and under what modifications of persons and circumstances? *Alk.*—How? Are there

σιν, οὐ μόντοι οἱ νοσοῦντες πάντες οὐ γὰρ πᾶσι οὔτε ἐμοὶ οὔτε ἐμοὶς
 πῦρ ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ ποταγῶσιν οὐδὲ γὰρ διατρέπονται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν αὐτῆς
 ὀφθαλμῶσιν· ἀλλὰ νόσος μὲν πᾶν τὸ νόσημα ἐκείνη.
 τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, διαφέρειν δὲ φασὶν οὐδὲ δὴ
 καλούμεν ἰατροὺς τὴν ἀπεργασίαν αὐτῶν.
¹ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 141.
² Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 141-142.

any matters or circumstances in which it is better for a man to be ignorant, than to know? *Sokr.*—You will see that there are such. Ignorance of good, or ignorance of what is best, is always mischievous: moreover, assuming that a man knows what is best, then all other knowledge will be profitable to him. In his special case, ignorance on any subject cannot be otherwise than hurtful. But if a man be ignorant of good, or of what is best, in his case knowledge on other subjects will be more often hurtful than profitable. To a man like Orestes, so misguided on the question, "What is good?" as to resolve to kill his mother,—it would be a real benefit, if for the time he did not know his mother. Ignorance on that point, in his state of mind, would be better for him than knowledge.¹ *Alk.*—It appears so.

Sokr.—Follow the argument farther. When we come forward to say or do any thing, we either know what we are about to say and do, or at least believe ourselves to know it. Every statesman who gives counsel to the public, does so in the faith of such knowledge. Most citizens are unwise, and ignorant of good as well as of other things. The wise are but few, and by their advice the city is conducted. Now upon what ground do we call these few, wise and useful public counsellors? If a statesman knows war, but does not know whether it is best to go to war, or at what juncture it is best—should we call him wise? If he knows how to kill men, or dispossess them, or drive them into exile,—but does not know upon whom, or on what occasions, it is good to inflict this treatment—is he a useful counsellor? If he can ride, or shoot, or wrestle, well,—we give him an epithet derived from this special accomplishment: we do not call him wise. What would be the condition of a community composed of bowmen, horsemen, wrestlers, rhetors, &c., accomplished and excellent each in his own particular craft, yet none of them knowing what is good, nor when, nor on what occasions, it is good to employ

generally. We must discriminate. Ignorance of what? Ignorance of good, is always mischievous: ignorance of other things, not always.

Wise public counsellors are few. Upon what ground do we call these few wise? Not because they possess merely special arts or accomplishments, but because they know, besides, upon what occasions and under what limits each of these accomplishments ought to be used.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 144.

their craft? When each man pushes forward his own art and speciality, without any knowledge whether it is good on the whole either for himself or for the city, will not affairs thus conducted be reckless and disastrous?¹ *Alk.*—They will be very bad indeed.

Sokr.—If, then, a man has no knowledge of good or of the better—if upon this cardinal point he obeys fancy without reason—the possession of knowledge upon special subjects will be oftener hurtful than profitable to him; because it will make him more forward in action, without any good result. Possessing many arts and accomplishments,—and prosecuting one after another, but without the knowledge of good,—he will only fall into greater trouble, like a ship sailing without a pilot. Knowledge of good is, in other words, knowledge of what is useful and profitable. In conjunction with this, all other knowledge is valuable, and goes to increase a man's competence as a counsellor: apart from this, all other knowledge will not render a man competent as a counsellor, but will be more frequently hurtful than beneficial.² Towards right living, what we need is, the knowledge of good: just as the sick stand in need of a physician, and the ship's crew of a pilot. *Alk.*—I admit your reasoning. My opinion is changed. I no longer believe myself competent to determine what I ought to accept from the Gods, or what I ought to pray for. I incur serious danger of erring, and of asking for mischiefs, under the belief that they are benefits.

Sokr.—The Lacedæmonians, when they offer sacrifice, pray simply that they may obtain what is honourable and good, without farther specification. This language is

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 146.

² Plato, *Alkib.* ii. 146 C:

Ὅστις ἄρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, ἰδὼν μὲν παύεται αὐτὸς ἢ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμῃ—αὐτὸς δ' ἢ ἢ αὐτὸ δέ-που ἤπειρ καὶ ἢ τοῦ ὠφελίμου—φρονίμως γὰρ αὐτὸν φέρομεν καὶ ἀποχρῶντα ἐξήρως καὶ τῇ πόλει καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτῶν τὸν δὲ μὴ τοιούτων, τὰς αἰτίας τούτων. (Τοιούτων is Schneider's emendation for ποιούτων.) Ibid. 146 C: Οὐκοῦν φανὲν πάλιν τοὺς πολλοὺς διαμαρτυρεῖναι τοῦ βελτίστου, ὡς τὰ πολλὰ γὰρ,

οἶμαι, ἄνευ τοῦ δόξῃ πιστευομένου; Ibid. 146 E: Ὅπως οὖν, ὅτε γ' ἔβην κινδυνεύειν τό γε γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἰδὼν τις ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης κεκτημένος ἢ, διλογίαις μὲν ὠφέλει, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. Ibid. 147 A: Ὅ δὲ ἔβη τὴν καλονμένην πολυμάθειαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν κεκτημένος, ὁφθαλμοὶ δὲ ὡς ταῦτα τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ οὐδὲ μίαν ἐκείτης τῶν ἄλλων, ἀρ' οὐχὶ τῷ ὄντι δικαίως πολλὰ χεῖματι χρῆσται, ἀτ', οἶμαι, ἄνευ κυβερνήτου διατελεῖν ἐν πηλάγῳ, &c.

acceptable to the Gods, more acceptable than the costly festivals of Athens. It has procured for the Spartans more continued prosperity than the Athenians have enjoyed.¹ The Gods honour wise and just men,—that is, men who know what they ought to say and do both towards Gods and towards men—more than numerous and splendid offerings.² You see, therefore, that it is not safe for you to proceed with your sacrifice, until you have learnt what is the proper language to be used, and what are the really good gifts to be prayed for. Otherwise your sacrifice will not prove acceptable, and you may even bring upon yourself positive mischief.³ *Alk.*—When shall I be able to learn this, and who is there to teach me? I shall be delighted to meet him. *Sokr.*—There is a person at hand most anxious for your improvement. What he must do is, first to disperse the darkness from your mind,—next, to impart that which will teach you to discriminate evil from good, which at present you are unable to do. *Alk.*—I shall shrink from no labour to accomplish this object. Until then, I postpone my intended sacrifice: and I tender my sacrificial wreath to you, in gratitude for your counsel.⁴ *Sokr.*—I accept the wreath as a welcome augury of future friendship and conversation between us, to help us out of the present embarrassment.

proceed with his sacrifice, until he has learnt what is the proper language to address to the Gods. He renounces his sacrifice, and throws himself upon the counsel of Sokrates.

The two dialogues, called First and Second Alkibiadès, of which I have just given some account, resemble each other more than most of the Platonic dialogues, not merely in the personages introduced, but in general spirit, in subject, and even in illustrations. The First Alkibiadès was recognised as authentic by all critics without exception, until the days of Schleiermacher. Nay, it was not only recognised, but extolled as one of the most valuable and important of all the Platonic compositions; proper to be studied first, as a key to all the rest. Such was the view of

Different critical opinions respecting these two dialogues.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 143.

² Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 150.

³ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 150.

⁴ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 151.

Jamblichus and Proklus, transmitted to modern times ; until it received a harsh contradiction from Schleiermacher, who declared the dialogue to be both worthless and spurious. The Second Alkibiadēs was also admitted both by Thrasylus, and by the general body of critics in ancient times : but there were some persons (as we learn from Athenæus)¹ who considered it to be a work of Xenophon ; perceiving probably (what is the fact) that it bears much analogy to several conversations which Xenophon has set down. But those who held this opinion are not to be considered as of one mind with critics who reject the dialogue as a forgery or imitation of Plato. Compositions emanating from Xenophon are just as much Sokratic, probably even more Sokratic, than the most unquestioned Platonic dialogues, besides that they must of necessity be contemporary also. Schleiermacher has gone much farther : declaring the Second as well as the First to be an unworthy imitation of Plato.²

Here Ast agrees with Schleiermacher fully, including both the First and Second Alkibiadēs in his large list of the spurious. Most of the subsequent critics go with Schleiermacher only half-way : Socher, Hermann, Stallbaum, Steinhart, Susemihl, recognise the First Alkibiadēs, but disallow the Second.³ In my judgment, Schleiermacher and Ast are more consistently

right, or more consistently wrong, in rejecting both, than the other critics who find or make so capital a distinction between the two. The similarity of tone and topics between the two is obvious, and is indeed admitted by all. Moreover, if I were compelled to make a choice, I should say that the grounds for suspicion are rather less strong against the Second than against the First ; and that Schleiermacher, reasoning upon the objections admitted by his opponents as conclusive against the Second, would have no difficulty in showing that his own objections against the First were still more forcible. The long speech

¹ Athenæus, xi. p. 506.

² See the *Einleitung* of Schleiermacher to Alkib. i. part ii. vol. iii. p. 293 seq. *Einleitung* to Alkib. ii. part i. vol. ii. p. 365 seq. His notes on the two dialogues contain various additional reasons, besides what is urged in his Introduction.

³ Socher, *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, p. 112. Stallbaum, *Prolegg.* to Alkib. i. and ii. vol. v. pp. 171-304. K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Philos.* p. 420-439. Steinhart, *Einleitungen* to Alkib. i. and ii. in Hieronymus Müller's *Uebersetzung des Platon's Werke*, vol. i. pp. 185-509.

assigned in the First Alkibiadēs to Sokrates, about the privileges of the Spartan and Persian kings,¹ including the mention of Zoroaster, son of Oromazes, and the Magian religion, appears to me more unusual with Plato than anything which I find in the Second Alkibiadēs. It is more Xenophontic² than Platonic.

But I must here repeat, that because I find, in this or any other dialogue, some peculiarities not usual with Plato, I do not feel warranted thereby in declaring the dialogue spurious. In my judgment, we must look for a large measure of diversity in the various dialogues; and I think it an injudicious novelty, introduced by Schleiermacher, to set up a canonical type of Platonism, all deviations from which are to be rejected as forgeries. Both the First and the Second Alkibiadēs appear to me genuine, even upon the showing of those very critics who disallow them. Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and Steinhart, all admit that there is in both the dialogues a considerable proportion of Sokratic and Platonic ideas: but they maintain that there are also other ideas which are not Sokratic or Platonic, and that the texture, style, and prolixity of the Second Alkibiadēs (Schleiermacher maintains this about the First also) are unworthy of Plato. But if we grant these premisses, the reasonable inference would be, not to disallow it altogether, but to admit it as a work by Plato, of inferior merit; perhaps of earlier days, before his powers of composition had attained their maturity. To presume that because Plato composed many excellent dialogues, therefore all that he composed must have been excellent,—is a pretension formally disclaimed by many critics, and asserted by none.³ Steinhart himself allows that the Second Alkibiadēs, though not composed by Plato, is the work of some other author contemporary, an untrained Sokratic disciple attempting to imitate Plato.⁴ But we do not know that there

The supposed grounds for disallowance are in reality only marks of inferiority.

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 121-124.

Whoever reads the objections in Steinhart's *Einleitung* (p. 148-150) against the First Alkibiadēs, will see that they are quite as forcible as what he urges against the Second; only, that in the case of the First, he gives to these objections their legitimate bearing, allowing them to tell against the merit of the dialogue, but not against its authenticity.

² See Xenoph. (*Ekonom.* c. 4; *Cyropæd.* vii. 5, 58-64, viii. 1, 5-8-45; *Laced. Repub.* c. 15.

³ Stallbaum (*Prolegg. ad Alcib.* i. p. 186) makes this general statement very justly, but he as well as other critics are apt to forget it in particular cases.

⁴ Steinhart, *Einleitung*, p. 516-519. Stallbaum and Boeckh indeed assign the dialogue to a later period. Hein-

were any contemporaries who tried to imitate Plato: though Theopompus accused him of imitating others, and called most of his dialogues useless as well as false: while Plato himself, in his inferior works, will naturally appear like an imitator of his better self.

I agree with Schleiermacher and the other recent critics in considering the First and Second Alkibiadés to be inferior in merit to Plato's best dialogues; and I contend that their own premisses justify no more. They may probably be among his earlier productions, though I do not believe that the First Alkibiadés was composed during the lifetime of Sokrates, as Socher, Steinhart, and Stallbaum endeavour to show.¹ I have already given my

dorf (ad Lysin, p. 211) thinks it the work "antiqui auctoris, sed non Platonis".

Steinhart and others who disallow the authenticity of the Second Alkibiadés, insist much (p. 518) upon the enormity of the chronological blunder, whereby Sokrates and Alkibiadés are introduced as talking about the death of Archelaus king of Macedonia, who was killed in 399 B.C., in the same year as Sokrates, and four years after Alkibiadés. Such an anachronism (Steinhart urges) Plato could never allow himself to commit. But when we read the *Symposion*, we find Aristophanes in a company of which Sokrates, Alkibiadés, and Agathon form a part, alluding to the *Isoklous* of Mantinea, which took place in 386 B.C. No one has ever made this glaring anachronism a ground for disallowing the *Symposion*. Steinhart says that the style of the Second Alkibiadés copies Plato too closely (die ängstlich platonisirende Sprache des Dialogs, p. 515), yet he agrees with Stallbaum that in several places it departs too widely from Plato.

¹ Stallbaum refers the composition of Alkib. i. to a time not long before the accusation of Sokrates, when the enemies of Sokrates were calumniating him in consequence of his past intimacy with Alkibiadés (who had before that time been killed in 404 B.C.) and when Plato was anxious to defend his master (Prolegg. p. 186). Socher and Steinhart (p. 210) remark that such writings would do little good to Sokrates under his accusation. They place the composition of the dialogue earlier, in 406 B.C. (Steinhart, p. 151-

152), and they consider it the first exercise of Plato in the strict dialectic method. Both Steinhart and Hermann (Gesch. Plat. Phil. p. 440) think that the dialogue has not only a speculative but a political purpose; to warn and amend Alkibiadés, and to prevent him from surrendering himself blindly to the democracy.

I cannot admit the hypothesis that the dialogue was written in 406 B.C. (when Plato was twenty-one years of age, at most twenty-two), nor that it had any intended bearing upon the real historical Alkibiadés, who left Athens in 415 B.C. at the head of the armament against Syracuse, was banished three months afterwards, and never came back to Athens until May 407 B.C. (Xenoph. Hellen. i. 4, 13; i. 5, 17). He then enjoyed four months of great ascendancy at Athens, left it at the head of the fleet to Asia in Oct. 407 B.C., remained in command of the fleet for about three months or so, then fell into disgrace and retired to Chersonese, never revisiting Athens. In 406 B.C. Alkibiadés was again in banishment, out of the reach of all such warnings as Hermann and Steinhart suppose that Plato intended to address to him in Alkib. i.

Steinhart says (p. 152), "In dieser Zeit also, wenige Jahre nach seiner triumphirenden Rückkehr, wo Alkibiadés," &c. Now Alkibiadés left the Athenian service, irrevocably, within less than one year after his triumphant return.

Steinhart has not realised in his mind the historical and chronological conditions of the period.

reasons, in a previous chapter, for believing that Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates ; still less in that of Alkibiadēs, who died four years earlier. There is certainly nothing in either Alkibiadēs I. or II. to shake this belief.

If we compare various colloquies of Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, we shall find Alkibiadēs I. and II. very analogous to them both in purpose and spirit. In Alkibiadēs I. the situation conceived is the same as that of Sokrates and Glaukon, in the third book of the Memorabilia. Xenophon recounts how the presumptuous Glaukon, hardly twenty years of age, fancied himself already fit to play a conspicuous part in public affairs, and tried to force himself, in spite of rebuffs and humiliations, upon the notice of the assembly.¹ No remonstrances of friends could deter him, nor could anything, except the ingenious dialectic of Sokrates, convince him of his own impertinent forwardness and exaggerated self-estimation. Probably Plato (Glaukon's elder brother) had heard of this conversation, but whether the fact be so or not, we see the same situation idealised by him in Alkibiadēs I., and worked out in a way of his own. Again, we find in the Xenophontic Memorabilia another colloquy, wherein Sokrates cross-questions, perplexes, and humiliates, the studious youth Euthydemus,² whom he regards as over-confident in his persuasions and too well satisfied with himself. It was among the specialties of Sokrates to humiliate confident young men, with a view to their future improvement. He made his conversation "an instrument of chastisement," in the language of Xenophon : or (to use a phrase of Plato himself in the Lysis) he conceived "that the proper way of talking to youth whom you love, was, not to exalt and puff them up, but to subdue and humiliate them".³

If Plato wished to idealise this feature in the character of

Analogy with various dialogues in the Xenophontic Memorabilia—Purpose of Sokrates to humble presumptuous young men.

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iii. 6.

² Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2.

³ Xenoph. Mem. i. 4, 1. *σκεψάμενοι μὴ μόνον ἂν ἐκείνος (Sokrates) κολαστήριον ἔνεκα τοῦ πάντ' οἰομένου εἰδέναι ἔρως ἤλεγχεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἂν λέγων συνημέρουν τοῖς συνδιατρίβουσιν,*

&c. So in the Platonic Lysis, the youthful Lysis says to Sokrates, "Talk to Menexenus, ἵν' αὐτὸν κολάσῃ" (Plat. Lysis, 211 B). And Sokrates himself says, a few lines before (210 E), Οὕτω χρὴ τοῖς παιδικοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ταπεινούντα καὶ συστέλλοντα, καὶ μὴ ὥσπερ σὺ χανούντα καὶ διαβρύπτοντα.

Fitness of
the name
and charac-
ter of Alki-
biades for
idealising
this feature
in Sokrates.

Sokrates, no name could be more suitable to his purpose than that of Alkibiadēs : who, having possessed as a youth the greatest personal beauty (to which Sokrates was exquisitely sensible) had become in his mature life distinguished not less for unprincipled ambition and insolence, than for energy and ability.

We know the real Alkibiadēs both from Thucydides and Xenophon, and we also know that Alkibiades had in his youth so far frequented the society of Sokrates as to catch some of that dialectic ingenuity, which the latter was expected and believed to impart.¹ The contrast, as well as the companionship, between Sokrates and Alkibiades was eminently suggestive to the writers of Sokratic dialogues, and nearly all of them made use of it, composing dialogues in which Alkibiades was the principal name and figure.² It would be surprising indeed if Plato had never done the same : which is what we must suppose, if we adopt Schleiermacher's view, that both Alkibiadēs I. and II. are spurious. In the Protagoras as well as in the Symposium, Alkibiades figures ; but in neither of them is he the principal person, or titular hero, of the piece. In Alkibiadēs I. and II., he is introduced as the solitary respondent to the questions of Sokrates — *κολαστηρίου ἕνεκα* : to receive from Sokrates a lesson of humiliation such as the Xenophontic Sokrates administers to Glaukon and Euthydemus, taking care to address the latter when alone.³

I conceive Alkibiadēs I. and II. as composed by Plato among his earlier writings (perhaps between 399-390 B.C.)⁴ giving an imaginary picture of the way in which

¹ The sensibility of Sokrates to youthful beauty is as strongly declared in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (I. 3, 8-14), as in the Platonic *Lysis*, *Charmides*, or *Symposium*.

The conversation reported by Xenophon between Alkibiades, when not yet twenty years of age, and his guardian Perikles, the first man in Athens—wherein Alkibiades puzzles Perikles by a Sokratic cross-examination—is likely enough to be real, and was probably the fruit of his society with Sokrates (Xen. Memor. I. 2, 40).

² Stallbaum observes (Prolegg. ad

Alcib. I. p. 215, 2nd ed.), "*Ceterum etiam Æschines, Euclides, Phædon, et Antisthenes, dialogos Alcibiadis nomine inscriptos composuisse narratur*".

Respecting the dialogues composed by Æschines, see the first note to this chapter.

³ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 8.

⁴ The date which I here suppose for the composition of Alcib. I. (i.e. after the death of Sokrates, but early in the literary career of Plato), is farther sustained (against those critics who place it in 406 B.C. or 402 B.C. before the death of Sokrates) by the long discourse (p. 121-124) of Sokrates about

"Sokrates handled every respondent just as he chose" (to use the literal phrase of Xenophon¹): taming even that most overbearing youth, whom Aristophanes characterises as the lion's whelp.² In selecting Alkibiades as the sufferer under such a chastising process, Plato rebuts in his own ideal style that charge which Xenophon answers with prosaic directness—the charge made against Sokrates by his enemies, that he taught political craft without teaching ethical sobriety; and that he had encouraged by his training the lawless propensities of Alkibiades.³ When Schleiermacher, and others who disallow the dialogue, argue that the inordinate insolence ascribed to Alkibiades, and the submissive deference towards Sokrates also ascribed to him, are incongruous and incompatible attributes,—I reply that such a conjunction is very improbable in any real character. But this does not hinder Plato from combining them in one and the same ideal character, as we shall farther see when we come to the manifestation of Alkibiades in the Symposium :

replying to the accusers of Sokrates. Magical influence ascribed to the conversation of Sokrates.

the Persian and Spartan kings. In reference to the Persian monarchy Sokrates says (p. 123 B), *ἐπεὶ ποτ' ἐγὼ ἤκουσα ἀνδρὸς ἀλιευσίτου τῶν ἀναβηκότων παρὰ βασιλέα, ὃς ἔφη παρελθεῖν χώραν πάντων πολλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν—ἦν καλεῖν τοὺς ἐπιχωρίους ζῶντων τῆς βασιλείας γυναικός, &c.* Olympiodorus and the Scholiast both suppose that Plato here refers to Xenophon and the Anabasis, in which a statement very like this is found (I. 4, 9). It is plain, therefore, that they did not consider the dialogue to have been composed before the death of Sokrates. I think it very probable that Plato had in his mind Xenophon (either his Anabasis, or personal communications with him); but at any rate visits of Greeks to the Persian court became very numerous between 390-390 B.C., whereas Plato can hardly have seen any such visitors at Athens in 406 B.C. (before the close of the war), nor probably in 402 B.C., when Athens, though relieved from the oligarchy, was still in a state of great public prostration. Between 390 B.C. and the peace of Antalkidas (387 B.C.), visitors from Greece to the interior of Persia became more and more frequent, the Persian kings interfering very actively in Grecian

politics. Plato may easily have seen during these years intelligent Greeks who had been up to the Persian court on military or political business. Both the Persian kings and the Spartan kings were then in the maximum of power and ascendancy—it is no wonder therefore that Sokrates should here be made to dwell upon their prodigious dignity in his discourse with Alkibiades. Steinhart (Einkl. p. 150) feels the difficulty of reconciling this part of the dialogue with his hypothesis that it was composed in 406 B.C.: yet he and Stallbaum both insist that it must have been composed before the death of Sokrates, for which they really produce no grounds at all.

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 2, 14. τοὺς δὲ διαλεγόμενους αὐτῷ πᾶσι χράμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως βούλοιο.

² Aristoph. Ran. 1431. οὐ χρὴ λόγοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν. Thucyd. vi. 15. φοβηθέντες γὰρ αὐτοῦ (Alkib.) οἱ πολλοὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τε κατὰ τὸ αὐτοῦ σῶμα παρανομίας ἐς τὴν διαίταν, καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἐν καθ' ἑκάστην, ἐν ὅτῃ γίγνεται, ἔπρασσαν, ὥς τυραννίδος ἐπιδημοῦντι πολέμοι καθίστασθαι, &c.

³ Xenoph. Memorab. i. 2, 17.

in which dialogue we find a combination of the same elements, still more extravagant and high-coloured. Both here and there we are made to see that Sokrates, far from encouraging Alkibiades, is the only person who ever succeeded in humbling him. Plato attributes to the personality and conversation of Sokrates an influence magical and almost superhuman : which Cicero and Plutarch, proceeding probably upon the evidence of the Platonic dialogues, describe as if it were historical fact. They represent Alkibiades as shedding tears of sorrow and shame, and entreating Sokrates to rescue him from a sense of degradation insupportably painful.¹ Now Xenophon mentions Euthydemus and other young men as having really experienced these profound and distressing emotions.² But he does not at all certify the same about Alkibiades, whose historical career is altogether adverse to the hypothesis. The Platonic picture is an *ideal*, drawn from what may have been actually true about other interlocutors of Sokrates, and calculated to reply to Melétus and his allies.

Looking at Alkibiades I. and II. in this point of view, we shall find both of them perfectly Sokratic both in topics and in manner—whatever may be said about unnecessary prolixity and common-place here and there. The leading ideas of Alkibiades I. may be found, nearly all, in the Platonic Apology. That warfare, which Sokrates proclaims in the Apology as having been the mission of his life, against the false persuasion of knowledge, or against beliefs ethical and æsthetical, firmly entertained without having been preceded by conscious study or subjected to serious examination—is exemplified in Alkibiades I. and II. as emphatically as in any Platonic composition. In both these dialogues, indeed (especially in the first), we find an excessive repetition of specialising illustrations, often needless and sometimes tiresome : a defect easily intelligible if we assume them to have been written when Plato was still a novice in the art of dialogic composition. But both dialogues are fully impregnated with the spirit of the Sokratic process, exposing, though with exuberant prolixity, the

¹ Cicero, Tusc. Disp. iii. 32, 77 ; Plutarch, Alkib. i. p. 127 D, 135 C ; Symposium, tarch, Alkib. c. 4-6. Compare Plato, p. 215-216.

² Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 39-40.

firm and universal belief, held and affirmed by every one even at the age of boyhood, without any assignable grounds or modes of acquisition, and amidst angry discordance between the affirmation of one man and another. The emphasis too with which Sokrates insists upon his own single function of merely questioning, and upon the fact that Alkibiades gives all the answers and pronounces all the self-condemnation with his own mouth¹—is remarkable in this dialogue: as well as the confidence with which he proclaims the dialogue as affording the only, but effective, cure.² The ignorance of which Alkibiades stands unexpectedly convicted, is expressly declared to be common to him with the other Athenian politicians: an exception being half allowed to pass in favour of the semi-philosophical Perikles, whom Plato judges here with less severity than elsewhere³—and a decided superiority being claimed for the Spartan and Persian kings, who are extolled as systematically trained from childhood.

The main purpose of Sokrates is to drive Alkibiades into self-contradictions, and to force upon him a painful consciousness of ignorance and mental defect, upon grave and important subjects, while he is yet young enough to amend it. Towards this purpose he is made to lay claim to a divine mission similar to that which the real Sokrates announces in the Apology.⁴ A number of perplexing questions and difficulties are accumulated: it is not meant that these difficulties are insoluble, but that they cannot be solved by one who has never seriously reflected on them—by one who (as the Xenophontic Sokrates says to Euthydemus),⁵ is so confident of knowing the subject that he has never meditated upon it at all. The disheartened Alkibiades feels the necessity of improving himself and supplicates the assistance of Sokrates: who reminds him that he must first determine what "Himself" is. Here again we find ourselves upon the track of Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, and under the influence of the memorable inscription at Delphi—*Nosce teipsum*. Your mind is yourself: your body is a mere instrument of your

Difficulties multiplied for the purpose of bringing Alkibiades to a conviction of his own ignorance.

¹ Plato, Alkib. i. p. 112-113.

² Plato, Alkib. i. p. 127 E.

³ Plato, Alkib. i. p. 118-120.

⁴ Plato, Alkib. i. p. 124 C—127 E.

⁵ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 36. ἅλλα ταῦτα μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ἴσως, διὰ τὸ σφόδρα πιστεύειν εἶδέναι, οὐδ' ἔσκεψαι.

⁶ Plato, Alkib. i. p. 128-132 A.

mind: your wealth and power are simple appurtenances or adjuncts. To know yourself, which is genuine *Sophrosynê* or temperance, is to know your mind: but this can only be done by looking into another mind, and into its most intelligent compartment: just as the eye can only see itself by looking into the centre of vision of another eye.¹

At the same time, when, after having convicted Alkibiades of deplorable ignorance, Sokrates is called upon to prescribe remedies—all distinctness of indication disappears. It is exacted only when the purpose is to bring difficulties and contradictions to view: it is dispensed with, when the purpose is to solve them. The conclusion is, that assuming happiness as the acknowledged ultimate end,² Alkibiades cannot secure this either for himself or for his city, by striving for wealth and power, private or public: he can only secure it by acquiring for himself, and implanting in his countrymen, justice, temperance, and virtue. This is perfectly Sokratic, and conformable to what is said by the real Sokrates in the Platonic Apology. But coming at the close of Alkibiades I., it presents no meaning and imparts no instruction: because Sokrates had shown in the earlier part of the dialogue, that neither he himself, nor Alkibiades, nor the general public, knew what justice and virtue were. The positive solution which Sokrates professes to give, is therefore illusory. He throws us back upon those old, familiar, emotional, associations, unconscious products and unexamined transmissions from mind to mind—which he had already shown to represent the fancy of knowledge without the reality—deep-seated belief without any assignable intellectual basis, or outward standard of rectitude.

Throughout the various Platonic dialogues, we find alternately two distinct and opposite methods of handling—the generalising of the special, and the specialising of the general. In Alkibiades I., the specialising of the general preponderates—as it does in most of the conversations of the Xenophontic *Memorabilia*: the

Sokrates furnishes no means of solving these difficulties. He exhorts to Justice and Virtue—but these are acknowledged Incognita.

Prolixity of Alkibiades I.—Extreme multiplication of illustrative examples—

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* i. p. 133.

² A Platonic metaphor, illustrating the necessity for two separate minds

co-operating in dialectic colloquy.

² Plat. *Alkibiad.* i. p. 134.

number of exemplifying particulars is unusually great. Sokrates does not accept as an answer a general term, without illustrating it by several of the specific terms comprehended under it: and this several times on occasions when an instructed reader thinks it superfluous and tiresome: hence, partly, the inclination of some modern critics to disallow the dialogue. But we must recollect that though a modern reader practised in the use of general terms may seize the meaning at once, an Athenian youth of the Platonic age would not be sure of doing the same. No conscious analysis had yet been applied to general terms: no grammar or logic then entered into education. Confident affirmation, without fully knowing the meaning of what is affirmed, is the besetting sin against which Plato here makes war: and his precautions for exposing it are pushed to extreme minuteness. So, too, in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, when he wishes to illustrate the process of logical division and subdivision, he applies it to cases so trifling and so multiplied, that Socher is revolted and rejects the dialogues altogether. But Plato himself foresees and replies to the objection; declaring expressly that his main purpose is, not to expound the particular subject chosen, but to make manifest and familiar the steps and conditions of the general classifying process—and that prolixity cannot be avoided.¹ We must reckon upon a similar purpose in *Alkibiadês I.* The dialogue is a specimen of that which Aristotle calls Inductive Dialectic, as distinguished from Syllogistic: the Inductive he considers to be plainer and easier, suitable when you have an ordinary collocutor—the Syllogistic is the more cogent, when you are dealing with a practised disputant.²

It has been seen that *Alkibiadês I.*, though professing to give something like a solution, gives what is really no solution at all. *Alkibiadês II.*, similar in many respects, is here different, inasmuch as it does not even profess to solve the difficulty which had been raised. The general mental defect—false persuasion of know-

Alkibiadês II. leaves its problem avowedly undetermined.

¹ Plato, *Politikus*, 285-286.
Aristotel. *Topic.* i. 104, a. 16.
Πόσα τῶν λόγων εἶδη τῶν διαλεκτικῶν
—ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δὲ
συλλογισμός ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπα-

γωγή πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ
κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ
τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν· ὁ δὲ συλλογισμός
βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογι-
κοὺς ἐνεργέστερον.

ledge without the reality—is presented in its application to a particular case. Alkibiades is obliged to admit that he does not know what he ought to pray to the Gods for: neither what is *good*, to be granted, nor what is *evil*, to be averted. He relies upon Sokrates for dispelling this mist from his mind: which Sokrates promises to do, but adjourns for another occasion.

Sokrates here ascribes to the Spartans, and to various philosophers, the practice of putting up prayers in undefined language, for good and honourable things generally. He commends that practice. Xenophon tells us that the historical Sokrates observed it:¹ but he tells us also that the historical Sokrates, though not praying for any special presents from the Gods, yet prayed for and believed himself to receive special revelations and advice as to what was good to be done or avoided in particular cases. He held that these special revelations were essential to any tolerable life: that the dispensations of the Gods, though administered upon regular principles on certain subjects and up to a certain point, were kept by them designedly inscrutable beyond that point: but that the Gods would, if properly solicited, afford premonitory warnings to any favoured person, such as would enable him to keep out of the way of evil, and put himself in the way of good. He declared that to consult and obey oracles and prophets was not less a maxim of prudence than a duty of piety: for himself, he was farther privileged through his divine sign or monitor, which he implicitly followed.² Such premonitory warnings were the only special favour which he thought it suitable to pray for—besides good things generally. For special presents he did not pray, because he professed not to know whether any of the ordinary objects of desire were good or bad. He proves in his conversation with Euthydêmus, that all those acquisitions which are usually accounted means of happiness—beauty, strength, wealth, reputa-

¹ Xenoph. Mem. i. 3, 2; Plat. Alk. ii. p. 143-148.

² These opinions of Sokrates are announced in various passages of the Xenophontic Memorabilia, i. 1, 1-10—ἐφη δὲ δεῖν, ἀ μὲν μετέστας ποιεῖν

ἔδωκαν οἱ θεοί, μαθάνειν· ἀ δὲ μὴ ἐγγε-
νοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐστί, κερᾶσθαι διὰ μα-
τικῆς παρὰ τῶν θεῶν κινδυνεύειν· τοὺς
θεοὺς γάρ, οἷς ἂν ἴσῃν ἴλεον, σημαίνειν
—i. 3, 4; i. 4, 2-15; iv. 3, 13; iv. 7, 10
iv. 8, 5-11.

tion, nay, even good health and wisdom—are sometimes good or causes of happiness, sometimes evil or causes of misery; and therefore cannot be considered either as absolutely the one or absolutely the other.¹

This impossibility of determining what is good and what is evil, in consequence of the uncertainty in the dispensations of the Gods and in human affairs—is a doctrine forcibly insisted on by the Xenophontic Sokrates in his discourse with Euthydēmus, and much akin to the Platonic Alkibiadēs II., being applied to the special case of prayer. But we must not suppose that Sokrates adheres to this doctrine throughout all the colloquies of the Xenophontic Memorabilia: on the contrary, we find him, in other places, reasoning upon such matters, as health, strength, and wisdom, as if they were decidedly good.² The fact is, that the arguments of Sokrates, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, vary materially according to the occasion and the person with whom he is discoursing: and the case is similar with the Platonic dialogues: illustrating farther the questionable evidence on which Schleiermacher and other critics proceed, when they declare one dialogue to be spurious, because it contains reasoning inconsistent with another.

Comparison of Alkibiadēs II. with the Xenophontic Memorabilia, especially the conversation of Sokrates with Euthydēmus. Sokrates not always consistent with himself.

We find in Alkibiadēs II. another doctrine which is also proclaimed by Sokrates in the Xenophontic Memorabilia: that the Gods are not moved by costly sacrifice more than by humble sacrifice, according to the circumstances of the offerer:³ they attend only to the mind of the offerer, whether he be just and wise: that is, “whether he knows what ought to be done both towards Gods and towards men.”⁴

But we find also in Alkibiadēs II. another doctrine, more remarkable. Sokrates will not proclaim absolutely that knowledge is good, and that ignorance is evil. In some cases, he contends, ignorance is good; and he discriminates which the cases are. That which we

Remarkable doctrine of Alkibiadēs II.—That knowledge

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, 31-32-36.

Ταῦτα οὐκ ποτὲ μὲν ὠφελοῦντα ποτὲ δὲ βλάπτοντα, τί μᾶλλον ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ εἰσιν;

² For example, Xen. Mem. iv. 5, 6

—σοφίαν τὸ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, &c.

³ Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149-150; Xen. Mem. i. 3. Compare Plato, Legg. x. p. 885; Isokrat. ad Nikok.

⁴ Plato, Alkib. ii. p. 149 E, 150 B.

is not always Good. The knowledge of Good itself is indispensable; without that, the knowledge of other things is more hurtful than beneficial. are principally interested in knowing, is *Good*, or *The Best*—*The Profitable*:¹ phrases used as equivalent. The knowledge of this is good, and the ignorance of it mischievous, under all supposable circumstances. And if a man knows good, the more he knows of everything else, the better; since he will be sure to make a good use of his knowledge. But if he does not know good, the knowledge of other things will be hurtful rather than beneficial to him. To be skilful in particular arts and accomplishments, under the capital mental deficiency supposed, will render him an instrument of evil and not of good. The more he knows—and the more he believes himself to know—the more forward will he be in acting, and therefore the greater amount of harm will he do. It is better that he should act as little as possible. Such a man is not fit to direct his own conduct, like a freeman: he must be directed and controlled by others, like a slave. The greater number of mankind are fools of this description—ignorant of good: the wise men who know good, and are fit to direct, are very few. The wise man alone, knowing good, follows reason: the rest trust to opinion, without reason.² He alone is competent to direct both his own conduct and that of the society.

The stress which is laid here upon the knowledge of good, as distinguished from all other varieties of knowledge—the identification of the good with the profitable, and of the knowledge of good with reason (*νοῦς*), while other varieties of knowledge are ranked with opinion (*δόξα*)—these are points which, under one phraseology or another, pervade many of the Platonic dialogues. The old phrase of Herakleitus—*Πολυμαθὴν νόον οὐ διδάσκει*—"much learning does not teach reason"—seems to have been present to the mind of Plato in composing this dialogue. The man of much learning and art, without the knowledge of good, and surrendering himself to the guidance of one or other among

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* II. p. 145 C. Ὅστις ἀρα τι τῶν τοιούτων οἶδεν, εὖ μὲν παρήσκει αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ βελτίστου ἐπιστήμης—αὐτῇ δ' ἢ ἢ αὐτῇ δέπου ἡμεῖς καὶ

ἢ τοῦ ἀφελίμου—also 146 B.

² Plato, *Alk.* II. p. 146 A-D. ἄνευ τοῦ δόξης πιστευόμενος.

his accomplishments, is like a vessel tossed about at sea without a pilot.¹

What Plato here calls the knowledge of Good, or Reason—the just discrimination and comparative appreciation of Ends and Means—appears in the *Politikus* and *Euthydēmus*, under the title of the Regal or Political Art, of employing or directing² the results of all other arts, which are considered as subordinate: in the *Protagoras*, under the title of art of calculation or mensuration: in the *Philēbus*, as measure and proportion: in the *Phædrus* (in regard to rhetoric) as the art of turning to account, for the main purpose of persuasion, all the special processes, stratagems, decorations, &c., imparted by professional masters. In the *Republic*, it is personified in the few venerable Elders who constitute the Reason of the society, and whose directions all the rest (Guardians and Producers) are bound implicitly to follow: the virtue of the subordinates consisting in this implicit obedience. In the *Leges*, it is defined as the complete subjection in the mind, of pleasures and pains to right Reason,³ without which, no special aptitudes are worth having. In the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*, it stands as a Sokratic authority under the title of *Sophrosynē* or Temperance:⁴ and the Profitable is declared identical with the Good, as the directing and limiting principle for all human pursuits and proceedings.⁵

Knowledge of Good—appears postulated and divined, in many of the Platonic dialogues, under different titles.

But what are we to understand by the *Good*, about which there are so many disputes, according to the acknowledgment of Plato as well as of Sokrates? And what are we to understand by the *Profitable*? In what relation does it stand to the *Pleasurable* and the *Painful*?

The Good—The Profitable—What is it? How are we to know it? Plato leaves this undetermined.

These are points which Plato here leaves undetermined. We shall find him again touching them, and trying different ways of determining them, in the *Protagoras*, the *Gorgias*, the *Republic*,

¹ Plato, *Alkib.* ii. p. 147 A. ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν καλουμένην πολυμάθειαν τε καὶ πολυτεχνίαν ἐκτενέμενος, ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης, ἀγόμενος δὲ ὑπὸ μίας ἐκείνης τῶν ἄλλων, &c.

² Plato, *Politikus*, 292 B, 304 B,

305 A; *Euthydēmus*, 291 B, 292 B. Compare Xenophon, *Ekonomikos*, i. 8, 13.

³ *Leges*, iii. 689 A-D, 691 A.

⁴ Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 2, 17; iv. 3, 1.

⁵ Xenoph. *Memor.* iv. 6, 8; iv. 7, 7.

and elsewhere. We have here the title and the postulate, but nothing more, of a comprehensive Teleology, or right comparative estimate of ends and means one against another, so as to decide when, how far, under what circumstances, &c., each ought to be pursued. We shall see what Plato does in other dialogues to connect this title and postulate with a more definite meaning.

CHAPTER XIII.

HIPPIAS MAJOR—HIPPIAS MINOR.

BOTH these two dialogues are carried on between Sokrates and the Eleian Sophist Hippias. The general conception of Hippias—described as accomplished, eloquent, and successful, yet made to say vain and silly things—is the same in both dialogues: in both also the polemics of Sokrates against him are conducted in a like spirit, of affected deference mingled with insulting sarcasm. Indeed the figure assigned to Hippias is so contemptible, that even an admiring critic like Stallbaum cannot avoid noticing the “petulans pene et proterva in Hippiam oratio,” and intimating that Plato has handled Hippias more coarsely than any one else. Such petulance Stallbaum attempts to excuse by saying that the dialogue is a youthful composition of Plato:¹ while Schleiermacher numbers it among the

Hippias
Major—
Situation
supposed—
Character
of the dia-
logue. Sar-
casm and
mockery
against
Hippias.

¹ Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Hipp. Maj. p. 149-150; also Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 42-43), who says, after an outpouring of his usual invective against the Sophist:—“Nevertheless the coarse jesting of the dialogue seems almost to exceed the admissible limit of comic effect,” &c. Again, p. 50, Steinhart talks of the banter which Sokrates carries on with Hippias, in a way not less cruel (*grausam*) than purposeless, tormenting him with a string of successive new propositions about the definition of the Beautiful, which propositions, as fast as Hippias catches at them, he again withdraws of his own accord, and thus at last dismisses him (as he had dismissed Ion) uninstructed and unimproved, without even leaving behind in him the sting of anger, &c.

It requires a powerful hatred against the persons called Sophists, to make

a critic take pleasure in a comedy wherein silly and ridiculous speeches are fastened upon the name of one of them, in his own day not merely honoured but acknowledged as deserving honour by remarkable and varied accomplishments—and to make the critic describe the historical Hippias (whom we only know from Plato and Xenophon—see Steinhart, note 7, p. 89; Socher, p. 221) as if he had really delivered these speeches, or something equally absurd.

How this comedy may be appreciated is doubtless a matter of individual taste. For my part, I agree with Ast in thinking it misplaced and unbecoming: and I am not surprised that he wishes to remove the dialogue from the Platonic canon, though I do not concur either in this inference, or in the general principle on which it proceeds,

reasons for suspecting the dialogue, and Ast, among the reasons for declaring positively that Plato is not the author.¹ This last conclusion I do not at all accept: nor even the hypothesis of Stallbaum, if it be tendered as an excuse for improprieties of tone: for I believe that the earliest of Plato's dialogues was composed after he was twenty-eight years of age—that is, after the death of Sokrates. It is however noway improbable, that both the Greater and Lesser Hippias may have been among Plato's earlier compositions. We see by the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon that there was repeated and acrimonious controversy between Sokrates and Hippias: so that we may probably suppose feelings of special dislike, determining Plato to compose two distinct dialogues, in which an imaginary Hippias is mocked and scourged by an imaginary Sokrates.

One considerable point in the *Hippias Major* appears to have a bearing on the debate between Sokrates and Hippias in the Xenophontic *Memorabilia*: in which debate, Hippias taunts Sokrates with always combating and deriding the opinions of others, while evading to give opinions of his own. It appears that some antecedent debates between the two had turned upon the definition of the Just, and that on these occasions Hippias had been the respondent, Sokrates the objector.

Hippias professes to have reflected upon these debates, and to be now prepared with a definition which neither Sokrates nor any one else can successfully assail, but he will not say what the definition is, until Sokrates has laid down one of his own. In reply to this challenge, Sokrates declares the Just to be equivalent to the Lawful or Customary: he defends this against various

viz., that all objections against the composition of a dialogue are to be held as being also objections against its genuineness as a work of Plato. The *Nubes* of Aristophanes, greatly superior as a comedy to the *Hippias* of Plato, is turned to an abusive purpose when critics put it into court as evidence about the character of the real Sokrates.

K. F. Hermann, in my judgment, takes a more rational view of the *Hippias Major* (*Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil.* p. 437-447). Instead of expatiating on the glory of Plato in deriding

an accomplished contemporary, he dwells upon the logical mistakes and confusion which the dialogue brings to view; and he reminds us justly of the intellectual condition of the age, when even elementary distinctions in logic and grammar had been scarcely attended to.

Both K. F. Hermann and Socher consider the *Hippias* to be not a juvenile production of Plato, but to belong to his middle age.

¹ Schleierm. *Einleitung*, p. 401; Ast, *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, p. 457-459.

Real debate
between the
historical
Sokrates
and Hippias
in the Xeno-
phontic Me-
morabilia
—Subject
of that de-
bate.

objections of Hippias, who concludes by admitting it.¹ Probably this debate, as reported by Xenophon, or something very like it, really took place. If so, we remark with surprise the feebleness of the objections of Hippias, in a case where Sokrates, if he had been the objector, would have found such strong ones—and the feeble replies given by Sokrates, whose talent lay in starting and enforcing difficulties, not in solving them.² Among the remarks which Sokrates makes in illustration to Hippias, one is—that Lykurgus had ensured superiority to Sparta by creating in the Spartans a habit of implicit obedience to the laws.³ Such is the character of the Xenophontic debate.

Here, in the beginning of the Hippias Major, the Platonic Sokrates remarks that Hippias has been long absent from Athens: which absence, the latter explains, by saying that he has visited many cities in Greece, giving lectures with great success, and receiving high pay: and that especially he has often visited Sparta, partly to give lectures, but partly also to transact diplomatic business for his countrymen the Eleians, who trusted him more than any one else for such duties. His lectures (he says) were eminently instructive and valuable for the training of youth: moreover they were so generally approved, that even from a small Sicilian town called Inykus, he obtained a considerable sum in fees.

Opening of the Hippias Major—Hippias describes the successful circuit which he had made through Greece, and the renown as well as the gain acquired by his lectures.

Upon this Sokrates asks—In which of the cities were your gains the largest: probably at Sparta? *Hip.*—No; I received nothing at all at Sparta. *Sokr.*—How? You amaze me! Were not your lectures calculated to improve the Spartan youth? or did not the Spartans desire to have their youth improved? or had they no money? *Hip.*—Neither one nor the other. The Spartans, like others, desire the improvement of their youth: they also have plenty of money: more—

Hippias had met with no success at Sparta. Why the Spartans did not admit his instructions. Their law forbids.

¹ Xenoph. Mem. iv. 4, 12-25.

² Compare the puzzling questions which Alkibiades when a youth is reported to have addressed to Perikles, and which he must unquestionably have heard from Sokrates himself, respecting the meaning of the word

Nómos (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 42). All the difficulties in determining the definition of *Nómos*, occur also in determining that of *Nómuon*, which includes both *Jus Scriptum* and *Jus Moribus* Receptum.

³ Xen. Mem. iv. 4, 15.

over my lectures were very beneficial to them as well as to the rest.¹ *Sokr.*—How could it happen then, that at Sparta, a city great and eminent for its good laws, your valuable instructions were left unrewarded; while you received so much at the inconsiderable town of Inykus? *Hip.*—It is not the custom of the country, Sokrates, for the Spartans to change their laws, or to educate their sons in a way different from their ordinary routine. *Sokr.*—How say you? It is not the custom of the country for the Spartans to do right, but to do wrong? *Hip.*—I shall not say *that*, Sokrates. *Sokr.*—But surely they would do right, in educating their children better and not worse? *Hip.*—Yes, they would do right: but it is not lawful for them to admit a foreign mode of education. If any one could have obtained payment there for education, I should have obtained a great deal; for they listen to me with delight and applaud me: but, as I told you, their law forbids.

Sokr.—Do you call law a hurt or benefit to the city? *Hip.*—
Question, What is law? The lawmakers always aim at the Profitable, but sometimes fail to attain it. When they fail, they fail to attain law. The lawful is the Profitable: the Unprofitable is also unlawful. Law is enacted with a view to benefit: but it sometimes hurts, if it be badly enacted.² *Sokr.*—But what? Do not the enactors enact it as the maximum of good, without which the citizens cannot live a regulated life? *Hip.*—Certainly: they do so. *Sokr.*—Therefore, when those who try to enact laws miss the attainment of good, they also miss the lawful and law itself. How say you? *Hip.*—They do so, if you speak with strict propriety: but such is not the language which men commonly use. *Sokr.*—What men? the knowing? or the ignorant? *Hip.*—The Many. *Sokr.*—The Many; is it *they* who know what truth is? *Hip.*—Assuredly not. *Sokr.*—But surely those who do know, account the profitable to be in truth more lawful than the unprofitable, to all men. Don't you admit this? *Hip.*—Yes, I admit they account it so in truth. *Sokr.*—Well, and it is so, too: the truth is as the knowing men account it. *Hip.*—Most certainly. *Sokr.*—Now you affirm, that it is more profitable to the Spartans to be educated according to your scheme, foreign as it is, than according to their own native scheme. *Hip.*—I affirm it,

¹ Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* 233-234.² Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* 234 C-D.

and with truth too. *Sokr.*—You affirm besides, that things more profitable are at the same time more lawful? *Hip.*—I said so. *Sokr.*—According to your reasoning, then, it is more lawful for the Spartan children to be educated by Hippias, and more unlawful for them to be educated by their fathers—if in reality they will be more benefited by you? *Hip.*—But they *will* be more benefited by me. *Sokr.*—The Spartans therefore act unlawfully, when they refuse to give you money and to confide to you their sons? *Hip.*—I admit that they do: indeed your reasoning seems to make in my favour, so that I am noway called upon to resist it. *Sokr.*—We find then, after all, that the Spartans are enemies of law, and that too in the most important matters—though they are esteemed the most exemplary followers of law.¹

Perhaps Plato intended the above argument as a derisory taunt against the Sophist Hippias, for being vain enough to think his own tuition better than that of the Spartan community. If such was his intention, the argument might have been retorted against Plato himself, for his propositions in the *Republic* and *Leges*: and we know that the enemies of Plato did taunt him with his inability to get these schemes adopted in any actual community. But the argument becomes interesting when we compare it with the debate before referred to in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*, where Sokrates maintains against Hippias that the Just is equivalent to the Lawful. In that *Xenophontic* dialogue, all the difficulties which embarrass this explanation are kept out of sight, and Sokrates is represented as gaining an easy victory over Hippias. In this *Platonic* dialogue, the equivocal use of the word νόμιμον is expressly adverted to, and Sokrates reduces Hippias to a supposed absurdity, by making him pronounce the Spartans to be enemies of law:—παρὰ νόμους bearing a double sense, and the proposition being true in one sense, false in the other. In the argument of the *Platonic Sokrates*, a law which does not attain its intended purpose of benefiting the

Comparison
of the argu-
ment of the
Platonic
Sokrates,
with that of
the Xeno-
phontic
Sokrates.

¹ Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* 285.

community, is no law at all,—not lawful :¹ so that we are driven back again upon the objections of Alkibiades against Perikles (in the Xenophontic Memorabilia) in regard to what constitutes a law. In the argument of the Xenophontic Sokrates, law means a law actually established, by official authority or custom—and the Spartans are produced as eminent examples of a lawfully minded community. As far as we can assign positive opinion to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias Major, he declares that the profitable or useful (being that which men always aim at in making law) is The Lawful, whether actually established or not : and that the unprofitable or hurtful (being that which men always intend to escape) is The Unlawful, whether prescribed by any living authority or not. This (he says) is the opinion of the wise men who know : though the ignorant vulgar hold the contrary opinion. The explanation of τὸ δίκαιον given by the Xenophontic Sokrates (τὸ δίκαιον = τὸ νόμιμον), would be equivalent, if we construe τὸ νόμιμον in the sense of the Platonic Sokrates (in Hippias Major) as an affirmation that The Just was the generally useful—Τὸ δίκαιον = τὸ κοινῇ σύμφερον.

There exists however in all this, a prevalent confusion between Law (or the Lawful) as actually established, and Law (or the Lawful) as it ought to be established, in the judgment of the critic, or of those whom he follows : that is (to use the phrase of Mr. Austin in his 'Province of Jurisprudence') Law as it would be, if it conformed to its assumed measure or test. In the first of these senses, τὸ νόμιμον is not one and the same, but variable according to place and time—one thing at Sparta, another thing elsewhere : accordingly it would not satisfy the demand of Plato's mind, when he asks for an explanation of τὸ δίκαιον. It is an explanation in the second of the two senses which Plato seeks—a common measure or test applicable universally, at all times and places. In so far as he ever finds one, it is that which I have mentioned above as delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in this dialogue : viz., the Just or Good, that which ought to be the measure or test of Law and Positive

The Just or Good is the beneficial or profitable. This is the only explanation which Plato ever gives—and to this he does not always adhere.

¹ Compare a similar argument of Sokrates against Thrasymachus—Republic, I. 330.

Morality, is, the beneficial or profitable. This (I repeat) is the only approach to a solution which we ever find in Plato. But this is seldom clearly enunciated, never systematically followed out, and sometimes, in appearance, even denied.

I resume the thread of the Hippias Major. Sokrates asks Hippias what sort of lectures they were that he delivered with so much success at Sparta? The Spartans (Hippias replies) knew nothing and cared nothing about letters, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy: but they took delight in hearing tales about heroes, early ancestors, foundation-legends of cities, &c., which his mnemonic artifice enabled him to deliver.¹ The Spartans delight in you (observes Sokrates) as children delight in old women's tales. Yes (replies Hippias), but that is not all: I discoursed to them also, recently, about fine and honourable pursuits, much to their admiration: I supposed a conversation between Nestor and Neoptolemus, after the capture of Troy, in which the veteran, answering a question put by his youthful companion, enlarged upon those pursuits which it was fine, honourable, beautiful for a young man to engage in. My discourse is excellent, and obtained from the Spartans great applause. I am going to deliver it again here at Athens, in the school-room of Pheidistratus, and I invite you, Sokrates, to come and hear it, with as many friends as you can bring.²

Lectures of Hippias at Sparta—not upon geometry, or astronomy, &c., but upon the question—What pursuits are beautiful, fine, and honourable for youth.

I shall come willingly (replied Sokrates). But first answer me one small question, which will rescue me from a present embarrassment. Just now, I was shamefully puzzled in conversation with a friend, to whom I had been praising some things as honourable and beautiful,—blaming other things as mean and ugly. He surprised me by the interrogation—How do you know, Sokrates, what things are beautiful, and what are ugly? Come now, can you tell me, What is the Beautiful? I, in my stupidity, was altogether puzzled, and could not answer the question. But after I had parted from

Question put by Sokrates, in the name of a friend in the background, who has just been puzzling him with it—What is the Beautiful?

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 235 E.

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. 236 A-B.

him, I became mortified and angry with myself; and I vowed that the next time I met any wise man, like you, I would put the question to him, and learn how to answer it; so that I might be able to renew the conversation with my friend. Your coming here is most opportune. I entreat you to answer and explain to me clearly what the Beautiful is; in order that I may not again incur the like mortification. You can easily answer: it is a small matter for you, with your numerous attainments.

Oh—yes—a small matter (replies Hippias); the question is easy to answer. I could teach you to answer many questions harder than that; so that no man shall be able to convict you in dialogue.¹

Sokrates then proceeds to interrogate Hippias, in the name of the absentee, starting one difficulty after another as if suggested by this unknown prompter, and pretending to be himself under awe of so impracticable a disputant.

All persons are just, through Justice—wise, through Wisdom—good, through Goodness or the Good—beautiful, through Beauty or the Beautiful. Now Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Beauty or the Beautiful, must each be *something*. Tell me what the Beautiful is?

Hippias does not conceive the question. Does the man want to know what is a beautiful thing? *Sokr.*—No; he wants to know what is *The Beautiful*. *Hip.*—I do not see the difference. I answer that a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing. No one can deny that.²

Sokr.—My disputatious friend will not accept your answer. He wants you to tell him, What is the Self-Beautiful?—that Something through which all beautiful things become beautiful. Am I to tell him, it is because a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing? He will say—Is not a beautiful mare a beautiful thing also? and a beautiful lyre as well? *Hip.*—Yes; both of them are so. *Sokr.*—Ay, and a beautiful pot, my friend will add, well moulded and rounded by a skilful potter, is a beautiful thing too. *Hip.*—How, Sokrates? Who can your

Hippias does not understand the question. He answers by indicating one particularly beautiful object.

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 236 C-D.

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. 237 A.

disputatious friend be ? Some ill-taught man, surely ; since he introduces such trivial names into a dignified debate. *Sokr.*—Yes ; that is his character : not polite, but vulgar, anxious for nothing else but the truth. *Hip.*—A pot, if it be beautifully made, must certainly be called beautiful ; yet still, all such objects are unworthy to be counted as beautiful, if compared with a maiden, a mare, or a lyre.

Sokr.—I understand. You follow the analogy suggested by Herakleitus in his dictum—That the most beautiful ape is ugly, if compared with the human race. So you say, the most beautiful pot is ugly, when compared with the race of maidens. *Hip.*—Yes. That is my meaning. *Sokr.*—Then my friend will ask you in return, whether the race of maidens is not as much inferior to the race of Gods, as the pot to the maiden ? whether the most beautiful maiden will not appear ugly, when compared to a Goddess ? whether the wisest of men will not appear an ape, when compared to the Gods, either in beauty or in wisdom.¹ *Hip.*—No one can dispute it. *Sokr.*—My friend will smile and say—You forget what was the question put. I asked you, What is the Beautiful ?—the Self-Beautiful : and your answer gives me, as the Self-Beautiful, something which you yourself acknowledge to be no more beautiful than ugly ? If I had asked you, from the first, what it was that was both beautiful and ugly, your answer would have been pertinent to the question. Can you still think that the Self-Beautiful,—that Something, by the presence of which all other things become beautiful,—is a maiden, or a mare, or a lyre ?

Hip.—I have another answer to which your friend can take no exception. That, by the presence of which all things become beautiful, is Gold. What was before ugly, will (we all know), when ornamented with gold, appear beautiful. *Sokr.*—You little know what sort of man my friend is. He will laugh at your answer, and ask you—Do you think, then, that Pheidias did not know his profession as a sculptor ? How came

Cross-questioning by Sokrates—Other things also are beautiful, but each thing is beautiful only by comparison, or under some particular circumstances: it is sometimes beautiful, sometimes not beautiful.

Second answer of Hipias—Gold, is that by the presence of which all things become beautiful. Scrutiny applied to the answer.

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 289.

Complaint by Hippias about vulgar analogies. he not to make the statue of Athênê all gold, instead of making (as he has done) the face, hands, and feet of ivory, and the pupils of the eyes of a particular stone? Is not ivory also beautiful, and particular kinds of stone? *Hip.*—Yes, each is beautiful, where it is becoming. *Sokr.*—And ugly, where it is not becoming.¹ *Hip.*—Doubtless. I admit that what is becoming or suitable, makes that to which it is applied appear beautiful: that which is not becoming or suitable, makes it appear ugly. *Sokr.*—My friend will next ask you, when you are boiling the beautiful pot of which we spoke just now, full of beautiful soup, what sort of ladle will be suitable and becoming—one made of gold, or of fig-tree wood? Will not the golden ladle spoil the soup, and the wooden ladle turn it out good? Is not the wooden ladle, therefore, better than the golden? *Hip.*—By Hêraklê, Sokrates! what a coarse and stupid fellow your friend is! I cannot continue to converse with a man who talks of such matters. *Sokr.*—I am not surprised that you, with your fine attire and lofty reputation, are offended with these low allusions. But I have nothing to spoil by intercourse with this man; and I entreat you to persevere, as a favour to me. He will ask you whether a wooden soup-ladle is not more beautiful than a ladle of gold,—since it is more suitable and becoming? So that though you said—The Self-Beautiful is Gold—you are now obliged to acknowledge that gold is not more beautiful than fig-tree wood?

Hip.—I acknowledge that it is so. But I have another answer ready which will silence your friend. I presume you wish me to indicate as The Beautiful, something which will never appear ugly to any one, at any time, or at any place.² *Sokr.*—That is exactly what I desire. *Hip.*—Well, I affirm, then, that to every man, always, and everywhere, the following is most beautiful. A man being healthy, rich, honoured by the Greeks, having come to old age and buried his own parents well, to be himself buried by his own sons well and magnificently. *Sokr.*—Your answer sounds imposing; but my friend will laugh it to scorn, and will remind me again, that his question pointed to the

Third answer of Hippias—questions upon it—proof given that it fails of universal application.

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 290.

² Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 C-D.

Beautiful *itself*¹—something which, being present as attribute in any subject, will make that subject (whether stone, wood, man, God, action, study, &c.) beautiful. Now that which you have asserted to be beautiful to every one everywhere, was not beautiful to Achilles, who accepted by preference the lot of dying before his father—nor is it so to the heroes, or to the sons of Gods, who do not survive or bury their fathers. To some, therefore, what you specify is beautiful—to others it is not beautiful but ugly: that is, it is both beautiful and ugly, like the maiden, the lyre, the pot, on which we have already remarked. *Hip.*—I did not speak about the Gods or Heroes. Your friend is intolerable, for touching on such profanities.² *Sokr.*—However, you cannot deny that what you have indicated is beautiful only for the sons of men, and not for the sons of Gods. My friend will thus make good his reproach against your answer. He will tell me, that all the answers, which we have as yet given, are too absurd. And he may perhaps at the same time himself suggest another, as he sometimes does in pity for my embarrassment.

Sokrates then mentions, as coming from hints of the absent friend, three or four different explanations of the Self-Beautiful: each of which, when first introduced, he approves, and Hippias approves also: but each of which he proceeds successively to test and condemn. It is to be remarked that all of them are general explanations: not consisting in conspicuous particular instances, like those which had come from Hippias. His explanations are the following:—

Farther answers, suggested by Sokrates himself—
1. The Suitable or Becoming—
Objections thereunto—it is rejected.

1. The suitable or becoming (which had before been glanced at). It is the suitable or becoming which constitutes the Beautiful.³

To this Sokrates objects: The suitable, or becoming, is what causes objects to *appear* beautiful—not what causes them to be *really* beautiful. Now the latter is that which we are seeking. The two conditions do not always go together. Those objects, institutions, and pursuits which *are really* beautiful (fine, honourable) very often do not appear so, either to individuals or to

¹ Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* 292 D.

² Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* 293 B.

³ Plato, *Hipp. Maj.* 293 E.

cities collectively ; so that there is perpetual dispute and fighting on the subject. The suitable or becoming, therefore, as it is certainly what makes objects appear beautiful, so it cannot be what makes them really beautiful.¹

2. The useful or profitable.—We call objects beautiful, looking to the purpose which they are calculated or intended to serve : the human body, with a view to running, wrestling, and other exercises—a horse, an ox, a cock, looking to the service required from them—implements, vehicles on land and ships at sea, instruments for music and other arts all upon the same principle, looking to the end which they accomplish or help to accomplish. Laws and pursuits are characterised in the same way. In each of these, we give the name Beautiful to the useful, in so far as it is useful, when it is useful, and for the purpose to which it is useful. To that which is useless or hurtful, in the same manner, we give the name Ugly.²

Now that which is capable of accomplishing each end, is useful for such end : that which is incapable, is useless. It is therefore capacity, or power, which is beautiful : incapacity, or impotence, is ugly.³

Most certainly (replies Hippias) : this is especially true in our cities and communities, wherein political power is the finest thing possible, political impotence, the meanest.

Yet, on closer inspection (continues Sokrates), such a theory will not hold. Power is employed by all men, though unwillingly, for bad purposes : and each man, through such employment of his power, does much more harm than good, beginning with his childhood. Now power, which is useful for the doing of evil, can never be called beautiful.⁴

You cannot therefore say that Power, taken absolutely, is beautiful. You must add the qualification—Power used for the production of some good, is beautiful. This, then, would be the profitable—the cause or generator of good.⁵ But the cause is different from its effect :—the generator or father is different

¹ Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 B-E.

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 C-D.

³ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 295 E. Οὐκ οὐν τὸ δυνατόν ἕκαστον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἰς

ὑπὲρ δυνατόν, εἰς τοῦτο καὶ χρήσιμον· τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἀχρηστον ; . . . Δύναμις μὲν ἄρα καλὴν—ἀδυναμία δὲ αἰσχρὴν ;

⁴ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 296 C-D.

⁵ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 B.

from the generated or son. The beautiful would, upon this view, be the cause of the good. But then the beautiful would be different from the good, and the good different from the beautiful? Who can admit this? It is obviously wrong: it is the most ridiculous theory which we have yet hit upon.¹

3. The Beautiful is a particular variety of the agreeable or pleasurable: that which characterises those things which cause pleasure to us through sight and hearing. Thus the men, the ornaments, the works of painting or sculpture, upon which we look with admiration,² are called beautiful: also songs, music, poetry, fable, discourse, in like manner; nay even laws, customs, pursuits, which we consider beautiful, might be brought under the same head.³

3. The Beautiful is a variety of the Pleasurable—that which is received through the eye and the ear.

The objector, however, must now be dealt with. He will ask us—Upon what ground do you make so marked a distinction between the pleasures of sight and hearing, and other pleasures? Do you deny that these others (those of taste, smell, eating, drinking, sex) are really pleasures? No, surely (we shall reply); we admit them to be pleasures,—but no one will tolerate us in calling them beautiful: especially the pleasures of sex, which as pleasures are the greatest of all, but which are ugly and disgraceful to behold. He will answer—I understand you: you are ashamed to call these pleasures beautiful, because they do not seem so to the multitude: but I did not ask you, what *seems* beautiful to the multitude—I asked you, what *is* beautiful.⁴ You mean to affirm, that all pleasures which do not belong to sight and hearing, are not beautiful: Do you mean, all which do

Objections to this last—What property is there common to both sight and hearing, which confers upon the pleasures of these two senses the exclusive privilege of being beautiful?

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 297 D-E. *οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐκείνων εἶναι (κινδυνεύει) γελοιότατος τὸν πρότερον.*

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 A-B.

³ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 298 D.

Professor Bain observes:—"The eye and the ear are the great avenues to the mind for the æsthetic class of influences; the other senses are more or less in the monopolist interest. The blue sky, the green woods, and all the beauties of the landscape, can fill

the vision of a countless throng of admirers. So with the pleasing sounds, &c." 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. xiv. (The Æsthetic Emotions), sect. 2, p. 228, 3rd ed.

⁴ Plato, Hipp. Maj. 298 E, 299 A.

Μανθάνω, ἂν ἴσως φαίη, καὶ ἐγώ, ὅτι πάλαι αἰσχύνεσθε ταύτας τὰς ἡδονὰς φάναι καλὰς εἶναι, ὅτι οὐ δοκεῖ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ' ἐγὼ οὐ τοῦτο ἡρώτων, ὃ δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς καλὸν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὃ, τι ἔστιν.

not belong to both? or all which do not belong to one or the other? We shall reply—To either one of the two—or to both the two. Well! but, why (he will ask) do you single out these pleasures of sight and hearing, as beautiful exclusively? What is there peculiar in them, which gives them a title to such distinction? All pleasures are alike, so far forth as pleasures, differing only in the more or less. Next, the pleasures of sight cannot be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through sight—for that reason would not apply to the pleasures of hearing: nor again can the pleasures of hearing be considered as beautiful by reason of their coming through hearing.¹ We must find something possessed as well by sight as by hearing, common to both, and peculiar to them,—which confers beauty upon the pleasures of both and of each. Any attribute of one, which does not also belong to the other, will not be sufficient for our purpose.² Beauty must depend upon some essential characteristic which both have in common.³ We must therefore look out for some such characteristic, which belongs to both as well as to each separately.

Now there is one characteristic which may perhaps serve.

Answer—
There is,
belonging
to each and
to both in
common,
the property
of being
innocuous
and profit-
able plea-
sures—
Upon this
ground they

The pleasures of sight and hearing, both and each, are distinguished from other pleasures by being the most innocuous and the best.⁴ It is for this reason that we call them beautiful. The Beautiful, then, is profitable pleasure—or pleasure producing good—for the profitable is, that which produces good.⁵

Nevertheless the objector will not be satisfied even with this. He will tell us—You declare the Beautiful to be Pleasure producing good. But we before

¹ Plato, Hipp. Maj. 299 D-E.

² Plato, Hipp. Maj. 300 B. A separate argument between Sokrates and Hippias is here as it were interpolated; Hippias affirms that he does not see how any predicate can be true of both which is not true of either separately. Sokrates points out that two men are Both, even in number, while each is One, an odd number. You cannot say of the two that they are one, nor can you say of either that he is Both. There are two classes of predicates; some which are true of either but not true of the two together,

or vice versa; some again which are true of the two and true also of each one—such as just, wise, handsome, &c. p. 301-303 B.

³ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 302 C. τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῇ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ἐπομένῃ φησιν, εἴπερ ἀμφοτέρω ἐστὶ καλόν, ταύτῃ δεῖν αὐτὰ καλὰ εἶναι, τῇ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ἑτέρα ἀπολειπομένη μὴ. καὶ ἐν τῷ οἴομαι.

⁴ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. ὅτι εἰσιν ἴσχυται αἱ τῶν ᾗδων εἰσι καὶ βέλτιοναι, καὶ ἀμφοτέρω καὶ ἑκατέρω.

⁵ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E. λέγετε ὅτι τὸ καλὸν εἶναι, ᾗδεον ἔστι ὡφελί-
μον.

agreed, that the producing agent or cause is different from what is produced or the effect. Accordingly, the Beautiful is different from the good : or, in other words, the Beautiful is not good, nor is the Good beautiful—if each of them is a different thing.¹ Now these propositions we have already pronounced to be inadmissible, so that your present explanation will not stand better than the preceding.

are called beautiful.

This will not hold—The Profitable is the cause of Good, and is therefore different from Good —To say that the Beautiful is the Profitable, is to say that it is different from Good —But this has been already declared inadmissible.

Remarks upon the Dialogue—The explanations ascribed to Hippias are special conspicuous examples : those ascribed to Sokrates are attempts to assign some general concept.

Thus finish the three distinct explanations of τὸ καλόν, which Plato in this dialogue causes to be first suggested by Sokrates, successively accepted by Hippias, and successively refuted by Sokrates. In comparing them with the three explanations which he puts into the mouth of Hippias, we note this distinction : That the explanations proposed by Hippias are conspicuous particular exemplifications of the Beautiful, substituted in place of the general concept : as we remarked, in the Dialogue Euthyphron, that the explanations of the Holy given by Euthyphron in reply to Sokrates, were of the same exemplifying character. On the contrary, those suggested by Sokrates keep in the region of abstractions, and seek to discover some more general concept, of which the Beautiful is only a derivative or a modification, so as to render a definition of it practicable. To illustrate this difference by the language of Dr. Whewell respecting many of the classifications in Natural History, we may say—That ac-

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 303 E—304 A. Οὐκ οὐν ὡφέλιμον, φήσει, τὸ ποιοῦν τὰγαθόν, τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ ποιούμενον, ἕτερον νῦν δὴ ἐφάνη, καὶ εἰς τὸν πρότερον λόγον ἦκει ὑμῖν ὁ λόγος; οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἂν εἴη καλὸν οὔτε τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθόν, εἰπερ ἄλλο αὐτῶν ἐκότερόν ἐστιν.

These last words deserve attention, because they coincide with the doctrine ascribed to Antisthenes, which has caused so many hard words to be applied to him (as well as to Stilpon) by critics, from Kolôtes downwards.

The general principle here laid down by Plato is—A is something different from B, therefore A is not B and B is not A. In other words, A cannot be predicated of B nor B of A. Antisthenes said in like manner—'Ἀνθρωπος and 'Ἀγαθός are different from each other, therefore you cannot say 'Ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν ἀγαθός. You can only say 'Ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν 'Ἀνθρωπος—'Ἀγαθός ἐστιν ἀγαθός.

I have touched farther upon this point in my chapter upon Antisthenes and the other Viri Sokratici.

cording to the views here represented by Hippias, the group of objects called beautiful is given by Type, not by Definition :¹ while Sokrates proceeds like one convinced that some common characteristic attribute may be found, on which to rest a Definition. To search for Definitions of general words, was (as Aristotle remarks) a novelty, and a valuable novelty, introduced by Sokrates. His contemporaries, the Sophists among them, were not accustomed to it : and here the Sophist Hippias (according to Plato's frequent manner) is derided as talking nonsense,² because, when asked for an explanation of The Self-Beautiful, he answers by citing special instances of beautiful objects. But we must remember, first, that Sokrates, who is introduced as trying several general explanations of the Self-Beautiful, does not find one which will stand : next, that even if one such could be found, particular instances can never be dispensed with, in the way of illustration ; lastly, that there are many general terms (the Beautiful being one of them) of which no definitions can be provided, and which can only be imperfectly explained, by enumerating a variety of objects to which the term in question is applied.³ Plato

¹ See Dr. Whewell's 'History of the Inductive Sciences,' ii. 120 seq. ; and Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' iv. 8, 3.

I shall illustrate this subject farther when I come to the dialogue called *Lysis*.

² Stallbaum, in his notes, bursts into exclamations of wonder at the incredible stupidity of Hippias—"En hominis stuporem prorsus admirabilem," p. 289 E.

³ Mr. John Stuart Mill observes in his *System of Logic*, i. 1, 5 : "One of the chief sources of lax habits of thought is the custom of using connotative terms without a distinctly ascertained connotation, and with no more precise notion of their meaning than can be loosely collected from observing what objects they are used to denote. It is in this manner that we all acquire, and inevitably so, our first knowledge of our vernacular language. A child learns the meaning of Man, White, &c., by hearing them applied to a number of individual objects, and finding out, by a process of generalisation of which he is but imperfectly conscious, what those different objects have in common. In

many cases objects bear a general resemblance to each other, which leads to their being familiarly classed together under a common name, while it is not immediately apparent what are the particular attributes upon the possession of which in common by them all their general resemblance depends. In this manner names creep on from subject to subject until all traces of a common meaning sometimes disappear, and the word comes to denote a number of things not only independently of any common attribute, but which have actually no attribute in common, or none but what is shared by other things to which the name is capriciously refused. It would be well if this degeneracy of language took place only in the hands of the untaught vulgar ; but some of the most remarkable instances are to be found in terms of art, and among technically educated persons, such as English lawyers. *Felony*, e.g., is a law-term with the sound of which all are familiar : but there is no lawyer who would undertake to tell what a *felony* is, otherwise than by enumerating the various offences so called. Originally the word *felony* had a meaning ; it denoted all offences, the

thought himself entitled to objectivise every general term, or to assume a substantive Ens, called a Form or Idea, corresponding to it. This was a logical mistake quite as serious as any which we know to have been committed by Hippias or any other Sophist. The assumption that wherever there is a general term, there must also be a generic attribute corresponding to it—is one which Aristotle takes much pains to negative: he recognises terms of transitional analogy, as well as terms equivocal: while he also especially numbers the Beautiful among equivocal terms.¹

We read in the Xenophontic Memorabilia a dialogue between Sokrates and Aristippus, on this same subject—What is the Beautiful, which affords a sort of contrast between the Dialogues of Search and those of Exposition. In the Hippias Major, we have the problem approached on several different sides, various suggestions being proposed, and each successively disallowed, on reasons shown, as failures: while in the Xenophontic dialogue, Sokrates declares an affirmative doctrine, and stands to it—but no pains are taken to bring out the objections against it and rebut them. The doctrine is, that the Beautiful is coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into the Useful: thus all beautiful objects, unlike as they may be to the eye or touch, bear that name because they have in common the attribute of conducing to one and the same purpose—the security, advantage, or gratification, of man, in some form or other. This is one of the three explanations broached by the Platonic Sokrates, and afterwards refuted by him, in the Hippias: while his declaration (which Hippias puts aside as unseemly)—that a pot and a wooden soup-ladle conveniently made are beautiful—is perfectly in harmony with that of the Xenophontic Sokrates, that a basket for carrying dung is beautiful, if it performs its work well.² We must moreover

Analogy between the explanations here ascribed to Sokrates, and those given by the Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia.

penalty of which included forfeiture of lands or goods, but subsequent Acts of Parliament have declared various offences to be felonies without enjoining that penalty, and have taken away that penalty from others which continue nevertheless to be called felonies, inasmuch that the acts so called have now no property whatever in common save that of being unlawful and punishable."

¹ Aristot. Topic. i. 106, a. 21. τὰ πολλὰ λέγόμενα—τὰ πλεοναχῶς λέγόμενα—are perpetually noted and distinguished by Aristotle.

² Xen. Mem. iii. 6, 2, 7; iv. 6, 8. Plato, Hipp. Maj. 288 D, 290 D.

I am obliged to translate the words τὸ Καλόν by the Beautiful or beauty, to avoid a tiresome periphrasis. But in reality the Greek words include

remark, that the objections whereby the Platonic Sokrates, after proposing the doctrine and saying much in its favour, finds himself compelled at last to disallow it—these objections are not produced and refuted, but passed over without notice, in the Xenophontic dialogue, wherein Sokrates affirms it decidedly.¹ The

more besides: they mean also the *fine*, the *honourable* or *that which is worthy of honour*, the *exalted*, &c. If we have difficulty in finding any common property connoted by the English word, the difficulty in the case of the Greek word is still greater.

¹ In regard to the question, Wherein consists *To Kalón*? and objections against the theory of the Xenophontic Sokrates, it is worth while to compare the views of modern philosophers. Dugald Stewart says (on the Beautiful, 'Philosophical Essays,' p. 214 seq.), "It has long been a favourite problem with philosophers to ascertain the common quality or qualities which entitle a thing to the denomination of Beautiful. But the success of their speculations has been so inconsiderable, that little can be inferred from them except the impossibility of the problem to which they have been directed. The speculations which have given occasion to these remarks have evidently originated in a prejudice which has descended to modern times from the scholastic ages. That when a word admits of a variety of significations, these different significations must all be species of the same genus, and must consequently include some essential idea common to every individual to which the generic term can be applied. Of this principle, which has been an abundant source of obscurity and mystery in the different sciences, it would be easy to expose the unsoundness and futility. Sokrates, whose plain good sense appears, on this as on other occasions, to have fortified his understanding to a wonderful degree against the metaphysical subtleties which misled his successors, was evidently apprised fully of the justice of the foregoing remarks, if any reliance can be placed on the account given by Xenophon of his conversation with Aristippus about the Good and the Beautiful," &c.

Stewart then proceeds to translate a portion of the Xenophontic dialogue (Memorab. iii. 8). But unfortunately he does not translate the whole of it. If he had he would have seen that he

has misconceived the opinion of Sokrates, who maintains the very doctrine here disallowed by Stewart, viz., That there is an essential idea common to all beautiful objects, the fact of being conducive to human security, comfort, or enjoyment. This is unquestionably an important common property, though the multifarious objects which possess it may be unlike in all other respects.

As to the general theory I think that Stewart is right: it is his compliment to Sokrates, on this occasion, which I consider misplaced. He certainly would not have agreed with Sokrates (nor should I agree with him) in calling by the epithet *beautiful* a basket for carrying dung when well made for its own purpose, or a convenient boiling-pot, or a soup-ladle made of fig-tree wood, as the Platonic Sokrates affirms in the Hippias (288 D, 290 D). The Beautiful and the Useful sometimes coincide; more often, or at least very often, they do not. Hippias is made to protest, in this dialogue, against the mention of such vulgar objects as the pot and the ladle; and this is apparently intended by Plato as a defective point in his character, denoting silly affectation and conceit, like his fine apparel. But Dugald Stewart would have agreed in the sentiment ascribed to Hippias—that vulgar and mean objects have no place in an inquiry into the Beautiful; and that they belong, when well-formed for their respective purposes, to the category of the Useful.

The Xenophontic Sokrates in the Memorabilia is mistaken in confounding the Beautiful with the Good and the Useful. But his remarks are valuable in another point of view, as they insist most forcibly on the essential relativity both of the Beautiful and the Good.

The doctrine of Dugald Stewart is supported by Mr. John Stuart Mill ('System of Logic,' iv. 4, 5; and Professor Bain has expounded the whole subject still more fully in a chapter (xiv. p. 225 seq., on the *Æsthetic Emotions*) of his work on the Emotions and the Will.

affirming Sokrates, and the objecting Sokrates, are not on the stage at once.

The concluding observations of this dialogue, interchanged between Hippias and Sokrates, are interesting as bringing out the antithesis between rhetoric and dialectic—between the concrete and exemplifying, as contrasted with the abstract and analytical. Immediately after Sokrates has brought his own third suggestion to an inextricable embarrassment, Hippias remarks—

“Well, Sokrates, what do you think now of all these reasonings of yours? They are what I declared them to be just now,—scrapings and parings of discourse, divided into minute fragments. But the really beautiful and precious acquirement is, to be able to set out well and finely a regular discourse before the Dikastery or the public assembly, to persuade your auditors, and to depart carrying with you not the least but the greatest of all prizes—safety for yourself, your property, and your friends. These are the real objects to strive for. Leave off your petty cavils, that you may not look like an extreme simpleton, handling silly trifles as you do at present.”¹

Concluding thrust exchanged between Hippias and Sokrates.

“My dear Hippias,” (replies Sokrates) “you are a happy man, since you know what pursuits a man ought to follow, and have yourself followed them, as you say, with good success. But I, as it seems, am under the grasp of an unaccountable fortune: for I am always fluctuating and puzzling myself, and when I lay my puzzle before you wise men, I am requited by you with hard words. I am told just what you have now been telling me, that I busy myself about matters silly, petty, and worthless. When on the contrary, overborne by your authority, I declare as you do, that it is the finest thing possible to be able to set out well and beautifully a regular discourse before the public assembly, and bring it to successful conclusion—then there are other men at hand who heap upon me bitter reproaches: especially that one man, my nearest kinsman and inmate, who never omits to convict me. When on my return home he hears me repeat what you have told me, he asks, if I am not ashamed of my impudence in talking about beautiful (honourable) pursuits, when I am so

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 A.

manifestly convicted upon this subject, of not even knowing what the Beautiful (Honourable) is. How can you (he says), being ignorant what the Beautiful is, know *who* has set out a discourse beautifully and *who* has not—*who* has performed a beautiful exploit and *who* has not? Since you are in a condition so disgraceful, can you think life better for you than death? Such then is my fate—to hear disparagement and reproaches from you on the one side, and from him on the other. Necessity however perhaps requires that I should endure all these discomforts: for it will be nothing strange if I profit by them. Indeed I think that I have already profited both by your society, Hippias, and by his: for I now think that I know what the proverb means—Beautiful (Honourable) things are difficult.”¹

Here is a suitable termination for one of the Dialogues of Search: “My mind has been embarrassed by contradictions as yet unreconciled, but this is a stage indispensable to future improvement”. We have moreover an interesting passage of arms between Rhetoric and Dialectic: two contemporaneous and contending agencies, among the stirring minds of Athens, in the time of Plato and Isokrates. The Rhetor accuses the Dialectician of departing from the conditions of reality—of breaking up the integrity of those concretes, which occur in nature each as continuous and indivisible wholes. Each of the analogous particular cases forms a continuum or concrete by itself, which may be compared with the others, but cannot be taken to pieces, and studied in separate fragments.² The Dialectician on his side treats the Abstract (τὸ καλὸν) as the real Integer, and the highest abstraction as the first of all integers, containing in itself and capable of evolving all the subordinate integers: the various accompaniments, which go along with each Abstract to make up a concrete, he disregards as shadowy and transient disguises.

Hippias accuses Sokrates of never taking into his view Wholes,

¹ Plat. Hipp. Maj. 304 D-E.

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. 301 B. Ἄλλὰ γὰρ διὰ σὺ, ὦ Σόκράτης, τὰ μὴ ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ’ ἐκείνοι, οἳ σὺ εἰώθας διαλεγεσθαι, προὔρουσι δὲ ἀπολαμβάνοντες τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἐν τοῖς λόγοις κατατέμνοντες· διὰ ταῦτα οὕτω μεγάλα ὄμας λανθάνει.

καὶ διανεκῇ σάματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα. Compare 301 E.

The words διανεκῇ σάματα τῆς οὐσίας πεφυκότα, correspond as nearly as can be to the logical term *Concrete*, opposed to *Abstract*. Nature furnishes only Concrete, not Abstracta.

and of confining his attention to separate parts and fragments, obtained by logical analysis and subdivision. Aristophanes, when he attacks the Dialectic of Sokrates, takes the same ground, employing numerous comic metaphors to illustrate the small and impalpable fragments handled, and the subtle transpositions which they underwent in the reasoning. Isokrates again deprecates the over-subtlety of dialectic debate, contrasting it with discussions (in his opinion) more useful ; wherein entire situations, each with its full clothing and assemblage of circumstances, were reviewed and estimated.¹ All these are protests, by persons accustomed to deal with real life, and to talk to auditors both numerous and commonplace, against that conscious analysis and close attention to general and abstract terms, which Sokrates first insisted on and transmitted to his disciples. On the other side, we have the emphatic declaration made by the Platonic Sokrates (and made still earlier by the Xenophonic² or historical Sokrates)—That a man was not fit to talk about beautiful things in the concrete—that he had no right to affirm or deny that attribute, with respect to any given subject—that he was even fit to live unless he could explain what was meant by The Beautiful, or Beauty in the abstract. Here are two distinct and conflicting intellectual habits, the antithesis between which, indicated in this dialogue, is described at large and forcibly in the *Theætétus*.³

Men who dealt with real life, contrasted with the speculative and analytical philosophy.

When Hippias accuses Sokrates of neglecting to notice Wholes or Aggregates, this is true in the sense of Concrete Wholes—the phenomenal sequences and co-existences, perceived by sense or imagined. But the Universal (as Aristotle says)⁴ is one kind of Whole : a Logical

Concrete Aggregates —Abstract or logical Aggregates. Distinct ap-

¹ Aristophan. *Nubes*, 130. λόγων ἀκριβῶν σχινδαλόμενος—παιτάλη. *Nub.* 261, *Aves*, 430. λεπτοτάτων λήρων ἱερῶν. *Nub.* 359. γνῶμαις λεπταῖς. *Nub.* 1404. σκαριψιμοῖσι λήρων, *Ran.* 1497. σμιλευμένα—*id.* 819. Isokrates, Πρὸς Νικοκλέα, s. 68, antithesis of the λόγοι πολιτικοὶ and λόγοι ἐριστικοί—μέλιστα μὲν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν καιρῶν θεωρεῖν συμβουλευόντας, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καθ' ὅλων τῶν πραγμάτων λέγοντας—which is almost exactly the phrase ascribed to Hippias by Plato in

this *Hippias Major*. Also Isokrates, *Contra Sophistas*, s. 24-25, where he contrasts the useless λογίδια, debated by the contentious dialecticians (Sokrates and Plato being probably included in this designation), with his own λόγοι πολιτικοί. Compare also Isokrates, *Or. xv. De Permutatione*, s. 211-213-235-237.

² Xen. *Mem.* i. 1, 16.

³ Plato, *Theætét.* pp. 173-174-175.

⁴ Aristot. *Physic.* i. 1. τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ

titudes required by Aristotle for the Dialectician.

Whole, having logical parts. In the minds of Sokrates and Plato, the Logical Whole separable into its logical parts and into them only, were preponderant.

One other point deserves peculiar notice, in the dialogue under our review. The problem started is, What is the Beautiful—the Self-Beautiful, or Beauty *per se*: and it is assumed that this must be Something,¹ that from the accession of which, each particular beautiful thing becomes beautiful. But Sokrates presently comes to make a distinction between that which is really beautiful and that which appears to be beautiful. Some things (he says) appear beautiful, but are not so in reality: some are beautiful, but do not appear so. The problem, as he states it, is, to find, not what that is which makes objects appear beautiful, but what it is that makes them really beautiful. This distinction, as we find it in the language of Hippias, is one of degree only:² that is beautiful which appears so to every one and at all times. But in the language of Sokrates, the distinction is radical: to be beautiful is one thing, to appear beautiful is another; whatever makes a thing appear beautiful without being so in reality, is a mere engine of deceit, and not what Sokrates is enquiring for.³ The Self-Beautiful or real Beauty is so, whether any one perceives it to be beautiful or not: it is an Absolute, which exists *per se*, having no relation to any sentient or percipient subject.⁴ At any rate, such is the manner in which Plato

δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τι ἐστὶ· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου. Compare Simplicius, Schol. Brandis ad loc. p. 324, a. 10-23.

¹ Plato, Hipp. Maj. 236 E. αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν δ', τι ἐστίν. Also 237 D, 239 D.

² Plato, Hipp. Maj. 291 D, 292 E.

³ Plato, Hipp. Maj. 294 A-B, 299 A.

⁴ Dr. Hutcheson, in his inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, observes (sect. i. and ii. p. 14-16).—

"Beauty is either original or comparative, or, if any like the terms better, absolute or relative; only let it be observed, that by *absolute* or *original*, is not understood any quality

supposed to be in the object, which should of itself be beautiful, without relation to any mind which perceives it. For Beauty, like other names of sensible ideas, properly denotes the perception of some mind. . . . Our inquiry is only about the qualities which are beautiful to men, or about the foundation of their sense of beauty, for (as above hinted) Beauty has always relation to the sense of some mind; and when we afterwards show how generally the objects that occur to us are beautiful, we mean that such objects are agreeable to the sense of men, &c."

The same is repeated, sect. iv. p. 40; sect. vi. p. 72.

conceives it, when he starts here as a problem to enquire, What it is.

Herein we note one of the material points of disagreement between Plato and his master: for Sokrates (in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*) affirms distinctly that Beauty is altogether relative to human wants and appreciations. The Real and Absolute, on the one hand, wherein alone resides truth and beauty—as against the phenomenal and relative, on the other hand, the world of illusion and meanness—this is an antithesis which we shall find often reproduced in Plato. I shall take it up more at large, when I come to discuss his argument against Protagoras in the *Theætetus*.

I now come to the Lesser Hippias: in which (as we have already seen in the Greater) that Sophist is described by epithets, affirming varied and extensive accomplishments, as master of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, poetry (especially that of Homer), legendary lore, music, metrical and rhythmical diversities, &c. His memory was prodigious, and he had even invented for himself a technical scheme for assisting memory. He had composed poems, epic, lyric, and tragic, as well as many works in prose: he was, besides, a splendid lecturer on ethical and political subjects, and professed to answer any question which might be asked. Furthermore, he was skilful in many kinds of manual dexterity: having woven his own garments, plaited his own girdle, made his own shoes, engraved his own seal-ring, and fabricated for himself a currycomb and oil-flask.¹ Lastly, he is described as wearing fine and showy apparel. What he is made to say is rather in harmony with this last point of character, than with the preceding. He talks with silliness and presumption, so as to invite and excuse the derisory sting of Sokrates. There is a third interlocutor, Eudikus: but he says very little, and other auditors are alluded to generally, who say nothing.²

Hippias
Minor—Characters and
situation
supposed.

¹ Plato, *Hipp. Minor*, 368.

² Plato, *Hipp. Minor*, 369 D, 373 B.

Asst rejects both the dialogues called by the name of Hippias, as not com-

posed by Plato. Schleiermacher doubts about both, and rejects the *Hippias Minor* (which he considers as perhaps worked up by a Platonic scholar from

In the *Hippias Minor*, that Sophist appears as having just concluded a lecture upon Homer, in which he had extolled Achilles as better than Odysseus: Achilles being depicted as veracious and straightforward, Odysseus as mendacious and full of tricks. Sokrates, who had been among the auditors, cross-examines Hippias upon the subject of this affirmation.

Hippias has just delivered a lecture, in which he extols Achilles as better than Odysseus—the veracious and straightforward hero, better than the mendacious and crafty.

Homer (says Hippias) considers veracious men, and mendacious men, to be not merely different, but opposite: and I agree with him. Permit me (Sokrates remarks) to ask some questions about the meaning of this from you, since I cannot ask any from Homer himself. You will answer both for yourself and him.¹

a genuine sketch by Plato himself) but will not pass the same sentence upon the *Hippias Major* (Schleierm. *Einleit.* vol. ii. pp. 293-298; vol. v. 399-403. *Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften*, pp. 457-464).

Stallbaum defends both the dialogues as genuine works of Plato, and in my judgment with good reason (*Prolegg.* ad *Hipp. Maj.* vol. iv. pp. 145-150; ad *Hipp. Minor.* pp. 227-235). Steinhart (*Einleit.* p. 99) and Socher (*Ueber Platon*, p. 144 seq., 215 seq.) maintain the same opinion on these dialogues as Stallbaum. It is to be remarked that Schleiermacher states the reasons both for and against the genuineness of the dialogues; and I think that even in his own statement the reasons for preponderate. The reasons which both Schleiermacher and Ast produce as proving the spuriousness, are in my view quite insufficient to sustain their conclusion. There is bad taste, sophistry, an overdose of banter and derision (they say very truly), in the part assigned to Sokrates: there are also differences of view, as compared with Sokrates in other dialogues; various other affirmations (they tell us) are not Platonic. I admit much of this, but I still do not accept their conclusion. These critics cannot bear to admit any Platonic work as genuine unless it affords to them ground for superlative admiration and glorification of the author. This postulate I altogether contest; and I think that differences of view, as between Sokrates in one dialogue and Sokrates in ano-

ther, are both naturally to be expected and actually manifested (witness the *Protagoras* and *Gorgias*). Moreover Ast designates (p. 404) a doctrine as "durchaus unsokratisch" which Stallbaum justly remarks (p. 233) to have been actually affirmed by Sokrates in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia*. Stallbaum thinks that both the two dialogues (Socher, that the *Hippias Minor* only) were composed by Plato among his earlier works, and this may probably be true. The citation and refutation of the *Hippias Minor* by Aristotle (*Metaphys.* Δ. 1025, a. 6) counts with me as a strong corroborative proof that the dialogue is Plato's work. Schleiermacher and Ast set this evidence aside because Aristotle does not name Plato as the author. But if the dialogue had been composed by any one less celebrated than Plato, Aristotle would have named the author. Mention by Aristotle, though without Plato's name, is of greater value to support the genuineness than the purely internal grounds stated by Ast and Schleiermacher against it.

¹ *Plat. Hipp. Minor*, 365 C-D.

The remark here made by Sokrates—"The poet is not here to answer for himself, so that you cannot put any questions to him"—is a point of view familiar to Plato: insisted upon forcibly in the *Protagoras* (347 E), and farther generalised in the *Phaedrus*, so as to apply to all written matter compared with personal converse (*Phaedrus*, p. 275 D).

This ought to count, so far as it

Mendacious men (answers Hippias, to a string of questions, somewhat prolix) are capable, intelligent, wise: they are not incapable or ignorant. If a man be incapable of speaking falsely, or ignorant, he is not mendacious. Now the capable man is one who can make sure of doing what he wishes to do, at the time and occasion when he does wish it, without let or hindrance.¹

You, Hippias (says Sokrates), are expert on matters of arithmetic: you can make sure of answering truly any question put to you on the subject. You are *better* on the subject than the ignorant man, who cannot make sure of doing the same. But as you can make sure of answering truly, so likewise you can make sure of answering falsely, whenever you choose to do so. Now the ignorant man cannot make sure of answering falsely. He may, by reason of his ignorance, when he wishes to answer falsely, answer truly without intending it. You, therefore, the intelligent man and the good in arithmetic, are better than the ignorant and the bad for both purposes—for speaking falsely, and for speaking truly.²

What is true about arithmetic, is true in other departments also. The only man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses is the man who can speak truly whenever he chooses. Now, the mendacious man, as we agreed, is the man who can speak falsely whenever he chooses. Accordingly, the mendacious man, and the veracious man, are the same. They are not different, still less opposite:—nay, the two epithets belong only to one and the same person. The veracious man is not better than the mendacious—seeing that he is one and the same.³

This is contested by Sokrates. The veracious man and the mendacious man are one and the same. The only man who can answer truly if he chooses, is he who can also answer falsely if he chooses—i.e., the knowing man. The ignorant man cannot make sure of doing either one or the other.

Analogy of special arts—It is only the arithmetician who can speak falsely on a question

goes, as a fragment of proof that the Hippias Minor is a genuine work of Plato, instead of which Schleiermacher treats it (p. 295) as evincing a poor copy, made by some imitator of Plato, from the Protagoras.

¹ Plat. Hipp. Minor, 366 B-C.

² Plato, Hippias Minor, 366 E. Πότερον σὺ ἂν μάλιστα ψεύδοιο καὶ ἀεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ψευδῇ λόγοις περὶ τούτων, βούλομενος ψεύδεσθαι καὶ μηδέποτε

ἀληθῆ ἀποκρίνεσθαι; ἢ ὁ ἀμαθὴς εἰς λογισμὸν δύναται ἂν σοῦ μᾶλλον ψεύδεσθαι βουλομένου; ἢ ὁ μὲν ἀμαθὴς πολὺ λάκεις ἂν βουλομένος ψευδῇ λέγειν τάληθ' ἂν εἰποι ἄκων, εἰ τύχοι, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι—σὺ δὲ ὁ σοφός, εἴπερ βούλοιο ψεύδεσθαι, αἰεὶ ἂν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ψεύδοιο;

³ Plato, Hipp. Minor, 367 C, 368 E, 369 A-B.

of arith-
metic when
he chooses.

You see, therefore, Hippias, that the distinction which you drew and which you said that Homer drew, between Achilles and Odysseus, will not hold. You called Achilles veracious, and Odysseus, mendacious: but if one of the two epithets belongs to either of them, the other must belong to him also.¹

View of
Sokrates
respecting
Achilles
in the
Iliad. He
thinks that
Achilles
speaks
falsehood
cleverly.
Hippias
maintains
that if
Achilles
ever speaks
falsehood,
it is with an
innocent
purpose,
whereas
Odysseus
does the
like with
fraudulent
purpose.

Issue here
taken.
Sokrates
contends
that those
who hurt,
or cheat, or
lie wilfully,
are better
than those
who do the
like un-
willingly.
He entreats
Hippias to
enlighten
him and
answer his
questions.

Sokrates then tries to make out that Achilles speaks falsehood in the Iliad, and speaks it very cleverly, because he does so in a way to escape detection from Odysseus himself. To this Hippias replies, that if Achilles ever speaks falsehood, he does it innocently, without any purpose of cheating or injuring any one; whereas the falsehoods of Odysseus are delivered with fraudulent and wicked intent.² It is impossible (he contends) that men who deceive and do wrong wilfully and intentionally, should be better than those who do so unwillingly and without design. The laws deal much more severely with the former than with the latter.³

Upon this point, Hippias (says Sokrates), I dissent from you entirely. I am, unhappily, a stupid person, who cannot find out the reality of things: and this appears plainly enough when I come to talk with wise men like you, for I always find myself differing from you. My only salvation consists in my earnest anxiety to put questions and learn from you, and in my gratitude for your answers and teaching. I think that those who hurt mankind, or cheat, or lie, or do wrong, *wilfully*—are better than those who do the same *unwillingly*. Sometimes, indeed, from my stupidity, the opposite view presents itself to me, and I become confused: but now, after talking with you, the fit of confidence has come round upon me again, to pronounce and characterise the persons who do wrong *unwillingly*, as worse than those who do wrong *wilfully*. I entreat you to heal this disorder of my

¹ Plat. Hipp. Minor, 300 B.

² Plat. Hipp. Minor, 370 E.

³ Plat. Hipp. Minor, 372 A.

mind will of course be the juster : if it be a combination of both capacity and knowledge, that mind which is more capable as well as more knowing, will be the juster—that which is less capable and less knowing, will be the more unjust. *Hip.*—So it appears. *Sokr.*—Now we have shown that the more capable and knowing mind is at once the better mind, and more competent to exert itself both ways—to do what is honourable as well as what is base—in every employment. *Hip.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—When, therefore, such a mind does what is base, it does so wilfully, through its capacity or intelligence, which we have seen to be of the nature of justice? *Hip.*—It seems so. *Sokr.*—Doing base things, is acting unjustly : doing honourable things, is acting justly. Accordingly, when this more capable and better mind acts unjustly, it will do so wilfully ; while the less capable and worse mind will do so without willing it? *Hip.*—Apparently.

Sokr.—Now the good man is he that has the good mind : the bad man is he that has the bad mind. It belongs therefore to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man, to do wrong without wishing it—that is, if the good man be he that has the good mind? *Hip.*—But that is unquestionable—that he has it. *Sokr.*—Accordingly, he that goes wrong and does base and unjust things wilfully, if there be any such character—can be no other than the good man. *Hip.*—I do not know how to concede *that* to you, Sokrates.¹ *Sokr.*—Nor I, how to concede it to myself, Hippias : yet so it must appear to us, now at least, from the past debate. As I told you long ago, I waver hither and thither upon this matter ; my conclusions never remain the same. No wonder indeed that I and other vulgar men waver : but if you wise men waver also, that becomes a fearful mischief even to us, since we cannot even by coming to you escape from our embarrassment.²

Conclusion
—that none
but the good
man can do
evil wilfully:
the bad man
does evil un-
willingly.
Hippias can-
not resist
the reason-
ing, but will
not accept
the conclu-
sion. So-
krates con-
fesses his
perplexity.

I will here again remind the reader, that in this, as in the other dialogues, the real speaker is Plato throughout : and that

¹ Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 E, 376 B.

² Plato, Hipp. Min. 376 C.

it is he alone who prefixes the different names to words determined by himself.

Now, if the dialogue just concluded had come down to us with the parts inverted, and with the reasoning of Sokrates assigned to Hippias, most critics would probably have produced it as a tissue of sophistry justifying the harsh epithets which they bestow upon the Athenian Sophists—as persons who considered truth and falsehood to be on a par—subverters of morality—and corruptors of the youth of Athens.¹ But as we read it, all that, which in the mouth of Hippias would have passed for sophistry, is here put forward by Sokrates; while Hippias not only resists his conclusions, and adheres to the received ethical sentiment tenaciously, even when he is unable to defend it, but hates the propositions forced upon him, protests against the perverse captiousness of Sokrates, and requires much pressing to induce him to continue the debate. Upon the views adopted by the critics, Hippias ought to receive credit for this conduct, as a friend of virtue and morality. To me, such reluctance to debate appears a defect rather than a merit; but I cite the dialogue as illustrating what I have already said in another place—that

¹ Accordingly one of the Platonic critics, Schwalbe (*Œuvres de Platon*, p. 116), explains Plato's purpose in the *Hippias Minor* by saying, that Sokrates here serves out to the Sophists a specimen of their own procedure, and gives them an example of sophistical dialectic, by defending a sophistical thesis in a sophistical manner: That he chooses and demonstrates at length the thesis—the liar is not different from the truth-teller—as an exposure of the sophistical art of proving the contrary of any given proposition, and for the purpose of deriding and unmasking the false morality of Hippias, who in this dialogue talks reasonably enough.

Schwalbe, while he affirms that this is the purpose of Plato, admits that the part here assigned to Sokrates is unworthy of him; and Steinhart maintains that Plato never could have had any such purpose, "however frequently" (Steinhart says), "sophistical artifices may occur in this conversation of

Sokrates, which artifices Sokrates no more disdained to employ than any other philosopher or rhetorician of that day" ("so häufig auch in seinen Erörterungen sophistische Kunstgriffe vorkommen mögen, die Sokrates eben so wenig verschmäht hat, als irgend ein Philosoph oder Redekünstler dieser Zeit"). Steinhart, *Einleitung zum Hipp. Minor*, p. 109.

I do not admit the purpose here ascribed to Plato by Schwalbe, but I refer to the passage as illustrating what Platonic critics think of the reasoning assigned to Sokrates in the *Hippias Minor*, and the hypotheses which they introduce to colour it.

The passage cited from Steinhart also—that Sokrates no more disdained to employ sophistical artifices than any other philosopher or rhetorician of the age—is worthy of note, as coming from one who is so very bitter in his invectives against the sophistry of the persons called Sophists, of which we have no specimens left.

mind. You will do me much more good than if you cured my body of a distemper. But it will be useless for you to give me one of your long discourses : for I warn you that I cannot follow it. The only way to confer upon me real service, will be to answer my questions again, as you have hitherto done. Assist me, Eudikus, in persuading Hippias to do so.

Assistance from me (says Eudikus) will hardly be needed, for Hippias professed himself ready to answer any man's questions.

Yes—I did so (replies Hippias)—but Sokrates always brings trouble into the debate, and proceeds like one disposed to do mischief.

Eudikus repeats his request, and Hippias, in deference to him, consents to resume the task of answering.¹

Sokrates then produces a string of questions, with a view to show that those who do wrong wilfully, are better than those who do wrong unwillingly. He appeals to various analogies. In running, the good runner is he who runs quickly, the bad runner is he who runs slowly. What is evil and base in running, is, to run slowly. It is the good runner who does this evil wilfully : it is the bad runner who does it unwillingly.² The like is true about wrestling and other bodily exercises. He that is good in the body, can work either strongly or feebly,—can do either what is honourable or what is base ; so that when he does what is base, he does it wilfully. But he that is bad in the body does what is base unwillingly, not being able to help it.³

Questions of Sokrates—multiplied analogies of the special arts. The unskilful artist, who runs, wrestles, or sings badly, whether he will or not, is worse than the skilful, who can sing well when he chooses, but can also sing badly when he chooses.

What is true about the bodily movements depending upon strength, is not less true about those depending on grace and elegance. To be wilfully ungraceful, belongs only to the well-constituted body : none but the badly-constituted body is ungraceful without wishing it. The same, also, about the feet, voice, eyes, ears, nose : of these organs, those which act badly through will and intention, are preferable to those which act badly without will or intention. Lameness of feet is a mis-

¹ Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 B.

² Plat. Hipp. Min. 373 D-E.

³ Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 B.

fortune and disgrace : feet which go lame only by intention are much to be preferred.¹

Again, in the instruments which we use, a rudder or a bow,—or the animals about us, horses or dogs,—those are better with which we work badly when we choose ; those are worse, with which we work badly without design, and contrary to our own wishes.

It is better to have the mind of a bowman who misses his mark by design, than that of one who misses when he tries to hit. The like about all other arts—the physician, the harper, the flute-player. In each of these artists, *that* mind is better, which goes wrong wilfully—*that* mind is worse, which goes wrong unwillingly, while wishing to go right. In regard to the minds of our slaves, we should all prefer those which go wrong only when they choose, to those which go wrong without their own choice.²

Having carried his examination through this string of analogous particulars, and having obtained from Hippias successive answers—"Yes—true in that particular case," Sokrates proceeds to sum up the result :—

Sokr.—Well ! should we not wish to have our own minds as good as possible ? *Hip.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—We have seen that they will be better if they do mischief and go wrong wilfully, than if they do so unwillingly ? *Hip.*—But it will be dreadful, Sokrates, if the willing wrong-doers are to pass for better men than the unwilling.

Sokr.—Nevertheless—it seems so :—from what we have said.

Hip.—It does not seem so to me. *Sokr.*—I thought that it would have seemed so to you, as it does to me.

However, answer me once more—Is not justice either a certain mental capacity ? or else knowledge ? or both together ?³

Hip.—Yes ! it is. *Sokr.*—If justice be a capacity of the mind, the more capable mind will also be the juster : and we have already seen that the more capable soul is the better. *Hip.*—We have. *Sokr.*—If it be knowledge, the more knowing or wiser

¹ Plat. Hipp. Min. 374 C-D.

² Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 B-D.

³ Plat. Hipp. Min. 375 D. ἡ δικαιοσύνη οὐχὶ ἢ δόξα τις ἐστίν, ἢ ἐπιστήμη, ἢ ἀμφοτέρω;

Sokrates and Plato threw out more startling novelties in ethical doctrine, than either Hippias or Protagoras, or any of the other persons denounced as Sophists.

That Plato intended to represent this accomplished Sophist as humiliated by Sokrates, is evident enough : and the words put into his mouth are suited to this purpose. The eloquent lecturer, so soon as his admiring crowd of auditors has retired, proves unable to parry the questions of a single expert dialectician who remains behind, upon a matter which appears to him almost self-evident, and upon which every one (from Homer downward) agrees with him. Besides this, however, Plato is not satisfied without making him say very simple and absurd things. All this is the personal, polemical, comic scope of the dialogue. It lends (whether well-placed or not) a certain animation and variety, which the author naturally looked out for, in an aggregate of dialogues all handling analogous matters about man and society.

Polemical
purpose of
the dialogue
—Hippias
humiliated
by Sokrates.

But though the polemical purpose of the dialogue is thus plain, its philosophical purpose perplexes the critics considerably. They do not like to see Sokrates employing sophistry against the Sophists : that is, as they think, casting out devils by the help of Beelzebub. And certainly, upon the theory which they adopt, respecting the relation between Plato and Sokrates on one side, and the Sophists on the other, I think this dialogue is very difficult to explain. But I do not think it is difficult, upon a true theory of the Platonic writings.

In a former chapter, I tried to elucidate the general character and purpose of those Dialogues of Search, which occupy more than half the Thrasyllean Canon, and of which we have already reviewed two or three specimens—Euthyphron, Alkibiadēs, &c. We have seen that they are distinguished by the absence of any affirmative conclusion : that they prove nothing, but only, at the most, disprove one or more supposable solutions : that they are not processes in which one man who knows communicates his knowledge to ignorant hearers, but in which all are alike ignorant, and all are employed, either in groping, or guessing, or testing the guesses of the rest. We have farther seen that the value of these

Philosophical
purpose
of the dia-
logue—
theory of
the Dia-
logues of
Search
generally,
and of
Knowledge
as under-
stood by
Plato.

Dialogues depends upon the Platonic theory about knowledge ; that Plato did not consider any one to know, who could not explain to others all that he knew, reply to the cross-examination of a Sokratic Elenchus, and cross-examine others to test their knowledge : that knowledge in this sense could not be attained by hearing, or reading, or committing to memory a theorem, together with the steps of reasoning which directly conducted to it :—but that there was required, besides, an acquaintance with many counter-theorems, each having more or less appearance of truth ; as well as with various embarrassing aspects and plausible delusions on the subject, which an expert cross-examiner would not fail to urge. Unless you are practised in meeting all the difficulties which he can devise, you cannot be said to *know*. Moreover, it is in this last portion of the conditions of knowledge, that most aspirants are found wanting.

Now the Greater and Lesser Hippias are peculiar specimens of these Dialogues of Search, and each serves the purpose above indicated. The Greater Hippias enumerates a string of tentatives, each one of which ends in acknowledged failure : the Lesser Hippias enunciates a thesis, which Sokrates proceeds to demonstrate, by plausible arguments such as Hippias is forced to admit. But though Hippias admits each successive step, he still mistrusts the conclusion, and suspects that he has been misled—a feeling which Plato¹ describes elsewhere as being frequent among the respondents of Sokrates. Nay, Sokrates himself shares in the mistrust—presents himself as an unwilling propounder of arguments which force themselves upon him,² and complains of his own mental embarrassment. Now you may call this sophistry, if you please ; and you may silence

The Hippias is an exemplification of this theory—Sokrates sets forth a case of confusion, and avows his inability to clear it up. Confusion—shown up in the Lesser Hippias—Error in the Greater.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* vi. 437 B.

Καὶ ὁ Ἀδείμαντος, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, πρὸς μὲν ταῦτά σοι οὐδεὶς ἀνὴρ ὅς τ' εἴη ἀντιτείνειν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῖόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε ἂ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δὲ ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτῆν καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἐκάστον τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀβροισθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τῶν λόγων, μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀνα-

φαίνεσθαι . . . ἐπεὶ τό γε ἀληθές οὐδὲν τι μᾶλλον ταύτῃ ἔχει.

This passage, attesting the effect of the Sokratic examination upon the minds of auditors, ought to be laid to heart by those Platonic critics who denounce the Sophists for generating scepticism and uncertainty.

² Plato, *Hipp. Minor.* 378 B ; also the last sentence of the dialogue.

its propounders by calling them hard names. But such ethical prudery—hiding all the uncomfortable logical puzzles which start up when you begin to analyse an established sentiment, and treating them as non-existent because you refuse to look at them—is not the way to attain what Plato calls knowledge. If there be any argument, the process of which seems indisputable, while yet its conclusion contradicts, or seems to contradict, what is known upon other evidence—the full and patient analysis of that argument is indispensable, before you can become master of the truth and able to defend it. Until you have gone through such analysis, your mind must remain in that state of confusion which is indicated by Sokrates at the end of the Lesser Hippias. As it is a part of the process of Search, to travel in the path of the Greater Hippias—that is, to go through a string of erroneous solutions, each of which can be proved, by reasons shown, to be erroneous: so it is an equally important part of the same process, to travel in the path of the Lesser Hippias—that is, to acquaint ourselves with all those arguments, bearing on the case, in which two contrary conclusions appear to be both of them plausibly demonstrated, and in which therefore we cannot as yet determine which of them is erroneous—or whether both are not erroneous. The Greater Hippias exhibits errors,—the Lesser Hippias puts before us confusion. With both these enemies the Searcher for truth must contend: and Bacon tells us, that confusion is the worst enemy of the two—"Citius emergit veritas ex errore, quam ex confusione". Plato, in the Lesser Hippias, having in hand a genuine Sokratic thesis, does not disdain to invest Sokrates with the task (sophistical, as some call it, yet not the less useful and instructive) of setting forth at large this case of confusion, and avowing his inability to clear it up. It is enough for Sokrates that he brings home the painful sense of confusion to the feelings of his hearer as well as to his own. In that painful sentiment lies the stimulus provocative of farther intellectual effort.¹ The dialogue ends; but the process of search, far from ending along with it, is emphatically declared to be unfinished, and to be

¹ See the passage in Republic, vii. *ἐπαικτικὸν τῆς νόστος* is declared to arise 522-524, where the *τὸ παραληπτικὸν καὶ* from the pain of a felt contradiction.

belongs to the good man to do wrong wilfully, to the bad man to do wrong unwillingly.

Aristotle,¹ in commenting upon this doctrine of the Hippias Minor, remarks justly, that Plato understands the epithets *veracious* and *mendacious* in a sense different from that which they usually bear. Plato understands the words as designating one who *can* tell the truth if he chooses—one who *can* speak falsely if he chooses: and in this sense he argues plausibly that the two epithets go together, and that no man can be mendacious unless he be also veracious. Aristotle points out that the epithets in their received meaning are applied, not to the power itself, but to the habitual and intentional use of that power. The power itself is doubtless presupposed or implied as one condition to the applicability of the epithets, and is one common condition to the applicability of both epithets: but the distinction, which they are intended to draw, regards the intentions and dispositions with which the power is employed. So also Aristotle observes that Plato's conclusion—"He that does wrong wilfully is a better man than he that does wrong unwillingly," is falsely collected from induction or analogy. The analogy of the special arts and accomplishments, upon which the argument is built, is not applicable. *Better* has reference, not to the amount of intelligence but to the dispositions and habitual intentions; though it presupposes a certain state and amount of intelligence as indispensable.

Aristotle
combats the
thesis. Ar-
guments
against it.

Both Sokrates and Plato (in many of his dialogues) commit the error of which the above is one particular manifestation—that of dwelling exclusively on the intellectual conditions of human conduct,² and omitting to give proper attention to the emotional and volitional, as essentially co-operating or preponderating in the complex meaning of ethical attributes. The reasoning ascribed to the Platonic Sokrates in the Hippias

Mistake of
Sokrates
and Plato
in dwelling
too exclu-
sively on the
intellectual
conditions
of human
conduct.

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. p. 1025, a. 8; compare *Ethic. Nikomach.* iv. p. 1127, b. 16.

² Aristotle has very just observations on these views of Sokrates, and on the incompleteness of his views when he resolved all virtue into knowledge,

all vice into ignorance. See, among other passages, *Aristot. Ethica Magna*, i. 1182, a. 16; 1183, b. 9; 1190, b. 28; *Ethic. Eudem.* i. 1216, b. 4. The remarks of Aristotle upon Sokrates and Plato evince a real progress in ethical theory.

Minor exemplifies this one-sided view. What he says is true, but it is only a part of the truth. When he speaks of a person "who does wrong unwillingly," he seems to have in view one who does wrong without knowing that he does so: one whose intelligence is so defective that he does not know when he speaks truth and when he speaks falsehood. Now a person thus unhappily circumstanced must be regarded as half-witted or imbecile, coming under the head which the Xenophontic Sokrates called *madness*:¹ unfit to perform any part in society, and requiring to be placed under tutelage. Compared with such a person, the opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be defended—that the mendacious person, who *can* tell truth when he chooses, is the better of the two in the sense of less mischievous or dangerous. But he is the object of a very different sentiment; moreover, this is not the comparison present to our minds when we call one man veracious, another man mendacious. We always assume, in every one, a measure of intelligence equal or superior to the admissible minimum; under such assumption, we compare two persons, one of whom speaks to the best of his knowledge and belief, the other, contrary to his knowledge and belief. We approve the former and disapprove the latter, according to the different intention and purpose of each (as Aristotle observes); that is, looking at them under the point of view of emotion and volition—which is logically distinguishable from the intelligence, though always acting in conjunction with it.

Again, the analogy of the special arts, upon which the Platonic Sokrates dwells in the Hippias Minor, fails in sustaining his inference. By a good runner, wrestler, harper, singer, speaker, &c., we undoubtedly mean one who can, if he pleases, perform some one of these operations well; although he can also, if he pleases, perform them badly. But the epithets *good* or *bad*, in this case, consider exclusively that element which was left out, and leave out that element which was exclusively considered, in the former case. The good singer is declared to stand distinguished from the bad

They rely too much on the analogy of the special arts.—They take no note of the tacit assumptions underlying the epithets of praise and blame.

¹ Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 7. τοὺς διημαρτημένους, ἐν οἷς πολλοὶ γηράσκουσι, μαινομένους καλεῖν, &c.

singer, or from the *Idæærys*, who, if he sings at all, will certainly sing badly, by an attribute belonging to his intelligence and vocal organs. To sing well is a special accomplishment, which is possessed only by a few, and which no man is blamed for not possessing. The distinction between such special accomplishments, and justice or rectitude of behaviour, is well brought out in the speech which Plato puts into the mouth of the Sophist Protagoras.¹ "The special artists (he says) are few in number: one of them is sufficient for many private citizens. But every citizen, without exception, must possess justice and a sense of shame: if he does not, he must be put away as a nuisance—otherwise, society could not be maintained." The special artist is a citizen also; and as such, must be subject to the obligations binding on all citizens universally. In predicating of him that he is *good* or *bad* as a citizen, we merely assume him to possess the average intelligence of the community; and the epithet declares whether his emotional and volitional attributes exceed, or fall short of, the minimum required in the application of that intelligence to his social obligations. It is thus that the words *good* or *bad* when applied to him as a citizen, have a totally different bearing from that which the same words have when applied to him in his character of special artist.

The value of these debates in the Platonic dialogues consists in their raising questions like the preceding, for the reflection of the reader—whether the Platonic Sokrates may or may not be represented as taking what we think the right view of the question. For a Dialogue of Search, the great merit is, that it should be suggestive; that it should bring before our attention the conditions requisite for a right and proper use of these common ethical epithets, and the state of circumstances which is tacitly implied whenever any one uses them. No man ever learns to reflect upon the meaning of such familiar epithets, which he has been using all his life—unless the process be forced upon his attention by some special conversation which brings home to him an uncomfortable sentiment of perplexity and contradiction. If a man intends to

Value of a Dialogue of Search, that it shall be suggestive, and that it shall bring before us different aspects of the question under review.

¹ Plato, Protagoras, 322.

acquire any grasp of ethical or political theory, he must render himself master, not only of the sound arguments and the guiding analogies but also of the unsound arguments and the misleading analogies, which bear upon each portion of it.

There is one other point of similitude deserving notice, between the Greater and Lesser Hippias. In both of them, Hippias makes special complaint of Sokrates, for breaking the question in pieces and picking out the minute puzzling fragments—instead of keeping it together as a whole, and applying to it the predicates which it merits when so considered.¹ Here is the standing antithesis between Rhetoric and Dialectic: between those unconsciously acquired mental combinations which are poured out in eloquent, impressive, unconditional, and undistinguishing generalities—and the logical analysis which resolves the generality into its specialities, bringing to view inconsistencies, contradictions, limits, qualifications, &c. I have already touched upon this at the close of the Greater Hippias.

¹ Plato, Hipp. Min. 360 B-C. ὁ Σόκράτης, αἰεὶ σὺ τινας τοιοῦτους πλείους λόγους, καὶ ἀπολαμβάνων ὃ ἂν ᾖ δυσχερότατον τοῦ λόγου, τούτου ἔχει κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμενος, καὶ οὐχ ὅλη ἀγωνίζεται τῷ πράγματι, περὶ ὅτου ἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ, &c.

A remark of Aristotle (Topica, viii. 164, b. 2) illustrates this dissecting

function of the Dialectician.

ἴσθι γάρ, ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, διαλεκτικὸς ὁ προτακτικὸς καὶ ἐνστακτικός· ἴσθι δὲ τὸ μὲν προτείνεισθαι, ἐν ποιεῖν τὰ πλείους (δεῖ γάρ ἐν ἑλπε λαβέσθαι πρὸς ὃ ὁ λόγος), τὸ δ' ἐνίστασθαι, τὸ ἐν πολλὰ· ἡ γὰρ διαιρεῖ, ἡ ἀναιρεῖ, τὸ μὲν διδοῦς, τὸ δὲ οὐ, τῶν προτεινομένων.

CHAPTER XIV.

HIPPARCHUS—MINOS.

IN these two dialogues, Plato sets before us two farther specimens of that error and confusion which beset the enquirer during his search after "reasoned truth". Sokrates forces upon the attention of a companion two of the most familiar words of the market-place, to see whether a clear explanation of their meaning can be obtained.

In the dialogue called Hipparchus, the debate turns on the definition of τὸ φιλοκερδές or ὁ φιλοκερδής—the love of gain or the lover of gain. Sokrates asks his Companion to define the word. The Companion replies—He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing.¹ Does he do this (asks Sokrates) knowing that the things are worth nothing? or not knowing? If the latter, he is simply ignorant. He knows it perfectly well (is the reply). He is cunning and wicked; and it is because he cannot resist the temptation of gain, that he has the impudence to make profit by such things, though well aware that they are worth nothing. *Sokr.*—Suppose a husbandman, knowing that the plant which he is tending is worthless—and yet thinking that he ought to gain by it: does not that correspond to your description of the lover of gain? *Comp.*—The lover of gain, Sokrates, thinks that he ought to gain from every thing. *Sokr.*—Do not answer in that reckless manner,² as if you had been wronged by any one; but answer with

Hipparchus
—Question
—What is the definition of Lover of Gain? He is one who thinks it right to gain from things worth nothing. Sokrates cross-examines upon this explanation. No man expects to gain from things which he knows to be worth nothing: in this sense, no man is a lover of gain.

¹ Plato, Hipparch. 225 A. οἱ δὲ ἀν κεραδαίνον ἀξίωσιν ἀπὸ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων.

² Plato, Hipparch. 225 C.

attention. You agree that the lover of gain knows the value of that from which he intends to derive profit; and that the husbandman is the person cognizant of the value of plants. *Comp.*—Yes: I agree. *Sokr.*—Do not therefore attempt, you are so young, to deceive an old man like me, by giving answers not in conformity with your own admissions; but tell me plainly, Do you believe that the experienced husbandman, when he knows that he is planting a tree worth nothing, thinks that he shall gain by it? *Comp.*—No, certainly: I do not believe it.

Sokrates then proceeds to multiply illustrations to the same general point. The good horseman does not expect to gain by worthless food given to his horse: the good pilot, by worthless tackle put into his ship: the good commander, by worthless arms delivered to his soldiers: the good fifer, harper, bowman, by employing worthless instruments of their respective arts, if they know them to be worthless.

None of these persons (concludes Sokrates) correspond to your description of the lover of gain. Where then can you find a lover of gain? On your explanation, no man is so.¹ *Comp.*—I mean, Sokrates, that the lovers of gain are those, who, through greediness, long eagerly for things altogether petty and worthless; and thus display a love of gain.² *Sokr.*—Not surely knowing them to be worthless—for this we have shown to be impossible—but ignorant that they are worthless, and believing them to be valuable. *Comp.*—It appears so. *Sokr.*—Now gain is the opposite of loss: and loss is evil and hurt to every one: therefore gain (as the opposite of loss) is good. *Comp.*—Yea. *Sokr.*—It appears then that the lovers of good are those whom you call lovers of gain? *Comp.*—Yes: it appears so. *Sokr.*—Do not you yourself love good—all good things? *Comp.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—And I too, and every one else. All men love good things, and hate evil. Now we agreed that gain was a good: so that by this reasoning, it appears that all men are lovers of gain—while by the former reasoning, we made out that none were so.³ Which of the two

¹ Plat. Hipparch. 226 D.

² Plat. Hipparch. 226 D. 'Αλλ' ἐγὼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν τοῦ-
τους φιλοκερδέεις εἶναι, οἱ ἐκαστοὶ ἐπὶ

ἐπιτηδείοις καὶ πρὸς σμικρὰ καὶ ὀλίγα
ἄξια καὶ οὐδενὸς γλίσχοντα ὑπερφύει
καὶ φιλοκερδοῦσιν.

³ Plat. Hipparch. 227 C.

shall we adopt, to avoid error. *Comp.*—We shall commit no error, Sokrates, if we rightly conceive the lover of gain. He is one who busies himself upon, and seeks to gain from, things from which good men do not venture to gain.

Sokr.—But, my friend, we agreed just now, that gain was a good, and that all men always love good. It follows therefore, that good men as well as others love all gains, if gains are good things. *Comp.*—Not, certainly, those gains by which they will afterwards be hurt. *Sokr.*—Be hurt: you mean, by which they will become losers. *Comp.*—I mean that and nothing else. *Sokr.*—Do they become losers by gain, or by loss? *Comp.*—By both: by loss, and by evil gain.

Sokr.—Does it appear to you that any useful and good thing is evil? *Comp.*—No. *Sokr.*—Well! we agreed just now that gain was the opposite of loss, which was evil; and that, being the opposite of evil, gain was good. *Comp.*—That was what we agreed. *Sokr.*—You see how it is: you are trying to deceive me: you purposely contradict what we just now agreed upon. *Comp.*—Not at all, by Zeus: on the contrary, it is you, Sokrates, who deceive me, wriggling up and down in your talk, I cannot tell how.¹ *Sokr.*—Be careful what you say: I should be very culpable, if I disobeyed a good and wise monitor. *Comp.*—Whom do you mean: and what do you mean? *Sokr.*—Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus.

Sokrates then describes at some length the excellent character of Hipparchus: his beneficent rule, his wisdom, his anxiety for the moral improvement of the Athenians: the causes, different from what was commonly believed, which led to his death; and the wholesome precepts which he during his life had caused to be inscribed on various busts of Hermes throughout Attica. One of these busts or Hermæ bore the words—Do not deceive a friend.²

Apparent contradiction. Sokrates accuses the companion of trying to deceive him. Accusation is retorted upon Sokrates.

Precept inscribed formerly by Hipparchus the Peisistratid—“Never deceive a friend”. Eulogy of Hipparchus by Sokrates.

¹ Plat. Hipparch. 228 A. *Sokr.* Ὅρῃς οὖν; ἐπιχειρεῖς με ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπὶ τῆδες ἐναντία λέγων ὅς ἐστι ἀμολογῆσαι. *Comp.* Οὐ μὲν Δέ, ὁ Σώκρατες· ἀλλὰ τοῦναντίον σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾷς, καὶ οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅτῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρίψεῖς.

² Plat. Hipparch. 228 B—229 D. The picture here given of Hipparchus deserves notice. We are informed that he was older than his brother Hippias, which was the general belief at Athens, as Thucydides (i. 20, vi. 58) affirms, though himself contra-

The Companion resumes :—Apparently, Sokrates, either you do not account me your friend, or you do not obey Hipparchus : for you are certainly deceiving me in some unaccountable way in your talk. You cannot persuade me to the contrary.

Sokr.—Well then ! in order that you may not think yourself deceived, you may take back any move that you choose, as if we were playing at draughts. Which of your admissions do you wish to retract—That all men desire good things ? That loss (to be a loser) is evil ? That gain is the opposite of loss : that to gain is the opposite of to lose ? That to gain, as being the opposite of evil, is a good thing ? **Comp.**—No. I do not retract any one of these. **Sokr.**—You think then, it appears, that some gain is good, other gain evil ? **Comp.**—Yes, that is what I do think.¹ **Sokr.**—Well, I give you back that move : let it stand as you say. Some gain is good : other gain is bad. But surely the good gain is no more *gain*, than the bad gain : both are *gain*, alike and equally. **Comp.**—How do you mean ?

Sokrates then illustrates his question by two or three analogies. **Questions by Sokrates**—Bad food is just as much *food*, as good food : bad drink, as much *drink* as good drink : a good man is no more *man* than a bad man.²

Sokr.—In like manner, bad gain, and good gain, are (both of them) *gain* alike—neither of them more or less than the other. Such being the case, what is that common quality possessed by both, which induces

dicting it, and affirming that Hippias was the elder brother. Plato however agrees with Thucydides in this point, that the three years after the assassination of Hipparchus, during which Hippias ruled alone, were years of oppression and tyranny ; and that the hateful recollection of the Peisistratids, which always survived in the minds of the Athenians, was derived from these three last years.

The picture which Plato here gives of Hipparchus is such as we might expect from a philosopher. He dwells upon the pains which Hipparchus took to have the recitation of the Homeric

poems made frequent and complete : also upon his intimacy with the poets Anakreon and Simonides. The colouring which Plato gives to the intimacy between Aristogiton and Harmodius is also peculiar. The *ἱπάρχης* is represented by Plato as eager for the education and improvement of the *ἱπάρχους* ; and the jealousy felt towards Hipparchus is described as arising from the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Hipparchus, which rendered him so much superior and more effective as an educator.

¹ Plat. Hipparch. 229 E, 230 A.

² Plat. Hipparch. 230 C.

you to call them by the same name *Gain*?¹ Would you call *Gain* any acquisition which one makes either with a smaller outlay or with no outlay at all?² *Comp.*—Yes. I should call that gain. *Sokr.*—For example, if after being at a banquet, not only without any outlay, but receiving an excellent dinner, you acquire an illness? *Comp.*—Not at all: that is no gain. *Sokr.*—But if from the banquet you acquire health, would that be gain or loss? *Comp.*—It would be gain. *Sokr.*—Not every acquisition therefore is gain, but only such acquisitions as are good and not evil: if the acquisition be evil, it is loss. *Comp.*—Exactly so. *Sokr.*—Well, now, you see, you are come round again to the very same point: Gain is good. Loss is evil. *Comp.*—I am puzzled what to say.³ *Sokr.*—You have good reason to be puzzled.

But tell me: you say that if a man lays out little and acquires much, that is gain? *Comp.*—Yes: but not if it be evil: it is gain, if it be good, like gold or silver. *Sokr.*—I will ask you about gold and silver. Suppose a man by laying out one pound of gold acquires two pounds of silver, is it gain or loss? *Comp.*—It is loss, decidedly, Sokrates: gold is twelve times the value of silver. *Sokr.*—Nevertheless he has acquired more: double is more than half. *Comp.*—Not in value: double silver is not more than half gold. *Sokr.*—It appears then that we must include value as essential to gain, not merely quantity. The valuable is gain: the valueless is no gain. The valuable is that which is valuable to possess: is that the profitable, or the unprofitable? *Comp.*—It is the profitable. *Sokr.*—But the profitable is good? *Comp.*—Yes: it is. *Sokr.*—Why then, here, the same conclusion comes back to us as agreed, for the third or fourth time. The gainful is good. *Comp.*—It appears so.⁴

Sokr.—Let me remind you of what has passed. You contended

¹ Plat. Hipparch. 230 E. διὰ τί ποτε ἀμφοτέρω αὐτὰ κέρδος καλεῖς; τί ταύτων ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὄναι;

² Plat. Hipparch. 231 A.

³ Plat. Hipparch. 231 C. *Sokr.* Ὅπως

ὄν, ὡς πάλιν αὐτὸ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ —τὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἢ δὲ ζημία κακόν; *Comp.* Ἀπορῶ ἐγώ γε ὁ, τι εἶπω. *Sokr.* Οὐκ ἔδραως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν.

⁴ Plato, Hipparch. 231 D-E, 232 A.

Recapitulation. The debate has shown that all gain is good, and that there is no evil gain. All men are lovers of Gain. No man ought to be reproached for being so. The Companion is compelled to admit this, though he declares that he is not persuaded.

that good men did not wish to acquire all sorts of gain, but only such as were good, and not such as were evil. But now, the debate has compelled us to acknowledge that all gains are good, whether small or great. *Comp.*—As for me, Sokrates, the debate has compelled me rather than persuaded me.¹ *Sokr.*—Presently, perhaps, it may even persuade you. But now, whether you have been persuaded or not, you at least concur with me in affirming that all gains, whether small or great, are good. That all good men wish for all good things. *Comp.*—I do concur. *Sokr.*—But you yourself stated that evil men love all gains, small and great? *Comp.*—I said so. *Sokr.*—According to your doctrine then, all men are lovers of gain, the good men as well as the evil? *Comp.*—Apparently so. *Sokr.*—It is therefore wrong to reproach any man as a lover of gain: for the person who reproaches is himself a lover of gain, just as much.

The Minos, like the Hipparchus, is a dialogue carried on between Sokrates and a companion not named. It relates to Law, or The Law—

Minos. Question put by Sokrates to the Companion, What is Law, or The Law? All Law is the same, *quatenus* law: What is the common constituent attribute?

Sokr.—What is Law (asks Sokrates)? *Comp.*—Respecting what sort of Law do you enquire (replies the Companion)? *Sokr.*—What! is there any difference between one law and another law, as to that identical circumstance, of being Law? Gold does not differ from gold, so far as the being gold is concerned—nor stone from stone, so far as being stone is concerned. In like manner, one law does not differ from another, all are the same, in so far as each is Law alike:—not, one of them more, and another less. It is about this as a whole that I ask you—What is Law?

Comp.—What should Law be, Sokrates, other than the various assemblage of consecrated and binding customs and beliefs?² *Sokr.*—Do you think, then, that discourse

¹ Plat. Hipparch. 232 A.B. *Sokr.* Οὐκοῦν νῦν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς πείθει καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι; *Comp.* Ἐπείγεται γάρ, ὦ Σόκράτης, μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγὼ γὰρ ἡ πείθειται.

Sokr. Ἄλλ' ἴσως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείθειται ἄν.

² Plato, Minos, 318 B. Τί οὖν ἄλλο νόμος εἰν ἂν ἄλλ' ἢ τὰ νομιζόμενα;

is, the things spoken : that sight is, the things seen ? that hearing is, the things heard ? Or are they not distinct, in each of the three cases—and is not Law also one thing, the various customs and beliefs another ? *Comp.*—Yes ! I now think that they are distinct.¹ *Sokr.*—Law is that whereby these binding customs become binding. What is it ? *Comp.*—Law can be nothing else than the public resolutions and decrees promulgated among us. Law is the decree of the city.² *Sokr.*—You mean, that Law is social opinion. *Comp.*—Yes—I do.

Sokr.—Perhaps you are right : but let us examine. You call some persons wise :—they are wise through wisdom. You call some just :—they are just through justice. In like manner, the lawfully-behaving men are so through law : the lawless men are so through lawlessness. Now the lawfully-behaving men are just : the lawless men are unjust. *Comp.*—It is so. *Sokr.*—Justice and Law, are highly honourable : injustice and lawlessness, highly dishonourable : the former preserves cities, the latter ruins them. *Comp.*—Yes—it does. *Sokr.*—Well, then ! we must consider law as something honourable ; and seek after it, under the assumption that it is a good thing. You defined law to be the decree of the city : Are not some decrees good, others evil ? *Comp.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—But we have already said that law is not evil. *Comp.*—I admit it. *Sokr.*—It is incorrect therefore to answer, as you did broadly, that law is the decree of the city. An evil decree cannot be law. *Comp.*—I see that it is incorrect.³

Sokr.—Still—I think, myself, that law is opinion of some sort ; and since it is not evil opinion, it must be good opinion. Now good opinion is true opinion : and true opinion is, the finding out of reality. *Comp.*—I admit it. *Sokr.*—Law therefore wishes or tends to

1. The consecrated and binding customs.
2. The decree of the city.
3. Social or civic opinion.

Cross-examination by Sokrates—Just and lawfully-behaving men are so through law : unjust and lawless men are so through the absence of law. Law is highly honourable and useful : lawlessness is ruinous. Accordingly, bad decrees of the city—or bad social opinion—cannot be law.

Suggestion by Sokrates—Law is the good opinion of the city—

¹ Plato, *Minos*, 313 B-C.

I pass over here an analogy started by Sokrates in his next question ;—as *δίκης* το τὰ δίκαια, so νόμος το τὰ νομίζεσθαι, &c.

² Plato, *Minos*, 314 A. *ἡθεὶς νόμος τὰ νομίζεσθαι νομίζεται, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται ;*

³ Plato, *Minos*, 314 B-C-D.

But good opinion is true opinion, or the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes (tends) to be the finding out of reality, though it does not always succeed in doing so.

be, the finding out of reality.¹ *Comp.*—But, Sokrates, if law is the finding out of reality—if we have therein already found out realities—how comes it that all communities of men do not use the same laws respecting the same matters? *Sokr.*—The law does not the less wish or tend to find out realities; but it is unable to do so. That is, if the fact be true as you state—that we change our laws, and do not all of us use the same. *Comp.*—Surely, the fact as a fact is obvious enough.²

(The Companion here enumerates some remarkable local rites, venerable in one place, abhorrent in another, such as the human sacrifices at Carthage, &c., thus lengthening his answer much beyond what it had been before. Sokrates then continues):—

Objection taken by the Companion—That there is great discordance of laws in different places. He specifies several cases of such discordance, at some length. Sokrates reproves his prolixity, and requests him to confine himself to question or answer.

Sokr.—Perhaps you are right, and these matters have escaped me. But if you and I go on making long speeches each for ourselves, we shall never come to an agreement. If we are to carry on our research together, we must do so by question and answer. Question me, if you prefer:—if not, answer me. *Comp.*—I am quite ready, Sokrates, to answer whatever you ask.

Sokr.—Well, then! do you think that just things are just, and that unjust things are unjust? *Comp.*—I think they are. *Sokr.*—Do not all men in all communities, among the Persians as well as here, now as well as formerly, think so too? *Comp.*—Unquestionably they do. *Sokr.*—Are not things which weigh more, accounted heavier; and things which weigh less, accounted lighter, here, at Carthage, and everywhere else?³ *Comp.*—Certainly. *Sokr.*—It seems, then, that honourable things are accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable

Farther questions by Sokrates—Things heavy and light, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, &c., are so

accounted honourable everywhere, and dishonourable

¹ Plato, *Minos*, 315 A. Οὐκ οὖν ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὅτου ἐστὶν ἐξέρεσις; . . . ὁ νόμος ἀπὸ βούληται τοῦ ὅτου εἶναι ἐξέρεσις;

² Plato, *Minos*, 315 A-B.

³ Plato, *Minos*, 316 A. Πένητον δὲ

τὰ πλείον ἔλκοντα βαρύτερα νομίζεται ἐνθάδε, τὰ δὲ ἑλαττον, λευφότερα, ἢ τούτωντιόν;

The verb *νομίζεται* deserves attention here, being the same word as has been employed in regard to law, and derived from *νόμος*.

things dishonourable? not the reverse. *Comp.*—Yes, it is so. *Sokr.*—Then, speaking universally, existent things or realities (not non-existents) are accounted existent and real, among us as well as among all other men? *Comp.*—I think they are. *Sokr.*—Whoever therefore fails in attaining the real fails in attaining the lawful.¹ *Comp.*—As you now put it, Sokrates, it would seem that the same things are accounted lawful both by us at all times, and by all the rest of mankind besides. But when I reflect that we are perpetually changing our laws, I cannot persuade myself of what you affirm.

Sokr.—Perhaps you do not reflect that pieces on the draught-board, when their position is changed, still remain the same. You know medical treatises: you know that physicians are the really knowing about matters of health: and that they agree with each other in writing about them. *Comp.*—Yes—I know that. *Sokr.*—The case is the same whether they be Greeks or not Greeks: Those who know, must of necessity hold the same opinion with each other, on matters which they know: always and everywhere. *Comp.*—Yes—always and everywhere. *Sokr.*—Physicians write respecting matters of health what they account to be true, and these writings of theirs are the medical laws? *Comp.*—Certainly they are. *Sokr.*—The like is true respecting the laws of farming—the laws of gardening—the laws of cookery. All these are the writings of persons, knowing in each of the respective pursuits? *Comp.*—Yes.² *Sokr.*—In like manner, what are the laws respecting the government of a city? Are they not the writings of those who know how to govern—kings, statesmen, and men of superior excellence? *Comp.*—Truly so. *Sokr.*—Knowing men like these will not write differently from each other about the same things, nor change what they

and are accounted so everywhere. Real things are always accounted real. Whoever fails in attaining the real, fails in attaining the lawful.

There are laws of health and of cure, composed by the few physicians wise upon those subjects, and unanimously declared by them. So also there are laws of farming, gardening, cookery, declared by the few wise in those respective pursuits. In like manner, the laws of a city are the judgments declared by the few wise men who know how to rule.

¹ Plat. Min. 316 B. οὐκοῦν, ὡς κατὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν. *Comp.* Ἐμοίγε δοκεῖ πάντων εἶπαι, τὰ ὅσα νομίζονται εἶναι. *Sokr.* Ὅς ἂν ἄρα τοῦ ὅτου ἀμαρτάνῃ, οὐ τὰ μὴ ὅτου, καὶ παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομίμου ἀμαρτάνει.

² Plato, Minos, 316 D-E.

have once written. If, then, we see some doing this, are we to declare them knowing or ignorant? *Comp.*—Ignorant—undoubtedly.

Sokr.—Whatever is right, therefore, we may pronounce to be lawful; in medicine, gardening, or cookery: whatever is not right, not to be lawful but lawless. And the like in treatises respecting just and unjust, prescribing how the city is to be administered: That which is right, is the regal law—that which is not right, is not so, but only seems to be law in the eyes of the ignorant—being in truth lawless. *Comp.*—Yea. *Sokr.*—We were correct therefore in declaring Law to be the finding out of reality. *Comp.*—It appears so.¹ *Sokr.*—It is the skilful husbandman who gives right laws on the sowing of land: the skilful musician on the touching of instruments: the skilful trainer, respecting exercise of the body: the skilful king or governor, respecting the minds of the citizens. *Comp.*—Yes—it is.²

Sokr.—Can you tell me which of the ancient kings has the glory of having been a good lawgiver, so that his laws still remain in force as divine institutions? *Comp.*—I cannot tell. *Sokr.*—But can you not say which among the Greeks have the most ancient laws? *Comp.*—Perhaps you mean the Lacedæmonians and Lykurgus? *Sokr.*—Why, the Lacedæmonian laws are hardly more than three hundred years old: besides, whence is it that the best of them come? *Comp.*—From Krete, they say. *Sokr.*—Then it is the Kretans who have the most ancient laws in Greece? *Comp.*—Yea. *Sokr.*—Do you know those good kings of Krete, from whom these laws are derived—Minos and Rhadamanthus, sons of Zeus and Europa? *Comp.*—Rhadamanthus certainly is said to have been a just man, Sokrates; but Minos quite the reverse—savage, ill-tempered, unjust. *Sokr.*—What you affirm, my friend, is a fiction of the Attic tragedians. It is not stated either by Homer or Hesiod; who are far more worthy of credit than all the tragedians put

¹ Plato, *Minos*, 317 C. τὸ μὲν ὁρθὸν νόμος ἐστὶ βασιλικός· τὸ δὲ μὴ ὁρθόν αὐτὸς ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶναι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόντι· ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀνομον.

² Plato, *Minos*, 318 A.

together. *Comp.*—What is it that Homer and Hesiod say about Minos? ¹

Sokrates replies by citing, and commenting upon, the statements of Homer and Hesiod respecting Minos, as the cherished son, companion, and pupil, of Zeus; who bestowed upon him an admirable training, teaching him wisdom and justice, and thus rendering him consummate as a lawgiver and ruler of men. It was through these laws, divine as emanating from the teaching of Zeus, that Krete (and Sparta as the imitator of Krete) had been for so long a period happy and virtuous. As ruler of Krete, Minos had made war upon Athens, and compelled the Athenians to pay tribute. Hence he had become odious to the Athenians, and especially odious to the tragic poets who were the great teachers and charmers of the crowd. These poets, whom every one ought to be cautious of offending, had calumniated Minos as the old enemy of Athens. ²

Question about the character of Minos—Homer and Hesiod declare him to have been admirable; the Attic tragedians defame him as a tyrant, because he was the enemy of Athens.

But that these tales are mere calumny (continues Sokrates), and that Minos was truly a good lawgiver, and a good shepherd (*νομὸς ἀγαθός*) of his people—we have proof through the fact, that his laws still remain unchanged: which shows that he has really found out truth and reality respecting the administration of a city. ³ *Comp.*—Your view seems plausible, Sokrates. *Sokr.*—If I am right, then, you think that the Kretans have more ancient laws than any other Greeks? and that Minos and Rhadamanthus are the best of all ancient lawgivers, rulers, and shepherds of mankind? *Comp.*—I think they are.

That Minos was really admirable—and that he has found out truth and reality respecting the administration of the city—we may be sure from the fact that his laws have remained so long unaltered.

Sokr.—Now take the case of the good lawgiver and good shepherd for the body—If we were asked, what it is that he prescribes for the body, so as to render it better? we should answer, at once, briefly, and well, by saying—food and labour: the former to sustain the body, the latter to exercise and consolidate it.

The question is made more determinate. What is it that the good law.

¹ Plato, Minos, 318 E.

² Plato, Minos, 319-320.

³ Plato, Minos, 321 B.

γιστον σημεϊον, ὅτι ἀκίνητοι αὐτοῦ οἱ νόμοι εἶναι, ἅτε τοῦ ὄντος περὶ πόλεως οὐκ ἔσθ' ἔξαρπός τις εὐ τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

giver prescribes and measures out for the health of the mind—as the physician measures out food and exercise for the body? Sokrates cannot tell. Close.

Comp.—Quite correct. *Sokr.*—And if after that we were asked, What are those things which the good lawgiver prescribes for the mind to make it better, what should we say, so as to avoid discrediting ourselves? *Comp.*—I really cannot tell. *Sokr.*—But surely it is discreditable enough both for your mind and mine—to confess, that we do not know upon what it is that good and evil for our minds depends, while we can define upon what it is that the good or evil of our bodies depends?¹

I have put together the two dialogues Hipparchus and Minos, partly because of the analogy which really exists between them, partly because that analogy is much insisted on by Boeckh, Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other recent critics; who not only strike them both out of the list of Platonic works, but speak of them with contempt as compositions. On the first point, I dissent from them altogether: on the second, I agree with them thus far—that I consider the two dialogues inferior works of Plato:—much inferior to his greatest and best compositions,—certainly displaying both less genius and less careful elaboration—probably among his early performances—perhaps even unfinished projects, destined for a farther elaboration, which they never received, and not published until after his decease. Yet in Hipparchus as well as in Minos, the subjects debated are important as regards ethical theory. Several questions are raised and partially canvassed: no conclusion is finally attained. These characteristics they have in common with several of the best Platonic dialogues.

In Hipparchus, the question put by Sokrates is, about the definition of *ὁ φιλοκερδής* (the lover of gain), and of *κέρδος* itself—gain. The first of these two words (like many in Greek as well as in English) is used in two senses. In its plain, etymological sense, it means an attribute belonging to all men: all men love gain, hate loss.

¹ Plato, Minos, 321 C-D.

But since this is predicable of all, there is seldom any necessity for predicating it of any one man or knot of men in particular. Accordingly, when you employ the epithet as a predicate of A or B, what you generally mean is, to assert something more than its strict etymological meaning: to declare that he has the attribute in unusual measure; or that he has shown himself, on various occasions, wanting in other attributes, which on those occasions ought, in your judgment, to have countervailed it. The epithet thus comes to connote a sentiment of blame or reproach, in the mind of the speaker.¹

The Companion or Collocutor, being called upon by Sokrates to explain τὸ φιλοκερδές, defines it in this last sense, as conveying or connoting a reproach. He gives three different explanations of it (always in this sense), loosely worded, each of which Sokrates shows to be untenable. A variety of parallel cases are compared, and the question is put (so constantly recurring in Plato's writings), what is the state of the agent's mind as to knowledge? The cross-examination makes out, that if the agent be supposed to know,—then there is no man corresponding to the definition of a φιλοκερδής: if the agent be supposed not to know—then, on the contrary, every man will come under the definition. The Companion is persuaded that there is such a thing as “love of gain” in the blamable sense. Yet he cannot find any tenable definition, to discriminate it from “love of gain” in the ordinary or innocent sense.

The same question comes back in another form, after Sokrates has given the liberty of retractation. The Collocutor maintains that there is *bad* gain, as well as *good* gain. But what is that common, generic, quality, designated by the word *gain*, apart from these two distinctive epithets? He cannot find it out or describe it. He gives two definitions, each of which is torn up by Sokrates. To deserve the name of *gain*, that which a man acquires must be good; and it must surpass, in value as well

State of mind of the agent, as to knowledge, frequent inquiry in Plato. No tenable definition found.

Admitting that there is bad gain, as well as good gain, what is the meaning of the word *gain*? None is found.

¹ Aristotle adverts to this class of ethical epithets, connoting both an attribute in the person designated and an unfavourable sentiment in the speaker (Ethic. Nikom. ii. 6, p. 1107

a. 9). Οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις, οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος, τὴν μεσότητα· ἐνία γὰρ εὐθὺς ἀνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φανλότητος, οἷον, &c.

as in quantity, the loss or outlay which he incurs in order to acquire it. But when thus understood, all gains are good. There is no meaning in the distinction between good and bad gains: all men are lovers of gain.

With this confusion, the dialogue closes. The Sokratic notion of good, as what every one loves—evil as what every one hates—also of evil-doing, as performed by every evil-doer only through ignorance or mistake—is brought out and applied to test the ethical phraseology of a common-place respondent. But it only serves to lay bare a state of confusion and perplexity, without clearing up any thing. Herein, so far as I can see, lies Plato's purpose in the dialogue. The respondent is made aware of the confusion, which he did not know before; and this, in Plato's view, is a progress. The respondent cannot avoid giving contradictory answers, under an acute cross-examination: but he does not adopt any new belief. He says to Sokrates at the close—"The debate has constrained rather than persuaded me".¹ This is a simple but instructive declaration of the force put by Sokrates upon his collocutors; and of the reactionary effort likely to be provoked in their minds, with a view to extricate themselves from a painful sense of contradiction. If such effort be provoked, Plato's purpose is attained.

One peculiarity there is, analogous to what we have already seen in the Hippias Major. It is not merely the Collocutor who charges Sokrates, but also Sokrates who accuses the Collocutor—each charging the other with attempts to deceive a friend.² This seems intended by Plato to create an occasion for introducing what he had to say about Hipparchus—*apropos* of the motto on the Hipparchean Hermes—*μη φίλον ἐξαπάτα*.

The modern critics, who proclaim the Hipparchus not to be the work of Plato, allege as one of the proofs of spuriousness, the occurrence of this long narrative and comment upon the historical Hipparchus and his behaviour; which narrative (the critics maintain) Plato would never have introduced, seeing that it

¹ Plato, Hipparch. 232 B. ἡγάκακε γὰρ (ὁ λόγος) μάλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.

² Plato, Hipparch. 225 E, 228 A.

contributes nothing to the settlement of the question debated. But to this we may reply, first, That there are other dialogues¹ (not to mention the *Minos*) in which Plato introduces recitals of considerable length, historical or quasi-historical recitals; bearing remotely, or hardly bearing at all, upon the precise question under discussion; next, —That even if no such analogies could be cited, and if the case stood single, no modern critic could fairly pretend to be so thoroughly acquainted with Plato's views and the surrounding circumstances, as to put a limit on the means which Plato might choose to take, for rendering his dialogues acceptable and interesting. Plato's political views made him disinclined to popular government generally, and to the democracy of Athens in particular. Conformably with such sentiment, he is disposed to surround the rule of the *Peisistratidæ* with an ethical and philosophical colouring: to depict *Hipparchus* as a wise man busied in instructing and elevating the citizens; and to discredit the renown of *Harmodius* and *Aristogeiton*, by affirming them to have been envious of *Hipparchus*, as a philosopher who surpassed themselves by his own mental worth. All this lay perfectly in the vein of Plato's sentiment; and we may say the same about the narrative in the *Minos*, respecting the divine parentage and teaching of *Minos*, giving rise to his superhuman efficacy as a lawgiver and ruler. It is surely very conceivable, that Plato, as a composer of ethical dialogues or dramas, might think that such recitals lent a charm or interest to some of them. Moreover, something like variety, or distinctive features as between one dialogue and another, was a point of no inconsiderable moment. I am of opinion that Plato did so conceive these narratives. But at any rate, what I here contend is, that no modern critics have a right to assume as certain that he did not.

¹ See *Alkibiad. ii.* pp. 142-149-150; *Alkibiad. i.* pp. 121-122: *Protagoras*, 342-344; *Politikus*, 268 D., *Σχεδόν ταυτὸν ὑπερασπίζουσι*, and the two or three pages which follow.

F. A. Wolf, and various critics after him, contend that the genuineness of the *Hipparchus* was doubted in antiquity, on the authority of *Ælian*, V. H. viii. 2. But I maintain that this is not the meaning of the passage, unless upon the supposition that the word

μαθητής is struck out of the text conjecturally. The passage may be perfectly well construed, leaving *μαθητής* in the text: we must undoubtedly suppose the author to have made an assertion historically erroneous: but this is nowise impossible in the case of *Ælian*. If you construe the passage as it stands, without such conjectural alteration, it does not justify Wolf's inference.

I now come to the Minos. The subject of this dialogue is, the explanation or definition of Law. Sokrates says to his Companion or Collocutor,—Tell me what is the generic constituent of Law: All Laws are alike *quatenus* Law. Take no note of the difference between one law and another, but explain to me what characteristic property it is, which is common to all Law, and is implied in or connoted by the name Law.

This question is logically the same as that which Sokrates asks in the Hipparchus with reference to *κέρδος* or gain.

That the definition of *Nómos* or Law was discussed by Sokrates, we know, not only from the general description of his debates given in Xenophon, but also from the interesting description (in that author) of the conversation between the youthful Alkibiades and Perikles.¹ The interrogations employed by Alkibiades on that occasion are Sokratic, and must have been derived, directly or indirectly, from Sokrates. They are partially analogous to the questions of Sokrates in the dialogue Minos, and they end by driving Perikles into a confusion, left unexplained, between Law and Lawlessness.

Definitions of *Nómos* are here given by the Companion, who undergoes a cross-examination upon them. First, he says, that *Nómos* = τὰ νομιζόμενα. But this is rejected by Sokrates, who intimates that Law is not the aggregate of laws enacted or of customs held binding: but that which lies behind these laws and customs, imparting to them their binding force.² We are to enquire what this is. The Companion declares that it is the public decree of the city: political or social opinion. But this again Sokrates contests: putting questions to show that Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, beauty, and preservation of the city with its possessions; while lawlessness includes injustice, evil, ugliness, and destruction. There can be no such thing as bad or wicked law.³ But among decrees of the city,

Definitions of law—suggested and refuted. Law includes, as a portion of its meaning, justice, goodness, usefulness, &c. Bad decrees are not laws.

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 1, 16; i. 2, 42-48.

² Plato, Minos, 314 A. εἰς αὐτὴν νόμος τὰ νομιζόμενα νομίζεται, τίτι ἐστὶ τῷ νόμῳ νομίζεται;

³ Plato, Minos, 314 E. καὶ μὴν νόμος γε οὐκ ἔστι ποταμός.

some are bad, some are good. Therefore to define Law as a decree of the city, thus generally, is incorrect. It is only the good decree, not the bad decree, which is Law. Now the good decree or opinion, is the true opinion: that is, it is the finding out of reality. Law therefore wishes or aims to be the finding out of reality: and if there are differences between different nations, this is because the power to find out does not always accompany the wish to find out.

As to the assertion—that Law is one thing here, another thing there, one thing at one time, another thing at another—Sokrates contests it. Just things are just (he says) everywhere and at all times; unjust things are unjust also. Heavy things are heavy, light things light, at one time, as well as at another. So also honourable things are everywhere honourable, base things everywhere base. In general phrase, existent things are everywhere existent,¹ non-existent things are not existent. Whoever therefore fails to attain the existent and real, fails to attain the lawful and just. It is only the man of art and knowledge, in this or that department, who attains the existent, the real, the right, true, lawful, just. Thus the authoritative rescripts or laws in matters of medicine, are those laid down by practitioners who know that subject, all of whom agree in what they lay down: the laws of cookery, the laws of agriculture and of gardening—are rescripts delivered by artists who know respectively each of those subjects. So also about Just and Unjust, about the political and social arrangements of the city—the authoritative rescripts or laws are, those laid down by the artists or men of knowledge in that department, all of whom agree in laying down the same: that is, all the men of art called kings or lawgivers. It is only the right, the true, the real—that which these artists attain—which is properly a law and is entitled to be so called. That which is not right is not a law,—ought not to be so called—and is only supposed to be a law by the error of ignorant men.²

Sokrates affirms that law is everywhere the same—It is the declared judgment and command of the Wise man, upon the subject to which it refers—It is truth and reality, found out and certified by him.

¹ M. Boeckh remarks justly in his note on this passage—"neque enim illud demonstratum est, eadem omnibus legitima esse—sed tantum, notionem" (rather the sentiment or

emotion) "*legitimi omnibus eandem esse. Sed omnia scriptor hic confundit.*"

² Plato, *Minos*, 317 C.

That the reasoning of Sokrates in this dialogue is confused and unsound (as M. Boeckh and other critics have remarked), I perfectly agree. But it is not the less completely Platonic; resting upon views and doctrines much cherished and often reproduced by Plato. The dialogue *Minos* presents, in a rude and awkward manner, without explanation or amplification, that worship of the Abstract and the Ideal, which Plato, in other and longer dialogues, seeks to diversify as well as to elaborate. The definitions of Law here combated and given by Sokrates, illustrate this. The good, the true, the right, the beautiful, the real—all coalesce in the mind of Plato. There is nothing (in his view) real, except *The Good, The Just, &c.* (*τὸ αἰὸν-ἀγαθόν; αἰὸν-δίκαιον*—Absolute Goodness and Justice): particular good and just things have no reality, they are no more good and just than bad and unjust—they are one or the other, according to circumstances—they are ever variable, floating midway between the real and unreal.¹ The real alone is knowable, correlating with knowledge or with the knowing Intelligence *Noûs*. As Sokrates distinguishes elsewhere *τὸ δίκαιον* or *αἰὸν-δίκαιον* from *τὰ δίκαια*—so here he distinguishes (*νόμος* from *τὰ νομίζοντα*) *Law*, from the assemblage of actual commands or customs received as *laws* among mankind. These latter are variable according to time and place; but Law is always one and the same. Plato will acknowledge nothing to be Law, except that which (he thinks) *ought to be Law*: that which emanates from a lawgiver of consummate knowledge, who aims at the accomplishment of the good and the real, and knows how to discover and realise that end. So far as “the decree of the city” coincides with what would have been enacted by this lawgiver (*i. e.* so far as it is good and right), Sokrates admits it as a valid explanation of Law; but no farther. He considers the phrase *bad law* to express a logical impossibility, involving a contradiction *in adjecto*.² What others call a bad law, he regards as being

¹ See the remarkable passage in the fifth book of the Republic, pp. 479-480; compare vii. 538 E.

² Plato, *Minos*, 814 D.

The same argument is brought to

bear by the Platonic Sokrates against Hippias in the *Hippias Major*, 284-285. If the laws are not really profitable, which is [the only real purpose for which they were established, they

no real law, but only a fallacious image, mistaken for such by the ignorant. He does not consider such ignorant persons as qualified to judge: he recognises only the judgment of the knowing one or few, among whom he affirms that there can be no difference of opinion. Every one admits just things to be just,—unjust things to be unjust,—heavy things to be heavy,—the existent and the real, to be the existent and the real. If then the lawgiver in any of his laws fails to attain this reality, he fails in the very purpose essential to the conception of law :¹ i. e. his pretended law is no law at all.

By *Law*, then, Plato means—not the assemblage of actual positive rules, nor any general property common to and characteristic of them, nor the free determination of an assembled Demos as distinguished from the mandates of a despot—but the Type of Law as it ought to be, and as it would be, if prescribed by a perfectly wise ruler, aiming at good and knowing how to realise it. This, which is the ideal of his own mind, Plato worships and reasons upon as if it were the only reality; as Law by nature, or natural Law, distinguished from actual positive laws: which last have either been set by some ill-qualified historical ruler, or have grown up insensibly. Knowledge, art, philosophy, systematic and constructive, applied by some one or few exalted individuals, is (in his view) the only cause capable of producing that typical result which is true, good, real, permanent, and worthy of the generic name.

Plato worships the Ideal of his own mind—the work of systematic constructive theory by the Wise Man.

In the *Minos*, this general Platonic view is applied to Law: in the *Politikus*, to government and social administration: in the *Kratylus*, to naming or language. In the *Politikus*, we find the received classification of governments (monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy) discarded as improper; and the assertion advanced, That there is only one government right, true, genuine, really existing—government by the uncontrolled authority and superintendence of the man of exalted intelligence: he who is master in the

Different applications of this general Platonic view, in the *Minos*, *Politikus*, *Kratylus*, &c. Natural Rectitude of Law, Government, Names, &c.

are no laws at all. The Spartans are *παράνομοι*. Some of the answers assigned to Hippias (284 D) are per-

tinent enough; but he is overborne.

¹ Plato, *Minos*, §16 B. Ὅς ἂν ἀπα τοῦ ὄντος ἀμαρτάνῃ, τοῦ νομίμου ἀμαρτάνῃ.

art of governing, whether such man do in fact hold power anywhere or not. All other governments are degenerate substitutes for this type, some receding from it less, some more.¹ Again, in the *Kratylus*, where names and name-giving are discussed, Sokrates² maintains that things can only be named according to their true and real nature—that there is, belonging to each thing, one special and appropriate Name-Form, discernible only by the sagacity of the intelligent Lawgiver: who alone is competent to bestow upon each thing its right, true, genuine, real name, possessing rectitude by nature (*ὀρθότης φύσει*).³ This Name-Form (according to Sokrates) is the same in all languages in so far as they are constructed by different intelligent Lawgivers, although the letters and syllables in which they may clothe the Form are very different.⁴ If names be not thus apportioned by the systematic purpose of an intelligent Lawgiver, but raised up by insensible and unsystematic growth—they will be unworthy substitutes for the genuine type, though they are the best which actual societies possess; according to the opinion announced by *Kratylus* in that same dialogue, they will not be names at all.⁵

The *Kretan Minos* (we here find it affirmed), son, companion, Enulogy on and pupil of Zeus, has learnt to establish laws of this Minos, as divine type or natural rectitude: the proof of which having es- is, that the ancient *Kretan* laws have for imme-

¹ Plato, *Politikus*, 293 C-E. ταύτην ὀρθὴν διαφερόντως εἶναι καὶ μόνην πολιτείαν, ἐν ᾗ τις ἀν εὐρισκοὶ τοὺς ἀρχοντας ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας καὶ οὐ δοκοῦντας μόνον . . . τότε καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιούτους ὄρους ἡμῖν μόνην ὀρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητέον. ὅσας δὲ ἄλλας λέγομεν, οὐ γνησίας οὐδ' ὄντως οὐσας λεκτέον, ἀλλὰ μεμιμημένας ταύτην, ἧς μὲν εὐνόμους λέγομεν, ἐπὶ τὰ καλλίω, τὰς δὲ ἄλλας ἐπὶ τὰ εἰσχίονα μεμιμῆσθαι.

The historical (Xenophontic) Sokrates asserts this same position in *Xenophon's Memorabilia* (iii. 9, 10). "Sokrates said that Kings and Rulers were those who knew how to command, not those who held the sceptre or were chosen by election or lot, or had acquired power by force or fraud," &c.

The Kings of Sparta and Macedonia, the Βασιλεῖς and ἄρχοντες of Athens, the Despot of Syracuse or Phæra, are here declared to be not real rulers at all.

² Plato, *Kratylus*, 387 D.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* 388 A-E.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* 389 E, 390 A, 432 E. Οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὴν νομοθέτην τὸν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ἕως ἀν τὸ τοῦ νόμου εἶδος ἀποδιδῇ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῃ ἐν ὁποιασούντων συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χεῖρας νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουσούν ἄλλοθι; Compare this with the *Minos*, 315 E, 316 D, where Sokrates evades, by an hypothesis very similar, the objection made by the interlocutor, that the laws in one country are very different from those in another—ἴσως γὰρ οὐκ ἔννοεῖς ταῦτα μεταστρεφόμενα εἶναι ταῦτά ἴσιν.

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* 430 A, 432 A, 433 D, 435 C.

Kratylus says that a name badly given is no name at all; just as Sokrates says in the *Minos* that a bad law is no law at all.

morial ages remained, and still do remain,¹ unchanged. But when Sokrates tries to determine, Wherein consists this Law-Type? What is it that the wise Law-giver prescribes for the minds of the citizens—as the wise gymnastic trainer prescribes proper measure of nourishment and exercise for their bodies?—the question is left unanswered. Sokrates confesses with shame that he cannot answer it: and the dialogue ends in a blank. The reader—according to Plato's manner—is to be piqued and shamed into the effort of meditating the question for himself.

laws on this divine type or natural rectitude.

An attempt to answer this question will be found in Plato's Treatise *De Legibus*—in the projected Kretan colony, of which he there sketches the fundamental laws. Aristophanes of Byzantium very naturally placed this treatise as sequel to the *Minos*; second in the Trilogy of which the *Minos* was first.²

The *Minos* was arranged by Aristophanes at first in a Trilogy along with the *Leges*.

Whoever has followed the abstract of the *Minos*, which I have just given, will remark the different explanations of the word Law—both those which are disallowed, and that which is preferred, though left incomplete, by Sokrates. On this same subject, there are in many writers, modern as well as ancient, two distinct modes of confusion traceable—pointed out by eminent recent jurists, such as Mr. Bentham, Mr. Austin, and Mr. Maine. 1. Between Law as it is, and Law as it ought to be. 2. Between Laws Imperative, set by intelligent rulers, and enforced by penal sanction—and Laws signifying uniformities of fact expressed in general terms, such as the Law of Gravitation, Crystallisation, &c.—We can hardly say that in the dialogue *Minos*, Plato falls into the first of these two modes of confusion: for he expressly says that he only recognises the Ideal of Law, or Law as it ought to be (actual Laws everywhere being disallowed, except in so far as they conform thereunto). But he does fall into the second, when he identifies the Lawful with the Real or Existent. His Ideal stands in place of generalisations of fact.

Explanations of the word Law—Confusion in its meaning.

There is also much confusion, if we compare the *Minos* with other dialogues: wherein Plato frequently talks of Laws as the

¹ Plato, *Minos*, 319 B, 321 A.

further remarks upon the genuineness

² I reserve for an Appendix some of Hipparchus and *Minos*.

laws and customs actually existing or imperative in any given state—Athens, Sparta, or elsewhere (*Nómos* = τὰ νομιζόμενα, according to the first words in the *Minos*). For example, in the harangue which he supposes to be addressed to Sokrates in the *Kriton*, and which he invests with so impressive a character—the Laws of Athens are introduced as speakers: but 'according to the principles laid down in the *Minos*, three-fourths of the Laws of Athens could not be regarded as laws at all. If therefore we take Plato's writings throughout, we shall not find that he is constant to one uniform sense of the word Law, or that he escapes the frequent confusion between Law as it actually exists and Law as it ought to be.¹

¹ The first explanation of *Nómos* advanced by the Companion in reply to Sokrates (viz. *Nómos* = τὰ νομιζόμενα), coincides substantially with the meaning of *Nómos βασιλεὺς* in Pindar and Herodotus (see above, chap. viii.), who is an imaginary ruler, occupying a given region, and enforcing τὰ νομιζόμενα. It coincides also with the precept *Nóμος πόλεως*, as prescribed by the Pythian priestess to applicants who asked advice about the proper forms of religious worship (*Xen. Mem.* i. 3, 1); though this precept, when Cicero comes to report it (*Legg.* ii. 16, 40), appears divested of its simplicity, and overclouded with the very confusion touched upon in my text. Aristotle does not keep clear of the confusion (compare *Ethic. Nikom.* i. 1, 1094, b. 16, and v. 5, 1130, b. 24). I shall revert again to the distinction between νόμος and φύσις, in touching on other Platonic dialogues. Cicero expressly declares (*Legg.* ii. 5, 11), conformably to what is said by the Platonic Sokrates in the *Minos*, that a bad law,

however passed in regular form, is no law at all; and this might be well if he adhered consistently to the same phraseology, but he perpetually uses, in other places, the words *Lex* and *Leges* to signify laws actually in force at Rome, good or bad.

Mr. Bentham gives an explanation of Law or The Law, which coincides with *Nómos* = τὰ νομιζόμενα. He says (*Principles of Morals and Legislation*, vol. ii. ch. 17, p. 257, ed. 1823), "Now Law, or The Law, taken indefinitely, is an abstract and collective term, which, when it means anything, can mean neither more nor less than the sum total of a number of individual laws taken together".

Mr. Austin in his Lectures, 'The Province of Jurisprudence Determined,' has explained more clearly and copiously than any antecedent author, the confused meanings of the word Law adverted to in my text. See especially his first lecture and his fifth, pp. 83 seq. and 171 seq., 4th ed.

APPENDIX.

In continuing to recognise Hipparchus and Minos as Platonic works, contrary to the opinion of many modern critics, I have to remind the reader, not only that both are included in the Canon of Thrasyllus, but that the Minos was expressly acknowledged by Aristophanes of Byzantium, and included by him among the Trilogies: showing that it existed then (220 B.C.) in the Alexandrine Museum as a Platonic work. The similarity between the Hipparchus and Minos is recognised by all the Platonic critics, most of whom declare that both of them are spurious. Schleiermacher affirms and vindicates this opinion in his *Einleitung* and notes: but it will be convenient to take the arguments advanced to prove the spuriousness, as they are set forth by M. Boeckh, in his "*Comment. in Platonis qui vulgo fertur Minoem*": in which treatise, though among his early works, the case is argued with all that copious learning and critical ability, which usually adorn his many admirable contributions to the improvement of philology.

M. Boeckh not only rejects the pretensions of Hipparchus and Minos to be considered as works of Plato, but advances an affirmative hypothesis to show what they are. He considers these two dialogues, together with those *De Justo*, and *De Virtute* (two short dialogues in the pseudo-Platonic list, not recognised by Thrasyllus) as among the dialogues published by Simon; an Athenian citizen and a shoemaker by trade, in whose shop Sokrates is said to have held many of his conversations. Simon is reported to have made many notes of these conversations, and to have composed and published, from them, a volume of thirty-three dialogues (*Diog. L. ii. 122*), among the titles of which there are two—*Περὶ Φιλοκερδοῦς* and *Περὶ Νόμου*. Simon was, of course, contemporary with Plato; but somewhat older in years. With this part of M. Boeckh's treatise, respecting the supposed authorship of Simon, I have nothing to do. I only notice the arguments by which he proposes to show that Hipparchus and Minos are not works of Plato.

In the first place, I notice that M. Boeckh explicitly recognises them

as works of an author contemporary with Plato, not later than 380 B.C. (p. 46). Hereby many of the tests, whereby we usually detect spurious works, become inapplicable.

In the second place, he admits that the dialogues are composed in good Attic Greek, suitable to the Platonic age both in character and manners—"At veteris esse et Attici scriptoris, probus sermo, antiqui mores, totus denique character, spondeat," p. 32.

The reasons urged by M. Boeckh to prove the spuriousness of the Minos, are first, that it is unlike Plato—next, that it is too much like Plato. "Dupliciter dialogus a Platonis ingenio discrepat: partim quod parum, partim quod nimium, similis ceteris ejusdem scriptis sit. Parum similis est in rebus permultis. Nam cum Plato adhuc vivos ac videntes aut nuper defunctos notosque homines, ut scenicus poeta actores, moribus ingeniisque accurate descriptis, nominatim producat in medium—in isto opusculo cum Socrate colloquens persona plané incerta est ac nomine carens: quippe cum imperitus scriptor esset artis illius colloquiis suis *dulcissimas veneres* illas inferendi, quæ ex peculiaribus personarum moribus pingendis redundant, atque à Platone ut flores per amplos dialogorum hortos sunt disseminatæ" (pp. 7-8): again, p. 9, it is complained that there is an "infinitus secundarius collocutor" in the Hipparchus.

Now the sentence, just transcribed from M. Boeckh, shows that he had in his mind as standard of comparison, a certain number of the Platonic works, but that he did not take account of all of them. The Platonic Protagoras begins with a dialogue between Sokrates and an unknown, nameless person; to whom Sokrates, after a page of conversation with him, recounts what has just passed between himself, Protagoras, and others. Next, if we turn to the Sophistês and Politikus, we find that in both of them, not simply the secundarius collocutor, but even the principal speaker, is an unknown and nameless person, described only as a Stranger from Elea, and never before seen by Sokrates. Again, in the Leges, the principal speaker is only an Ἀθηναῖος ξένος, without a name. In the face of such analogies, it is unsafe to lay down a peremptory rule, that no dialogue can be the work of Plato, which acknowledges as *collocutor* an unnamed person.

Then again—when M. Boeckh complains that the Hipparchus and Minos are destitute of those "*flores et dulcissimæ Veneres*" which Plato is accustomed to spread through his dialogues—I ask, Where are the "*dulcissimæ Veneres*" in the Parmenidês, Sophistês, Politikus, Leges, Timæus, Kritias? I find none. The presence of "*dulcissimæ Veneres*" is not a condition *sine quâ non*, in every composition which

pretends to Plato as its author : nor can the absence of them be admitted as a reason for disallowing Hipparchus and Minos.

The analogy of the *Sophistês* and *Politikus* (besides *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Leges*) farther shows, that there is nothing wonderful in finding the titles of Hipparchus and Minos derived from the subjects (*Περὶ Φιλοκερδοῦς* and *Περὶ Νόμου*), not from the name of one of the collocutors :—whether we suppose the titles to have been bestowed by Plato himself, or by some subsequent editor (Boeckh, p. 10).

To illustrate his first ground of objection—Dissimilarity between the *Minos* and the true Platonic writings—M. Boeckh enumerates (pp. 12-23) several passages of the dialogue which he considers unplatonic. Moreover, he includes among them (p. 12) examples of confused and illogical reasoning. I confess that to me this evidence is noway sufficient to prove that Plato is not the author. That certain passages may be picked out which are obscure, confused, inelegant—is certainly no sufficient evidence. If I thought so, I should go along with Ast in rejecting the *Euthydêmus*, *Menon*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Lysis*, &c., against all which Ast argues as spurious, upon evidence of the same kind. It is not too much to say, that against almost every one of the dialogues, taken severally, a case of the same kind, more or less plausible, might be made out. You might in each of them find passages peculiar, careless, awkwardly expressed. The expression *τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν ἀγέλην τοῦ σώματος*, which M. Boeckh insists upon so much as improper, would probably have been considered as a mere case of faulty text, if it had occurred in any other dialogue : and so it may fairly be considered in the *Minos*.

Moreover as to faults of logic and consistency in the reasoning, most certainly these cannot be held as proving the *Minos* not to be Plato's work. I would engage to produce, from most of his dialogues, defects of reasoning quite as grave as any which the *Minos* exhibits. On the principle assumed by M. Boeckh, every one who agreed with Panætius in considering the elaborate proof given in the *Phædon*, of the immortality of the soul, as illogical and delusive—would also agree with Panætius in declaring that the *Phædon* was not the work of Plato. It is one question, whether the reasoning in any dialogue be good or bad : it is another question, whether the dialogue be written by Plato or not. Unfortunately, the Platonic critics often treat the first question as if it determined the second.

M. Boeckh himself considers that the evidence arising from dissimilarity (upon which I have just dwelt) is not the strongest part of his case. He relies more upon the evidence arising from *too much simi-*

larity, as proving still more clearly the spuriousness of the Minos. "Jam pergamus ad alteram partem nostræ argumentationis, *eamque etiam firmiorem*, de *nimia similitudine* Platoniorum aliquot locorum, quæ imitationem doceat subesse. Nam de hoc quidem conveniet inter omnes doctos et indoctos, Platonem se ipsum haud posse imitari : nisi si quis dubitet de sanâ ejus mente" (p. 23). Again, p. 26, "Jam vero in nostro colloquio Symposium, Politicum, Euthyphronem, Protagoram, Gorgiam, Cratylum, Philëbum, dialogos expressos ac tantum non compilatos reperiēs". And M. Boeckh goes on to specify various passages of the Minos, which he considers to have been imitated, and badly imitated, from one or other of these dialogues.

I cannot agree with M. Boeckh in regarding this *nimia similitudo* as the strongest part of his case. On the contrary, I consider it as the weakest : because his own premisses (in my judgment) not only do not prove his conclusion, but go far to prove the opposite. When we find him insisting, in such strong language, upon the great analogy which subsists between the Minos and seven of the incontestable Platonic dialogues, this is surely a fair proof that its author is the same as their author. To me it appears as conclusive as internal evidence ever can be ; unless there be some disproof *aliunde* to overthrow it. But M. Boeckh produces no such disproof. He converts these analogies into testimony in his own favour, simply by bestowing upon them the name *imitatio*,—*stulla imitatio* (p. 27). This word involves an hypothesis, whereby the point to be proved is assumed—viz. : difference of authorship. "Plato cannot have imitated himself" (M. Boeckh observes). I cannot admit such impossibility, even if you describe the fact in that phrase : but if you say "Plato in one dialogue thought and wrote like Plato in another"—you describe the same fact in a different phrase, and it then appears not merely possible but natural and probable. Those very real analogies, to which M. Boeckh points in the word *imitatio*, are in my judgment cases of the Platonic thought in one dialogue being like the Platonic thought in another. The *similitudo*, between Minos and these other dialogues, can hardly be called *nimia*, for M. Boeckh himself points out that it is accompanied with much difference. It is a similitude, such as we should expect between one Platonic dialogue and another : with this difference, that whereas, in the Minos, Plato gives the same general views in a manner more brief, crude, abrupt—in the other dialogues he works them out with greater fulness of explanation and illustration, and some degree of change not unimportant. That there should be this amount of difference between one dialogue of Plato and another appears to me perfectly natural. On the other hand—that there should have been a

contemporary *falsarius* (scriptor miser, insulsus, vilissimus, to use phrases of M. Boeckh), who studied and pillaged the best dialogues of Plato, for the purpose of putting together a short and perverted abbreviation of them—and who contrived to get his miserable abbreviation recognised by the Byzantine Aristophanes among the genuine dialogues notwithstanding the existence of the Platonic school—this, I think highly improbable.

I cannot therefore agree with M. Boeckh in thinking, that “ubique se prodens Platonis imitatio” (p. 31) is an irresistible proof of spuriousness: nor can I think that his hypothesis shows itself to advantage, when he says, p. 10—“Ipse autem dialogus (Minos) quum post Politicum compositus sit, quod quædam in eo dicta rebus ibi expositis manifestè nitantur, ut paullo post ostendemus—quis est qui artificiosissimum philosophum, postquam ibi (in Politico) accuratius de naturâ legis egisset, de eâ iterum putet negligenter egisse?”—I do not think it so impossible as it appears to M. Boeckh, that a philosopher, after having *written* upon a given subject *accuratius*, should subsequently write upon it *negligenter*. But if I granted this ever so fully, I should still contend that there remains another alternative. The negligent workmanship may have preceded the accurate: an alternative which I think is probably the truth, and which has nothing to exclude it except M. Boeckh's pure hypothesis, that the Minos must have been copied from the Politikus.

While I admit then that the Hipparchus and Minos are among the inferior and earlier compositions of Plato, I still contend that there is no ground for excluding them from the list of his works. Though the Platonic critics of this century are for the most part of an adverse opinion, I have with me the general authority of the critics anterior to this century—from Aristophanes of Byzantium down to Bentley and Ruhnken—see Boeckh, pp. 7-32.

Yxem defends the genuineness of the Hipparchus—(Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, p. 8. Berlin, 1846).

CHAPTER XV.

THEAGES.

THIS is among the dialogues declared by Schleiermacher, Ast, Stallbaum, and various other modern critics, to be spurious and unworthy of Plato: the production of one who was not merely an imitator, but a bad and silly imitator.¹ Socher on the other hand defends the dialogue against them, reckoning it as a juvenile production of Plato.² The arguments which are adduced to prove its spuriousness appear to me altogether insufficient. It has some features of dissimilarity with that which we read in other dialogues—these the above-mentioned critics call un-Platonic: it has other features of similarity—these they call bad imitation by a *falsarius*: lastly, it is inferior, as a performance, to the best of the Platonic dialogues. But I am prepared to expect (and have even the authority of Schleiermacher for expecting) that some dialogues will be inferior to others. I also reckon with certainty, that between two dialogues, both genuine, there will be points of similarity as well as points of dissimilarity. Lastly, the critics find marks of a bad, recent, un-Platonic style: but Dionysius of Halikarnassus—a judge at least equally competent upon such a matter—found no such marks. He expressly cites the dialogue as the work of

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. pp. 220-225, "inceptus tenebrio," &c. Schleiermacher, Einleitung, part ii. v. iii. pp. 247-252. Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 406-407.

Ast speaks with respect (differing in this respect from the other two) of the Theages as a composition, though he does not believe it to be the work of

Plato. Schleiermacher also admits (see the end of his Einleitung) that the style in general has a good Platonic colouring, though he considers some particular phrases as un-Platonic.

² Socher, Ueber Platon, pp. 92-102. M. Cobet also speaks of it as a work of Plato (Novae Lectiones, &c., p. 624. Lugd. Bat. 1855).

Plato,¹ and explains the peculiar phraseology assigned to Demodokus by remarking, that the latter is presented as a person of rural habits and occupations.

Demodokus, an elderly man (of rank and landed property), and his youthful son Theagês, have come from their Deme to Athens, and enter into conversation with Sokrates: to whom the father explains, that Theagês has contracted, from the conversation of youthful companions, an extraordinary ardour for the acquisition of wisdom. The son has importuned his father to put him under the tuition of one of the Sophists, who profess to teach wisdom. The father, though not unwilling to comply with the request, is deterred by the difficulty of finding a good teacher and avoiding a bad one. He entreats the advice of Sokrates, who invites the young man to explain what it is that he wants, over and above the usual education of an Athenian youth of good family (letters, the harp, wrestling, &c.), which he has already gone through.²

Sokr.—You desire wisdom: but what kind of wisdom? That by which men manage chariots? or govern horses? or pilot ships? *Theag.*—No: that by which men are governed. *Sokr.*—But what men? those in a state of sickness—or those who are singing in a chorus—or those who are under gymnastic training? Each of

Persons of the dialogue—Sokrates, with Demodokus and Theagês, father and son. Theagês (the son), eager to acquire knowledge, desires to be placed under the teaching of a Sophist.

Sokrates questions Theagês, inviting him to specify what he wants.

¹ Dionys. Hal. *Ars Rhetor.* p. 405, Reiske. Compare Theagês, 121 D. *εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ παραβαίνοντες.*

In general, in discussions on the genuineness of any of the Platonic dialogues, I can do nothing but reply to the arguments of those critics who consider them spurious. But in the case of the Theagês there is one argument which tends to mark Plato positively as the author.

In the Theagês, p. 125, the senarius *σοφοὶ ῥήτορες τῶν σοφῶν οὐνοῦσις* is cited as a verse of Euripides. Now it appears that this is an error of memory, and that the verse really belongs to Sophocles, *iv Αἰαντὶ Δοκμῇ*. If the error had only appeared in this dialogue, Stallbaum would probably have cited it as one more instance of stupidity on the part of the *ineptus tenebrio* whom he supposes to have written the dia-

logue. But unfortunately the error does not belong to the Theagês alone. It is found also in the Republic (viii. 568 B), the most unquestionable of all the Platonic compositions. Accordingly, Schleiermacher tells us in his note that the *falsarius* of the Theagês has copied this error out of the above-named passage of the Republic of Plato (notes, p. 500).

This last supposition of Schleiermacher appears to me highly improbable. Since we know that the mistake is one made by Plato himself, surely we ought rather to believe that he made it in two distinct compositions. In other words, the occurrence of the same exact mistake in the Republic and the Theagês affords strong presumption that both are by the same author—Plato.

² Plato, Theagês, 122.

these classes has its own governor, who bears a special title, and belongs to a special art by itself—the medical, musical, gymnastic, &c. *Theag.*—No: I mean that wisdom by which we govern, not these classes alone, but all the other residents in the city along with them—professional as well as private—men as well as women.¹

Sokrates now proves to *Theagés*, that this function and power which he is desirous of obtaining, is, the function and power of a despot: and that no one can aid him in so culpable a project. I might yearn (says *Theagés*) for such despotic power over all: so probably would you and every other man. But it is not *that* to which I now aspire. I aspire to govern freemen, with their own consent; as was done by *Themistokles*, *Perikles*, *Kimón*, and other illustrious statesmen,² who have been accomplished in the political art.

Sokr.—Well, if you wished to become accomplished in the art of horsemanship, you would put yourself under able horsemen: if in the art of darting the javelin, under able darters. By parity of reasoning, since you seek to learn the art of statesmanship, you must frequent able statesmen.³

Theag.—No, *Sokrates*. I have heard of the language which you are in the habit of using to others. You pointed out to them that these eminent statesmen cannot train their own sons to be at all better than curriers: of course therefore they cannot do *me* any good.⁴

¹ Plato, *Theagés*, 124 A-B. Schleiermacher (*Kinleit.* p. 250) censures the prolixity of the inductive process in this dialogue, and the multitude of examples here accumulated to prove a general proposition obvious enough without proof. Let us grant this to be true; we cannot infer from it that the dialogue is not the work of Plato. By very similar arguments Socher endeavours to show that the *Sophistés* and the *Politikus* are not works of Plato, because in both these dialogues logical division and differentiation is accumulated with tiresome prolixity, and applied to most trivial subjects. But Plato himself (in *Politikus*, pp. 235-236) explains why he does so, and tells us that he wishes to familiarise his readers with logical subdivision and

classification as a process. In like manner I maintain that prolixity in the λόγοι ἐπαικτικοί is not to be held as proof of spurious authorship, any more than prolixity in the process of logical subdivision and classification.

I noticed the same objection in the case of the *First Alkibiadés*.

² Plato, *Theagés*, 126 A.

³ Plato, *Theagés*, 126 C.

⁴ Plato, *Theagés*, 126 D. Here again Stallbaum (p. 222) urges, among his reasons for believing the dialogue to be spurious—How absurd to represent the youthful *Theagés* as knowing what arguments *Sokrates* had addressed to others! But the youthful *Theastétus* is also represented as having heard from others the cross-examinations made by *Sokrates* (*Theastét.* 143 E). So like-

Sokr.—But what can your father do for you better than this, Theagès? What ground have you for complaining of him? He is prepared to place you under any one of the best and most excellent men of Athens, whichever of them you prefer. *Theag.*—Why will not you take me yourself, Sokrates? I look upon you as one of these men, and I desire nothing better.¹

one else.
Theagès re-
quests that
Sokrates
will himself
teach him.

Demodokus joins his entreaties with those of Theagès to prevail upon Sokrates to undertake this function. But Sokrates in reply says that he is less fit for it than Demodokus himself, who has exercised high political duties, with the esteem of every one: and that if practical statesmen are considered unfit, there are the professional Sophists, Prodikus, Gorgias, Polus, who teach many pupils, and earn not merely good pay, but also the admiration and gratitude of every one—of the pupils as well as their senior relatives.²

Sokr.—I know nothing of the fine things which these Sophists teach: I wish I did know. I declare everywhere, that I know nothing whatever except one small matter—what belongs to love. In that, I surpass every one else, past as well as present.³ *Theag.*—Sokrates is only mocking us. I know youths (of my own age and somewhat older), who were altogether worthless and inferior to every one, before they went to him; but who, after they had frequented his society, became in a short time superior to all their former rivals. The like will happen with me, if he will only consent to receive me.⁴

Sokrates
declares
that he is
not com-
petent to
teach—that
he knows
nothing ex-
cept about
matters
of love.
Theagès
maintains
that many
of his young
friends have
profited
largely by
the conver-
sation of
Sokrates.

Sokr.—You do not know how this happens; I will explain it to you. From my childhood, I have had a peculiar superhuman something attached to me by divine appointment: a voice, which, whenever it occurs, warns me to abstain from that which I am

Sokrates
explains
how this

wise the youthful sons of Lysimachus —(Lachès, 181 A); compare also Lysis, 211 A.

¹ Plato, Theagès, 127 A.

² Plato, Theagès, 127 D-E, 128 A.

³ Plato, Theagès, 128 B. ἀλλὰ καὶ

λέγω δήπου ἀεὶ, ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος πλὴν γε μικροῦ τινὸς μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτικῶν, τοῦτο μόντοι τὸ μάθημα παρ' ὀντοσύνης ποιοῦμαι δεινὸς εἶναι, καὶ τῶν προγεγε-
νότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν.

⁴ Plato, Theagès, 128 C.

has sometimes happened—He recites his experience of the divine sign or *Dæmon*.

prove what I say: and many persons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the Athenian armament at Syracuse.² My young friend Sannion is now absent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his departure, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him.

The *Dæmon* is favour-able to some persons, adverse to others. Upon this circumstance it depends how far any companion profits by the society of Sokrates. Aristeides has not learnt anything from Sokrates, yet has improved much by being near to him.

about to do, but never impels me.¹ Moreover, when any one of my friends mentions to me what he is about to do, if the voice shall then occur to me it is a warning for him to abstain. The examples of Charmides and Timarchus (here detailed by Sokrates) prove what I say: and many persons will tell you how truly I forewarned them of the ruin of the Athenian armament at Syracuse.² My young friend Sannion is now absent, serving on the expedition under Thrasyllus to Ionia: on his departure, the divine sign manifested itself to me, and I am persuaded that some grave calamity will befall him.

These facts I mention to you (Sokrates continues) because it is that same divine power which exercises paramount influence over my intercourse with companions.³ Towards many, it is positively adverse; so that I cannot even enter into companionship with them. Towards others, it does not forbid, yet neither does it co-operate: so that they derive no benefit from me. There are others again in whose case it co-operates; these are the persons to whom you allude, who make rapid progress.⁴ With some, such improvement is lasting: others, though they improve wonderfully while in my society, yet relapse into commonplace men when they leave me. Aristeides, for example (grandson of Aristeides the Just), was one of those who made rapid progress while he was with me. But he was forced to absent himself on military service; and on returning, he found as my companion Thucydides (son of Melesias), who however had quarrelled with me for some debate of the day before. I understand (said Aristeides to me) that Thucydides has taken offence and gives himself airs; he forgets what a poor creature he was, before he came to you.⁵ I

¹ Plato, Theages, 128 D. ἔστι γὰρ τι θεῖς μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἑμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρχόμενον δαιμόνιον· ἐστὶ δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἢ ὅταν γίνηται, αἰεί μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μάλιστ' ἀρτίστειν, τοῦτον ἀποτροπῇ, προτρέψει δὲ οὐδέποτε.

² Plato, Theages, 128.

³ Plato, Theages, 129 E. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰρηκά σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὐτῇ τοῦ δαιμονίου τοῦτον καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ' ἑμοὶ συνδιατρίβόντων τὸ

ἄπαν δύναται. πολλοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐναντιοῦται, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ τοῦτοις ἐφελκθῆναι μετ' ἑμοὺ διατρίβουσιν.

⁴ Plato, Theages, 129 E. οἷς δ' ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις, οἱτοὶ εἰσιν ἂν καὶ σὺ ᾗσθησαι· ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόσκειν.

⁵ Plato, Theages, 130 A-B. τί δαί; οὐκ οἶδεν, ἔφη, πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι, οἷον ἦν τὸ ἀνδράποδον;

myself, too, have fallen into a despicable condition. When I left you, I was competent to discuss with any one and make a good figure, so that I courted debate with the most accomplished men. Now, on the contrary, I avoid them altogether—so thoroughly am I ashamed of my own incapacity. Did the capacity (I, *Sokrates*, asked *Aristeides*) forsake you all at once, or little by little? Little by little, he replied. And when you possessed it (I asked), did you get it by learning from me? or in what other way? I will tell you, *Sokrates* (he answered), what seems incredible, yet is nevertheless true.¹ I never learnt from you any thing at all. You yourself well know this. But I always made progress, whenever I was along with you, even if I were only in the same house without being in the same room; but I made greater progress, if I was in the same room—greater still, if I looked in your face, instead of turning my eyes elsewhere—and the greatest of all, by far, if I sat close and touching you. But now (continued *Aristeides*) all that I then acquired has dribbled out of me.²

Sokr.—I have now explained to you, *Theagēs*, what it is to become my companion. If it be the pleasure of the God, you will make great and rapid progress: if not, not. Consider, therefore, whether it is not safer for you to seek instruction from some of those who are themselves masters of the benefits which they impart, rather than to take your chance of the result with me.³ *Theag.*—I shall be glad, *Sokrates*, to become your companion, and to make trial of this divine coadjutor. If he shows himself propitious, that will be the best of all: if not, we can then take counsel, whether I shall try to propitiate him by prayer, sacrifice, or any other means which the prophets may recommend—or whether I shall go to some other teacher.⁴

¹ Plato, *Theag.* 120 D. Ἠνίκα δέ σοι παρεγένετο (ἡ δύναμις), πότερον μαθόντι παρ' ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο, ἢ τινι ἄλλῃ τρόπῃ; Ἐγὼ σοι, ἔφη, ἐγὼ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἀπιστοῖν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθεῖς δέ. ἐγὼ γάρ, ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς οἶσθα· ἐπεδίδουν δὲ ὅποτε σοι συνέειν, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ μόνον οἰκίᾳ εἴην, μὴ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ οἰκίᾳ, &c.

² Plato, *Theag.* 130 E. πολὺ δὲ

μάλιστα καὶ πλείστον ἐπεδίδουν, ὅποτε παρ' αὐτὸν σε καθοίμην ἐχόμενός σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος. νῦν δέ, ἢ δ' ὅς, πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἡ εἰς ἐξέρηνην.

³ Plato, *Theag.* 130 E. Ὡρα οὖν μή σοι ἀσφαλιστοῖεν ἡ παρ' ἐκείνων τινι παιδεύεσθαι, οἱ ἡγεταῖς αὐτοὶ εἰσι τῆς ὠφελείας, ἢν ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, μᾶλλον ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὃ, τι ἐν τύχῃ, τοῦτο πρᾶξαι.

⁴ Plato, *Theag.* 131 A.

The Theagès figured in the list of Thrasyllus as first in the fifth Tetralogy : the other three members of the same Tetralogy being Charmidès, Lachès, Lysis. Some persons considered it suitable to read as first dialogue of all.¹ There are several points of analogy between the Theagès and the Lachès, though with a different turn given to them. Aristides and Thucydides are mentioned in both of them : Sokrates also is solicited to undertake the duty of teacher. The ardour of the young Theagès to acquire wisdom reminds us of Hippokrates at the beginning of the Protagoras. The string of questions put by Sokrates to Theagès, requiring that what is called wisdom shall be clearly defined and specialised, has its parallel in many of the Platonic dialogues. Moreover the declaration of Sokrates, that he knows nothing except about matters of love, but that in them he is a consummate master—is the same as what he explicitly declares both in the Symposium and other dialogues.²

But the chief peculiarity of the Theagès consists in the stress which is laid upon the Dæmon, the divine voice, the inspiration of Sokrates. This divine auxiliary is here described, not only as giving a timely check or warning to Sokrates, when either he or his friends contemplated any inauspicious project—but also as intervening, in the case of those youthful companions with whom he conversed, to promote the improvement of one, to obstruct that of others ; so that whether Sokrates will produce any effect or not in improving any one, depends neither upon his own efforts nor upon those of the recipient, but upon the unpredictable concurrence of a divine agency.³

Plato employs the Sokratic Dæmon, in the Theagès, for a philosophical purpose, which, I think, admits of reasonable explanation. During the eight (perhaps ten) years of his personal communion with Sokrates,

¹ Diog. L. iii. 59-61.

² Symposium, 177 E. οὐτε γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἐγὼ ἀποφύσαιμι, ὅς οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο ἐπιστάσθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρωτικά. Compare the same dialogue, p. 212 B, 216 C. Phædrus, 227 E, 257 A ; Lysis, 204 B. Compare also Xenoph. Memor. ii. 6, 28 ; Xenoph. Sympos. iv. 27.

It is not reasonable to treat this declaration of Sokrates, in the Theagès, as an evidence that the dialogue is the work of a *falsarius*, when a declaration quite similar is ascribed to Sokrates in other Platonic dialogues.

³ See some remarks on this point in Appendix.

he had had large experience of the variable and unaccountable effect produced by the Sokratic conversation upon different hearers: a fact which is also attested by the Xenophontic *Memorabilia*. This difference of effect was in no way commensurate to the intelligence of the hearers. Chærephon, Apollodôrus, Kriton, seem to have been ordinary men:—¹ while Kritias and Alkibiades, who brought so much discredit both upon Sokrates and his teaching, profited little by him, though they were among the ablest pupils that he ever addressed: moreover Antisthenes, and Aristippus, probably did not appear to Plato (since he greatly dissented from their philosophical views) to have profited much by the common companionship with Sokrates. Other companions there must have been also personally known to Plato, though not to us: for we must remember that Sokrates passed his whole day in talking with all listeners. Now when Plato in after life came to cast the ministry of Sokrates into dramatic scenes, and to make each scene subservient to the illustration of some philosophical point of view, at least a negative—he was naturally led to advert to the Dæmon or divine inspiration, which formed so marked a feature in the character of his master. The concurrence or prohibition of this divine auxiliary served to explain why it was that the seed, sown broadcast by Sokrates, sometimes fructified, and sometimes did not fructify, or speedily perished afterwards—when no sufficient explanatory peculiarity could be pointed out in the ground on which it fell. It gave an apparent reason for the perfect singularity of the course pursued by Sokrates: for his preternatural acuteness in one direction, and his avowed incapacity in another: for his mastery of the Elenchus, convicting men of ignorance, and his inability to supply them with knowledge: for his refusal to undertake the duties of a teacher. All these are mysterious features of the Sokratic character. The intervention of the Dæmon appears to afford an explanation, by converting them into religious mysteries: which, though it be no explanation at all, yet is equally efficacious by stopping the mouth of the questioner, and by making him believe that it is guilt and impiety to

render some explanation of the singularity and eccentricity of Sokrates, and of his unequal influence upon different companions.

¹ Xenophon, *Apol. Sokr.* 28. Ἄπολ- δ' ἄλλως δ' εὐήθης.—Plat. *Phædon*, 117 *λόγος*—ἐπιθυμίας μὲν ισχυρῶς αὐτοῦ, D.

ask for explanation—as Sokrates himself declared in regard to astronomical phenomena, and as Herodotus feels, when his narrative is crossed by strange religious legends.¹

In this manner, the Theagès is made by Plato to exhibit one way of parrying the difficulty frequently addressed to Sokrates by various hearers: "You tell us that the leading citizens cannot even teach their own sons, and that the Sophists teach nothing worth having: you perpetually call upon us to seek for better teachers, without telling us where such are to be found. We entreat you to teach us yourself, conformably to your own views."

Sokrates, while continually finding fault with other teachers, refused to teach himself. Difficulty of finding an excuse for his refusal. The Theagès furnishes an excuse.

If a leader of political opposition, after years employed in denouncing successive administrators as ignorant and iniquitous, refuses, when invited, to take upon himself the business of administration—an intelligent admirer must find some decent pretence to colour the refusal. Such a pretence is found for Sokrates in the Theagès: "I am not my own master on this point. I am the instrument of a divine ally, without whose active working I can accomplish nothing: who forbids altogether my teaching of one man—tolerates, without assisting, my unavailing lessons to another—assists efficaciously in my teaching of a third, in which case alone the pupil receives any real benefit. The assistance of this divine ally is given or withheld according to motives of his own, which I cannot even foretell, much less influence. I should deceive you therefore if I undertook to teach, when I cannot tell whether I shall do good or harm."

The reply of Theagès meets this scruple. He asks permission to make the experiment, and promises to propitiate the divine auxiliary by prayer and sacrifice: under which reserve Sokrates gives consent.

It is in this way that the Dæmon or divine auxiliary serves the purpose of reconciling what would otherwise be an inconsistency in the proceedings of Sokrates. I mean, that such is the purpose served in *this* dialogue: I know perfectly that Plato deals with the

Plato does not always, nor in other dialogues, allude to the divine sign

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 7, 5-6; Herodot. ii. 2, 45-46.

case differently elsewhere: but I am not bound (as in the same way. Its character and working essentially impenetrable. Sokrates a privileged person.) I have said more than once) to force upon all the dialogues one and the same point of view. That the agency of the Gods was often and in the most important cases, essentially undiscoverable and unpredictable, and that in such cases they might sometimes be prevailed on to give special warnings to favoured persons—were doctrines which the historical Sokrates in Xenophon asserts with emphasis.¹ The Dæmon of Sokrates was believed, both by himself and his friends, to be a special privilege and an extreme case of divine favour and communication to him.² It was perfectly applicable to the scope of the Theagês, though Plato might not choose always to make the same employment of it. It is used in the same general way in the Theætétus;³ doubtless with less expansion, and blended with another analogy (that of the mid-wife) which introduces a considerable difference.⁴

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 8-9-10.
Euripid. Hecub. 944.

φύρουσι δ' αὐτὰ θεοὶ πάλιν τε καὶ
πρόσω,
ταραγμὸν ἐντιθέντες, ὡς ἀγνωσίᾳ
σέβωμεν αὐτούς.

² Xenoph. Mem. iv. 8, 12.

³ Plato, Theætét. 150 D-E.

⁴ Plato, Apolog. Sokr. 83 C. ἐμοὶ
δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέταται

ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων
καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ἥπέρ
τίς ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπων
καὶ ὁτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν. 40 A.
ἡ γὰρ εἰσθυιά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαι-
μονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ παντὶ
πάνυ πυκνὴ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ
ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιοῦν μὲν,
εἴ τι μίλλοιμι μὴ ὁρθῶς πράττειν. Com-
pare Xenophon, Memor. iv. 8, 5; Apol.
Sokr. c. 13.

APPENDIX.

Τὸ δαιμόνιον σημείον.

Here is one of the points most insisted on by Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, as proving that the Theagès is not the work of Plato. These critics affirm (to use the language of Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 220) "Quam Plato alias de Socratis dæmonio prodidit sententiam, ea longissimè recedit ab illâ ratione, quæ in hoc sermone exposita est". He says that the representation of the Dæmon of Sokrates, given in the Theagès, has been copied from a passage in the Theætétus, by an imitator who has not understood the passage, p. 150, D, E. But Socher (p. 97) appears to me to have shown satisfactorily, that there is no such material difference as these critics affirm between this passage of the Theætétus and the Theagès. In the Theætétus, Sokrates declares, that none of his companions learnt any thing from him, but that all of them οἷονπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη (the very same term is used at the close of the Theagès—131 A, εἰς μὲν παρείκη ἡμῖν—τὸ δαιμόνιον) made astonishing progress and improvement in his company. Stallbaum says, "Itaque ὁ θεός, qui ibi memoratur, non est Socratis dæmonium, sed potius deus i. e. sors divina. Quod non perspicuus noster tenebrius protenus illud dæmonium, quod Sokrates sibi semper adesse dictitabat, ad eum dignitatis et potentis gradum evehit, ut, &c." I agree with Socher in thinking that the phrase ὁ θεός in the Theætétus has substantially the same meaning as τὸ δαιμόνιον in the Theagès. Both Schleiermacher (Notes on the Apology, p. 432) and Ast (p. 482), have notes on the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον—and I think the note of Ast is the more instructive of the two. In Plato and Xenophon, the words τὸ δαιμόνιον, τὸ θεῖον, are in many cases undistinguishable in meaning from ὁ δαίμων, ὁ θεός. Compare the Phædrus, 242 E, about θεός and θεῖον τ. Sokrates, in his argument against Meletus in the Apology (p. 27) emphatically argues that no man could believe in any thing δαιμόνιον, without also believing in δαίμονες. The special θεῖον τ. καὶ

δαιμόνιον (Apol. p. 31 C), which presented itself in regard to him and his proceedings, was only one of the many modes in which (as he believed) ὁ θεός commanded and stimulated him to work upon the minds of the Athenians:—ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέταται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντιῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ᾧπέρ τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλη θεία μοῖρα ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ δτιοῦν προσέταξε πράττειν (Apol. p. 33 C). So again in Apol. p. 40 A, B, ἡ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου—and four lines afterwards we read the very same fact intimated in the words, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον, where Sokratis dæmonium—and Deus—are identified: thus refuting the argument above cited from Stallbaum. There is therefore no such discrepancy, in reference to τὸ δαιμόνιον, as Stallbaum and Schleiermacher contend for. We perceive indeed this difference between them—that in the Theætétus, the simile of the obstetric art is largely employed, while it is not noticed in the Theagês. But we should impose an unwarrantable restriction upon Plato's fancy, if we hindered him from working out his variety and exuberance of metaphors, and from accommodating each dialogue to the metaphor predominant with him at the time.

Moreover, in respect to what is called the Dæmon of Sokrates, we ought hardly to expect that either Plato or Xenophon would always be consistent even with themselves. It is unsafe for a modern critic to determine beforehand, by reason or feelings of his own, in what manner either of them would speak upon this mysterious subject. The belief and feeling of a divine intervention was very real on the part of both, but their manner of conceiving it might naturally fluctuate: and there was, throughout all the proceedings of Sokrates, a mixture of the serious and the playful, of the sublime and the eccentric, of ratiocinative acuteness with impulsive superstition—which it is difficult to bring into harmonious interpretation. Such heterogeneous mixture is forcibly described in the Platonic Symposium, pp. 215-222. When we consider how undefined, and undefinable, the idea of this δαιμόνιον was, we cannot wonder if Plato ascribes to it different workings and manifestations at different times. Stallbaum affirms that it is made ridiculous in the Theagês: and Kühner declares that Plutarch makes it ridiculous, in his treatise De Genio Sokratis (Comm. ad. Xenoph. Memor. p. 23). But this is because its agency is described more in detail. You can easily present it in a ridiculous aspect, by introducing it as intervening on petty and insignificant matters. Now it is remarkable, that in the Apology, we are expressly told that it actually did intervene on the most trifling occasions—πάνυ

ἐπὶ συμφοῖς ἐναρτιούμενη. The business of an historian of philosophy is, to describe it as it was really felt and believed by Sokrates and Plato—whether a modern critic may consider the description ridiculous or not.

When Schleiermacher says (Einleitung, p. 248), respecting the *falsarius* whom he supposes to have written the Theagès—"Damit ist ihm begegnet, auf eine höchst verkehrte Art wunderbar zusammenzurühren diese göttliche Schickung, und jenes persönliche Vorgefühl welches dem Sokrates zur göttlichen Stimme ward".—I contend that the mistake is chargeable to Schleiermacher himself, for bisecting into two phenomena that which appears in the *Apology* as the same phenomenon under two different names—τὸ δαιμόνιον—τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον. Besides, to treat the Dæmon as a mere "personal presentiment" of Sokrates, may be a true view:—but it is the view of one who does not inhale the same religious atmosphere as Sokrates, Plato, and Xenophon. It cannot therefore be properly applied in explaining their sayings or doings. Kühner, who treats the Theagès as not composed by Plato, grounds this belief partly on the assertion, that the δαιμόνιον of Sokrates is described therein as something peculiar to Sokrates; which, according to Kühner, was the fiction of a subsequent time. By Sokrates and his contemporaries (Kühner says) it was considered "non sibi soli tanquam proprium quoddam beneficium a Diis tributum, sed commune sibi esse cum cæteris hominibus" (pp. 20-21). I dissent entirely from this view, which is contradicted by most of the passages noticed even by Kühner himself. It is at variance with the Platonic *Apology*, as well as with the *Theætétus* (150 D), and *Republic* (vi. 496 C). Xenophon does indeed try, in the first Chapter of the *Memorabilia*, as the defender of Sokrates, to soften the *invidia* against Sokrates, by intimating that other persons had communications from the Gods as well as he. But we see plainly, even from other passages of the *Memorabilia*, that this was not the persuasion of Sokrates himself, nor of his friends, nor of his enemies. They all considered it (as it is depicted in the Theagès also) to be a special privilege and revelation.

CHAPTER XVI.

ERASTÆ OR ANTERASTÆ—RIVALES.

THE main subject of this short dialogue is—What is philosophy ? ἡ φιλοσοφία—τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. How are we to explain or define it ? What is its province and purport ?

Instead of the simple, naked, self-introducing, conversation, which we read in the Menon, Hipparchus, Minos, &c., Sokrates recounts a scene and colloquy, which occurred when he went into the house of Dionysius the grammarist or school-master,¹ frequented by many elegant and high-born youths as pupils. Two of these youths were engaged in animated debate upon some geometrical or astronomical problem, in the presence of various spectators ; and especially of two young men, rivals for the affection of one of them. Of these rivals, the one is a person devoted to music, letters, discourse, philosophy :—the other hates and despises these pursuits, devoting himself to gymnastic exercise, and bent on acquiring the maximum of athletic force.² It is much the same contrast as that between the brothers Amphion and Zethus in the Antiope of Euripides— which is beautifully employed as an illustration by Plato in the Gorgias.³

As soon as Sokrates begins his interrogatories, the two youths relinquish⁴ their geometrical talk, and turn to him as attentive listeners. Their approach affects his emotions hardly less than those of the Erastes. He first

Erastes—
Subject and
persons of
the dialogue
—Dramatic
introduc-
tion—inter-
esting
youths in
the pale-
stra.

Two rival
Erastes—
one of them
literary, de-

¹ Plato, Erastes, 132. εἰς Διονυσίου τοῦ γραμματιστοῦ εἰσέλθων, καὶ εἶδον αὐτὸς τῶν τε νέων τοὺς ἐπικεισμένους δοκοῦντας εἶναι τὴν ἰδίαν καὶ πατέρων εὐδοκίμων καὶ τούτων ἑραστές.

² Plato, Erast. 132 E.

³ Plato, Gorgias, 485-486. Compare

Cicero De Oratore, ii. 37, 156.

⁴ The powerful sentiment of admiration ascribed to Sokrates in the presence of these beautiful youths deserves notice as a point in his character. Compare the beginning of the Charmides and the Lysis.

voted to philosophy—the other gymnastic, hating philosophy.

enquires from the athletic Erastes, What is it that these two youths are so intently engaged upon? It must surely be something very fine, to judge by the eagerness which they display? How do you mean *fine* (replies the athlete)? They are only prozing about astronomical matters—talking nonsense—philosophising! The literary rival, on the contrary, treats this athlete as unworthy of attention, speaks with enthusiastic admiration of philosophy, and declares that all those to whom it is repugnant are degraded specimens of humanity.

Sokr.—You think philosophy a fine thing? But you cannot

Question put by Sokrates, What is philosophy? It is the perpetual accumulation of knowledge, so as to make the largest sum total.

tell whether it is fine or not, unless you know what it is?¹ Pray explain to me what philosophy is. *Erast.*

—I will do so readily. Philosophy consists in the perpetual growth of a man's knowledge—in his going on perpetually acquiring something new, both in youth and old age, so that he may learn as much as possible during life. Philosophy is polymathy.² *Sokr.*—You think philosophy not only a fine thing, but good?

Erast.—Yes—very good. *Sokr.*—But is the case similar in regard to gymnastic? Is a man's bodily condition benefited by taking as much exercise, or as much nourishment, as possible? Is such very great quantity good for the body?³

It appears after some debate (in which the other or athletic

In the case of the body, it is not the maximum of exercise which does good, but the proper, measured, quantity. For the mind

Erastes sides with Sokrates⁴) that in regard to exercise and food, it is not the great quantity, or the small quantity, which is good for the body—but the moderate or measured quantity.⁵ For the mind, the case is admitted to be similar. Not the *much*, nor the *little*, of learning is good for it—but the right or measured amount. *Sokr.*—And who is the competent judge,

¹ Plat. *Erast.* 133 A-B.

² Plato, *Erast.* 133 D. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν—πολυμάθειαν.

³ Plat. *Erast.* 133 E.

⁴ Plat. *Erast.* 134 B-C. The literary Erastes says to Sokrates, "To you I have no objection to concede this point, and to admit that my previous answer must be modified. But if I were to debate the point only with Aim (the

athletic rival), I could perfectly well have defended my answer, and even a worse answer still, for he is quite worthless (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐστίν)."

This is a curious passage, illustrating the dialectic habits of the day, and the pride felt in maintaining an answer once given.

⁵ Plato, *Erastes*, 134 B-D. τὰ μέτρια μέγιστα ὠφελεῖν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰ πολλὰ μὲν τὰ ὀλίγα.

how much of either is right measure for the body?

Erast.—The physician and the gymnastic trainer.

Sokr.—Who is the competent judge, how much seed is right measure for sowing a field? *Erast.*—The farmer.

Sokr.—Who is the competent judge, in reference to the sowing and planting of knowledge in the mind, which varieties are good, and how much of each is right measure?

also, it is not the maximum of knowledge, but the measured quantity which is good. Who is the judge to determine this measure?

The question is one which none of the persons present can answer.¹ None of them can tell who is the special referee, about training of mind; corresponding to the physician or the farmer in the analogous cases. Sokrates then puts a question somewhat different: *Sokr.*

—Since we have agreed, that the man who prosecutes philosophy ought not to learn many things, still less all things—what is the best conjecture that we can make, respecting the matters which he ought to learn?

Erast.—The finest and most suitable acquirements for him to aim at, are those which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher. He ought to appear accomplished in every variety of science, or at least in all the more important; and with that view, to learn as much of each as becomes a freeman to

No answer given. What is the best conjecture? Answer of the literary Erastes. A man must learn that which will yield to him the greatest reputation as a philosopher—as much as will enable him to talk like an intelligent critic, though not to practise.

know:—that is, what belongs to the intelligent critic, as distinguished from the manual operative: to the planning and superintending architect, as distinguished from the working carpenter.²

Sokr.—But you cannot learn even two different arts to this extent—much less several considerable arts. *Erast.*—I do not of course mean that the philosopher can be supposed to know each of them accurately, like the artist himself—but only as much as may be expected from the free and cultivated citizen. That is, he shall be able to appreciate, better than other hearers, the observations made by the artist: and farther to deliver a reasonable opinion of his own, so as to be accounted, by all the hearers, more accomplished in the affairs of the art than themselves.³

Sokr.—You mean that the philosopher is to be second-best in

¹ Plato, *Erast.* 134 E, 135 A.

ἐχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

² Plat. *Erast.* 135 B. ὅσα φύριοντες

³ Plat. *Erast.* 135 D.

The philosopher is one who is second-best in several different arts—a Pentathlus—who talks well upon each.

to neglect all others: he attends to all of them in reasonable measure.¹

Upon this answer Sokrates proceeds to cross-examine:—*Sokr.*

On what occasions can such second-best men be useful? There are always regular practitioners at hand, and no one will call in the second-best man when he can have the regular practitioner.

Do you think that good men are useful, bad men

useless? *Erast.*—Yes—I do. *Sokr.*—You think that philosophers, as you describe them, are useful?

Erast.—Certainly: extremely useful. *Sokr.*—But tell me on what occasions such second-best men are

useful: for obviously they are inferior to each separate artist. If you fall sick will you send for one of *them*, or for a professional physician? *Erast.*—

I should send for both. *Sokr.*—That is no answer: I wish to know, which of the two you will send for,

first and by preference? *Erast.*—No doubt—I shall

send for the professional physician. *Sokr.*—The like also, if you are in danger on shipboard, you will entrust your life to the pilot rather than to the philosopher: and so as to all other matters, as long as a professional man is to be found, the philosopher is of no use? *Erast.*—So it appears. *Sokr.*—Our philosopher then is one of the useless persons: for we assuredly have professional men at hand. Now we agreed before, that good men were useful, bad men useless.² *Erast.*—Yes; that was agreed.

Sokr.—If then you have correctly defined a philosopher to be one who has a second-rate knowledge on many subjects, he is useless so long as there exist professional artists on each subject. Your definition cannot therefore be correct. Philosophy must be something quite apart from this multifarious and busy meddling with

¹ Plat. *Erast.* 135 E, 136 A. καὶ οὗτοι γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὑπακρὸν τινα ἀνδρα τὸν ἀφιλοσοφηκότα. The five matches were leaping, running, throw-

ing the quoit and the javelin, wrestling.

² Plat. *Erast.* 136 B. ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφάρθαι.

³ Plat. *Erast.* 136 C-D.

different professional subjects, or this multiplication of learned acquirements. Indeed I fancied, that to be absorbed in professional subjects and in variety of studies, was vulgar and discreditable rather than otherwise.¹

Let us now, however (continues Sokrates), take up the matter in another way. In regard to horses and dogs, those who punish rightly are also those who know how to make them better, and to discriminate with most exactness the good from the bad? *Erast.*—Yes: such is the fact.

Sokr.—Is not the case similar with men? Is it not the same art, which punishes men rightly, makes them better, and best distinguishes the good from the bad? whether applied to one, few, or many? *Erast.*—It is so.² *Sokr.*—The art or science, whereby men punish evil-doers rightly, is the judicial or justice: and it is by the same that they know the good apart from the bad, either one or many. If any man be a stranger to this art, so as not to know good men apart from bad, is he not also ignorant of himself, whether he be a good or a bad man? *Erast.*—Yes: he is. *Sokr.*—To be ignorant of yourself, is to be wanting in sobriety or temperance; to know yourself is to be sober or temperate. But this is the same art as that by which we punish rightly—or justice. Therefore justice and temperance are the same: and the Delphian rescript, *Know thyself*, does in fact enjoin the practice both of justice and of sobriety.³ *Erast.*—So it appears. *Sokr.*—Now it is by this same art, when practised by a king, rightly punishing evil-doers, that cities are well governed; it is by the same art practised by a private citizen or house-master, that the house is well-governed: so that this art, justice or sobriety, is at the same time political, regal, economical; and the just and sober man is at once the true king, statesman, house-master.⁴ *Erast.*—I admit it.

Sokr.—Now let me ask you. You said that it was discreditable for the philosopher, when in company with a physician or any other craftsman talking about matters of his own craft, not to be able to follow what he said

Sokrates changes his course of examination. Questions put to show that there is one special art, regal and political, of administering and discriminating the bad from the good.

In this art the philosopher must not only be

¹ Plato, *Erast.* 137 B.

² Plato, *Erast.* 137 C-D.

³ Plato, *Erast.* 138 A.

⁴ Plato, *Erast.* 138 C.

second-best, competent to talk—but he must be a fully qualified practitioner, competent to act. and comment upon it. Would it not also be discreditable to the philosopher, when listening to any king, judge, or house-master, about professional affairs, not to be able to understand and comment? *Erast.*—Assuredly it would be most discreditable upon matters of such grave moment. *Sokr.*—Shall we say then, that upon these matters also, as well as all others, the philosopher ought to be a Pentathlus or second-rate performer, useless so long as the special craftsman is at hand? or shall we not rather affirm, that he must not confide his own house to any one else, nor be the second-best within it, but must himself judge and punish rightly, if his house is to be well administered? *Erast.*—That too I admit.¹ *Sokr.*—Farther, if his friends shall entrust to him the arbitration of their disputes,—if the city shall command him to act as Dikast or to settle any difficulty,—in those cases also it will be disgraceful for him to stand second or third, and not to be first-rate? *Erast.*—I think it will be. *Sokr.*—You see then, my friend, philosophy is something very different from much learning and acquaintance with multifarious arts or sciences.²

Upon my saying this (so Sokrates concludes his recital of the Close of the conversation) the literary one of the two rivals was ashamed and held his peace; while the gymnastic rival declared that I was in the right, and the other hearers also commended what I had said.

Close of the
dialogue—
Humilia-
tion of the
literary
Erastes.

The antithesis between the philo-gymnast, hater of philosophy, —and the enthusiastic admirer of philosophy, who nevertheless cannot explain what it is—gives much point and vivacity to this short dialogue. This last person is exhibited as somewhat presumptuous and confident; thus affording a sort of excuse for the humiliating

Remarks—
Animated
manner of
the dia-
logue.

¹ Plato, *Erast.* 138 E. Πότερον οὐν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, τὰ δευτερεία ἔχοντα πάντων, τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι, ὥς ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ; ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὐτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλῃ ἐντροπείᾳ οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεία ἐν τούτῳ ἐκτείν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν κολαστίον διεκάζοντα ὁρθῶς, εἰ μᾶλλον εὐ οἰκίσθαι αὐτοῦ ἢ οἰκία;

² Plato, *Erast.* 139 A. Πελοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὃ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμάθειά τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία.

cross-examination put upon him by Sokrates to the satisfaction of his stupid rival. Moreover, the dramatic introduction is full of animation, like that of the Charmidès and Lysis.

Besides the animated style of the dialogue, the points raised for discussion in it are of much interest. The word philosophy has at all times been vague and ambiguous. Certainly no one before Sokrates—probably no one before Plato—ever sought a definition of it. In no other Platonic dialogue than this, is the definition of it made a special topic of research.

It is here handled in Plato's negative, elenchtic, tentative, manner. By some of his contemporaries, philosophy was really considered as equivalent to polymathy, or to much and varied knowledge: so at least Plato represents it as being considered by Hippias the Sophist, contrary to the opinion of Protagoras.¹ The exception taken by Sokrates to a definition founded on simple quantity, without any standard point of sufficiency by which much or little is to be measured, introduces that governing idea of τὸ μέτριον (the moderate, that which conforms to a standard measure) upon which Plato insists so much in other more elaborate dialogues. The conception of a measure, of a standard of measurement—and of conformity thereunto, as the main constituent of what is good and desirable—stands prominent in his mind,² though it is not always handled in the same way. We have seen it, in the Second Alkibiadès, indicated under another name as knowledge of Good or of the Best: without which, knowledge on special matters was declared to be hurtful rather than useful.³ Plato considers that this Measure is neither discernible nor applicable except by a specially trained intelligence. In the Erastæ as elsewhere, such an intelligence is called for in general terms: but when it is asked, Where is the person possessing such intelligence, available in the case of mental training—neither Sokrates nor any one else can point him out. To suggest a question, and direct

Definition of philosophy—here sought for the first time—Platonic conception of measure—reference not discovered.

¹ Plato, Protag. 318 E. Compare, too, the Platonic dialogues, Hippias Major and Minor.

² See about ἡ τοῦ μετρίου φύσις, as οὐσία—as ἔσθως γινόμενον.—Plato, Politikos, 283-284. Compare also the

Philébus, p. 64 D, and the Protagoras, pp. 356-357, where ἡ μετρίτης τέχνη is declared to be the principal saviour of life and happiness.

³ Plato, Alkib. ii. 145-146; supra, ch. xii. p. 16.

attention to it, yet still to leave it unanswered—is a practice familiar with Plato. In this respect the Erastæ is like other dialogues. The answer, if any, intended to be understood or divined, is, that such an intelligence is the philosopher himself.

The second explanation of philosophy here given—that the philosopher is one who is second-best in many departments, and a good talker upon all, but inferior to the special master in each—was supposed by Thrasyllus in ancient times to be pointed at Demokritus. By many Platonic critics, it is referred to those persons whom they single out to be called Sophists. I conceive it to be applicable (whether intended or not) to the literary men generally of that age, the persons called Sophists included. That which Perikles expressed by the word, when he claimed the love of wisdom and the love of beauty as characteristic features of the Athenian citizen—referred chiefly to the free and abundant discussion, the necessity felt by every one for talking over every thing before it was done, yet accompanied with full energy in action as soon as the resolution was taken to act.¹ Speech, ready and pertinent, free conflict of opinion on many different topics—was the manifestation and the measure of knowledge acquired. Sokrates passed his life in talking, with every one indiscriminately, and upon each man's particular subject; often perplexing the artist himself. Xenophon recounts conversations with various professional men—a painter, a sculptor, an armourer—and informs us that it was instructive to all of them, though Sokrates was no practitioner in any craft.² It was not merely Demokritus, but Plato and Aristotle also, who talked or wrote upon almost every subject included in contemporary observation. The voluminous works of Aristotle,—the *Timæus*, *Republic*, and *Leges*, of Plato,—embrace a large variety of subjects, on each of which, severally taken, these two great men were second-best or inferior to some special proficient. Yet both of them had judgments to give,

¹ Thucyd. II. 39 fin.—40. καὶ ἐν τοῖς τούτοις τὴν πόλιν ἀξίαν εἶναι θαυμάζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπὶ ἐν ἄλλοις. φιλοκαλούμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἀνευ μαλακίας, &c., and the remarkable sequel

of the same chapter about the intimate conjunction of abundant speech with energetic action in the Athenian character.

² Xen. Mem. III. 10; III. 11; III. 12.

which it was important to hear, upon all subjects :¹ and both of them could probably talk better upon each than the special proficient himself. Aristotle, for example, would write better upon rhetoric than Demosthenes—upon tragedy, than Sophokles. Undoubtedly, if an oration or a tragedy were to be composed—if resolution or action were required on any real state of particular circumstances—the special proficient would be called upon to act : but it would be a mistake to infer from hence, as the Platonic Sokrates intimates in the *Erastæ*, that the second-best, or theorizing reasoner, was a useless man. The theoretical and critical point of view, with the command of language apt for explaining and defending it, has a value of its own ; distinct from, yet ultimately modifying and improving, the practical. And such comprehensive survey and comparison of numerous objects, without having the attention exclusively fastened or enslaved to any one of them, deserves to rank high as a variety of intelligence—whether it be adopted as the definition of a philosopher, or not.

Plato undoubtedly did not conceive the definition of the philosopher in the same way as Sokrates. The close of the *Erastæ* is employed in opening a distant and dim view of the Platonic conception. We are given to understand, that the philosopher has a province of his own, wherein he is not second-best, but a first-rate actor and adviser. To indicate, in many different ways, that there is or must be such a peculiar, appertaining to philosophy—distinct from, though analogous to, the peculiar of each several art—is one leading purpose in many Platonic dialogues. But what is the peculiar of the philosopher? Here, as elsewhere, it is marked out in a sort of misty outline, not as by one who already knows and is familiar with it, but as one who is trying to find it without being sure that he has succeeded. Here, we have it described as the art of discriminating good from evil, governing, and applying penal sanctions rightly. This is the supreme art or

Plato's view
—that the
philosopher
has a province
special to
himself,
distinct
from other
specialties
—dimly indicated—
regal or political art.

¹ The *πύραβλος* or *ὕπακρος*, whom Plato criticises in this dialogue, coincides with what Aristotle calls "the man of universal education or culture".—*Ethic. Nikem.* I. i. 1095, a. 1.

ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτὴς· καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα, ὃ πεπαιδευμένος· ἄλλως δέ, ὃ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος.

science, of which the philosopher is the professor ; and in which, far from requiring advice from others, he is the only person competent both to advise and to act : the art which exercises control over all other special arts, directing how far, and on what occasions, each of them comes into appliance. It is philosophy, looked at in one of its two aspects : not as a body of speculative truth, to be debated, proved, and discriminated from what cannot be proved or can be disproved—but as a critical judgment bearing on actual life, prescribing rules or giving directions in particular cases, with a view to the attainment of foreknown ends, recognised as *expetenda*.¹ This is what Plato understands by the measuring or calculating art, the regal or political art, according as we use the language of the Protagoras, Politikus, Euthydēmus, Republic. Both justice and sobriety are branches of this art ; and the distinction between the two loses its importance when the art is considered as a whole—as we find both in the Erastæ and in the Republic.²

Here, in the Erastæ, this conception of the philosopher as the supreme artist controlling all other artists, is darkly indicated and crudely sketched. We shall find the same conception more elaborately illustrated in other dialogues ; yet never passing out of that state of dreamy grandeur which characterises Plato as an expositor.

¹ The difference between the second explanation of philosophy and the third explanation, suggested in the Erastæ, will be found to coincide pretty nearly with the distinction which Aristotle takes much pains to draw between σοφία and φρόνησις.—Ethic. Nikomach.

vi. 5, pp. 1140-1141; also Ethic. Magn. i. pp. 1197-1198.

² See Republic, iv. 433 A ; Gorgias, 526 C ; Charmidēs, 164 B ; and Heindorf's note on the passage in the Charmidēs.

APPENDIX.

This is one of the dialogues declared to be spurious by Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, and Stallbaum,—all of them critics of the present century. In my judgment, their grounds for such declaration are altogether inconclusive. They think the dialogue an inferior composition, unworthy of Plato; and they accordingly find reasons, more or less ingenious, for relieving Plato from the discredit of it. I do not think so meanly of the dialogue as they do; but even if I did, I should not pronounce it to be spurious, without some evidence bearing upon that special question. No such evidence, of any value, is produced.

It is indeed contended, on the authority of a passage in Diogenes (ix. 37), that Thrasyllus himself doubted of the authenticity of the Erastæ. The passage is as follows, in his life of Demokritus—*εἴπερ οἱ Ἀντερασταὶ Πλάτωνός εἰσι, φησὶ Θράσυλλος, οὗτος ἂν εἴη ὁ παραγενόμενος ἀνώνυμος, τῶν περὶ Οἰνοπίδην καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν ἕτερος, ἐν τῇ πρὸς Σωκράτην ὁμιλίᾳ διαλεγόμενος περὶ φιλοσοφίας· ὃ, φησὶν, ὡς πεντάβληφ ἔοικεν ὁ φιλόσοφος· καὶ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ πένταβλος* (Demokritus).

Now in the first place, Schleiermacher and Stallbaum both declare that Thrasyllus can never have said that which Diogenes here makes him say (Schleierm. p. 510; Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad. Erast. p. 266, and not. p. 273).

Next, it is certain that Thrasyllus did consider it the undoubted work of Plato, for he enrolled it in his classification, as the third dialogue in the fourth tetralogy (Diog. L. iii. 59).

Yxem, who defends the genuineness of the Erastæ (Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, pp. 6-7, Berlin, 1846), insists very properly on this point; not merely as an important fact in itself, but as determining the sense of the words *εἴπερ οἱ Ἀντερασταὶ Πλάτωνός εἰσι*, and as showing that the words rather affirm, than deny, the authenticity of the dialogue. "If the Anterastæ are the work of Plato, *as they are universally admitted to be*." You must supply the parenthesis in this way, in order to make Thrasyllus consistent with himself. Yxem cites a passage

from Galen, in which *εἴπερ* is used, and in which the parenthesis must be supplied in the way indicated: no doubt at all being meant to be hinted. And I will produce another passage out of Diogenes himself, where *εἴπερ* is used in the same way; not as intended to convey the smallest doubt, but merely introducing the premiss for a conclusion immediately following. Diogenes says, respecting the Platonic Ideas, *εἴπερ ἐστὶ μνήμη, τὰς ἰδέας ἐν τοῖς οὖσις ὑπάρχειν* (iii. 15). He does not intend to suggest any doubt whether there be such a fact as memory. *Εἴπερ* is sometimes the equivalent of *ἐπειδήπερ*: as we learn from Hermann ad Viger. VIII. 6, p. 512.

There is therefore no fair ground for supposing that Thrasyllus doubted the genuineness of the Erastæ. And when I read what modern critics say in support of their verdict of condemnation, I feel the more authorised in dissenting from it. I will cite a passage or two from Stallbaum.

Stallbaum begins his Prolegomena as follows, pp. 205-206: "Quamquam hic libellus genus dicendi habet purum, castum, elegans, nihil ut inveniri queat quod à Platonis aut Xenophontis elegantia abhorreat—tamen quin à Boeckhio, Schleiermachers, Astio, Sochero, Knebelio, aliis jure meritoque pro suppositicio habitus sit, haudquaquam dubitamus. Est enim materia operis adeo non ad Platonis mentem rationemque elaborata, ut potius cuivis alii Socraticorum quam huic rectè adscribi posse videatur."

After stating that the Erastæ may be divided into two principal sections, Stallbaum proceeds:—"Neutra harum partium ita tractata est, ut nihil desideretur, quod ad justam argumenti explicationem merito requiras—nihil inculcatum reperiatur, quod vel alio modo illustratum vel omnino omisum esse cupias".

I call attention to this sentence as a fair specimen of the grounds upon which the Platonic critics proceed when they strike dialogues out of the Platonic Canon. If there be anything wanting in it which is required for what they consider a proper setting forth of the argument—if there be anything which they would desire to see omitted or otherwise illustrated—this is with them a reason for deciding that it is not Plato's work. That is, if there be any defects in it of any kind, it cannot be admitted as Plato's work;—*his genuine works have no defects*. I protest altogether against this *ratio decidendi*. If I acknowledged it and applied it consistently I should strike out every dialogue in the Canon. Certainly, the presumption in favour of the Catalogue of Thrasyllus must be counted as *nil*, if it will not outweigh such feeble counter-arguments as these.

One reason given by Stallbaum for considering the Erastæ as spurious is, that the Sophists are not derided in it. "Quis est igitur, qui Platonem sibi persuadeat illos non fuisse castigatum, et omnino non significatum, quinam illi essent, adversus quos hanc disputationem instituisset?" It is strange to be called on by learned men to strike out all dialogues from the Canon in which there is no derision of the Sophists. Such derision exists already in excess: we hear until we are tired how mean it is to receive money for lecturing. Again, Stallbaum says that the persons whose opinions are here attacked are not specified by name. But who are the *εἰδῶν φιλοὶ* attacked in the *Sophistæ*? They are not specified by name, and critics differ as to the persons intended.

CHAPTER XVII.

ION.

The dialogue called Ion is carried on between Sokrates and the Ephesian rhapsode Ion. It is among those disallowed by Ast, first faintly defended, afterwards disallowed, by Schleiermacher,¹ and treated contemptuously by both. Subsequent critics, Hermann,² Stallbaum, Steinhart, consider it as genuine, yet as an inferior production, of little worth, and belonging to Plato's earliest years.

I hold it to be genuine, and it may be comparatively early ; but I see no ground for the disparaging criticism which has often been applied to it. The personage whom it introduces to us as subjected to the cross-examination of Sokrates is a rhapsode of celebrity ; one among a class of artists at that time both useful and esteemed. They recited or sang,³ with appropriate accent and gesture, the compositions of Homer and of other epic poets : thus serving to the Grecian epic, the same purpose as the actors served to the dramatic, and the harp-singers (*κιθαρῳδοί*) to the lyric. There were various solemn festivals such as that of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, and (most especially) the Panathenæa at Athens, where prizes were awarded for the competition of the rhapsodes. Ion is described as having competed triumphantly in the festival at Epidaurus, and carried off the first prize. He appeared there in a splendid costume, crowned

Rhapsodes as a class in Greece. They competed for prizes at the festivals. Ion has been triumphant.

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einleit. zum Ion*, pp. 261-266 ; Ast, *Leben und Schriften des Platon*, p. 466.

² K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. und Syst.*

der Plat. Phil. pp. 437-438 ; Steinhart, *Einleitung*, p. 15.

³ The word *ᾄδω* is in this very dialogue (532 D, 535 A) applied to the rhapsodizing of Ion.

with a golden wreath, amidst a crowd which is described as containing more than 20,000 persons.¹

Much of the acquaintance of cultivated Greeks with Homer and the other epic poets was both acquired and maintained through such rhapsodes; the best of whom contended at the festivals, while others, less highly gifted as to vocal power and gesticulation, gave separate declamations and lectures of their own, and even private lessons to individuals.² Euthydēmus, in one of the Xenophontic conversations with Sokrates, and Antisthenes in the Xenophontic Symposium, are made to declare that the rhapsodes as a class were extremely silly. This, if true at all, can apply only to the expositions and comments with which they accompanied their recital of Homer and other poets. Moreover we cannot reasonably set it down (though some modern critics do so) as so much incontestable truth: we must consider it as an opinion delivered by one of the speakers in the conversation, but not necessarily well founded.³ Unquestionably, the comments made upon Homer (both in that age and afterwards) were often fanciful and misleading. Metrodorus, Anaxagoras, and others, resolved the Homeric narrative into various allegories, physical, ethical, and theological: and most men who had an opinion to defend, rejoiced to be able to support or enforce it by some passages of Homer, well or ill-explained—just as texts of the Bible are quoted in modern times. In this manner, Homer was pressed into the service of every disputant; and the Homeric poems were presented as containing, or at least as implying, doctrines quite foreign to the age in which they were composed.⁴

The Rhapsodes, in so far as they interpreted Homer, were

Functions of the Rhapsodes.—Recitation—Exposition of the poets. Arbitrary exposition of the poets was then frequent.

¹ Plato, *Ion*, 535 D.

² Xen. *Sympos.* iii. 6. Nikératus says that he heard the rhapsodes nearly every day. He professes to be able to repeat both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* from memory.

³ Xen. *Mem.* iv. 2, 10; *Sympos.* iii. 6; Plato, *Ion*, 530 E.

⁴ Steinhart cites this judgment about the rhapsodes as if it had been pronounced by the Xenophontic Sokrates

himself, which is not the fact (Steinhart, *Einleitung*, p. 3).

⁴ Diogenes Laert. ii. 11; Nitzsch, *Die Heldensage der Griechen*, pp. 74-78; Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 157.

Seneca, *Epistol.* 88: "modo Stoicū Homerum faciunt—modo Epicūreū . . . modo Peripateticū, tria genera bonorum inducentem: modo Academicū, incerta omnia dicentem. Apparet nihil horum esse in illo, cui omnia insunt: ista enim inter se dissident."

The popularity of the Rhapsodes was chiefly derived from their recitation. Powerful effect which they produced.

probably not less disposed than others to discover in him their own fancies. But the character in which they acquired most popularity, was, not as expositors, but as reciters, of the poems. The powerful emotion which, in the process of reciting, they both felt themselves, and communicated to their auditors, is declared in this dialogue: "When that which I recite is pathetic (says Ion), my eyes are filled with tears: when it is awful or terrible, my hair stands on end, and my heart leaps. Moreover I see the spectators also weeping, sympathising with my emotions, and looking aghast at what they hear."¹ This assertion of the vehement emotional effect produced by the words of the poet as declaimed or sung by the rhapsode, deserves all the more credit—because Plato himself, far from looking upon it favourably, either derides or disapproves it. Accepting it as a matter of fact, we see that the influence of rhapsodes, among auditors generally, must have been derived more from their efficacy as actors than from their ability as expositors.

Ion however is described in this dialogue as combining the two functions of reciter and expositor: a partnership like that of Garrick and Johnson, in regard to Shakespeare. It is in the last of the two functions, that Sokrates here examines him: considering Homer, not as a poet appealing to the emotions of hearers, but as a teacher administering lessons and imparting instruction. Such was the view of Homer entertained by a large proportion of the Hellenic world. In that capacity, his poems served as a theme for rhapsodes, as well as for various philosophers and Sophists who were not rhapsodes, nor accomplished reciters.

The reader must keep in mind, in following the questions put by Sokrates, that this pædagogic and edifying view of Homer is the only one present to the men of the Sokratic school—and especially to Plato. Of the genuine functions of the gifted poet, who touches the chords of strong and diversified emotion—"qui

¹ Plato, Ion, 535 C-E.

The description here given is the more interesting because it is the only

intimation remaining of the strong effect produced by these rhapsodic representations.

pectus inaniter angit, Irritat, mulcet, falsis terroribus implet" (Horat. Epist. II. 1, 212)—Plato takes no account: or rather, he declares open war against them, either as childish delusions¹, or as mischievous stimulants, tending to exalt the unruly elements of the mind, and to overthrow the sovereign authority of reason. We shall find farther manifestations on this point in the Republic and Leges.

Ion professes to have devoted himself to the study of Homer exclusively, neglecting other poets: so that he can interpret the thoughts, and furnish reflections upon them, better than any other expositor.² How does it happen (asked Sokrates) that you have so much to say about Homer, and nothing at all about other poets? Homer may be the best of all poets: but he is still only one of those who exercise the poetic art, and he must necessarily talk about the same subjects as other poets. Now the art of poetry is *One* altogether—like that of painting, sculpture, playing on the flute, playing on the harp, rhapsodizing, &c.³ Whoever is competent to judge and explain one artist,—what he has done well and what he has done ill,—is competent also to judge any other artist in the same profession.

Ion devoted himself to Homer exclusively. Questions of Sokrates to him—How happens it that you cannot talk equally upon other poets? The poetic art is one.

I cannot explain to you how it happens (replies Ion): I only know the fact incontestably—that when I talk about Homer, my thoughts flow abundantly, and every one tells me that my discourse is excellent. Quite the reverse, when I talk of any other poet.⁴

I can explain it (says Sokrates). Your talent in expounding Homer is not an art, acquired by system and method—otherwise it would have been applicable to other poets besides. It is a special gift, imparted to you by divine power and inspiration. The like is true of the poet whom you expound. His genius does not spring from art, system, or method: it is a special gift ema-

Explanation given by Sokrates. Both the Rhapsode and the Poet work, not by art and

¹ The question of Sokrates (Ion, 536 D), about the emotion produced in the hearers by the recital of Homer's poetry, bears out what is here asserted.

² Plato, Ion, 536 E.

³ Plato, Ion, 531 A, 532 C-D. ποιη-

τική γάρ ποῦ ἐστὶ τὸ ὅλον. . . . Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴν λάβῃ τις καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἡρτινοῦν ὅλην, ὃ αὐτὸς τρόπος τῆς σκέψεώς ἐστι περὶ ἀπασῶν τῶν τεχνῶν; 533 A.

⁴ Plato, Ion, 533 C.

system, but by divine inspiration. Fine poets are bereft of their reason, and possessed by inspiration from some God.

nating from the inspiration of the Muses.¹ A poet is a light, airy, holy, person, who cannot compose verses at all, so long as his reason remains within him.² The Muses take away his reason, substituting in place of it their own divine inspiration and special impulse, either towards epic, dithyramb, encomiastic hymns, hyporchemata, &c., one or other of these. Each poet receives one of these special gifts, but is incompetent for any of the others: whereas, if their ability had been methodical or artistic, it would have displayed itself in all of them alike. Like prophets, and deliverers of oracles, these poets have their reason taken away, and become servants of the Gods.³ It is not *they* who, bereft of their reason, speak in such sublime strains: it is the God who speaks to us, and speaks through them. You may see this by Tynnichus of Chalkis; who composed his Pæan, the finest of all Pæans, which is in every one's mouth, telling us himself, that it was the invention of the Muses—but who never composed anything else worth hearing. It is through this worthless poet that the God has sung the most sublime hymn:⁴ for the express purpose of showing us that these fine compositions are not human performances at all, but divine: and that the poet is only an interpreter of the Gods, possessed by one or other of them, as the case may be.

Homer is thus (continues Sokrates) not a man of art or reason, but the interpreter of the Gods; deprived of his reason, but possessed, inspired, by them. You, Ion, are the interpreter of Homer: and the divine inspiration, carrying away your reason, is exercised over you through him. It is in this way that the influence of

Analogy of the Magnet, which holds up by attraction successive stages of

¹ Plato, Ion, 533 E—534 A. πάντες γὰρ οἱ τε τῶν ἑσῶν ποιηταὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης ἀλλ' ἐθεοὶ ὄντες καὶ κατεχόμενοι πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλὰ λέγουσι ποιήματα, καὶ οἱ μολοποιοὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ὡσαύτως· ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβασιῶντες οὐκ ἐμφρονες ὄντες ὀρχοῦνται, οὕτως καὶ οἱ μολοποιοὶ οὐκ ἐμφρονες ὄντες τὰ καλὰ μέλη ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν, &c.

² Plato, Ion, 534 B. κούφον γὰρ χεῖμα ποιητὴς ἐστί καὶ πτηρὸν καὶ ἱερὸν, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οἷός τε ποιεῖν πρὶν ἢ θεοῦ τε γίνεσθαι καὶ ἄκρῶν καὶ ὁ νοῦς μακρῶς ἐν αὐτῷ ἐκχέσθαι· ὥς δ' ἂν

νοῦτι ἔχη τὸ πᾶμα, εἰδύνατος πᾶς ποιεῖν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος καὶ χρησόμεθαι.

³ Plato, Ion, 534 C-D. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐξαιρούμενος τούτων τὸν νοῦν τούτοις χρήται ὑπερέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμέθοις καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις, ἵνα ἡμεῖς οἱ ἀκούοντες εἰδῶμεν, ὅτι οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσιν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες οὕτως πολλοῦ ἀξία, ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς αὐτὸς ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, διὰ τούτων δὲ φέγγεται πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

⁴ Plato, Ion, 534 E. ταῦτα ἐνδεκαπύκνους ὁ θεὸς ἐξεπύκνους διὰ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου ποιητοῦ τὸ κάλλιστον μέλος ἦγον.

the Magnet is shown, attracting and holding up successive stages of iron rings.¹ The first ring is in contact with the Magnet itself: the second is suspended to the first, the third to the second, and so on. The attractive influence of the Magnet is thus transmitted through a succession of different rings, so as to keep suspended several which are a good way removed from itself. So the influence of the Gods is exerted directly and immediately upon Homer: through him, it passes by a second stage to you: through him and you, it passes by a third stage to those auditors whom you so powerfully affect and delight, becoming however comparatively enfeebled at each stage of transition.

iron rings.
The Gods
first inspire
Homer, then
act through
him and
through Ion
upon the
auditors.

The passage and comparison here given by Sokrates—remarkable as an early description of the working of the Magnet—forms the central point or kernel of the dialogue called *Ion*. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates himself in his *Apology* to the *Dikasts*, and it is repeated in more than one place by Plato.² Sokrates declares in his *Apology* that he had applied his testing cross-examination to several excellent poets; and that finding them unable to give any rational account of their own compositions, he concluded that they composed without any wisdom of their own, under the same inspiration as prophets and declarers of oracles. In the dialogue before us, this thought is strikingly illustrated and amplified.

This comparison forms the central point of the dialogue. It is an expansion of a judgment delivered by Sokrates in the *Apology*.

The contrast between systematic, professional, procedure, deliberately taught and consciously acquired, capable of being defended at every step by appeal to intelligible rules founded upon scientific theory, and enabling the person so qualified to impart his qualification to others—and a different procedure purely impulsive and unthinking, whereby the agent, having in his mind a conception of the end aimed at, proceeds from one intermediate step to another, without knowing why he does so or how he has come to do so, and

Platonic antithesis: Systematic procedure distinguished from unsystematic: which latter was either blind routine, or madness inspired by the Gods.

¹ Plato, *Ion*, 533 D-E.

² Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 22 D; Plato, *Menon*, p. 99 D.

Varieties of madness, good and bad. without being able to explain his practice if questioned or to impart it to others—this contrast is a favourite one with Plato. The last-mentioned procedure—the unphilosophical or irrational—he conceives under different aspects: sometimes as a blind routine or insensibly acquired habit,¹ sometimes as a stimulus applied from without by some God, superseding the reason of the individual. Such a condition Plato calls *madness*, and he considers those under it as persons out of their senses. But he recognises different varieties of madness, according to the God from whom it came: the bad madness was a disastrous visitation and distemper—the good madness was a privilege and blessing, an inspiration superior to human reason. Among these privileged madmen he reckoned prophets and poets; another variety under the same genus, is, that mental love, between a well-trained adult, and a beautiful, intelligent, youth, which he regards as the most exalted of all human emotions.² In the *Ion*, this idea of a privileged madness—inspiration from the Gods superseding reason—is applied not only to the poet, but also to the rhapsode who recites the poem, and even to the auditors whom he addresses. The poet receives the inspiration directly from the Gods: he inoculates the rhapsode with it, who again inoculates the auditors—the fervour is, at each successive communication, diminished. The auditor represents the last of the rings; held in suspension, through the intermediate agency of other rings, by the inherent force of the magnet.³

We must remember, that privileged communications from the Gods to men, and special persons recipient thereof, were acknowledged and witnessed everywhere as a constant phenomenon of Grecian life. There were not only numerous oracular temples, which every one could visit to ask questions in matters of doubt—but also favoured persons who had received from the Gods the gift of predicting the future, of interpreting omens, of determining the good or bad indications

Special inspiration from the Gods was a familiar fact in Grecian life. Privileged communications from the Gods to Sokrates—

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, 82 A; *Gorgias*, 463 A, 465 A; about Eros, pp. 244-245-249 D.

² This doctrine is set forth at length by Sokrates in the Platonic *Phædrus*, in the second discourse of Sokrates

³ Plato, *Ion*, 535 E. οὗτος δὲ θεῶν τὸν δακτυλίον ὁ δαχτύλιος . . . ὁ δὲ μέγας σὺν ὁ βασιλεὺς καὶ ὑποκρίτης, ὁ δὲ πρῶτος, αὐτὸς δὲ ποιητής.

furnished by animals sacrificed.¹ In every town or village—or wherever any body of men were assembled—there were always persons who prophesied or delivered oracles, and to whom special revelations were believed to be vouchsafed, during periods of anxiety. No one was more familiar with this fact than the Sokratic disciples: for Sokrates himself had perhaps a greater number of special communications from the Gods than any man of his age: his divine sign having begun when he was a child, and continuing to move him frequently, even upon small matters, until his death: though the revelations were for the most part negative, not affirmative—telling him often what was not to be done—seldom what was to be done—resembling in this respect his own dialogues with other persons. Moreover Sokrates inculcated upon his friends emphatically, that they ought to have constant recourse to prophecy: that none but impious men neglected to do so: that the benevolence of the Gods was nowhere more conspicuous than in their furnishing such special revelations and warnings, to persons whom they favoured: that the Gods administered the affairs of the world partly upon principles of regular sequence, so that men by diligent study might learn what they were to expect,—but partly also, and by design, in a manner irregular and undecypherable, such that it could not be fathomed by any human study, and could not be understood except through direct and special revelation from themselves.²

Here, as well as elsewhere, Plato places inspiration, both of the prophet and the poet, in marked contrast with reason and intelligence. Reason is supposed to be for the time withdrawn or abolished, and inspiration is intro-

his firm belief in them.

Condition of the inspired person—his reason is for

¹ Not only the χρησμολόγοι, μάντιες, oracular temples, &c., are often mentioned in Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, &c., but Aristotle also recognises οἱ νυμφόληπτοι καὶ θεόληπτοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπιπνοῖα δαιμονίου τινὸς ὥστερ ἐνθουσιάζοντες, as a real and known class of persons. See Ethic. Eudem. i. p. 1214, a. 23; Ethic. Magna, ii. p. 1207, b. 8.

The μάντις is a recognised profession, the gift of Apollo, not merely according to Homer, but according to Solon (Frag. xi. 62, Schn.):

* Ἄλλον μάντιν ἔθηκεν ἀναξ' ἐκέρχους Ἀπόλλων, ἔγνω δ' ἀνδρὶ κακὸν τηλόθεν ἐρχόμενον, &c.

² These views of Sokrates are declared in the Memorabilia of Xenophon, i. 1. 6-10; i. 4. 2-18; iv. 3. 12.

It is plain from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1. 8) that many persons were offended with Sokrates because they believed—or at least because he affirmed—that he received more numerous and special revelations from the Gods than any one else.

the time withdrawn. deduced by the Gods into its place. "When Monarch

Reason sleeps, this mimic wakes." The person inspired (prophet or poet) becomes for the time the organ of an extraneous agency, speaking what he neither originates nor understands. The genuine gift of prophecy¹ (Plato says) attaches only to a disabled, enfeebled, distempered, condition of the intelligence; the gift of poetry is conferred by the Gods upon the most inferior men, as we see by the case of Tynnichus—whose sublime pæan shows us, that it is the Gods alone who utter fine poetry through the organs of a person himself thoroughly incompetent.

It is thus that Plato, setting before himself a process of systematised reason,—originating in a superior intellect, laying down universal principles and deducing consequences from them—capable of being consistently applied, designedly taught, and defended against objections—enumerates the various mental conditions opposed to it, and ranks inspiration as one of them. In this dialogue, Sokrates seeks to prove that the success of Ion as a rhapsode depends upon his being out of his mind or inspired. But Ion does not accept the compliment: *Ion*.—You speak well, Sokrates; but I should be surprised if you spoke well enough to create in me the new conviction, that I am possessed and mad when I eulogize Homer. I do not think that you would even yourself say so, if you heard me discourse on the subject.²

Sokr.—But Homer talks upon all subjects. Upon which of them can you discourse? *Ion*.—Upon all. *Sokr.*—Not surely upon such as belong to special arts, professions. Each portion of the matter of knowledge is included under some special art, and is known through that art by those who possess it. Thus, you and I, both of us, know the number of our fingers; we know it through the same art, which both of us possess—the arithmetical. But Homer talks of matters be-

Homer talks upon all subjects—Is Ion competent to explain what Homer says upon all of them? Rhapsodic art. What is its province?

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, 71 E. ἰκανὸν δὲ σημῖον ὡς μαγικὴν ἐφορῶντη θεὸς ἀνθρωπίνῃ δέδωκεν οὐδαὶς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐφαπτεται μαγικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς, ἀλλ' ἢ καθ' ὅσον τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως περὶ θεοῦ δύναμιν, ἣ διὰ νόσον ἢ τινὰ ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας.

Compare Plato, *Menon*, pp. 99-100. οἱ χρησμεῖοι τε καὶ οἱ θεομαντεῖς . . . λέγουσι μὲν ἀληθῆ καὶ πολλὰ ἴσασι δὲ οὐδὲν ὧν λέγουσι. Compare Plato, *Legg.* iv. 719.

² Plato, *Ion*, 536 E.

longing to many different arts or occupations, that of the physician, the charioteer, the fisherman, &c. You cannot know these ; since you do not belong to any of these professions, but are a rhapsode. Describe to me what are the matters included in the rhapsodic art. The rhapsodic art is one art by itself, distinct from the medical and others : it cannot know every thing ; tell me what matters come under its special province.¹ *Ion*.—The rhapsodic art does not know what belongs to any one of the other special arts : but that of which it takes cognizance, and that which I know, is, what is becoming and suitable to each variety of character described by Homer : to a man or woman—to a freeman or slave—to the commander who gives orders or to the subordinate who obeys them, &c. This is what belongs to the peculiar province of the rhapsode to appreciate and understand.² *Sokr*.—Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the commander of a ship to say to his seamen, during a dangerous storm, better than the pilot ? Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for one who gives directions about the treatment of a sick man, better than the physician ? Will the rhapsode know what is suitable to be said by the herdsman when the cattle are savage and distracted, or to the female slaves when busy in spinning ? *Ion*.—No : the rhapsode will not know these things so well as the pilot, the physician, the grazier, the mistress, &c.³ *Sokr*.—Will the rhapsode know what is suitable for the military commander to say, when he is exhorting his soldiers ? *Ion*.—Yes : the rhapsode will know this well : at least I know it well.

Sokr.—Perhaps, *Ion*, you are not merely a rhapsode, but possess also the competence for being a general. If you know matters belonging to military command, do you know them in your capacity of general, or in your capacity of rhapsode ? *Ion*.—I think there is no difference. *Sokr*.—How say you ? Do you affirm that the rhapsodic art, and the strategic art, are one ? *Ion*.—I think they are one. *Sokr*.—Then whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general ? *Ion*.—Unquestionably. *Sokr*.—And of course, whoever is a good general,

The rhapsode does not know special matters, such as the craft of the pilot, physician, farmer, &c., but he knows the business of the general, and is com-

¹ Plato, *Ion*, 533-539.

² Plato, *Ion*, 540 A. ὁ τῆς ῥαψωδίας προσήκει καὶ σκοπεῖσθαι καὶ διακρίνειν

παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους, 539 E.

³ Plato, *Ion*, 540 B-C.

petent to
command
soldiers,
having
learnt it
from
Homer.

is also a good rhapsode? *Ion*.—No: I do not think that.

Sokr.—But you do maintain, that whosoever is a good rhapsode, is also a good general? *Ion*.—Decidedly.

Sokr.—You are yourself the best rhapsode in Greece?

Ion.—By far. *Sokr.*—Are you then also the best general in Greece? *Ion*.—Certainly I am, Sokrates: and that too, by having learnt it from Homer.¹

After putting a question or two, not very forcible, to ask how it happens that *Ion*, being an excellent general, does not obtain a military appointment from Athens, Sparta, or some other city, Sokrates winds up the dialogue as follows:—

Well, *Ion*, if it be really true that you possess a rational and intelligent competence to illustrate the beauties of Homer, you wrong and deceive me, because after promising to deliver to me a fine discourse about Homer, you will not even comply with my preliminary entreaty—that you will first tell me what those matters are, on which your superiority bears. You twist every way like Proteus, until at last you slip through my fingers and appear as a general. If your powers of expounding Homer depend on art and intelligence, you are a wrong-doer and deceiver, for not fulfilling your promise to me. But you are not chargeable with wrong, if the fact be as I say; that is, if you know nothing about Homer, but are only able to discourse upon him finely and abundantly, through a divine inspiration with which you are possessed by him. Choose whether you wish me to regard you as a promise-breaker, or as a divine man. *Ion*.—I choose the last: it is much better to be regarded as a divine man.²

It seems strange to read such language put into *Ion*'s mouth (we are not warranted in regarding it as what any rhapsode ever did say), as the affirmation—that every good rhapsode was also a good general, and that he

¹ Plato, *Ion*, 540 D—541 B.

² Plato, *Ion*, 541 E—542 A. εἰ μὲν ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ὡς τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη οἷός τε εἰ Ὀμηρον ἐπαινεῖν, ἀδικεῖς . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ τεχνικὸς εἶ, ἀλλὰ θεῖα μοῖρα

κατεχόμενος ἐξ Ὀμήρου μὴδὲν εἶδὼς πολλά καὶ καλὰ λέγεις περὶ τοῦ ποιητοῦ, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ εἶπον περὶ σοῦ, οὐδὲν ἀδικεῖς· ἢ οὐ σὺν, πότερα βούλει νομίζεσθαι ὅψ' ἡμῶν ἀδικὸς ἀνὴρ εἶναι ἢ θεῖος.

had become the best of generals simply through complete acquaintance with Homer. But this is only a caricature of a sentiment largely prevalent at Athens, according to which the works of the poets, especially the Homeric poems, were supposed to be a mine of varied instruction, and were taught as such to youth.¹ In Greece, the general was not often required (except at Sparta, and not always even there) to possess professional experience.² Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic conversations, tries to persuade Nikomachides, a practised soldier (who had failed in getting himself elected general, because a successful Chorégus had been preferred to him), how much the qualities of an effective Chorégus coincided with those of an effective general.³ The poet Sophokles was named by the Athenians one of the generals of the very important armament for reconquering Samos: though Perikles, one of his colleagues, as well as his contemporary Ion of Chios, declared that he was an excellent poet, but knew nothing of generalship.⁴ Plato frequently seeks to make it evident how little the qualities required for governing numbers, either civil or military, were made matter of professional study or special teaching. The picture of Homer conveyed in the tenth book of the Platonic Republic is, that of a man who pretends to know

possessed no professional experience—Homer and the poets were talked of as the great teachers—Plato's view of the poet, as pretending to know everything, but really knowing nothing.

¹ Aristophan. *Ranæ*, 1032.

Ὅρφεύς μὲν γὰρ τελετὰς θ' ἡμῖν κατέδειξε φόνων τ' ἀνέχεσθαι Μουσαῖος δ' ἱερακείας τε νόσων καὶ χρησμούς, Ἡσίοδος δὲ γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπὸν ἄρας, ἀρότους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὅμηρος Ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμῆν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν, πλὴν τοῦδ', ὅτι χρηστὴν ἐδίδασκε, Τάξεις, ἀρετάς, ἀπλίστους ἀνδρῶν; . . . Ἄλλ' ἄλλους τοὶ πολλοὺς ἀγαθοὺς (ἐδίδασκεν), ὧν ἦν καὶ Δάμαχος ἥρως.

See these views combated by Plato, *Republ.* x. 599-600-606 E.

The exaggerated pretension here ascribed to Ion makes him look contemptible—like the sentiment ascribed to him, 535 E, "If I make the auditors weep, I myself shall laugh and pocket money," &c.

² Xenoph. *Memor.* iii. 5, 21, in the conversation between the younger Perikles and Sokrates—*τῶν δὲ στρα-*

τηγῶν οἱ πλείστοι αὐτοσχεδιάζουσιν. Also iii. 5, 24.

Compare, respecting the generals, the striking lines of Euripides, *Androm.* 698, and the encomium of Cicero (*Academ. Prior.* 2, 1) respecting the quickness and facility with which Lucullus made himself an excellent general.

³ Xen. *Mem.* iii. 4, especially iii. 4, 6, where Nikomachides asks with surprise, λέγεις σὺ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστί χορηγεῖν τε καλῶς καὶ στρατηγεῖν;

⁴ See the very curious extract from the contemporary Ion of Chios, in Athenæus, xiii. 604. Aristophanes of Byzantium says that the appointment of Sophokles to this military function (about B.C. 440) arose from the extraordinary popularity of his tragedy *Antigonè*, exhibited a little time before. See Boeckh's valuable "Dissertation on the *Antigonè*," appended to his edition thereof, pp. 121-124.

everything, but really knows nothing : an imitative artist, removed by two stages from truth and reality,—who gives the shadows of shadows, resembling only enough to satisfy an ignorant crowd. This is the picture there presented of poets generally, and of Homer as the best among them. The rhapsode Ion is here brought under the same category as the poet Homer, whom he has by heart and recites. The whole field of knowledge is assumed to be distributed among various specialties, not one of which either of the two can claim. Accordingly, both of them under the mask of universal knowledge, conceal the reality of universal ignorance.

Ion is willing enough (as he promises) to exhibit before Sokrates one of his eloquent discourses upon Homer. But Sokrates never permits him to arrive at it : arresting him always by preliminary questions, and requiring him to furnish an intelligible description of the matter which his discourse is intended to embrace, and thus to distinguish it from other matters left untouched. A man who cannot comply with this requisition,—who cannot (to repeat what I said in a previous chapter) stand a Sokratic cross-examination on the subject—possesses no rational intelligence of his own proceedings : no art, science, knowledge, system, or method. If as a practitioner he executes well what he promises (which is often the case), and attains success—he does so either by blind imitation of some master, or else under the stimulus and guidance of some agency foreign to himself—of the Gods or Fortune.

This is the Platonic point of view ; developed in several different ways and different dialogues, but hardly anywhere more conspicuously than in the *Ion*.

I have observed that in this dialogue, Ion is anxious to embark on his eloquent expository discourse, but Sokrates will not allow him to begin : requiring as a preliminary stage that certain preliminary difficulties shall be first cleared up. Here we have an illustration of Plato's doctrine, to which I adverted in a former chapter,¹—that no written geometrical treatise

Knowledge, opposed to divine inspiration without knowledge.

Illustration of Plato's opinion respecting the uselessness of written geometrical treatises.

¹ Chap. viii. p. 353.

could impart a knowledge of geometry to one ignorant thereof. The geometrical writer begins by laying down a string of definitions and axioms ; and then strikes out boldly in demonstrating his theorems. But Plato would refuse him the liberty of striking out, until he should have cleared up the preliminary difficulties about the definitions and axioms themselves. This the geometrical treatise does not even attempt.¹

¹ Compare Plato, Republic, vi. 510 C ; vii. 533 C-D

CHAPTER XVIII.

LACHES.

THE main substance of this dialogue consists of a discussion, carried on by Sokrates with Nikias and Lachês, respecting Courage. Each of the two latter proposes an explanation of Courage: Sokratês criticises both of them, and reduces each to a confessed contradiction.

The discussion is invited, or at least dramatically introduced, by two elderly men—Lysimachus, son of Aristides the Just,—and Melêsias son of Thucydides the rival of Perikles. Lysimachus and Melêsias, confessing with shame that they are inferior to their fathers, because their education has been neglected, wish to guard against the same misfortune in the case of their own sons: respecting the education of whom, they ask the advice of Nikias and Lachês. The question turns especially upon the propriety of causing their sons to receive lessons from a master of arms just then in vogue. Nikias and Lachês, both of them not merely distinguished citizens but also commanders of Athenian armies, are assumed to be well qualified to give advice. Accordingly they deliver their opinions: Nikias approving such lessons as beneficial, in exalting the courage of a young man, and rendering him effective on the field of battle: while Lachês takes an opposite view, disparages the masters of arms as being no soldiers, and adds that they are despised by the Lacedæmonians, to whose authority on military matters general deference was paid in Greece.¹ Sokratês,—commended greatly by

Lachês. Subject and persons of the dialogue. Whether it is useful that two young men should receive lessons from a master of arms. Nikias and Lachês differ in opinion.

¹ Plato, *Lachês*, 182-183.

Nikias for his acuteness and sagacity, by Lachês for his courage in the battle of Delium,—is invited to take part in the consultation. Being younger than both, he waits till they have delivered their opinions, and is then called upon to declare with which of the two his own judgment will concur.¹

Sokr.—The question must not be determined by a plurality of votes, but by superiority of knowledge.² If we were debating about the proper gymnastic discipline for these young men, we should consult a known artist or professional trainer, or at least some one who had gone through a course of teaching and practice under the trainer. The first thing to be enquired therefore is, whether, in reference to the point now under discussion, there be any one of us professionally or technically competent, who has studied under good masters, and has proved his own competence as a master by producing well-trained pupils. The next thing is, to understand clearly what it is, with reference to which such competence is required.³

Nikias.—Surely the point before us is, whether it be wise to put these young men under the lessons of the master of arms? That is what we want to know. *Sokr.*—Doubtless it is: but that is only one particular branch of a wider and more comprehensive enquiry. When you are considering whether a particular ointment is good for your eyes, it is your eyes, and their general benefit, which form the subject of investigation—not the ointment simply. The person to assist you will be, he who understands professionally the general treatment of the eyes. So in this case, you are enquiring whether lessons in arms will be improving for the minds and character of your sons. Look out therefore for some one who is professionally competent, from having studied under good masters, in regard to the general treatment of the mind.⁴ *Lachês.*—But there are various persons who, without ever having studied under masters, possess greater technical com-

Sokrates is invited to declare his opinion. He replies that the point cannot be decided without a competent professional judge.

¹ Plato, *Lachês*, 184 D.

Nikias is made to say that *Sokrates* has recently recommended to him *Damon*, as a teacher of *μουσική* to his sons, and that *Damon* had proved an admirable teacher as well as companion (180 D). *Damon* is mentioned by Plato generally with much eulogy.

² Plato, *Lachês*, 184 E. ἐπιστήμη δὲ κρίνεται ἄλλ' οὐ πλῆθει τὸ μέλλον καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι.

³ Plato, *Lachês*, 185 C.

⁴ Plato, *Lachês*, 185 E. εἰ τις ἡμῶν τεχνικῶς περὶ ψυχῆς θεραπείαν, καὶ οἷός τε καλῶς τοῦτο θεραπεύσει, καὶ ὅτε διδάσκαλοι ἀγαθοὶ γυγνῶσι, τοῦτο σκεπτόν.

petence than others who have so studied. *Sokr.*—There are such persons : but you will never believe it upon their own assurance, unless they can show you some good special work actually performed by themselves.

Sokr.—Now then, Lysimachus, since you have invited Lachês and Nikias, as well as me, to advise you on the means of most effectively improving the mind of your son, it is for us to show you that we possess competent professional skill respecting the treatment of the youthful mind. We must declare to you who are the masters from whom we have learnt, and we must prove their qualifications. Or if we have had no masters, we must demonstrate to you our own competence by citing cases of individuals, whom we have successfully trained, and who have become incontestably good under our care. If we can fulfil neither of these two conditions, we ought to confess our incompetence and decline advising you. We must not begin to try our hands upon so precious a subject as the son of a friend, at the hazard of doing him more harm than good.¹

As to myself, I frankly confess that I have neither had any master to impart to me such competence, nor have I been able to acquire it by my own efforts. I am not rich enough to pay the Sophists, who profess to teach it. But as to Nikias and Lachês, they are both older and richer than I am : so that they may well have learnt it from others, or acquired it for themselves. They must be thoroughly satisfied of their own knowledge on the work of education ; otherwise they would hardly have given such confident opinions, pronouncing what pursuits are good or bad for youth. For my part, I trust them implicitly : the only thing which surprises me, is, that they dissent from each other.² It is for you therefore, Lysimachus, to ask Nikias and Lachês,—Who have been their masters ? Who have been their fellow-pupils ? If they have been their own masters, what proof can they produce of previous success in teaching, and what examples can they cite of pupils whom they have converted from bad to good ?³

¹ Plato, *Lachês*, 186 B.

² Plato, *Lachês*, 186 C-D. δοκοῦσι, δὴ μοι δυνατόι εἶναι παιδεύσαι ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε ἄδεις ἀπεφάνοντο περὶ ἐκτελεσμάτων νέῃ χρηστῶν τε καὶ ποτ-

ρῶν, εἰ μὴ αὐτοῖς ἐπίστευον ἑκατέρω εἰδέναι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα, ἔγωγε τοῖσι πιστεύω, ὅτι δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων, θαύμασα.

³ Plato, *Lachês*, 186-187.

Nikias.—I knew from the beginning that we should both of us fall under the cross-examination of Sokrates, and be compelled to give account of our past lives. For my part, I have already gone through this scrutiny before, and am not averse to undergo it again.

Nikias and Lachés submit to be cross-examined by Sokrates.

Lachés.—And I, though I have never experienced it before, shall willingly submit to learn from Sokrates, whom I know to be a man thoroughly courageous and honest in his actions. I hate men whose lives are inconsistent with their talk.¹—Thus speak both of them.

This portion of the dialogue, which forms a sort of preamble to the main discussion, brings out forcibly some of the Platonic points of view. We have seen it laid down in the *Kriton*—That in questions about right and wrong, good and evil, &c., we ought not to trust the decision of the Many, but only that of the One Wise Man. Here we learn something about the criteria by which this One man may be known. He must be one who has gone through a regular training under some master approved in ethical or educational teaching: or, if he cannot produce such a certificate, he must at least cite sufficient examples of men whom he has taught well himself. This is the Sokratic comparison, assimilating the general art of living well to the requirements of a special profession, which a man must learn through express teaching, from a master who has proved his ability, and through conscious application of his own. *Nikias* and *Lachés* give their opinions offhand and confidently, upon the question whether lessons from the master of arms be profitable to youth or not. Plato, on the contrary, speaking through Sokrates, points out that this is only one branch of the more comprehensive question as to education generally—"What are the qualities and habits proper to be imparted to youth by training? What is the proper treatment of the mind? No one

Both of them give opinions offhand, according to their feelings on the special case—Sokrates requires that the question shall be generalised, and examined as a branch of education.

¹ Plato, *Lachés*, 188.

"Ego odi homines ignavā operā et philosophā sententiā," is a line cited

by Cicero out of one of the Latin comic writers.

is competent to decide the special question, except he who has professionally studied the treatment of the mind." To deal with the special question, without such preliminary general preparation, involves rash and unverified assumptions, which render any opinion so given dangerous to act upon. Such is the judgment of the Platonic Sokrates, insisting on the necessity of taking up ethical questions in their most comprehensive aspect.

Consequent upon this preamble, we should expect that Lachés and Nikias would be made to cite the names of those who had been their masters; or to produce some examples of persons effectively taught by themselves. This would bring us a step nearer to that One Wise Man—often darkly indicated, but nowhere named or brought into daylight—from whom alone we can receive a trustworthy judgment. But here, as in the *Kriton* and so many other Platonic dialogues, we get only a Pisgah view of our promised adviser—nothing more. The discussion takes a different turn.

Appeal of Sokrates to the judgment of the One Wise Man. This man is never seen or identified.

Sokr.—"We will pursue a line of enquiry which conducts to the same result, and which starts even more decidedly from the beginning.¹ We are called upon to advise by what means virtue can be imparted to these youths, so as to make them better men. Of course this implies that we know what virtue is: otherwise how can we give advice as to the means of acquiring it? *Lachés.*—We could give no advice at all. *Sokr.*—We affirm ourselves therefore to know what virtue is? *Lachés.*—We do. *Sokr.*—Since therefore we know, we can farther declare what it is.² *Lachés.*—Of course we can. *Sokr.*—Still, we will not at once enquire as to the whole of virtue, which might be an arduous task, but as to a part of it—Courage: that part to which the lessons of the master of arms are supposed to tend. We will

We must know what virtue is, before we give an opinion on education. Virtue, as a whole, is too large a question. We will enquire about one branch of virtue—courage.

¹ Plato, *Lachés*, 189 E. καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη ἡ ἀρχὴ, εἰδέναι αὐτὸ (τὴν ἀρετὴν) ὃ, τι στέφει εἰς ταῦτόν φέρεται, σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ ἔστι. Φαμὲν μάλιστα. Οὐκοῦν ὃ γε ἴσμεν, μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἰς ἂν.

² Plato, *Lachés*, 190 C. φαμὲν ὅρα, οὐ;

first enquire what courage is: after that has been determined, we will then consider how it can best be imparted to these youths."

"Try then if you can tell me, Lachês, what courage is. *Lachês*.—There is no difficulty in telling you that. Whoever keeps his place in the rank, repels the enemy, and does not run away, is a courageous man."¹

Here is the same error in replying, as was committed by Euthyphron when asked, What is the Holy? and by Hippias about the Beautiful. One particular case of courageous behaviour, among many, is indicated, as if it were an explanation of the whole: but the general feature common to all acts of courage is not declared. Sokrates points out that men are courageous, not merely among hoplites who keep their rank and fight, but also among the Scythian horsemen who fight while running away; others also are courageous against disease, poverty, political adversity, pain and fear of every sort; others moreover, against desires and pleasures. What is the common attribute which in all these cases constitutes Courage? If you asked me what is *quickness*—common to all those cases when a man runs, speaks, plays, learns, &c., quickly—I should tell you that it was that which accomplished much in a little time. Tell me in like manner, what is the common fact or attribute pervading all cases of courage?

Lachês at first does not understand the question:² and Sokrates elucidates it by giving the parallel explanation of quickness. Here, as elsewhere, Plato takes great pains to impress the conception in its full generality, and he seems to have found difficulty in making others follow him.

Lachês then gives a general definition of courage. It is a sort of endurance of the mind.³

Surely not *all* endurance (rejoins Sokrates)? You admit that courage is a fine and honourable thing

Question.
What is
courage?
Lachês
answers by
citing one
particularly
manifest
case of cou-
rage. Mis-
take of not
giving a
general ex-
planation.

Second an-
swer. Cou-
rage is a sort
of endurance

¹ Plato, *Lachês*, 190 D-E.

² Plato, *Lachês*, 191-192.

πάλιν οὐδὲν περὶ εἰπεῖν ἀνδρείαν πρῶ-
τον, τί δὲ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖσι ταῦτόν ἐστιν.
ἢ οὕτω καταμαρτάνεις ὁ λόγος; *Lachês*.
Ὁὐ πᾶν τι. . . . *Sokr.* περὶ δὲ τὴν

ἀνδρείαν οὕτως εἰπεῖν, τίς οὕσα δύναμις ἡ
αὕτη ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ καὶ ἐν ἀπασιν
οἷς νῦν δὲ ἐλάγομεν αὐτὴν εἶναι, εἴπει'
ἀνδρεία κέκληται.

³ Plato, *Lachês*, 192 B. κατρεία τις
τῆς ψυχῆς.

of the mind. Sokrates points out that the answer is vague and incorrect. Endurance is not always courage: even intelligent endurance is not always courage.

But endurance without intelligence is hurtful and dishonourable: it cannot therefore be courage. Only intelligent endurance, therefore, can be courage. And then what is meant by *intelligent*? Intelligent—of what—or to what end? A man, who endures the loss of money, understanding well that he will thereby gain a larger sum, is he courageous? No. He who endures fighting, knowing that he has superior skill, numbers, and all other advantages on his side, manifests more of intelligent endurance, than his adversary who knows that he has all these advantages against him, yet who nevertheless endures fighting. Nevertheless this latter is the most courageous of the two.¹ Unintelligent endurance is in this case courage: but unintelligent endurance was acknowledged to be bad and hurtful, and courage to be a fine thing. We have entangled ourselves in a contradiction. We must at least show our own courage, by enduring until we can get right. For my part (replies Lachês) I am quite prepared for such endurance. I am piqued and angry that I cannot express what I conceive. I seem to have in my mind clearly what courage is: but it escapes me somehow or other, when I try to put it in words.²

Sokrates now asks aid from Nikias. *Nikias*.—My explanation of courage is, that it is a sort of knowledge or intelligence. *Sokr.*—But what sort of intelligence? Not certainly intelligence of piping or playing the harp. Intelligence of what?

Nikias.—Courage is intelligence of things terrible, and things not terrible, both in war and in all other conjunctures. *Lachês*.—What nonsense! Courage is a thing totally apart from knowledge or intelligence.³ The physician knows best what is terrible, and what is not terrible, in reference to disease: the husbandman, in reference to agriculture. But they are not for that reason courageous. *Nikias*.—They are not; but neither do they know what is terrible, or what is not terrible. Physicians can predict the result of a

¹ Plato, *Lachês*, 192 D-E. ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία . . . ἴσμεν δὲ, ἡ εἰς τὸ φρόνιμος· ἡ ἡ εἰς πάντα καὶ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τὰ σμικρὰ;

² Plato, *Lachês*, 193 C, 194 B.

³ Plato, *Lachês*, 196 A. τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρράλων ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπασιν.

patient's case: they can tell what may cure him, or what will kill him. But whether it be better for him to die or to recover—that they do not know, and cannot tell him. To some persons, death is a less evil than life:—defeat, than victory:—loss of wealth, than gain. None except the person who can discriminate these cases, knows what is really terrible and what is not so. He alone is really courageous.¹ *Lachês*.—Where is there any such man? It can be only some God. Nikias feels himself in a puzzle, and instead of confessing it frankly as I have done, he is trying to help himself out by evasions more fit for a pleader before the Dikastery.²

Sokr.—You do not admit, then, Nikias, that lions, tigers, boars, &c., and such animals, are courageous? *Nikias*.—No: they are without fear—simply from not knowing the danger—like children: but they are not courageous, though most people call them so. I may call them bold, but I reserve the epithet courageous for the intelligent. *Lachês*.—See how Nikias strips those, whom every one admits to be courageous, of this honourable appellation! *Nikias*.—Not altogether, *Lachês*: I admit you, and Lamachus, and many other Athenians, to be courageous, and of course therefore intelligent. *Lachês*.—I feel the compliment: but such subtle distinctions befit a Sophist rather than a general in high command.³

Sokr.—The highest measure of intelligence befits one in the highest command. What you have said, Nikias, deserves careful examination. You remember that in taking up the investigation of courage, we reckoned it only as a portion of virtue: you are aware that there are other portions of virtue, such as justice, temperance, and the like. Now you define courage to be, intelligence of what is terrible or not terrible: of that which causes

Questions of Sokrates to Nikias. It is only future events, not past or present, which are terrible. But intelligence of future events cannot be had without intelligence of past or present.

Lachês.—Ὅς ἄποα λέγει!—χωρίς δὲ πού σοφία ἴσθιν ἀνδρείας.

It appears from two other passages (195 E, and 198 B) that *θαυμάσιος* here is simply the negation of *δεινός*, and cannot be translated by any affirmative word.

¹ Plato, *Lachês*, 195-196.

² Plato, *Lachês*, 196 B.

³ Plato, *Lachês*, 197. Καὶ γὰρ πρέπει, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοφιστῇ τὰ τοιαῦτα μάλλον

κομψεύεσθαι ἢ ἀνδρὶ ὃν ἡ πόλις ἐξιοῖ αὐτῆς προϊστάμεναι.

Assuredly the distinctions which Plato puts into the mouth of Nikias are nowise more subtle than those which he is perpetually putting into the mouth of Sokrates. He cannot here mean to distinguish the Sophists from Sokrates, but to distinguish the dialectic talkers, including both one and the other, from the active political leaders.

fear, or does not cause fear. But nothing causes fear, except future or apprehended evils: present or past evils cause no fear. Hence courage, as you define it, is intelligence respecting future evils, and future events not evil. But how can there be intelligence respecting the future, except in conjunction with intelligence respecting the present and the past? In every special department, such as medicine, military proceedings, agriculture, &c., does not the same man, who knows the phenomena of the future, know also the phenomena of present and past? Are they not all inseparable acquirements of one and the same intelligent mind? ¹

Courage therefore must be intelligence of good and evil generally. But this definition would include the whole of virtue, and we declared that courage was only a part thereof. It will not hold therefore as a definition of courage. Since therefore courage, according to your definition, is the knowledge of futurities evil and not evil, or future evil and good—and since such knowledge cannot exist without the knowledge of good and evil generally—it follows that courage is the knowledge of good and evil generally. ² But a man who knows thus much, cannot be destitute of any part of virtue. He must possess temperance and justice as well as courage. Courage, therefore, according to your definition, is not a part of virtue, it is the whole. Now we began the enquiry by stating that it was only a part of virtue, and that there were other parts of virtue which it did not comprise. It is plain therefore that your definition of courage is not precise, and cannot be sustained. We have not yet discovered what courage is. ³

Here ends the dialogue called Lachês, without any positive result. Nothing is proved except the ignorance of two brave and eminent generals respecting the moral attribute known by the name *Courage*: which never-

¹ Plato, Lachês, 198 D. περί δὲ οὖν δὲσιν ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἄλλη μὲν εἶναι περί γεγονότος, εἰδέναι δὲ γινώσκον, ἄλλη δὲ περί γεγνημένων, δὲ γίγνεται, ἄλλη δὲ δὲ καλλίστα γινώσκον καὶ γενήσεται τὸ μέγιστον γεγονός—ἀλλ' ἡ αὐτή. οἷον περί τὸ θυμεινὸν εἰς ἅπαστας τοὺς χρόνους οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ ἡ ἱατρικὴ, μία οὖσα, εἴφορξ καὶ γεγνημένα καὶ γεγονότα καὶ γενήσμενα, δὲ γινώσκεται.

199 B. ἡ δὲ γ' αὐτὴ ἐπιστήμη τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ μελλόντων καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων εἶναι [ἡμολόγηται].

² Plato, Lachês, 199 C. κατὰ τὸν οὖν λόγον οὐ μόνον δεῖναι τε καὶ θαρραλέων ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ἢ περί πάντων ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν καὶ πάντως ἐχόντων, &c.

³ Plato, Lachês, 199 E. Οὐκ ἄρα εὐρήκαμεν, ἀνδρεία δ', τι ἐστίν.

theless they are known to possess, and have the full sentiment and persuasion of knowing perfectly ; so that they give confident advice as to the means of imparting it. "I am unaccustomed to debates like these" (says Lachês): "but I am piqued and mortified—because I feel that I know well what Courage is, yet somehow or other I cannot state my own thoughts in words." Here is a description¹ of the intellectual deficiency which Sokrates seeks to render conspicuous to the consciousness, instead of suffering it to remain latent and unknown, as it is in the ordinary mind. Here, as elsewhere, he impugns the false persuasion of knowledge, and the unconscious presumption of estimable men in delivering opinions upon ethical and social subjects, which have become familiar and interwoven with deeply rooted associations, but have never been studied under a master, nor carefully analysed and discussed, nor looked at in their full generality. This is a mental defect which he pronounces to be universal: belonging not less to men of action like Nikias and Lachês, than to Sophists and Rhetors like Protagoras and Gorgias.

Here, as elsewhere, Plato (or the Platonic Sokrates) exposes the faulty solutions of others, but proposes no better solution of his own, and even disclaims all ability to do so. We may nevertheless trace, in the refutation which he gives of the two unsatisfactory explanations, hints guiding the mind into that direction in which Plato looks to supply the deficiency. Thus when Lachês, after having given as his first answer (to the question, What is Courage?) a definition not even formally sufficient, is put by Sokrates upon giving his second answer,—That Courage is intelligent endurance: Sokrates asks him²—"Yes, *intelligent*: but intelligent to

false persuasion of knowledge. Brave generals deliver opinions confidently about courage, without knowing what it is.

No solution given by Plato. Apparent tendency of his mind, in looking for a solution. Intelligence—cannot be understood without reference to some object or end.

¹ Plato, Lachês, 194. Καίτοι ἀθήνῃ γ' εἰμι (Lachês) τῶν τοιοῦτων λόγων· ἀλλὰ τίς με καὶ φιλονεικία εἰληθεῖ πρὸς τὰ εἰρημικά, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ οὐτως ἂν νοῦν μὴ οἷός τ' εἰμι εἰπεῖν. νοεῖν μὲν γὰρ ἐμοίγε δοκῶ περὶ ἀνδρείας ὁ, τι ἔστιν, οὐκ οἶδα ὁ δ' ὅπῃ με ἀρετὴ διέφυγεν, ὥστε μὴ ξυλλαβεῖν τῷ λόγῳ αὐτὴν καὶ εἰπεῖν ὁ, τι ἔστιν.

Compare the Charmidês, p. 159 A, 160 D, where Sokrates professes to tell Charmidês, If temperance is really in you, you can of course inform us what it is.

² Plato, Lachês, 192 D. ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία . . . ἴδωμεν δὲ, ἡ εἰς τι φρόνιμος· ἢ ἡ εἰς ἀπαντα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ σμικρά;

what end? Do you mean, to all things alike, great as well as little?" We are here reminded that *intelligence*, simply taken, is altogether undefined; that intelligence must relate to *something*—and when human conduct is in question, must relate to some end; and that the Something, and the End, to which it relates, must be set forth, before the proposition can be clearly understood.

Coming to the answer given by Nikias, we perceive that this deficiency is in a certain manner supplied. Courage is said to consist in knowledge: in knowledge of things terrible, and things not terrible. When Laches applies his cross-examination to the answer, the manner in which Nikias defends it puts us upon a distinction often brought to view, though not always adhered to, in the Platonic writings. There can be no doubt that death, distemper, loss of wealth, defeat, &c., are terrible things (i.e. the prospect of them inspires fear) in the estimation of mankind generally. Correct foresight of such contingencies, and of the antecedents tending to produce or avert them, is possessed by the physician and other professional persons: who would therefore, it should seem, possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible. But Nikias denies this. He does not admit that the contingencies here enumerated are, always or necessarily, proper objects of fear. In some cases, he contends, they are the least of two evils. Before you can be said to possess the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible, you must be able to take correct measure not only of the intervening antecedents or means, but also of the end itself as compared with other alternative ends: whether, in each particular case, it be the end most to be feared, or the real evil under the given circumstances. The professional man can do the former, but he cannot do the latter. He advises as to means, and executes: but he assumes his own one end as an indisputable datum. The physician seeks to cure his patient, without ever enquiring whether it may not be a less evil for such patient to die than to survive.

The ulterior, yet not less important, estimate of the comparative worth of different ends, is reserved for that unknown master whom Nikias himself does not farther

Object—is supplied in the answer of Nikias. Intelligence—of things terrible and not terrible. Such intelligence is not possessed by professional artists.

Postulate of a Science of

specify, and whom Lachês sets aside as nowhere to be found, under the peculiar phrase of "some God". Subjectively considered, this is an appeal to the judgment of that One Wise Man, often alluded to by Plato as an absent Expert who might be called into court—yet never to be found at the exact moment, nor produced in visible presence: Objectively considered, it is a postulate or divination of some yet undiscovered Teleology or Science of Ends: that Science of the Good, which (as we have already noticed in *Alkibiadês II.*) Plato pronounces to be the crowning and capital science of all—and without which he there declared, that knowledge on all other topics was useless and even worse than useless.¹ The One Wise Man—the *Science of Good*—are the Subject and Object corresponding to each other, and postulated by Plato. None but the One Wise Man can measure things terrible and not terrible: none else can estimate the good or evil, or the comparative value of two alternative evils, in each individual case. The items here directed to be taken into the calculation, correspond with what is laid down by Sokrates in the *Protagoras*, not with that laid down in the *Gorgias*: we find here none of that marked antithesis between pleasure and good—between pain and evil—upon which Sokrates expatiates in the *Gorgias*.

Ends, or Teleology, dimly indicated by Plato. The Unknown Wise Man—correlates with the undiscovered Science of Ends.

This appears still farther when the cross-examination is taken up by Sokrates instead of by Lachês. We are then made to perceive, that the knowledge of things terrible and not terrible is a part, but an inseparable part, of the knowledge of good and evil generally: the lesser cannot be had without the greater—and the greater carries with it not merely courage, but all the other virtues besides. None can know good or evil generally except the perfectly Wise Man. The perfect condition of the Intelligence, is the sole and all-sufficient condition of virtue. None can possess one mode of virtue separately.

Perfect condition of the intelligence—is the one sufficient condition of virtue.

This is the doctrine to which the conclusion of the *Lachês* points, though the question debated is confessedly left without solution. It is a doctrine which seems to have been really main-

¹ Plato, *Alkib. ii.* 146-147. See above, ch. xii. p. 16.

tained by the historical Sokrates, and is often implied in the reasonings of the Platonic Sokrates, but not always nor consistently.

In reference to this dialogue, the dramatic contrast is very forcible, between the cross-examination carried on by Lachés, and that carried on by Sokrates. The former is pettish and impatient, bringing out no result, and accusing the respondent of cavil and disingenuousness : the latter takes up the same answer patiently, expands it into the full generality wrapped up in it, and renders palpable its inconsistency with previous admissions.

Dramatic
contrast
between
Lachés and
Sokrates,
as cross-
examiners.

APPENDIX.

Ast is the only critic who declares the Lachês not to be Plato's work (Platon's Leben und Schr. pp. 451-456): He indeed even finds it difficult to imagine how Schleiermacher can accept it as genuine (p. 454). He justifies this opinion by numerous reasons—pointing out what he thinks glaring defects, absurdity, and bad taste, both in the ratiocination and in the dramatic handling, also *dicta* alleged to be *un-Platonic*. Compare Schleiermacher's Einleitung zum Lachês, p. 324 seq.

I do not concur with Ast in the estimation of those passages which serve as premisses to his conclusion. But even if I admitted his premisses, I still should not admit his conclusion. I should conclude that the dialogue was an inferior work of Plato, but I should conclude nothing beyond. Stallbaum (Prolegg. ad Lachet. p. 29-30, 2nd ed.) and Socher discover "*adolescentiæ vestigia*" in it, which are not apparent to me.

Socher, Stallbaum, and K. F. Hermann pass lightly over the objections of Ast; and Steinhart (Einleit. p. 355) declares them to be unworthy of a serious answer. For my part, I draw from these dissensions among the Platonic critics a conviction of the uncertain evidence upon which all of them proceed. Each has his own belief as to what Plato *must* say, *ought* to say, and *could not* have said; and each adjudicates thereupon with a degree of confidence which surprises me. The grounds upon which Ast rejects Lachês, Charmidês, and Lysis, though inconclusive, appear to me not more inconclusive than those on which he and other critics reject the Erastæ, Theagês, Hippias Major, Alkibiadês II., &c.

The dates which Stallbaum, Schleiermacher, Socher, and Steinhart assign to the Lachês (about 406-404 B.C.) are in my judgment erroneous. I have already shown my reasons for believing that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed until after the death of Sokrates. The hypotheses also of Steinhart (p. 357) as to the special purposes of Plato in composing the dialogue are unsupported by any evidence;

and are all imagined so as to fit his supposition as to the date. So also Schleiermacher tells us that a portion of the *Lachês* is intended by Plato as a defence of himself against accusations which had been brought against him, a young man, for impertinence in having attacked Lysias in the *Phædrus*, and Protagoras in the *Protagoras*, both of them much older than Plato. But Steinhart justly remarks that this explanation can only be valid if we admit Schleiermacher's theory that the *Phædrus* and the *Protagoras* are earlier compositions than the *Lachês*, which theory Steinhart and most of the others deny. Steinhart himself adapts his hypotheses to his own idea of the date of the *Lachês* : and he is open to the same remark as he himself makes upon Schleiermacher.

positions at once philosophical and poetical :¹ illustrating the affinity of these two intellectual veins, as Plato conceived them. He is also described as eminently temperate and modest :² from whence the questions of Sokrates take their departure.

You are said to be temperate, Charmides (says Sokrates). If so, your temperance will surely manifest itself within you in some way, so as to enable you to form and deliver an opinion, What Temperance is. Tell us in plain language what you conceive it to be. Temperance, replies Charmides (after some hesitation),³ consists in doing every thing in an orderly and sedate manner, when we walk in the highway, or talk, or perform other matters in the presence of others. It is, in short, a kind of sedateness or slowness.

Sokrates begins his cross-examination upon this answer, in the same manner as he had begun it with Laches in respect to courage. *Sokr.*—Is not temperance a fine and honourable thing? Does it not partake of the essence, and come under the definition, of what is fine and honourable?⁴ *Char.*—Undoubtedly it does. *Sokr.*—But if we specify in detail our various operations, either of body or mind—such as writing, reading, playing on the harp, boxing, running, jumping, learning, teaching, recollecting, comprehending, deliberating, determining, &c.—we shall find that to do them quickly is more fine and honourable than to do them slowly. Slowness does not, except by accident, belong to the fine and honourable : therefore temperance, which does so belong to it, cannot be a kind of slowness.⁵

Charmides next declares Temperance to be a variety of the feeling of shame or modesty. But this (observes Sokrates) will not hold, more than the former explanation : since Homer has pronounced shame not to be

¹ Plato, Charm. 155 A.

² Plato, Charm. 157 D. About the diffidence of Charmides in his younger years, see Xen. Mem. iii. 7, 1.

³ Plato, Charm. 159 B. τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, ἐν τε ταῖς

ἁδοῖς βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι . . . συλλήβδην ἡσυχώτης τις.

⁴ Plato, Charm. 159 C—160 D. οὐ τῶν καλῶν μόντοι ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστίν; . . . ἐπειδὴ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τε ἡμῖν ἡ σωφροσύνη ὑπερέσθῃ.

⁵ Plato, Charm. 160 C.

CHAPTER XIX.

CHARMIDES.

As in *Lachês*, we have pursued an enquiry into the nature of Courage—so in *Charmidês*, we find an examination of Temperance, Sobriety, Moderation.¹ Both dialogues conclude without providing any tenable explanation. In both there is an abundant introduction—in *Charmidês*, there is even the bustle of a crowded *palæstra*, with much dramatic incident—preluding to the substantive discussion. I omit the notice of this dramatic incident, though it is highly interesting to read.

The two persons with whom Sokrates here carries on the discussion, are Charmides and Kritias; both of whom, as historical persons, were active movers in the oligarchical government of the Thirty, with its numerous enormities. In this dialogue, Charmides appears as a youth just rising into manhood, strikingly beautiful both in face and stature: Kritias his cousin is an accomplished literary man of mature age. The powerful emotion which Sokrates describes himself as experiencing,² from the sight and close neighbourhood of the beautiful Charmides, is remarkable, as a manifestation of Hellenic sentiment. The same exaltation of the feelings and imagination, which is now produced only by beautiful women, was then excited chiefly by fine youths. Charmides is described by Kritias as exhibiting dis-

Scene and
personages
of the dia-
logue.
Crowded
palæstra.
Emotions
of Sokrates.

¹ I translate *σωφροσύνη* Temperance, though it is very inadequate, but I know no single English word better suited.

² Plato, *Charm.* 154 C. Ficinus, in his *Argumentum* to this dialogue (p. 767), considers it as mainly allegorical, especially the warm expressions of erotic sentiment contained therein,

which he compares to the Song of Solomon. "Et si omnia in hoc dialogo mirificam habeant allegoriam, amatoris maxime, non aliter quam Cantica Salomonis—mutavi tamen nonnihil—nonnihil etiam prætermisi. Quæ enim consonabant castigatissimis auribus Atticorum, rudioribus fortè auribus minimè consonarent."

good, for certain persons and under certain circumstances.¹

"Temperance consists in doing one's own business."

Here we have a third explanation, proposed by Charmides and presently espoused by Kritias. Sokrates professes not to understand it, and pronounces it to be like a riddle.² Every tradesman or artisan does the business of others as well as his own. Are we to say for that reason that he is not temperate? I distinguish (says Kritias) between *making* and *doing*: the artisan *makes* for others, but he does not *do* for others, and often cannot be said to *do* at all. *To do*, implies honourable, profitable, good, occupation: this alone is a man's own business, and this I call temperance. When a man acts so as to harm himself, he does not do his own business.³ The doing of good things, is temperance.⁴

Sokr.—Perhaps it is. But does the well-doer always and certainly know that he is doing well? Does the temperate man know his own temperance? *Krit.*—He certainly must. Indeed I think that the essence of temperance is, *Self-knowledge*. *Know thyself*—is the precept of the Delphian God, who means thereby the same as if he had said—Be temperate. I now put aside all that I have said before, and take up this new position, That temperance consists in a man's knowing himself. If you do not admit it, I challenge your cross-examination.⁵

Sokr.—I cannot tell you whether I admit it or not, until I have investigated. You address me as if I professed to know the subject: but it is because I do not know, that I examine, in conjunction with you, each successive answer.⁶ If temperance

the feeling of shame. Refuted by Sokrates.

Third answer. Temperance consists in doing one's own business. Defended by Kritias. Sokrates pronounces it a riddle, and refutes it. Distinction between making and doing.

Fourth answer, by Kritias. Temperance consists in self-knowledge.

¹ Plato, Charm. 161 A.

² Plato, Charm. 161 C—162 B. σωφροσύνη—τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν . . . αἰνιγματὶ τινι δοικεν.

There is here a good deal of playful vivacity in the dialogue: Charmides gives this last answer, which he has heard from Kritias, who is at first not forward to defend it, until Charmides forces him to come forward, by hints and side-insinuations. This is the dramatic art and variety of Plato, charming to read, but not bearing upon

him as a philosopher.

³ Plato, Charm. 163 C-D. τὰ καλῶς καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιοῦμενα . . . οἰκεία μόντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι, τὰ δὲ βλαβερὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια . . . ὅτι τὰ οἰκεία τε καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοῖς, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν νοήσεις πράξεις.

⁴ Plato, Charm. 163 E. τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοὶ διορίζομαι.

⁵ Plato, Charm. 164-165.

⁶ Plato, Charm. 165 C.

Questions of Sokrates thereupon. What good does self-knowledge procure for us? What is the object known, in this case? Answer: There is no object of knowledge, distinct from the knowledge itself.

consists in knowing, it must be a knowledge of something. *Krit.*—It is so: it is knowledge of a man's self.

Sokr.—What good does this knowledge procure for us? as medical knowledge procures for us health—architectural knowledge, buildings, &c.? *Krit.*—It has no positive result of analogous character: but neither have arithmetic nor geometry. *Sokr.*—True, but in arithmetic and geometry, we can at least indicate a something known, distinct from the knowledge. Number and proportion are distinct from arithmetic, the science which takes cognizance of them. Now what is that, of which temperance is the knowledge,—

distinct from temperance itself? *Krit.*—It is on this very point that temperance differs from all the other cognitions. Each of the others is knowledge of something different from itself, but not knowledge of itself: while temperance is knowledge of all the other sciences and of itself also.¹ *Sokr.*—If this be so, it will of course be a knowledge of ignorance, as well as a knowledge of knowledge? *Krit.*—Certainly.

Sokr.—According to your explanation, then, it is only the temperate man who knows himself. He alone is able to examine himself, and thus to find out what he really knows and does not know: he alone is able to examine others, and thus to find out what each man knows, or what each man only believes himself to know without really knowing. Temperance, or self-knowledge, is the knowledge what a man knows, and what he does not know.² Now two questions arise upon this: First, is it possible for a man to know, that he knows what he does know, and that he does not know what he does not know? Next, granting it to be possible, in what way do we gain by it? The first of these two questions involves much difficulty. How can there be any cognition, which is not cognition of a given *cognitum*, but cognition merely of other cognitions and non-cognitions? There is no vision except of some colour, no audition except of some sound: there can be no vision of

Sokrates doubts the possibility of any knowledge, without a given *cognitum* as its object. Analogies to prove that knowledge of knowledge is impossible.

¹ Plato, Charm. 166 C. αἱ μὲν ἅλλαι ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς. So also πᾶσαι ἅλλαι εἰσὶν ἐπιστήμαι, ἑαυτῶν δ' 166 E.

οὐ· ἢ δὲ μόνῃ τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν

² Plato, Charm. 167 A.

visions, or audition of auditions. So likewise, all desire is desire of some pleasure ; there is no desire of desires. All volition is volition of some good ; there is no volition of volitions : all love applies to something beautiful—there is no love of other loves. The like is true of fear, opinion, &c. It would be singular therefore, if contrary to all these analogies, there were any cognition not of some *cognitum*, but of itself and other cognitions.¹

It is of the essence of cognition to be cognition of something, and to have its characteristic property with reference to some correlate.² What is greater, has its property of being greater in relation to something else, which is less—not in relation to itself. It cannot be greater than itself, for then it would also be less than itself. It cannot include in itself the characteristic property of the *correlatum* as well as that of the *relatum*. So too about what is older, younger, heavier, lighter : there is always a something distinct, to which reference is made. Vision does not include in itself both the property of seeing, and that of being seen : the *videns* is distinct from the *visum*. A movement implies something else to be moved : a heater something else to be heated.

In all these cases (concludes Sokrates) the characteristic property is essentially relative, implying something distinguishable from, yet correlating with, itself. May we generalise the proposition, and affirm, That all properties are relative, and that every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference, not to itself, but to something else? Or is this true only of some things and not of all—so that cognition may be in the latter category?

All knowledge must be relative to some object.

All properties are relative—every thing in nature has its characteristic property with reference to something else.

This is an embarrassing question, which I do not feel qualified to decide : neither the general question, whether there be any cases of characteristic properties having no reference to any thing beyond themselves, and therefore not relative, but absolute—nor the particular question, whether cognition be one of those cases, implying no separate *cognitum*, but being itself both *relatum* and *correlatum*—cognition of cognition.³

¹ Plato, Charm. 167-168.

² Plato, Charm. 168 B. ἔστι μὲν αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμη τινὲς ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἔχει τινα τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὲς εἶναι.

³ Plato, Charm. 168-169. 169 A :

μεγάλου δὲ τινος ἀνδρός δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἰκανῶς διαρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ

But even if cognition of cognition be possible, I shall not admit it as an explanation of what temperance is, until I have satisfied myself that it is beneficial. For I have a presentiment that temperance must be something beneficial and good.¹

Let us concede for the present discussion (continues Sokrates) that cognition of cognition is possible. Still how does this prove that there can be cognition of non-cognition? that a man can know both what he knows and what he does not know? For this is what we declared self-knowledge and temperance to be.² To have cognition of cognition is one thing: to have cognition of non-cognition is a different thing, not necessarily connected with it. If you have cognition of cognition, you will be enabled to distinguish that which is cognition from that which is not—but no more. Now the knowledge or ignorance of the matter of health is one thing, known by medical science: that of justice is a different thing, known by political science. The knowledge of knowledge simply—cognition of cognition—is different from both. The person who possesses this last only, without knowing either medicine or politics, will become aware that he knows something and possesses some sort of knowledge, and will

be able to verify so much with regard to others. But *what* it is that he himself knows, or that others know, he will not thereby be enabled to find out: he will not distinguish whether that which is known belong to physiology or to politics; to do this, special acquirements are needed. You, a temperate man therefore, as such, do not know *what* you know and *what* you do not know; you know the bare fact, *that* you know and *that* you do not know. You will not be competent to cross-examine any one who professes to know medicine or any other particular subject, so as to ascertain whether the man really possesses what he pretends to

πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πύφκεν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλῃ—ἢ τὰ μὲν, τὰ δ' οὐ· καὶ εἰ ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ αὐτὰ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἔχει, ἀρ' ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἢ οὐ; καὶ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φάμεν εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἑμαυτῷ ἰκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα διαλέσθαι.

¹ Plato, Charm. 169 B. ὁφελιμὸν τι

κάνανθον μαρτυρούμαι εἶναι.

² Plato, Charm. 169 D. γινῶσκον μὲν τοῦτο ἐνγυωρήσωμεν, δυνατόν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης—ἴθι δὴ οὐν, εἰ δ' οὐ, μάλιστα δυνατόν τοῦτο, τί μάλ' οὐδὲν τί ἐστὶν εἰδέναι ἢ τί τις οἶδε καὶ ἢ μή; τοῦτο γὰρ δήπου ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γινῶσκειν αὐτὸν καὶ σωφροσύνην.

possess. There will be no point in common between you and him. You, as a temperate man, possess cognition of cognition, but you do not know any special *cognitum*: the special man knows his own special *cognitum*, but is a stranger to cognition generally. You cannot question him, nor criticise what he says or performs, in his own specialty—for of that you are ignorant:—no one can do it except some fellow *expert*. You can ascertain that he possesses *some* knowledge: but whether he possesses that particular knowledge to which he lays claim, or whether he falsely pretends to it, you cannot ascertain:—since, as a temperate man, you know only cognition and non-cognition generally. To ascertain this point, you must be not only a temperate man, but a man of special cognition besides.¹ You can question and test no one, except another temperate man like yourself.

But if this be all that temperance can do, of what use is it to us (continues Sokrates)? It is indeed a great benefit to know how much we know, and how much we do not know: it is also a great benefit to know respecting others, how much *they* know, and how much they do not know. If thus instructed, we should make fewer mistakes: we should do by ourselves only what we knew how to do,—we should commit to others that which they knew how to do, and which we did not know. But temperance (meaning thereby cognition of cognition and of non-cognition generally) does not confer such instruction, nor have we found any science which does.² How temperance benefits us, does not yet appear.

Temperance therefore as thus defined would be of little or no value.

But let us even concede—what has been just shown to be impossible—that through temperance we become aware of what we do know and what we do not know. Even upon this hypothesis, it will be of little service to us. We have been too hasty in conceding that it would be a great benefit if each of us did only what he knew, committing to others to do only what they

But even granting the possibility of that which has just been denied, still Temperance would be of

¹ Plato, *Charm.* 170-171. 171. C: Παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἢ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρίναι οἷα τε ἐσταὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης, ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον προσποιούμενον. δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὄντων, πλην γὰρ τὸν αὐτοῦ ὁμοτέχον, ὥστε οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί.

² Plato, *Charm.* 172 A. ὁρᾷς, ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία ταιαυτὴ οὐσα πεφάνται.

little value. Suppose that all separate work were well performed, by special practitioners, we should not attain our end—Happiness.

knew. I have an awkward suspicion (continues Sokrates) that after all, this would be no great benefit.¹ It is true that upon this hypothesis, all operations in society would be conducted scientifically and skillfully. We should have none but competent pilots, physicians, generals, &c., acting for us, each of them doing the work for which he was fit. The supervision exercised by temperance (in the sense above defined) would guard us against all pretenders. Let us even admit that as to prediction of the future, we should have none but competent and genuine prophets to advise us; charlatans being kept aloof by this same supervision. We should thus have every thing done scientifically and in a workmanlike manner. But should we for that reason do well and be happy? Can that be made out, Kritias?²

Krit.—You will hardly find the end of well-doing anywhere else, if you deny that it follows on doing scientifically or according to knowledge.³ *Sokr.*—But according to knowledge, of *what*? Of leather-cutting, brazen work, wool, wood, &c.? *Krit.*—No, none of these. *Sokr.*—Well then, you see, we do not follow out consistently your doctrine—That the happy man is he who lives scientifically, or according to knowledge. For all these men live according to knowledge, and still you do not admit them to be happy. Your definition of happiness applies only to some portion of those who live according to knowledge, but not to all. How are we to distinguish which of them? Suppose a man to know every thing past, present, and future; which among the fractions of such omniscience would contribute most to make him happy? Would they all contribute equally? *Krit.*—By no means. *Sokr.*—Which of them then would contribute most? Would it be that by which he knew the art of gaming? *Krit.*—Certainly not. *Sokr.*—Or that by which he knew the art of computing? *Krit.*—No. *Sokr.*—Or

¹ Plato, Charm. 172-173.

² Plato, Charm. 173 C-D. κατασκευασμένων δὲ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος, ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῆν, ἔσονται—ὅτι δ' ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττουντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοί-

μεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὕτω διδράμεθα μαθῆναι, ὡς φίλε Κριτία.

³ Plato, Charm. 173 D. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἢ δ' ὅς, οὐ βέλους εὐρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν ἢ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμᾶσθαι.

that by which he knew the conditions of health? *Krit.*—That will suit better. *Sokr.*—But which of them most of all? *Krit.*—That by which he knew good and evil.¹

Sokr.—Here then, you have been long dragging me round in a circle, keeping back the fact, that well-doing and happiness does not arise from living according to science generally, not of all other matters taken together—but from living according to the science of this one single matter, good and evil. If you exclude this last, and leave only the other sciences, each of these others will work as before: the medical man will heal, the weaver will prepare clothes, the pilot will navigate his vessel, the general will conduct his army—each of them scientifically. Nevertheless, that each of these things shall conduce to our well-being and profit, will be an impossibility, if the science of good and evil be wanting.² Now this science of good and evil, the special purpose of which is to benefit us,³ is altogether different from temperance; which you have defined as the science of cognition and non-cognition, and which appears not to benefit us at all. *Krit.*—Surely it does benefit us: for it presides over and regulates all the other sciences, and of course regulates this very science, of good and evil, among the rest. *Sokr.*—In what way can it benefit us? It does not procure for us any special service, such as good health: that is the province of medicine: in like manner, each separate result arises from its own producing art. To confer benefit is, as we have just laid down, the special province of the science of good and evil.⁴ Temperance, as the science of cognition and non-cognition, cannot work any benefit at all.

Without the science of good and evil, the other special science will be of little or no service. Temperance is not the science of good and evil, and is of little service.

Thus then, concludes Sokrates, we are baffled in every way:

¹ Plato, *Charm.* 174.

² Plato, *Charm.* 174 C-D. *ἔπει εἰ θέλεις ἐξελείν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην (of good and evil) ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἥττον τι ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἢ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεέσθαι, ἢ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἡμφιεσθαι, ἢ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποδηήσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ; Οὐδὲν ἥττον, ἔφη. Ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ τε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀφελίμως ἀπολείπειν ἡμᾶς ἐστὶν ταύτης ἀπούσης.*

³ Plato, *Charm.* 174 D. *ἥς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ἀφελείν ἡμᾶς, &c.*

⁴ Plato, *Charm.* 175 A. *Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγείας ἐστὶ δημιουργός (ἢ σωφροσύνη). Οὐ δῆτα. Ἄλλης γὰρ ἢ τέχνης ὑγεία, ἢ οὐ; Ἄλλης. Οὐδ' ἄρα ἀφελείας, ὡς εἴπαι· ἄλλη γὰρ αὖ ἀπὸδομὴν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνη νῦν δὲ· ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Πῶς οὖν ἀφελίμως ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμίαν ἀφελείας οὐσα δημιουργός; Οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰκοί γε.*

Sokrates confesses to entire failure in his research. He cannot find out what temperance is: although several concessions have been made which cannot be justified.

we cannot find out what temperance is, nor what that name has been intended to designate. All our tentatives have failed; although, in our anxiety to secure some result, we have accepted more than one inadmissible hypothesis. Thus we have admitted that there might exist cognition of cognition, though our discussion tended to negative such a possibility. We have farther granted, that this cognition of cognition, or science of science, might know all the operations of each separate and special science: so that the temperate man (i.e. he who possesses cognition of cognition) might know both what he knows and what he does not know: might know, namely, that he knows the former and that he does not know the latter. We have granted this, though it is really an absurdity to say, that what a man does not know at all, he nevertheless does know after a certain fashion.¹ Yet after these multiplied concessions against strict truth, we have still been unable to establish our definition of temperance: for temperance as we defined it has, after all, turned out to be thoroughly unprofitable.

It is plain that we have taken the wrong road, and that I (Sokrates) do not know how to conduct the enquiry. Temperance is and must be a good thing: but Charmides cannot tell whether he is temperate or not: since what temperance is remains unknown. For temperance, whatever it may consist in, must assuredly be a great benefit: and you, Charmides, are happy if you possess it. How can I tell (rejoins Charmides) whether I possess it or not: since even men like you and Kritias cannot discover what it is?²

Expressions both from Charmides

Here ends the dialogue called Charmidês,³ after the interchange of a few concluding compliments, forming

¹ Plato, Charm. 175 B. και γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἴσμεν τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοιτο εἶναι· καὶ ταύτη αὐτῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γινώσκειν ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἴσμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σῶφρων ἐπιστήμων ὡν τε οἶδεν, ὅτι οἶδε, καὶ ὡν μὴ οἶδεν, ὅτι οὐκ οἶδε. τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδ' ἰσχυρόμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, α

τις μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ μὲν, ταῦτα εἶδέναι ἄμωγ γὰρ πως· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδε, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἶδέναι ἢ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία. καίτοι, ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, οὐδενὸς δέου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ' εἶναι φαίνεται. This would not appear an absurdity to Aristotle. See Analyt. Priora, II. p. 67, a. 21; Anal. Post. I. 71, a. 22.

² Plato, Charm. 175 A.

³ See Appendix at end of chapter.

part of the great dramatic richness which characterises this dialogue from the beginning. I make no attempt to reproduce this latter attribute ; though it is one of the peculiar merits of Plato in reference to ethical enquiry, imparting to the subject a charm which does not naturally belong to it. I confine myself to the philosophical bearing of the dialogue. According to the express declaration of Sokrates, it ends in nothing but disappointment. No positive result is attained. The problem—What is Temperance?—remains unsolved, after four or five different solutions have been successively tested and repudiated.

and Kritias of praise and devotion to Sokrates, at the close of the dialogue. Dramatic ornament throughout.

The Charnidés (like the Lachês) is a good illustrative specimen of those Dialogues of Search, the general character and purpose of which I have explained in my sixth chapter. It proves nothing : it disproves several hypotheses : but it exhibits (and therein consists its value) the anticipating, guessing, tentative, and eliminating process, without which no defensible conclusions can be obtained—without which, even if such be found, no advocate can be formed capable of defending them against an acute cross-examiner. In most cases, this tentative process is forgotten or ignored : even when recognised as a reality, it is set aside with indifference, often with ridicule. A writer who believes himself to have solved any problem, publishes his solution together with the proofs ; and acquires deserved credit for it, if those proofs give satisfaction. But he does not care to preserve, nor do the public care to know, the steps by which such solution has been reached. Nevertheless in most cases, and in all cases involving much difficulty, there has been a process, more or less tedious, of tentative and groping—of guesses at first hailed as promising, then followed out to a certain extent, lastly discovered to be untenable. The history of science,¹ astronomical, physical, chemical, physiological, &c.,

The Charnidés is an excellent specimen of Dialogues of Search. Abundance of guesses and tentatives, all ultimately disallowed.

¹ It is not often that historians of science take much pains to preserve and bring together the mistaken guesses and tentatives which have preceded great physical discoveries. One instance in which this has been ably and carefully done is in the 'Biography of

Cavendish,' the chemist and natural philosopher, by Dr. Geo. Wilson.

The great chemical discovery of the composition of water, accomplished during the last quarter of the eighteenth century, has been claimed as the privilege of three eminent scientific men

wherever it has been at all recorded, attests this constant antecedence of a period of ignorance, confusion, and dispute, even in cases where ultimately a solution has been found commanding the nearly unanimous adhesion of the scientific world. But on subjects connected with man and society, this period of dispute and confusion continues to the present moment. No unanimity has ever been approached, among nations at once active in intellect and enjoying tolerable liberty of dissent. Moreover—apart from the condition of different sciences among mature men—we must remember that the transitive process, above described, represents the successive stages by which every adult mind has been gradually built up from infancy. Trial and error—alternate guess and rejection, generation and destruction of sentiments and beliefs—is among the most widespread facts of human intelligence.¹ Even those ordinary minds, which in mature life harden with the most exemplary fidelity into the locally prevalent type of orthodoxy,—have all in their earlier years gone through that semi-fluid and indeterminate period, in which the type to come is yet a matter of doubt—in which the head might have been permanently lengthened or permanently flattened, according to the direction in which pressure was applied.

We shall follow Plato towards the close of his career (*Treatise De Legibus*), into an imperative and stationary ortho-

—Cavendish, Watt, and Lavoisier. The controversy on the subject, voluminous and bitter, has been the means of recording each successive scientific phase and point of view. It will be found admirably expounded in this biography. Wilson sets forth the misconceptions, confusion of ideas, approximations to truth seen but not followed out, &c., which prevailed upon the scientific men of that day, especially under the misleading influence of the “*phlogiston* theory,” then universally received.

To Plato such a period of mental confusion would have been in itself an interesting object for contemplation and description. He might have dramatised it under the names of various disputants, with the cross-examining Elenchus, personified in Sokrates, introduced to stir up the debate, either by first advocating, then refuting, a string of successive guesses

and dreams (*Charmides*, 173 A) of his own, or by exposing similar suggestions emanating from others; especially in regard to the definition of *phlogiston*, an entity which then overspread and darkened all chemical speculation, but which every theorist thought himself obliged to define. The dialogues would have ended (as the *Protagoras*, *Lyais*, *Charmides*, &c., now end) by Sokrates deriding the ill success which had attended them in the search for an explanation, and by his pointing out that while all the theorists talked familiarly about *phlogiston* as a powerful agent, none of them could agree what it was.

See Dr. Wilson's ‘*Biography of Cavendish*,’ pp. 36-198-320-325, and elsewhere.

¹ It is strikingly described by Plato in one of the most remarkable passages of the speech of Diotima in the *Symposium*, pp. 207-208.

doxy of his own : but in the dialogues which I have already reviewed, as well as in several others which I shall presently notice, no mention is made of any given affirmative doctrine as indispensable to arrive at ultimately. Plato here concentrates his attention upon the indeterminate period of the mind : looking upon the mind not as an empty vessel, requiring to be filled by ready-made matter from without—nor as a blank sheet, awaiting a foreign hand to write characters upon it—but as an assemblage of latent capacities, which must be called into action by stimulus and example, but which can only attain improvement through multiplied trials and multiplied failures. Whereas in most cases these failures are forgotten, the peculiarity of Plato consists in his bringing them to view with full detail, explaining the reasons of each. He illustrates abundantly, and dramatises with the greatest vivacity, the intellectual process whereby opinions are broached, at first adopted, then mistrusted, unmade, and re-made—or perhaps not re-made at all, but exchanged for a state of conscious ignorance. The great hero and operator in this process is the Platonic Sokrates, who accepts for himself this condition of conscious ignorance, and even makes it a matter of comparative pride, that he stands nearly alone in such confession.¹ His colloquial influence, working powerfully and almost preternaturally,² not only serves both to spur and to direct the activity of hearers still youthful and undecided, but also exposes those who have already made up their minds and confidently believe themselves to know. Sokrates brings back these latter from the false persuasion of knowledge to the state of conscious ignorance, and to the prior indeterminate condition of mind, in which their opinions have again to be put together by the tentative and guessing process. This tentative process, prosecuted under the drill of Sokrates, is in itself full of charm and interest for Plato, whether it ends by finding a good solution or only by discarding a bad one.

The *Charmidés* is one of the many Platonic dialogues wherein

Trial and Error, the natural process of the human mind. Plato stands alone in bringing to view and dramatising this part of the mental process. Sokrates accepts for himself the condition of conscious ignorance.

¹ Plato, *Apolog. Sokr.* pp. 21-22-23.

² Plato, *Symposium*, 213 E, 215-216; *Menon*, 80 A-B.

Familiar words—
constantly
used, with
much ear-
nest feeling,
but never
understood
nor defined
—ordinary
phenome-
non in
human
society.

such intellectual experimentation appears depicted without any positive result: except as it adds fresh matter to illustrate that wide-spread mental fact,—(which has already come before the reader, in Euthyphron, Alkibiadēs, Hippias, Erastæ, Lachēs, &c., as to holiness, beauty, philosophy, courage, &c., and is now brought to view in the case of *temperance* also; all of them words in every one's mouth, and tacitly assumed by every one as known quantities)—the perpetual and confident judgments which mankind are in the habit of delivering—their apportionment of praise and blame, as well as of reward and punishment consequent on praise and blame—without any better basis than that of strong emotion imbibed they know not how, and without being able to render any rational explanation even of the familiar words round which such emotions are grouped. No philosopher has done so much as Plato to depict in detail this important fact—the habitual condition of human society, modern as well as ancient, and for that very reason generally unnoticed.¹ The emotional or subjective value of temperance is all that Sokrates determines, and which indeed he makes his point of departure. Temperance is essentially among the fine, beautiful, honourable, things:² but its rational or objective value (i.e., what is the common object characterising all temperate acts or persons), he cannot determine. Here indeed Plato is not always consistent with himself: for we shall come to other dialogues wherein he professes himself incompetent to say whether a thing be beautiful or not, until it be determined what the thing is:³ and we have already found

¹ "Whoever has reflected on the generation of ideas in his own mind, or has investigated the causes of misunderstandings among mankind; will be obliged to proclaim as a fact deeply seated in human nature.—That most of the misunderstandings and contradictions among men, most of the controversies and errors both in science and in society, arise usually from our assuming (consciously or unconsciously) fundamental maxims and fundamental facts as if they were self-evident, and as if they must be assumed by every one else besides. Accordingly we never think of closely examining them, until at length experience has taught us

that these *self-evident* matters are exactly what stand most in need of proof, and what form the special root of divergent opinions."—(L. O. Bröcker—Untersuchungen über die Glaubwürdigkeit der alt-Römischen Geschichte, p. 490.)

² Plato, Charm. 159 B, 160 D. ἡ σωφροσύνη—τῶν καλῶν τι—ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῶν καλῶν τι. So also Sokrates, in the Lachēs (192 C), assumes that courage is τῶν πάντων καλῶν πραγμάτων, though he professes not to know nor to be able to discover what courage is.

³ See Gorgias, 462 E, 448 E; Menon, 70 B.

Sokrates declaring (in the *Hippias Major*), that we cannot determine whether any particular object is beautiful or not, until we have first determined, What is Beauty in the Absolute, or the Self-Beautiful? a problem nowhere solved by Plato.

Among the various unsuccessful definitions of temperance propounded, there is more than one which affords farther example to show how differently Plato deals with the same subject in different dialogues. Here we have the phrase—"to do one's own business"—treated as an unmeaning puzzle, and exhibited as if it were analogous to various other phrases, with which the analogy is more verbal than real. But in the *Republic*, Plato admits this phrase as well understood, and sets it forth as the constituent element of justice; in the *Gorgias*, as the leading mark of philosophical life.¹

Different ethical points of view in different Platonic dialogues.

Again, another definition given by Kritias is, That temperance consists in knowing yourself, or in self-knowledge. In commenting upon this definition, Sokrates makes out—first, that self-knowledge is impossible: next, that if possible, it would be useless. You cannot know yourself, he argues: you cannot know what you know, and what you do not know: to say that you know what you know, is either tautological or untrue—to say that you know what you do not know, is a contradiction. All cognition must be cognition of something distinct from yourself: it is a relative term which must have some correlate, and cannot be its own correlate: you cannot have cognition of cognition, still less cognition of non-cognition.

Self-knowledge is here declared to be impossible.

This is an important point of view, which I shall discuss more at length when I come to the *Platonic Theætétus*. I bring it to view here only as contrasting with the different language held by the Platonic Sokrates in other dialogues; where he insists on the great value and indispensable necessity of self-knowledge, as a preliminary to all other knowledge—upon the duty of eradicating from men's minds that false persuasion of their own knowledge which they universally che-

In other dialogues, Sokrates declares self-knowledge to be essential and inestimable. Necessity for the student to have pre-

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iv. 433, vi. 496 C, viii. 550 A; *Gorgias*, 526 C. Compare also *Timæus*, 72 A, *Xen. Mem.* ii. 9, 1.

sented to him dissent-
ient points
of view.

rished—and upon the importance of forcing them to know their own ignorance as well as their own knowledge. In the face of this last purpose, so frequently avowed by the Platonic Sokrates (indirectly even in this very dialogue),¹ we remark a material discrepancy, when he here proclaims self-knowledge to be impossible. We must judge every dialogue by itself, illustrating it when practicable by comparison with others, but not assuming consistence between them as a postulate *à priori*. It is a part of Plato's dramatic and tentative mode of philosophising to work out different ethical points of view, and to have present to his mind one or other of them, with peculiar force in each different dialogue. The subject is thus brought before us on all its sides, and the reader is familiarised with what a dialectician might say, whether capable of being refuted or not. Inconsistency between one dialogue and another is not a fault in the Platonic dialogues of Search; but is, on the contrary, a part of the training process, for any student who is destined to acquire that full mastery of question and answer which Plato regards as the characteristic test of knowledge. It is a puzzle and provocative to the internal meditation of the student.

In analysing the *Lachês*, we observed that the definition of courage given by Nikias was shown by Sokrates to have no meaning, except in so far as it coincided with the general knowledge or cognition of good and evil. Here, too, in the *Charmidês*, we are brought in the last result to the same terminus—the general cognition of good and evil. But Temperance, as previously defined, is not comprehended under that cognition, and is therefore pronounced to be unprofitable.

This cognition of good and evil—the science of the profitable—is here (in the *Charmidês*) proclaimed by Sokrates to have a place of its own among the other sciences; and even to be first among them, essentially necessary to supervise and direct them, as it had been declared in *Alkibiadês II.* Now the same supervising place and directorship had been claimed by

Courage and Temperance are shown to have no distinct meaning, except as founded on the general cognition of good and evil.

Distinction made between the special sciences and the science of Good and Evil. With-

¹ Plato, *Charm.* 166 D.

Kritias for Temperance as he defines it—that is, self-knowledge, or the cognition of our cognitions and non-cognitions. But Sokrates doubts even the reality of such self-knowledge: and granting for argument's sake that it exists, he still does not see how it can be profitable. For the utmost which its supervision can ensure would be, that each description of work shall be scientifically done, by the skilful man, and not by the unskilful. But it is not true, absolutely speaking (he argues), that acting scientifically or with knowledge is sufficient for well doing or for happiness: for the question must next be asked—Knowledge—of what? Not knowledge of leather-cutting, carpenter's or brazier's work, arithmetic, or even medicine: these, and many others, a man may possess, and may act according to them; but still he will not attain the end of being happy. All cognitions contribute in greater or less proportion towards that end: but what contributes most, and most essentially, is the cognition of good and evil, without which all the rest are insufficient. Of this last-mentioned cognition or science, it is the special object to ensure profit or benefit:¹ to take care that everything done by the other sciences shall be done well or in a manner conducing towards the end Happiness. After this, there is no province left for temperance—i.e., self-knowledge, or the knowledge of cognitions and non-cognitions: no assignable way in which it can yield any benefit.²

Two points are here to be noted, as contained and debated in the handling of this dialogue. 1. Knowledge absolutely, is a word without meaning: all knowledge is relative, and has a definite object or *cognitum*: there can be no *scientia scientiarum*. 2. Among the various objects of knowledge (*cognita* or *cognoscenda*), one is, *good and evil*. There is a science of good and evil, the function of which is, to watch over and compare the results of the other sciences, in order to promote results of happiness, and to prevent results of misery: without the supervision of this latter science, the other sciences might be all

out this last, the special sciences are of no use.

Knowledge, always relative to some object known. Postulate or divination of a Science of Teleology.

¹ Plato, Charm. 174 D. Οὐχ αὐτῇ δι' γε, ὡς δοκεῖν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλ' ἢς ἔργον ἐστὶ τὸ ωφελεῖν ἡμᾶς. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀρεπιστημοσύνην ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ.

² Plato, Charm. 174 E. Οὐκ ἄρα ὕψις ἐστὶν δημιουργός; Οὐ δὴ τα.

Ἄλλης γὰρ ἢν τέχνης ὕψις; ἢ οὐ; Ἄλλης. Οὐδ' ἄρα ωφελείας, ὃ ἔταίρε' ἀλλ' ἡ γὰρ αὐτὴ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνην νῦν δὴ; ἢ γάρ; Πάνυ γε. Πῶς οὖν ωφελίμος ἐστὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδ' ἡμᾶς ωφελείας οὐδ' αὖ δημιουργός; Οὐκ ἂν μῶς, ὦ Ζώικρατες, εἰσὶ καὶ γε.

exactly followed out, but no rational comparison could be had between them.¹ In other words, there is a science of Ends, estimating the comparative worth of each End in relation to other Ends (Teleology): distinct from those other more special sciences, which study the means each towards a separate End of its own. Here we fall into the same track as we have already indicated in *Lachês* and *Alkibiadês II.*

These matters I shall revert to in other dialogues, where we shall find them turned over and canvassed in many different ways. One farther observation remains to be made on the *Lachês* and *Charmidês*, discussing as they do Courage (which is also again discussed in the *Protagoras*) and Temperance. An interesting comparison may be made between them and the third book of the *Nikomachean Ethics* of Aristotle,² where the same two subjects are handled in the Aristotelian manner. The direct, didactic, systematising, brevity of Aristotle contrasts remarkably with the indirect and circuitous prolixity, the multiplied suggestive comparisons, the shifting points of view, which we find in Plato. Each has its advantages: and both together will be found not more than sufficient, for any one who is seriously bent on acquiring what Plato calls knowledge, with the cross-examining power included in it. Aristotle is greatly superior to Plato in one important attribute of a philosopher: in the care which he takes to discriminate the different significations of the same word: the univocal and the equivocal, the generically identical from the remotely analogical, the proper from the improper, the literal from the metaphorical. Of such precautions we discover little or no trace in Plato, who sometimes seems not merely to neglect, but even to deride them. Yet Aristotle, assisted as he was by all Plato's speculations before us, is not to be understood as having superseded the necessity for that negative *Elenchus* which animates the Platonic dialogues of Search: nor would his affirmative doctrines have held their grounds before a cross-examining *Sokrates*.

¹ Compare what has been said upon the same subject in my remarks on *Alkib. i.* and *ii. p.*

² *Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. iii. p. 1115, 1119; also Ethic. Eudem. iii. 1229, 1231.*

The comments of Aristotle upon the doctrine of *Sokrates* respecting Courage seem to relate rather to the *Protagoras* than to the *Lachês* of Plato. See *Eth. Nik. 1116, 6, 4; Eth. Eud. 1229, a. 15.*

APPENDIX.

The dialogue *Charmidês* is declared to be spurious, not only by Ast, but also by Socher (Ast, *Platon's Leb.* pp. 419-428 ; Socher, *Ueber Platon*, pp. 130-137). Steinhart maintains the genuineness of the dialogue against them ; declaring (as in regard to the *Lachês*) that he can hardly conceive how critics can mistake the truly Platonic character of it, though here too, as in the *Lachês*, he detects "*adolescenciæ vestigia*" (Steinhart, *Einleit. zum Charmidês*, pp. 290-293).

Schleiermacher considers *Charmidês* as well as *Lachês* to be appendixes to the *Protagoras*, which opinion both Stallbaum (*Proleg. ad Charm.* p. 121 ; *Proleg. ad Lachet.* p. 30, 2nd ed.) and Steinhart controvert.

The views of Stallbaum respecting the *Charmidês* are declared by Steinhart (p. 290) to be "*recht äusserlich und oberflächlich*". To me they appear much nearer the truth than the profound and recondite meanings, the far-sighted indirect hints, which Steinhart himself perceives or supposes in the words of Plato.

These critics consider the dialogue as composed during the government of the Thirty at Athens, in which opinion I do not concur.

CHAPTER XX.

LYSIS.

THE *Lysis*, as well as the *Charmidês*, is a dialogue recounted by Sokrates himself, describing both incidents and a conversation in a crowded *Palæstra*; wherein not merely bodily exercises were habitually practised, but debate was carried on and intellectual instruction given by a Sophist named Mikkus, companion and admirer of Sokrates. There is a lively dramatic commencement, introducing Sokrates into the *Palæstra*, and detailing the preparation and scenic arrangements, before the real discussion opens. It is the day of the *Hermæa*, or festival of *Hermes*, celebrated by sacrifice and its accompanying banquets among the frequenters of *gymnasia*.

Lysis, like *Charmidês*, is an Athenian youth, of conspicuous beauty, modesty, and promise. His father *Demokrates* represents an ancient family of the *Æxonian Deme* in *Attica*, and is said to be descended from *Zeus* and the daughter of the *Archêgetês* or Heroic Founder of that *Deme*. The family moreover are so wealthy, that they have gained many victories at the *Pythian*, *Isthmian*, and *Nemean games*, both with horses and with chariots and four. *Menexenus*, companion of *Lysis*, is somewhat older, and is his affectionate friend. The persons who invite Sokrates into the *palæstra*, and give occasion to the debate, are *Ktesippus* and *Hippothalês*: both of them adults, yet in the vigour of age. *Hippothalês* is the *Erastes* of *Lysis*, passionately attached to him. He is ridiculed by *Ktesippus* for perpetually talking about *Lysis*, as well as for addressing to him compositions both in prose and verse, full of praise and

Analogy between *Lysis* and *Charmidês*.
Richness of dramatic incident in both.
Youthful beauty.

Scenery and personages of the *Lysis*.

flattery ; extolling not only his personal beauty, but also his splendid ancestry and position.¹

In reference to these addresses, Sokrates remonstrates with Hippothalês on the imprudence and mischief of addressing to a youth flatteries calculated to turn his head. He is himself then invited by Hippothalês to exhibit a specimen of the proper mode of talking to youth ; such as shall be at once acceptable to the person addressed, and unobjectionable. Sokrates agrees to do so, if an opportunity be afforded him of conversing with Lysis.² Accordingly after some well-imagined incidents, interesting as marks of Greek manners—Sokrates and Ktesippus with others seat themselves in the palæstra, amidst a crowd of listeners.³ Lysis, too modest at first to approach, is emboldened to sit down by seeing Menexenus seated by the side of Sokrates : while Hippothalês, not daring to put himself where Lysis can see him, listens, but conceals himself behind some of the crowd. Sokrates begins the conversation with Menexenus and Lysis jointly : but presently Menexenus is called away for a moment, and he talks with Lysis singly.

Origin of the conversation. Sokrates promises to give an example of the proper way of talking to a youth, for his benefit.

Sokr.—Well—Lysis—your father and mother love you extremely. *Lysis.*—Assuredly they do. *Sokr.*—They would wish you therefore to be as happy as possible. *Lysis.*—Undoubtedly. *Sokr.*—Do you think any man happy, who is a slave, and who is not allowed to do any thing that he desires ? *Lysis.*—I do not think him happy at all. *Sokr.*—Since therefore your father and mother are so anxious that you should be happy, they of course allow you to do the things which you desire, and never reprove nor forbid you. *Lysis.*—Not at all, by Zeus, Sokrates : there are a great many things that they forbid me. *Sokr.*—How say you ! they wish you to be happy—and they hinder you from doing what you wish ! Tell me, for example, when one of your father's chariots is going to run a race, if you wished to mount and take the reins, would not they allow you to do so ? *Lysis.*—No—certainly : they would not allow me. *Sokr.*—But whom do they allow, then ? *Lysis.*—My father employs a paid charioteer. *Sokr.*—What ! do they per-

Conver-
sation of
Sokrates
with Lysis.

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 203-205.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 206.

³ Plato, *Lysis*, 206-207.

mit a hireling, in preference to *you*, to do what he wishes with the horses? and do they give him pay besides for doing so? *Lysis*.—Why—to be sure. *Sokr*.—But doubtless, I imagine, they trust the team of mules to your direction; and if you chose to take the whip and flog, they would allow you? *Lysis*.—Allow me? not at all. *Sokr*.—What! is no one allowed to flog them? *Lysis*.—Yes—certainly—the mule-groom. *Sokr*.—Is he a slave or free? *Lysis*.—A slave. *Sokr*.—Then, it seems, they esteem a slave higher than you their son; trusting their property to him rather than to you, letting *him* do what he pleases, while they forbid you. But tell me farther: do they allow you to direct yourself—or do not they even trust you so far as that? *Lysis*.—How can you imagine that they trust me? *Sokr*.—But does any one else direct you? *Lysis*.—Yes—this tutor here. *Sokr*.—Is he a slave? *Lysis*.—To be sure: belonging to our family. *Sokr*.—That is shocking: one of free birth to be under the direction of a slave! But what is it that he does, as your director? *Lysis*.—He conducts me to my teacher's house. *Sokr*.—What! do *they* govern you also, these teachers? *Lysis*.—Undoubtedly they do. *Sokr*.—Then your father certainly is bent on putting over you plenty of directors and governors. But surely, when you come home to your mother, she at least, anxious that you should be happy as far as she is concerned, lets you do what you please about the wool or the web, when she is weaving: she does not forbid you to meddle with the bodkin or any of the other instruments of her work? *Lysis*.—Ridiculous! not only does she forbid me, but I should be beaten if I did meddle. *Sokr*.—How is this, by Heraklès? Have you done any wrong to your father and mother? *Lysis*.—Never at all, by Zeus. *Sokr*.—From what provocation is it, then, that they prevent you in this terrible way, from being happy and doing what you wish? keeping you the whole day in servitude to some one, and never your own master? so that you derive no benefit either from the great wealth of the family, which is managed by every one else rather than by you—or from your own body, noble as it is. Even *that* is consigned to the watch and direction of another: while you, *Lysis*, are master of nothing, nor can do any one thing of what you desire. *Lysis*.—The reason is, Sokrates, that I am not yet old enough. *Sokr*.—That can hardly be the reason; for to a certain extent your father and

mother do trust you, without waiting for you to grow older. If they want any thing to be written or read for them, they employ you for that purpose in preference to any one in the house : and you are then allowed to write or read first, whichever of the letters you think proper. Again, when you take up the lyre, neither father nor mother hinder you from tightening or relaxing the strings, or striking them either with your finger or with the plectrum. *Lysis*.—They do not. *Sokr*.—Why is it, then, that they do not hinder you in this last case, as they did in the cases before mentioned? *Lysis*.—I suppose it is because I know this last, but did not know the others. *Sokr*.—Well, my good friend, you see that it is not your increase of years that your father waits for ; but on the very day that he becomes convinced that you know better than he, he will entrust both himself and his property to your management. *Lysis*.—I suppose that he will. *Sokr*.—Ay—and your neighbour too will judge in the same way as your father. As soon as he is satisfied that you understand house-management better than he does, which do you think he will rather do—confide his house to you, or continue to manage it himself? *Lysis*.—I think he will confide it to me. *Sokr*.—The Athenians too : do not you think that they also will put their affairs into your management, as soon as they perceive that you have intelligence adequate to the task? *Lysis*.—Yes : I do. *Sokr*.—What do you say about the Great King also, by Zeus ! When his meat is being boiled, would he permit his eldest son who is to succeed to the rule of Asia, to throw in any thing that he pleases into the sauce, rather than us, if we come and prove to him that we know better than his son the way of preparing sauce? *Lysis*.—Clearly, he will rather permit us. *Sokr*.—The Great King will not let his son throw in even a pinch of salt : while we, if we chose to take up an entire handful, should be allowed to throw it in. *Lysis*.—No doubt. *Sokr*.—What if his son has a complaint in his eyes ; would the Great King, knowing him to be ignorant of medicine, allow him even to touch his own eyes—or would he forbid him? *Lysis*.—He would forbid him. *Sokr*.—As to us, on the contrary, if he accounted us good physicians, and if we desired even to open the eyes and drop a powder into them, he would not hinder us, in the conviction that we understood what we were doing. *Lysis*.

—You speak truly. *Sokr.*—All other matters, in short, on which he believed us to be wiser than himself or his son, he would entrust to us rather than to himself or his son? *Lysis.*—Necessarily so, Sokrates. *Sokr.*—This is the state of the case, then, my dear Lysis: On those matters on which we shall have become intelligent, all persons will put trust in us—Greeks as well as barbarians, men as well as women. We shall do whatever we please respecting them: no one will be at all inclined to interfere with us on such matters; not only we shall be ourselves free, but we shall have command over others besides. These matters will be really ours, because we shall derive real good from them.¹ As to those subjects, on the contrary, on which we shall not have acquired intelligence, no one will trust us to do what we think right: every one,—not merely strangers, but father and mother and nearer relatives if there were any,—will obstruct us as much as they can: we shall be in servitude so far as these subjects are concerned; and they will be really alien to us, for we shall derive no real good from them. Do you admit that this is the case? *Lysis.*—I do admit it. *Sokr.*—Shall we then be friends to any one, or will any one love us, on those matters on which we are unprofitable? *Lysis.*—Certainly not. *Sokr.*—You see that neither does your father love you, nor does any man love another, in so far as he is useless? *Lysis.*—Apparently not. *Sokr.*—If then you become intelligent, my boy, all persons will be your friends and all persons will be your kinsmen: for you will be useful and good: if you do not, no one will be your friend,—not even your father nor your mother nor your other relatives.

Is it possible then, Lysis, for a man to think highly of himself on those matters on which he does not yet think aright? *Lysis.*—How can it be possible? *Sokr.*—If you stand in need of a teacher, you do not yet think aright? *Lysis.*—True. *Sokr.*—Accordingly, you are not presumptuous on the score of intelligence, since you are still without intelligence. *Lysis.*—By Zeus, Sokrates, I think not.²

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 210 B. *καὶ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶς ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι ἐμποδίζει, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ τε ἐλευθέροι ἐσόμεθα ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχόντες, ἡμετέρὰ τε ταῦτα ἔσται· ὀνησόμεθα γὰρ ἐκ αὐτῶν.* αὐτοῖς ἐσόμεθα ἄλλων ὑπὲρκοι, καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται ἑλλότριά· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ αὐτῶν ὀνησόμεθα. *Συγχωρεῖς οὕτως ἔχειν;*

² Plato, *Lysis*, 210 C. *αὐτοὶ τε ἐν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἄλλοι, μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐν οἷς*

When I heard Lysis speak thus (continues Sokrates, who is here the narrator), I looked towards Hippothalés and I was on the point of committing a blunder: for it occurred to me to say, That is the way, Hippothalés, to address a youth whom you love: you ought to check and humble him, not puff him up and spoil him, as you have hitherto done. But when I saw him agitated and distressed by what had been said, I called to mind that, though standing close by, he wished not to be seen by Lysis. Accordingly, I restrained myself and said nothing of the kind.¹

Lysis is humiliated. Distress of Hippothalés.

Lysis accepts this as a friendly lesson, inculcating humility: and seeing Menexenus just then coming back, he says aside to Sokrates, Talk to Menexenus, as you have been talking to me. You can tell him yourself (replies Sokrates) what you have heard from me: you listened very attentively. Most certainly I shall tell him (says Lysis): but meanwhile pray address to him yourself some other questions, for me to hear. You must engage to help me if I require it (answers Sokrates): for Menexenus is a formidable disputant, scholar of our friend Ktesippus, who is here ready to assist him. I know he is (rejoined Lysis), and it is for that very reason that I want you to talk to him—that you may chasten and punish him.²

Lysis entreats Sokrates to talk in the like strain to Menexenus.

I have given at length, and almost literally (with some few abbreviations), this first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, because it is a very characteristic passage, exhibiting conspicuously several peculiar features of the Platonic-Socratic interrogation. Facts common and familiar are placed in a novel point of view, ingeniously contrasted, and introduced as stepping-stones to a very wide generality. Wisdom or knowledge is exalted into the ruling force with liberty of

Value of the first conversation between Sokrates and Lysis, as an illustration of the Platonic-Socratic manner.

τις μήτε φρονεῖ; Καὶ πῶς ἂν; ἔφη. Εἰ δ' ἄρα σὺ διδασκάλου δέει, οὕτω φρονεῖς. Ἀληθῆ.

Οὐδ' ἄρα μεγαλόφρων εἶ, εἴπερ ἄφρων ἐστὶ. Μὰ Δί', ἔφη, ὦ Σόκράτης, οὐ μοι δοκεῖ.

There is here a double sense of μέγα φρονεῖν, μεγαλόφρων, which cannot easily be made to pass into any other language.

¹ Plato, Lysis, 210 E.

² Plato, Lysis, 211 B-C. ἄλλ' ὅρα ὅπως ἐπικουρήσεις μοι, εἴαν με ἐλγέχην ἐπιχειρῇ ὁ Μενέξενος. ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι ἱστοτικός ἐστι; Ναι μὰ Δία, ἔφη, σφέδρα γε. διὰ ταῦτά τοι καὶ βούλομαι σε αὐτῷ διαλγίσθαι—ἵν' αὐτὸν κολάωγας.

Compare Xenophon, Memor. 1. 4. 1, where he speaks of the chastising purpose often contemplated by Sokrates in

action not admissible except under its guidance: the questions are put in an inverted half-ironical tone (not uncommon with the historical Sokrates¹), as if an affirmative answer were expected as a matter of course, while in truth the answer is sure to be negative: lastly, the purpose of checking undue self-esteem is proclaimed. The rest of the dialogue, which contains the main substantive question investigated, I can report only in brief abridgment, with a few remarks following.

Sokrates begins, as Lysis requests, to interrogate Menexenus—
 first premising—Different men have different tastes :
 Sokrates begins to examine Menexenus respecting friendship. Who is to be called a friend? Halt in the dialogue.
 some love horses and dogs, others wealth or honours. For my part, I care little about all such acquisitions: but I ardently desire to possess friends, and I would rather have a good friend than all the treasures of Persia. You two, Menexenus and Lysis, are much to be envied, because at your early age, each of you has made an attached friend of the other. But I am so far from any such good fortune, that I do not even know how any man becomes the friend of another. This is what I want to ask from you, Menexenus, as one who must know,² having acquired such a friend already.

When one man loves another, which becomes the friend of which? Does he who loves, become the friend of him whom he loves, whether the latter returns the affection or not? Or is the person loved, whatever be his own dispositions, the friend of the person who loves him? Or is reciprocity of affection necessary, in order that either shall be the friend of the other?

The speakers cannot satisfy themselves that the title of *friend* fits either of the three cases;³ so that this line of interrogating comes to a dead lock. Menexenus avows his embarrassment, while Lysis expresses himself more hopefully.

Sokrates now takes up a different aspect of the question, and

his conversation—*ἡ δὲ αὖτις κολαστηρίον ἔσκα τοὺς πάντας οἰομένους εἶδέναι ἑρῶν ἡλέγγυν.*

¹ See the conversation of Sokrates with Glaukon in Xenophon, *Memor. iii. 6*; also the conversation with Perikles, *iii. 5, 23-24*.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 211-212.

³ Plato, *Lysis*, 212-213. 213 C:—

εἰ μήτε οἱ φιλοῦντες (1) φίλοι ἴσονται, μήθ' οἱ φιλούμενοι (2), μήθ' οἱ φιλοῦντές τε καὶ φιλούμενοι (3), &c. Sokrates here professes to have shown grounds for rejecting all these three suppositions. But if we follow the preceding argument, we shall see that he has shown grounds only against the first two, not against the third.

turns to Lysis, inviting him to consider what has been laid down by the poets, "our fathers and guides in respect of wisdom".¹ Homer says that the Gods originate friendship, by bringing the like man to his like: Empedokles and other physical philosophers have also asserted, that like must always and of necessity be the friend of like. These wise teachers cannot mean (continues Sokrates) that bad men are friends of each other. The bad man can be no one's friend. He is not even like himself, but ever wayward and insane:—much less can he be like to any one else, even to another bad man. They mean that the good alone are like to each other, and friends to each other.² But is this true? What good, or what harm, can like do to like, which it does not also do to itself? How can there be reciprocal love between parties who render to each other no reciprocal aid? Is not the good man, so far forth as good, sufficient to himself,—standing in need of no one—and therefore loving no one? How can good men care much for each other, seeing that they thus neither regret each other when absent, nor have need of each other when present?

It appears, therefore, Lysis (continues Sokrates), that we are travelling in the wrong road, and must try another direction. I now remember to have recently heard some one affirming—contrary to what we have just said—that likeness is a cause of aversion, and unlikeness a cause of friendship. He too produced evidence from the poets: for Hesiod tells us, that "potter is jealous of potter, and bard of bard". Things most alike are most full of envy, jealousy and hatred to each other: things most unlike, are most full of friendship. Thus the poor man is of necessity a friend to the rich, the weak man to the strong, for the sake of protection: the sick man, for similar reason, to the physician. In general, every ignorant man loves, and is a friend to, the man of knowledge. Nay, there are

Questions addressed to Lysis. Appeal to the maxims of the poets. Like is the friend of like. Canvassed and rejected.

Other poets declare that likeness is a cause of aversion; unlikeness, of friendship. Reasons pro and con. Rejected.

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 213 E: σκοποῦντα κατὰ τοὺς ποιητάς· οὗτοι γὰρ ἡμῖν ὥσπερ πατέρες τῆς σοφίας εἰσι καὶ ἡγεμόνες.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 214.

³ Plato, *Lysis*, 215 B: Ὁ δὲ μὴ του δεδομένος, οὐδέ τι ἀγαπήνῃ ἀν. . . . Ὁ δὲ

μὴ ἀγαπήνῃ, οὐδ' ἂν φιλοῖ. . . . Πῶς οὖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἡμῖν φίλοι εἰσὶν αἱ τὴν ἀρχὴν, οἱ μὴτε ἀπόντες ποθεῖν οἱ ἀλλήλους—ἱκανοὶ γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς καὶ χωρὶς ὄντες—μὴτε παρόντες χρειαῖαν αὐτῶν ἔχουσι; τοὺς δὲ τοιοῦτους τίς μηχανῇ περι πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι ἀλλήλους;

also physical philosophers, who assert that this principle pervades all nature; that dry is the friend of moist, cold of hot, and so forth: that all contraries serve as nourishment to their contraries. These are ingenious teachers: but if we follow them, we shall have the cleverest disputants attacking us immediately, and asking—What! is the opposite essentially a friend to its opposite? Do you mean that unjust is essentially the friend of just—temperate of intemperate—good of evil? Impossible: the doctrine cannot be maintained.¹

My head turns (continues Sokrates) with this confusion and puzzle—since neither like is the friend of like, nor contrary of contrary. But I will now hazard a different guess of my own.² There are three genera in all: the good—the evil—and that which is neither good nor evil, the indifferent. Now we have found that good is not a friend to good—nor evil to evil—nor good to evil—nor evil to good. If therefore there exist any friendship at all, it must be the indifferent that is friend, either to its like, or to the good: for nothing whatever can be a friend to evil. But if the indifferent be a friend at all, it cannot be a friend to its own like; since we have already shown that like generally is not friend to like. It remains therefore, that the indifferent, in itself neither good nor evil, is friend to the good.³

Yet hold! Are we on the right scent? What reason is there to determine, on the part of the indifferent, attachment to the good? It will only have such attachment under certain given circumstances: when, though neither good nor evil in itself, it has nevertheless evil associated with it, of which it desires to be rid. Thus the body in itself is neither good nor evil: but when diseased, it has evil clinging to it, and becomes in consequence of this evil, friendly to the medical art as a remedy. But this is true only so long as the evil is only apparent, and not real: so long as it is a mere superficial appendage, and has not become incorporated with the

Confusion
of Sokrates.
He suggests,
That the
Indifferent
(neither
good nor
evil) is
friend to
the Good.

Suggestion
canvassed.
If the In-
different is
friend to the
Good, it is
determined
to become so
by the con-
tact of felt
evil, from
which it is
anxious to
escape.

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 215-216.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 216 C-D: τῷ ὄντι αὐ- τὸς ἡλικιῶ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας —ἀέτι τοῖνον ἀπομαρτυρούμενος, &c.

³ Plato, *Lysis*, 216 D.

essential nature of the body. When evil has become engrained, the body ceases to be indifferent (i.e., neither good nor evil), and loses all its attachment to good. Thus that which determines the indifferent to become friend of the good, is, the contact and pressure of accessory evil not in harmony with its own nature, accompanied by a desire for the cure of such evil.¹

Under this head comes the explanation of the philosopher—the friend or lover of wisdom. The man already wise is not a lover of wisdom: nor the man thoroughly bad and stupid, with whose nature ignorance is engrained. Like does not love like, nor does contrary love contrary. The philosopher is intermediate between the two: he is not wise, but neither has he yet become radically stupid and unteachable. He has ignorance cleaving to him as an evil, but he knows his own ignorance, and yearns for wisdom as a cure for it.²

Principle illustrated by the philosopher. His intermediate condition—not wise, yet painfully feeling his own ignorance.

The two young collocutors with Sokrates welcome this explanation heartily, and Sokrates himself appears for the moment satisfied with it. But he presently bethinks himself, and exclaims, Ah! Lysis and Menexenus, our wealth is all a dream! we have been yielding again to delusions! Let us once more examine. You will admit that all friendship is on account of something and for the sake of something: it is relative both to some producing cause, and to some prospective end. Thus the body, which is in itself neither good nor evil, becomes when sick a friend to the medical art: on account of sickness, which is an evil—and for the sake of health, which is a good. The medical art is dear to us, because health is dear: but is there any thing behind, for

this explanation Sokrates dissatisfied. He originates a new suggestion. The *Primum Amabile*, or Object originally dear to us, *per se*: by relation or resemblance to which other objects become dear.

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 217 E: Τὸ μὴτε κακὸν ἀρα μὴτ' ἀγαθὸν ἐνίστη κακοῦ παρόντος οὕτω κακὸν ἐστίν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἤδη τὸ τοιοῦτον γέγονεν. Πάνυ γε. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν μήπω κακὸν ἢ κακοῦ παρόντος, αὐτῇ μὲν ἡ παρουσία ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ δὲ κακὸν ποιοῦσα ἀποστρεφεῖ αὐτὸ τῆς τ' ἐπιθυμίας ἅμα καὶ τῆς φιλίας τάχα τοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ ἐστὶν οὔτε κακὸν οὐτ' ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ κακόν· φίλον δὲ ἀγαθὸν κακὸν οὐκ ἔν.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 218 A. διὰ ταῦτα δι

φαίμεν ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἤδη σοφοὺς μηκέτι φιλοσοφεῖν, εἴτε θεοὶ εἴτε ἀνθρώποι εἰσιν οὗτοι· οὐδ' αὖ ἐκείνους φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς οὕτως ἀγνοίαν ἔχοντας ὥστε κακοὺς εἶναι· κακὸν γὰρ καὶ ἀμαθὴ οὐδένα φιλοσοφεῖν. λείπονται δὲ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἀγνοίαν, μὴπω δὲ ὡς αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μὴ ἀμαθεῖς, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἡγουμένοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν. διὸ δὲ φιλοσοφοῦσιν οἱ οὔτε ἀγαθοὶ οὔτε κακοὶ πω ὄντες. ὅσοι δὲ κακοὶ, οὐ φιλοσοφοῦσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοί.

Compare Plato, *Symposium*, 204.

the sake of which health also is dear? It is plain that we cannot push the series of references onward for ever, and that we must come ultimately to something which is dear *per se*, not from reference to any ulterior *aliud*. We must come to some *primum amabile*, dear by its own nature, to which all other dear things refer, and from which they are derivatives.¹ It is this *primum amabile* which is the primitive, essential, and constant, object of our affections: we love other things only from their being associated with it. Thus suppose a father tenderly attached to his son, and that the son has drunk hemlock, for which wine is an antidote; the father will come by association to prize highly, not merely the wine which saves his son's life, but even the cup in which the wine is contained. Yet it would be wrong to say that he prizes the wine or the cup as much as his son: for the truth is, that all his solicitude is really on behalf of his son, and extends only in a derivative and secondary way to the wine and the cup. So about gold and silver: we talk of prizing highly gold and silver—but this is incorrect, for what we really prize is, not gold, but the ulterior something, whatever it be, for the attainment of which gold and other instrumental means are accumulated. In general terms—when we say that B is dear on account of A, we are really speaking of A under the name of B. What is really dear, is that primitive object of love, *primum amabile*, towards which all the affections which we bear to other things, refer and tend.²

Is it then true (continues Sokrates) that good is our *primum amabile*, and dear to us in itself? If so, is it dear to us on account of evil? that is, only as a remedy for evil; so that if evil were totally banished, good would cease to be prized? Is it true that evil is the cause why any thing is dear to us?³ This cannot be: be-

¹ Plato, Lysis, 219 C-D. 'Ἀρ' οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἀπειπεῖν ἡμᾶς οὕτως ἰόντας, καὶ ἀφικέσθαι ἐπὶ τινα ἀρχήν, ἣ οὐκ ἐπὶ ἑαυτοῖσι ἐπ' ἄλλο φίλον, ἀλλ' ἤξει ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐστὶ πρῶτον φίλον, οὐ ἕνεκα καὶ τὰλλα φαμέν πάντα φίλα εἶναι;

² Plato, Lysis, c. 37, p. 220 B. 'Ὅσα γὰρ φαμέν φίλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινός, ἐτέρῳ ῥήματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὄντι κινδυνεύει εἰς αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς δὲ πᾶσι αὐταῖς αἰ λεγόμεναι φιλίας τελευτῶσιν.

³ Plato, Lysis, 220 D. We may see that in this chapter Plato runs into a confusion between τὸ διὰ τι and τὸ ἕνεκά του, which two he began by carefully distinguishing. Thus in 218 D he says, ὁ φίλος ἐστὶ τῷ φίλῳ—ἕνεκά του καὶ διὰ τι. Again 219 A, he says—τὸ σῶμα τῆς ἱατρικῆς φίλον ἐστίν, διὰ τῆς νόσον, ἕνεκα τῆς ὑγιείας. This is a very clear and important distinction.

It is continued in 220 D—ὅτι διὰ τὸ κακὸν τὰγαθὸν ἡγαπημένον καὶ ἐφιλομένον.

cause even if all evil were banished, the appetites and desires, such of them as were neither good nor evil, would still remain ; and the things which gratify those appetites will be dear to us. It is not therefore true that evil is the cause of things being dear to us. We have just found out another cause for loving and being loved—desire. He who desires, loves what he desires and as long as he desires : he desires moreover that of which he is in want, and he is in want of that which has been taken away from him—of his own.¹ It is therefore this *own* which is the appropriate object of desire, friendship, and love. If you two, Lysis and Menexenus, love each other, it is because you are somehow of kindred nature with each other. The lover would not become a lover, unless there were, between him and his beloved, a certain kinship or affinity in mind, disposition, tastes, or form. We love, by necessary law, that which has a natural affinity to us ; so that the real and genuine lover may be certain of a return of affection from his beloved.²

But is there any real difference between what is akin and what is like ? We must assume that there is : for we showed before, that like was useless to like, and therefore not dear to like. Shall we say that good

Good is of a nature akin to every one, evil is alien

ὡς φάρμακον ἐν τοῦ κακοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακὸν νόσημα. But in 220 E—τὸ δὲ τῷ ὄντι φίλον πᾶν τούτωντιον τούτου φαίνεται πεφυκός· φίλον γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀνελόντῃ ἐν ἰχθρῶ ἐνεκα. To make the reasoning consistent with what had gone before, these two last words ought to be exchanged for δὲ τὸ ἰχθρῶν. Plato had laid down the doctrine that good is loved—δὲ τὸ κακόν, not ἐνεκα τοῦ κακοῦ. Good is loved on account of evil, but for the sake of obtaining a remedy to or cessation of the evil.

Steinhart (in his note on Hieron. Müller's translation of Plato, p. 268) calls this a "sophistisches Räthsel-spiel" ; and he notes other portions of the dialogue which "remind us of the deceptive tricks of the Sophists" (die Trugsprüche der Sophisten, see pp. 222-224-227-230). He praises Plato here for his "fine pleasantry on the deceptive arts of the Sophists". Admitting that Plato puts forward sophistical quibbles with the word φίλος, he tells us that this is suitable for the purpose

of puzzling the contentious young man Menexenus. The confusion between ἐνεκα του and δὲ τι (noticed above) appears to be numbered by Steinhardt among the fine jests against Protagoras, Prodikos, or some of the Sophists. I can see nothing in it except an unconscious inaccuracy in Plato's reasoning.

¹ Plato, Lysis, 221 E. Τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐνδεὶς ᾗ, τοῦτον ἐπιθυμῶν ἐνδεὶς δὲ γίγνεται οὐδ' ἂν τις ἀφαιρῆται—τοῦ οἰκείου δὲ, ὡς τοκερ, ὁ τε ἔρως καὶ ἡ φιλία καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία τυγχάνει οὕσα. This is the same doctrine as that which we read, expanded and cast into a myth with comic turn, in the speech of Aristophanes in the Symposium, pp. 191-192-193. ἵκατος οὐκ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον, ἀπὲ τετυμμημένος ὥσπερ αἱ ψῆται ἐξ ἐνός δύο. ζῆται δὲ αἱ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἵκατος σύμβολον (191 D)—δικαίως ἂν ὑπονοίμεν ἔρωτα, ὅς ἐν τε τῷ παρόντι πλείστα ἡμᾶς ἐνίστησιν εἰς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀγων, &c. (193 D).

² Plato, Lysis, 221-222.

to every one. is of a nature akin to every one, and evil of a nature
Inconsistency with foreign to every one? If so, then there can be no
what has friendship except between one good man and ano-
been pre- ther good man. But this too has been proved to
viously be impossible. All our tentatives have been alike
laid down. unsuccessful.

In this dilemma (continues Sokrates, the narrator) I was about
Failure of to ask assistance from some of the older men around.
the enquiry. But the tutors of Menexenus and Lysis came up to us
Close of the dialogue. and insisted on conveying their pupils home—the
hour being late. As the youths were departing I said to them—
Well, we must close our dialogue with the confession, that we
have all three made a ridiculous figure in it: I, an old man, as
well as you two youths. Our hearers will go away declaring,
that we fancy ourselves to be friends each to the other two; but
that we have not yet been able to find out what a friend is¹

Thus ends the main discussion of the Lysis: not only without
Remarks. any positive result, but with speakers and hearers
No positive more puzzled than they were at the beginning:
result. So- having been made to feel a great many difficulties
kritic pur- which they never felt before. Nor can I perceive
pose in ana- any general purpose running through the dialogue,
lysing the except that truly Sokratic and Platonic purpose—To
familiar words—to expose the
to expose the false per-
suaasion of knowledge. and ideas, that what every one appears to know, and
talks about most confidently, no one really knows or can dis-
tinctly explain.² This is the meaning of the final declaration

¹ Plato, Lysis, 223 B. *Nῦν μὲν κατα-
γλαστοὶ γέγοναμεν ἐνὶ τῇ, γερῶν ἀνρί,*
καὶ ὑμεῖς, &c.

² Among the many points of analogy
between the Lysis and the Charmides,
one is, that both of them are declared
to be spurious and unworthy of Plato,
by Socher as well as by Ast (Ast,
Platon's Leben, pp. 429-434; Socher,
Ueber Platon, pp. 137-144).

Schleiermacher ranks the Lysis as
second in his Platonic series of dia-
logues, an appendix to the Phædrus
(Einkl. p. 174 seq.); K. F. Hermann,

Stallbaum, and nearly all the other
critics dissent from this view: they
place the Lysis as an early dialogue,
along with Charmides and Laches, an-
terior to the Protagoras (K. F. Her-
mann, Gesch. und Syst. Plat. Phil. pp.
447-448; Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Lys. p.
90 (110 2nd ed.); Steinhart, Einkl. p. 221)
near to or during the government of the
Thirty. All of them profess to discover
in the Lysis "adolescens vestigia".

Ast and Socher characterise the
dialogue as a tissue of subtle sophistry
and eristic contradiction, such as (in

put into the mouth of Sokrates. "We believe ourselves to be each other's friends, yet we none of us know what a friend is." The question is one, which no one had ever troubled himself to investigate, or thought it requisite to ask from others. Every one supposed himself to know, and every one had in his memory an aggregate of conceptions and beliefs which he accounted tantamount to knowledge: an aggregate generated by the unconscious addition of a thousand facts and associations, each separately unimportant and often inconsistent with the remainder: while no rational analysis had ever been applied to verify the consistency of this spontaneous product, or to define the familiar words in which it is expressed. The reader is here involved in a cloud of confusion respecting Friendship. No way out of it is shown, and how is he to find one? He must take the matter into his own active and studious meditation: which he has never yet done, though the word is always in his mouth, and though the topic is among the most common and familiar, upon which "the swain treads daily with his clouted shoon".

This was a proper subject for a dialogue of Search. In the dialogue *Lysis*, Plato describes Sokrates as engaged in one of these searches, handling, testing, and dropping, one point of view after another, respecting the idea and foundation of friendship. He speaks, professedly, as a diviner or guesser; following out obscure promptings which he does not yet understand himself.¹ In this character, he suggests several different explanations, not only distinct but inconsistent with each other; each of them true to a certain extent, under certain conditions and circumstances: but each of

Subject of *Lysis* suited for a Dialogue of Search. Manner of Sokrates, multiplying defective explanations, and showing reasons why each is defective.

their opinion) Plato cannot have composed. Stallbaum concedes the sophistry, but contends that it is put by Plato intentionally, for the purpose of deriding, exposing, disgracing, the Sophists and their dialectical tricks: "ludibri causa" (p. 88); "ut illustri aliquo exemplo demonstretur dialecticam istam, quam adolescentes magno quodam studio sectabantur, nihil esse aliud, nisi inanem quandam argutiarum captatricem," &c. (p. 87). Nevertheless he contends that along with this derisory matter there is intermingled serious reasoning which may be easily

distinguished (p. 87), but which certainly he does not clearly point out. (Compare pp. 108-9-14-15, 2nd ed.) Schleiermacher and Steinhart also (pp. 222-224-227) admit the sophistry in which Sokrates is here made to indulge. But Steinhart maintains that there is an assignable philosophical purpose in the dialogue, which Plato purposely wrapped up in enigmatical language, but of which he (Steinhart) professes to give the solution (p. 228).

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 216 D. λέγω τοῖνυν ἀπομαντεύμενος, &c.

them untrue, when we travel beyond those limits : other contradictory considerations then interfering. To multiply defective explanations, and to indicate why each is defective, is the whole business of the dialogue.

Schleiermacher discovers in this dialogue indications of a positive result not plainly enunciated : but he admits that Aristotle did not discover them—nor can I believe them to have been intended by the author.¹ But most critics speak slightly of it, as alike sceptical and sophistical : and some even deny its authenticity on these grounds. Plato might have replied by saying that he intended it as a specimen illustrating the process of search for an unknown *quantum* ; and as an exposition of what can be said for, as well as against, many different points of view. The process of trial and error, the most general fact of human intelligence, is even better illustrated when the search is unsuccessful : because when a result is once obtained, most persons care for nothing else and forget the antecedent blunders. To those indeed, who ask only to hear the result as soon as it is found, and who wait for others to look for it—such a dialogue as the *Lysis* will appear of little value. But to any one who intends to search for it himself, or to study the same problem for himself, the report thus presented of a previous unsuccessful search, is useful both as guidance and warning. Every one of the tentative solutions indicated in the *Lysis* has something in its favour, yet is nevertheless inadmissible. To learn the grounds which ultimately compel us to reject what at first appears admissible, is instruction not to be despised ; at the very least, it helps to preserve us from mistake, and to state the problem in the manner most suitable for obtaining a solution.

In truth, no one general solution is attainable, such as Plato here professes to search for.² In one of the three Xenophontic dialogues wherein the subject of friend-

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Lysis*, i. p. 177.

² Turgot has some excellent remarks on the hopelessness of such problems as that which Plato propounds, here as well as in other dialogues, to find definitions of common and vague terms.

We read in his article *Etymologie*, in the *Encyclopédie* (vol. iii. pp. 70-72 of his *Œuvres Complètes*) :

“Qu'on se représente la foule des acceptions du mot *esprit*, depuis son sens primitif *espritus*, *haléine*, jusqu'à ceux qu'on lui donne dans la chimie,

ship is discussed we find the real Sokrates presenting it with a juster view of its real complications.¹ The same remark may be made upon Aristotle's manner of handling friendship in the *Ethica*. He seems plainly to allude to the *Lysis* (though not mentioning it by name); and to profit by it at least in what he puts out of consideration, if not in what he brings forward.² He discards the physical and cosmical analogies, which Plato borrows from Empedokles and Herakleitus, as too remote and inapplicable: he considers that the question must be determined by facts and principles relating to human dispositions and conduct. In other ways, he circumscribes the problem, by setting aside (what Plato includes) all objects of attachment which are not capable of reciprocating attachment.³ The problem, as set forth here by Plato, is conceived in great generality. In what manner does one man become the friend of another?⁴ How does a man become the object

both by the Xenophonic Sokrates, and by Aristotle.

dans la littérature, dans la jurisprudence, esprit acide, esprit de Montaigne, esprit des lois, etc.—qu'on essaie d'extraire de toutes ces acceptions une idée qui soit commune à toutes—on verra s'évanouir tous les caractères qui distinguent l'esprit de toute autre chose, dans quelque sens qu'on le prenne. . . La multitude et l'incompatibilité des acceptions du mot esprit, sont telles, que personne n'a été tenté de les comprendre toutes dans une seule définition, et de définir l'esprit en général. Mais le vice de cette méthode n'est pas moins réel lorsqu'il n'est pas assez sensible pour empêcher qu'on ne la suive.

"A mesure que le nombre et la diversité des acceptions diminue, l'absurdité s'affaiblit: et quand elle disparaît, il reste encore l'erreur. J'ose dire, que presque toutes les définitions où l'on annonce qu'on va définir les choses dans le sens le plus général, ont ce défaut, et ne définissent véritablement rien: parceque leurs auteurs, en voulant renfermer toutes les acceptions d'un mot, ont entrepris une chose impossible: je veux dire, de rassembler sous une seule idée générale des idées très différentes entre elles, et qu'un même nom n'a jamais pu désigner que successivement, en cessant en quelque sorte d'être le même mot."

See also the remarks of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the same subject. Sys-

tem of Logic, Book IV. chap. 4, s. 5.

¹ See Xenophon, Memor. II. 4-5-6. In the last of these three conversations (s. 21-22), Sokrates says to Kritobulus 'Ἄλλ' ἔχει μὲν τοιαύτως πως ταῦτα, ὃ Κριτόβουλος· φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικὰ· δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἐλεοῦσι, καὶ συνεργοῦντες ὠφελοῦσι, καὶ τοῦτο συνιέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ πολεμικά· τὰ τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται, καὶ διχογνωμονοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται· πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἐρις καὶ ὀργή· καὶ δυσμενὲς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλειονεκτεῖν ἔργος, μισθὸν δὲ ὁ φθόνος.

This observation of Sokrates is very true and valuable—that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity are both of them equally natural, i.e. equally interwoven with the constant conditions of individual and social life. This is very different from the vague, partial, and encomiastic predicates with which τὸ φύσει is often decorated elsewhere by Sokrates himself, as well as by Plato and Aristotle.

² Aristot. Eth. Nikom. viii. i. p. 1155 b. Compare Plato, *Lysis*, 214 A—215 E.

³ Aristot. Ethic. Nik. viii. 2, p. 1155, b. 28; Plato, *Lysis*, 212 D.

⁴ Plato, *Lysis*, 212 A: ὅτινα τρόπον γίγνεται φίλος ἕτερος ἑτέρου. 223 ad fin.: ὃ, τι ἴστω ὁ φίλος.

of friendship or love from another? What is that object towards which our love or friendship is determined? These terms are so large, that they include everything belonging to the Tender Emotion generally.¹

The debate in the *Lysis* is partly verbal : i.e., respecting the word *φίλος*, whether it means the person loving, or the person loved, or whether it shall be confined to those cases in which the love is reciprocal, and then applied to both. Herein the question is about the meaning of words—a word and nothing more. The following portions of the dialogue enter upon questions not verbal but real—"Whether we are disposed to love what is like to ourselves, or what is unlike or opposite to ourselves?" Though both these are occasionally true, it is shown that as general explanations neither of them will hold. But this is shown by means of the following assumptions, which not only those whom Plato here calls the "very clever Disputants,"² but Sokrates himself at other times, would have called in question, viz. : "That bad men cannot be friends to each other—that men like to each

¹ See the chapter on Tender Emotion in Mr. Bain's elaborate classification and description of the Emotions. 'The Emotions and the Will,' ch. vii. p. 94 seq. (3rd ed., p. 124).

In the *Lysis*, 216 C-D, we read, among the suppositions thrown out by Sokrates, about τὸ φίλον—*κινδυνεύει κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν παροιμίαν τὸ καλὸν φίλον εἶναι. δοκεῖ γοῦν μαλακῶ τι καὶ λείψαι καὶ λιπαρῶ· διὰ καὶ ἴσως ῥᾶδιον διοκισθῆναι· καὶ διαδύναται ἡμᾶς, ἂν τοιοῦτος ὦν. λέγω γὰρ τὴν αὐτὴν καλὸν εἶναι.* This allusion to the soft and the smooth is not very clear; a passage in Mr. Bain's chapter serves to illustrate it.

"Among the sensations of the senses we find some that have the power of awakening tender emotion. The sensations that incline to tenderness are, in the first place, the effects of very gentle or soft stimulants, such as soft touches, gentle sounds, slow movements, temperate warmth, mild sunshine. These sensations must be felt in order to produce the effect, which is mental and not simply organic. We have seen that an acute sensation raises a vigorous muscular expression, as in

wonder; a contrast to this is exhibited by gentle pressure or mild radiance. Hence tenderness is passive emotion by pre-eminence: we see it flourishing best in the quiescence of the moving members. Remotely there may be a large amount of action stimulated by it, but the proper outgoing accompaniment of it is organic not muscular."

That the sensations of the soft and the smooth dispose to the Tender Emotion is here pointed out as a fact in human nature, agreeably to the comparison of Plato. Mr. Bain's treatise has the rare merit of describing fully the physical as well as the mental characteristics of each separate emotion.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 216 A.: οἱ πάνσοφοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ἀντιλογητοί, &c. Yet Plato, in the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*, indicates colloquial debate as the great generating cause of the most intense and durable friendship. *Aristeides the Rhetor* says, *Orat.* xlvii. (*Περὶ Καρίωνος*), p. 418, Dindorf, ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων τὸ ἀληθὲς ἀναταχούσας τῆς, καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις συνουσίας ἀφορμὰς φιλίας ἀλλήλων ὑπολαμβάνει.

other (therefore good men as well as bad) can be of no use to each other, and therefore there can be no basis of friendship between them—that the good man is self-sufficing, stands in need of no one, and therefore will not love any one.”¹ All these assumptions Sokrates would have found sufficient reason for challenging, if they had been advanced by Protagoras or any other opponents. They stand here as affirmed by him; but here, as elsewhere in Plato, the reader must apply his own critical intellect, and test what he reads for himself.

It is thus shown, or supposed to be shown, that the persons who love are neither the Good, nor the Bad: and that the objects loved, are neither things or persons similar, nor opposite, to the persons loving. Sokrates now adverts to the existence of a third category—Persons who are neither good, nor bad, but intermediate between the two—Objects which are intermediate between likeness and opposition. He announces as his own conjecture,² that the Subject of friendly or loving feeling, is, that which is neither good nor evil: the Object of the feeling, Good: and the cause of the feeling, the superficial presence of evil, which the subject desires to see removed.³ The evil must be present in a superficial and removable manner—like whiteness in the hair caused by white paint, not by the grey colour of old age. Sokrates applies this to the state of mind of the philosopher, or lover of knowledge: who is not yet either thoroughly good or thoroughly bad,—either thoroughly wise or thoroughly unwise—but in a state intermediate between the two: ignorant, yet conscious of his own ignorance, and feeling it as a misfortune which he was anxious to shake off.⁴

Peculiar theory about friendship broached by Sokrates. Persons neither good nor evil by nature, yet having a superficial tinge of evil, and desiring good, to escape from it.

¹ Plato, *Lysis*, 214-215. The discourse of Cicero, *De Amicitia*, is composed in a style of pleasing rhetoric; suitable to Lælius, an ancient Roman senator and active politician, who expressly renounces the accurate subtlety of Grecian philosophers (v. 18). There is little in it which we can compare with the Platonic *Lysis*; but I observe that he too, giving expression to his own feelings, maintains that there can be no friendship except between the

good and virtuous: a position which is refuted by the “*nefaria vox*,” cited by himself as spoken by C. Blossius, xi. 87.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 216 D. λέγω τὸν ἄπομαρτυνόμενον, &c.

³ Plato, *Lysis*, 216-217.

⁴ Plato, *Lysis*, 218 C. λείπονται δὲ οἱ ἔχοντες μὲν τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο, τὴν ἀγνοίαν, μήπω δὲ ἔκ' αὐτοῦ ὄντες ἀγνώμονες μηδ' ἀμαθείς, ἀλλ' ἔτι ἡγούμενοι μὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασι· διὸ δὲ φιλοσοφούν· οἱ οὐτε ἀγαθοὶ οὐτε κακοὶ πῶς ὄντες· ὅσοι δὲ κακοί,

This general theory illustrated by the case of the philosopher or lover of wisdom. Painful consciousness of ignorance the attribute of the philosopher. Value set by Sokrates and Plato upon this attribute.

This meaning of philosophy, though it is not always and consistently maintained throughout the Platonic writings, is important as expanding and bringing into system the position laid down by Sokrates in the Apology. He there disclaimed all pretensions to wisdom, but he announced himself as a philosopher, in the above literal sense: that is, as ignorant, yet as painfully conscious of his own ignorance, and anxiously searching for wisdom as a corrective to it: while most men were equally ignorant, but were unconscious of their own ignorance, believed themselves to be already wise, and delivered confident opinions without ever having analysed the matters on which they spoke.

The conversation of Sokrates (as I have before remarked) was intended, not to teach wisdom, but to raise men out of this false persuasion of wisdom, which he believed to be the natural state of the human mind, into that mental condition which he called philosophy. His Elenchus made them conscious of their ignorance, anxious to escape from it, and prepared for mental efforts in search of knowledge: in which search Sokrates assisted them, but without declaring, and even professing inability to declare, where that truth lay in which the search was to end. He considered that this change was in itself a great and serious improvement, converting what was evil, radical, and engrained—into evil superficial and removable; which was a preliminary condition to any positive acquirement. The first thing to be done was to create searchers after truth, men who would look at the subject for themselves with earnest attention, and make up their own individual convictions. Even if nothing ulterior were achieved, that alone would be a great deal. Such was the scope of the Sokratic conversation; and such the conception of philosophy (the capital peculiarity which Plato borrowed from Sokrates), which is briefly noted in this passage of the Lysis, and developed in other Platonic dialogues, especially in the Symposium,¹ which we shall reach presently.

Still, however, Sokrates is not fully satisfied with this hypo-

οὐ φιλοσοφῶσιν, οὐδὲ οἱ ἀγαθοί. Compare the phrase of Seneca, Epist. 59, p. 211, Gronov.: "Elai difficile est: non

enim inquinati sumus, sed infecti".

¹ Plat. Sympos. 202-203-204. Phaedrus, 278 D.

thesis, but passes on to another. If we love anything, we must love it (he says) for the sake of something. This implies that there must exist, in the background, a something which is the primitive and real object of affection. The various things which we actually love, are not loved for their own sake, but for the sake of this *primum amabile*, and as shadows projected by it: just as a man who loves his son, comes to love by association what is salutary or comforting to his son—or as he loves money for the sake of what money will purchase. The *primum amabile*, in the view of Sokrates, is *Good*; particular things loved, are loved as shadows of good.

Another theory of Sokrates. The *Primum Amabile*, or original and primary object of Love. Particular objects are loved through association with this. The object is, *Good*.

This is a doctrine which we shall find reproduced in other dialogues. We note with interest here, that it appears illustrated, by a statement of the general law of mental association—the calling up of one idea by other ideas or by sensations, and the transference of affections from one object to others which have been apprehended in conjunction with it, either as antecedents or consequents. Plato states this law clearly in the *Phædon* and elsewhere:¹ but he here conceives it imperfectly: for he seems to believe that, if an affection be transferred by association from a primitive object A, to other objects, B, C, D, &c., A always continues to be the only real object of affection, while B, C, D, &c., operate upon the mind merely by carrying it back to A. The affection towards B, C, D, &c., therefore is, in the view of Plato, only the affection for A under other denominations and disguises.² Now this is doubtless often the case; but often also, perhaps even more generally, it is not the case. After a certain length of repetition and habit, all conscious reference to the primitive object of affection will commonly be left out, and the affection towards the secondary object will become a feeling both substantive and immediate. What was originally loved as means, for the sake of an ulterior end, will in time come to be loved as

Statement by Plato of the general law of mental association.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, 73-74.

It is declared differently, and more clearly, by Aristotle in the treatise *Περὶ Μνήμης καὶ Ἀναμνήσεως*, pp. 451-452.

² Plato, *Lysis*, 220 B. ὅσα γὰρ φαινο-

φύλα εἶναι ἡμῖν ἕνεκα φίλου τινός, ἐν ἑκάστῳ φάσματι φαινόμεθα λέγοντες αὐτό· φίλον δὲ τῷ ὅτι κινδυνεύει ἐκείνῳ αὐτὸ εἶναι, εἰς ὃ πάσαι αὐταὶ αἱ λεγόμεναι φιλίαι τελευτῶσιν.

an end for itself; and to constitute a new centre of force, from whence derivatives may branch out. It may even come to be loved more vehemently than any primitive object of affection, if it chance to accumulate in itself derivative influences from many of those objects.¹ This remark naturally presents itself, when we meet here for the first time, distinctly stated by Plato, the important psychological doctrine of the transference of affections by association from one object to others.

The *primum amabile*, here introduced by Sokrates, is described in restricted terms, as valuable merely to correct evil, and as having no value *per se*, if evil were assumed not to exist. In consequence chiefly of this restriction, Sokrates discards it as unsatisfactory. Such restriction, however, is noway essential to the doctrine: which approaches to, but is not coincident with, the Ideal Good or Idea of Good, described in other dialogues as what every one yearns after and aspires to, though without ever attaining it and without even knowing what it is.² The Platonic Idea was conceived as a substantive, intelligible, *Ena*, distinct in its nature from all the particulars bearing the same name, and separated from them all by a gulf which admitted no gradations of nearer and farther—

yet communicating itself to, or partaken by, all of them, in some inexplicable way. Aristotle combated this doctrine, denying the separate reality of the Idea, and admitting only a common generic essence, dwelling in and pervading the particulars, but pervading them all equally. The general word connoting this generic unity was said by Aristotle (retaining the Platonic phraseology) to be *λεγόμενον κατὰ μίαν ιδέαν* or *καθ' ἓν*.

But apart from and beyond such generic unity, which implied a common essence belonging to all, Aristotle recognised a looser, more imperfect, yet more extensive, communion, founded upon

¹ There is no stronger illustration of this than the love of money, which is the very example that Plato himself here cites.

The important point to which I here call attention, in respect to the law of Mental Association, is forcibly illustrated by Mr. James Mill in his

'Analysis of the Human Mind,' chapters xxi. and xxii., and by Professor Bain in his works on the Senses and the Intellect,—Intellect, chap. i. sect. 47-48, p. 404 seq. ed. 3; and on the Emotions and the Will, chap. iv. sect. 4-5, p. 423 seq. (3rd ed. p. 363 seq.).

² Plato, *Republ.* vi. pp. 505-506.

common relationship towards some 'Αρχή—First Principle—or First Object. Such relationship was not always the same in kind: it might be either resemblance, concomitance, antecedence or consequence, &c.: it might also be different in degree, closer or more remote, direct or indirect. Here, then, there was room for graduation, or ordination of objects as former and latter, first, second, third, &c., according as, when compared with each other, they were more or less related to the common root. This imperfect communion was designated by Aristotle under the title *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*, as contrasted with *κατὰ γένος*: the predicate which affirmed it was said to be applied, not *κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν* or *καθ' ἓν*, but *πρὸς μίαν φύσιν* or *πρὸς ἓν*:¹ it was affirmed neither entirely *συνωνύμως* (which would imply generic communion), nor entirely *ὁμωνύμως* (which would be casual and imply no communion at all), but midway between the two, so as to admit of a graduated communion, and an arrangement as former and later, first cousin, or second, third cousin. Members

¹ Arist. *Metaphys.* A. 1072, a. 28-29; Bonitz, *Comm.* p. 497 id. *Πρῶτον ὁρεκτόν—Πρῶτον νοητόν (πρῶτον ὁρεκτόν—“quod per se appetibile est et concupiscitur”). “Quod autem primum est in aliquâ serie, id præcipue etiam habet qualitatem, quæ in reliquâ cernitur serie, c. a. 993, b. 24: ergo prima illa substantia est τὸ ἀριστόν”—also Γ. 1004, a. 25-26, 1005, a. 7, about the πρῶτον ἓν—πρῶτον ὄν. These were τὰ πολλὰ καὶ λεγόμενα—τὰ πλεοναχῶς λεγόμενα—which were something less than *συνώνυμα* and more than *ὁμώνυμα*; intermediate between the two, having no common λόγος or generic unity, and yet not entirely equivocal, but designating a κοινὸν κατ' ἀναλογίαν: not κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν λεγόμενα, but πρὸς ἓν or πρὸς μίαν φύσιν; having a certain relation to one common φύσις called τὸ πρῶτον. See the *Metaphys.* Γ. 1003, a. 33—τὸ δὲ ὅν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἓν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὁμωνύμως, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν ἅπαν πρὸς ὑγίαν, τὸ μὲν τῷ φυλάττειν, τὸ δὲ τῷ ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ τῷ σημειοῦν εἶναι τῆς ὑγίαιας, τὸ δ' ὅτι δεκτικὸν αὐτῆς—καὶ τὸ ἰατρικὸν πρὸς ἰατρικὴν, &c. The Scholion of Alexander upon this passage is instructive (p. 638, a. Brandis); and a very copious explanation of the whole doctrine is given by M. Brentano, in his valuable treatise, 'Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach*

Aristoteles,' Freiburg, 1862, pp. 85-108-147. Compare Aristotle. *Polit.* III. i. 9, p. 1275, a. 35.

The distinction drawn by Aristotle between τὸ κοινὸν κατ' ἰδέαν and τὸ κοινὸν κατ' ἀναλογίαν—between τὰ κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν λεγόμενα, and τὰ πρὸς ἓν or πρὸς μίαν φύσιν λεγόμενα—this distinction corresponds in part to that which is drawn by Dr. Whewell between classes which are given by Definition, and natural groups which are given by Type. "Such a natural group" (says Dr. Whewell) "is steadily fixed, though not precisely limited; it is given, though not circumscribed; it is determined, not by a boundary without but by a central point within, &c." The coincidence between this doctrine and the Aristotelian is real, though only partial: τὸ πρῶτον φίλον, τὸ πρῶτον ὁρεκτόν, may be considered as types of *objects lovable*, *objects desirable*, &c., but ἡ ὑγία cannot be considered as a type of τὰ ὑγιεινὰ nor ἡ ἰατρικὴ as a type of τὰ ἰατρικά, though it is "the central point" to which all things so called are referred. See Dr. Whewell's doctrine stated in the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, i. 476-477; and the comments of Mr. John Stuart Mill on the doctrine—'System of Logic,' Book iv. ch. 7. I have adverted to this same doctrine in remarking on the *Hippias Major*, supra, p. 47; also

of the same Genus were considered to be brothers, all on a par : but wherever there was this graduated cousinship or communion (signified by the words Former and Later, more or less in degree of relationship), Aristotle did not admit a common Genus, nor did Plato admit a Substantive Idea.¹

Now the *Πρώτον φίλον* or *Primum Amabile* which we find in the *Lysis*, is described as the principium or initial root of one of these imperfectly united aggregates; ramifying into many branches more or less distant, in obedience to one or other of the different laws of association. Aristotle expresses the same idea in another form of words: instead of a *Primum Amabile*, he gives us a *Prima Amicitia*—affirming that the diversities of friendship are not species comprehended under the same genus, but gradations or degeneracies departing in one direction or other from the First or pure Friendship. The *Primum Amabile*, in Plato's view, appears to be the Good, though he does not explicitly declare it: the *Prima Amicitia*, with Aristotle, is friendship subsisting between two good persons, who have had sufficient experience to know, esteem, and trust, each other.²

In regard to the Platonic *Lysis*, I have already observed that no positive result can be found in it, and that all the hypotheses broached are successively negated. What is kept before the reader's mind, however, more than anything else, though not embodied in any distinct formula, is—The Good and the Beautiful considered as objects of love or attachment.

on the *Philæbus*, *infra*, chap. 82, vol. III.

¹ This is attested by Aristotle, *Eth. Nik.* i. 64, p. 1096, a. 16. *Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν ὁρᾶν ταύτην, οὐκ ἐπιοῦν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὅστερον ἐλεγον· διότι οὐδὲ τῶν ἀρεθμῶν ἰδέαν κατασκευάζουσιν*: compare *Eth.* Eudem. i. 8, 1213, a. 2. He goes on to object that Plato, having laid this down as a general principle, departed from it in recognising an *ἰδέαν ἀγαθοῦ*, because *τάγαθον* was predicated in all the categories, in that of *οὐσία* as well as in that of *πρὸς τι*—τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρὸς τι—ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινὴ τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα.

² *Aristotel. Eth. Nikom.* viii. 2, 1156, b. 12, viii. 5, 1157, a. 30, viii. 4; *Eth. Eudem.* vii. 2, 1236, a. 16. The statement is more full in the Eudemian *Ethics* than in the *Nikomachean*; he begins the seventh book by saying that *φιλία* is not said *μοναχῶς* but *πλευραχῶς*; and in p. 1236 he says *Ἀνάγκη δὲ τρία φίλος εἶδη εἶναι, καὶ μὴτε καθ' ἑν ἀπάσας μὴδ' ὡς εἶδη ἐνδὸς γένους, μήτε πάντας λέγεσθαι ὁμωνύμως· πρὸς μίαν γάρ τινα λέγονται καὶ πρῶτην, ὥστε τὸ ἐστὶν ἰατρικόν, &c.* The whole passage is instructive, but is too long to cite.

Bonitz gives some good explanations of these passages. Observations Criticæ in Aristotelis quæ feruntur *Magna Moralia et Eudemia*, pp. 56-57.

CHAPTER XXI.

EUTHYDEMUS.

DRAMATIC vivacity, and comic force, holding up various persons to ridicule or contempt, are attributes which Plato manifests often and abundantly. But the dialogue in which these qualities reach their maximum, is, the Euthydémus. Some portions of it approach to the Nubes of Aristophanes: so that Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and other admiring critics have some difficulty in explaining, to their own satisfaction,¹ how Plato, the sublime moralist and lawgiver, can here have admitted so much trifling and buffoonery. Ast even rejects the dialogue as spurious; declaring it to be unworthy of Plato and insisting on various peculiarities, defects, and even absurdities, which offend his critical taste. His conclusion in this case has found no favour: yet I think it is based on reasons quite as forcible as those upon which other dialogues have been condemned:² upon reasons, which, even if admitted, might prove that the dialogue was an inferior performance, but would not prove that Plato was not the author.

Dramatic and comic exuberance of the Euthydémus. Judgments of various critics.

Sokrates recounts (to Kriton) a conversation in which he has just been engaged with two Sophists, Euthydémus and Dionysodoros, in the undressing-room belonging to the gymnasium of the Lykeium. There were present, besides, Kleinias, a youth of remarkable beauty and intelligence, cousin of the great Alkibiades—Ktesippus, an adult man, yet still young, friend of Sokrates and devotedly attached to Kleinias

Scenery and personages.

¹ Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Euthydemus*, vol. iii. pp. 400-403-407: Stallbaum, *Proleg. in Euthydem.* p. 14.

² Ast, *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, pp. 408-418.

—and a crowd of unnamed persons, partly friends of Kleinias, partly admirers and supporters of the two Sophists.

This couple are described and treated throughout by Sokrates, with the utmost admiration and respect: that is, in terms designating such feelings, but intended as the extreme of irony or caricature. They are masters of the art of Contention, in its three varieties¹—1. Arms, and the command of soldiers. 2. Judicial and political rhetoric, fighting an opponent before the assembled Dikasts or people. 3. Contentious Dialectic—they can reduce every respondent to a contradiction, if he will only continue to answer their questions—whether what he says be true or false.² All or each of these accomplishments they are prepared to teach to any pupil who will pay the required fee: the standing sarcasm of Plato against the paid teacher, occurring here as in so many other places. Lastly, they are brothers, old and almost toothless—natives of Chios, colonists from thence to Thurii, and exiles from Thurii and resident at Athens, yet visiting other cities for the purpose of giving lessons.³ Their dialectic skill is described as a recent acquisition,—made during their old age, only in the preceding year,—and completing their excellence as professors of the tripartite Eristic. But they now devote themselves to it more than to the other two parts. Moreover they advertise themselves as teachers of virtue.

The two Sophists, having announced themselves as competent to teach virtue and stimulate pupils to a virtuous life, are entreated by Sokrates to exercise their beneficent influence upon the youth Kleinias, in whose improvement he as well as Ktesippus feels the warmest interest. Sokrates gives a specimen of what he wishes by putting a series of questions himself. Euthydémus follows, and begins questioning Kleinias; who, after answering

¹ Plato, Euthyd. pp. 271-272.

² Plat. Euthyd. p. 272 B. *ἐξελόμενοι τὸ εἶναι λεγόμενον, οὐκ οἶον τὸν τε ψεύδος εἶναι τ' ἀληθὲς ἢ*: p. 275 C. *οὐδὲν διαφέρει, εἰ μὴ μόνον ἐθέλει ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὁ νεανίσκος.*

³ Plat. Euthyd. p. 273 B-C. "*quamvis essent ætate grandiores et edentuli,*" says Stallbaum in his Proleg. p. 10. He seems to infer this from page 294 C;

the inference, though not very certain, is plausible.

Steinhart, in his *Einleitung zum Euthydemus* (vol. ii. p. 2 of Hieronym. Müller's translation of Plato) repeats these antecedents of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, as recited in the dialogue before us, as if they were matter of real history, exemplifications of the character of the class called Sophists. He

three or four successive questions, is forced to contradict himself. Dionysodorus then takes up the last answer of Kleinias, puts him through another series of interrogations, and makes him contradict himself again. In this manner the two Sophists toss the youthful respondent backwards and forwards to each other, each contriving to entangle him in some puzzle and contradiction. They even apply the same process to Sokrates, who cannot avoid being entangled in the net; and to Ktesippus, who becomes exasperated, and retorts upon them with contemptuous asperity. The alternate interference of the two Sophists is described with great smartness and animation; which is promoted by the use of the dual number, peculiar to the Greek language, employed by Plato in speaking of them.

This mode of dialectic, conducted by the two Sophists, is interrupted on two several occasions by a counter-exhibition of dialectic on the part of Sokrates: who, under colour of again showing to the couple a specimen of that which he wishes them to do, puts two successive batches of questions to Kleinias in his own manner.¹ The contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, in the same work, carried on respectively by him and by them, of interrogating Kleinias, is evidently meant as one of the special matters to arrest attention in the dialogue. The questions put by the couple are made to turn chiefly on verbal quibbles and ambiguities: they are purposely designed to make the respondent contradict himself, and are proclaimed to be certain of bringing about this result, provided the respondent will conform to the laws of dialectic—by confining his answer to the special point of the question, without adding any qualification of his own, or asking for farther explanation from the questioner, or reverting to any antecedent answer lying apart from the actual question of the moment. Sokrates, on the contrary, addresses interrogations, each of which has a clear and substantive meaning, and most of which Kleinias is able to answer without embarrassment: he professes no other design except that of encouraging Kleinias to

Contrast
between
the two
different
modes of in-
terrogation.

might just as well produce what is said by the comic poets Eupolis and Aristophanes—the proceedings as recounted by the Sokratic disciple in the *φροντιστήριον* (Nubes)—as evidence about

the character of Sokrates.

¹ Plat. *Euthydém.* pp. 279-288.

² Plat. *Euthyd.* pp. 275 E-276 E. Πάντα τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἀφ' ἑκτά, pp. 287 B-296 B-296 A, &c.

virtue, and assisting him to determine in what virtue consists : he resorts to no known quibbles or words of equivocal import. The effect of the interrogations is represented as being, not to confound and silence the youth, but to quicken and stimulate his mind and to call forth an unexpected amount of latent knowledge : insomuch that he makes one or two answers very much beyond his years, exciting the greatest astonishment and admiration, in Sokrates as well as in Kriton.¹ In this respect, the youth Kleinias serves the same illustrative purpose as the youthful slave in the Menon :² each is supposed to be quickened by the interrogatory of Sokrates, into a manifestation of knowledge noway expected, nor traceable to any teaching. But in the Menon, this magical evocation of knowledge from an untaught youth is explained by the theory of reminiscence, pre-existence, and omniscience, of the soul : while in the Euthydēmus, no allusion is made to any such theory, nor to any other cause except the stimulus of the Sokratic cross-questioning.

In the dialogue *Euthydēmus*, then, one main purpose of Plato is to exhibit in contrast two distinct modes of questioning : one practised by Euthydemus and Dionysodorus ; the other, by Sokrates. Of these two, it is the first which is shown up in the most copious and elaborate manner : the second is made subordinate, serving mainly as a standard of comparison with the first. We must take care however to understand in what the contrast between the two consists, and in what it does not consist.

The contrast does not consist in this—that Sokrates so contrives his string of questions as to bring out some established and positive conclusion, while Euthydemus and his brother leave everything in perplexity. Such is not the fact. Sokrates ends without any result, and with a confession of his inability to find any. Professing earnest anxiety to stimulate Kleinias in the path of virtue, he is at the same time unable to define what the

¹ Plat. Euthydēm. pp. 290-291. The unexpected wisdom, exhibited by the youth Kleinias in his concluding answer, can be understood only as illustrating the obstetric efficacy of Sokratic interrogations. See Winckelmann, Proleg. ad Euthyd. pp. xxxiii.

xxxiv. The words τὴν κρείττοναν must have the usual signification, as recognised by Routh and Heindorf, though Schleiermacher treats it as absurd, p. 562, notes.

² Plato, Menon, pp. 82-85.

capital condition of virtue is.¹ On this point, then, there is no contrast between Sokrates and his competitors: if they land their pupil in embarrassment, so does he. Nor, again, does Sokrates stand distinguished from them by affirming (or rather implying in his questions) nothing but what is true and indisputable.²

The real contrast between the competitors, consists, first in the pretensions—next in the method. The two Sophists are described as persons of exorbitant arrogance, professing to teach virtue,³ and claiming a fee as if they did teach it: Sokrates disdains the fee, doubts whether such teaching is possible, and professes only to encourage or help forward on the road a willing pupil. The pupil in this case is a given subject, Kleinias, a modest and intelligent youth: and the whole scene passes in public before an indiscriminate audience. To such a pupil, what is needed is, encouragement and guidance. Both of these are really administered by the questions of Sokrates, which are all suggestive and pertinent to the matter in hand, though failing to reach a satisfactory result: moreover, Sokrates attends only to Kleinias, and is indifferent to the effect on the audience around. The two Sophists, on the contrary, do not say a word pertinent to the object desired. Far from seeking (as they promised) to encourage Kleinias,⁴ they confuse and humiliate him from the beginning: all their implements for teaching consist only of logical puzzles; lastly, their main purpose is to elicit applause from the by-standers, by reducing both the modest Kleinias and every other respondent to contradiction and stand-still.

Such is the real contrast between Sokrates and the two Sophists, and such is the real scene which we read in the dialogue. The presence, as well as the loud manifestations of an indiscriminate crowd in the Lykeium, are essential features of the drama.⁵ The

Abuse of fallacies by the Sophists—their bidding for the applause of

¹ Plat. Euthydém. pp. 291 A—293 A; Plat. Kleitophon, pp. 409-410.

² See Plat. Euthydém. p. 281 C-D, where undoubtedly the positions laid down by Sokrates would not have passed without contradiction by an opponent.

³ Plat. Euthydém. pp. 273 D, 275 A, 304 B.

⁴ Plat. Euthyd. p. 278 C. ἐφάτην γὰρ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὴν προπαινετικὴν σοφίαν.

⁵ The ὄχλος (surrounding multitude) is especially insisted on in the first sentence of the dialogue, and is perpetually adverted to throughout all the recital of Sokrates to Kriton, pp. 276 B-D, 303 B.

the by-standers. point of view which Plato is working out, is, the abusive employment, the excess, and the misplacement, of logical puzzles : which he brings before us as administered for the humiliation of a youth who requires opposite treatment,—in the prosecution of an object which they do not really promote—and before undiscerning auditors, for whose applause the two Sophists are bidding.¹ The whole debate upon these fallacies is rendered ridiculous ; and when conducted with Ktesippus, degenerates into wrangling and ribaldry.

The bearing of the Euthydémus, as I here state it, will be better understood if we contrast it with the Parmenidés. In this last-mentioned dialogue, the amount of negative dialectic and contradiction is greater and more serious than that which we read in the Euthydémus. One single case of it is elaborately built up in the long Antinomies at the close of the Parmenidés (which occupy as much space, and contain nearly as much sophistry, as the speeches assigned to the two Sophists in Euthydémus), while we are given to understand that many more remain behind.² These perplexing Antinomies (addressed by the veteran Parmenides to Sokrates as his junior), after a variety of other objections against the Platonic theory of Ideas, which theory Sokrates has been introduced as affirming,—are drawn up for the avowed purpose of checking premature affirmation, and of illustrating the difficult exercises and problems which must be solved, before affirmation can become justifiable. This task, though long and laborious, cannot be evaded (we are here told) by aspirants in philosophy. But it is a task which ought only to be undertaken in conjunction with a few select companions. “Before any large audience, it would be unseemly and inadmissible : for the public are not aware that without such roundabout and devious journey in all directions, no man can hit upon truth or acquire intelligence.”³

¹ Plat. Euthydém. p. 303 B.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B. I shall revert to this point when I notice the Parmenidés.

³ Plat. Parmen. pp. 135-136. ἔλκυσον δὲ σπαντὴν καὶ γυμνασάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκοῦσης ἀχρηστοῦ εἶναι καὶ καλοῦ-πείνης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀβολαρχίας, ὥς

εἴτι νῆος εἰ—εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι, (to request Parmenides to give a specimen of dialectic) ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτων· ἐγροῦσιν γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου τε καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ νοῦν σχεῖν.

This important proposition—That before a man can be entitled to lay down with confidence any affirmative theory, in the domain of philosophy or “reasoned truth,” he must have had before him the various knots tied by negative dialectic, and must find out the way of untying them—is a postulate which lies at the bottom of Plato’s Dialogues of Search, as I have remarked in the eighth chapter of this work. But there is much difference in the time, manner, and circumstances, under which such knots are brought before the student for solution. In the *Parmenidês*, the process is presented as one both serious and indispensable, yet requiring some precautions: the public must be excluded, for they do not understand the purpose: and the student under examination must be one who is competent or more than competent to bear the heavy burthen put upon him, as Sokrates is represented to be in the *Parmenidês*.¹ In the *Euthydêmus*, on the contrary, the process is intended to be made ridiculous; accordingly these precautions are disregarded. The crowd of indiscriminate auditors are not only present, but are the persons whose feelings the two Sophists address—and who either admire what is said as dexterous legerdemain, or laugh at the interchange of thrusts, as the duel becomes warmer: in fact, the debate ends with general mirth, in which the couple themselves are among the loudest. Lastly, Kleinias, the youth under interrogation, is a modest novice; not represented, like Lysis in the dialogue just reviewed, as in danger of corruption from the exorbitant flatteries of an Erastes, nor as requiring a lowering medicine to be administered by a judicious friend. When the Xenophontic (historical) Sokrates cross-examines and humiliates Euthydêmus (a youth, but nevertheless more advanced than Kleinias in the Platonic Euthydêmus is represented to be), we shall see that he not only lays a train for the process by antecedent suggestions, but takes especial care to attack Euthydêmus when alone.² The cross-examination

Necessity of settling accounts with the negative, before we venture upon the affirmative, is common to both: in the one the process is solitary and serious; in the other, it is vulgarised and ludicrous.

¹ See the compliments to Sokrates, on his strenuous ardour and vocation for philosophy, addressed by Parmenides, p. 135 B.

² Plat. *Euthyd.* p. 303 B. Ἐνταῦθα μέντοι, ὃ φίλε Κρίτων, οὐδεὶς ὅστις οὐ

τῶν παρόντων ὑπερεπήνεσε τὸν λόγον, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρὶ (Euthydêmus and Dionysodorus) γελῶντε καὶ κροτοῦντε καὶ χαίροντε ὀλίγον παρετάθησαν.

³ Xenophon. *Memor.* iv. 2, 5-8. ὡς δ' ᾔσθητο (Sokrates) αὐτὸν ἐτοιμότερον

pursued by Sokrates inflicts upon this accomplished young man the severest distress and humiliation, and would have been utterly intolerable, if there had been by-standers clapping their hands (as we read in the Platonic Euthydémus) whenever the respondent was driven into a corner. We see that it was hardly tolerable even when the respondent was alone with Sokrates; for though Euthydémus bore up against the temporary suffering, cultivated the society of Sokrates, and was handled by him more gently afterwards; yet there were many other youths whom Sokrates cross-examined in the same way, and who suffered so much humiliation from the first solitary colloquy, that they never again came near him (so Xenophon expressly tells us)¹ for a second. This is quite enough to show us how important is the injunction delivered in the Platonic Parmenidês—to carry on these testing colloquies apart from indiscriminate auditors, in the presence, at most, of a few select companions.

Stallbaum, Steinhart, and other commentators denounce in severe terms the Eristics or controversial Sophists of Athens, as disciples of Protagoras and Gorgias, infected with the mania of questioning and disputing every thing, and thereby corrupting the minds of youth. They tell us that Sokrates was the constant enemy of this school, but that nevertheless he was unjustly confounded with them by the comic poets, and others; from which confusion alone his unpopularity with the Athenian people arose.² In the Platonic dialogue of Euthydémus the two Sophists (according to these commentators) represent the way in which Protagoras and Gorgias with their disciples reasoned: and the purpose of the dialogue is to contrast this with the way in which Sokrates reasoned.

Now, in this opinion, I think that there is much of unfounded assumption, as well as a misconception of the real contrast intended in the Platonic Euthydémus. Compar-

ὑπομένοντα, ὅτε διαλέγοιτο, καὶ προθυμότερον ἀκούοντα, μόνος ἦλθεν εἰς τὸ ἡριστοκρίτειον· παρακαθεζομένου δ' αὐτῷ τοῦ Εὐθυδήμου, Εὐπίμοι, ἔφη, &c.

¹ Xen. Mem. iv. 2, 39-40. Compare

the remarks of Sokrates in Plato, Theætétus, p. 151 C.

² Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Plat. Euthydém. pp. 9-11-13; Winckelmann, Proleg. ad eundem, pp. xxxiii.-xxxiv.

ing Protagoras with Sokrates, I maintain that Sokrates was decidedly the more Eristic of the two, and left behind him a greater number of active disciples. In so far as we can trust the picture given by Plato in the dialogue called Protagoras, we learn that the Sophist of that name chiefly manifested himself in long continuous speeches or rhetoric; and though he also professed, if required, to enter into dialectic colloquy, in this art he was no match for Sokrates.¹ Moreover, we know by the evidence of Sokrates himself, that he was an Eristic not only by taste, but on principle, and by a sense of duty. He tells us, in the Platonic Apology, that he felt himself under a divine mission to go about convicting men of ignorance, and that he had prosecuted this vocation throughout many years of a long life. Every one of these convictions must have been brought about by one or more disputes of his own seeking: every such dispute, with occasional exceptions, made him unpopular, in the outset at least, with the person convicted: the rather, as his ability in the process is known, upon the testimony of Xenophon² as well as of Plato, to have been consummate. It is therefore a mistake to decry Protagoras and the Protagoreans (if there were any) as the special Eristics, and to represent Sokrates as a tutelary genius, the opponent of such habits. If the commentators are right (which I do not think they are) in declaring the Athenian mind to have been perverted by Eristic, Sokrates is much more chargeable with the mischief than Protagoras. And the comic poets, when they treated Sokrates as a specimen and teacher of Eristic, proceeded very naturally upon what they actually saw or heard of him.³

The fact is, that the Platonic Sokrates when he talks with the two Sophists in the dialogue Euthydémus, is a character drawn by Plato for the purpose of that dialogue, and is very different from the real historical Sokrates,

Sokrates was much more Eristic than Protagoras, who generally manifested himself by continuous speech or lecture.

Sokrates in the Euthydémus is drawn suit-

¹ See Plat. Protag., especially pp. 329 and 336. About the eristic disposition of Sokrates, see the striking passage in Plato, Theætét. 169 B-C; also Lachés, 187, 188.

² Xen. Mem. i. 2.

³ Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon.

Euthydém. pp. 50-51. "Sed hoc ut-
cunque se habet, illud quidem ex
Aristophane pariter atque ex ipso
Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem
non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus,
sed etiam ab aliis, in vanissimorum
sophistarum loco habitum fuisse."

ably to the purpose of that dialogue. whom the public of Athens saw and heard in the market-place or gymnasia. He is depicted as a gentle, soothing, encouraging talker, with his claws drawn in, and affecting inability even to hold his own against the two Sophists: such indeed as he sometimes may have been in conversing with particular persons (so Xenophon¹ takes pains to remind his readers in the *Memorabilia*), but with entire elimination of that characteristic aggressive Elenchus for which he himself (in the Platonic Apology) takes credit, and which the auditors usually heard him exhibit.

This picture, accurate or not, suited the dramatic scheme of the Euthydēmus. Such, in my judgment, is the value and meaning of the Euthydēmus, as far as regards personal contrasts. One style of reasoning is represented by Sokrates, the other by the two Sophists: both are the creatures of Plato, having the same dramatic reality as Sokrates and Strepsiades, or the *Δίκαιος Λόγος* and *Ἄδικος Λόγος*, of Aristophanes, but no more. That they correspond to any actual persons at Athens, is neither proved nor probable. The comic poets introduce Sokrates as talking what was either nonsensical, or offensive to the feelings of the Athenians: and Sokrates (in the Platonic Apology) complains that the *Dikasts* judged him, not according to what he had really said or done, but according to the impression made on them by this dramatic picture. The Athenian Sophists would have equal right to complain of those critics, who not only speak of Euthydēmus and Dionysodorus with a degree of acrimony applicable only to historical persons, but also describe them as representative types of Protagoras, Gorgias, and their disciples.²

The conversation of Sokrates with the youth Kleinias is

¹ Xen. Mem. i. 4, 1; iv. 2, 40.

² The language of Schleiermacher is more moderate than that of Stallbaum, Steinhart, and others. He thinks moreover, that the polemical purpose of this dialogue is directed not against Protagoras or Gorgias, but against the Megarics and against Antisthenes, who (so Schleiermacher supposes) had brought the attack upon themselves

by attacking Plato first (Einleitung zum Euthyd. p. 404 seq.). Schleiermacher cannot make out who the two Sophists were personally, but he conceives them as obscure persons, deserving no notice.

This is a conjecture which admits of no proof; but if any real victim is here intended by Plato, we may just as reasonably suppose Antisthenes as Protagoras.

ble for its plainness and simplicity. His is to implant or inflame in the youth the on and effort towards wisdom or knowledge (*σοφία*, in its etymological sense). "You, like one else, wish to do well or to be happy. Nay to be happy is, to have many good things. Every one knows this: every one knows too, that among these good things, wealth is an indisputable one:¹ likewise health, beauty, bodily activity, good birth, power and others, honour in our city, temperance, justice, courage, freedom, &c. Good fortune does not count as a distinct item, because it resolves itself into wisdom.²—But it is not enough to have all these good things: we must not only have them but use them: moreover, we must use them not wrongly, but rightly. If we use them wrongly, they will not produce their appropriate consequences. They will even make us more miserable than if we had them not, because the possession of them will prompt us to be active and meddlesome: whereas, if we have them not, we shall keep in the back-ground and do little.³ But to use these good things rightly, depends upon wisdom, knowledge, intelligence. It thus appears that the enumerated items are not really good, except on the assumption that they are under the guidance of intelligence: if they are under the guidance of ignorance, they are not good; nay, they even produce more harm than good, since they are active instruments in the service of a foolish master.⁴

"But what intelligence do we want for the purpose? Is it all intelligence? Or is there any one single variety of intelligence, by the possession of which we shall become good and happy?"⁵ Obviously, it must be such as will be profitable to us.⁶ We have seen that

Colloquy of Sokrates with Kleinias—possession of good things is useless, unless we also have intelligence how to use them.

But intelligence—of what? It must be such intelligence, or

¹ Plato, Euthydém. p. 279 A. ἀγαθὰ δὲ ποῖα ἅρα τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει ἡμῖν ὄντα; ἢ οὐ χαλεπὸν οὐδὲ σεμνοῦ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ τι οὐδὲ τοῦτο εἰσικεν εἶναι εὐραῖν; πᾶς γὰρ ἂν ἡμῖν εἴποι ὅτι τὸ πλουτεῖν ἀγαθόν;

² Plato, Euthydém. pp. 279-280.

³ Plato, Euthydém. p. 281 C. ἥττον δὲ κακῶς πράττων, ἀθλιος ἥττον ἂν εἴη.

⁴ Plato, Euthyd. p. 282 E. If we compare this with p. 279 C-D we shall

see that the argument of Sokrates is open to the exception which he himself takes in the case of εὐτυχία—δὲς ταῦτα λέγειν. Wisdom is counted twice over.

⁵ Plato, Euthydém. p. 282 E. Sokrates here breaks off the string of questions to Kleinias, but resumes them, p. 283 D.

⁶ Plato, Euthydém. p. 283 D. τίνα ποτ' ὁδὸν ἂν κτησάμενοι ἐπιστήμην ὁρῶμεν

such an art, as will include both the making of what we want, and the right use of it when made. there is no good in possessing wealth—that we should gain nothing by knowing how to acquire wealth or even to turn stones into gold, unless we at the same time knew how to use it rightly. Nor should we gain any thing by knowing how to make ourselves healthy, or even immortal, unless we knew how to employ rightly our health or immortality. We want knowledge or intelligence, of such a nature, as to include both acting, making, or construction—and rightly using what we have done, made, or constructed.¹ The makers of lyres and flutes may be men of skill, but they cannot play upon the instruments which they have made: the logographers compose fine discourses, but hand them over for others to deliver. Even masters in the most distinguished arts—such as military commanders, geometers, arithmeticians, astronomers, &c., do not come up to our requirement. They are all of them varieties under the general class *hunters*: they find and seize, but hand over what they have seized for others to use. The hunter, when he has caught or killed game, hands it over to the cook; the general, when he has taken a town, delivers it to the political leader or minister: the geometer makes over his theorems to be employed by the dialectician or comprehensive philosopher.²

“Where then can we find such an art—such a variety of knowledge or intelligence—as we are seeking? The regal or political art looks like it: that art which regulates and enforces all the arrangements of the city. But what is the work which this art performs? What product does it yield, as the medical art supplies good health, and the farmer’s art, provision? What good does it effect? You may say that it makes the citizens wealthy, free, harmonious in their intercourse. But we have already seen that these acquisitions are not good, unless they be under the guidance of intelligence: that nothing is really good, except some variety of intelligence.³ Does the regal art then confer knowledge? If

κτησαίμεθα; ἀρ’ οὐ τοῦτο μὲν ἀπλοῦν, ὅτι ταύτην ἥτις ἡμᾶς διησεί;

¹ Plato, Euthyd. p. 289 B. τοιαύτης τινος ἀρ’ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμης δεῖ, ἐν ᾗ συμ-

πέστωκεν ἅμα τὸ τε ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐπισ-
τάσθαι χρῆσθαι ὃ ἂν ποιῇ.

² Plato, Euthyd. p. 290 C-D.

³ Plato, Euthyd. p. 292 B. Ἀγαθόν

so, does it confer every variety of knowledge—that of the carpenter, currier, &c., as well as others? Not certainly any of these, for we have already settled that they are in themselves neither good nor bad. The regal art can thus impart no knowledge except itself; and what is *itself*? how are we to use it? If we say, that we shall render other men *good*—the question again recurs, *Good*—in what respect? *useful*—for what purpose?¹

“Here then” (concludes Sokrates), “we come to a dead lock: we can find no issue.” We cannot discover what the regal art does for us or gives us: yet this is the art which is to make us happy.” In this difficulty, Sokrates turns to the two Sophists, and implores their help. The contrast between him and them is thus brought out.

The argument of Sokrates, which I have thus abridged from the Euthydēmus, arrives at no solution: but it is nevertheless eminently suggestive, and puts the question in a way to receive solution. What is the regal or political art which directs or regulates all others? A man has many different impulses, dispositions, qualities, aptitudes, advantages, possessions, &c., which we describe by saying that he is an artist, a general, a tradesman, clever, just, temperate, brave, strong, rich, powerful, &c. But in the course of life, each particular situation has its different exigencies, while the prospective future has its exigencies also. The whole man is one, with all these distinct and sometimes conflicting attributes: in following one impulse, he must resist others—in turning his aptitudes to one object, he must turn them away from others—he must, as Plato says, distinguish the right use of his force from the wrong, by virtue of knowledge, intelligence, reason. Such discriminating intelligence, which in this dialogue is called the Regal or political art,—what is the object of it? It is intelligence or knowledge,—But of *what*? Not certainly of the way how each particular act is to be performed—how each particular end is to be attained.

δέ γέ που ὁμολογήσαμεν ἀλλήλοις—
οὐδέν εἶναι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμην τινά.

¹ Plat. Euthydēm. p. 292 D. Ἀλλὰ
τίνα δὲ ἐπιστήμην; ἢ τί χρῆσθαι;
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἔργων οὐδενὸς δεῖ αὐτὴν
δημιουργεῖν εἶναι τῶν μῆτε κακῶν μῆτε

ἀγαθῶν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ παραδιδόναι μηδε-
μίαν ἄλλην ἢ αὐτὴν αὐτήν· λέγωμεν
δὴ οὖν, τίς ποτε ἐστὶν αὐτὴ ἢ τί χρῆ-
σθαι;

² Plat. Euthyd. p. 292 E.

Each of these separately is the object of some special knowledge. But the whole of a man's life is passed in a series of such particular acts, each of which is the object of some special knowledge: what then remains as the object of Regal or political intelligence, upon which our happiness is said to depend? Or how can it have any object at all?

The question here raised is present to Plato's mind in other dialogues, and occurs under other words, as for example, What is good? Good is the object of the Regal or political intelligence; but what is Good? In the *Republic* he raises this question, but declines to answer it, confessing that he could not make it intelligible to his hearers:¹ in the *Gorgias*, he takes pains to tell us what it is *not*: in the *Philébus*, he does indeed tell us what it is, but in terms which need explanation quite as much as the term which they are brought to explain. There is only one dialogue in which the question is answered affirmatively, in clear and unmistakable language, and with considerable development—and that is, the *Protagoras*: where Sokrates asserts and proves at length, that Good is at the bottom identical with pleasure, and Evil with pain: that the measuring or calculating intelligence is the truly regal art of life, upon which the attainment of Good depends: and that the object of that intelligence—the items which we are to measure, calculate, and compare—is pleasures and pains, so as to secure to ourselves as much as possible of the former, and escape as much as possible of the latter.

In my remarks on the *Protagoras*, I shall state the view which I take of the doctrine laid down in that dialogue by Sokrates. Persons may think the answer insufficient: most of the Platonic critics declare it to be absolutely wrong. But at any rate it is the only distinct answer which Plato ever gives, to the question raised by Sokrates in the *Euthydémus* and elsewhere.

From the abstract just given of the argument of Sokrates in the *Euthydémus*, it will be seen to be serious and pertinent, though ending with a confession of failure. The observations placed in contrast with it and

Comparison with other dialogues—*Republic*, *Philébus*, *Protagoras*. The only distinct answer is found in the *Protagoras*.

The talk of the two Sophists, though

¹ Plato, *Republic*, vi. pp. 505-506.

ascribed to the two Sophists, are distinguished by being neither serious nor pertinent; but parodies of debate for the most part, put together for the express purpose of appearing obviously silly to the reader. Plato keeps up the dramatic or ironical appearance, that they are admired and welcomed not only by the hearers, but even by Sokrates himself. Nevertheless, it is made clear at the end that all this is nothing but irony, and that the talk which Plato ascribes to Euthydēmus and Dionysodorus produced, according to his own showing, no sentiment of esteem for their abilities among the by-standers, but quite the reverse. Whether there were individual Sophists at Athens who talked in that style, we can neither affirm nor deny: but that there were an established class of persons who did so, and made both money and reputation by it, we can securely deny. It is the more surprising that the Platonic commentators should desire us to regard Euthydēmus and Dionysodorus as representative samples of a special class named Sophists, since one of the most eminent of those commentators (Stallbaum),¹ both admits that Sokrates himself was generally numbered in the class and called by the name—and affirms also (incorrectly, in my opinion) that the interrogations of Sokrates, which in this dialogue stand contrasted with those of the two Sophists, do not enunciate the opinions either of Sokrates or of Plato himself, but the opinions of these very Sophists, which Plato adopts and utters for the occasion.²

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. in Platon. Euthydem. p. 50. "Illud quidem ex Aristophane pariter atque ipso Platone evidenter apparet, Socratem non tantum ab orationum scriptoribus, sed etiam ab aliis in vanissimorum sophistarum numero habitum fuisse." Ib. p. 49 (cited in a previous note). "Videtur pervulgata fuisse hominum opinio, quā Socratem inter vanos sophistas numerandum esse existimabant." Again p. 44, where Stallbaum tells us that Sokrates was considered by many to belong "misallorum Sophistarum gregi".

² Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Euthydem. p. 30. "Cavendum est magnopere, ne quæ hic à Socrate disputantur, pro ipsius decretis habeamus: sunt

enim omnia ad mentem Sophistarum disputata, quos ille, reprehensis eorum opinionibus, sperat eo adductum iri, ut gravem prudentemque earum defensionem suscipiant." Compare p. 66. Stallbaum says that Plato often reasons, adopting for the occasion the doctrine of the Sophists. See his Prolegg. to the Lachæ and Charmidæ, and still more his Proleg. to the Protagoras, where he tells us that Plato introduces his spokesman Sokrates not only as arguing *ex mente Sophistarum*, but also as employing captious and delusive artifice, such as in this dialogue is ascribed to Euthydemus and Dionysodorus.—pp. 23-24. "Itaque Sokrates, missa hujus rei disputatione, repente ad alia progreditur,

Mistaken representations about the Sophists—Aristotle's definition—no distinguishable line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician.

The received supposition that there were at Athens a class of men called Sophists who made money and reputation by obvious fallacies employed to bring about contradictions in dialogue—appears to me to pervert the representations given of ancient philosophy. Aristotle defines a Sophist to be “one who seeks to make money by apparent wisdom which is not real wisdom”:—the Sophist (he says) is an Eristic who, besides money-making, seeks for nothing but victory in debate and humiliation of his opponent:—Distinguishing the Dialectician from the Sophist (he says), the Dialectician impugns or defends, by probable arguments, probable tenets—that is, tenets which are believed by a numerous public or by a few wise and eminent individuals:—while the Sophist deals with tenets which are probable only in appearance and not in reality—that is to say, tenets which almost every one by the slightest attention recognises as false.¹ This definition is founded, partly on the personal character and purpose ascribed to the Sophist: partly upon the distinction between apparent and real wisdom, assumed to be known and permanent. Now such pseudo-wisdom was declared by Sokrates to be the natural state of all mankind, even the most eminent, which it was his mission to expose: moreover, the determination, what is to be comprised in this description, must depend upon the

scilicet similibus laqueis hominem denuo irretiturus. Nemini facile obscurum erit, hoc quoque loco Protagoræ argutis conclusionibus deludi” (i.e. by Sokrates) “atque callidè eo permoveat,” &c. “Quamquam nemo erit, quin videat, callidè deludi Protagoræ, ubi ex eo, quod qui injustè faciat, is nequitiam agat σωφρόνως, protinus colligitur justitiam et σωφρόνῃν unum idemque esse.”—p. 25. “Disputat enim Sokrates pleraque omnia ad mentem ipsius Protagoræ.”—p. 30. “Platonem ipsum hæc non probasse, sed e vulgi opinione et mente explicasse, vel illud non obscure significat,” &c.—p. 33.

¹ Aristotle. Topic. i. 1, p. 100, b. 21. ἐνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκούντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τούτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Ἐρι-

στικός δὲ ἐστὶ συλλογισμὸς ὃ ἐκ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων, μὴ ὄντων δὲ—καὶ ὃ ἐξ ἐνδόξων ἢ φαινομένων ἐνδόξων φαινόμενος. Οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν λεγομένων ἐνδόξων ἐπιπόλαιον ἔχει παντελῶς τὴν φαντασίαν, καθάπερ περὶ τὰς τῶν ἐριστικῶν λόγων ἀρχὰς συμβέβηκεν ἔχειν. Παραχρημα γὰρ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τοῖς καὶ μικρὰ συνορᾶν δυνάμενοι, κατὰ δόλητος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῦ ψεύδους ἐστὶ φύσις.

De Sophisticis Elenchis, i. p. 165, a. 21. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία, οὕσα δ' οὐ· καὶ ὁ σοφιστὴς χρηματιστὴς ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὕσης, p. 165, b. 10, p. 171, b. 8-27. Οἱ φιλέριδες, ἐριστικοὶ, ἀγωνιστικοὶ, are persons who break the rules of dialectic (ἀδικομαχία) for the purpose of gaining victory; οἱ σοφισταὶ are those who do the same thing for the purpose of getting money. See also Metaphys. iii. 1004, b. 17.

judges to whom it is submitted, since much of the works of Aristotle and Plato would come under the category, in the judgment of modern readers both vulgar and instructed. But apart from this relative and variable character of the definition, when applied to philosophy generally—we may confidently assert, that there never was any real class of intellectual men, in a given time or place, to whom it could possibly apply. Of individuals, the varieties are innumerable: but no professional body of men ever acquired gain or celebrity by maintaining theses, and employing arguments, which every one could easily detect as false. Every man employs sophisms more or less; every man does so inadvertently, some do it by design also; moreover, almost every reasoner does it largely, in the estimation of his opponents. No distinct line can be drawn between the Sophist and the Dialectician: the definition given by Aristotle applies to an ideal in his own mind, but to no reality without: Protagoras and Prodikus no more correspond to it than Sokrates and Plato. Aristotle observes, with great truth, that all men are dialecticians and testers of reasoning, up to a certain point: he might have added that they are all Sophists also, up to a certain point.¹ Moreover, when he attempts to found a scientific classification of intellectual processes upon a difference in the purposes of different practitioners—whether they employ the same process for money or display, or beneficence, or mental satisfaction to themselves—this is altogether unphilosophical. The medical art is the same, whether employed to advise gratis, or in exchange for a fee.²

Though I maintain that no class of professional Sophists (in the meaning given to that term by the Platonic critics after Plato and Aristotle) ever existed—and though the distinction between the paid and the gratuitous discourses is altogether unworthy to enter into the history of philosophy—yet I am not the less persuaded that the Platonic dialogue *Euthydēmus*, and the treatise of Aristotle *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, are very striking and useful compositions. This last-

Philosophical purpose of the *Euthydēmus*—exposure of fallacies, in Plato's dramatic manner, by multiplication of particular examples.

¹ Aristot. *Sophist. Elench.* p. 172, a. 30. He here admits that the only difference between the Dialectician and the

² Aristot. *Rhetor.* i. 1, 1355, b. 18. Sophist lies in their purposes—that the

mentioned treatise was composed by Aristotle very much under the stimulus of the Platonic dialogue Euthydémus, to which it refers several times—and for the purpose of distributing the variety of possible fallacies under a limited number of general heads, each described by its appropriate characteristic, and represented by its illustrative type. Such attempt at arrangement—one of the many valuable contributions of Aristotle to the theory of reasoning—is expressly claimed by him as his own. He takes a just pride in having been the first to introduce system where none had introduced it before.¹ No such system was known to Plato, who (in the Euthydémus) enumerates a string of fallacies one after another without any project of classifying them, and who presents them as it were in concrete, as applied by certain disputants in an imaginary dialogue. The purpose is, to make these fallacies appear conspicuously in their character of fallacies: a purpose which is assisted by presenting the propounders of them as ridiculous and contemptible. The lively fancy of Plato attaches suitable accessories to Euthydémus and Dionysodorus. They are old men, who have been all their lives engaged in teaching rhetoric and tactics, but have recently taken to dialectic, and acquired perfect mastery thereof without any trouble—who make extravagant promises—and who as talkers play into each other's hands, making a shuttlecock of the respondent, a modest novice every way unsuitable for such treatment.

Thus different is the Platonic manner, from the Aristotelian manner, of exposing fallacies. But those exhibited in the former appear as members of one or more among the classes framed by the latter. The fallacies which we read in the Euthydémus are chiefly verbal: but some are verbal, and something beyond.

Thus, for example, if we take the first sophism introduced by the two exhibitors, upon which they bring the youth Kleinias, by suitable questions, to declare successively both sides of the alternative—

"Which of the two is it that learns, the wise or the

Aristotle
(Soph.
Elench.)
attempts a
classification
of
fallacies:
Plato enu-
merates
them with-
out classi-
fication.

Fallacies of
equivoca-

mental activity employed by both is the same. ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ προαίρεσει· πλὴν ἐνταῦθα μὲν (in Rhetoric) ἔσται ὁ μὲν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ὁ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ῥήτωρ, ἐκεῖ δὲ (in Dialectic)

σοφιστικὸς μὲν κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, διὰ λεκτικὸς δὲ οὐ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δυνάμιν.

¹ See the last chapter of the treatise De Sophisticis Elenchiis.

ignorant?"—Sokrates himself elucidates it by pointing out that the terms used are equivocal:¹ You might answer it by using the language ascribed to Dionysodorus in another part of this dialogue—"Neither and Both".² The like may be said about the fallacy in page 284 D—"Are there persons who speak of things as they are? Good men speak of things as they are: they speak of good men well, of bad men badly: therefore, of course, they speak of stout men stoutly, and of hot men hotly. Ay! rejoins the respondent Ktesippus, angrily—they speak of cold men coldly, and say that they talk coldly."³ These are fallacies of double meaning of words—or double construction of phrases: as we read also in page 287 D, where the same Greek verb (*voeiv*) may be construed either to *think* or to *mean*: so that when Sokrates talks about what a predication *means*—the Sophists ask him—"Does anything *think*, except things having a soul? Did you ever know any predication that had a soul?"

tion propounded by the two Sophists in the Euthydémus.

Again, the two Sophists undertake to prove that Sokrates, as well as the youth Kleinias and indeed every one else, knows everything. "Can any existing thing be that which it is, and at the same time *not* be that which it is?—No.—You know some things?—Yes.—Then if you know, *you are knowing*?—Certainly. I am knowing of those particular things.—That makes no difference: if you are knowing, you necessarily know everything.—Oh! no: for there are many things which I do not know.—Then if there be anything which you do not know, *you are not knowing*?—Yes, doubtless—of that particular thing.—Still you are *not knowing*: and just now you said that you were *knowing*: and thus, at one and the same time, you are what you are, and you are not what you are."

Fallacies—*dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter*—in the Euthydémus.

"But *you* also" (retorts Sokrates upon the couple), "do not

¹ Plato, Euthydém. pp. 275 D—278 D. Aristotle also adverts to this fallacy, but without naming the Euthydémus. See Soph. El. 4, 165, b. 30.

² Plato, Euthydém. p. 300 D. Οὐδὲ τε καὶ ἀμφότερα.

³ Plato, Euthydém. p. 284 E. τοὺς γούν ψυχροὺς ψυχρῶς λέγουσι τε καὶ

φασὶ διαλέγεσθαι. The metaphorical sense of *ψυχρὸς* in criticism is *pointless, stupid, out of taste, out of place, &c.*

⁴ Plato, Euthydém. p. 293 C. Aristotle considers *know* to be an equivocal word; he admits that in certain senses you may both *know* and *not know* the same thing. Anal. Prior. ii. 67, b. 8. Anal. Post. I. 71, a. 26.

you also know some things, not know others ?—By no means.—What ! do you know nothing ?—Far from it.—Then you know all things ?—Certainly we do,—and you too : if you know one thing, you know all things.—What ! do you know the art of the carpenter, the currier, the cobbler—the number of stars in the heaven, and of grains of sand in the desert, &c. ?—Yes : we know all these things.”

The two Sophists maintain their consistency by making reply in the affirmative to each of these successive questions: though Ktesippus pushes them hard by enquiries as to a string of mean and diverse specialties.¹ This is one of the purposes of the dialogue : to represent the two Sophists as willing to answer any thing, however obviously wrong and false, for the purpose of avoiding defeat in the dispute—as using their best efforts to preserve themselves in the position of questioners, and to evade the position of respondents—and as exacting a categorical answer—Yes or No—to every question which they put without any qualifying words, and without any assurance that the meaning of the question was understood.²

The base of these fallacious inferences is, That respecting the same subject, you cannot both affirm and deny the same predicate : you cannot say, A is knowing—A is not knowing (*ἐπιστήμην*). This is a fallacy more than verbal : it is recognised by Aristotle (and by all subsequent logicians) under the name—*à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter*.

It is very certain that this fallacy is often inadvertently committed by very competent reasoners, including both Plato and Aristotle.

Again—Sophroniskus was my father—Chæredemus was the father of Patrokles.—Then Sophroniskus was different from a father : therefore he was not a father. You are different from a stone, therefore you are not a stone : you are different from gold, therefore you are not gold. By parity of reasoning, Sophroniskus is different from a father—therefore he is not a father. Accordingly, you, Sokrates, have no father.³

¹ Plato, Euthydém. pp. 293-294.

² Plato, Euthydém. pp. 295-296.

³ Plato, Euthydém. pp. 297-298.

But (retorts Ktesippus upon the couple) your father is different from my father.—Not at all.—How can that be?—What! is your father, then, the father of all men and of all animals?—Certainly he is. A man cannot be at the same time a father, and not a father. He cannot be at the same time a man, and not a man—gold, and not gold.¹

You have got a dog (Euthydémus says to Ktesippus).—Yes.—The dog is the father of puppies?—Yes.—The dog, being a father, is yours?—Certainly.—Then your father is a dog, and you are brother of the puppies.

You beat your dog sometimes? Then you beat your father.²

Those animals, and those alone are *yours* (sheep, oxen, &c.), which you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. But Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê are *your* Gods. The Gods have a soul and are animals. Therefore your Gods are your animals. Now you told us that those alone were your animals, which you could give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure. Therefore you can give away, or sell, or sacrifice at pleasure, Zeus, Apollo, and Athênê.³

This fallacy depends upon the double and equivocal meaning of *yours*—one of its different explanations being treated as if it were the only one.

Other puzzles cited in this dialogue go deeper :—Contradiction is impossible—To speak falsely is impossible.⁴ These paradoxes were maintained by Antisthenes and others, and appear to have been matters of dialectic debate throughout the fourth and third centuries. I shall say more of them when I speak about the Megarics and Antisthenes. Here I only note, that in this dialogue, Ktesippus is represented as put to silence by them, and Sokrates as making an answer which is no answer at all.⁵ We see how much trouble these paradoxes gave

Fallacies involving deeper logical principles—contradiction is impossible. —To speak falsely is impossible.

¹ Plato, Euthydém. p. 298. Some of the fallacies in the dialogue (Πότερον ὁρῶσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ δυνατόν ἢ τὰ ἀδύνατον; . . . Ἡ οὐχ ὁλόν τε σιγῶντα λέγειν; p. 300 A) are hardly translatable into English, since they depend upon equivocal constructions peculiar to the Greek language. Aristotle refers them to the general head *παρ' ἀμφιβολίαν*. The same about *προσέχει τὸν μάγειρον*

κατακόπτειν, p. 301 D.

² Plat. Euthyd. p. 298.

³ Plat. Euthydém. p. 302. This same fallacy, in substance, is given by Aristotle, De Sophist. El. 17, 178 a. 3, 179, a. 5, but with different exemplifying names and persons.

⁴ Plato, Euthydém. pp. 285-286.

⁵ Plato, Euthydém. pp. 286 B-287 A.

to Plato, when we read the *Sophistês*, in which he handles the last of the two in a manner elaborate, but (to my judgment) unsatisfactory.

The Euthydêmus of Plato is memorable in the history of philosophy as the earliest known attempt to set out, and exhibit to attention, a string of fallacious modes of reasoning. Plato makes them all absurd and ridiculous. He gives a caricature of a dialectic debate, not unworthy of his namesake Plato Comicus—or of Aristophanes, Swift, or Voltaire. The sophisms appear for the most part so silly, as he puts them, that the reader asks himself how any one could have been ever imposed upon by such a palpable delusion? Yet such confidence is by no means justified. A sophism, perfectly analogous in character to those which Plato here exposes to ridicule, may, in another case, easily escape detection from the hearer, and even from the reasoner himself. People are constantly misled by fallacies arising from the same word bearing two senses, from double construction of the same phrase, from unconscious application of a *dictum secundum quid*, as if it were a *dictum simpliciter*; from *Petitio Principii*, &c., *Ignoratio Elenchi*, &c. Neither Plato himself, nor Aristotle, can boast of escaping them.¹ If these fallacies appear, in the examples chosen by Plato for the Euthydêmus, so obviously inconclusive that they can deceive no one—the reason lies not in the premisses themselves, but in the particular conclusions to which they lead: which conclusions are known on other grounds to be false, and never to be seriously maintainable by any person. Such conclusions as—“Sokrates had no father: Sophroniskus, if father of Sokrates, was father of all men and all animals: In beating your dog, you beat your father: If you know one thing, you know everything,” &c., being known *aliunde* to be false, prove that there has been some fallacy in the premisses whereby they have been established. Such cases serve as a *reductio ad absurdum* of the antecedent pro-

¹ See a passage in Plato's *Charmides*, where Heindorf remarks with propriety upon his equivocal use of the words *ἐἶναι* and *ἐπὶ πάντων*—also

the *Gorgias*, p. 507 D, with the notes of Routh and Heindorf. I have noticed both passages in discussing these two dialogues.

cess. They make us aware of one mode of liability to error, and put us on our guard against it in analogous cases. This is a valuable service, and all the more valuable, because the liability to error is real and widespread, even from fallacies perfectly analogous to those which seem so silly under the particular exemplifications which Plato selects and exposes. Many of the illustrations of the Platonic Euthydémus are reproduced by Aristotle in the *Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis*, together with other fallacies, discriminated with a certain method and system.¹

The true character of these fallacies is very generally overlooked by the Platonic critics, in their appreciation of the Euthydémus ; when they point our attention to the supposed tricks and frauds of the persons whom they called Sophists, as well as to mischievous corruptions alleged to arise from Eristic or formal contentious debate. These critics speak as if they thought that such fallacies were the special inventions of Athenian Sophists for the purposes of Athenian Eristic : as if such causes of error were inoperative on persons of ordinary honesty or intelligence, who never consulted or heard the Sophists. It has been the practice of writers on logic, from Aristotle down to Whately, to represent logical fallacies as frauds devised and maintained by dishonest practitioners, whose art Whately assimilates to that of jugglers.

Mistake of supposing fallacies to have been invented and propagated by Athenian Sophists—they are inherent inadvertencies and liabilities to error, in the ordinary process of thinking. Formal debate affords the best means of correcting them.

This view of the case appears to me incomplete and misleading. It substitutes the rare and accidental in place of the constant and essential. The various sophisms, of which Plato in the Euthydémus gives the *reductio ad absurdum*, are not the inventions of Sophists. They are erroneous tendencies of the reasoning process, frequently incident to human thought and speech : specimens of those ever-renewed "inadvertencies of ordinary thinking" (to recur to a phrase cited in my preface), which it is the peculiar mission of philosophy or "reasoned truth" to rectify. Moreover the practice of formal debate, which is usually denounced with so much asperity—if it affords on some occasions opportunity to produce such fallacies, presents not merely equal opportunity, but the only effective means, for exposing and con-

¹ Aristotle, *De Sophist. Elench.* ; also *Arist. Rhet. II. p. 1401, a-b.*

futing them. Whately in his *Logic*,¹ like Plato in the *Euthydemus*, when bringing these fallacies into open daylight in order that every one may detect them, may enliven the theme by presenting them as the deliberate tricks of a Sophist. Doubtless they are so by accident: yet their essential character is that of infirmities incident to the *intellectus sibi permissus*: operative at Athens before Athenian Sophists existed, and in other regions also, where these persons never penetrated.

The wide diffusion and constant prevalence of such infirmities is attested not less by Sokrates in his last speech, wherein he declares real want of knowledge and false persuasion of knowledge, to be universal, the mission of his life being to expose them, though he could not correct them—than by Bacon in his reformatory projects, where he enumerates the various Idola worshipped by the human intellect, and the false tendencies acquired "*in primâ digestionem mentis*". The psychological analysis of the sentiment of belief with its different sources, given in Mr. Alexander Bain's work on the Emotions and the Will, shows how this takes place; and exhibits true or sound belief, in so far as it ever is acquired, as an acquisition only attained after expulsion of earlier antecedent error.² Of such error, and

¹ Whately's *Logic*, ch. v. sect. 5. Though Whately, like other logicians, keeps the Sophists in the foreground, as the fraudulent enemy who sow tares among that which would otherwise come up as a clean crop of wheat—yet he intimates also incidentally how widespread and frequent such fallacies are, quite apart from dishonest design. He says—"It seems by most persons to be taken for granted, that a Fallacy is to be dreaded merely as a weapon fashioned and wielded by a skillful Sophist: or, if they allow that a man may with honest intentions slide into one, unconsciously, in the heat of *argument*—still they seem to suppose, that where there is no *dispute*, there is no cause to dread Fallacy. Whereas there is much danger, even in what may be called *solitary reasoning*, of sliding unawares into some Fallacy, by which one may be so far deceived as even to act upon the conclusion so obtained. By *solitary reasoning*, is meant the case in which

we are not seeking for arguments to prove a given question, but labouring to elicit from our previous stock of knowledge some useful inference."

"To speak of all the Fallacies that have ever been enumerated, as too glaring and obvious to need even being mentioned—because the simple instances given in books, and there stated in the plainest and consequently most easily detected form, are such as (in that form) would deceive no one—this, surely, shows either extreme weakness or extreme unfairness."—Aristotle himself makes the same remark as Whately—That the man who is easily taken in by a Fallacy advanced by another, will be easily misled by the like Fallacy in his own solitary reasoning. *Sophist. Elench.* 16, 175, a. 10.

² See the instructive and original chapter on the generation, sources, and growth of Belief, in Mr. Bain's work, '*Emotions and Will*,' p. 568 seq. After laying down the fundamental

of the different ways in which apparent evidence is mistaken for real evidence, a comprehensive philosophical exposition is farther given by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the fifth book of his *System of Logic*, devoted to the subject of Fallacies. Every variety of erroneous procedure is referable to some one or more of the general heads of Fallacy there enumerated. It is the Fallacies of Ratiocination, of which the two Sophists, in the Platonic *Euthydēmus*, are made to exhibit specimens: and when we regard such Fallacies, as one branch among several in a complete logical scheme, we shall see at once that they are not inventions of the Athenian Sophists—still less inventions for the purpose of Eristic or formal debate. For every one of these Fallacies is of a nature to ensnare men, and even to ensnare them more easily, in the common, informal, conversation of life—or in their separate thoughts. Besides mistakes on matters of fact, the two main

characteristic of Belief, as referable altogether to intended action, either certain to come, or contingent under supposed circumstances, and after enumerating the different Sources of Belief.—1. Intuitive or Instinctive. 2. Experience. 3. The Influence of the Emotions (sect. x. p. 579)—Mr. Bain says: "Having in our constitution primordial fountains of activity in the spontaneous and voluntary impulses, we follow the first clue that experience gives us, and accept the indication with the whole force of these natural promptings. Being under the strongest impulses to act somehow, an animal accepts any lead that is presented, and if successful, abides by that lead with unshaken confidence. This is that instinct of credulity so commonly attributed to the infant mind. It is not the single instance, or the repetition of two or three, that makes up the strong tone of confidence; it is the mind's own active determination, finding some definite vent in the gratification of its ends, and abiding by the discovery with the whole energy of the character, until the occurrence of some check, failure, or contradiction. The force of belief, therefore, is not one rising from zero to a full development by slow degrees, according to the length of the experience. We must treat it rather as a strong primitive manifestation, derived from the natural activity of the system, and taking its direction

and rectification from experience (p. 583). The anticipation of nature, so strenuously repudiated by Bacon, is the offspring of this characteristic of the mental system. With the active tendency at its maximum, and the exercise of intelligence and acquired knowledge at the minimum, there can issue nothing but a quantity of rash enterprises. The respectable name *generalisation*, implying the best products of enlightened scientific research, has also a different meaning, expressing one of the most erroneous impulses and crudest determinations of untutored human nature. To extend some familiar and narrow experience, so as to comprehend cases the most distant, is a piece of mere reckless instinct, demanding severe discipline for its correction. I have mentioned the case of our supposing all other minds constituted like our own. The veriest infant has got this length in the career of fallacy. Sound belief, instead of being a pacific and gentle growth, is in reality the battering of a series of strongholds, the conquering of a country in hostile occupation. This is a fact common both to the individual and to the race. Observation is unanimous on the point. It will probably be long ere the last of the delusions attributable to this method of believing first and proving afterwards can be eradicated from humanity." [3rd ed., p. 506 seq.]

causes which promote the success and encourage the multiplication of Fallacies generally, are first, the emotional bias towards particular conclusions, which disposes persons to accept any apparent evidence, favourable to such conclusion, as if it were real evidence: next, the careless and elliptical character of common speech, in which some parts of the evidence are merely insinuated, and other parts altogether left out. It is this last circumstance which gives occasion to the very extensive class of Fallacies called by Mr. Mill Fallacies of Confusion: a class so large, that the greater number of Fallacies might plausibly be brought under it.¹

¹ Mill, 'System of Logic,' Book V., to which is prefixed the following citation from Hobbes's 'Logica'. "Errare non modo affirmando et negando, sed etiam in sentiendo, et in tacitâ hominum cogitatione, contingit."

Mr. Mill points out forcibly both the operation of moral or emotional bias in perverting the intellect, and causing sophisms or fallacies to produce conviction; and the increased chance afforded for the success of a sophism by the suppression of part of the premises, which is unavoidable in informal discussions.

"Bias is not a direct source of wrong conclusions (v. 1-3). We cannot believe a proposition only by wishing, or only by dreading, to believe it. Bias acts indirectly by placing the intellectual grounds of belief in an incomplete or distorted shape before a man's eyes. It makes him shrink from the irksome labour of a rigorous induction. It operates too by making him look out eagerly for reasons, or apparent reasons, to support opinions which are conformable, or resist those which are repugnant, to his interests or feelings; and when the interests or feelings are common to great numbers of persons, reasons are accepted or pass current which would not for a moment be listened to in that character, if the conclusion had nothing more powerful than its reasons to speak in its behalf. The natural or acquired prejudices of mankind are perpetually throwing up philosophical theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premises which they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying favourite feelings; and when any one

of these theories has become so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is always ready to take its place."—"Though the opinions of the generality of mankind, when not dependent upon mere habit and inculcation, have their root much more in the inclinations than in the intellect, it is a necessary condition to the triumph of the moral bias that it should first pervert the understanding."

Again in v. 2, 3. "It is not in the nature of bad reasoning to express itself unambiguously. When a sophist, whether he is imposing upon himself or attempting to impose upon others, can be constrained to throw his argument into so distinct a form, it needs, in a large number of cases, no farther exposure. In all arguments, everywhere but in the schools, some of the links are suppressed: *a fortiori*, when the arguer either intends to deceive, or is a lame and inexperienced thinker, little accustomed to bring his reasoning processes to any test; and it is in those steps of the reasoning which are made in this tacit and half-conscious, or even wholly unconscious, manner, that the error oftenest lurks. In order to detect the fallacy the proposition thus silently assumed must be supplied, but the reasoner, most likely, has never really asked himself what he was assuming; his confuter, unless permitted to extort it from him by the Socratic mode of interrogation, must himself judge what the suppressed premises ought to be, in order to support the conclusion." Mr. Mill proceeds to illustrate this confusion by an excellent passage cited from Whately's 'Logic'. I may add, that Aristotle

We thus see not only that the fallacious agencies are self-operative, generating their own weeds in the common soil of human thought and speech, without being planted by Athenian Sophists or watered by Eristic—but that this very Eristic affords the best means of restraining their diffusion. It is only in formal debate that the disputant can be forced to make clear to himself and declare explicitly to others, without reserve or omission, all the premisses upon which his conclusion rests—that every part of these premisses becomes liable to immediate challenge by an opponent—that the question comes distinctly under consideration, what is or is not sufficient evidence—that the premisses of one argument can be compared with the premisses of another, so that if in the former you are tempted to acquiesce in them as sufficient because you have a bias favourable to the conclusion, in the latter you may be made to feel that they are *insufficient*, because the conclusion which they prove is one which you know to be untrue (*reductio ad absurdum*). The habit of formal debate (called by those who do not like it, Eristic¹) is thus an indispensable condition both for the exposure and confutation of fallacies, which exist quite independent of that habit—owing their rise and prevalence to deep-seated psychological causes.

Without the experience acquired by this habit of dialectic debate at Athens, Plato could not have composed his *Euthydēmus*, exhibiting a *reductio ad absurdum* of several verbal fallacies—nor could we have had the

Value of formal debate as a means for testing and confuting fallacies.

Without the habit of formal debate, Plato

himself makes a remark substantially the same—That the same fallacy may be referred to one general head or to another, according to circumstances. *Sophist. Elench.* 83, 182, b. 10.

¹ The Platonic critics talk about the Eristics (as they do about the Sophists) as if that name designated a known and definite class of persons. This is altogether misleading. The term is vituperative, and was applied by different persons according to their own tastes.

Ueberweg remarks with great justice, that Isokrates called all speculators on philosophy by the name of Eristics. "Als ob jener Rhetor nicht (wie ja doch Spengel selbst gut nachgewiesen hat) alle und jede Spekulation mit dem Namen der Eristik bezeichnete."

(Untersuchungen über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schriften, p. 267.) In reference to the distinction which Aristotle attempts to draw between Dialectic and Eristic—the former legitimate, the latter illegitimate—we must remark that even in the legitimate Dialectic the purpose prominent in his mind is that of victory over an opponent. He enjoins that you are not only to guard against your opponent, lest he should out-manoeuvre you, but you are to conceal and disguise the sequence of your questions so as to out-manoeuvre him. *Xpῆ δ' ὅπερ φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομαι ἀποκρινόμενους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειράσθαι λανθάνειν.* *Anal. Prior.* II. 66, a. 32. Compare *Topic.* 108, a. 25, 156, a. 23, 164, b. 35.

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logical theories of Aristotle, embodied in the *Analytica* and *Topica* with its annexed treatise *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, in which various fallacies are discriminated and classified. These theories, and the corollaries connected with them, do infinite honour to the comprehensive intellect of Aristotle: but he could not have conceived them without previous study of the ratiocinative process. He, as the first theorizer, must have had before him abundant arguments explicitly laid out, and contested, or open to be contested, at every step by an opponent.¹ Towards such habit of formal argumentation, a strong repugnance was felt by many of the Athenian public, as there is among modern readers generally: but those who felt thus, had probably little interest in the speculations either of Plato or of Aristotle. That the Platonic critics should themselves feel this same repugnance, seems to me not consistent with their admiration for the great dialectician and logician of antiquity: nor can I at all subscribe to their view, when they present to us the inherent infirmities of the human intellect as factitious distempers generated by the habit of formal debate, and by the rapacity of Protagoras, Prodikos, and others.

I think it probable that the dialogue of Euthydémus, as far as the point to which I have brought it (i.e., where Sokrates finishes his recital to Kriton of the conversation which he had had with the two Sophists), was among the most popular of all the Platonic dialogues: not merely because of its dramatic vivacity and charm of expression, but because it would be heartily welcomed by the numerous enemies of Dialectic at Athens. We must remember that in the estimation of most persons at Athens, Dialectic included Sokrates and all the *virī Sokratici* (Plato among them), just as much as the persons called Sophists. The discreditable picture here given of Euthydémus and Dionysodoros, would be considered as telling against Dialectic and the Sokratic Elenchus generally: while the rhetors, and others who dealt in long continuous discourse, would treat it as a blow

¹ MILL, 'System of Logic,' Book VI. rational faculty, like those of every
1. 1. "Principles of Evidence and other natural agency, are only got by
Theories of Method, are not to be constructed & priori. The laws of our
seeing the agent at work."

inflicted upon the rival art of dialogue, by the professor of the dialogue himself. In Plato's view, the dialogue was the special and appropriate manifestation of philosophy.

That the natural effect of the picture here drawn by Plato, was, to justify the antipathy of those who hated philosophy—we may see by the epilogue which Plato has thought fit to annex: an epilogue so little in harmony with what has preceded, that we might almost imagine it to be an afterthought—yet obviously intended to protect philosophy against imputations. Sokrates having concluded the recital, in his ironical way, by saying that he intended to become a pupil under the two Sophists, and by inviting Kriton to be a pupil along with him—Kriton replies by saying that he is anxious to obtain instruction from any one who can give it, but that he has no sympathy with Euthydémus, and would rather be refuted by him, than learn from him to refute in such a manner. Kriton proceeds to report to Sokrates the remarks of a by-stander (an able writer of discourses for the Dikastery) who had heard all that passed; and who expressed his surprise that Sokrates could have remained so long listening to such nonsense, and manifesting so much deference for a couple of foolish men. Nevertheless (continued the by-stander) this couple are among the most powerful talkers of the day upon philosophy. This shows you how worthless a thing philosophy is: prodigious fuss, with contemptible result—men careless what they say, and carping at every word that they hear.¹

Epilogue of Plato to the Dialogue, trying to obviate this inference by opponents—Conversation between Sokrates and Kriton.

Now, Sokrates (concludes Kriton), this man is wrong for depreciating philosophy, and all others who depreciate it are wrong also. But he was right in blaming *you*, for disputing with such a couple before a large crowd.

Sokr.—What kind of person is this censor of philosophy? Is he a powerful speaker himself in the Dikastery? Or is he only a composer of discourses to be spoken by others? *Krit.*—The latter. I do not think that he has ever spoken in court: but every one says that he knows judicial practice well, and that he composes admirable speeches.²

¹ Plat. Euthyd. pp. 304-306.

² Plat. Euthyd. p. 306.

Sokr.—I understand the man. He belongs to that class whom Prodikus describes as the border-men between philosophy and politica. Persons of this class account themselves the wisest of mankind, and think farther that besides being such in reality, they are also admired as such by many: insomuch that the admiration for them would be universal, if it were not for the professors of philosophy. Accordingly they fancy, that if they could once discredit these philosophers, the prize of glory would be awarded to themselves, without controversy, by every one: they being in truth the wisest men in society, though liable, if ever they are caught in dialectic debate, to be overpowered and humbled by men like Euthydémus.¹ They have very plausible grounds for believing in their own wisdom, since they pursue both philosophy and politics to a moderate extent, as far as propriety enjoins; and thus pluck the fruit of wisdom without encountering either dangers or contests.

Krit.—What do you say to their reasoning, Sokrates? It seems to me specious. *Sokr.*—Yes, it is specious, but not well founded. You cannot easily persuade them, though nevertheless it is true, that men who take a line mid-way between two pursuits, are *better* than either, if both pursuits be bad—*worse* than either, if both pursuits be good, but tending to different ends—*better* than one and *worse* than the other, if one of the pursuits be bad and the other good—*better* than both, if both be bad, but tending to different ends. Such being the case, if the pursuit of philosophy and that of active politics be both of them good, but tending to different objects, these men are inferior to the pursuers of one as well as of the other: if one be good, the other bad, they are worse than the pursuers of the former, better than the pursuers of the latter: if both be bad, they are better than either. Now I am sure that these men themselves account both philosophy and politics to be good. Accordingly, they are inferior both to philosophers and politicians:² they occupy only the third rank, though they pretend to be in the first. While

¹ Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 D. εἶναι μὲν γὰρ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ σφᾶς σοφωτάτους, ὡς δὲ τοῖς ἰδίῳι λόγοις ὅταν ἀποληφθῶσιν, ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον κολούεσθαι. Οἱ ἀμφὶ Εὐθύδημον may mean Euthy-

démus himself and alone; yet I incline to think that it here means Euthydémus and his like.

² Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 B.

we pardon such a pretension, and refrain from judging these men severely, we must nevertheless recognise them for such as they really are. We must be content with every one, who announces any scheme of life, whatever it be, coming within the limits of intelligence, and who pursues his work with persevering resolution.¹

Krit.—I am always telling you, Sokrates, that I too am embarrassed where to seek instructors for my sons. Conversation with you has satisfied me, that it is madness to bestow so much care upon the fortune and position of sons, and so little upon their instruction. Yet when I turn my eyes to the men who make profession of instructing, I am really astonished. To tell you the truth, every one of them appears to me extravagantly absurd,² so that I know not how to help forward my son towards philosophy. *Sokr.*—

Kriton asks Sokrates for advice about the education of his sons —Sokrates cannot recommend a teacher—tells him to search for himself.

Don't you know, Kriton, that in every different pursuit, most of the professors are foolish and worthless, and that a few only are excellent and above price? Is not this the case with gymnastic, commercial business, rhetoric, military command? Are not most of those who undertake these pursuits ridiculously silly?³

Krit.—Unquestionably: nothing can be more true. *Sokr.*—Do you think that a sufficient reason for avoiding all these pursuits yourself, and keeping your son out of them also? *Krit.*—No: it would be wrong to do so. *Sokr.*—Well then, don't do so. Take no heed about the professors of philosophy, whether they are good or bad; but test philosophy itself, well and carefully. If it shall appear to you worthless, dissuade not merely your sons, but every one else also, from following it.⁴ But if it shall appear to you as valuable as I consider it to be, then take courage to pursue and practise it, you and your children both, according to the proverb.—

¹ Plat. Euthyd. p. 306 C. συγκρίνει μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ μὴ χαλεπαίνειν, ἡγεῖσθαι μόντοι τοιούτους εἶναι οἱοί εἰσι· πάντα γὰρ ἄνθρωποι καὶ ἀγαπᾶν, ὅστις καὶ ὀνείδων λέγει ἔχοντες φρονήσεως πρᾶγμα, καὶ ἀνδρείως ἐπεὶ τὴν διαπονεῖται.

² Plato, Euthyd. p. 306 E. καὶ μοι δοκεῖ εἰς ἕκαστος αὐτὸν σκοπεῖν πᾶν

ἄλλόκοτος εἶναι, &c.

³ Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. ἐν ἑκάστῃ τούτων τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς ἕκαστον τὸ ἔργον οὐ καταγελάσθους ὁφεῖς;

⁴ Plato, Euthyd. p. 307 B. ἑάσας χαίρειν τοὺς ἐπιτηδευόντας φιλοσοφίαν, εἴτε χρηστοὶ εἰσιν εἴτε πονηροί, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα βασανίσας καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ, εἰδὲν μὲν σοὶ φαίνεται φανερὸν ὅτι, &c.

The first part of this epilogue, which I have here given in abridgment, has a bearing very different from the rest of the dialogue, and different also from most of the other Platonic dialogues. In the epilogue, Euthydémus is cited as the representative of true dialectic and philosophy: the opponents of philosophy are represented as afraid of being put down by Euthydémus: whereas, previously, he had been depicted as contemptible,—as a man whose manner of refuting opponents was more discreditable to himself than to the opponent refuted; and who had no chance of success except among hearers like himself. We are not here told that Euthydémus was a bad specimen of philosophers, and that there were others better, by the standard of whom philosophy ought to be judged. On the contrary, we find him here announced by Sokrates as among those dreaded by men adverse to philosophy,—and as not undeserving of that epithet which the semi-philosopher cited by Kriton applies to “one of the most powerful champions of the day”.

Plato, therefore, after having applied his great dramatic talent to make dialectic debate ridiculous, and thus said much to gratify its enemies—changes his battery, and says something against these enemies, without reflecting whether it is consistent or not with what had preceded. Before the close, however, he comes again into consistency with the tone of the earlier part, in the observation which he assigns to Kriton, that most of the professors of philosophy are worthless; to which Sokrates rejoins that this is not less true of all other professions. The concluding inference is, that philosophy is to be judged, not by its professors, but by itself; and that Kriton must examine it for himself, and either pursue it or leave it alone, according as his own convictions dictated.

This is a valuable admonition, and worthy of Sokrates, laying full stress as it does upon the conscientious conviction which the person examining may form for himself. But it is no answer to the question of Kriton; who says that he had already heard from Sokrates, and was himself convinced, that philosophy was of first-rate importance—and that he only desired to learn where he could find teachers to forward the progress of his son in it. As in so many other dialogues, Plato leaves the problem started, but

unsolved. The impulse towards philosophy being assured, those who feel it ask Plato in what direction they are to move towards it. He gives no answer. He can neither perform the service himself, nor recommend any one else, as competent. We shall find such silence made matter of pointed animadversion, in the fragment called Kleitophon.

The person, whom Kriton here brings forward as the censor of Sokrates and the enemy of philosophy, is peculiarly marked. In general, the persons whom Plato ranks as enemies of philosophy are the rhetors and politicians: but the example here chosen is not comprised in either of these classes: it is a semi-philosopher, yet a writer of discourses for others. Schleiermacher, Heindorf, and Spengel, suppose that Isokrates is the person intended: Winckelmann thinks it is Thrasymachus: others refer it to Lysias, or Theodorus of Byzantium:¹ Socher and Stallbaum doubt whether any special person is intended, or any thing beyond some supposed representative of a class described by attributes. I rather agree with those who refer the passage to Isokrates. He might naturally be described as one steering a middle course between philosophy and rhetoric: which in fact he himself proclaims in the Oration De Permutatione, and which agrees with the language of Plato in the dialogue Phædrus, where Isokrates is mentioned by name along with Lysias. In the Phædrus, moreover, Plato speaks of Isokrates with unusual esteem, especially as a favourable contrast with Lysias, and as a person who, though not yet a philosopher, may be expected to improve, so as in no long time to deserve that appellation.² We

Who is the person here intended by Plato, half-philosopher, half-politician? Is it Isokrates?

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyd. p. 47; Winckelmann, Proleg. p. xxxv.

Heindorf, in endeavouring to explain the difference between Plato's language in the Phædrus and in the Euthydæmus respecting Isokrates, assumes as a matter beyond question the theory of Schleiermacher, that the Phædrus was composed during Plato's early years. I have already intimated my dissent from this theory.

² Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 E.

I have already observed that I do not agree with Schleiermacher and the other critics who rank the Phædrus as the earliest or even among the earliest

compositions of Plato. That it is of much later composition I am persuaded, but of what particular date can only be conjectured. The opinion of K. F. Hermann, Stallbaum, and others, that it was composed about the time when Plato began his school at Athens (387-336 B.C.) is sufficiently probable.

The Euthydæmus may be earlier or may be later than the Phædrus. I incline to think it later. The opinion of Stallbaum (resting upon the mention of Alkibiades, p. 275 A), that it was composed in or before 404 B.C., appears to me untenable (Stallbaum, Proleg. p. 64). Plato would not be

must remember that Plato in the *Phædrus* attacks by name, and with considerable asperity, first *Lysias*, next *Theodorus* and *Thrasymachus* the rhetors—all three persons living and of note. Being sure to offend all these, Plato might well feel disposed to avoid making an enemy of *Isokrates* at the same time, and to except him honourably by name from the vulgar professors of rhetoric. In the *Euthydémus* (where the satire is directed not against the rhetors, but against their competitors the dialecticians or pseudo-dialecticians) he had no similar motive to address compliments to *Isokrates*: respecting whom he speaks in a manner probably more conformable to his real sentiments, as the unnamed representative of a certain type of character—a semi-philosopher, fancying himself among the first men in Athens, and assuming unwarrantable superiority over the genuine philosopher; but entitled to nothing more than a decent measure of esteem, such as belonged to sincere mediocrity of intelligence.

That there prevailed at different times different sentiments, more or less of reciprocal esteem or reciprocal jealousy, between Plato and *Isokrates*, ought not to be matter of surprise. Both of them were celebrated teachers of Athens, each in his own manner, during the last forty years of Plato's life: both of them enjoyed the favour of foreign princes, and received pupils from out-lying, sometimes distant, cities—from Bosphorus and Cyprus in the East, and from Sicily in the West. We know moreover that during the years immediately preceding Plato's death (347 B.C.), his pupil Aristotle, then rising into importance as a teacher of rhetoric, was engaged in acrimonious literary warfare, seemingly

likely to introduce Sokrates speaking of *Alkibiadés* as a deceased person, at whatever time the dialogue was composed. Nor can I agree with Steinhart, who refers it to 402 B.C. (*Einleitung*, p. 26). *Ueberweg* (*Untersuch. über die Zeitfolge der Plat. Schr.* pp. 266-267) considers the *Euthydémus* later (but not much later) than the *Phædrus*, subsequent to the establishment of the Platonic school at Athens (387-336 B.C.) This seems to me more probable than the contrary.

Schleiermacher, in arranging the Platonic dialogues, ranks the *Euthy-*

démus as an immediate sequel to the *Menon*, and as presupposing both *Gorgias* and *Theæstétus* (*Einl.* pp. 400-401). *Socher* agrees in this opinion, but Steinhart rejects it (*Einleit.* p. 26), placing the *Euthydémus* immediately after the *Protagoras*, and immediately before the *Menon* and the *Gorgias*; according to him, *Euthydémus*, *Menon*, and *Gorgias*, form a well marked Trilogy.

Neither of these arrangements rests upon any sufficient reasons. The chronological order cannot be determined.

of his own seeking, with Isokrates (then advanced in years) and some of the Isokratean pupils. The little which we learn concerning the literary and philosophical world of Athens, represents it as much distracted by feuds and jealousies. Isokrates on his part has in his compositions various passages which appear to allude (no name being mentioned) to Plato among others, in a tone of depreciation.¹

Isokrates seems, as far as we can make out, to have been in early life, like Lysias, a composer of speeches to be spoken by clients in the *Dikastery*. This lucrative profession was tempting, since his family had been nearly ruined during the misfortunes of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian war. Having gained reputation by such means, Isokrates became in his mature age a teacher of Rhetoric, and a composer of discourses, not for private use by clients, but for the general reader, on political or educational topics. In this character, he corresponded to the description given by Plato in the *Euthydémus*: being partly a public adviser, partly a philosopher. But the general principle under which Plato here attacks him, though conforming to the doctrine of the Platonic Republic, is contrary to that of Plato in other dialogues. "You must devote yourself either wholly to philosophy, or wholly to politics: a mixture of the two is worse than either"—this agrees with the Republic, wherein Plato enjoins upon each man one special and exclusive pursuit, as well as with the doctrine maintained against Kalliklès in the *Gorgias*—but it differs from the *Phædrus*, where he ascribes the excellence of Periklès as a statesman and rhetor, to the fact of his having acquired a large tincture of philosophy.² Cicero quotes this last passage as applicable to his own distinguished career, a combination of philosophy with politics. He dissented altogether from the doctrine here laid down by Plato in the *Euthydémus*, and many other eminent men would have dissented from it also.

As a doctrine of universal application, in fact, it cannot be

¹ Isokrates, ad Philipp. Or. v. s. 14, p. 84; contra Sophistas, Or. xiii.; Or. xiii. s. 2-24, pp. 291-296; Encom. Helenæ, Or. x. inf.; Panathenæic. Or. xii. s. 128, p. 267; Or. xv. De Permutatione, s. 90, p. 440, Bekk.

² See the facts about Isokrates in a good Dissertation by H. P. Schroder,

Utrecht, 1859, *Questiones Isocratæ*, p. 51, seq.

Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 270; Plutarch, Periklès, c. 23; Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 397.

³ Cicero, *De Orator*. iii. 84, 133; *Orator*. iv. 14; *Brutus*, 11, 44.

defended. The opposite scheme of life (which is maintained by Isokrates in *De Permutatione* and by Kalliklès in the Platonic *Gorgias*)¹—that philosophy is to be attentively studied in the earlier years of life as an intellectual training, to arm the mind with knowledge and capacities which may afterwards be applied to the active duties of life—is at least equally defensible, and suits better for other minds of a very high order. Not only Xenophon and other distinguished Greeks, but also most of the best Roman citizens, held the opinion which Plato in the *Gorgias* ascribes to Kalliklès and rebukes through the organ of Sokrates—That philosophical study, if prolonged beyond what was necessary for this purpose of adequate intellectual training, and if made the permanent occupation of life, was more hurtful than beneficial.² Certainly, a man may often fail in the attempt to combine philosophy with active politics. No one failed in such a career more lamentably than Dion, the friend of Plato—and Plato himself, when he visited Sicily to second Dion. Moreover Alkibiadès and Kritias were cited by Anytus and the other accusers of Sokrates as examples of the like mischievous conjunction. But on the other hand, Archytas at Tarentum (another friend of Plato and philosopher) administered his native city with success, as long (seemingly) as Periklès administered Athens. Such men as these two are nowise inferior either to the special

¹ Isokrates, *De Permutatione*, Or. xv. sect. 278-288, pp. 485-486, Bekk.; Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 484-485.

² The half-philosophers and half-politicians to whom Sokrates here alludes, are characterised by one of the Platonic critics as "jene oberflächlichen und schwächlichen Naturen die sich zwischen beiden Richtungen stellen und zur Erreichung selbstsüchtiger und beschränkter Zwecke von beiden aufnehmen was sie verstehen und was ihnen gefällt" (Steinhart, *Einleit.* p. 26). On the other hand we find in Tacitus a striking passage respecting the studies of Agricola in his youth at Massilia. "Memoria teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in primâ juventutis studium philosophiæ acutus, ultra quam concessum Romano ac senatori, hausisse—ni prudentia matris incensum ac flagrantem animum exercuisset: Scilicet sublime et erectum ingenium, pulchritudinem ac speciem excelso

magnæque gloriæ vehementius quam lautè appetebat: retinuitque, quod est difficillimum, ex sapientiâ modum" (*Vit. Agr.* c. 4).

Tacitus expresses himself in the same manner about the purpose with which Helvidius Priscus applied himself to philosophy (*Hist.* iv. 6): "non, ut plerique, ut nomine magnifico segne otium velaret, sed quo constantior adversus fortuita rempublicam caperetur".

Compare also the memorable passage in the Funeral Oration pronounced by Periklès (*Thuc.* ii. 40)—*φιλοσοφούμεν ἄνευ μάλακίας*, &c., which exhibits the like views.

Aulus Gellius (x. 22), who cites the doctrine which Plato ascribes to Kalliklès in the *Gorgias* (about the propriety of confining philosophy to the function of training and preparation for active pursuits), tries to make out that this was Plato's own opinion.

philosopher or to the special politician. Plato has laid down an untenable generality, in this passage of the Euthydémus, in order to suit a particular point which he wished to make against Isokrates, or against the semi-philosopher indicated, whoever else he may have been.

CHAPTER XXII.

MENON.

THIS dialogue is carried on between Sokrates and Menon, a man of noble family, wealth, and political influence, in the Thessalian city of Larissa. He is supposed to have previously frequented, in his native city, the lectures and society of the rhetor Gorgias.¹ The name and general features of Menon are probably borrowed from the Thessalian military officer, who commanded a division of the Ten Thousand Greeks, and whose character Xenophon depicts in the *Anabasis*: but there is nothing in the Platonic dialogue to mark that meanness and perfidy which the Xenophontic picture indicates. The conversation between Sokrates and Menon is interrupted by two episodes: in the first of these, Sokrates questions an unlettered youth, the slave of Menon: in the second, he is brought into conflict with Anytus, the historical accuser of the historical Sokrates.

The dialogue is begun by Menon, in a manner quite as abrupt as the Hipparchus and Minos:

Menon.—Can you tell me, Sokrates, whether virtue is teachable—or acquirable by exercise—or whether it comes by nature—or in what other manner it comes? *Sokr.*—I cannot answer your question. I am ashamed to say that I do not even know what virtue is: and when I do not know what a thing is, how can I know any thing about its attributes or accessories? A man who does not know, Menon, cannot tell whether he is handsome, rich, &c., or the contrary. *Menon.*—Cer-

¹ Cicero notices Isokrates as having heard Gorgias in Thessaly (*Orator*. 53, 176).

tainly not. But is it really true, Sokrates, that you do not know what virtue is? Am I to proclaim this respecting you, when I go home?¹ *Sokr.*—Yes—undoubtedly: and proclaim besides that I have never yet met with any one who *did* know. *Menon.*—What! have you not seen Gorgias at Athens, and did not he appear to you to know? *Sokr.*—I have met him, but I do not quite recollect what he said. We need not consider what he said, since he is not here to answer for himself.² But you doubtless recollect, and can tell me, both from yourself, and from him, what virtue is? *Menon.*—There is *no difficulty* in telling you.³

Many commentators here speak as if such disclaimer on the part of Sokrates had reference merely to certain impudent pretensions to universal knowledge on the part of the Sophists. But this (as I have before remarked) is a misconception of the Sokratic or Platonic point of view. The matter which Sokrates proclaims that *he* does not know, is, what, not Sophists alone, but every one else also, professes to know well. Sokrates stands alone in avowing that he does not know it, and that he can find no one else who knows. Menon treats the question as one of no difficulty—one on which confessed ignorance was discreditable. "What!" says Menon, "am I really to state respecting you, that you do not know what virtue is?" The man who makes such a confession will be looked upon by his neighbours with surprise and displeasure—not to speak of probable consequences yet worse. He is one whom the multifarious agencies employed by King Nomos (which we shall find described more at length in the Protagoras) have failed to mould into perfect and uninquiring conformity, and he is still in process of examination to form a judgment for himself.

Sokrates stands alone in this confession. Unpopularity entailed by it.

Menon proceeds to answer that there are many virtues: the virtue of a man—competence to transact the business of the city, and in such business to benefit his friends

Answer of Menon—plurality of

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 71 B-C. 'Ἄλλὰ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδ' ὃ τι ἀρετὴ ἴσθιν οἶσθα, ἀλλὰ τὰυτὰ περὶ σοῦ καὶ οἰκάδε ἀπαγγέλλωμεν;

² Plato, Menon, p. 71 D. ἰκεῖνον μὲντοι νῦν ἴωμεν, ἵπειδ' καὶ ἀπεσιν. Sokrates sets little value upon opinions unless where the person giving them

is present to explain and defend: compare what he says about the uselessness of citation from poets, from whom you can ask no questions, Plato, Protagor. p. 347 E.

³ Plato, Menon, p. 71 E. 'Ἄλλ' οὐ χαλεπὸν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπεῖν, &c.

virtues, one belonging to each different class and condition. Sokrates enquires for the property common to all of them.

and injure his enemies : the virtue of a woman—to administer the house well, preserving every thing within it, and obeying her husband : the virtue of a child, of an old man, a slave, &c. There is in short a virtue—and its contrary, a vice—belonging to each of us in every work, profession, and age.¹

But (replies Sokrates) are they not all the same, *quatenus* virtue? Health, *quatenus* Health, is the same in a man or a woman : is not the case similar with virtue? *Menon*.—Not exactly similar. *Sokr.*—How so? Though there are many diverse virtues, have not all of them one and the same form in common, through the communion of which they are virtues? In answer to my question, you ought to declare what this common form is. Thus, both the man who administers the city, and the woman who administers the house, must act both of them with justice and moderation. Through the same qualities, both the one and the other are good. There is thus some common constituent : tell me what it is, according to you and Gorgias? *Menon*.—It is to be competent to exercise command over men. *Sokr.*—But that will not suit for the virtue of a child or a slave. Moreover, must we not superadd the condition, to command justly, and not unjustly? *Menon*.—I think so : justice is virtue. *Sokr.*—Is it virtue—or is it one particular variety of virtue?² *Menon*.—How do you mean? *Sokr.*—Just as if I were to say about roundness, that it is not figure, but a particular variety of figure : because there are other figures besides roundness. *Menon*.—Very true : I say too, that there are other virtues besides justice—namely, courage, moderation, wisdom, magnanimity, and several others also. *Sokr.*—We are thus still in the same predicament. In looking for one virtue, we have found many ; but we cannot find that one form which runs through them all. *Menon*.—I cannot at present tell what that one is.⁴

¹ Plato, *Menon*, p. 72 A. καθ' ἐκάστην γὰρ τῶν πράξεων καὶ τῶν ἡλικιών πρὸς ἑκάστον ἔργον ἐκάστη ἡμῶν ἢ ἀρετὴ ἐστίν. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία.

Though Sokrates disapproves this method of answering—τὸ ἐξαριθμεῖν τὰς ἀρετάς (to use the expression of Aristotle)—yet Aristotle seems to think it better than searching for one general

definition. See *Politica*, i. 13, p. 1260, a. 15-30, where he has the Platonic *Menon* in his mind.

² Plato, *Menon*, p. 73 D.

³ Plato, *Menon*, p. 73 E. Πόρετον ἀρετῇ, ὃ Μένων, ἢ ἀρετῇ τις ;

⁴ Plato, *Menon*, p. 74 A. οὐ γὰρ δύναμαι πῶς, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ ζητεῖς, μίαν ἀρετὴν λαβεῖν κατὰ πάντων.

Sokrates proceeds to illustrate his meaning by the analogies of figure and colour. You call *round* a figure, and *square* a figure: you call *white* and *black* both colour, the one as much as the other, though they are unlike and even opposite.¹ Tell me, What is this same common property in both, which makes you call both of them figure—both of them colour? Take this as a preliminary exercise, in order to help you in answering my enquiry about virtue.² Menon cannot answer, and Sokrates answers his own question. He gives a general definition, first of figure, next of colour. He first defines figure in a way which implies colour to be known. This is pointed out; and he then admits that in a good definition, suitable to genuine dialectical investigation, nothing should be implied as known, except what the respondent admits himself to know. Figure and colour are both defined suitably to this condition.³

Analogous cases cited—definitions of figure and colour.

All this preliminary matter seems to be intended for the purpose of getting the question clearly conceived as a general question—of exhibiting and eliminating the narrow and partial conceptions which often unconsciously substitute themselves in the mind, in place of that which ought to be conceived as a generic whole—and of clearing up what is required in a good definition. A generic whole, including various specific portions distinguishable from each other, was at that time little understood by any one. There existed no grammar, nor any rules of logic founded on analysis of the intellectual processes. To predicate of the genus what was true only of the species—to predicate as distinctively characterizing the species, what is true of the whole genus in which it is contained—to lose the integrity of the genus in its separate parcels or fragments⁴—these were errors which men had never yet been expressly taught to avoid. To assign the one common meaning, constituent of or connoted by a generic term,

Importance at that time of bringing into conscious view, logical subordination and distinctions—Neither logic nor grammar had then been cast into system.

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 74 D.

² Plato, Menon, c. 7, pp. 74-75.

Περὶ εἶναι, ἵνα καὶ γένηται σοὶ μελέτη πρὸς τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς ἀπόκρισιν (75 A).

The purpose of practising the re-

spondent is here distinctly announced.

³ Plato, Menon, p. 75 C-E.

⁴ Plato, Menon, p. 79 A. ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος σου μὴ καταγνῖναι μηδὲ κερματίζειν τὴν ἀρετὴν, &c. 79 B: ἐμοῦ δεηθέντος ὅλην εἶπαι τὴν ἀρετὴν, &c.

had never yet been put before them as a problem. Such preliminary clearing of the ground is instructive even now, when formal and systematic logic has become more or less familiar: but in the time of Plato, it must have been indispensably required, to arrive at a full conception of any general question.¹

Menon having been thus made to understand the formal requisites for a definition, gives as his definition of virtue the phrase of some lyric poet—"To delight in, or desire, things beautiful, fine, honourable—and to have the power of getting them". But Sokrates remarks that honourable things are good things, and that every one without exception desires good. No one desires evil except when he mistakes it for good. On this point all men are alike; the distinctive feature of virtue must then consist in the second half of the definition—in the power of acquiring good things, such as health, wealth, money, power, dignities, &c.² But the acquisition of these things is not virtuous, unless it be made consistently with justice and moderation: moreover the man who acts justly is virtuous, even though he does not acquire them. It appears then that every agent who acts with justice

¹ These examples of trial, error, and exposure, have great value and reflect high credit on Plato, when we regard them as an intellectual or propædæutic discipline, forcing upon hearers an attention to useful logical distinctions at a time when there existed no systematic grammar or logic. But surely they must appear degraded, as they are presented in the Prolegomena of Stallbaum, and by some other critics. We are there told that Plato's main purpose in this dialogue was to mock and jeer the Sophists and their pupil, and that for this purpose Sokrates is made to employ not his own arguments but arguments borrowed from the Sophists themselves—"ut callidè suam ipsius rationem occultare existimandus sit, quo magis illudat Sophistarum alumnium" (p. 15). "Quæ quidem argumentatio" (that of Sokrates) "admodum cavendum est ne pro Socraticâ vel Platonicâ accipiat. Est enim prorsus ad mentem Sophistarum aliorumque id genus hominum comparat," &c. (p. 16). Compare pp. 12-13 seq.

The Sophists undoubtedly had no distinct consciousness, any more than other persons, of these logical distinc-

tions, which were then for the first time pressed forcibly upon attention.

² Plato, Menon, p. 77 B. δοκεῖ τοῖνυν μοι ἀρετὴ εἶναι, καθάπερ ὁ ποιητὴς λέγει, χαίρειν τε καλοῖσι καὶ δύνασθαι. καὶ ἐγὼ τοῦτο λέγω ἀρετὴν ἐπιθυμοῦντα τῶν καλῶν δυνατὸν εἶναι κορίζεσθαι.

Whoever this lyric poet was, his real meaning is somewhat twisted by Sokrates in order to furnish a basis for ethical criticism, as the song of Simonides is in the Protagoras. A person having power, and taking delight in honourable or beautiful things—is a very intelligible Hellenic ideal, as an object of envy and admiration. Compare Protagoras, p. 351 C: εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς ζῆν ἡδόμενος. A poor man may be φιλόκαλος as well as a rich man: φιλοκαλοῦμεν μετ' εὐτελείας, is the boast of Periklēs in the name of the Athenians, Thucyd. ii. 40.

Plato, Menon, p. 78 C. Sokr. Ἀγαθὰ δὲ καλεῖς οὐχὶ οἷον ὑγιεινὰ τε καὶ πλούσιον; καὶ χρυσίον λέγω καὶ ἀργύριον πᾶσθαι καὶ τιμὰς ἐν πόλει καὶ ἀρχαίς; μὴ ἄλλ' ἅπτα λέγεις ἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ τοιαῦτα; Menon. Οὐκ· ἀλλὰ πάντα λέγω τὰ τοιαῦτα.

and moderation is virtuous. But this is nugatory as a definition of virtue: for justice and moderation are only known as parts of virtue, and require to be themselves defined. No man can know what a part of virtue is, unless he knows what virtue itself is.¹ Menon must look for a better definition, including nothing but what is already known or admitted.

Menon.—Your conversation, Sokrates, produces the effect of the shock of the torpedo: you stun and confound me: you throw me into inextricable perplexity, so that I can make no answer. I have often discoursed copiously—and, as I thought, effectively—upon virtue; but now you have shown that I do not even know what virtue is. *Sokr.*—If I throw you into perplexity, it is only because I am myself in the like perplexity and ignorance. I do not know what virtue is, any more than you: and I shall be glad to continue the search for finding it, if you will assist me.

Menon.—But how are you to search for that of which you are altogether ignorant? Even if you do find it, how can you ever know that you have found it? *Sokr.*—You are now introducing a troublesome doctrine, laid down by those who are averse to the labour of thought. They tell us that a man cannot search either for what he knows, or for what he does not know. For the former, research is superfluous: for the latter it is unprofitable and purposeless, since the searcher does not know what he is looking for.

I do not believe this doctrine (continues Sokrates). Priests, priestesses, and poets (Pindar among them) tell us, that the mind of man is immortal and has existed throughout all past time, in conjunction with successive bodies; alternately abandoning one body, or dying—and taking up new life or reviving in another body. In this perpetual succession of existences, it has seen every thing,—both here and in Hades and everywhere else—and has learnt every thing. But though thus omniscient, it has forgotten the larger portion of its knowledge. Yet what has

Menon complains that the conversation of Sokrates confounds him like an electric shock—Sokrates replies that he is himself in the same state of confusion and ignorance. He urges continuance of search by both.

But how is the process of search available to any purpose? No man searches for what he already knows; and for what he does not know, it is useless to search, for he cannot tell when he has found it.

Theory of reminiscence propounded by Sokrates—antecedent immortality of the soul—

¹ Plato, *Menon*, p. 79.

what is called teaching is the revival and recognition of knowledge acquired in a former life, but forgotten.

been thus forgotten may again be revived. What we call learning, is such revival. It is reminiscence of something which the mind had seen in a former state of existence, and knew, but had forgotten. Since then all the parts of nature are analogous, or cognate—and since the mind has gone through and learnt them all—we cannot wonder that the revival of any one part should put it upon the track of recovering for itself all the rest, both about virtue and about every thing else, if a man will only persevere in intent meditation. All research and all learning is thus nothing but reminiscence. In our researches, we are not looking for what we do not know: we are looking for what we do know, but have forgotten. There is therefore ample motive, and ample remuneration, for prosecuting enquiries: and your doctrine which pronounces them to be unprofitable, is incorrect.¹

Sokrates proceeds to illustrate the position, just laid down, by cross-examining Menon's youthful slave, who, though wholly untaught and having never heard any mention of geometry, is brought by a proper series of questions to give answers out of his own mind, furnishing the solution of a geometrical problem. The first part of the examination brings him to a perception of the difficulty, and makes him feel a painful perplexity, from which he desires to obtain relief:² the second part guides his mind in the efforts necessary for fishing up a solution out of its own pre-existing, but forgotten, stores. True opinions, which he had long had within him without knowing it, are awakened by interrogation, and become cognitions. From the fact that the mind thus

Illustration of this theory—knowledge may be revived by skilful questions in the mind of a man thoroughly untaught. Sokrates questions the slave of Menon.

¹ Plato, Menon, pp. 81 C-D. Ἄτε ὅν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατός τε οὐσα καὶ πολλὰς γενονία, καὶ ἑωρακία καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν Ἄιδου καὶ πάντα χρημάτα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι οὐ μαμάθηκεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ περὶ ἄλλων ὁλόν τε εἶναι αὐτὴν ἀναμνησθῆναι ἃ γε καὶ πρότερον ἤπιστάτο. Ἄτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὐσης καὶ μαμάθηκίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐν μόνον ἀναμνησθῆναι, ὃ ἃ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι, τᾶλλα

πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἔάν τις ἀνδρείως ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμῃ ζητῶν. Τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μαμάθαι ἀνάμνησις ὅλον ἔστιν.

² Plato, Menon, p. 84 C. Οἷα ὅν ἂν αὐτὸν πρότερον ἐπιχειρήσαι ζητεῖν ἢ μαμάθαι τούτο ὃ φέτο εἶδέναι οὐκ εἰδώς, πρὶν εἰς ἀπορίαν κατέπεσον ἤγγασμένος μὴ εἶδέναι, καὶ ἐπύθετο τὸ εἶδέναι; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Ὅντο ἄρα παρ' ἐκείνης;

possesses the truth of things which it has not acquired in this life, Sokrates infers that it must have gone through a pre-existence of indefinite duration, or must be immortal.¹

The former topic of enquiry is now resumed : but at the instance of Menon, the question taken up, is not—“What is virtue?” but—“Is virtue teachable or not?” Sokrates, after renewing his objection against the inversion of philosophical order by discussing the second question without having determined the first, enters upon the discussion hypothetically, assuming as a postulate, that nothing can be taught except knowledge. The question then stands thus—“Is virtue knowledge?” If it be, it can be taught : if not, it cannot be taught.²

Sokrates proceeds to prove that virtue is knowledge, or a mode of knowledge. Virtue is good : all good things are profitable. But none of the things accounted good are profitable, unless they be rightly employed ; that is, employed with knowledge or intelligence. This is true not only of health, wealth, beauty, strength, power, &c., but also of the mental attributes justice, moderation, courage, quick apprehension, &c. All of these are profitable, and therefore good, if brought into action under knowledge or right intelligence ; none of them are profitable or good, without this condition—which is therefore the distinctive constituent of virtue.³

Virtue, therefore, being knowledge or a mode of knowledge, cannot come by nature, but must be teachable.

Yet again there are other contrary reasons (he proceeds) which prove that it cannot be teachable. For if it were so, there would be distinct and assignable teachers and learners of it, and the times and places could be pointed out where it is taught and learnt. We see that this is the case with all arts and professions. But in regard to virtue, there are neither recognised teachers, nor learners, nor years of learning. The Sophists pretend to be teachers of it, but are not :⁴

Enquiry taken up—Whether virtue is teachable? without determining what virtue is.

Virtue is knowledge—no possessions, no attributes, either of mind or body, are good or profitable, except under the guidance of knowledge.

Virtue, as being knowledge, must be teachable. Yet there are opposing reasons, showing that it cannot be teachable. No

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 86. Οὐκ οὖν εἰ δὲ ἐν ἀλήθεια ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ὅστις ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ἀθάνατος ἂν ἢ ψυχὴ εἴη;

² Plato, Menon, p. 87.

³ Plato, Menon, p. 89.

⁴ Plato, Menon, p. 92.

there was nothing except knowledge which guided us to useful and profitable consequences. But this assumption will not hold. There is something else besides knowledge, which also guides us to the same useful results. That something is *right opinion*, which is quite different from knowledge. The man who holds right opinions is just as profitable to us, and guides us quite as well to right actions, as if he knew. Right opinions, so long as they stay in the mind, are as good as knowledge, for the purpose of guidance in practice. But the difference is, that they are evanescent and will not stay in the mind: while knowledge is permanent and ineffaceable. They are exalted into knowledge, when bound in the mind by a chain of causal reasoning:¹ that is, by the process of reminiscence; before described.

Virtue then (continues Sokrates)—that which constitutes the virtuous character and the permanent, trustworthy, useful guide—consists in knowledge. But there is also right opinion, a sort of *quasi-knowledge*, which produces in practice effects as good as knowledge, only that it is not deeply or permanently fixed in the mind.² It is this right opinion, or *quasi-knowledge*, which esteemed and distinguished citizens possess, and by means of which they render useful service to the city. That they do not possess knowledge, is certain; for if they did, they would be able to teach it to others, and especially to their own sons: and this it has been shown that they cannot do.³ They deliver true opinions and predictions, and excellent advice, like prophets and oracular ministers, by divine inspiration and possession, without knowledge or wisdom of their own. They are divine and inspired persons, but not wise or knowing.⁴

premises—knowledge is not the only thing which guides to good results—right opinion will do the same.

Right opinion cannot be relied on for staying in the mind, and can never give rational explanations, nor teach others—good practical statesmen receive right opinion by inspiration from the Gods.

¹ Plato, Menon, pp. 97 E—98 A. και γὰρ αἱ δοξαὶ αἱ ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν ἂν χρόνον παραμείνωσιν, καλὸν τι χρήμα και πάντα τάγαθὰ ἐργάζονται· πολλὴν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἰσθίουσι παραμείνειν, ἀλλὰ δραστηρεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὥστε οὐ πολλοὺ ἀξία εἰσιν, ὥς ἂν τις αὐτὰς δῆσῃ αἰτίας λογισμῷ· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνέμνησις, ὥς ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἡμῖν ἀπολόγηται.

² Plato, Menon, p. 99 A. φ δὲ ἀνθρώ-

πος ἡγεμῶν ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν, δύο ταῦτα, δόξα ἀληθὴς και ἐπιστήμη.

³ Plato, Menon, p. 99 B. Οὐκ ἄρα σοφία τινὶ οὐδὲ σοφοὶ ὄντες οἱ τοιοῦτοι ἄνδρες ἡγούντο ταῖς πόλεσιν, οἱ ἀμφὶ θεμιστοκλέα. . . διὰ και οὐχ οἱοί τε ἄλλους ποιεῖν τοιοῦτον οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσιν, ἅτε οὐ δὲ ἐπιστήμην ὄντες τοιοῦτοι.

⁴ Plato, Menon, p. 99 D. και τοὺς πολιτικούς οὐχ ἥκιστα τούτων φαίμεν, ἂν θείους τε εἶναι και ἐνθουσιάζειν, ἐπίπνοους

And thus (concludes Sokrates) the answer to the question originally started by Menon—"Whether virtue is teachable?"—is as follows. Virtue in its highest sense, in which it is equivalent to or coincident with knowledge, is teachable: but no such virtue exists. That which exists in the most distinguished citizens under the name of virtue,—or at least producing the results of virtue in practice—is not teachable. Nor does it come by nature, but by special inspiration from the Gods. The best statesmen now existing cannot make any other person like themselves: if any one of them could do this, he would be, in comparison with the rest, like a real thing compared with a shadow.¹

Nevertheless the question which we have just discussed—
 But what virtue itself is, remains unknown. "How virtue arises or is generated?"—must be regarded as secondary and dependent, not capable of being clearly understood until the primary and principal question—"What is virtue?"—has been investigated and brought to a solution.

This last observation is repeated by Sokrates at the end—as it had been stated at the beginning, and in more than one place during the continuance—of the dialogue. In fact, Sokrates seems at first resolved to enforce the natural and necessary priority of the latter question: but is induced by the solicitation of Menon to invert the order.²

The propriety of the order marked out, but not pursued, by Sokrates is indisputable. Before you can enquire how virtue is generated or communicated, you must be satisfied that you know what virtue is. You must know the essence of the subject—or those predicates which the word connotes (= the meaning of the term) before you investigate its accidents and antecedents.³ Menon begins by being satisfied that he knows what

ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅταν κατορθῶσι λέγοντες πολλὰ καὶ μεγάλα πράγματα, μὴδὲν εἰδότες ὅν λέγουσιν.

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 100.

² Plato, Menon, p. 100 B.

³ Plato, Menon, p. 96.

⁴ To use the phrase of Plato himself in the Euthyphron, p. 11 A, the

virtue is : so satisfied, that he accounts it discreditable for a man not to know : although he is made to answer like one who has never thought upon the subject, and does not even understand the question. Sokrates, on the other hand, not only confesses that he does not himself know, but asserts that he never yet met with a man who did know. One of the most important lessons in this, as in so many other Platonic dialogues, is the mischief of proceeding to debate ulterior and secondary questions, without having settled the fundamental words and notions : the false persuasion of knowledge, common to almost every one, respecting these familiar ethical and social ideas. Menon represents the common state of mind. He begins with the false persuasion that he as well as every one else knows what virtue is : and even when he is proved to be ignorant, he still feels no interest in the fundamental enquiry, but turns aside to his original object of curiosity—"Whether virtue is teachable". Nothing can be more repugnant to an ordinary mind than the thorough sifting of deep-seated, long familiarised, notions—*τὸ γὰρ ὀρθοῦσθαι γινώμην, ὀδυνῶ.*

The confession of Sokrates that neither he nor any other person in his experience knows what virtue is—that it must be made a subject of special and deliberate investigation—and that no man can know what justice, or any other part of virtue is, unless he first knows what virtue as a whole is¹—are matters to be kept in mind also, as contrasting with other portions of the Platonic dialogues, wherein virtue, justice, &c., are tacitly assumed (according to the received habit) as matters known and understood. The contributions which we obtain from the Menon towards finding out the Platonic notion of virtue, are negative rather than positive. The comments of Sokrates upon Menon's first definition include the doctrine often announced in Plato—That no man by nature desires suffering or evil ; every man desires good : if

Doctrine of Sokrates in the Menon—desire of good alleged to be universally felt—in what sense this is true.

οὐσία must be known before the *πάθος* are sought—*κινδυνεύεις, ὦ Εὐθύφρων, ἐρωτώμενος τὸ δόσιον, ὃ, τί ποτ' ἐστὶ τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν μοι αὐτοῦ οὐ βούλεσθαι δηλῶσαι, πάθος δὲ τί περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν, ὃ, τι πέποιθε τοῦτο τὸ δόσιον, φιλεῖσθαι ὑπὸ πάντων θεῶν· ὃ τι δὲ ὅν, οὐκ ἔγωγε εἶπα.*

Compare Lachés, p. 190 B, and Gorgias, pp. 448 E, 462 C.

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 79 B-C. *τὴν γὰρ δικαιοσύνην μόνιον φησὶ ἀρετὴς εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστα τούτων. . . . οἷα τινα εἰδέναι μόνιον ἀρετὴς ὃ τι ἐστίν, αὐτὴν μὴ εἰδέναι· οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.*

he seeks or pursues suffering or evil, he does so merely from error or ignorance, mistaking it for good.¹ This is true, undoubtedly, if we mean what is good or evil for himself: and if by good or evil we mean (according to the doctrine enforced by Sokrates in the Protagoras) the result of items of pleasure and pain, rightly estimated and compared by the Measuring Reason. Every man naturally desires pleasure, and the means of acquiring pleasure, for himself: every man naturally shrinks from pain, or the causes of pain, to himself: every one compares and measures the items of each with more or less wisdom and impartiality. But the proposition is not true, if we mean what is good or evil for others: and if by good we mean (as Sokrates is made to declare in the Gorgias) something apart from pleasure, and by evil something apart from pain (understanding pleasure and pain in their largest sense). A man sometimes desires what is good for others, sometimes what is evil for others, as the case may be. Plato's observation therefore cannot be admitted—That as to the wish or desire, all men are alike: one man is no better than another.²

The second portion of Plato's theory, advanced to explain what virtue is, presents nothing more satisfactory. Sokrates requires knowledge as the principal condition of virtue, but does not determine knowledge, of what. Virtue is useful or profitable: but neither health, strength, beauty, wealth, power, &c., are profitable, unless rightly used: nor are justice, moderation, courage, quick apprehension, good memory, &c., profitable, unless they are accompanied and guided by knowledge or prudence.³ Now if by *profitable* we have reference not to the individual agent alone, but to other persons concerned also, the proposition is true, but not instructive or distinct. For what is meant by *right use*? To what ends are the gifts here enumerated to be turned, in order to constitute right use? What again is meant by *knowledge*? knowledge of what?⁴ This is a question put by Sokrates in many other dialogues, and necessary to be put here also. Moreover, knowledge is a term which requires to be determined, not merely to some assignable object, but also in its general import,

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 77.

² Plato, Menon, p. 78 B. τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι πάντων ὑπάρχει, καὶ ταύτη γὰρ οὐδὲν ὁ ἄνθρωπος τοῦ ἑτέρου βελτίων.

³ Plato, Menon, pp. 87-88.

⁴ See Republic, vi. p. 505 B, where this question is put, but not answered, respecting φρόνησις.

no less than virtue. We shall come presently to an elaborate dialogue (*Theætétus*) in which Plato makes many attempts to determine knowledge generally, but ends in a confessed failure. Knowledge must be knowledge *possessed by some one*, and must be knowledge of *something*. What is it, that a man must know, in order that his justice or courage may become profitable? Is it pleasures and pains, with their causes, and the comparative magnitude of each (as Sokrates declares in the *Protagoras*), in order that he may contribute to diminish the sum of pains, increase that of pleasures, to himself or to the society? If this be what he is required to know, Plato should have said so—or if not, what else—in order that the requirement of knowledge might be made an intelligible condition.

Though the subject of direct debate in the *Menon* is the same as that in the *Protagoras* (whether virtue be teachable?) yet the manner of treating this subject is very different in the two. One point of difference between the two has been just noticed. Another difference is, that whereas in *Menon* the teachability of virtue is assumed to be disproved, because there are no recognised teachers or learners of it—in the *Protagoras* this argument is produced by Sokrates, but is combated at length (as we shall presently see) by a counter-argument on the part of the Sophists, without any rejoinder from Sokrates. Of this counter-argument no notice is taken in the *Menon*: although, if it be well-founded, it would have served Anytus no less than Protagoras, as a solution of the difficulties raised by Sokrates. Such diversity of handling and argumentative fertility, are characteristic of the Platonic procedure. I have already remarked, that the establishment of positive conclusions, capable of being severed from their premisses, registered in the memory, and used as principles for deduction—is foreign to the spirit of these Dialogues of Search. To settle a question and finish with it—to get rid of the debate, as if it were a troublesome temporary necessity—is not what Plato desires. His purpose is, to provoke the spirit of enquiry—to stimulate responsive efforts of the mind by a painful shock of exposed ignorance—and to open before it a multiplicity of new roads with varied points of view.

Subject of
Menon,
same as
that of the
Protagoras
—diversity
of handling
—Plato is
not anxious
to settle a
question
and get
rid of it.

Anxiety of
Plato to
keep up and
enforce the
spirit of
research.

Nowhere in the Platonic writings is this provocative shock more vividly illustrated than in the Menon, by the simile of the electrical fish: a simile as striking as that of the magnet in Ion.¹ Nowhere, again, is the true character of the Sokratic intellect more clearly enunciated. "You complain, Menon, that I plunge your mind into nothing but doubt, and puzzle, and conscious ignorance. If I do this, it is only because my own mind is already in that same condition."² The only way out of it is, through joint dialectical colloquy and search; in which I invite you to accompany me, though I do not know when or where it will end." And then, for the purpose of justifying as well as encouraging such prolonged search, Sokrates proceeds to unfold his remarkable hypothesis—eternal pre-existence, boundless past experience, and omniscience, of the mind—identity of cognition with recognition, dependent on reminiscence. "Research or enquiry (said some) is fruitless. You must search either for that which you know, or for that which you do not know. The first is superfluous—the second impossible: for if you do not know what a thing is, how are you to be satisfied that the answer which you find is that which you are looking for? How can you distinguish a true solution from another which is untrue, but plausible?"

Here we find explicitly raised, for the first time, that difficulty which embarrassed the different philosophical schools in Greece for the subsequent three centuries—What is the criterion of truth? Wherein consists the process called verification and proof, of that which is first presented as an hypothesis? This was one of the great problems debated between the Academics, the Stoics, and the Sceptics, until the extinction of the schools of philosophy.³

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 80 A. *ἡλεκτρικὴ θαλασσία*. Compare what I have said above about the Ion, ch. XVII, p. 128.

² Plato, Menon, p. 80 D.

³ Sokrates here calls this problem an *ἀπομνηστικὸς λόγος*. Stallbaum (in his Prolegom. to the Menon, p. 14) describes it as a "questiunculam, hand dubie e sophistarum disciplina arreptam." If the Sophists were the

first to raise this question, I think that by doing so they rendered service to the interests of philosophy. The question is among the first which ought to be thoroughly debated and sifted, if we are to have a body of "reasoned truth" called philosophy.

I dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum (p. 20), though it is adopted both by Socher (Ueber Platon, p. 185) and

Not one of these schools was satisfied with the very peculiar answer which the Platonic Sokrates here gives to the question. When truth is presented to us (he intimates), we recognise it as an old friend after a long absence. We know it by reason of its conformity to our antecedent, pre-natal, experience (in the Phædon, such pre-natal experience is restricted to commerce with the substantial, intelligible, Ideas, which are not mentioned in the Menon): the soul or mind is immortal, has gone through an indefinite succession of temporary lives prior to the present, and will go through an indefinite succession of temporary lives posterior to the present—"longæ, canitis si cognita, vitæ Mors media est". The mind has thus become omniscient, having seen, heard, and learnt every thing, both on earth and in Hades: but such knowledge exists as a confused and unavailable mass, having been buried and forgotten on the commencement of its actual life.

None of the philosophers were satisfied with the answer here made by Plato—that verification consists in appeal to pre-natal experience.

Since all nature is in universal kindred, communion, or interdependence, that which we hear or see here, recalls to the memory, by association, portions of our prior forgotten omni-

by Steinhart (Einleitung zum Menon, p. 123), that the Menon was composed by Plato during the lifetime of Sokrates. Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, p. 22; Einleitung zum Menon, pp. 329-330), Ueberweg (Aechth. Plat. Schr. p. 226), and K. F. Hermann, on the other hand, regard the Menon as composed after the death of Sokrates, and on this point I agree with them, though whether it was composed not long after that event (as K. F. Hermann thinks) or thirteen years after it (as Schleiermacher thinks), I see no sufficient grounds for deciding. I incline to the belief that its composition is considerably later than Hermann supposes; the mention of the Theban Ismenias is one among the reasons rendering such later origin probable. Plato probably borrowed from the Xenophontic Anabasis the name, country, and social position of Menon, who may have received teaching from Gorgias, as we know that Proxenus did, Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16. The reader can compare the Einleitung of Schleiermacher (in which he professes to prove

that the Menon is a corollary to the Theætétus and Gorgias, and an immediate antecedent to the Euthydémus,—that it solves the riddle of the Protagoras—and that it presupposes and refers back to the Phædrus) with the Einleitung of Steinhart (p. 120 seq.), who contests all these propositions, saying that the Menon is decidedly later than the Euthydémus, and decidedly earlier than the Theætétus, Gorgias, and Phædrus; with the opinions of Stallbaum and Hermann, who recognise an order different from that either of Steinhart or Schleiermacher; and with that of Ast, who rejects the Menon altogether as unworthy of Plato. Every one of these dissentient critics has something to say for his opinion, while none of them (in my judgment) can make out anything like a conclusive case. The mistake consists in assuming that there must have been a peremptory order and intentional interdependence among the Platonic Dialogues, and next in trying to show by internal evidence what that order was.

science.¹ It is in this recall or reminiscence that search, learning, acquisition of knowledge, consists. Teaching and learning are words without meaning: the only process really instructive is that of dialectic debate, which, if indefatigably prosecuted, will dig out the omniscience buried within.² So vast is the theory generated in Plato's mind, by his worship of dialectic,

¹ The doctrine of communion or interdependence pervading all Nature, with one continuous cosmical soul penetrating everywhere, will be found set forth in the kosmology of the Timæus, pp. 37-42-43. It was held, with various modifications, both by the Pythagoreans and the Stoics. Compare Cicero, Divinat. ii. 14-15; Virgil, Aeneid vi. 715 seqq.; Georgic. iv. 220; Sextus Empir. adv. Mathem. ix. 127; Ekphantus Pythagoreus ap. Stobæum, Tit. 48, vol. ii. p. 320, Gaisford.

The view here taken by Plato, that all nature is cognate and interdependent—*ἀρε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀνάσσει συγγενεὺς οὐρανός*—is very similar to the theory of Leibnitz:—"Ubique per materiam disseminata statuo principia vitalia seu percipientia. Omnia in naturâ sunt analogica" (Leibnitz, Epist. ad Wagnerum, p. 466; Leibn. Opp. Erdmann). Farther, that the human mind by virtue of its interdependence or kindred with all nature, includes a confused omniscience, is also a Leibnitzian view. "Car comme tout est plein (ce qui rend toute la matière liée) et comme dans le plein tout mouvement fait quelque effet sur les corps distans à mesure de la distance, de sorte que chaque corps est affecté non seulement par ceux qui le touchent, et se ressent en quelque façon de tout ce qui leur arrive—mais aussi par leur moyen se ressent de ceux qui touchent les premiers dont il est touché immédiatement. Il s'ensuit que cette communication va à quelque distance que ce soit. Et par conséquent tout corps se ressent de tout ce qui se fait dans l'Univers: tellement que celui, qui voit tout, pourroit lire dans chacun ce qui se fait partout et même ce qui s'est fait et se fera, en remarquant dans le présent ce qui est éloigné tant selon les temps que selon les lieux: *οὐρανὸν πάντα*, disoit Hippocrate. Mais une âme ne peut lire en elle même que ce qui y est représenté distinctement: elle ne sauroit développer tout d'un coup ses règles, car elles

vont à l'infini. Ainsi quoique chaque monade créée représente tout l'Univers, elle représente plus distinctement le corps qui lui est particulièrement affecté, et dont elle fait l'Entéléchie. Et comme ce corps exprime tout l'Univers par la connexion de toute la matière dans le plein, l'âme représente aussi tout l'Univers en représentant ce corps qui lui appartient d'une manière particulière" (Leibnitz, Monadologie, sect. 61-62, No. 83, p. 710; Opp. Leibn. ed. Erdmann).

Again, Leibnitz, in another Dissertation:—"Comme à cause de la plénitude du monde tout est lié, et chaque corps agit sur chaque autre corps, plus ou moins, selon la distance, et en est affecté par la réaction—il s'ensuit que chaque monade est un miroir vivant, ou doué d'action interne, représentatif de l'Univers, suivant son point de vue, et aussi réglé que l'Univers même" (Principes de la Nature et de la Grace, p. 714, ed. Erdmann; also Système Nouveau, p. 128, a. 36).

Leibnitz expresses more than once how much his own metaphysical views agreed with those of Plato. Lettre à M. Bourguet, pp. 723-725. He expresses his belief in the pre-existence of the soul: "Tout ce que je crois pouvoir assurer, est, que l'âme de tout animal a préexisté, et a été dans un corps organique: qui enfin, par beaucoup de changemens, involutions, et évolutions, est devenu l'animal présent" (Lettre à M. Bourguet, p. 731). And in the Platonic doctrine of reminiscence to a certain point: "Il y a quelque chose de solide dans ce que dit Platon de la reminiscence" (p. 137, b. 10). Also Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Humain, p. 198, b. 28; and Epistol. ad Hanschium, p. 440, a. 12.

See the elaborate account of the philosophy of Leibnitz by Dr. Kuno Fischer—Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 226-232.

² Plato, Menon, p. 81 D. *ὅτι τὰς ἀνδρείας ἢ καὶ μὴ ἀνοικιστὴν ἔχουσιν*. Compare also p. 86 B.

respecting that process of search to which more than half of his dialogues are devoted.

In various other dialogues of Plato, the same hypothesis is found repeated. His conception of the immortality of the soul or mind, includes pre-existence as well as post-existence: a perpetual succession of temporary lives, each in a distinct body, each terminated by death, and each followed by renewed life for a time in another body. In fact, the pre-existence of the mind formed the most important part of Plato's theory about immortality: for he employed it as the means of explaining how the mind became possessed of general notions. As the doctrine is stated in the *Menon*, it is made applicable to all minds (instead of being confined, as in *Phædrus*, *Phædon*, and elsewhere, to a few highly gifted minds, and to commerce with the intelligible substances called Ideas). This appears from the person chosen to illustrate the alleged possibility of stimulating artificial reminiscence: that person is an unlettered youth, taken at hazard from among the numerous slaves of *Menon*.¹

Plato's view of the immortality of the soul—difference between the *Menon*, *Phædrus*, and *Phædon*.

It is true, indeed (as *Schleiermacher* observes), that the questions put by *Sokrates* to this youth are in great proportion leading questions, suggesting their own answers. They would not have served their purpose unless they had been such. The illustration here furnished, of the *Socratic* interrogatory process, is highly interesting, and his theory is in a great degree true.² Not all learning, but an important part of learning, consists in reminiscence—not indeed of

Doctrine of Plato, that new truth may be elicited by skilful examination out of the unlettered mind—how far correct?

¹ *Plato*, *Menon*, pp. 82 A, 85 E. προσέλασον τῶν πολλῶν ἀκολουθῶν τούτων τῶν σαυτοῦ ἕνα, ὅντινα βούλει, ἵνα ἐν τούτῳ σοὶ ἐπιδείξωμαι. *Stallbaum* says that this allusion to the numerous slaves in attendance is intended to illustrate conspicuously the wealth and nobility of *Menon*. In my judgment, it is rather intended to illustrate the operation of pure accident—the perfectly ordinary character of the mind worked upon—"one among many, which you please".

² *Plutarch* (Fragment. *Περὶ ψυχῆς*). Εἰ ἀπὸ ἑτέρου ἑτέρον ἐννοοῦμεν; οὐκ ἂν, εἰ μὴ πρόγνωστο. Τὸ ἐπιχείρημα Πλα-

τωνικόν. Εἰ προστίθμεν τὸ ἑλλειπον τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς;—καὶ αὐτὸ Πλατωνικόν.

Plutarch, in the same fragment, indicates some of the objections made by *Bion* and *Straton* against the doctrine of ἀνάμνησις. How (they asked) does it happen that this reminiscence brings up often what is false or absurd? (asked *Bion*). If such reminiscence exists (asked *Straton*) how comes it that we require demonstrations to conduct us to knowledge? and how is it that no man can play on the flute or the harp without practice?

*Οτι Βίων ἠγόρευε περὶ τοῦ ψεύδους, εἰ καὶ αὐτὸ κατ' ἀνάμνησιν, ὡς τὸ ἐναντίον

acquisitions made in an antecedent life, but of past experience and judgments in this life. Of such experience and judgments every one has travelled through a large course; which has disappeared from his memory, yet not irrevocably. Portions of it may be revived, if new matter be presented to the mind, fitted to excite the recollection of them by the laws of association. By suitable interrogations, a teacher may thus recall to the memory of his pupils many facts and judgments which have been hitherto forgotten: he may bring into juxtaposition those which have never before been put together in the mind: and he may thus make them elicit instructive comparisons and inferences. He may provoke the pupils to strike out new results for themselves, or to follow, by means of their own stock of knowledge, in the path suggested by the questions. He may farther lead them to perceive the fallacy of erroneous analogies which at first presented themselves as plausible; and to become painfully sensible of embarrassment and perplexing ignorance, before he puts those questions which indicate the way of escape from it. Upon the necessity of producing such painful consciousness of ignorance Plato insists emphatically, as is his custom.¹

γε, ἢ οὐ; καὶ τί ἡ ἀλογία; Ὅτι Σκράτων ἠρώρει, εἰ ἔστιν ἀνάμνησις, πῶς ἀνευ ἀποδείξεων οὐ γινώσκοντα ἐπιστήμονας; πῶς δὲ οὐδεὶς αὐληγῆς ἢ κιθαριστῆς γέγονεν ἀνευ μελέτης;

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 84. The sixteenth Dissertation of Maximus Tyrius presents a rhetorical amplification of this doctrine—*pāsa μάθησις, ἀνάμνησις*—in which he enters fully into the spirit of the Menon and the Phædon—*αὐτοδιδασκτὸν τι χρῆμα ἡ ψυχὴ—ἡ ψυχὴς εὐρεσις, αὐτογενὴς τις οὐσα, καὶ αὐτοφύης, καὶ ἐξυμνῶτος, τί ἄλλο ἔστιν ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἐγγράμμεναι, ὅν τῃ ἐπαγέροι τε καὶ ξυντάξει ἐπιστήμη ὀνομα;* (c. 6). Compare also Cicero, Tuscul. D. i. 24. The doctrine has furnished a theme for very elegant poetry: both in the Consolatio Philosophiæ of Boethius—the piece which ends with

“Ac si Platonis Musa personat verum,
Quod quisque discit, immemor recordatur”—

and in Wordsworth—“Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,” &c.

On the other hand Aristotle alludes also to the same doctrine and criticises

it; but he does not seem (so far as I can understand this brief allusion) to seize exactly Plato's meaning. This is the remark of the Scholiast on Aristotle: and I think it just. It is curious to compare the way in which ἀνάμνησις is handled by Plato in the Menon and Phædon, and by Aristotle in the valuable little tract—Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως (p. 451, b.). Aristotle has his own way of replying to the difficulty raised in the question of Menon, and tries to show that sometimes we know in one sense and do not know in another. See Aristotel. Anal. Prior., ii. p. 67, a. 22; Anal. Poster. i. p. 71, a. 27; and the Scholia on the former passage, p. 193, b. 21, ed. Brandis.

Sir William Hamilton, in one of the Appendices to his edition of Reid's Works (Append. D. p. 890 seq.), has given a learned and valuable translation and illustration of the treatise of Aristotle Περὶ Ἀναμνήσεως. I note, however, with some surprise, that while collecting many interesting comments from writers who lived after Aristotle, he has not adverted to what was said upon this same subject by Plato, before

Plato does not intend here to distinguish (as many modern writers distinguish) geometry from other sciences, as if geometry were known *a priori*, and other sciences known *a posteriori* or from experience. He does not suppose that geometrical truths are such that no man can possibly believe the contrary of them; or that they are different in this respect from the truths of any other science. He here maintains that all the sciences lie equally in the untaught mind,¹ but buried, forgotten, and confused: so as to require the skill of the questioner not merely to recall them into consciousness, but to disentangle truth from error. Far from supposing that the untaught mind has a natural tendency to answer correctly geometrical questions, he treats erroneous answers as springing up more naturally than true answers, and as requiring a process of painful exposure before the mind can be put upon the right track. The questioner, without possessing any knowledge himself, (so Plato thinks,) can nevertheless exercise an influence at once stimulating, corrective, and directive. He stimulates the action of the associative process, to call up facts, comparisons, and analogies, bearing on the question: he arrests the respondent on a wrong answer, creating within him a painful sense of ignorance and embarrassment: he directs him by his subsequent questions into the path of right answers. His obstetric aid (to use the simile in Plato's *Theætétus*), though presupposing the pregnancy of the respondent mind, is indispensable both to forward the childbirth, and to throw away any offspring which may happen to be deformed. In the *Theætétus*, the main stress is laid on that part of the dialogue which is performed by the questioner: in the *Menon*, upon the latent competence and large dead stock of an untaught respondent.

Plato's doctrine about *a priori* reasonings—Different from the modern doctrine.

The mind of the slave questioned by Sokrates is discovered to be pregnant. Though he has received no teaching from any professed geometer, he is nevertheless found competent, when subjected to a skilful interrogatory, to arrive at last, through a series of mistakes, at correct answers, determining certain simple pro-

Aristotle. It was the more to be expected that he would do this, since he insists so emphatically upon the complete originality of Aristotle.

¹ Plato, *Menon*, p. 85 E. οὗτος γὰρ (the untaught slave) ποιήσει περί πάσης γεωμετρίας τὰ τὰ ταῦτα, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μαθημάτων ἀπάντων.

blems of geometry. He knows nothing about geometry : nevertheless there exist in his mind true opinions respecting that which he does not know. These opinions are "called up like a dream" by the interrogatories : which, if repeated and diversified, convert the opinions into knowledge, taken up by the respondent out of himself.¹ The opinions are inherited from an antecedent life and born with him, since they have never been taught to him during this life.

It is thus that Plato applies to philosophical theory the doctrine (borrowed from the Pythagoreans) of pre-natal experience and cognitions : which he considers, not as inherent appurtenances of the mind, but as acquisitions made by the mind during various antecedent lives. These ideas (Plato argues) cannot have been acquired during the present life, because the youth has received no special teaching in geometry. But

Plato here takes no account of the multiplicity and diversity of experiences gone through, comparisons made, and acquirements lodged, in the mind of a youthful adult however unlettered. He recognises no acquisition of knowledge except through special teaching. So, too, in the Protagoras, we shall find him putting into the mouth of Sokrates the doctrine—That virtue is not taught and cannot be taught, because there were no special masters or times of teaching. But in that dialogue we shall also see Plato furnishing an elaborate reply to this doctrine in the speech of Protagoras ; who indicates the multifarious and powerful influences which are perpetually operative, even without special professors, in creating and enforcing ethical sentiment. If Plato had taken pains to study the early life of the untaught slave, with its stock of facts, judgments, comparisons, and inferences suggested by analogy, &c., he might easily have found enough to explain the competence of the slave to answer the questions appearing in the dialogue. And even if enough could not have been found, to afford a direct and specific explanation—

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 85. τῷ οὐκ εἰδότε ἀρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἐννοεῖται ἀληθεῖς δοῦναι. . . . καὶ νῦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ ὡς περὶ ὄναρ ἀρετὴ ἀνακεκίνηται αἱ δόξαι αὐταὶ· εἰ δὲ αὐτόν τις ἀνερρήσεται πολλάκις τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ πολλαχῇ,

οἷόςθ' ὅτι τελευτῶν οὐδένος ἦτον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ αὐτῶν. . . . Οὐκοῦν οὐδένος διδάξαντος ἄλλ' ἐρωτήσαντος ἐπιστήσεται, ἀναλαβὼν αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐπιστήμην;

we must remember that only a very small proportion of the long series of mental phenomena realised in the infant, the child, the youth, ever comes to be remembered or recorded. To assume that the large unknown remainder would be insufficient, if known, to afford the explanation sought, is neither philosophical nor reasonable. This is assumed in every form of the doctrine of innate ideas: and assumed by Plato here without even trying any explanation to dispense with the hypothesis: simply because the youth interrogated had never received any special instruction in geometry.

I have already observed, that though great stress is laid in this dialogue upon the doctrine of opinions and knowledge inherited from an antecedent life—upon the distinction between true opinion and knowledge—and upon the identity of the process of learning with reminiscence—yet nothing is said about universal Ideas or Forms, so much dwelt upon in other dialogues. In the *Phædrus* and *Phædon*, it is with these universal Ideas that the mind is affirmed to have had communion during its prior existence, as contrasted with the particulars of sense apprehended during the present life: while in the *Menon*, the difference pointed out between true opinions and knowledge is something much less marked and decisive. Both the one and the other are said to be, not acquired during this life, but inherited from antecedent life: to be innate, yet unperceived—revived by way of reminiscence and interrogation. True opinions are affirmed to render as much service as knowledge, in reference to practice. There is only this distinction between them—that true opinions are transient, and will not remain in the mind until they are bound in it by causal reasoning, or become knowledge.

What Plato meant by this “causal reasoning, or computation of cause,” is not clearly explained. But he affirms very unequivocally, first, that the distinction between true opinion and knowledge is one of the few things of which he feels assured—next, with somewhat less confidence, that the distinction consists only in

Little or nothing is said in the *Menon* about the Platonic Ideas or Forms.

What Plato meant by Causal Reasoning—his distinction between knowledge

¹ Plato, *Menon*, p. 98 B. ὅτι δὲ εἴπω τι ἄλλο φαίην ἂν εἶδέναι, ὁλίγα ἔστι τι ἄλλοιον ὁρῶν δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, δ' ἂν φαίην, ἐν δ' οὖν καὶ τοῦτο οὐ πάνν μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάσειν· ἀλλ' ἐκείνων θείην ἂν εἶναι οἶδα.

and right opinion. the greater security which knowledge affords for permanent in-dwelling in the mind. This appears substantially the same distinction as what is laid down in other words towards the close of the dialogue—That those, who have only true opinions and not knowledge, judge rightly without knowing how or why; by an aptitude not their own but supplied to them from without for the occasion, in the nature of inspiration or prophetic *æstus*. Hence they are unable to teach others, or to transfer this occasional inspiration to any one else. They cannot give account of what they affect to know, nor answer scrutinizing questions to test it. This power of answering and administering cross-examination, is Plato's characteristic test of real knowledge—as I have already observed in my sixth chapter.

To translate the views of Plato into analogous views of a modern philosopher, we may say—That right opinion, as contrasted with knowledge, is a discriminating and acute empirical judgment: inferring only from old particulars to new particulars (without the intermediate help and guarantee of general propositions distinctly enunciated and interpreted), but selecting for every new case the appropriate analogies out of the past, with which it ought to be compared. Many persons judge in this manner fairly well, and some with extreme success. But let them be ever so successful in practice, they proceed without any conscious method; they are unable to communicate the grounds of their inferences to others: and when they are right, it is only by haphazard—that is (to use Plato's language), through special inspiration vouchsafed to them by the Gods. But when they ascend to knowledge, and come to judge scientifically, they then distribute these particular facts into classes—note the constant sequences as distinguished from the occasional—and draw their inferences in every new case according to such general laws or uniformities of antecedent and consequent. Such uniform and unconditional antecedents are the only causes of which we have cognizance. They admit of being described in the language which Plato here uses (*αίτιας λογισμῶ*), and they also serve as reasons for justifying or explaining our inferences to others.¹

¹ We have seen that in the Menon nothing but *ἀνάμνησις*. The doctrine Plato denies all *διεσχυ*, and recognises of the Timæus (p. 51 D-E) is very dif-

The manner in which Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates before the Dikastery, is introduced into this dialogue, deserves notice. The questions are put to him by Sokrates—"Is virtue teachable? How is Menon to learn virtue, and from whom? Ought he not to do as he would do if he wished to learn medicine or music: to put himself under some paid professional man as teacher?" Anytus answers these questions in the affirmative: but asks, where such professional teachers of virtue are to be found. "There are the Sophists," replies Sokrates. Upon this Anytus breaks out into a burst of angry invective against the Sophists; denouncing them as corruptors of youth, whom none but a madman would consult, and who ought to be banished by public authority.

Manifestation of Anytus—intense antipathy to the Sophists and to philosophy generally.

ferent. He there lays especial stress on the distinction between *ἰδιώτης* and *καθολός*—the first belonging to *ἰστέρισμα*, the second to *δόξα*. Also in Gorgias, 454, and in Republic, v. pp. 477-479, about *δόξα* and *ἰστέρισμα*. In those dialogues the distinction between the two is presented as marked and fundamental, as if *δόξα* alone was fallible and *ἰστέρισμα* infallible. In the Menon the distinction appears as important, but not fundamental; the Platonic Ideas or Universals being not recognised as constituting a substantive world by themselves. In this respect the Menon is nearer to the truth in describing the difference between *ἰστέρισμα* *δόξα* and *ἰστέρισμα*. Mr. John Stuart Mill (in the chapter of his System of Logic wherein the true theory of the Syllogism is for the first time expounded) has clearly explained what that difference amounts to. All our inferences are from particulars, sometimes to new particulars directly and at once (*δόξα*), sometimes to generals in the first instance, and through them to new particulars; which latter, or scientific process, is highly valuable as a security for correctness (*ἰστέρισμα*). "Not only" (says Mr. Mill) "may we reason from particulars to particulars without passing through generals, but we perpetually do so reason. All our earliest inferences are of this nature. From the first dawn of intelligence we draw inferences, but years elapse before we learn the use of general language. We are constantly reasoning from ourselves to other

people, or from one person to another, without giving ourselves the trouble to erect our observations into general maxims of human or external nature. If we have an extensive experience and retain its impressions strongly, we may acquire in this manner a very considerable power of accurate judgment, which we may be utterly incapable of justifying or of communicating to others. Among the higher order of practical intellects, there have been many of whom it was remarked how admirably they suited their means to their ends, without being able to give any sufficient account of what they did; and applied, or seemed to apply, recondite principles which they were wholly unable to state. This is a natural consequence of having a mind stored with appropriate particulars, and having been accustomed to reason at once from these to fresh particulars, without practising the habit of stating to one's self or others the corresponding general propositions. The cases of men of talent performing wonderful things they know not how, are examples of the rudest and most spontaneous forms of the operations of superior minds. It is a defect in them, and often a source of errors, not to have generalised as they went on; but generalisation, though a help, the most important indeed of all helps, is not an essential" (Mill, Syst. of Logic, Book II. ch. iii.). Compare the first chapter of the *Metaphysica* of Aristotle, p. 980, a. 15, b. 7.

Why are you so bitter against the Sophists? asks Sokrates. Have any of them ever injured you? *Anyt.*—No; never: I have never been in the company of any one of them, nor would I ever suffer any of my family to be so. *Sokr.*—Then you have no experience whatever about the Sophists? *Anyt.*—None: and I hope that I never may have. *Sokr.*—How then can you know about this matter, how far it is good or bad, if you have no experience whatever about it? *Anyt.*—Easily. I know what sort of men the Sophists are, whether I have experience of them or not. *Sokr.*—Perhaps you are a prophet, Anytus: for how else you can know about them, I do not understand, even on your own statement.¹

Anytus then declares, that the persons from whom Menon ought to learn virtue are the leading practical politicians; and that any one of them can teach it. But Sokrates puts a series of questions, showing that the leading Athenian politicians, Themistoklēs, Periklēs, &c., have not been able to teach virtue even to their own sons: *à fortiori*, therefore, they cannot teach it to any one else. Anytus treats this series of questions as disparaging and calumnious towards the great men of Athens. He breaks off the conversation abruptly, with an angry warning to Sokrates to be cautious about his language, and to take care of his own safety.

The dialogue is then prosecuted and finished between Sokrates and Menon: and at the close of it, Sokrates says—"Talk to Anytus, and communicate to him that persuasion which you have yourself contracted,² in order that he may be more mildly disposed: for, if you persuade him, you will do some good to the Athenians as well as to himself."

The enemy and accuser of Sokrates is here depicted as the bitter enemy of the Sophists also. And Plato takes pains to exhibit the enmity of Anytus to the Sophists as founded on no facts or experience. Without having seen or ascertained anything about them, Anytus hates them as violently as if he had sustained from them some personal injury; a sentiment which many

¹ Plato, Menon, p. 92.

² Plato, Menon, ad fin. ὃν δὲ ταῦτα τὸνδε ἄνθρωπον, ἵνα πεισθῇ ὅτι ὅς ἐστιν ἀπὸ αὐτοῦ πείσθαι, οὕτως δὲ, καὶ ἀθροιστικῶς.

Platonic critics and many historians of philosophy have inherited from him.¹ Whether the corruption which these Sophists were accused of bringing about in the minds of youth, was intentional or not intentional on their part—how such corruption could have been perpetually continued, while at the same time the eminent Sophists enjoyed long and unabated esteem from the youth themselves and from their relatives—are difficulties which Anytus does not attempt to explain, though they are started here by Sokrates. Indeed we find the same topics employed by Sokrates himself, in his defence before the Dikasts against the same charge.² Anytus has confidence in no one except the practical statesmen: and when a question is raised about *their* power to impart their own excellence to others, he presently takes offence against Sokrates also. The same causes which have determined his furious antipathy against the Sophists, make him ready to transfer the like antipathy to Sokrates. He is a man of plain sense, practical habits, and conservative patriotism—who worships what he finds accredited as virtue, and dislikes the talkers and theorists about virtue in general: whether they debated in subtle interrogation and dialectics, like Sokrates—or lectured in eloquent continuous discourse, like Protagoras. He accuses the Sophists, in this dialogue, of corrupting the youth; just as he and Melétus, before the Dikastery, accused Sokrates of the same offence. He understands the use of words, to discuss actual business before the assembly or dikastery; but he hates discourse on the generalities of ethics or philosophy. He is essentially *μυσολογος*. The point which he condemns in the Sophists, is that which they have in common with Sokrates.

In many of the Platonic dialogues we have the antithesis between Sokrates and the Sophists brought out, as to the different point of view from which the one and The Menon brings for-

¹ Upon the bitter antipathy here expressed by Anytus against the Sophists, whom nevertheless he admits that he does not at all know, Steinhart remarks as follows:—"Gerade so haben zu allen Zeiten Orthodoxe und Fanatiker aller Arten über ihre Gegner abgeurtheilt, ohne sie zu kennen oder auch nur kennen lernen zu wollen" (Einleit. zum Menon, not. 15, p. 173).

Certainly orthodox and fanatical

persons often do what is here imputed to them. But Steinhart might have found a still closer parallel with Anytus, in his own criticisms, and in those of many other Platonic critics on the Sophists; the same expressions of bitterness and severity, with the same slender knowledge of the persons upon whom they bear.

² Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* pp. 26 A, 33 D, 34 B.

ward the point of analogy between Sokrates and the Sophists, in which both were disliked by the practical statesmen.

the other approached ethical questions. But in this portion of the Menon, we find exhibited the feature of analogy between them, in which both one and the other stood upon ground obnoxious to the merely practical politicians. Far from regarding hatred against the Sophists as a mark of virtue in Anytus, Sokrates deprecates it as unwarranted and as menacing to philosophy in all her manifestations. The last declaration ascribed to Anytus, coupled with the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue, show us that Plato conceives the anti-Sophistic antipathy as being anti-Sokratic also, in its natural consequences. That Sokrates was in common parlance a Sophist, disliked by a large portion of the general public, and ridiculed by Aristophanes, on the same grounds as those whom Plato calls Sophists—is a point which I have noticed elsewhere.

CHAPTER XXIII.

PROTAGORAS.

THE dialogue called Protagoras presents a larger assemblage of varied and celebrated characters, with more of dramatic winding, and more frequent breaks and resummptions in the conversation, than any dialogue of Plato—not excepting even *Symposion* and *Republic*. Scenic arrangement and personages of the dialogue.

It exhibits Sokrates in controversy with the celebrated Sophist Protagoras, in the presence of a distinguished society, most of whom take occasional part in the dialogue. This controversy is preceded by a striking conversation between Sokrates and Hippokrates—a youth of distinguished family, eager to profit by the instructions of Protagoras. The two Sophists Prodikus and Hippias, together with Kallias, Kritias, Alkibiades, Eryximachus, Phædrus, Pausanias, Agathon, the two sons of Periklēs (Paralus and Xanthippos), Charmides, son of Glaukon, Antimærus of Mende, a promising pupil of Protagoras, who is in training for the profession of a Sophist—these and others are all present at the meeting, which is held in the house of Kallias.¹ Sokrates himself recounts the whole—both his conversation with Hippokrates and that with Protagoras—to a nameless friend.

This dialogue enters upon a larger and more comprehensive ethical theory than anything in the others hitherto noticed. But it contains also a great deal in which we hardly recognise, or at least cannot verify, any distinct purpose, either of search or exposition. Much of it seems to be composed with a literary or poetical view, to enhance the charm or interest of the composition. The personal characteristics of each speaker—the intel-

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 315.

lectual peculiarities of Prodikus and Hippias—the ardent partisanship of Alkibiades—are brought out as in a real drama. But the great and marked antithesis is that between the Sophist Protagoras and Sokrates—the Hektor and Ajax of the piece : who stand forward in single combat, exchange some serious blows, yet ultimately part as friends.

An introduction of some length impresses upon us forcibly the celebrity of the Great Sophist, and the earnest interest excited by his visit to Athens. Hippokrates, a young man of noble family and eager aspirations for improvement, having just learnt the arrival of Protagoras, comes to the house of Sokrates and awakens him before daylight, entreating that Sokrates will introduce him to the new-comer. He is ready to give all that he possesses in order that he may become wise like Protagoras.¹ While they are awaiting a suitable hour for such introduction, Sokrates puts a series of questions to test the force of Hippokrates.²

Sokr.—You are now intending to visit Protagoras, and to pay him for something to be done for you—tell me what manner of man it is that you are going to visit—and what manner of man do you wish to become? If you were going in like manner to pay a fee for instruction to your namesake Hippokrates of Kos, you would tell me that you were going to him as to a physician—and that you wished to qualify yourself for becoming a physician. If you were addressing yourself with the like view to Pheidias or Polykleitus, you would go to them as to sculptors, and for the purpose of becoming yourself a sculptor. Now then that we are to go in all this hurry to Protagoras, tell me who he is and what title he bears, as we called Pheidias a sculptor? **Hipp.**—They call him a Sophist.³ **Sokr.**—We are going to pay him then as a Sophist? **Hipp.**—Certainly. **Sokr.**—And what are you to become by going to him? **Hipp.**—Why, judging from the preceding analogies, I am to become a Sophist. **Sokr.**—But would not you be ashamed of presenting yourself to the Grecian public as a

¹ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 310-311 A.

ῥάμης διασκόπου αὐτὸν καὶ ἡρώτων.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 311 B. καὶ ἐγὼ
παραίτητος τοῦ ἱκανοῦτος τῆς

&c.

³ Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 311.

Sophist? *Hipp.*—Yes: if I am to tell you my real opinion.¹ *Sokr.*—Perhaps however you only propose to visit Protagoras, as you visited your schoolmaster and your musical or gymnastical teacher: not for the purpose of entering that career as a professional man, but to acquire such instruction as is suitable for a private citizen and a freeman? *Hipp.*—That is more the instruction which I seek from Protagoras. *Sokr.*—Do you know then what you are going to do? You are consigning your mind to be treated by one whom you call a Sophist: but I shall be surprised if you know what a Sophist is²—and if you do not know, neither do you know what it is—good or evil—to which you are consigning your mind. *Hipp.*—I think I *do* know. The Sophist is, as the name implies, one cognizant of matters wise and able.³ *Sokr.*—That may be said also of painters and carpenters. If we were asked in what special department are painters cognizant of matters wise and able, we should specify that it was in the workmanship of portraits. Answer me the same question about the Sophist. What sort of workmanship does he direct? *Hipp.*—That of forming able speakers.⁴ *Sokr.*—Your answer may be correct, but it is not specific enough: for we must still ask, About *what* is it that the Sophist forms able speakers? just as the harp-master makes a man an able speaker about harping, at the same time that he teaches him harping. About *what* is it that the Sophist forms able speakers:

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 312 A. οὐδ' ἐγὼ, πρὸς θεῶν, οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιο εἰς τοὺς Ἕλληνας σαυτὸν σοφιστὴν παρέχων; Νῆ τὸν Δί', ὃ Σώκρατες, εἰπερ γε ἂν διανοοῦμαι χρὴ λέγειν. Ast (*Platon's Leben*, p. 78) and other Platonic critics treat this *Sophistomanie* (as they call it) of an Athenian youth as something ludicrous and contemptible: all the more ludicrous because (they say) none of them goes to qualify himself for becoming a Sophist, but would even be ashamed of the title. Yet if we suppose the same question addressed to a young Englishman of rank and fortune (as Hippocrates was at Athens), "Why do you put yourself under the teaching of Dr. — at Eton or Professor — at Oxford? Do you intend to qualify yourself for becoming a schoolmaster or a professor?" He will laugh at you for the question: if he answers it seriously,

he will probably answer as Hippocrates does. But there is nothing at all in the question to imply that the schoolmaster or the professor is a worthless pretender—or the youth foolish, for being anxious to obtain instruction from him; which is the inference that Ast and other Platonic critics desire us to draw about the Athenian Sophists.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 312 C. ὅ, τι δὲ ποτε ὁ σοφιστής ἐστι, θαυμάζομαι ἂν εἰ οἶσθα, &c.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 312 C. ὡς περ τοῦνομα λέγει, τὸν τῶν σοφῶν ἐπιστήμονα. (Quasi sophistes sit—ὁ τῶν σοφῶν ἴστης, Heindorf.) If this supposition of Heindorf be just, we may see in it an illustration of the etymological views of Plato, which I shall notice when I come to the *Kratylus*.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 312 D. πρὸς ἐργασίας ἐπιστάτης; ἐπιστάτης τοῦ ποιεῖν δεινὸν λέγειν.

of course about that which he himself knows?¹ *Hipp.*—Probably. *Sokr.*—What then is that, about which the Sophist is himself cognizant, and makes his pupil cognizant? *Hipp.*—By Zeus, I cannot give you any farther answer.²

Sokr.—Do you see then to what danger you are going to submit your mind? If the question were about trusting your body to any one, with the risk whether it should become sound or unsound, you would have thought long, and taken much advice, before you decided. But now, when it is about your mind, which you value more than your body, and upon the good or evil of which all your affairs turn³—you are hastening without reflection and without advice, you are ready

to pay all the money that you possess or can obtain, with a firm resolution already taken to put yourself at all hazard under Protagoras: whom you do not know—with whom you have never once talked—whom you call a Sophist, without knowing what a Sophist is? *Hipp.*—I must admit the case to be as you say.⁴ *Sokr.*—Perhaps the Sophist is a man who brings for sale those transportable commodities, instruction or doctrine, which form the nourishment of the mind. Now the traders in food for the body praise indiscriminately all that they have to sell, though neither they nor their purchasers know whether it is good for the body; unless by chance any one of them be a gymnastic trainer or a physician.⁵ So, too, these Sophists, who carry about food for the mind, praise all that they have to sell: but perhaps some of them are ignorant, and assuredly their purchasers are ignorant, whether it be good or bad for the mind: unless by accident any one possess medical knowledge about the mind. Now if you, Hippokrates, happen to possess such knowledge of what is good or bad for the mind, you may safely purchase doctrine from Protagoras or from any one else:⁶ but if not, you are

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 312 D-E. ἐρωτή-
σεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀποκρισὶς ἡμῖν δέχεται,
περὶ οὗτου ὁ σοφιστὴς δεῖνόν ποιεῖ λέγειν·
ὥσπερ ὁ κυβεριστὴς δεῖνόν δῆπου ποιεῖ
λέγειν περὶ οὗτου καὶ ἐπιστήμονα, περὶ
κυβερίσσεως.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 312 E.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 313 A. ὁ δὲ περὶ
πλείονος τοῦ σώματος ἡγεί, τὴν ψυχὴν,
καὶ ἐν τῇ πάντ' ἐστὶ τὰ σὰ ἢ εὖ ἢ καλῶς

πράττειν, χρηστοῦ ἢ πονηροῦ αὐτοῦ γε-
νέου, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 313 C.

⁵ Plato, *Protag.* p. 313 D.

⁶ Plato, *Protag.* p. 313 E. εἰ μὴ
τις τύχη περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς ἱατρικὴν
ᾧν. εἰ μὲν οὖν σὺ τυγχάνεις ἐπιστήμον
τούτων τί χρῆσθόν καὶ πονηρόν, ἀσ-
φαλές σοι ὠφεῖσθαι μαθήματα καὶ παρὰ
Πρωταγόρου καὶ παρ' ἄλλου οὐνοῦν· εἰ

hazarding and putting at stake your dearest interests. The purchase of doctrines is far more dangerous than that of eatables or drinkables. As to these latter, you may carry them away with you in separate vessels, and before you take them into your body you may invoke the *Expert*, to tell you what you may safely eat and drink, and when, and how much. But this cannot be done with doctrines. You cannot carry away *them* in a separate vessel to be tested; you learn them and take them into the mind itself; so that you go away, after having paid your money, actually damaged or actually benefited, as the case may be.¹ We will consider these matters in conjunction with our elders. But first let us go and talk with Protagoras—we can consult the others afterwards.

Such is the preliminary conversation of Sokrates with Hippokrates, before the interview with Protagoras. I have given it (like the introduction to the *Lysis*) at considerable length, because it is a very characteristic specimen of the Sokratico-Platonic point of view. It brings to light that false persuasion of knowledge, under which men unconsciously act, especially in what concerns the mind and its treatment. Common fame and celebrity suffice to determine the most vehement aspirations towards a lecturer, in one who has never stopped to reflect or enquire what the lecturer does. The pressure applied by Sokrates in his successive questions, to get beyond vague generalities into definite particulars—the insufficiency, thereby exposed, of the conceptions with which men usually rest satisfied—exhibit the working of his *Elenchus* in one of its most instructive ways. The parallel drawn between the body and the mind—the constant precaution taken in the case of the former to consult the professional man and to follow his advice in respect both to dis-

Remarks on the introduction. False persuasion of knowledge brought to light.

δὲ μή, ὅρα, ὃ φίλτατε, μὴ περὶ τοῖς φιλάτοις κυβεῖν τε καὶ κινδυνεύειν.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 314 A. σιτία μὲν γὰρ καὶ ποτὰ πρίσμενον ἔξεστιν ἐν ἄλλοις ἀγγείοις ἀποφέρειν, καὶ πρὶν δοῖσθαι αὐτὰ ἐς τὸ σῶμα πίνοντα ἢ φαγόντα, καταβέβηκεν οὐκ ἔξεστι συμβουλευσάσθαι παρακαλίσαντα τὸν

ἐπαίοντα, ὃ, τι τε ἔδεστέον ἢ ποτέον καὶ ὃ, τι μὴ, καὶ ὁπόσον, καὶ ὁπότε. . . . μαθήματα δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀγγεῖῳ ἀπενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη καταβέντα τὴν τιμὴν τὸ μάθημα ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ λαβόντα καὶ μαθόντα ἀπέναι ἢ βεβλημένον ἢ ὠφελημένον.

cipline and nourishment—are in the same vein of sentiment which we have already followed in other dialogues. Here too, as elsewhere, some similar *Expert*, in reference to the ethical and intellectual training of mind, is desiderated, as still more imperatively necessary. Yet where is he to be found? How is the business of mental training to be brought to a beneficial issue without him? Or is Protagoras the man to supply such a demand? We shall presently see.

Sokrates and Hippokrates proceed to the house of Kallias, and find him walking about in the fore-court with Protagoras, and some of the other company; all of whom are described as treating the Sophist with almost ostentatious respect. Prodikus and Hippias have each their separate hearers, in or adjoining to the court. Sokrates addresses Protagoras.

Sokrates and Hippokrates go to the house of Kallias. Company therein. Respect shown to Protagoras.

Questions of Sokrates to Protagoras. Answer of the latter, declaring the antiquity of the sophistical profession, and his own openness in avowing himself a sophist.

Sokr.—Protagoras, I and Hippokrates here are come to talk to you about something. *Prot.*—Do you wish to talk to me alone, or in presence of the rest? *Sokr.*—To us it is indifferent: but I will tell you what we come about, and you may then determine for yourself. This Hippokrates is a young man of noble family, and fully equal to his contemporaries in capacity. He wishes to become distinguished in the city; and he thinks he shall best attain that object through your society. Consider whether you would like better to talk with him alone, or in presence of the rest.¹

Prot.—Your consideration on my behalf, Sokrates, is reasonable. A person of my profession must be cautious in his proceedings. I, a foreigner, visit large cities, persuading the youth of best family to frequent my society in preference to that of their kinsmen and all others; in the conviction that I shall do them good. I thus inevitably become exposed to much jealousy and even to

¹ Plat. Prot. p. 316.
The motive assigned by Hippokrates, for putting himself under the teaching of Protagoras, is just the same as that

which Xenophon assigns to his friend Proxenus for taking lessons and paying fees to the Leontine Gorgias (Xen. Anab. ii. 6, 16).

hostile conspiracies.¹ The sophistical art is an old one ;² but its older professors, being afraid of enmity if they proclaimed what they really were, have always disguised themselves under other titles. Some, like Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides, called themselves poets : others, Orpheus, Musæus, &c., professed to prescribe religious rites and mysteries : others announced themselves as gymnastic trainers or teachers of music. But I have departed altogether from this policy ; which indeed did not succeed in really deceiving any leading men—whom alone it was intended to deceive—and which, when found out, entailed upon its authors the additional disgrace of being considered deceivers. The true caution consists in open dealing ; and this is what I have always adopted. I avow myself a Sophist, educating men. I am now advanced in years, old enough to be the father of any of you, and have grown old in the profession : yet during all these years, thank God, I have suffered no harm either from my practice or my title.³ If therefore you desire to converse with me, it will be far more agreeable to me to converse in presence of all who are now in the house.⁴

¹ The jealousy felt by fathers, mothers, and relatives against a teacher or converser who acquired great influence over their youthful relatives, is alluded to by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology (p. 37 E), and is illustrated by a tragical incident in the Cyropaedia of Xenophon, iii. 1. 14-38. Compare also Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 52.

² Plat. Prot. p. 316 D. ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημι μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν.

³ Plat. Prot. p. 317 C. ὥστε οὐν θεῶ εἰπὼν μηδὲν δεινὸν πᾶσιν διὰ τὸ ὁμολογεῖν σοφιστὴς εἶναι.

⁴ Plat. Prot. p. 317 D. In the Menon, the Platonic Sokrates is made to say that Protagoras died at the age of seventy ; that he had practised forty years as a Sophist ; and that during all that long time he had enjoyed the highest esteem and reputation, even after his death, "down to the present day" (Menon, p. 91 E).

It must be remembered that the speech, of which I have just given an abstract, is delivered not by the historical, real, Protagoras, but by the character named *Protagoras*, depicted by Plato in this dialogue : i.e. the

speech is composed by Plato himself. I read, therefore, with much surprise, a note of Heindorf (ad p. 316 D), wherein he says about Protagoras : "Callidè in postremis reticet, quod addere poterat, χρήματα δίδοντας." "Protagoras cunningly keeps back, what he might have here added, that people gave him money for his teaching." Heindorf must surely have supposed that he was commenting upon a real speech, delivered by the historical person called Protagoras. Otherwise what can be meant by this charge of "cunning reticence or keeping back?" Protagoras here speaks what Plato puts into his mouth ; neither more nor less. What makes the remark of Heindorf the more preposterous is, that in page 323 B the very fact, which Protagoras is here said "cunningly to keep back," appears mentioned by Protagoras ; and mentioned in the same spirit of honourable frankness and fair-dealing as that which pervades the discourse which I have just (freely) translated. Indeed nothing can be more marked than the way in which Plato makes Protagoras dwell with emphasis on the frankness and openness of his dealing : nothing

On hearing this, Sokrates—under the suspicion (he tells us) that Protagoras wanted to show off in the presence of Prodikus and Hippias—proposes to convene all the dispersed guests, and to talk in their hearing. This is accordingly done, and the conversation recommences—Sokrates repeating the introductory request which he had preferred on behalf of Hippokrates.

Sokr.—Hippokrates is anxious to distinguish himself in the city, and thinks that he shall best attain this end by placing himself under your instruction. He would gladly learn, Protagoras, what will happen to him, if he comes into intercourse with you. **Prot.**—Young man, if you come to me, on the day of your first visit, you will go home better than you came, and on the next day the like : each successive day you will make progress for the better. ¹

Sokr.—Of course he will ; there is nothing surprising in that : but towards *what*, and about *what*, will he make progress ? **Prot.**—Your question is a reasonable one, and I am glad to reply to it. I shall not throw him back—as other Sophists do, with mischievous effect—into the special sciences, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, music, &c.; just after he has completed his course in them. I shall teach him what he really comes to learn : wisdom and good counsel, both respecting his domestic affairs, that he may manage his own family well—and respecting the affairs of the city, that he may address himself to them most efficaciously, both in speech and act. **Sokr.**—You speak of political or social science. You engage to make men good citizens. **Prot.**—Exactly so. ²

Sokr.—That is a fine talent indeed, which you possess, if you do possess it ; for (to speak frankly) I thought that Sokrates doubts whether virtue is teach- the thing had not been teachable, nor intentionally communicable, by man to man. ³ I will tell you why

can be more at variance with the character which critics give us of the Sophists, as “cheats, who defrauded pupils of their money while teaching them nothing at all, or what they themselves knew to be false”.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 318 A. “Qui ad philosophorum scholas venit, quod seculum aliquid boni ferat : aut sanior domum redeat, aut sanabilior.” Seneca, *Epistol.* 108, p. 530.

² Plato, *Protag.* pp. 318-319.

The declaration made by Protagoras—that he will not throw back his pupils into the special arts—is represented by Plato as intended to be an indirect censure on Hippias, then sitting by.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 319 B. οὐ δίδασκόντες εἶναι, μὴδ' ὅτι ἀρετὰν παρέχουσιν ἀρετῶν.

I think so. The Athenians are universally recognised as intelligent men. Now when our public assembly is convened, if the subject of debate be fortification, ship-building, or any other specialty which they regard as learnable and teachable, they will listen to no one except a professional artist or craftsman.¹ If any non-professional man presumes to advise them on the subject, they refuse to hear him, however rich and well-born he may be. It is thus that they act in matters of any special art;² but when the debate turns upon the general administration of the city, they hear every man alike—the brass-worker, leather-cutter, merchant, navigator, rich, poor, well-born, low-born, &c. Against none of them is any exception taken, as in the former case—that he comes to give advice on that which he has not learnt, and on which he has had no master.³ It is plain that the public generally think it not teachable. Moreover our best and wisest citizens, those who possess civic virtue in the highest measure, cannot communicate to their own children this same virtue, though they cause them to be taught all those accomplishments which paid masters can impart. Periklēs and others, excellent citizens themselves, have never been able to make any one else excellent, either in or out of their own family. These reasons make me conclude that social or political virtue is not teachable. I shall be glad if you can show me that it is so.⁴

Prot.—I will readily show you. But shall I, like an old man addressing his juniors, recount to you an illustrative mythe?⁵ or shall I go through an expository discourse? The mythe perhaps will be the more acceptable of the two.

Explanation of Protagoras. He begins with a mythe.

There was once a time when Gods existed, but neither men nor

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 319 C. καὶ τὰλλα πάντα οὕτως, ὅσα γιγνύνται μαθητὰ τε καὶ διδασκὰ εἶναι. εἰς δὲ τις ἄλλος ἐπιχειρῇ αὐτοῖς συμβουλεύειν ὃν ἐκεῖνοι μὴ οἰοῦνται δημιουργὸν εἶναι, &c.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 319 D. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὃν οἰοῦνται ἐν τέχνῃ εἶναι, οὕτω διακρίνονται.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 319 D. καὶ τοῦτοι οὐδεὶς τοῦτο ἐπιπλήσσει ὥσπερ τοῖς πρότερον, ὅτι οὐδαμῶθεν μαθὼν, οὐδὲ ὄντος διδασκάλου οὐδεὶς αὐτῷ, ἐπειτα συμ-

βουλεύειν ἐπιχειρεῖ· ὅθλον γὰρ ὅτι οὐχ ἡγούνται διδασκὸν εἶναι.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 319-320.

⁵ Plato, *Protag.* p. 320 C. πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτεροι νεώτεροι, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω, ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθῶν;

It is probable that the Sophists often delivered illustrative mythes or fables as a more interesting way of handling social matters before an audience. Such was the memorable fable called the choice of Hēraklēs by Prodikus.

Mythe.
First fabri-
cation of
men by the
Gods. Pro-
metheus and
Epimetheus.
Bad distri-
bution of en-
dowments to
man by
the latter.
It is partly
amended by
Prometheus.

animals had yet come into existence. At the epoch prescribed by Fate, the Gods fabricated men and animals in the interior of the earth, out of earth, fire, and other ingredients: directing the brothers Prometheus and Epimetheus to fit them out with suitable endowments. Epimetheus, having been allowed by his brother to undertake the task of distributing these endowments, did his work very improvidently, wasted all his gifts upon the inferior animals, and left nothing for man. When Prometheus came to inspect what had been done, he found that other animals were adequately equipped, but that man had no natural provision for clothing, shoeing, bedding, or defence. The only way whereby Prometheus could supply the defect was, by breaking into the common workshop of Athênê and Hephæstus, and stealing from thence their artistic skill, together with fire.¹ Both of these he presented to man, who was thus enabled to construct for himself, by art, all that other animals received from nature and more besides.

Still however, mankind did not possess the political or social art; which Zeus kept in his own custody, where Prometheus could not reach it. Accordingly, though mankind could provide for themselves as individuals, yet when they attempted to form themselves into communities, they wronged each other so much, from being destitute of the political or social art, that they were presently forced again into dispersion.² The art of war, too, being a part of the political art, which mankind did not possess—they could not get up a common defence against hostile animals: so that the human race would have been presently destroyed, had not Zeus interposed to avert such a consummation. He sent Hermês to mankind, bearing with him

Prometheus
gave to man-
kind skill
for the sup-
ply of indi-
vidual wants,
but could
not give
them the
social art.
Mankind
are on the
point of
perishing
when Zeus
sends to
them the
dispositions
essential for
society.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 321-322. ἀπορία
ὅν ἐχόμενος ὁ Πρωμηθεὺς ἦρτοια σωτη-
ρίαν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εὖροι, κλέπτει Ἡφαί-
στου καὶ Ἀθηνᾶς τὴν ἐντεχνον σοφίαν
σὺν πυρὶ. . . . Τὴν μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν
βίον σοφίαν ἀνθρώπος ταύτῃ ἔσχε, τὴν
δὲ πολιτικὴν οὐκ εἶχε· ἦν γὰρ παρὰ τῷ
Διὶ, &c.

If the reader will compare this with
the doctrine delivered in the Platonic

Timæus—that the inferior animals
spring from degenerate men—he will
perceive the entire variance between
the two (*Timæus*, pp. 91-92).

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 322 B. ἐχόντων
δὲ ἀβροῖσθαι καὶ σώζεσθαι κτίζοντες
πόλεις· ὅτ' οὖν ἀβροισθῆιν, ἡδίκουν ἑλ-
λῆλους, ἅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες τὴν πολιτικὴν
τέχνην, ὥστε πάλιν σκεδανύμενοι διεφ-
θεύοντο.

Justice and the sense of Shame (or Moderation), as the bonds and ornaments of civic society, coupling men in friendship.¹ Hermès asked Zeus—Upon what principle shall I distribute these gifts among mankind? Shall I distribute them in the same way as artistic skill is distributed, only to a small number—a few accomplished physicians, navigators, &c., being adequate to supply the wants of the entire community? Or are they to be apportioned in a certain dose to every man? Undoubtedly, to every man (was the command of Zeus). All without exception must be partakers in them. If they are confined exclusively to a few, like artistic or professional skill, no community can exist.² Ordain, by my authority, that every man, who cannot take a share of his own in justice and the sense of shame, shall be slain, as a nuisance to the community.

This fable will show you, therefore, Sokrates (continues Protagoras), that the Athenians have good reason for making the distinction to which you advert. When they are discussing matters of special art, they will hear only the few to whom such matters are known. But when they are taking counsel about social or political virtue, which consists altogether in justice and moderation, they naturally hear every one; since every one is presumed, as a condition of the existence of the commonwealth, to be a partaker therein.³ Moreover, even though they know a man not to have these virtues in reality, they treat him as insane if he does not proclaim himself to have them, and make profession of virtue: whereas, in the case of the special arts, if a man makes

Protagoras follows up his mythé by a discourse. Justice and the sense of shame are not professional attributes, but are possessed by all citizens, and taught by all to all.

Compare Plato, Republic, l. p. 351 C, p. 352 B, where Sokrates sets forth a similar argument.

¹ Plato, Protagor. p. 322 C. Ἐρμῆν πέμπει ἄγοντα εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἰδῶ τε καὶ δίκην, τὸν εἶναι πόλεως κόσμον τε καὶ δεσμοὶ φίλιας συναγωγῆς.

² Plato, Protag. p. 322 C-D. εἰς ἕχων ἱατρικὴν πολλοὶς ἱκανὸς ἰδυῖται, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι θημιουργοί. καὶ δίκην δὲ καὶ αἰδῶ οὐτε θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νεῖμω; Ἐπὶ πάντας, ἔφη ὁ Ζεὺς, καὶ πάντας μετεχόντων· οὐ γὰρ ἂν γένοιτο πόλις, εἰ ὅλγοι αὐτῶν μετέχουσιν ὥσπερ ἄλλων τεχνῶν. καὶ νόμον γε

θεὸς παρ' ἐμοῦ, τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον αἰδοῦς καὶ δίκης μετεχειν, κτείνειν ὡς νόσον πόλεως.

We see by p. 323 A that σωφροσύνη is employed as substitute or equivalent for αἰδῶς: yet still αἰδῶς is the proper word to express Plato's meaning, as it denotes a distinct and positive regard to the feelings of others—a feeling of pain in each man's mind, when he discovers or believes that he is disapproved by his comrades. Hom. II. O. 561—αἰδῶ θέσθ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ Ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδέσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμῖνας.

³ Plat. Prot. pp. 322-323.

proclamation of his own skill as a physician or musician, they censure or ridicule him.¹

Nevertheless, though they account this political or social virtue an universal endowment, they are far from thinking that it comes spontaneously or by nature. They conceive it to be generated by care and teaching. For in respect of all those qualities which come by nature or by accident, no one is ever angry with another or blames another for being found wanting. An ugly, dwarfish, or sickly man is looked upon simply with pity, because his defects are such as he cannot help. But when any one manifests injustice or other qualities the opposite of political virtue, then all his neighbours visit him with indignation, censure, and perhaps punishment: implying clearly their belief that this virtue is an acquirement obtained by care and learning.² Indeed the whole institution of punishment has no other meaning. It is in itself a proof that men think social virtue to be acquirable and acquired. For no rational man ever punishes malefactors because they *have* done wrong, or simply with a view to the past:—since what is already done cannot be undone. He punishes with a view to the future, in order that neither the same man, nor others who see him punished, may be again guilty of similar wrong. This opinion plainly implies the belief, that virtue is producible by training, since men punish for the purpose of prevention.³

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 323 C.

² Plato, *Protag.* pp. 323-324.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 324 A-B. οὐδεὶς γὰρ κολάζει τοὺς ἀδικούντας πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νόον ἔχων καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα ὅτι ᾗδισται, ὅστις μὴ ὥστερ ἑρπύλον ἀλογίστως τιμωρεῖται· ὁ δὲ μετὰ λόγον ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρελθόντος ἕνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται—οὐ γὰρ ἂν τό γε πρᾶχθαι ἀγνόητον εἴη—ἀλλὰ τοῦ μέλλοντος χάριν, ἵνα μὴ ἀδίκῃσιν ἄλλοι αὐτὸς ὅπως μὴτε ἄλλος ὁ τούτου ἰδὼν κολασθῆναι. καὶ τοιαύτην διανοίαν ἔχων, διανοεῖται πεινυτὴν εἶναι ἀρετὴν· ἀποτροπῆς γοῦν ἕνεκα κολάζει.

This clear and striking exposition of the theory of punishment is one of the most memorable passages in Plato, or in any ancient author. And if we are to believe the words which immediately follow, it was the theory universally accepted at that time—ταῦτα οὖν τὴν δόξαν πάντες ἔχουσιν, ὅσοι περ τιμω-

ροῦνται καὶ ἰδὲ καὶ δημοσίᾳ. Compare Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 933, where the same doctrine is announced: Seneca, *De Ira*, i. 16. "Nam, ut Plato ait, nemo prudens punit, quia peccatum est, sed ne peccetur. Revocari enim præterita non possunt: futura prohibentur." Steinhart (*Einleit.* zum *Protag.* p. 423) pronounces a just encomium upon this theory of punishment, which, as he truly observes, combines together the purposes declared in the two modern theories—Reforming and Detering. He says further, however, that the same theory of punishment reappears in the *Gorgias*, which I do not think exact. The purpose of punishment, as given in the *Gorgias*, is simply to cure a distempered patient of a terrible distemper, and thus to confer great benefit on him—but without any allusion to tutelary results as regards society.

I come now to your remaining argument, Sokrates. You urge that citizens of eminent civil virtue cannot communicate that virtue to their own sons, to whom nevertheless they secure all the accomplishments which masters can teach. Now I have already shown you that civil virtue is the one accomplishment needful,¹ which every man without exception must possess, on pain of punishment or final expulsion, if he be without it. I have shown you, moreover that every one believes it to be communicable by teaching and attention. How can you believe then that these excellent fathers teach their sons other things, but do not teach them this, the want of which entails such terrible penalties?

Why eminent men cannot make their sons eminent.

The fact is, they *do* teach it: and that too with great pains.² They begin to admonish and lecture their children, from the earliest years. Father, mother, tutor, nurse, all vie with each other to make the child as good as possible: by constantly telling him on every occasion which arises, This is right—That is wrong—This is honourable—That is mean—This is holy—That is unholy—Do these things, abstain from those.³ If the child obeys them, it is well: if he do not, they straighten or rectify him, like a crooked piece of wood, by reproof and flogging. Next, they send him to a schoolmaster, who teaches him letters and the harp; but who is enjoined to take still greater pains in watching over his orderly behaviour. Here the youth is put to read, learn by heart, and recite, the compositions of able poets; full of exhortations to excellence and of stirring examples from the good men of past times.⁴ On the harp also, he learns the best songs, his conduct is strictly watched, and his emotions are disciplined by the influence of rhythmical and regular measure. While his mind is thus trained to good, he is sent besides to the gymnastic trainer, to render his body a suitable instrument for it,⁵ and to guard against

Teaching by parents, school-master, harpist, laws, dikastery, &c.

¹ Plato, Protag. p. 324 E. Πότερον ἔστι τι ἐν, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν, ὃ ἐναγκαλίον πάντας τοὺς πολίτας μετέχειν, εἴπερ μέλει πόλις εἶναι; ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ αὕτη λύνεται ἢ ἀπορία ἦν σὺ ἀπορείς.

² Plato, Protag. p. 325 B.

³ Plato, Protag. p. 325 D. παρ' ἑκαστον καὶ ἔργον καὶ λόγον διδάσκοντες καὶ ἐνδεικνύμενοι ὅτι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ ἀδίκον, καὶ τόδε μὲν καλόν, τόδε δὲ αἰσχρόν, &c.

⁴ Plato, Protag. p. 325 E—326 A. παρατίθεσιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βιβίων ἀναγνώσκων ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα καὶ ἑκμανθάνειν ἀναγράζουσιν, ἐν οἷς πολλὰ μὲν νοσητήσους ἐνεσι, πολλὰ δὲ διδόναι καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ ὑψίσματα παλαιῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀγαθῶν, ἵνα ὁ παῖς ζῆλόν μίμῃται καὶ ὀρέγῃται τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι.

⁵ Plato, Protag. p. 326 B. ἵνα τὰ σώματα βελτίως ἔχοντες υπηρετώσι τῇ διανοίᾳ χρηστῇ οὖσῃ, &c.

failure of energy under the obligations of military service. If he be the son of a wealthy man, he is sent to such training sooner, and remains in it longer. As soon as he is released from his masters, the city publicly takes him in hand, compelling him to learn the laws prescribed by old and good lawgivers,¹ to live according to their prescriptions, and to learn both command and obedience, on pain of being punished. Such then being the care bestowed, both publicly and privately, to foster virtue, can you really doubt, Sokrates, whether it be teachable? You might much rather wonder if it were not so.²

How does it happen, then, you ask, that excellent men so frequently have worthless sons, to whom, even with all these precautions, they cannot teach their own virtue? This is not surprising, when you recollect what I have just said—That in regard to social virtue, every man must be a craftsman and producer; there must be no non-professional consumers.³ All of us are interested in rendering our neighbours just and virtuous, as well as in keeping them so. Accordingly, every one, instead of being jealous, like a professional artist, of seeing his own accomplishments diffused, stands forward zealously in teaching justice and virtue to every one else, and in reproving all short-comers.⁴ Every man is a teacher of virtue to others: every man learns his virtue from such general teaching, public and private. The sons of the best men learn it in this way, as well as others. The instruction of their fathers counts for comparatively little, amidst such universal and paramount extraneous influence; so that it depends upon the aptitude and predispositions of the sons themselves, whether they turn out better or worse than others. The son of a superior man will often turn out ill; while the son of a worthless man will

ALL learn virtue from the same teaching by all. Whether a learner shall acquire more or less of it, depends upon his own individual aptitude.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 326 D. νόμους ὑπογράφασα, ἀγαθῶν καὶ παλαιῶν νομοθετῶν ἐνρήματα, &c.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 326 E.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 326 E. ὅτι τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος, τῆς ἀρετῆς, εἰ μᾶλλον πόλις εἶναι, οὐδένα δεῖ ἰδεοτέειν.

It is to be regretted that there is no precise word to translate exactly the useful antithesis between ἰδιώτης and

τεχνίτης οἱ δημιουργοί.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 327 A. εἰ καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ πᾶς πάντα καὶ ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἐπέπληττε τὸν μὴ καλῶς αὐλοῦντα, καὶ μὴ ἐφθάνει τοῦτον, ὥσπερ τὴν τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν νομίμων οὐδεὶς φθονεῖ οὐδ' ἀποκρύπτειται, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνημάτων—ἀνιστίζεται γὰρ, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἡ ἀλλήλων δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἀρετὴ διὰ ταῦτα πᾶς παντὶ προθύμως λέγει καὶ δίδασκει καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ νόμιμα.

prove meritorious. So the case would be, if playing on the flute were the one thing needful for all citizens; if every one taught and enforced flute-playing upon all others, and every one learnt it from the teaching of all others.¹ You would find that the sons of good or bad flute-players would turn out good or bad, not in proportion to the skill of their fathers, but according to their own natural aptitudes. You would find however also, that all of them, even the most unskilful, would be accomplished flute-players, if compared with men absolutely untaught, who had gone through no such social training. So too, in regard to justice and virtue.² The very worst man brought up in your society and its public and private training, would appear to you a craftsman in these endowments, if you compared him with men who had been brought up without education, without laws, without dikasteries, without any general social pressure bearing on them, to enforce virtue: such men as the savages exhibited last year in the comedy of Pherekrates at the Lenæan festival. If you were thrown among such men, you, like the chorus of misanthropes in that play, would look back with regret even upon the worst criminals of the society which you had left, such as Eurybatus and Phrynondas.³

But now, Sokrates, you are over-nice, because all of us are teachers of virtue, to the best of every man's power; while no particular individual appears to teach it specially and *ex professo*.⁴ By the same analogy, if you asked who was the teacher for speaking our vernacular Greek, no one special person could be pointed out:⁵ nor would you find out who was the finishing teacher for those sons of craftsmen who learnt the rudiments of their art from their own fathers—while if the son of any non-professional person learns a craft, it is easy to assign the person by whom he was taught.⁶

¹ Plato, Protag. p. 327 C.

² Plato, Protag. p. 327 C-D. ὅστις σοὶ ἀδικώτατος φαίνεται ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐν νόμοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις τετραμμένων, δίκαιον αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ δημιουργὸν τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματος, εἰ δέοι αὐτὸν κρίνεσθαι πρὸς ἀνθρώπους, οἷς μήτε παιδεία ἐστὶ μήτε δικαστήρια μήτε νόμοι μήτε ἀνάγκη μηδενίᾳ διὰ παντός ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμαλίσθαι.

³ Plato, Protag. p. 327 D.

⁴ Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. νῦν δὲ τρυφῆς, ὡς Σώκρατες, διότι πάντες διδάσκαλοι εἰσιν ἀρετῆς, καθ' ὅσον δύναται ἕκαστος, καὶ οὐδεὶς σοὶ φαίνεται.

⁵ Plato, Protag. p. 327 E. εἰδ' ὡς περ ἂν εἰ ζητοῖς τίς διδάσκαλος τοῦ ἐλληνίζειν, οὐδ' ἂν εἰς φανεῖν.

⁶ Plato, Protag. p. 328 A.

So it is in respect to virtue. All of us teach and enforce virtue to the best of our power ; and we ought to be satisfied if there be any one of us ever so little superior to the rest, in the power of teaching it. Of such men I believe myself to be one.¹ I can train a man into an excellent citizen, better than others, and in a manner worthy not only of the fee which I ask, but even of a still greater remuneration, in the judgment of the pupil himself. This is the stipulation which I make with him : when he has completed his course, he is either to pay me the fee which I shall demand—or if he prefers, he may go into a temple, make oath as to his own estimate of the instruction imparted to him, and pay me according to that estimate.²

I have thus proved to you, Sokrates—That virtue is teachable—That the Athenians account it to be teachable—That there is nothing wonderful in finding the sons of good men worthless, and the sons of worthless men good. Indeed this is true no less about the special professions, than about the common accomplishment, virtue. The sons of Polyklêtus the statuary, and of many other artists, are nothing as compared with their fathers.³

Remarks upon the myth and discourse. They explain the manner in which the established sentiment of a community propagates and perpetuates itself.

Such is the discourse composed by Plato and attributed to the Platonic Protagoras—showing that virtue is teachable, and intended to remove the difficulties proposed by Sokrates. It is an exposition of some length : and because it is put into the mouth of a Sophist, many commentators presume, as a matter of course, that it must be a manifestation of some worthless quality : ⁴ that it is either empty verbiage, or ostentatious self-praise, or low-minded immorality. I am unable to perceive in the discourse any of these demerita. I think it one of the best parts of the Platonic writings,

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 323 B. Ἄλλὰ καὶ εἰ δαίμων ᾖ, τις ἄνθρωπος διαφέρει ἡμῶν ὑπερβέδεται εἰς ἀρετὴν, ἐγχαρτὸν. Ὡς τὸν οὐρανὸν εἰς εἶναι, &c.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 323 B.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 323 C.

⁴ So Serranus (ad 326 E), who has

been followed by many later critics. "Quæstio est, Virtutem doceri possit? Quod instituit demonstrare Sophista, sed ineptissimis argumentis et quæ contra seipsum faciunt."

To me this appears the reverse of the truth. But even if it were true,

as an exposition of the growth and propagation of common sense—the common, established, ethical and social sentiment, among a community: sentiment neither dictated in the beginning, by any scientific or artistic lawgiver, nor personified in any special guild of craftsmen apart from the remaining community—nor inculcated by any formal professional teachers—nor tested by analysis—nor verified by comparison with any objective standard: but self-sown and self-asserting, stamped, multiplied, and kept in circulation, by the unpremeditated conspiracy of the general¹ public—the omnipresent agency of King Nomos and his numerous volunteers.

In many of the Platonic dialogues, Sokrates is made to dwell upon the fact that there are no recognised professional teachers of virtue; and to ground upon this fact a doubt, whether virtue be really teachable. But the present dialogue is the only one in which the fact is accounted for, and the doubt formally answered. There are neither special teachers, nor professed pupils, nor determinate periods of study, nor definite lessons or stadia, for the acquirement of virtue, as there are for a particular art or craft: the reason being, that in that department every man must of necessity be a practitioner, more or less perfectly: every man has an interest in communicating it to his neighbour: hence every man is constantly both teacher and learner. Herein consists one main and real distinction between virtue and the

Antithesis of Protagoras and Sokrates. Whether virtue is to be assimilated to a special art.

no blame could fall on Protagoras. We should only be warranted in concluding that it suited the scheme of Plato here to make him talk nonsense.

¹ This is what the Platonic Sokrates alludes to in the Phædon and elsewhere. οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδευκότες, ἦν δὲ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἑθους τε καὶ μελέτης γιγνόμεναι, ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ. Phædon, p. 82 B; compare the same dialogue, p. 68 C; also Republic, x. p. 619 C—*ἔθαι ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετὴς μεταληφόμενα*.

The account given by Mr. James Mill (Fragment on Mackintosh, p. 259-260) of the manner in which the established morality of a society is transmitted and perpetuated, coincides completely with the discourse of the Platonic Protagoras. The passage is too long to be cited: I give here only

the concluding words, which describe the δημοτικὴ ἀρετὴ ἀπὸ φιλοσοφίας—

“In this manner it is that men, in the social state, acquire the habits of moral acting, and certain affections connected with it, before they are capable of reflecting upon the grounds which recommend the acts either to praise or blame. Nearly at this point the greater part of them remain: continuing to perform moral acts and to abstain from the contrary, chiefly from the habits which they have acquired, and the authority upon which they originally acted: though it is not possible that any man should come to the years and blessing of reason, without perceiving at least in an indistinct and general way, the advantage which mankind derive from their acting towards one another in one way rather than another.”

special arts ; an answer to the view most frequently espoused by the Platonic Sokrates, assimilating virtue to a professional craft, which ought to have special teachers, and a special season of apprenticeship, if it is to be acquired at all.

The speech is censured by some critics as prolix. But to me it seems full of matter and argument, exceedingly free from superfluous rhetoric. The fable with which it opens presents of course the poetical ornament which belongs to that manner of handling. It is however fully equal, in point of perspicuity as well as charm—in my judgment, it is even superior—to any other fable in Plato.

When the harangue, lecture, or sermon, of Protagoras is concluded, Sokrates both expresses his profound admiration of it, and admits the conclusion—That virtue is teachable—to be made out, as well as it can be made out by any continuous exposition.¹ In fact, the speaker has done all that could be done by Perikles or the best orator of the assembly. He has given a long series of reasonings in support of his own case, without stopping to hear the doubts of opponents. He has sailed along triumphantly upon the stream of public sentiment, accepting all the established beliefs—appealing to his hearers with all those familiar phrases, round which the most powerful associations are grouped—and taking for granted that justice, virtue, good, evil, &c., are known, indis-

Procedure of Sokrates in regard to the discourse of Protagoras—he compliments it as an exposition, and analyses some of the fundamental assumptions.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 323-329.

Very different indeed is the sentiment of the principal Platonic commentators. Schleiermacher will not allow the mythus of Protagoras to be counted among the Platonic mythes: he says that it is composed in the style of Protagoras, and perhaps copied from some real composition of that Sophist. He finds in it nothing but a "grobmaterialistische Denkungsart, die über die sinnliche Erfahrung nicht hinaus philosophirt" (*Einleitung zum Protagoras*, vol. i. pp. 233-234).

To the like purpose Ast (*Plat. Leb.* p. 71)—who tells us that what is expressed in the mythus is, "the vulgar and mean sentiment and manner of thought of the Sophist: for it deduces every thing, both arts and the social union itself, from human wants and necessity". Apparently these critics, when they treat this as a proof of

meanness and vulgarity, have forgotten that the Platonic Sokrates himself does exactly the same thing in the Republic—deriving the entire social union from human necessities (*Republ.* ii. 369 C).

K. F. Hermann is hardly less severe upon the Protagorean discourse (*Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil.* p. 460).

For my part, I take a view altogether opposed to these learned persons. I think the discourse one of the most striking and instructive portions of the Platonic writings: and if I could believe that it was the composition of Protagoras himself, my estimation of him would be considerably raised.

Steinhart pronounces a much more rational and equitable judgment than Ast and Schleiermacher, upon the discourse of Protagoras (*Einleitung zum Prot.* pp. 422-423).

putable, determinate data, fully understood, and unanimously interpreted. He has shown that the community take great pains, both publicly and privately, to inculcate and enforce virtue: that is, what *they* believe in and esteem as virtue. But is their belief well founded? Is that which they esteem, really virtue? Do they and their elegant spokesman Protagoras, know what virtue is? If so, *how* do they know it, and can they explain it?

This is the point upon which Sokrates now brings his Elenchus to bear: his method of short question and answer. We have seen what long continuous speaking can do: we have now to see what short cross-questioning can do. The antithesis between the two is at least one main purpose of Plato—if it be not even *the* purpose (as Schleiermacher supposes it to be)—in this memorable dialogue.

One purpose of the dialogue. To contrast continuous discourse with short cross-examining question and answer.

After your copious exposition, Protagoras (says Sokrates), I have only one little doubt remaining, which you will easily explain.¹ You have several times spoken of justice, moderation, holiness, &c., as if they all, taken collectively, made up virtue. Do you mean that virtue is a Whole, and that these three names denote distinct parts of it? Or are the three names all equivalent to virtue, different names for one and the same thing? *Prot.*—They are names signifying distinct parts of virtue. *Sokr.*—Are these parts like the parts of the face,—eyes, nose, mouth, ears—each part not only distinct from the rest, but having its own peculiar properties? Or are they like the parts of gold, homogeneous with each other and with the whole, differing only in magnitude? *Prot.*—The former. *Sokr.*—Then some men may possess one part, some another. Or is it necessary that he who possesses one part, should possess all? *Prot.*—By no means necessary. Some men are courageous, but unjust: others are just, but not intelligent. *Sokr.*—Wisdom and courage then, both of them, are parts of virtue? *Prot.*—They are so. Wisdom is the greatest of the parts: but no one of the parts is the exact likeness of another: each of them has its own peculiar property.²

Questions by Sokrates —Whether virtue is one and indivisible, or composed of different parts? Whether the parts are homogeneous or heterogeneous.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 328 E—329 B. *σμικροῦ τινος ἐνδεὲς εἰμι πᾶσι ἔχειν, πλὴν σμικρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δὴλον &c.*
² *ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥηδὶως ἐπεκιδάξει. . . .* ² Plato, *Protag.* pp. 329-330.

Sokr.—Now let us examine what sort of thing each of these parts is. Tell me—is justice some thing, or no thing? I think it is some thing: are you of the same opinion?¹ *Prot.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—Now this thing which you call *justice*: is it itself just or unjust? I should say that it was just: what do you say?² *Prot.*—I think so too. *Sokr.*—Holiness also is some thing: is the thing called *holiness*, itself holy or unholy? As for me, if any one were to ask me the question, I should reply—Of course it is: nothing else can well be holy, if holiness itself be not holy. Would you say the same? *Prot.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—Justice being admitted to be just, and holiness to be holy—do not you think that justice also is holy, and that holiness is just? If so, how can you reconcile that with your former declaration, that no one of the parts of virtue is like any other part? *Prot.*—I do not altogether admit that justice is holy, and that holiness is just. But the matter is of little moment: if you please, let both of them stand as admitted. *Sokr.*—Not so:³ I do not want the debate to turn upon an “If you please”: You and I are the debaters, and we shall determine the debate best without “Ifs”. *Prot.*—I say then that justice and holiness are indeed, in a certain way, like each other; so also there is a point of analogy between white and black,⁴ hard and soft, and between many other things which no one would pronounce to be like generally. *Sokr.*—Do you think then that justice and holiness have only a small point of analogy between them? *Prot.*—Not exactly so: but I do not concur with you when you declare that one is like the other.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 330 B. κοινῇ σκεψάμεθα ποῖόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἕκαστον. πρῶτον μὲν τὸ τοιόνδε· ἡ δικαιοσύνη πρᾶγμα τί ἐστιν; ἢ οὐδὲν πρᾶγμα; ἔμοι μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ· τί δὲ σοί;

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 330 C. τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὀνομάσατε ἀρετή, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἢ ἀδίκον;

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 331 C. εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἵστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη δίκαιον καὶ δσιόντης δίκαιον. Μὴ μοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ “εἰ βούλει” τοῦτο καὶ “εἰ σοί· δοκεῖ” ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν τε καὶ σέ.

This passage seems intended to illustrate the indifference of Protagoras for dialectic forms and strict accuracy of discussion. The ἀκριβολογία of Sokrates and Plato was not merely unfamiliar but even distasteful to rhetorical and practical men. Protagoras is made to exhibit himself as thinking the distinctions drawn by Sokrates too nice, not worth attending to. Many of the contemporaries of both shared this opinion. One purpose of our dialogue is to bring such antitheses into view.

⁴ Plat. *Prot.* p. 331 D.

Sokr.—Well then! since you seem to follow with some repugnance this line of argument, let us enter upon another.¹

Sokrates then attempts to show that intelligence and moderation are identical with each other (*σοφία* and *σωφροσύνη*). The proof which he produces, elicited by several questions, is—that both the one and the other are contrary to folly (*ἀφροσύνη*), and, that as a general rule, nothing can have more than one single contrary.²

Intelligence and moderation are identical because they have the same contrary.

Sokrates thus seems to himself to have made much progress in proving all the names of different virtues to be names of one and the same thing. Moderation and intelligence are shown to be the same: justice and holiness had before been shown to be nearly the same:³ though we must recollect that this last point had not been admitted by Protagoras. It must be confessed however that neither the one nor the other is proved by any conclusive reasons. In laying down the maxim—that nothing can have more than one single contrary—Plato seems to have forgotten that the same term may be used in two different senses. Because the term folly (*ἀφροσύνη*), is used sometimes to denote the opposite of moderation (*σωφροσύνη*), sometimes the opposite of intelligence (*σοφία*), it does not follow that moderation and intelligence are the same thing.⁴ Nor does he furnish more satisfactory proof of the other point, *viz.*: That holiness and justice are the same, or as much alike as possible. The intermediate position which is assumed to form the proof, *viz.*: That holiness is holy, and that justice is just—is either tautological, or unmeaning; and cannot serve as a real proof of any thing. It is indeed so futile, that if it were found in the

Insufficient reasons given by Sokrates. He seldom cares to distinguish different meanings of the same term.

¹ Plat. Prot. p. 332 A.

² Plat. Protag. p. 332.

³ Plato, Protag. p. 333 B. *σχέδον τι καὶ ἄλλον ὅν.*

⁴ Aristotle would probably have avoided such a mistake as this. One important point (as I have already remarked, vol. II. p. 170) in which he

is superior to Plato is, in being far more careful to distinguish the different meanings of the same word—*τὰ πρὸς ἑκάστῳ λεγόμενα*. Plato rarely troubles himself to notice such distinction, and seems indeed generally unaware of it. He constantly ridicules Prodikos, who tried to distinguish words apparently synonymous.

mouth of Protagoras and not in that of Sokrates, commentators would probably have cited it as an illustration of the futilities of the Sophists. As yet therefore little has been done to elucidate the important question to which Sokrates addresses himself—What is the extent of analogy between the different virtues? Are they at bottom one and the same thing under different names? In what does the analogy or the sameness consist?

But though little progress has been made in determining the question mooted by Sokrates, enough has been done to discompose and mortify Protagoras. The general tenor of the dialogue is, to depict this man, so eloquent in popular and continuous exposition, as destitute of the analytical acumen requisite to meet cross-examination, and of promptitude for dealing with new aspects of the case, on the very subjects which form the theme of his eloquence. He finds himself brought round, by a series of short questions, to a conclusion which—whether conclusively proved or not—is proved in a manner binding upon him, since he has admitted all the antecedent premisses. He becomes dissatisfied with himself, answers with increasing reluctance,¹ and is at last so provoked as to break out of the limits imposed upon a respondent.

Meanwhile Sokrates pursues his examination, with intent to prove that justice (*δικαιοσύνη*) and moderation (*σωφροσύνη*) are identical. Does a man who acts unjustly conduct himself with moderation? I should be ashamed (replies Protagoras) to answer in the affirmative, though many people say so. *Sokr.*—It is indifferent to me whether you yourself think so or not, provided only you consent to make answer. What I principally examine is the opinion itself: though it follows perhaps as a consequence, that I the questioner, and the respondent along with me, undergo examination at the same time.² You answer then (though without

Sokrates presses Protagoras farther. His purpose is, to test opinions and not persons. Protagoras answers with angry prolixity.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 333 B, 335 A.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 333 C. τὸν γὰρ λόγον ἔργου μάλιστα ἐφετάω, συμβαίνει μὲντοι ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐρωτῶντα καὶ τὸν

ἐρωτῶμενον ἐφετάσθαι.

Here again we find Plato drawing special attention to the conditions of dialectic debate.

adopting the opinion) that men who act unjustly sometimes behave with moderation, or with intelligence: that is, that they follow a wise policy in committing injustice. *Prot.*—Be it so. *Sokr.*—You admit too that there exist certain things called good things. Are those things good, which are profitable to mankind? *Prot.*—By Zeus, I call some things good, even though they be not profitable to *men* (replies Protagoras, with increasing acrimony).¹ *Sokr.*—Do you mean those things which are not profitable to any *man*, or those which are not profitable to any creature whatever? Do you call these latter *good* also? *Prot.*—Not at all: but there are many things profitable to men, yet unprofitable or hurtful to different animals. Good is of a character exceedingly diversified and heterogeneous.²

Protagoras is represented as giving this answer at considerable length, and in a rhetorical manner, so as to elicit applause from the hearers.³ Upon this Sokrates replies, "I am a man of short memory, and if any one speaks at length, I forget what he has said. If you wish me to follow you, I must entreat you to make shorter answers." *Prot.*—What do you mean by asking me to make shorter answers? Do you mean shorter than the case requires? *Sokr.*—No, certainly not. *Prot.*—But who is to be judge of the brevity necessary, you or I? *Sokr.*—I have understood that you profess to be master and teacher both of long speech and of short speech: what I beg is, that you will employ only short speech, if you expect me to follow you. *Prot.*—Why, Sokrates, I have carried on many debates in my time; and if, as you ask me now, I had always talked just as my opponent wished, I should never have acquired any reputation at all. *Sokr.*—Be it so: in that case I must retire; for as to long speaking, I am incompetent: I can neither make long speeches, nor follow them.⁴

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 333 E.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 334 B. ὅτιν τε καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν καὶ παντοδαπόν, &c.

The explanation here given by Protagoras of *good* is the same as that which is given by the historical Sokrates himself in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia* (iii. 3). Things called

good are diverse in the highest degree; but they are all called *good* because they all contribute in some way to human security, relief, comfort, or prosperity. To one or other of these ends *good*, in all its multifarious forms, is relative.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 334 D.

⁴ Plato, *Prot.* pp. 334 E, 335 A-C.

Remonstrance of Sokrates against long answers, as inconsistent with the laws of dialogue. Protagoras persists. Sokrates rises to depart.

Here Sokrates rises to depart ; but Kallias, the master of the house, detains him, and expresses an earnest wish that the debate may be continued. A promiscuous conversation ensues, in which most persons present take part. Alkibiades, as the champion of Sokrates, gives, what seems really to be the key of the dialogue, when he says—"Sokrates admits that he has no capacity for long speaking, and that he is no match therein for Protagoras. But as to dialectic debate, or administering and resisting cross-examination, I should be surprised if any one were a match for him. If Protagoras admits that on this point he is inferior, Sokrates requires no more : if he does not, let him continue the debate : but he must not lengthen his answers so that hearers lose the thread of the subject."

This remark of Alkibiades, speaking altogether as a vehement partisan of Sokrates, brings to view at least one purpose—if not the main purpose—of Plato in the dialogue. "Sokrates acknowledges the superiority of Protagoras in rhetoric : if Protagoras acknowledges the superiority of Sokrates in dialectic, Sokrates is satisfied." An express *locus standi* is here claimed for dialectic, and a recognised superiority for its professors on their own ground. Protagoras professes to be master both of long speech and of short speech : but in the last he must recognise a superior.

Kritias, Prodikus, and Hippias all speak (each in a manner of his own) deprecating marked partisanship on either side, exhorting both parties to moderation, and insisting that the conversation shall be continued. At length Sokrates consents to remain, yet on condition that Protagoras shall confine himself within the limits of the dialectic procedure. Protagoras (he says) shall first question me as long as he pleases : when he has finished, I will question him. The Sophist, though at first reluctant, is constrained, by the instance of those around, to accede to this proposition.¹

Interference of Kallias to get the debate continued. Promiscuous conversation. Alkibiades declares that Protagoras ought to acknowledge superiority of Sokrates in dialogue.

Claim of a special *locus standi* and professorship for Dialectic, apart from Rhetoric.

Sokrates is prevailed upon to continue, and invites Protagoras to question him.

¹ Plat. Prot. p. 336 C-D.

² Plat. Prot. pp. 337-338.

For the purpose of questioning, Protagoras selects a song of Simonides : prefacing it with a remark, that the most important accomplishment of a cultivated man consists in being thorough master of the works of the poets, so as to understand and appreciate them correctly, and answer all questions respecting them.¹ Sokrates intimates that he knows and admires the song : upon which Protagoras proceeds to point out two passages in it which contradict each other, and asks how Sokrates can explain or justify such contradiction.² The latter is at first embarrassed, and invokes the aid of Prodikos ; who interferes to uphold the consistency of his fellow-citizen Simonides, but is made to speak (as elsewhere by Plato) in a stupid and ridiculous manner. After a desultory string of remarks,³ with disputed interpretation of particular phrases and passages of the song, but without promise of any result—Sokrates offers to give an exposition of the general purpose of the whole song, in order that the company may see how far he has advanced in that accomplishment which Protagoras had so emphatically extolled—complete mastery of the works of the poets.⁴

Protagoras extols the importance of knowing the works of the poets, and questions about parts of a song of Simonides. Dissenting opinions about the interpretation of the song.

He then proceeds to deliver a long harangue, the commencement of which appears to be a sort of counter-part and parody of the first speech delivered by Protagoras in this dialogue. That Sophist had represented that the sophistical art was ancient :⁵ and that the poets, from Homer downward, were Sophists, but dreaded the odium of the name, and professed a different avocation with another title. Sokrates here tells us that philosophy was more ancient still in Krete and Sparta, and that there were more Sophists (he does not distinguish between the Sophist and the philosopher), female as well as male, in those regions, than anywhere else : but that they concealed their name and profession, for fear that others should copy them and acquire the like

Long speech of Sokrates, expounding the purpose of the song, and laying down an ironical theory about the numerous concealed sophists at Krete and Sparta, masters of short speech.

¹ Plat. Prot. p. 339 A. ἡγοῦμαι ἐγὼ ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος εἶναι, περὶ ἧτων δεῖνόν εἶναι.

² Plat. Prot. p. 339 C-D.

³ Plat. Prot. pp. 340-341.

⁴ Plat. Prot. p. 342 A. εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μὲν πείραν ὅπως ἔχω, δὲ σὺ λέγεις τοῦτο, περὶ ἧτων.

⁵ Plat. Prot. pp. 316-317

eminence :¹ that they pretended to devote themselves altogether to arms and gymnastic—a pretence whereby (he says) all the other Greeks were really deluded. The special characteristic of these philosophers or Sophists was, short and emphatic speech—epigram shot in at the seasonable moment, and thoroughly prosecuting an opponent.² The Seven Wise Men, among whom Pittakus was one, were philosophers on this type, of supreme excellence : which they showed by inscribing their memorable brief aphorisms at Delphi. So great was the celebrity which Pittakus acquired by his aphorism, that Simonides the poet became jealous, and composed this song altogether for the purpose of discrediting him. Having stated this general view, Sokrates illustrates it by going through the song, with exposition and criticism of several different passages.³ As soon as Sokrates has concluded, Hippias⁴ compliments him, and says that he too has a lecture ready prepared on the same song : which he would willingly deliver : but Alkibiades and the rest beg him to postpone it.

No remark is made by any one present, either upon the circumstance that Sokrates, after protesting against long speeches, has here delivered one longer by far than the first speech of Protagoras, and more than half as long as the second, which contains a large theory—nor upon the sort of interpretation that he bestows upon the Simonidean song. That interpretation is so strange and forced—so violent in distorting the meaning of the poet—so evidently predetermined by the resolution to find Platonic metaphysics in a lyric effusion addressed to a Thessalian prince⁵—that if such an expo-

Character of this speech—its connection with the dialogue, and its general purpose. Sokrates inferior to Protagoras in continuous speech.

¹ Plat. Prot. p. 342.

² Plat. Prot. p. 342 E, 343 B-C. Ὅτι οὗτος ὁ τρόπος ἦν τῶν παλαιῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας, βραχυλογία τις λακωνική.

³ Plat. Prot. pp. 344-347.

⁴ Plat. Prot. p. 347.

⁵ Especially his explanation of ἐκείνη ἰδέη (p. 345 D.). Heyne (Opuscula, i. p. 160) remarks upon the strange interpretation given by Sokrates of the Simonidean song. Compare Plato in Lysis, p. 212 E, and in Alkib. ii. p. 147 D. In both these cases, Sokrates cites passages of poetry, assigning to them a sense which their authors

plainly did not intend them to bear. Heindorf in his note on the Lysis (l. c.) observes—"Videlicet, ut extat sententia, quam Solon ne somniavit quidem, versuum horum structuram, neglecto planè sermonis usu, hanc statuit.—Cujusmodi interpretationis aliud est luculentum exemplum in Alcib. ii. p. 147 D."

See also Heindorf's notes on the Charmides, p. 163 B; Lachés, p. 191 B; and Lysis, p. 214 D.

M. Boeckh observes (ad Pindar. Isthm. v. p. 528) respecting an allusion made by Pindar to Hesiod—

sition had been found under the name of Protagoras, critics would have dwelt upon it as an additional proof of dishonest perversions by the Sophists.¹ It appears as if Plato, intending in this dialogue to set out the contrast between long or continuous speech (sophistical, rhetorical, poetical) represented by Protagoras, and short, interrogatory speech (dialectical) represented by Sokrates—having moreover composed for Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue, an harangue claiming venerable antiquity for his own accomplishment—has thought it right to compose for Sokrates a pleading with like purpose, to put the two accomplishments on a par. And if that pleading includes both pointless irony and misplaced comparisons (especially what is said about the Spartans)—we must remember that Sokrates has expressly renounced all competition with Protagoras in continuous speech, and that he is here handling the weapon in which he is confessedly inferior. Plato secures a decisive triumph to dialectic, and to Sokrates as representing it: but he seems content here to leave Sokrates on the lower ground as a rhetorician.

Moreover, when Sokrates intends to show himself off as a master of poetical lore (*περὶ ἐπῶν δεινός*), he at the same time claims a right of interpreting the poets in his own way. He considers the poets either as persons divinely inspired, who speak fine things without rational understanding (we have seen this in the *Apology* and the *Ion*)—or as men of superior wisdom, who deliver valuable truth lying beneath the surface, and not discernible by vulgar eyes. Both these views differ from that of literal interpretation, which is here represented by Protagoras and Prodikus. And these two Sophists are here contrasted with Sokrates as interpreters of the poets. Protagoras and Prodikus look upon poetical compositions as sources of instruc-

Sokrates depreciates the value of debates on the poets. Their meaning is always disputed, and you can never ask from themselves what it is. Protagoras consents reluctantly to resume the task of answering.

"Num malé intellexit poeta intelligentissimus perspicua verba Hesiodi? Non credo: sed bene sciens, consulto alium sensum intulit, suo consilio accommodatum! Simile exemplum offert gravissimus auctor Plato Theætet. p. 155 D." Stallbaum in his note on the *Theætetus* adopts this remark of

Boeckh. Groen van Prinsterer gives a similar opinion. (*Prosopographia Platonica*, p. 17.)

¹ K. F. Hermann observes (*Gesch. der Plat. Philos.* p. 460) that Sokrates, in his interpretation of the Simonidean song, shows that he can play the Sophist as well as other people can.

tion: and seek to interpret them literally, as an intelligent hearer would have understood them when they were sung or recited for the first time. Towards that end, discrimination of the usual or grammatical meaning of words was indispensable. Sokrates, on the contrary, disregards the literal interpretation, derides verbal distinctions as useless, or twists them into harmony with his own purpose: Simonides and other poets are considered as superior men, and even as inspired men—in whose verses wisdom and virtue *must* be embodied and discoverable¹—only that they are given in an obscure and enigmatical manner: requiring to be extracted by the divination of the philosopher, who alone knows what wisdom and virtue are. It is for the philosopher to show his ingenuity by detecting the traces of them. This is what Sokrates does with the song of Simonides. He discovers in it supposed underlying thoughts (*ὑπονοίας*):² distinctions of Platonic Metaphysics (between *εἶναι* and *γενέσθαι*), and principles of Platonic Ethics (*οὐδεὶς ἔκων κακός*)—he proceeds to point out passages in which they are to be found, and explains the song conformably to them, in spite of much violence to the obvious meaning and verbal structure.³ But though Sokrates accepts, when required, the task of discussing what is said by the poets, and deals with them according to his own point of view—yet he presently lets us see that they are witnesses called into

¹ See Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 245 A-B; *Apol.* p. 22 B-C; *Ion*, pp. 533-534.

Compare the distinction drawn in *Timæus*, p. 72 A-B, between the *μάρτυς* and the *σποδάρης*.

² About the *ὑπονοίας* ascribed to the poets, see *Repub.* ii. p. 378 D.; *Xen. Sympos.* iii. 6; and F. A. Wolf, *Prolegom.* Homer. p. cxcii-cxciv.

F. A. Wolf remarks, respecting the various allegorical interpretations of Homer and other Greek poets—

“Sed nec prioribus illis, sive allegorica et anagogica somnia sua ipse crediderunt, sive ab aliis duntaxat credi voluerunt, idonea deest excusatio. Ita enim ratio comparata est, ut libris, quos a teneris statim annis cognoscimus, omnes propè nostras nostræque ætatis opiniones subiciamus: ac si illi jampridem populari usu consecrati sunt, ipsa obstat veneratio, quominus in his absurda et ridicula inesse credamus. Lenimus ergo atque adeo ornatus interpretando, quicquid proprio

sensu non ferendum videtur. Atque ita factum est omni tempore in libris his, qui pro sacris habiti sunt.”

The distinction was similar in character, and even more marked in respect of earnest reciprocal antipathy, between the different schools of the Jews in Alexandria and Palestine about the interpretation of the Pentateuch. 1. Those who interpreted literally, *κατὰ τὴν μάτην διάνοιαν*. 2. Those who set aside the literal interpretation, and explained the text upon a philosophy of their own, above the reach of the vulgar (Eusebius, *Præp. Ev.* viii. 10). Some admitted both the two interpretations, side by side.

Respecting these allegorising schools of the Hellenistic Jews, from Aristobolus (150 B.C.) down to Philo, see the learned and valuable work of Gfrörer—*Philo und die Jüd.-Alexandr. Theosophie*, vol. i. pp. 84-86, ii. p. 356 seq.

³ Plat. *Prot.* p. 345.

court by his opponent and not by himself. Alkibiades urges that the debate which had been interrupted shall be resumed and Sokrates himself requests Protagoras to consent. "To debate about the compositions of poets" (says Sokrates), "is to proceed as silly and common-place men do at their banquets: where they cannot pass the time without hiring musical or dancing girls. Noble and well-educated guests, on the contrary, can find enough to interest them in their own conversation, even if they drink ever so much wine.¹ Men such as we are, do not require to be amused by singers—nor to talk about the poets, whom no one can ask what they mean; and who, when cited by different speakers, are affirmed by one to mean one thing, and by another to mean something else, without any decisive authority to appeal to. Such men as you and I ought to lay aside the poets, and test each other by colloquy of our own. If you wish to persist in questioning, I am ready to answer: if not, consent to answer me, and let us bring the interrupted debate to a close."²

In spite of this appeal, Protagoras is still unwilling to resume, and is only forced to do so by a stinging taunt from Alkibiades, enforced by requests from Kallias and others. He is depicted as afraid of Sokrates, who, as soon as consent is given, recommences the discussion by saying—"Do not think, Protagoras, that I have any other purpose in debating, except to sift through and through, in conjunction with you, difficulties which puzzle my own mind. Two of us together can do more in this way than any one singly."³

Purpose of Sokrates to sift difficulties which he really feels in his own mind. Importance of a colloquial companion for this purpose.

¹ Plato, Prot. p. 347 D. *καὶ πάντων οἶνον πίνουσιν*—a phrase which will be found suitably illustrated by the persistent dialectic of Sokrates, even at the close of the Platonic Symposium, after he has swallowed an incredible quantity of wine.

² Plat. Prot. pp. 347-348. This remark—that the poet may be interpreted in many different ways, and that you cannot produce him in court to declare or defend his own meaning—is highly significant, in regard to the value set by Sokrates on living conversation and dialectic.

³ Plat. Prot. p. 348 C. *μὴ οἶον διαλέγεσθαι μέ σοι ἄλλο τι βουλούμενον*

ἢ ἂ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ, ἐκάστοτε ταῦτα διασκέψασθαι.

The remark here given should be carefully noted in appreciating the Socratic frame of mind. The cross-examination which he bestows, is not that of one who himself knows—and who only gets up artificial difficulties to ascertain whether others know as much as he does. On the contrary, it proceeds from one who is himself puzzled; and that which puzzles him he states to others, and debates with others, as affording the best chance of clearing up his own ideas and obtaining a solution.

The grand purpose with Sokrates is

"We are all more fertile and suggestive, with regard to thought, word, and deed, when we act in couples. If a man strikes out anything new by himself, he immediately goes about looking for a companion to whom he can communicate it, and with whom he can jointly review it. Moreover, you are the best man that I know for this purpose, especially on the subject of virtue: for you are not only virtuous yourself, but you can make others so likewise, and you proclaim yourself a teacher of virtue more publicly than any one has ever done before. Whom can I find so competent as you, for questioning and communication on these very subjects?"¹

After this eulogy on dialectic conversation (illustrating still farther the main purpose of the dialogue), Sokrates resumes the argument as it stood when interrupted. *Sokr.*—You, Protagoras, said that intelligence, moderation, justice, holiness, courage, were all parts of virtue; but each different from the others, and each having a separate essence and properties of its own. Do you still adhere to that opinion? *Prot.*—I now think that the first four are tolerably like and akin to each other, but that courage is very greatly different from all the four. The proof is, that you will find many men pre-eminent for courage, but thoroughly unjust, unholy, intemperate, and stupid.² *Sokr.*—Do you consider that all virtue, and each separate part of it, is fine and honourable? *Prot.*—I consider it in the highest degree fine and honourable: I must be mad to think otherwise.³

Sokrates then shows that the courageous men are confident men, forward in dashing at dangers, which people in general will not affront: that men who dive with confidence into the water, are those who know how to swim; men who go into battle with confidence as

to bring into clear daylight the difficulties which impede the construction of philosophy or "reasoned truth," and to sift them thoroughly, instead of slurring them over or hiding them.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 348-349.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 349 D. τὰ μὲν τέτταρα αὐτῶν εὖ τιμῶνται, ἀλλ' ἄλλως δὲ ὅτιν, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρεία πάντων πολλὰ

διαφέρειν πάντων τούτων.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 349 E. κάλλιον μὲν οὖν, εἰ μὴ μαινομαι γὰρ. ὅλον που καλὸν ὡς οἷόν τε μάλιστα.

It is not unimportant to notice such declarations as this, put by Plato into the mouth of Protagoras. They tend to show that Plato did not seek (as many of his commentators do) to depict Protagoras as a corruptor of the public mind.

horse-soldiers or light infantry, are those who understand their profession as such. If any men embark in these dangers, without such preliminary knowledge, do you consider them men of courage? Not at all (says Protagoras), they are madmen: courage would be a dishonourable thing, if *they* were reckoned courageous.¹ Then (replies Sokrates) upon this reasoning, those who face dangers confidently, with preliminary knowledge, are courageous: those who do so without it, are madmen. Courage therefore must consist in knowledge or intelligence?² Protagoras declines to admit this, drawing a distinction somewhat confused:³ upon which Sokrates approaches the same argument from a different point.

or intelligence. Protagoras does not admit this. Sokrates changes his attack.

Sokr.—You say that some men live well, others badly. Do you think that a man lives well if he lives in pain and distress? *Prot.*—No. *Sokr.*—But if he passes his life pleasantly until its close, does he not then appear to you to have lived well? *Prot.*—I think so. *Sokr.*—To live pleasantly therefore is good: to live disagreeably is evil. *Prot.*—Yes: at least provided he lives taking pleasure in fine or honourable things.⁴ *Sokr.*—What! do you concur with the generality of people in calling some pleasurable things evil, and some painful things good? *Prot.*—That is my opinion. *Sokr.*—But are not all pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, to that extent good, unless some consequences of a different sort result from them? And again, subject to the like limitation, are not all painful things evil, so far forth as they are painful? *Prot.*—To that question, absolutely as you put it, I do not know whether I can reply affirmatively—that all pleasurable things are good, and all painful things evil. I think it safer—with reference not merely to the present answer, but to my manner of life generally—to say, that there are some pleasurable things which are good, others which are not good—some painful things which are evil, others which are not evil: again, some which are neither, neither

Identity of the pleasurable with the good—of the painful with the evil. Sokrates maintains it. Protagoras denies. Debate.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 350 B. *Αἰσχρὸν μὲν' ἂν, ἔφη, εἶη, ἢ ἀνδρεία· ἐπεὶ οὐτοὶ γε μαυρόμενοί εἰσιν.*

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 350 C.

³ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 350-351.

⁴ Plat. *Prot.* p. 351 C. *Τὸ μὲν ἀγαθόν, ἡδύς, ἀγαθόν, τὸ δ' ἀπῶς, κακόν; εἴπερ τοῖς καλοῖς γ', ἔφη, ζῆται ἡδόμενος.*

good nor evil.¹ *Sokr.*—You call those things pleasurable, which either partake of the nature of pleasure, or cause pleasure? *Prot.*—Unquestionably. *Sokr.*—When I ask whether pleasurable things are not good, in so far forth as pleasurable—I ask in other words, whether pleasure itself be not good? *Prot.*—As you observed before, Sokrates,² let us examine the question on each side, to see whether the pleasurable and the good be really the same.

Sokr.—Let us penetrate from the surface to the interior of the question.³ What is your opinion about knowledge? Do you share the opinion of mankind generally about it, as you do about pleasure and pain? Mankind regard knowledge as something neither strong nor directive nor dominant. Often (they say), when knowledge is in a man, it is not knowledge which governs him, but something else—passion, pleasure, pain, love, fear—all or any of which overpower knowledge, and drag it round about in their train like a slave. Are you of the common opinion on this point also?⁴ Or do you believe that knowledge is

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 351 D. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν νῦν ἀπόκρισιν ἐμοὶ ἀσφαλτέστερον εἶναι ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς πάντα τὸν ἄλλον βίον τὸν ἐμόν, ὅτι ἐστὶ μὲν ἡ τῶν ἡδῶν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὰ, ἐστὶ δ' αὖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀνιάρων οὐκ ἐστὶ κακά, ἐστὶ δ' ἡ ἐστὶ, καὶ τρίτον ἡ οὐδέτερον, οὔτε κακὰ οὔτ' ἀγαθὰ.

These words strengthen farther what I remarked in a recent note, about the character which Plato wished to depict in Protagoras, so different from what is imputed to that Sophist by the Platonic commentators.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 351 E. ὥσπερ οὐ λόγῳ, ἐκείνοτε, ἢ Σώκρατες, σκοπεύεσθαι.

This is an allusion to the words used by Sokrates not long before,—ἡ αὐτὸς ἀπορῶ ἐκείνοτε ταῦτα διασκώμεσθαι, p. 348 C.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 352 A.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 352 B-C. πότερον καὶ τοῦτο σοὶ δοκεῖ ὥσπερ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλως; . . . διανοούμενοι περὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὥσπερ περὶ ἀνθρώπων, περιελκόμενης ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων. Aristotle in the *Nikomachean Ethics* cites and criticises the opinion of

Sokrates, wherein the latter affirmed the irresistible supremacy of knowledge, when really possessed, over all passions and desires. Aristotle cites it with the express phraseology and illustration contained in this passage of the Protagoras. Ἐπιστάμενον μὲν οὖν οὐ φασὶ τινες οὐδὲν τε εἶναι (ἀκρατεύεσθαι). δεῖνόν γάρ, ἐπιστήμης ἐνούσης, ὥς ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἄλλο τι κρατεῖν, καὶ περιέλκειν αὐτὴν ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπων. Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ ὅλως ἐμάχετο πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ὥς οὐκ οὕτως ἀκρασίας· οὐθένα γὰρ ὑπολαμβάνοντα, πρᾶττεν παρὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀγνοίαν (*Ethic. N. vii. 2, vii. 3, p. 1145, b. 24*). The same metaphor *περιέλκεται ἐπιστήμη* is again ascribed to Sokrates by Aristotle, a little farther on in the same treatise, p. 1147, b. 15.

We see from hence that when Aristotle comments upon the doctrine of Sokrates, what he here means is, the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates in the Protagoras; the citation of this particular metaphor establishes the identity.

In another passage of the *Nikom. Eth.*, Aristotle also cites a fact respecting the Sophist Protagoras, which fact

an honourable thing, and made to govern man : and that when once a man knows what good and evil things are, he will not be over-ruled by any other motive whatever, so as to do other things than what are enjoined by such knowledge—his own intelligence being a sufficient defence to him? ¹ *Prot.*—The last opinion is what I hold. To me, above all others, it would be disgraceful not to proclaim that knowledge or intelligence was the governing element of human affairs.

Sokr.—You speak well and truly. But you are aware that most men are of a different opinion. They affirm that many who know what is best, act against their own knowledge, overcome by pleasure or by pain.

Prot.—Most men think so : incorrectly, in my judgment, as they say many other things besides. ² *Sokr.*

—When they say that a man, being overcome by food or drink or other temptations, will do things which he knows to be evil, we must ask them, On what ground do you call these things evil? Is it because they impart pleasure at the moment, or because they prepare disease, poverty, and other such things, for the future? ³ Most men would reply, I think, that

they called these things evil not on account of the present pleasure which the things produced, but on account of their ulterior consequences—poverty and disease being both of them distressing? *Prot.*—Most men would say this. *Sokr.*—It would

be admitted then that these things were evil for no other reason, than because they ended in pain and in privation of pleasure. ⁴

Prot.—Certainly. *Sokr.*—Again, when it is said that some good things are painful, such things are meant as gymnastic exercises, military expeditions, medical treatment. Now no one will say that these things are good because of the immediate suffering which they occasion, but because of the ulterior results of health,

is mentioned in the Platonic dialogue Protagoras—respecting the manner in which that Sophist allowed his pupils to assess their own fee for his teaching (*Ethic. Nik. ix. 1, 1164, a. 25*).

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 352 C. ἀλλ' ἱκανὴν εἶναι τὴν φρόνησιν βοηθεῖν τῷ ἀσθενέει.

² Plato, *Protag.* pp. 352-353.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 353 D. πονηρὰ δὲ

αὐτὰ πῇ φασκε εἶναι; πότερον δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ταύτην ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα παρέχει καὶ ἡδὺ ἔστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ἢ ὅτι εἰς τὸν ὑστερον χρόνον νόσους τε ποιεῖ καὶ πενίας καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. πολλὰ παρασκευάζει;

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 353 E. Οὐκοῦν φαίνεται. . . . δι' οὐδὲν ἄλλο ταῦτα κακὰ ὄντα, ἢ διότι εἰς ἀνίας τε ἀποτελευτῇ καὶ ἄλλων ἡδονῶν ἀποστρεφεί;

wealth, and security, which we obtain by them. Thus, these also are good for no other reason, than because they end in pleasures, or in relief or prevention of pain.¹ Or can you indicate any other end, to which men look when they call these matters evil? *Prot.*—No other end can be indicated.

Sokr.—It thus appears that you pursue pleasure as good, and

Pleasure is the only good—pain the only evil. No man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil. Difference between pleasures present and future—resolves itself into pleasure and pain.

avoid pain as evil. Pleasure is what you think good :

pain is what you think evil : for even pleasure itself appears to you evil, when it either deprives you of pleasures greater than itself, or entails upon you pains outweighing itself. Is there any other reason, or any

other ulterior end, to which you look when you pronounce pleasure to be evil? If there be any other reason, or any other end, tell us what it is.² *Prot.*—

There is none whatever. *Sokr.*—The case is similar about pains : you call pain good, when it preserves you from greater pains, or procures for you a future balance of pleasure. If there be any other end to

which you look when you call pain good, tell us what

it is. *Prot.*—You speak truly. *Sokr.*—If I am asked why I insist so much on the topic now before us, I shall reply, that it is no easy matter to explain what is meant by being overcome by pleasure ; and that the whole proof hinges upon this point—whether there is any other good than pleasure, or any other evil than pain ; and whether it be not sufficient, that we should go through life pleasurable and without pains.³ If this be sufficient, and if no other good or evil can be pointed out, which does not end in pleasures and pains, mark the consequences. Good and evil being identical with pleasurable and painful, it is ridiculous to say that a man does evil voluntarily, knowing it to be evil, under the overpowering influence of pleasure : that is, under the

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 354 B-C. Ταῦτα δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἵσται δὲ ἄλλο τι ἢ εἶναι εἰς ἡδονὰς ἀποτελεσντὶς καὶ λύπῃν ἀπαιλλεγνῆς καὶ ἀποτροπῆς ; ἢ ἔχει τι ἄλλο τέλος λέγειν, εἰς δὲ ἀποβλέψαντες αὐτὰ ἀγαθὰ καλεῖται, ἀλλ' ἢ ἡδονὰς τε καὶ λύπας ; οὐκ ἂν φαίην, ὡς ἀγῆμαι . . . Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν ἡδονὴν διώκετε ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὄν, τὴν δὲ λύπην φεύγετε ὡς κακόν ;

καλεῖται καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχετε ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔχετε. Οὐδ' ἔμοι δοκοῦσιν, ἔφη ὁ Πρωταγόρας.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 354 E. ἔπειτα ἂν τοῦτον εἰσὶ πᾶσαι αἱ ἀποδείξεις· ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τὴν ἀναβῆσθαι ἔχουσιν, εἰ περ ἔχετε ἄλλο τι φάναι εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἢ τὸ κακὸν ἄλλο τι ἢ τὴν ἀνίαν, ἢ ἀρκεῖ ὅμῳ τὸ ἡδύς καταβῆσθαι τὸν βίον ἂνεν λύπῃν ;

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 354 D. ἐπεὶ εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χεῖρειν κακόν

overpowering influence of good.¹ How can it be wrong, that a man should yield to the influence of good? It never can be wrong, except in this case—when the good obtained is of smaller amount than the consequent good forfeited or the consequent evil entailed. What other exchangeable value can there be between pleasures and pains, except in the ratio of quantity—greater or less, more or fewer?² If an objector tells me that there is a material difference between pleasures and pains of the moment, and pleasures and pains postponed to a future time, I ask him in reply, Is there any other difference, except in pleasure and pain? An intelligent man ought to put them both in the scale, the pleasures and the pains, the present and the future, so as to determine the balance. Weighing pleasures against pleasures, he ought to prefer the more and the greater: weighing pains against pains, the fewer and the less. If pleasures against pains, then when the latter outweigh the former, reckoning distant as well as near, he ought to abstain from the act: when the pleasures outweigh, he ought to do it. *Prot.*—The objectors could have nothing to say against this.³

Sokr.—Well then—I shall tell them farther—you know that the same magnitude, and the same voice, appears to you greater when near than when distant. Now, if all our well-doing depended upon our choosing the magnitudes really greater and avoiding those really less, where would the security of our life be found? In the art of mensuration, or in the apparent impression?⁴ Would not the latter lead us astray, causing us to vacillate and judge badly in our choice between great and little, with frequent repentance afterwards? Would not the art of mensuration set aside these false appearances, and by revealing to us the truth, impart tranquillity to our minds and security to our lives? Would not the objectors themselves

Necessary resort to the measuring art for choosing pleasures rightly—all the security of our lives depends upon it.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 355 C.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 356 A. και τις ἄλλη ἀξία ἔχοντες πρὸς λύπην ἔστιν ἄλλ' ἢ υπερβολὴ ἀλλήλων καὶ ἑλλειψις; ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ μείζων τε καὶ σμικρότερα γινόμενα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πλείων καὶ ἐλάττω, καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 356 C.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 356 D. εἰ οὐν

ἐν τούτοις ἡμῖν ᾗ τὸ εὖ πράττειν, ἐν τῷ τὰ μὲν μεγάλα μέτρον καὶ πράττειν καὶ λαμβάνειν, τὰ δὲ σμικρὰ καὶ φεύγειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν, τίς ἐν ἡμῖν σωτηρία ἐφάνη τοῦ βίου; ἀρα ἡ μετρητικὴ τέχνη, ἣ ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις; . . . Ἀρ' ἂν ὁμολογοίεν οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ταῦτα ἡμᾶς τὴν μετρητικὴν σῶζειν ἂν τέχνην, ἣ ἄλλην;

acknowledge that there was no other safety, except in the art of mensuration? *Prot.*—They would acknowledge it. *Sokr.*—Again, If the good conduct of our lives depended on the choice of odd and even, and in distinguishing rightly the greater from the less, whether far or near, would not our safety reside in knowledge, and in a certain knowledge of mensuration too, in Arithmetic? *Prot.*—They would concede to you that also. *Sokr.*—Well then, my friends, since the security of our lives has been found to depend on the right choice of pleasure and pain—between the more and fewer, greater and less, nearer and farther—does it not come to a simple estimate of excess, deficiency, and equality between them? in other words, to mensuration, art, or science?¹ What kind of art or science it is, we will enquire another time: for the purpose of our argument, enough has been done when we have shown that it is science.

For when *we* (Protagoras and Sokrates) affirmed, that nothing was more powerful than science or knowledge, and that this, in whatsoever minds it existed, prevailed over pleasure and every thing else—you (the supposed objectors) maintained, on the contrary, that pleasure often prevailed over knowledge even in the instructed man: and you called upon us to explain, upon our principles, what that mental affection was, which people called, being overcome by the seduction of pleasure. We have now shown you that this mental affection is nothing else but ignorance, and the gravest ignorance. You have admitted that those who go wrong in the choice of pleasures and pains—that is, in the choice of good and evil things—go wrong from want of knowledge, of the knowledge or science of mensuration. The wrong deed done from want of knowledge, is done through ignorance. What you call being overcome by pleasure is thus, the gravest ignorance; which these Sophists, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias, engage to cure: but you (the objectors whom we now address) not believing it to be ignorance, or

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 357 A-B. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁδοῦς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὁρθῇ τῇ αἰρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἢ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὐδὲν, τοῦ τε πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος καὶ μείζονος καὶ μικροτέρου καὶ

πρόβωτότερου καὶ ἐγγυτέρου, ἄρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδεείας οὐσα καὶ ἰσότητος ὕπὸς ἀλλήλων σκέψις; Ἄλλ' ἀνάγκη. Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ, ἀνάγκη δέητον τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη.

perhaps unwilling to pay them their fees, refuse to visit them, and therefore go on doing ill, both privately and publicly.¹

Now then, Protagoras, Prodikus, and Hippias (continues Sokrates), I turn to you, and ask, whether you account my reasoning true or false? (All of them pronounced it to be surpassingly true.) *Sokr.*—You agree, then, all three, that the pleasurable is good, and that the painful is evil :² for I take no account at present of the verbal distinctions of Prodikus, discriminating between the *pleasurable*, the *delightful*, and the *enjoyable*. If this be so, are not all those actions, which conduct to a life of pleasure or to a life free from pain, honourable? and is not the honourable deed, good and profitable?³ (In this, all persons present concurred.) If then the pleasurable is good, no one ever does anything, when he either knows or believes other things in his power to be better. To be inferior to yourself is nothing else than ignorance : to be superior to yourself, is nothing else than wisdom. Ignorance consists in holding false opinions, and in being deceived respecting matters of high importance. (Agreed by all.) Accordingly, no one willingly enters upon courses which are evil, or which he believes to be evil : nor is it in the nature of man to enter upon what he thinks evil courses, in preference to good. When a man is compelled to make choice between two evils, no one will take the greater when he might take the less.⁴ (Agreed to by all three.) Farther, no one will affront things of which he is afraid, when other things are open to him, of which he is not afraid : for fear is an expectation of evil, so that what a man fears, he of course thinks to be an evil,—and will not approach it willingly. (Agreed.)⁵

Sokr.—Let us now revert to the explanation of courage, given by Protagoras. He said that four out of the five parts of virtue were tolerably similar ; but that courage

Reasoning of Sokrates assented to by all. Actions which conduct to pleasure or freedom from pain, are honourable.

Explanation of courage.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 357 E.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 358 A. ὑπερφύως δίδασκεν ἀπασιν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὰ εὐρημύνα. Ὁμολογεῖτε ἀρα, ὅτι ἐγώ, τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἀναισθητὸν κακόν.

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 358 B. αἱ ἐπὶ τούτων πράξεις ἀπασαι ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀλύτου εἰναι καὶ ἡδέαι, ἀρ' οὐ καλὰι ; καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἔργον, ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ ὠφέλιμον ;

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 358 C-D. ἐπὶ γὰρ τὰ κακὰ οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἔρχεται, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ τὰ οἰεται κακὰ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἐπὶ τούτῳ, ὡς δοκεῖ, ἐν ἀνθρώπων φύσει, ἐπὶ δὲ οἰεται κακὰ εἶναι ἐθέλειν ἵδναι ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν. ὅταν τε ἀναγκάσθῃ ὁμοῦ κακοῖν τὸ ἕτερον αἰρεῖσθαι, οὐδεὶς τὸ μείζον αἰρεῖσθαι, ἐξὸν τὸ ἐλαττον.

⁵ Plato, *Protag.* p. 358 E.

It consists in a wise estimate of things terrible and not terrible.

differed greatly from all of them. And he affirmed that there were men distinguished for courage; yet at the same time eminently unjust, immoderate, unholy, and stupid. He said, too, that the courageous men were men to attempt things which timid men would not approach. Now, Protagoras, what are these things which the courageous men alone are prepared to attempt? Will they attempt terrible things, believing them to be terrible? *Prot.*—That is impossible, as you have shown just now. *Sokr.*—No one will enter upon that which he believes to be terrible,—or, in other words, will go into evil knowing it to be evil: a man who does so is inferior to himself—and this, as we have agreed, is ignorance, or the contrary of knowledge. All men, both timid and brave, attempt things upon which they have a good heart: in this respect, the things which the timid and the brave go at, are the same.¹ *Prot.*—How can this be? The things which the timid and the brave go at or affront, are quite contrary: for example, the latter are willing to go to war, which the former are not. *Sokr.*—Is it honourable to go to war, or dishonourable? *Prot.*—Honourable. *Sokr.*—If it be honourable, it must also be good:² for we have agreed, in the preceding debate, that all honourable things were good. *Prot.*—You speak truly.³ I at least always persist in thinking so. *Sokr.*—Which of the two is it, who (you say) are unwilling to go into war; it being an honourable and good thing? *Prot.*—The cowards. *Sokr.*—But if going to war be an honourable and good thing, it is also pleasurable? *Prot.*—Certainly that has been admitted.⁴ *Sokr.*—Is it then knowingly that cowards refuse to go into war, which is both more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? *Prot.*—We cannot say so, without contradicting our preceding admissions. *Sokr.*—What about the courageous man? does not he affront or

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 359 D. ἐπὶ μὲν ἂν δεινὰ ᾔσθεται εἶναι οὐδεὶς ἔρχεται, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἦντα εἶναι αὐτοῦ εὐρέτη ἀμαθία οὖσα. Ὁμολόγει. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπὶ ἃ γε θαρροῦσι πάντες αὐτὸν ἔρχονται, καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι, καὶ ταῦτα γε ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἔρχονται οἱ δειλοὶ τε καὶ οἱ ἀνδρείοι.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 359 E. πότερον καλὸν ὃν εἶναι (εἰς τὸν πόλεμον) ἢ αἰσχρόν; Καλόν, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν, εἴπερ καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν ὁμολογήσαμεν ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-

προσθεν· τὰς γὰρ καλὰς πράξεις ἀπάντες ἀγαθὰς ὁμολογήσαμεν;

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 359 E. Ἀληθὲς λέγεις, καὶ αἰεὶ ἐμοί γε δοκεῖ οὕτως.

This answer, put into the mouth of Protagoras, affords another proof that Plato did not intend to impute to him the character which many commentators impute.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 360 A. Οὐκοῦν, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἴπερ καλόν καὶ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἥδ'; Ὁμολογεῖται γοῦν, ἔφη.

go at what is more honourable, better, and more pleasurable? *Prot.*—It cannot be denied. *Sokr.*—Courageous men then, generally, are those whose fears, when they are afraid, are honourable and good—not dishonourable or bad: and whose confidence, when they feel confident, is also honourable and good?¹ On the contrary, cowards, impudent men, and madmen, both fear, and feel confidence, on dishonourable occasions? *Prot.*—Agreed. *Sokr.*—When they thus view with confidence things dishonourable and evil, is it from any other reason than from ignorance and stupidity? Are they not cowards from stupidity, or a stupid estimate of things terrible? And is it not in this ignorance, or stupid estimate of things terrible, and things not terrible—that cowardice consists? Lastly,²—courage being the opposite of cowardice—is it not in the knowledge, or wise estimate, of things terrible and things not terrible, that courage consists?

Protagoras is described as answering the last few questions with increasing reluctance. But at this final question, he declines altogether to answer, or even to imply assent by a gesture.³ *Sokr.*—Why will you not answer my question, either affirmatively or negatively? *Prot.*—Finish the exposition by yourself. *Sokr.*—I will only ask you one more question. Do you still think, as you said before, that there are some men extremely stupid, but extremely courageous? *Prot.*—You seem to be obstinately bent on making me answer: I will therefore comply with your wish: I say that according to our previous admissions, it appears to me impossible. *Sokr.*—I have no other motive for questioning you thus, except the wish to investigate how the truth stands respecting virtue and what virtue is in itself.⁴ To determine this, is the way to elucidate

Reluctance of Protagoras to continue answering. Close of the discussion. Sokrates declares that the subject is still in confusion, and that he wishes to debate it again with Protagoras. Amicable reply of Protagoras.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 360 B. Οὐκοῦν ἴδως οἱ ἀνδρείοι οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φόβον φοβούνται, ὅταν φοβῶνται, οὐδὲ αἰσχρὰ θάρρος θάρρουν; . . . Εἰ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρὰ, ἀρ' οὐ καλὰ; . . . Εἰ δὲ καλὰ, καὶ ἀγαθὰ;

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 360 D. Οὐκοῦν ἡ τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν ἀμαθία δειλία ἐν εἴῃ; . . . Ἡ σοφία ἀρα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ μὴ δεινῶν, ἀνδρεία ἐστίν, ἐναντία οὐσα τῇ τούτων ἀμαθείᾳ;

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 360 D. οὐκέν τι ἐνταῦθα οὐτ' ἐπινοῦσαι ἠθέλησεν, εἰσὶγα τε.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* pp. 360-361. Οὗτοι ἄλλου ἔνεκα ἔρωτες πάντα ταῦτα, ἢ σέψασθαι βουλόμενος πῶς ποτ' ἔχει τὰ περὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς, καὶ τί ποτ' ἐστὶν αὐτὸ ἡ ἀρετὴ. Οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι τούτου φανεροῦ γενομένου μάλιστα ἂν κατὰβηλον γένοιτο ἐκεῖνο, περὶ οὗ ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ

the question which you and I first debated at length :—I, affirming that virtue was not teachable—you, that it was teachable. The issue of our conversation renders both of us ridiculous. For I, who denied virtue to be teachable, have shown that it consists altogether in knowledge, which is the most teachable of all things : while Protagoras, who affirmed that it was teachable, has tried to show that it consisted in every thing rather than knowledge :—on which supposition it would be hardly teachable at all. I therefore, seeing all these questions sadly confused and turned upside down, am beyond measure anxious to clear them up ;¹ and should be glad, conjointly with you, to go through the whole investigation—First, what Virtue is,—Next, whether it is teachable or not. It is with a provident anxiety for the conduct of my own life that I undertake this research, and I should be delighted to have you as a coadjutor.² Prot.—I commend your earnestness, Sokrates, and your manner of conducting discussion. I think myself not a bad man in other respects : and as to jealousy, I have as little of it as any one. For I have always said of you, that I admire you much more than any man of my acquaintance—decidedly more than any man of your own age. It would not surprise me, if you became one day illustrious for wisdom.

Such is the end of this long and interesting dialogue.³ We

Remarks on the dialogue. It closes without the least allusion to Hippokrates.

remark with some surprise that it closes without any mention of Hippokrates, and without a word addressed to him respecting his anxious request for admission to the society of Protagoras : though such request had been presented at the beginning, with much emphasis, as the sole motive for the interven-

μακρὸν λόγον ἐκείνους ἀπετείναμεν, ἐγὼ μὲν λέγων, ὅτι οὐ διδασκτὸν ἀρετὴ, σὺ δ' ὡς διδασκτὸν.

¹ Plato, Protag. p. 361 C. ἐγὼ οὖν πάντα ταῦτα καθορῶν ἀνω κάτω παραττόμενα δεινῶς, πᾶσαν προθυμίαν ἔχω καταφανῆ αὐτὰ γενέσθαι, καὶ βουλοίμην ἂν ταῦτα διεξελλθόντας ἡμᾶς ἐξελεσθῆναι καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν δεξιᾶν εἶναι.

² Plato, Protag. p. 361 D. προμηθεύμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἡμετέρου παντός.

³ Most critics treat the Protagoras as a composition of Plato's younger years—what they call his *first period*—before the death of Sokrates. They fix different years, from 407 B.C. (Arist.) down to 403 B.C. I do not agree with this view. I can admit no dialogue

tion of Sokrates. Upon this point¹ the dialogue is open to the same criticism as that which Plato (in the *Phædrus*) bestows on the discourse of Lysias : requiring that every discourse shall be like a living organism, neither headless nor footless, but having extremities and a middle piece adapted to each other.

In our review of this dialogue, we have found first, towards the beginning, an expository discourse from Protagoras, describing the maintenance and propagation of virtue in an established community : next, towards the close, an expository string of interrogatories by Sokrates, destined to establish the identity of Good with Pleasurable, Evil with Painful ; and the indispensable supremacy of the calculating or measuring science, as the tutelary guide of human life. Of the first, I speak (like other critics) as the discourse of Protagoras : of the second, as the theory of Sokrates. But I must again remind the reader, that both the one and the other are compositions of Plato ; both alike are offspring of his ingenious and productive imagination. Protagoras is not the author of that which appears here under his name : and when we read the disparaging epithets which many critics affix to his discourse, we must recollect that these epithets, if they were well-founded, would have no real application to the historical Protagoras, but only to Plato himself. He has set forth two aspects, distinct and in part opposing, of ethics and politics : and he has provided a worthy champion for each. Philosophy, or "reasoned truth," if it be attainable at all, cannot most certainly be attained without such many-sided handling : still less can that which Plato calls knowledge be attained—or such command of philosophy as will enable a man to stand a Sokratic cross-examination in it.

Two distinct aspects of ethics and politics exhibited : one under the name of Protagoras ; the other, under that of Sokrates.

In the last speech of Sokrates in the dialogue,² we find him proclaiming, that the first of all problems to be solved was, What virtue really is? upon which there prevails serious confusion of opinions. It was a second question—important, yet still second and presupposing the solution of the first—Whether virtue is teachable? We

Order of ethical problems as conceived by Sokrates.

earlier than 399 B.C. : and I consider the Protagoras to belong to Plato's full maturity.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 264 C. *δεῖν*

πάντα λόγον ὡς περ ζῶν συµπεσάναι, σῶμα τι ἔχοντα αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ, ὥστε μήτε ἀκέφαλον εἶναι μήτε ἄπουν, &c.

² Plato, *Protag.* p. 361 C.

noticed the same judgment as to the order of the two questions delivered by Sokrates in the Menon.¹

Now the conception of ethical questions in this order—the reluctance to deal with the second until the first has been fully debated and settled—is one fundamental characteristic of Sokrates. The difference of method, between him and Protagoras, flows from this prior difference between them in fundamental conception. What virtue is, Protagoras neither defines nor analyses, nor submits to debate. He manifests no consciousness of the necessity of analysis : he accepts the ground already prepared for him by King Nomos: he thus proceeds as if the first step had been made sure, and takes his departure from hypotheses of which he renders no account—as the Platonic Sokrates complains of the geometers for doing.² To Protagoras, social or political virtue is a known and familiar datum, about which no one can mistake : which must be possessed, in greater or less measure, by every man, as a condition of the existence of society : which every individual has an interest in promoting in all his neighbours : and which every one therefore teaches and enforces upon every one else. It is a matter of common sense or common sentiment, and thus stands in contrast with the special professional accomplishments ; which are confined only to a few—and the possessors, teachers, and learners of which are each an assignable section of the society. The parts or branches of virtue are, in like manner, assumed by him as known, in their relations to each other and to the whole. This persuasion of knowledge, without preliminary investigation, he adopts from the general public, with whom he is in communion of sentiment. What they accept and enforce as virtue, he accepts and enforces also.

¹ See the last preceding chapter of this volume, p. 240.

Upon this order, necessarily required, of the two questions, Schleiermacher has a pertinent remark in his general Einleitung to the works of Plato, p. 23. Eberhard (he says) affirms that the end proposed by Plato in his dialogues was to form the minds of the noble Athenian youth, so as to make them virtuous citizens. Schleiermacher

controverts the position of Eberhard ; maintaining "that this is far too subordinate a standing-point for philosophy,—besides that it is reasoning in a circle, since philosophy has first to determine what the virtue of a citizen is".

² See *supra*, vol. i. ch. viii. p. 255 and ch. xviii. p. 136, respecting these remarks of Plato on the geometers.

Again, the method pursued by Protagoras, is one suitable to a teacher who has jumped over this first step ; who assumes virtue, as something fixed in the public sentiments—and addresses himself to those sentiments, ready-made as he finds them. He expands and illustrates them in continuous lectures of some length, which fill both the ears and minds of the listener—"Spartam nactus es, hanc exorna": he describes their growth, propagation, and working in the community: he gives interesting comments on the poets, eulogising the admired heroes who form the theme of their verses, and enlarging on their admonitions. Moreover, while resting altogether upon the authority of King Nomos, he points out the best jewel in the crown of that potentate; the great social fact of punishment prospective, rationally apportioned, and employed altogether for preventing and deterring—instead of being a mere retrospective impulse, vindictive or retributive for the past. He describes instructively the machinery operative in the community for ensuring obedience to what they think right: he teaches, in his eloquent expositions and interpretations, the same morality, public and private, that every one else teaches: while he can perform the work of teaching, somewhat more effectively than they. Lastly, his method is essentially showy and popular; intended for numerous assemblies, reproducing the established creeds and sentiments of those assemblies, to their satisfaction and admiration. He is prepared to be met and answered in his own way, by opposing speakers; and he conceives himself more than a match for such rivals. He professes also to possess the art of short conversation or discussion. But in the exercise of this art, he runs almost involuntarily into his more characteristic endowment of continuous speech: besides that the points which he raises for discussion assume all the fundamental principles, and turn only upon such applications of those principles as are admitted by most persons to be open questions, not foreclosed by a peremptory orthodoxy.

Method of Protagoras. Continuous lectures addressed to established public sentiments with which he is in harmony.

Upon all these points, Sokrates is the formal antithesis of Protagoras. He disclaims altogether the capacities to which that Sophist lays claim. Not only he cannot teach virtue, but he professes not to know what it is,

Method of Sokrates. Dwells upon that part of

the problem nor whether it be teachable at all. He starts from a different point of view : not considering virtue as a known datum, or as an universal postulate, but assimilating it to a special craft or accomplishment, in which a few practitioners suffice for the entire public : requiring that in this capacity it shall be defined, and its practitioners and teachers pointed out. He has no common ground with Protagoras ; for the difficulties which he moots are just such as the common consciousness (and Protagoras along with it) overleaps or supposes to be settled. His first requirement, advanced under the modest guise of a small doubt¹ which Protagoras must certainly be competent to remove, is, to know—What virtue is ? What are the separate parts of virtue—justice, moderation, holiness, &c. ? What is the relation which they bear to each other and to the whole—virtue ? Are they homogeneous, differing only in quantity—or has each of them its own specific essence and peculiarity ?² Respecting virtue as a whole, we must recollect, Protagoras had discoursed eloquently and confidently, as of a matter perfectly known. He is now called back as it were to meet an attack in the rear : to answer questions which he had never considered, and which had never even presented themselves to him as questions. At first he replies as if the questions offered no difficulty ;³ sometimes he does not feel their importance, so that it seems to him a matter of indifference whether he replies in the affirmative or negative.⁴ But he finds himself brought round, by a series of questions, to assent to conclusions which he nevertheless thinks untrue, and which are certainly unwelcome. Accordingly, he becomes more and more disgusted with the process of analytical interrogation : and at length answers with such impatience and prolixity, that the interrogation can no longer be prosecuted. Here comes in the break—the remonstrance of Sokrates—and the mediation of the by-standers.

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 328 E. πλὴν σμικρὸν τί μοι ἐμποδῶν, ὃ δῆλον ὅτι Πρωταγόρας ῥηδίας ἐπεκιδάξει, &c.

² Respecting Aristotle of Chios, Diogenes Laertius tells us—Ἀρετὰς δ' οὔτε πολλὰς εἰσάγει, ὥς ὁ Ζήνων, οὔτε μίαν πολλοῖς ὀνόμασιν καλουμένην—ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πρὸς τί πως ἔχειν (Diog. Laert. vii. 161).

³ Plato, *Protag.* p. 329 D. ἄλλα ῥᾷδιον τοῦτό γ', ἐφ' ἣ, ἀποκρίνεσθαι, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Protag.* p. 331 D. εἰ γὰρ βούλει, ἔστω ἡμῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνη δόσιον καὶ δσιότης δίκαιον. Μὴ μοι, ᾗ δ' ἐγώ· οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ "εἰ βούλει" τοῦτο καὶ "εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ" ἐλέγχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἐμὲ τε καὶ σέ.

It is this antithesis between the eloquent popular lecturer, and the analytical enquirer and cross-examiner, which the dialogue seems mainly intended to set forth. Protagoras professes to know that which he neither knows, nor has ever tried to probe to the bottom. Upon this false persuasion of knowledge, the Sokratic Elenchus is brought to bear. We are made to see how strange, repugnant, and perplexing, is the process of analysis to this eloquent expositor: how incompetent he is to go through it without confusion: how little he can define his own terms, or determine the limits of those notions on which he is perpetually descanting.

Antithesis between the eloquent lecturer and the analytical cross-examiner.

It is not that Protagoras is proved to be wrong (I speak now of this early part of the conversation, between chapters 51-62—pp. 329-335) in the substantive ground which he takes. I do not at all believe (as many critics either affirm or imply) that Plato intended all which he composed under the name of Protagoras to be vile perversion of truth, with nothing but empty words and exorbitant pretensions. I do not even believe that Plato intended all those observations, to which the name of Protagoras is prefixed, to be accounted silly—while all that is assigned to Sokrates,¹ is admirable sense and acuteness. It is by no means certain that Plato intended to be understood as himself endorsing the opinions which he ascribes everywhere to Sokrates: and it is quite certain that he does not always make the Sokrates of one dialogue consistent with the Sokrates of another. For the purpose of showing the incapacity of the respondent to satisfy the exigencies of analysis, we need not necessarily suppose that the conclusion to which the questions conduct should be a true one. If the respondent be brought, through his own admissions, to a contradiction, this is enough to prove that he did not know the subject deeply enough to make the proper answers and distinctions.

Protagoras not intended to be always in the wrong, though he is described as brought to a contradiction.

But whatever may have been the intention of Plato, if we look at the fact, we shall find that what he has assigned to Sokrates is not always true, nor what he has given to

Affirmation of Protagoras about

¹ Schöne, in his Commentary on the Protagoras, is of opinion that a given under the name of Protagoras (Ueber den Protag. von Platon, p. 180 seq.).

courage is affirmed by Plato himself elsewhere.

Protagoras, always false. The positions laid down by the latter—That many men are courageous, but unjust: that various persons are just, without being wise and intelligent: that he who possesses one virtue, does not of necessity possess all:—are not only in conformity with the common opinion, but are quite true, though Sokrates is made to dispute them. Moreover, the arguments employed by Sokrates (including in those arguments the strange propositions that justice is just, and that holiness is holy) are certainly noway conclusive.² Though Protagoras, becoming entangled in difficulties, and incapable of maintaining his consistency against an embarrassing cross-examination, is of course exhibited as ignorant of that which he professes to know—the doctrine which he maintains is neither untrue in itself, nor even shown to be apparently untrue.

The harsh epithets applied by critics to Protagoras are not borne out by the dialogue. He stands on the same ground as the common consciousness.

As to the arrogant and exorbitant pretensions which the Platonic commentators ascribe to Protagoras, more is said than the reality justifies. He pretends to know what virtue, justice, moderation, courage, &c., are, and he is proved not to know. But this is what every one else pretends to know also, and what every body else teaches as well as he—"*Hæc Janus summus ab imo Perdocet: hæc recinunt juvenes dictata senesque*". What he pretends to do, beyond the general public, he really can do. He can discourse, learnedly and eloquently, upon these received doctrines and sentiments: he can enlist the feelings and sympathies of the public in favour of that which he, in common with the public, believes to be good—and against that which he and they believe to be bad:

¹ Plato, Protag. p. 329 E. Protagoras is here made to affirm that many men are courageous who are neither just, nor temperate, nor virtuous in other respects. Sokrates contradicts the position. But in the Treatise De Legibus (l. p. 680 B), Plato himself says the same thing as Protagoras is here made to say: at least assuming that the Athenian speaker in De Legg. represents the sentiment of Plato himself at the time when he composed that treatise.

² Plato, Protag. p. 330 C, p. 333 B.

To say "Justice is just," or "Holiness is holy," is indeed either mere tautology, or else an impropriety of speech. Dr. Hutcheson observes on an analogous case:—"None can apply moral attributes to the very faculty of perceiving moral qualities: or call his moral Sense morally Good or Evil, any more than he calls the power of tasting, sweet or bitter—or the power of seeing, straight or crooked, white or black" (Hutcheson on the Passions, sect. i. p. 234).

he can thus teach virtue more effectively than others. But whether that which is received as virtue, be really such—he has never analysed or verified : nor does he willingly submit to the process of analysis. Here again he is in harmony with the general public : for they hate, as much as he does, to be dragged back to fundamentals, and forced to explain, defend, revise, or modify, their established sentiments and maxims : which they apply as *principia* for deduction to particular cases, and which they recognise as axioms whereby other things are to be tried, not as liable to be tried themselves. Protagoras is one of the general public, in dislike of, and inaptitude for, analysis and dialectic discussion : while he stands above them in his eloquence and his power of combining, illustrating, and adorning, received doctrines. These are points of superiority, not pretended, but real.

The aversion of Protagoras for dialectic discussion—after causing an interruption of the ethical argument, and an interlude of comment on the poet Simonides—is at length with difficulty overcome, and the argument is then resumed. The question still continues, What is virtue? What are the five different parts of virtue? Yet it is so far altered that Protagoras now admits that the four parts of virtue which Sokrates professed to have shown to be nearly identical, really are tolerably alike : but he nevertheless contends that courage is very different from all of them, repeating his declaration that many men are courageous, but unjust and stupid at the same time. This position Sokrates undertakes to refute. In doing so, he lays out one of the largest, most distinct, and most positive theories of virtue, which can be found in the Platonic writings.

Aversion of Protagoras for dialectic. Interlude about the song of Simonides.

Virtue, according to this theory, consists in a right measurement and choice of pleasures and pains : in deciding correctly, wherever we have an alternative, on which side lies the largest pleasure or the least pain—and choosing the side which presents this balance. To live pleasantly, is pronounced to be good : to live without pleasure or in pain, is evil. Moreover, nothing but pleasure, or comparative mitigation of

Ethical view given by Sokrates—worked out at length clearly. Good and evil consist in right or wrong calculation.

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pain, is good : nothing but pain is evil.¹ Good, is identical with the greatest pleasure or least pain : evil, with the greatest pain : meaning thereby each pleasure and each pain when looked at along with its consequences and concomitants. The grand determining cause and condition of virtue is knowledge : the knowledge, science, or art, of correctly measuring the comparative value of different pleasures and pains. Such knowledge (the theory affirms), wherever it is possessed, will be sure to command the whole man, to dictate all his conduct, and to prevail over every temptation of special appetite or aversion. To say that a man who knows on which side the greatest pleasure or the least pain lies, will act against his knowledge—is a mistake. If he acts in this way, it is plain that he does not possess the knowledge, and that he sins through ignorance.

Protagoras agrees with Sokrates in the encomiums bestowed on the paramount importance and ascendancy of knowledge : but does not at first agree with him in identifying good with pleasure, and evil with pain.

¹ The substantial identity of Good with Pleasure, of Evil with Pain, was the doctrine of the historical Sokrates as declared in Xenophon's Memorabilia. See, among other passages, i. 6, 8. Τοῦ δὲ μὴ δουλεύειν γαστρὶ μηδὲ ὕπνῳ καὶ λαγνείᾳ, οἷα τι ἄλλο αἰτιά-
τερον εἶναι, ἢ τὸ ἔτετα ἔχειν τοῦτων ἡδῶν, ἃ οὐ μόνον ἐν χρεῖᾳ ὄντα εὐφραίνει, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡλικίας παρέχοντα ἀφελήσκειν δει; Καὶ μὲν τοῦτό γε οἶσθα, ὅτι οἱ μὲν οἰόμενοι μηδὲν εὖ πράττειν οὐκ εὐφραίνονται, οἱ δὲ φησόμενοι καλῶς προχωρεῖν ἑαυτοῖς, ἢ γεωργίαν ἢ ναυκληρίαν ἢ ἄλλ' ὅ, τι ἂν τυγχάνωσιν ἐργαζόμενοι, ὥς εὖ πράττοντες εὐφραίνονται. Οἷα οὐδ' ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων τοσαύτην ἡδονὴν εἶναι, ὅσην ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν τε φρεσθῆαι βέλτιον γίγνεσθαι καὶ φίλους ἀμείνους κατασθαι; Ἐγὼ τοίνυν διατελῶ ταῦτα νομίζων.

Locke says, 'Essay on Human Understanding,' Book ii. ch. 28, "Good or Evil is nothing but pleasure or pain to us—or that which procures pleasure or pain to us. Moral good or evil then is only the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law, whereby good or evil is drawn on us by the will and power of the law-maker; which good or evil, pleasure or pain, attending our observance or

breach of the law, is that we call reward or punishment."

The formal distinction here taken by Locke between pleasure and that which procures pleasure—both the one and the other being called Good—(the like in regard to pain and evil) is not distinctly stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though he says nothing inconsistent with it: but it is distinctly stated in the Republic, ii. p. 357, where Good is distributed under three heads. 1. That which we desire immediately and for itself—such as Enjoyment, Innocuous pleasure. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its consequences—health, intelligence, good sight or hearing, &c. 3. That which we do not desire (perhaps even shun) for itself, but which we accept by reason of its consequences in averting greater pains or procuring greater pleasures.

This discrimination of the varieties of Good, given in the Republic, is quite consistent with what is stated by Sokrates in the Protagoras, though it is more full and precise. But it is not consistent with what Sokrates says in the Gorgias, where he asserts a radical dissimilarity of nature between ἡδὴ and ἀγῶν.

Upon this point, too, he is represented as agreeing in opinion with the Many. He does not admit that to live pleasantly is good, unless where a man takes his pleasure in honourable things. He thinks it safer, and more consistent with his own whole life, to maintain—That pleasurable things, or painful things, may be either good, or evil, or indifferent, according to the particular case.

This doctrine Sokrates takes much pains to refute. He contends that pleasurable things, so far forth as pleasurable, are always good—and painful things, so far forth as painful, always evil. When some pleasures are called evil, that is not on account of any thing belonging to the pleasure itself, but because of its ulterior consequences and concomitants, which are painful or distressing in a degree more than counterbalancing the pleasure. So too, when some pains are pronounced to be good, this is not from any peculiarity in the pain itself, but because of its consequences and concomitants: such pain being required as a condition to the attainment of health, security, wealth, and other pleasures or satisfactions more than counterbalancing. Sokrates challenges opponents to name any other end, with reference to which things are called *good*, except their tendency to prevent or relieve pains and to ensure a balance of pleasure: he challenges them to name any other end, with reference to which things are called *evil*, except their tendency to produce pains and to intercept or destroy pleasures. In measuring pleasures and pains against each other, there is no other difference to be reckoned except that of greater or less, more or fewer. The difference between near and distant, does indeed obtrude itself upon us as a misleading element. But it is the special task of the "measuring science" to correct this illusion—and to compare pleasures or pains, whether near or distant, according to their real worth: just as we learn to rectify the illusions of the sight in regard to near and distant objects.

Sokrates proceeds to apply this general principle in correcting the explanation of courage given by Protagoras. He shows, or tries to show, that courage, like all the other branches of virtue, consists in acting on a just estimate of comparative pleasures and pains. No man affronts evil, or the alternative of greater pain, knowing it

Reasoning
of Sokrates.

Application
of that reason-
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courage.

to be such : no man therefore adventures himself in any terrible enterprise, knowing it to be so : neither the brave nor the timid do this. Both the brave and the timid affront that which they think not terrible, or the least terrible of two alternatives : but they estimate differently what is such. The former go readily to war when required, the latter evade it. Now to go into war when required, is honourable : being honourable, it is good : being honourable and good, it is pleasurable. The brave know this, and enter upon it willingly : the timid not only do not know it, but entertain the contrary opinion, looking upon war as painful and terrible, and therefore keeping aloof. The brave men fear what it is honourable to fear, the cowards what it is dishonourable to fear : the former act upon the knowledge of what is really terrible, the latter are misled by their ignorance of it. Courage is thus, like the other virtues, a case of accurate knowledge of comparative pleasures and pains, or of good and evil.¹

Such is the ethical theory which the Platonic Sokrates enunciates in this dialogue, and which Protagoras and the others accept. It is positive and distinct, to a degree very unusual with Plato. We shall find that

The theory which Plato here lays down is

¹ Compare, respecting Courage, a passage in the Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, which is better stated there (though substantially the same opinion) than here in the Protagoras.

The opinion of the Platonic Sokrates may be illustrated by a sentence from the funeral oration delivered by Periklēs, Thucyd. ii. 43, fin. 'Αλγεινότερα γὰρ ἀνδρὶ γὰρ φρόνημα ἔχοντι ἢ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦ μαλακισθῆναι κακώσις, ἢ ὁ μετὰ πόλεως καὶ κοινης ἐλπίδος ἀμα γυνόμενος ἀναισθητός θάνατος—which Dr. Arnold thus translates in his note : "For more grievous to a man of noble mind is the misery which comes together with cowardice, than the unfelt death which befalls him in the midst of his strength and hopes for the common welfare."

So again in the Phædon (p. 68) Sokrates describes the courage of the ordinary unphilosophical citizen to consist in braving death from fear of greater evils (which is the same view as that of Sokrates in the Protagoras), while the philosopher is courageous on a different principle ; aspiring only to

reason and intelligence, with the pleasures attending it, he welcomes death as releasing his mind from the obstructive companionship of the body.

The fear of disgrace and dishonour, in his own eyes and in those of others, is more intolerable to the brave man than the fear of wounds and death in the service of his country. See Plato, Leg. i. pp. 646-647. He is φοβερός μετὰ νόμον, μετὰ δίκης, p. 647 E. Such is the way in which both Plato and Thucydides conceive the character of the brave citizen as compared with the coward.

It is plain that this resolves itself ultimately into a different estimate of prospective pains ; the case being one in which pleasure is not concerned. That the pains of self-reproach and infamy in the eyes of others are among the most agonising in the human bosom, need hardly be remarked. At the same time the sentiments here conceived embrace a wide field of sympathy, comprising the interests, honour, and security, of others as well as of the individual agent.

he theorises differently in other dialogues ; whether for the better or the worse, will be hereafter seen. He declares here explicitly that pleasure, or happiness, is the end to be pursued ; and pain, or misery, the end to be avoided : and that there is no other end, in reference to which things can be called good or evil, except as they tend to promote pleasure or mitigate suffering, on the one side—to entail pain or suffering on the other. He challenges objectors to assign any other end. And thus much is certain—that in those other dialogues where he himself departs from the present doctrine, he has not complied with his own challenge. Nowhere has he specified a different end. In other dialogues, as well as in the Protagoras, Plato has insisted on the necessity of a science or art of calculation : but in no other dialogue has he told us distinctly what are the items to be calculated.

more distinct and specific than any theory laid down in other dialogues.

I perfectly agree with the doctrine laid down by Sokrates in the Protagoras, that pain or suffering is the End to be avoided or lessened as far as possible—and pleasure or happiness the End to be pursued as far as attainable—by intelligent forethought and comparison : that there is no other intelligible standard of reference, for application of the terms Good and Evil, except the tendency to produce happiness or misery : and that if this standard be rejected, ethical debate loses all standard for rational discussion, and becomes only an enunciation of the different sentiments, authoritative and self-justifying, prevalent in each community. But the End just mentioned is highly complex, and care must be taken to conceive it in its full comprehension. Herein I conceive the argument of Sokrates (in the Protagoras) to be incomplete. It carries attention only to a part of the truth, keeping out of sight, though not excluding, the remainder. It considers each man as an individual, determining good or evil for himself by calculating his own pleasures and pains : as a prudent, temperate, and courageous agent, but neither as just nor beneficent. It omits to take account of him as a member of a society, composed of many others akin or co-ordinate with himself. Now it is the purpose of an ethical or political reasoner (such as Plato both professes to be and really is) to study the means of happiness, not simply for the agent

Remarks on the theory here laid down by Sokrates. It is too narrow, and exclusively prudential.

himself, but for that agent together with others around him—for the members of the community generally.¹ The Platonic Sokrates says this himself in the Republic: and accordingly, he there treats of other points which are not touched upon by Sokrates in the Protagoras. He proclaims that the happiness of each citizen must be sought only by means consistent with the security, and to a certain extent with the happiness, of others: he provides as far as practicable that all shall derive their pleasures and pains from the same causes: common pleasures, and common pains, to all.² The doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras requires to be enlarged so as to comprehend these other important elements. Since the conduct of every agent affects the happiness of others, he must be called upon to take account of its consequences under both aspects, especially where it goes to inflict hurt or privation upon others. Good and evil depend upon that scientific computation and comparison of pleasures and pains which Sokrates in the Protagoras prescribes: but the computation must include, to a certain extent, the pleasures and pains (security and rightful expectations) of others besides the agent himself, implicated in the consequences of his acts.³

As to this point, we shall find the Platonic Sokrates not always correct, nor even consistent with himself. Comparison
with the
Republic. This will appear especially when we come to see the account which he gives of Justice in the Republic. In that branch of the Ethical End, a direct regard to the security of others comes into the foreground. For in an act of injustice, the prominent characteristic is that of harm done to others—though that is not the whole, since the security of the agent himself is implicated with that of others in the general fulfilment of these obligations. It is this primary regard to others, and secondary regard to self, implicated in one complex

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iv. pp. 420-421, v. p. 406 A.

² Plato, *Republ.* v. pp. 462 A-B-D, 464 A-D.

Throughout the first of these passages we see *ἀναδόν* used as the equivalent of *ἀπορί*, *κακόν* as the equivalent of *ἀσύν*.

³ See, especially on this point, the brief but valuable Tract on Utili-

tarianism by Mr. John Stuart Mill. In page 16 of that work attention is called to the fact, that in Utilitarianism the standard is not the greatest happiness of the agent himself alone, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether. So that we cannot with exactness call the doctrine of Sokrates, in his conversation with Protagoras, "the theory of Utilitarianism," as Mr. Mill calls it in page 1.

feeling—which distinguishes justice from prudence. The Platonic Sokrates in the Republic (though his language is not always clear) does not admit this; but considers justice as a branch of prudence, necessary to ensure the happiness of the individual agent himself.

Now in the Protagoras, what the Platonic Sokrates dwells upon (in the argument which I have been considering) is prudence, temperance, courage: little or nothing is said about justice: there was therefore the less necessity for insisting on that prominent reference to the security of others (besides the agent himself) which justice involves. If, however, we turn back to the earlier part of the dialogue, to the speech delivered by Protagoras, we see justice brought into the foreground. It is not indeed handled analytically (which is not the manner of that Sophist), nor is it resolved into regard to pleasure and pain, happiness and misery: but it is announced as a social sentiment indispensably and reciprocally necessary from every man towards every other (*δική—αἰδώς*), distinguishable from those endowments which supply the wants and multiply the comforts of the individual himself. The very existence of the social union requires, that each man should feel a sentiment of duties on his part towards others, and duties on their parts towards him: or (in other words) of rights on his part to have his interests considered by others, and rights on their parts to have their interests considered by him. Unless this sentiment of reciprocity—reciprocal duty and right—exist in the bosom of each individual citizen, or at least in the large majority—no social union could subsist. There are doubtless different degrees of the sentiment: moreover the rights and duties may be apportioned better or worse, more or less fairly, among the individuals of a society; thus rendering the society more or less estimable and comfortable. But without a certain minimum of the sentiment in each individual bosom, even the worst constituted society could not hold together. And it is this sentiment of reciprocity which Protagoras (in the dialogue before us) is introduced as postulating in his declaration, that justice and the sense of shame (unlike to professional aptitudes) must be distributed universally and without exception among all the members

The discourse of Protagoras brings out an important part of the whole case, which is omitted in the analysis by Sokrates.

of a community. Each man must feel them, in his conduct towards others: each man must also be able to reckon that others will feel the like, in their behaviour towards him.¹

If we thus compare the Ethical End, as implied, though not explicitly laid down, by Protagoras in the earlier part of the dialogue,—and as laid down by Sokrates in the later part—we shall see that while Sokrates restricts it to a true comparative estimate of the pains and pleasures of the agent himself, Protagoras enlarges it so as to include a direct reference to those of others also, coupled with an expectation of the like

The Ethical End, as implied in the discourse of Protagoras, involves a direct regard to the pleasures and pains of other

¹ Professor Bain (in his work on the Emotions and the Will, ch. xv. On the Ethical Emotions, pp. 271-5) has given remarks extremely pertinent to the illustration of that doctrine which Plato has here placed under the name of Protagoras.

"The supposed uniformity of moral distinctions resolves itself into the two following particulars. First, the common end of public security, which is also individual preservation, demands certain precautions that are everywhere very much alike, and can in no case be dispensed with. Some sort of constituted authority to control the individual impulses and to protect each man's person and property, must exist wherever a number of human beings live together. The duties springing out of this necessary arrangement are essentially the same in all societies. . . They have a pretty uniform character all over the globe. If the sense of the common safety were not sufficiently strong to constitute the social tie of obedience to some common regulations, society could not exist. . . It is no proof of the universal spread of a special innate faculty of moral distinctions, but of a certain rational appreciation of what is necessary for the very existence of every human being living in the company of others: Doubtless, if the sad history of the human race had been preserved in all its details, we should have many examples of tribes that perished from being unequal to the conception of a social system, or to the restraints imposed by it. We know enough of the records of anarchy, to see how difficult it is for human nature to comply in full with the social conditions of security;

but if this were not complied with at all, the result would be mutual and swift destruction. . . . In the second place, mankind have been singularly unanimous in the practice of imposing upon individual members of societies some observances or restraints of purely sentimental origin, having no reference, direct or indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the safeguards implied in it. Certain maxims founded in taste, liking, aversion, or fancy, have, in every community known to us, been raised to the dignity of authoritative morality; being rendered (so to speak) 'terms of communion,' and have been enforced by punishment. . . . In the rules, founded on men's sentiments, likings, aversions, and antipathies, there is nothing common but the fact that some one or other of these are carried to the length of public requirement, and mixed up in one code with the imperative duties that hold society together."

The postulate of the Platonic Protagoras—that *dike* and *aidos* must be felt to a certain extent in each man's bosom, as a condition to the very existence of society—agrees with the first of the two elements here distinguished by Mr. Bain, and does not necessarily go beyond it. But the unsystematic teaching and universal propagandism, which Protagoras describes as the agency whereby virtue is communicated, applies alike to both the two elements distinguished by Mr. Bain: to the factitious exigencies of King Nomos, as well as to his tutelary control. It is this mixed mass that the Sokratic analysis is brought to examine.

reference on the part of others.¹ Sokrates is satisfied with requiring from each person calculating prudence for his own pleasures and pains: while Protagoras proclaims that after this attribute had been obtained by man, and individual wants supplied, still there was a farther element necessary in the calculation—the social sentiment or reciprocity of regard implanted in every one's bosom: without this the human race would have perished. Prudence and skill will suffice for an isolated existence; but if men are to live and act in social communion, the services as well as the requirements of each man must be shaped, in a certain measure, with a direct view to the security of others as well as to his own.

In my judgment, the Ethical End, exclusively self-regarding, here laid down by Sokrates, is too narrow. And if we turn to other Platonic dialogues, we shall find Sokrates still represented as proclaiming a self-regarding Ethical End, though not the same as what we read in the Protagoras. In the Gorgias, Republic, Phædon, &c., we shall find him discountenancing the calculation (recommended in the Protagoras) of pleasures and pains against each other, as greater, more certain, durable, &c., and insisting that all shall be estimated according as they bear on the general condition or health of the mind, which he assimilates to the general condition or health of the body. The health of the body, considered as an End to be pursued, is essentially self-regarding: so also is the health of the mind. I shall touch upon this farther when I consider the above-mentioned dialogues: at present, I only remark that they agree with the Sokrates of the Protagoras in assuming a self-regarding Ethical End, though they do not agree with him in describing what that End should be.

The application which Sokrates makes (in the Protagoras) of his own assumed Ethical End to the explanation of courage, is certainly confused and unsatisfactory. And indeed, we may farther remark that the general result at which Plato seems to be aiming in this dialogue, viz.: That all the different virtues are at the bottom one and the same, and that he who pos-

persons besides the agent himself.

Plato's reasoning in the dialogue is not clear or satisfactory, especially about courage.

¹ Plato, Protag. pp. 321-322.

sesses one of them must also possess the remainder—cannot be made out even upon his own assumptions. Though it be true that all the virtues depend upon correct calculation, yet as each of them applies to a different set of circumstances and different disturbing and misleading causes, the same man who calculates well under one set of circumstances, may calculate badly under others. The position laid down by Protagoras, that men are often courageous but unjust—just, but not wise—is noway refuted by Plato. Nor is it even inconsistent with Plato's own theory, though he seems to think it so.

Some of the Platonic commentators maintain,¹ that the doctrine here explicitly laid down and illustrated by Sokrates, viz.: the essential identity of the pleasurable with the good, of the painful with the evil—is to be regarded as not serious, but as taken up in jest for the purpose of mocking and humiliating Protagoras. Such an hypothesis appears to me untenable; contradicted by the whole tenor of the dialogue. Throughout all the Platonic compositions, there is nowhere to be found any train of argument more direct, more serious, and more elaborate, than that by which Sokrates here proves the identity of good with pleasure, of pain with evil (p. 351 to end). Protagoras begins by denying it, and is only compelled to accept the conclusion against his own will, by the series of questions which he cannot otherwise answer.² Sokrates admits that the bulk of mankind are also opposed to it: but he establishes it with an ingenuity which is pronounced to be triumphant by all the

Doctrine of Stallbaum and other critics is not correct: That the analysis here ascribed to Sokrates is not intended by Plato as serious, but as a mockery of the sophists.

¹ See Brandis, *Gesch. d. Griech.-Röm. Phil.* Part II. sect. 114, note ² p. 458; Stallbaum, *Prolegom. ad Protag.* pp. 15-33-34.

So too Ficinus says in his *Argumentum to the Protagoras*: (p. 785) "Tum vero de bono et malo multa tractantur. Siquidem prudentia est scientia eligendi boni, malique vitandi. Ambigitur autem utrum bonum malumque idem sit penitus quod et voluptas et dolor. *Neque affirmatur id quidem omnino, neque manifestè omnino negatur.* De hoc enim in Gorgia Philoboe et alibi," &c.

When a critic composes an Argu-

ment to the Protagoras, he is surely under obligation to report faithfully and exactly what is declared by Sokrates in the Protagoras, whether it be consistent or not with the Gorgias and Philæbus. Yet here we find Ficinus misrepresenting the Protagoras, in order to force it into harmony with the other two.

² This is so directly stated that I am surprised to find Zeller (among many other critics) announcing that Plato here accepts for the occasion the *Standpunkt* of his enemies (Philos. der Griech. vol. II. p. 380, ed. 2nd).

hearers around.¹ The commentators are at liberty to impeach the reasoning as unsound; but to set it aside as mere banter and mockery, is preposterous. Assume it even to be intended as mockery—assume that Sokrates is mystifying the hearers, by a string of delusive queries, to make out a thesis which he knows to be untrue and silly—how can the mockery fall upon Protagoras, who denies the thesis from the beginning?² The irony, if it were irony, would be misplaced and absurd.

The commentators resort to this hypothesis, partly because the

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 358 A. ὑπερφύως ἰδοὺς ἅπασιν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὰ εἰρημένα.

² When Stallbaum asserts that the thesis is taken up by Sokrates as one which was maintained by Protagoras and the other Sophists (*Proleg.* p. 33), he says what is distinctly at variance with the dialogue, p. 351.

Schleiermacher maintains that this same thesis (the fundamental identity of good with pleasure, evil with pain) is altogether "unsokratic and un-platonic"; that it is handled here by Sokrates in a manner visibly ironical (sichtbar ironisch); that the purpose of the argument is to show the stupidity of Protagoras, who is puzzled and imposed upon by such obvious fallacies (*Einleitung zum Protag.* p. 230, bottom of p. 232), and who is made to exhibit (so Schleiermacher says, *Einl. zum Gorgias*, p. 14) a string of ludicrous absurdities.

Upon this I have to remark first, that if the stupidity of Protagoras is intended to be shown up, that of all the other persons present must be equally manifested; for all of them assent emphatically, at the close, to the thesis as having been proved (*Prot.* p. 358 A); next, that I am unable to see either the absurdities of Protagoras or the irony of Sokrates, which Schleiermacher asserts to be so visible. The argument of Sokrates is as serious and elaborate as any thing which we read in Plato. Schleiermacher seems to me to misconceive altogether (not only here but also in his *Einleitung zum Gorgias*, p. 10) the concluding argument of Sokrates in the *Protagoras*. To describe the identity between γῆν and ἀγᾶθόν as a "scheinbare Voraussetzung" is to depart from the plain meaning of words.

Again, Steinhart contends that Sokrates assumes this doctrine (identity of pleasure with good, pain with evil),

"not as his own opinion, but only hypothetically, with a sarcastic side-glance at the absurd consequences which many deduced from it—only as the received world-morality, as the opinion of the majority" (*Einleit. zum Protag.* p. 419). How Steinhart can find proof of this in the dialogue, I am at a loss to understand. The dialogue presents to us Sokrates introducing the opinion as his own, against that of Protagoras and against that of the multitude (p. 351 C). On hearing this opposition from Protagoras, Sokrates invites him to an investigation, whether the opinion be just; Sokrates then conducts the investigation himself, along with Protagoras, at considerable length, and ultimately brings out the doctrine as proved, with the assent of all present.

These forced interpretations are resorted to, because the critics cannot bear to see the Platonic Sokrates maintaining a thesis substantially the same as that of Eudoxus and Epikurus. Upon this point, K. F. Hermann is more moderate than the others; he admits the thesis to be seriously maintained in the dialogue—states that it was really the opinion of the historical Sokrates—and adds that it was also the opinion of Plato himself during his early Sokratic stadium, when the *Protagoras* (as he thinks) was composed (*Gesch. und Syst. der Plat. Phil.* pp. 462-463).

Most of the critics agree in considering the *Protagoras* to be one of Plato's earlier dialogues, about 403 B.C. Ast even refers it to 407 B.C. when Plato was about twenty-one years of age. I have already given my reasons for believing that none of the Platonic dialogues were composed before 399 B.C. The *Protagoras* belongs, in my opinion, to Plato's most perfect and mature period.

Grounds of
that doc-
trine. Their
insuffici-
ency.

doctrine in question is one which they disapprove —partly because doctrines inconsistent with it are maintained in other Platonic dialogues. These are the same two reasons upon which, in other cases, various dialogues have been rejected as not genuine works of Plato. The first of the two reasons is plainly irrelevant: we must accept what Plato gives us, whether we assent to it or not. The second reason also, I think, proves little. The dialogues are distinct compositions, written each with its own circumstances and purpose: we have no right to require that they shall be all consistent with each other in doctrine, especially when we look to the long philosophical career of Plato. To suppose that the elaborate reasoning of Sokrates in the latter portion of the Protagoras is mere irony, intended to mystify both Protagoras himself and all the by-standers, who accept it as earnest and convincing —appears to me far less reasonable than the admission, that the dialectic pleading ascribed to Sokrates in one dialogue is inconsistent with that assigned to him in another.

Subject is
professedly
still left un-
settled at
the close of
the dia-
logue.

Though there is every mark of seriousness, and no mark of irony, in this reasoning of Sokrates, yet we must remember that he does not profess to leave the subject settled at the close of the dialogue. On the contrary, he declares himself to be in a state of puzzle and perplexity. The question, proposed at the outset, Whether virtue is teachable? remains undecided.

CHAPTER XXIV.

GORGIAS.

ARISTOTLE, in one of his lost dialogues, made honourable mention of a Corinthian cultivator, who, on reading the Platonic Gorgias, was smitten with such vehement admiration, that he abandoned his fields and his vines, came to Athens forthwith, and committed himself to the tuition of Plato.¹ How much of reality there may be in this anecdote, we cannot say: but the Gorgias itself is well calculated to justify such warm admiration. It opens with a discussion on the nature and purpose of Rhetoric, but is gradually enlarged so as to include a comparison of the various schemes of life, and an outline of positive ethical theory. It is carried on by Sokrates with three distinct interlocutors—Gorgias, Polus, and Kalliklēs; but I must again remind the reader that all the four are only spokesmen prompted by Plato himself.² It may indeed be considered almost as three distinct dialogues, connected by a loose thread. The historical Gorgias, a native of Leontini in Sicily, was the most celebrated of the Grecian rhetors; an elderly man during Plato's youth. He paid visits to different cities in all parts of Greece, and gave lessons in rhetoric to numerous pupils, chiefly young men of ambitious aspirations.³

Persons who
debate in
the Gorgias.
Celebrity of
the historical
Gorgias.

¹ Themistius, Or. xxiii. p. 356, Dindorf. Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι καὶ Διόδορος. Ὁ δὲ γεωργὸς ὁ Κορινθίος τῷ Γοργίᾳ ἐντυγνόμενος—οὐκ αὐτῷ ἰκέσθαι Γοργίαν, ἀλλὰ τῷ λόγῳ ἐν Πλάτων ἔγραφεν ἐκ' ἐλέγχου τοῦ σοφιστοῦ—αὐτίκα ἀφίκεται τὸν ἄγρον καὶ τοὺς ἀμπελόους, Πλάτωνι ἐπέθηκε τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὰ ἐκείνου ἐστυνέρετο καὶ ἐφυσνέρετο· καὶ οὕτως ἔστιν ἐν τιμῇ Ἀριστοτέλους ἐν τῷ διαλόγῳ τῷ Κορινθίῳ.

Τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι καὶ Διόδορος καὶ ὁ Κελλικλῆς καὶ ὁ Γοργίας καὶ ὁ Πάλος, πάντες ταῦτ' ἐστὶ Πλάτων, πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦν αὐτῷ ἐρίσων τοὺς λόγους; Though Aristides asks reasonably enough, Who is ignorant of this?—the remarks of Stallbaum and others often imply forgetfulness of it.

² Aristides, Orat. xvi. p. 887, Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) is of opinion

³ Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Gorgias, vol. iii. p. 22) is of opinion

Sokrates and Chærephon are described as intending to come to a rhetorical lecture of Gorgias, but as having been accidentally detained so as not to arrive until just after it has been finished, with brilliant success. Kalliklès, however, the host and friend of Gorgias, promises that the rhetor will readily answer any questions put by Sokrates; which Gorgias himself confirms, observing at the same time that no one had asked him any new question for many years past.¹ Sokrates accordingly asks Gorgias what his profession is? what it is that he teaches? what is the definition of rhetoric? Not receiving a satisfactory answer, Sokrates furnishes a definition of his own: out of which grow two arguments of wide ethical bearing: carried on by Sokrates, the first against Polus, the second against Kalliklès. Both these two are represented as voluble speakers, of confident temper, regarding the acquisition of political power and oratorical celebrity as the grand objects of life. Polus had even composed a work on Rhetoric, of which we know nothing: but the tone of this dialogue would seem to indicate (as far as we can judge from such evidence) that the style of the work was affected, and the temper of the author flippant.

Here, as in the other dialogues above noticed, the avowed aim of Sokrates is—first, to exclude long speaking—next, to get the question accurately conceived, and answered in an appropriate manner. Specimens are given of unsuitable and inaccurate answers, which Sokrates corrects. The conditions of a good definition are made plain by contrast with bad ones; which either include much more than the thing defined, or set forth what is accessory and occasional in place of what is essential and constant. These tentatives and gropings to find a definition are always instructive,

that Plato composed the Gorgias shortly after returning from his first voyage to Sicily, 387 B.C.

I shall not contradict this: but I see nothing to prove it. At the same time, Schleiermacher assumes as certain that Aristophanes in the *Ekklesiazusæ* alludes to the doctrines published by Plato in his *Republic* (*Einleitung zum Gorgias*, p. 20). Putting these two statements together, the Gorgias would be later in date of composition than the *Republic*, which I hardly think

probable. However, I do not at all believe that Aristophanes in the *Ekklesiazusæ* makes any allusion to the *Republic* of Plato. Nor shall I believe, until some evidence is produced, that the *Republic* was composed at so early a date as 390 B.C.

¹ Plato, *Gorg.* pp. 447-448 A. The dialogue is supposed to be carried on in the presence of many persons, seemingly belonging to the auditory of the lecture which Gorgias has just finished, p. 455 C.

and must have been especially so in the Platonic age, when logical distinctions had never yet been made a subject of separate attention or analysis.

About what is Rhetoric as a cognition concerned, Gorgias?

Gorg.—About words or discourses. *Sokr.*—About what discourses? such as inform sick men how they are to get well? *Gorg.*—No. *Sokr.*—It is not then about all discourses? *Gorg.*—It makes men competent to speak: of course therefore also to think, upon the matters on which they speak.¹

Questions about the definition of Rhetoric. It is the artisan of persuasion.

Sokr.—But the medical and gymnastic arts do this likewise, each with reference to its respective subject: what then is the difference between them and Rhetoric? *Gorg.*—The difference is, that each of these other arts tends mainly towards some actual work or performance, to which the discourses, when required at all, are subsidiary: but Rhetoric accomplishes every thing by discourses alone.² *Sokr.*—But the same may be said about arithmetic, geometry, and other sciences. How are they distinguished from Rhetoric? You must tell me upon what matters the discourses with which Rhetoric is conversant turn; just as you would tell me, if I asked the like question about arithmetic or astronomy. *Gorg.*—The discourses, with which Rhetoric is conversant, turn upon the greatest of all human affairs. *Sokr.*—But this too, Gorgias, is indistinct and equivocal. Every man, the physician, the gymnast, the money-maker, thinks his own object and his own affairs the greatest of all.³ *Gorg.*—The function of Rhetoric, is to persuade assembled multitudes, and thus to secure what are in truth the greatest benefits: freedom to the city, political command to the speaker.⁴ *Sokr.*—Rhetoric is then the artisan of persuasion. Its single purpose is to produce persuasion in the minds of hearers? *Gorg.*—It is so.

Sokr.—But are there not other persons besides the Rhetor, who produce persuasion? Does not the arithmetical teacher, and every other teacher, produce persuasion?

The Rhetor produces belief without

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 449 E. Οὐκοῦν περὶ ὥσπερ λέγειν, καὶ φρονεῖν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 450 B-C. τῆς ῥητορικῆς. . . . πᾶσα ἡ πράξις καὶ ἡ κύρωσις διὰ λόγων ἐστίν.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 451-452.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 452 D. Ὅσπερ ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν, καὶ αἴτιον, ἅμα μὲν εὐθυερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἀρχεῖν ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει ἐκάστη.

knowledge. Upon what matters is he competent to advise? How does the Rhetor differ from them? What mode of persuasion does he bring about? Persuasion about what? *Gorg.*—I reply—it is that persuasion which is brought about in *Dikasteries*, and other assembled multitudes—and which relates to just and unjust.¹ *Sokr.*—You recognise that to have learnt and to know any matter, is one thing—to believe it, is another: that knowledge and belief are different—knowledge being always true, belief sometimes false? *Gorg.*—Yes. *Sokr.*—We must then distinguish two sorts of persuasion: one carrying with it knowledge—the other belief without knowledge. Which of the two does the Rhetor bring about? *Gorg.*—That which produces belief without knowledge. He can teach nothing. *Sokr.*—Well, then, Gorgias, on what matters will the Rhetor be competent to advise? When the people are deliberating about the choice of generals or physicians, about the construction of docks, about practical questions of any kind—there will be in each case a special man informed and competent to teach or give counsel, while the Rhetor is not competent. Upon what then can the Rhetor advise—upon just and unjust—nothing else?²

The Rhetor (says Gorgias) or accomplished public speaker, will give advice about all the matters that you name, and others besides. He will persuade the people and carry them along with him, even against the opinion of the special *Expert*. He will talk more persuasively than the craftsman about matters of the craftsman's own business. The power of the Rhetor is thus very great: but he ought to use it, like all other powers, for just and honest purposes; not to abuse it for wrong and oppression. If he does the latter, the misdeed is his own, and not the fault of his teacher, who gave his lessons with a view that they should be turned to proper use. If a man, who has learnt the use of arms, employs them to commit murder, this abuse ought not to be imputed to his master of arms.³

You mean (replies Sokrates) that he, who has learnt Rhetoric from you, will become competent not to teach, but to persuade

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 454 B.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 455 D.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 456-457.

the multitude :—that is, competent among the ignorant. He has acquired an engine of persuasion ; so that he will appear, when addressing the ignorant, to know more than those who really do know.¹

Thus far, the conversation is carried on between Sokrates and Gorgias. But the latter is now made to contradict himself—apparently rather than really—for the argument whereby Sokrates reduces him to a contradiction, is not tenable, unless we admit the Platonic doctrine that the man who has learnt just and unjust, may be relied on to act as a just man ;² in other words, that virtue consists in knowledge.

Polus now interferes and takes up the conversation : challenging Sokrates to furnish what *he* thinks the proper definition of Rhetoric. Sokrates obeys, in a tone of pungent polemic. Rhetoric (he says) is no art at all, but an empirical knack of catering for the pleasure and favour of hearers ; analogous to cookery.³ It is a talent falling under the general aptitude called Flattery ; possessed by some bold spirits, who are forward in divining and adapting themselves to the temper of the public.⁴ It is not honourable, but a mean pursuit, like cookery. It is the shadow or false imitation of a branch of the political art.⁵ In reference both to the body and the mind, there are two different conditions: one, a condition really and truly

Gorgias is now made to contradict himself. Polus takes up the debate with Sokrates.

Polemical tone of Sokrates. At the instance of Polus he gives his own definition of rhetoric. It is no art, but an empirical knack of catering for the immediate pleasure of hearers, analogous to cookery. It is a branch under the

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 450 B. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀπάσας τέχνας ὡσαύτως ἔχει ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ· αὐτὰ μὲν τὰ πράγματα οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὴν εἶδέναι ὥπως ἔχει, μηχανὴν δὲ τίνα πειθοῦς εὐρεῖναι, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τοῖς οὐκ εἰδόντι μᾶλλον εἶδέναι τὴν εἰδέναι.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 460 B. ὁ δὲ τὰ δίκαια μαμαθῆναι, δίκαιος. Aristotle notices this confusion of Sokrates, who falls into it also in the conversation with Euthydemus, Xenoph. Memorab. iv. 2, 20, iii. 9, 5.

³ Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 C. ἐμπειρία . . . χάριτος τινος καὶ ψευδὸς ἀπεργασίας. In the Philébus (pp. 55-56) Sokrates treats *ισχυρία* differently, as

falling short of the idea of *τέχνη*, and coming much nearer to what is here called *ἐμπειρία* or *στοχαστική*. Asklepiades was displeased with the Thracian Dionysius for calling *γραμματική* by the name of *ἐμπειρία* instead of *τέχνη*: see Sextus Empiric. adv. Grammat. s. 57-72, p. 615, Bekk.

⁴ Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 A. δοκίμοι εἶναι τι ἐπιτήδευμα, τεχνικὸν μὲν οὐ, ψυχῆς δὲ στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φύσει δεινῆς προσομιλεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· καλῶ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολεαίαν.

⁵ Plato, Gorgias, p. 463 D. πολιτικῆς μορίου εἰδωλον.

general head good—the other, good only in fallacious appearance, *flattery*. and not so in reality. To produce, and to verify, the really good condition of the body, there are two specially qualified professions, the gymnast or trainer and the physician: in regard to the mind, the function of the trainer is performed by the law-giving power, that of the physician by the judicial power. Law-making, and adjudicating, are both branches of the political art, and when put together make up the whole of it. Gymnastic and medicine train and doctor the body towards its really best condition: law-making and adjudicating do the same in regard to the mind. To each of the four, there corresponds a sham counterpart or mimic, a branch under the general head *flattery*—taking no account of what is really best, but only of that which is most agreeable for the moment, and by this trick recommending itself to a fallacious esteem.¹ Thus Cosmetic, or Ornamental Trickery, is the counterfeit of Gymnastic; and Cookery the counterfeit of Medicine. Cookery studies only what is immediately agreeable to the body, without considering whether it be good or wholesome: and does this moreover, without any truly scientific process of observation or inference, but simply by an empirical process of memory or analogy. But Medicine examines, and that too by scientific method, only what is good and wholesome for the body, whether agreeable or not. Amidst ignorant men, Cookery slips in as the counterfeit of medicine; pretending to know what food is *good* for the body, while it really knows only what food is *agreeable*. In like manner, the artifices of ornament dress up the body to a false appearance of that vigour and symmetry, which Gymnastics impart to it really and intrinsically.

The same analogies hold in regard to the mind. Sophistic is the shadow or counterfeit of law-giving: Rhetoric, of judging or adjudicating. The lawgiver and the judge aim at what is good for the mind: the Sophist and the Rhetor aim at what is agreeable to it. This dis-

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 464 C. τετρά- ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἑκαστον τῶν μορίων, ὅν δὲ τούτων οὐσῶν, καὶ αἰετὶ πρὸς τὸ πρὸς ποιεῖται εἶναι τούτο ἔκαστον· βελτίστον θεραπεύουσιν, τῶν μὲν τὸ καὶ τοῦ μὲν βελτίστον οὐδὲν φροντίζει, σῶμα, τῶν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ κολλεκτικῇ τῇ δὲ αἰετὶ ἡδίστην θηρεύεται τὴν ἀνομίαν αἰσθημένη, οὐ γινούσα λόγῳ ἀλλὰ στοχα- καὶ ἐξπατῇ, ὥστε δοκεῖ πλείστον εἶναι εἶναι.

inction between them (continues Sokrates) is true and real: though it often happens that the Sophist is, both by himself and by others, confounded with and mistaken for the lawgiver, because he deals with the same topics and occurrences: and the Rhetor, in the same manner, is confounded with the judge.¹ The Sophist and the Rhetor, addressing themselves to the present relish of an undiscerning public, are enabled to usurp the functions and the credit of their more severe and far-sighted rivals.

This is the definition given by Sokrates of Rhetoric and of the Rhetor. Polus then asks him: You say that Rhetoric is a branch of Flattery: Do you think that good Rhetors are considered as flatterers in their respective cities? *Sokr.*—I do not think that² they are considered at all. *Polus.*—How! not considered? Do not good Rhetors possess great power in their respective cities? *Sokr.*—No: if you understand the possession of power as a good thing for the possessor. *Polus.*—I do understand it so. *Sokr.*—Then I say that the Rhetors possess nothing beyond the very minimum of power. *Polus.*—How can that be? Do not they, like despots, kill, impoverish, and expel any one whom they please? *Sokr.*—I admit that both Rhetors and Despots can do what seems good to themselves, and can bring penalties of death, poverty, or exile upon

and mind—and the counterfeit arts, which pretend to the same, but in reality aim at immediate pleasure.

Questions of Polus. Sokrates denies that the Rhetor have any real power, because they do nothing which they really wish.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 465 C. διότι καὶ μὴν οὕτω φύσει· ὅτι δὲ ἐγγὺς ὄντων, φύρονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ ταῦτα σοφιστὰι καὶ ῥήτορες, καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσιν δὲ, τι χρῆσθαι οὐτε αὐτοὶ ἑαυτοῖς οὐτε οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι τοῦτοις.

It seems to me that the persons whom Plato here designates as being confounded together are, the Sophist with the lawgiver, the Rhetor with the judge or dikast; which is shown by the allusion, three lines farther on, to the confusion between the cook and the physician. Heindorf supposes that the persons designated as being confounded are, the Sophist with the Rhetor; which I cannot think to be the meaning of Plato.

² Plat. *Gorg.* p. 466 B. *Polus.* "Ἀρ'

οὐδ' ὁκοῦσί σοι ὡς κόλακες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι φαῦλοι νομίζεσθαι οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ῥήτορες; . . . *Sokr.* Οὐδὲ νομίζεσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν.

The play on words here—for I see nothing else in it—can be expressed in English as well as in Greek. It has very little pertinence; because, as a matter of fact, the Rhetors certainly had considerable importance, whether they deserved it or not. How little Plato cared to make his comparisons harmonise with the fact, may be seen by what immediately follows—where he compares the Rhetors to Despots? and puts in the mouth of Polus the assertion that they kill or banish any one whom they choose.

others : but I say that nevertheless they have no power, because they can do nothing which they really wish.¹

That which men wish (Sokrates lays down as a general proposition) is to obtain good, and to escape evil. Each separate act which they perform, is performed not with a view to its own special result, but with a view to these constant and paramount ends. Good things, or profitable things (for Sokrates alternates the phrases as equivalent), are wisdom, health, wealth, and other such things. Evil things are the contraries of these.² Many things are in themselves neither good nor evil, but may become one or the other, according to circumstances—such as stones, wood, the acts of sitting still or moving, &c. When we do any of these indifferent acts, it is with a view to the pursuit of good, or to the avoidance of evil : we do not wish for the act, we wish for its good or profitable results.

We do every thing for the sake of good : and if the results are really good or profitable, we accomplish what we wish : if the contrary, not. Now, Despots and Rhetors, when they kill or banish or impoverish any one, do so because they think it will be better for them, or profitable.³ If it be good for them, they do what they wish : if evil for them, they do the contrary of what they wish—and therefore have no power.

To do evil (continues Sokrates), is the worst thing that can happen to any one ; the evil-doer is the most miserable and pitiable of men. The person who suffers evil is unfortunate, and is to be pitied ; but much less unfortunate and less to be pitied than the evil-doer. If I have a concealed dagger in the public market-place, I can kill any one whom I choose : but this is no good to me, nor is it a proof of great power, because I shall be forthwith taken up and punished. The result is not profitable,

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 406 E. οὐδὲν γὰρ ποιεῖν ἂν βούλονται, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ποιεῖν μέντοι ὃ, τι ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 467 E. Οὐκοῦν λέγετε εἶναι ἀγαθὸν μὲν σοφίαν, τε καὶ ὑγίειαν καὶ πλοῦτον καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, κακὰ δὲ τὰναντία τούτων ; Ἐγὼ γε.

³ Plato, Gorgias, p. 468 B-C. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀποκτίνωμεν, εἰ τίς ἀποκτίνωμεν, . . . οἰόμενοι ἀμείνων εἶναι ἡμῖν ταῦτα ἢ μή ; . . . ἐπεὶ ἄρα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦσιν οἱ ποιοῦντες . . . τὰν μὲν ὠφέλιμα ἢ ταῦτα, βουλόμεθα πρᾶττειν αὐτά ; βλαβερὰ δὲ ὅττα, οὐ βουλόμεθα. . . . τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ βουλόμεθα, ὡς φησὶ σὺ, &c.

but hurtful : therefore the act is not good, nor is the power to do it either good or desirable.¹ It is sometimes good to kill, banish, or impoverish—sometimes bad. It is good when you do it justly : bad, when you do it unjustly.²

Polus.—A child can refute such doctrine. You have heard of Archelaus King of Macedonia. Is he, in your opinion, happy or miserable? *Sokr.*—I do not know : I have never been in his society. *Polus*.—Cannot you tell without that, whether he is happy or not? *Sokr.*—No, certainly not. *Polus*.—Then you will not call even the Great King happy? *Sokr.*—No : I do not know how he stands in respect to education and justice. *Polus*.—What ! does all happiness consist in that? *Sokr.*—I say that it does. I maintain that the good and honourable man or woman is happy : the unjust and wicked, miserable.³ *Polus*.—Then Archelaus is miserable, according to your doctrine? *Sokr.*—Assuredly, if he is wicked. *Polus*.—Wicked, of course ; since he has committed enormous crimes : but he has obtained complete kingly power in Macedonia. Is there any Athenian, yourself included, who would not rather be Archelaus than any other man in Macedonia? ⁴ *Sokr.*—All the public, with Nikias, Perikles, and the most eminent men among them, will agree with you in declaring Archelaus to be happy. I alone do not agree with you. You, like a Rhetor, intend to overwhelm me and gain your cause, by calling a multitude of witnesses : I shall prove my case without calling any other witness than yourself.⁵ Do you think that Archelaus would have been a happy man, if he had been defeated in his conspiracy and punished? *Polus*.—Certainly not : he would then have been very miserable. *Sokr.*—Here again I differ from you : I think that Archelaus, or any other wicked man, is under all circumstances miserable ; but he is less miserable, if afterwards punished, than he would be if

Comparison of Archelaus, usurping despot of Macedonia—*Polus* affirms that Archelaus is happy, and that every one thinks so—*Sokrates* admits that every one thinks so, but nevertheless denies it.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 400-470.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 470 C.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 470 E.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 471 B-C.

⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 472 B. 'Αλλ' ἔγω σοι εἰς ἀν σὺχ ὁμολογῶ. . . ἔγω δὲ

ἀν μὴ σὲ αὐτὸν εἶνα ὄντα μάρτυρα παράσχωμαι ὁμολογοῦντα περὶ ὧν λέγω, οὐδὲν εἰμαι ἄξιον λόγου πεπεράσθαι περὶ ὧν ἀν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ᾗ· οἷμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σοί, ἰδὼν μὴ ἐγὼ σοι μαρτυρῶ εἰς ἀν μόνος, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους πάντας τοὺτους χαίρειν εἶπε.

unpunished and successful.¹ *Polus*.—How say you? If a man, unjustly conspiring to become despot, be captured, subjected to torture, mutilated, with his eyes burnt out and with many other outrages inflicted, not only upon himself but upon his wife and children—do you say that he will be more happy than if he succeeded in his enterprise, and passed his life in possession of undisputed authority over his city—envied and extolled as happy, by citizens and strangers alike?² *Sokr*.—More happy, I shall not say: for in both cases he will be miserable; but he will be less miserable on the former supposition.

Sokr.—Which of the two is worst: to do wrong, or to suffer wrong? *Polus*.—To suffer wrong. *Sokr*.—Which of the two is the most ugly and disgraceful? *Polus*.—To do wrong. *Sokr*.—If more ugly and disgraceful, is it not then worse? *Polus*.—By no means. *Sokr*.—You do not think then that the good—and the fine or honourable—are one and the same; nor the bad—and the ugly or disgraceful? *Polus*.—No: certainly not. *Sokr*.—How is this? Are not all fine or honourable things, such as bodies, colours, figures, voices, pursuits, &c., so denominated from some common property? Are not fine bodies said to be fine, either from rendering some useful service, or from affording some pleasure to the spectator who contemplates them?³ And are not figures, colours, voices, laws, sciences, &c., called fine or honourable for the same reason, either for their agreeableness or their usefulness, or both? *Polus*.—Certainly: your definition of the fine or honourable, by reference to pleasure, or to good, is satisfactory. *Sokr*.—Of course therefore the ugly or disgraceful must be defined by the contrary, by reference to pain or to evil? *Polus*.—Doubtless.⁴ *Sokr*.—If therefore one thing be finer or

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 478 C.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 478 D.

³ Plat. *Gorg.* p. 474 D. *ἴδαν ἐν τῇ θεωρίᾳ χαίρειν ποιῇ τοὺς θεωροῦντας;*

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 474 E. *Sokr.* Καὶ μὴν τὰ γε κατὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, οὗ δῆπου ἐκτὸς τούτων ἔστι τὰ καλά, τοῦ ἡ ἀφ' ἐλ. μα εἶναι ἢ ἡδία ἢ ἀμφοτέρω. *Pol.* Οὐκ ἔμογε δεκκί. *Sokr.* Οὐκ οὖν καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων

κάλλος ἀσπύσας; *Pol.* Πάν γε καὶ καλῶς γε νῦν ὁρίζει, ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἔτε καὶ ἀγαθῶ ὁριζόμενος τὸ καλόν. *Sokr.* Οὐκ οὖν τὸ αἰσχροὺς τῷ ἑαυτοῦ, ἀσπῆ γε καὶ κακῶ; *Pol.* Ἀνάγκη.

A little farther on βλεβῆ is used as equivalent to κακόν. These words—καλόν, αἰσχροὺς—(very difficult to translate properly) introduce a reference to the feeling or judgment of spectators, or of an undefined public, not concerned either as agents or sufferers.

more honourable than another, this is because it surpasses the other either in pleasure, or in profit: if one thing be more ugly or disgraceful than another, it must surpass that other either in pain, or in evil? *Polus*.—Yes.

Sokr.—Well, then! what did you say about doing wrong and suffering wrong? You said that to suffer wrong was the worst of the two, but to do wrong was the most ugly or disgraceful. Now, if to do wrong be more disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be because it has a preponderance either of pain or of evil? *Polus*.—Undoubtedly. *Sokr.*—Has it a preponderance of pain? Does the doer of wrong endure more pain than the sufferer? *Polus*.—Certainly not. *Sokr.*—Then it must have a preponderance of evil? *Polus*.—Yes. *Sokr.*—To do wrong therefore is worse than to suffer wrong, as well as more disgraceful? *Polus*.—It appears so. *Sokr.*—Since therefore it is both worse and more disgraceful, I was right in affirming that neither you, nor I, nor any one else, would choose to do wrong in preference to suffering wrong. *Polus*.—So it seems.¹

Sokr.—Now let us take the second point—Whether it be the greatest evil for the wrong-doer to be punished, or whether it be not a still greater evil for him to remain unpunished. If punished, the wrong-doer is of course punished justly; and are not all just things fine or honourable, in so far as they are just? *Polus*.—I think so. *Sokr.*—When a man does anything, must there not be some correlate which suffers; and must it not suffer in a way corresponding to what the doer does? Thus if any one strikes, there must also be something stricken: and if he strikes quickly or violently, there must be something which is stricken quickly or violently. And so, if any one burns or cuts, there must be something burnt or cut. As the agent acts, so the patient suffers. *Polus*.—Yes. *Sokr.*—Now if a man be punished for wrong doing, he suffers what is just, and the punisher does what is just? *Polus*.—He does. *Sokr.*—You admitted that all just things were honourable: therefore the agent does what is honourable, the patient suffers what is honourable.² But if honourable, it must be either agreeable—

Sokrates
offers proof
—Definition
of Pul-
chrum and
Turpe—
Proof of the
first
point.

Proof of
the second
point.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 475 C-D.

² See Aristotle, *Rhet.* 1. 2, p. 1366,

b. 30, where the contrary of this opinion is maintained, and maintained with truth.

or good and profitable. In this case, it is certainly not agreeable: it must therefore be good and profitable. The wrong-doer therefore, when punished, suffers what is good and is profited. *Polus.*

—Yea.¹ *Sokr.*—In what manner is he profited? It is, as I presume, by becoming better in his mind—by being relieved from badness of mind. *Polus.*—Probably. *Sokr.*—Is not this badness of mind the greatest evil? In regard to wealth, the special badness is poverty: in regard to the body, it is weakness, sickness, deformity, &c.: in regard to the mind, it is ignorance, injustice, cowardice, &c. Is not injustice, and other badness of mind, the most disgraceful of the three? *Polus.*—Decidedly. *Sokr.*—If it be most disgraceful, it must therefore be the worst. *Polus.*—How? *Sokr.*—It must (as we before agreed) have the greatest preponderance either of pain, or of hurt and evil. But the preponderance is not in pain: for no one will say that the being unjust and intemperate and ignorant, is more painful than being poor and sick. The preponderance must therefore be great in hurt and evil. Mental badness is therefore a greater evil than either poverty, or disease and bodily deformity. It is the greatest of human evils. *Polus.*—It appears so.²

Sokr.—The money-making art is, that which relieves us from poverty: the medical art, from sickness and weakness: the judicial or punitive, from injustice and wickedness of mind. Of these three relieving forces, which is the most honourable? *Polus.*—The last, by far. *Sokr.*—If most honourable, it confers either most pleasure or most profit? *Polus.*—Yea. *Sokr.*—Now, to go through medical treatment is not agreeable; but it answers to a man to undergo the pain, in order to get rid of a great evil, and to become well. He would be a happier man, if he were never sick: he is less miserable by undergoing the painful treatment and becoming well, than if he underwent no treatment and remained sick. Just so the man who is mentally bad: the happiest man is he who never becomes so; but if a man has become so, the next best course for him is, to undergo punishment and to get rid of the evil. The worst lot of all is, that of

The criminal labours under a mental distemper, which, though not painful, is a capital evil. Punishment is the only cure for him. To be punished is best for him.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 476 D-E.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 477 E.

him who remains mentally bad, without ever getting rid of badness.¹

This last, Polus (continues Sokrates), is the condition of Archelaus, and of despots and Rhetors generally. They possess power which enables them, after they have committed injustice, to guard themselves against being punished: which is just as if a sick man were to pride himself upon having taken precautions against being cured. They see the pain of the cure, but they are blind to the profit of it; they are ignorant how much more miserable it is to have an unhealthy and unjust mind than an unhealthy body.²

There is therefore little use in Rhetoric: for our first object ought to be, to avoid doing wrong: our next object, if we have done wrong, not to resist or elude punishment by skilful defence, but to present ourselves voluntarily and invite it: and if our friends or relatives have done wrong, far from helping to defend them, we ought ourselves to accuse them, and to invoke punishment upon them also.³ On the other hand, as to our enemy, we ought undoubtedly to take precautions against suffering any wrong from him ourselves: but if he has done wrong to others, we ought to do all we can, by word or deed, not to bring him to punishment, but to prevent him from suffering punishment or making compensation: so that he may live as long as possible in impunity.⁴ These are the purposes towards which rhetoric is serviceable. For one who intends to do no wrong, it seems of no great use.⁵

Misery of the Despot, who is never punished. If our friend has done wrong, we ought to get him punished: if our enemy, we ought to keep him unpunished.

This dialogue between Sokrates and Polus exhibits a represen-

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 478 D-E.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 479 B. τὸ ἀλγεινὸν αὐτοῦ καθορᾶν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἀφελίμων τυφλῶς ἔχειν, καὶ ἄγνοεῖν ὅσην ἀβλιώτερόν ἐστι μὴ ὕγιους σώματος μὴ ὕγιαι ψυχῇ συνικνεῖν, ἀλλὰ σαβεῖ καὶ ἀδικεῖ καὶ ἀνοσίγῃ.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 480 C, 506 B. κατηγορητέον εἰς καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ νείας καὶ εἰραῖνον, εἰς τι ἀδικεῖ, &c.

Plato might have put this argument into the mouth of Euthyphron as a

reason for indicting his own father on the charge of murder: as I have already observed in reviewing the *Euthyphron*, which see above, vol. i. ch. xi. p. 442.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 481 A. εἰς δὲ ἄλλον ἀδικεῖ ὁ ἐχθρὸς, παντὶ τρόπῳ παρασκευαστέον καὶ πρᾶττοντα καὶ λέγοντα, ὅπως μὴ δὴ δίκην. . . . εἰς τε χρεῖστον ἥσυχας ἢ πολὺν, μὴ ἀποδιδόναι τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔχον ἀναλίσκεται. . . . ἀδικεῖ καὶ ἀνείας, &c.

⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 481.

tation of Platonic Ethics longer and more continuous than is usual in the dialogues. I have therefore given a tolerably copious abridgment of it, and shall now proceed to comment upon its reasoning.

The whole tenor of its assumptions, as well as the conclusions in which it ends, are so repugnant to received opinions, that Polus, even while compelled to assent, treats it as a paradox: while Kallikles, who now takes up the argument, begins by asking from Chærephon—"Is Sokrates really in earnest, or is he only jesting?"¹ Sokrates himself admits that he stands almost alone. He has nothing to rely upon, except the consistency of his dialectics—and the verdict of philosophy.² This however is a matter of little moment, in discussing the truth and value of the reasoning, except in so far as it involves an appeal to the judgment of the public as a matter of fact. Plato follows out the train of reasoning—which at the time presents itself to his mind as conclusive, or at least as plausible—whether he may agree or disagree with others.

~~Plato has ranked the Rhetor in the same category as the~~
 Principle laid down by Sokrates—That every one acts with a view to the attainment of happiness and avoidance of misery.

Despot: a classification upon which I shall say something presently. But throughout the part of the dialogue just extracted, he treats the original question about Rhetoric as part of a much larger ethical question.³ Every one (argues Sokrates) wishes for the attainment of good and for the avoidance of evil. Every one performs each separate act with a view not to its own immediate end, but to one or other of these permanent ends. In so far as he attains them, he is happy: in so far as he either fails in attaining the good, or incurs the evil, he is unhappy or miserable. The good and honourable man or woman is happy, the unjust and wicked is miserable. Power acquired or employed unjustly, is no boon to the possessor: for he does not thereby obtain what he really wishes, good or happiness; but incurs the contrary, evil

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 481.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 482.

³ I may be told that this comparison is first made by Polus (p. 466 C), and that Sokrates only takes it up from

him to comment upon. True, but the speech of Polus is just as much the composition of Plato as that of Sokrates. Many readers of Plato are apt to forget this.

and misery. The man who does wrong is more miserable than he who suffers wrong: but the most miserable of all is he who does wrong and then remains unpunished for it.¹

Polus, on the other hand, contends, that Archelaus, who has "waded through slaughter" to the throne of Macedonia, is a happy man both in his own feelings and in those of every one else, envied and admired by the world generally: That to say—Archelaus would have been more happy, or less miserable, if he had failed in his enterprise and had been put to death under cruel torture—is an untenable paradox.

The issue here turns, and the force of Plato's argument rests (assuming Sokrates to speak the real sentiments of Plato), upon the peculiar sense which he gives to the words Good—Evil—Happiness:—different from the sense in which they are conceived by mankind generally, and which is here followed by Polus. It is possible that to minds like Sokrates and Plato, the idea of themselves committing enormous crimes for ambitious purposes might be the most intolerable of all ideas, worse to contemplate than any amount of suffering: moreover, that if they could conceive themselves as having been thus guilty, the sequel the least intolerable for them to imagine would be one of expiatory pain. This, taken as the personal sentiment of Plato, admits of no reply. But when he attempts to convert this subjective judgment into an objective conclusion binding on all, he fails of success, and misleads himself by equivocal language.

Peculiar
view taken
by Plato of
Good—Evil
—Happi-
ness.

Plato distinguishes two general objects of human desire, and two of human aversion. 1. The immediate, and generally transient, object—Pleasure or the Pleasurable—Pain or the Painful. 2. The distant, ulterior, and more permanent object—Good or the profitable—Evil or the hurtful.—In the attainment of Good and avoidance of Evil consists happiness. But now comes the important question—In what sense are we to understand the

Contrast of
the usual
meaning
of these
words
with the
Platonic
meaning.

¹ Isokrates, in his Panathenaic Oration (Or. xii. sect. 123, pp. 257-347), alludes to the same thesis as this here advanced by Plato, treating it as one which all men of sense would reject, and which none but a few men pretending to be wise would proclaim

—ἔπερ πάντες μὲν ἂν οἱ νοῦν ἔχοντες ἔλοιτο καὶ βουλήθευε, ὀλίγοι δὲ τινες τῶν προσποιουμένων εἶναι σοφῶν, ἐρωτηθέντες οὐκ ἂν φήσαιεν.

In this last phrase Isokrates probably has Plato in his mind, though without pronouncing the name.

words Good and Evil? What did Plato mean by them? Did he mean the same as mankind generally? Have mankind generally one uniform meaning? In answer to this question, we must say, that neither Plato, nor mankind generally, are consistent or unanimous in their use of the words: and that Plato sometimes approximates to, sometimes diverges from, the more usual meaning. Plato does not here tell us clearly what he himself means by Good and Evil: he specifies no objective or external mark by which we may know it: we learn only, that Good is a mental perfection—Evil a mental taint—answering to indescribable but characteristic sentiments in Plato's own mind, and only negatively determined by this circumstance—That they have no reference either to pleasure or pain. In the vulgar sense, Good stands distinguished from pleasure (or relief from pain), and Evil from pain (or loss of pleasure), as the remote, the causal, the lasting from the present, the product, the transient. Good and Evil are explained by enumerating all the things so called, of which enumeration Plato gives a partial specimen in this dialogue: elsewhere he dwells upon what he calls the Idea of Good, of which I shall speak more fully hereafter. Having said that all men aim at good, he gives, as examples of good things—Wisdom, Health, Wealth, and other such things: while the contrary of these, Stupidity, Sickness, Poverty, are evil things: the list of course might be much enlarged. Taking Good and Evil generally to denote the common property of each of these lists, it is true that men perform a large portion of their acts with a view to attain the former and avoid the latter:—that the approach which they make to happiness depends, speaking generally, upon the success which attends their exertions for the attainment of and avoidance of these permanent ends: and moreover that these ends have their ultimate reference to each man's own feelings.

But this meaning of Good is no longer preserved, when Sokrates proceeds to prove that the triumphant usurper Archelaus is the most miserable of men, and that to do wrong with impunity is the greatest of all evils.

Sokrates provides a basis for his intended proof by asking
 Examina- Polus,¹ which of the two is most disgraceful—To do
 tion of the wrong—or to suffer wrong? Polus answers—To do
 proof given

¹ Plat. Gorg. p. 474 C.

wrong: and this answer is inconsistent with what he had previously said about Archelaus. That prince, though a wrong-doer on the largest scale, has been declared by Polus to be an object of his supreme envy and admiration: while Sokrates also admits that this is the sentiment of almost all mankind, except himself. To be consistent with such an assertion, Polus ought to have answered the contrary of what he does answer, when the general question is afterwards put to him: or at least he ought to have said—"Sometimes the one, sometimes the other". But this he is ashamed to do, as we shall find Kallikles intimating at a subsequent stage of the dialogue:¹ because of King Nomos, or the established habit of the community—who feel that society rests upon a sentiment of reciprocal right and obligation animating every one, and require that violations of that sentiment shall be marked with censure in general words, however widely the critical feeling may depart from such censure in particular cases.² Polus is forced to make profession of a

by Sokrates
—Inconsistency between the general answer of Polus and his previous declarations—Law and Nature.

¹ Plat. Gorg. p. 482 C. To maintain that τὸ ἀδίκειν βέλτιον τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι was an ἀδύνατον ὑπόθεσις—one which it was χεῖροντος ἤθελεν ἐλέσθαι: which therefore Aristotle advises the dialectician not to defend (Aristot. Topic. viii. 156, 6-15).

² This portion of the Gorgias may receive illustration from the third chapter (pp. 99-101) of Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, entitled, "Of the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by the disposition to admire the rich and great, and to neglect or despise persons of poor and mean condition". He says—"The disposition to admire and almost to worship the rich and the powerful, and to despise, or at least to neglect, persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary both to establish and maintain the distinction of ranks and the order of society, is, at the same time, the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments. . . . They are the wise and the virtuous chiefly—a select, though I am afraid, a small party—who are the real and steady admirers of wisdom and virtue. The great mob of mankind are the admirers and worshippers—and what may seem more extraordinary, most frequently the dis-

interested admirers and worshippers—of wealth and greatness. . . . It is scarce agreeable to good morals, or even to good language, perhaps, to say that mere wealth and greatness, abstracted from merit and virtue, deserve our respect. We must acknowledge, however, that they almost constantly obtain it: and that they may therefore in a certain sense be considered as the natural objects of it."

Now Archelaus is a most conspicuous example of this disposition of the mass of mankind to worship and admire, disinterestedly, power and greatness: and the language used by Adam Smith in the last sentence illustrates the conversation of Sokrates, Polus, and Kalliklēs. Adam Smith admits that energetic proceedings, ending in great power, such as those of Archelaus, obtain honour and worship from the vast majority of disinterested spectators: and that therefore they are in a certain sense the natural objects of such a sentiment (κατὰ φύσιν). But if the question be put to him, Whether such proceedings, with such a position, are worthy of honour, he is constrained by good morals (κατὰ νόμον) to reply in the negative. It is true that Adam Smith numbers himself with the small minority, while Polus shares the opinion

faith, which neither he nor others (except Sokrates with a few companions) universally or consistently apply. To bring such a force to bear upon the opponent, was one of the known artifices of dialecticians :¹ and Sokrates makes it his point of departure, to prove the unparalleled misery of Archelaus.

He proceeds to define Pulchrum and Turpe (*καλὸν-αἰσχρόν*).

The definition of Pulchrum and Turpe, given by Sokrates, will not hold.

When we recollect the Hippias Major, in which dialogue many definitions of Pulchrum were canvassed and all rejected, so that the search ended in total dis-appointment—we are surprised to see that Sokrates hits off at once a definition satisfactory both to himself and Polus : and we are the more surprised, because the definition here admitted without a remark, is in substance one of those shown to be untenable in the Hippias Major.² It depends upon the actual argumentative purpose which Plato has in hand, whether he chooses to multiply objections and give them effect—or to ignore them altogether. But the definition which he here proposes, even if assumed as incontestable, fails altogether to sustain the conclusion that he draws from it. He defines Pulchrum to be that which either confers pleasure upon the spectator when he contemplates it, or produces ulterior profit or good—we must presume profit to the spectator, or to him along with others—at any rate it is not said to whom. He next defines the ugly and disgraceful (*τὸ αἰσχρόν*) as comprehending both the painful and the hurtful or evil. If then (he argues) to do wrong is more ugly and disgraceful than to suffer wrong, this must be either because it is more painful—or because it is more hurtful, more evil (worse). It certainly is not more painful : therefore it must be worse.

But worse, for whom? For the spectators, who declare the worse or better proceedings of Archelaus to be disgraceful? For the persons who suffer by his proceedings? Or for Archelaus himself? It is the last of the three which Sokrates undertakes to prove : but his definition does

of the large majority. But what is required by King Nomos must be professed even by dissentients, unless they possess the unbending resolution of Sokrates.

¹ Aristot. De Soph. Elench. pp. 172-173, where he contrasts the opinions

which men must make a show of holding, with those which they really do hold—*αἱ φανταί δόξαν-αἱ ἀφανείς, ἀνεκρυμμένας, δόξαν.*

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 45-46. See above, vol. II. ch. xiii.

not help him to the proof. Turpe is defined to be either what causes immediate pain to the spectator, or ulterior hurt—to whom? If we say—to the spectator—the definition will not serve as a ground of inference to the condition of the agent contemplated. If on the other hand, we say—to the agent—the definition so understood becomes inadmissible: as well for other reasons, as because there are a great many Turpia which are not agents at all, and which the definition therefore would not include. Either therefore the definition given by Sokrates is a bad one—or it will not sustain his conclusion. And thus, on this very important argument, where Sokrates admits that he stands alone, and where therefore the proof would need to be doubly cogent—an argument too where the great cause (so Adam Smith terms it) of the corruption of men's moral sentiments has to be combated—Sokrates has nothing to produce except premisses alike far-fetched and irrelevant. What increases our regret is, that the real arguments establishing the turpitude of Archelaus and his acts are obvious enough, if you look for them in the right direction. You discover nothing while your eye is fixed on Archelaus himself: far from presenting any indications of misery, which Sokrates professes to discover, he has gained much of what men admire as good wherever they see it. But when you turn to the persons whom he has killed, banished, or ruined—to the mass of suffering which he has inflicted—and to the widespread insecurity which such acts of successful iniquity spread through all societies where they become known—there is no lack of argument to justify that sentiment which prompts a reflecting spectator to brand him as a disgraceful man. This argument however is here altogether neglected by Plato. Here, as elsewhere, he looks only at the self-regarding side of Ethics.

Sokrates proceeds next to prove—That the wrong-doer who remains unpunished is more miserable than if he were punished. The wrong-doer (he argues) when punished suffers what is just: but all just things are honourable: therefore he suffers what is honourable. But all honourable things are so called because they are either agreeable, or profitable, or both together. Punishment is certainly not agreeable: it must

specify. If understood in the sense necessary for his inference, the definition would be inadmissible.

Plato applies to everyone a standard of happiness and misery peculiar to himself. His view about the conduct of Arche-

laus is just, but he does not give the true reasons for it. therefore be profitable or good. Accordingly the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good. He is benefited, by being relieved of mental evil or wickedness, which is a worse evil than either bodily sickness or poverty. In proportion to the magnitude of this evil, is the value of the relief which removes it, and the superior misery of the unpunished wrong-doer who continues to live under it.¹

Upon this argument, I make the same remark as upon that immediately preceding. We are not expressly told, whether good, evil, happiness, misery, &c., refer to the agent alone or to others also : but the general tenor implies that the agent alone is meant. And in this sense, Plato does not make out his case. He establishes an arbitrary standard of his own, recognised only by a few followers, and altogether differing from the ordinary standard, to test and compare happiness and misery. The successful criminal, Archelaus himself, far from feeling any such intense misery as Plato describes, is satisfied and proud of his position, which most others also account an object of envy. This is not disputed by Plato himself. And in the face of this fact, it is fruitless as well as illogical to attempt to prove, by an elaborate process of deductive reasoning, that Archelaus *must* be miserable. That step of Plato's reasoning, in which he asserts, that the wrong-doer when justly punished suffers what is profitable or good—is only true if you take in (what Plato omits to mention) the interests of society as well as those of the agent. His punishment is certainly profitable to (conducive to the security and well being of) society : it may possibly be also profitable to himself, but very frequently it is not so. The conclusion brought out by Plato, therefore, while contradicted by the fact, involves also a fallacy in the reasoning process.

Throughout the whole of this dialogue, Plato intimates decidedly how great a paradox the doctrine maintained by Sokrates must appear : how diametrically it was opposed to the opinion not merely of the less informed multitude, but of the wiser and more reflecting citizen—even such a man as Nikias. Indeed it is literally

If the reasoning of Plato were true, the point of view in which punish-

¹ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 477-478.

exact—what Plato here puts into the mouth of Kallikles—that if the doctrine here advocated by Sokrates were true, the whole of social life would be turned upside down.¹ If, for example, it were true, as Plato contends, —That every man who commits a crime, takes upon him thereby a terrible and lasting distemper, incurable except by the application of punishment, which is the specific remedy in the case—every theory of punishment would, literally speaking, be turned upside down. The great discouragement from crime would then consist in the fear of that formidable distemper with which the criminal was sure to inoculate himself: and punishment, instead of being (as it is now considered, and as Plato himself represents it in the *Protagoras*) the great discouragement to the commission of crime, would operate in the contrary direction. It would be the means of removing or impairing the great real discouragement to crime: and a wise legislator would hesitate to inflict it. This would be nothing less than a reversal of the most universally accepted political or social precepts (as Kallikles is made to express himself).

It will indeed be at once seen, that the taint or distemper with which Archelaus is supposed to inoculate himself, when he commits signal crime—is a pure fancy or poetical metaphor on the part of Plato himself.² A distemper must imply something painful, enfeebling, disabling, to the individual who feels it: there is no other meaning: we cannot recognise a distemper, which does not make itself felt in any way by the distempered person. Plato is misled by his ever-repeated analogy between bodily health and mental health: real, on some points—not real on others. When a man is in bad bodily health, his sensations warn him of it at once. He suffers from pain, discomfort,

ment is considered would be reversed.

Plato pushes too far the analogy between mental distemper and bodily distemper—Material difference between the two—Distemper must be felt by the distempered person.

¹ Plato, *Gorg.* p. 481 C. *Kall.*—*οὐκ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι καὶ τοῦτο πᾶσι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὅτι καὶ λέγεις, ἄλλο τι ἢ τοῦτο ὅτι βίος ἀνατρεπόμενος ἀνὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐναντία πρᾶττονται, ἢ ὅτι;*

² The disposition of Plato to build argument on a metaphor is often shown.

Aristotle remarks it of him in respect to his theory of Ideas; and Aristotle in his *Topica* gives several precepts in regard to the general tendency—precepts enjoining disputants to be on their guard against it in dialectic discussion (*Topica*, iv. 123, a. 33, vi. 139-140)—*πάν γὰρ εἰσαφίς τὸ κατὰ μεταφορὰν λεγόμενον, &c.*

or disabilities, which leave no doubt as to the fact: though he may not know either the precise cause, or the appropriate remedy. Conversely, in the absence of any such warnings, and in the presence of certain positive sensations, he knows himself to be in tolerable or good health. If Sokrates and Archelaus were both in good bodily health, or both in bad bodily health, each would be made aware of the fact by analogous evidences. But by what measure are we to determine *when* a man is in a good or bad mental state? By his own feelings? In that case, Archelaus and Sokrates are in a mental state equally good: each is satisfied with his own. By the judgment of by-standers? Archelaus will then be the better of the two: at least his admirers and enviers will outnumber those of Sokrates. By my judgment? If my opinion is asked, I agree with Sokrates: though not on the grounds which he here urges, but on other grounds. Who is to be the ultimate referee—the interests or security of other persons, who have suffered or are likely to suffer by Archelaus, being by the supposition left out of view?

Polus is now dismissed as vanquished, after having been forced, against his will, to concede—That the doer of wrong is more miserable than the sufferer: That he is more miserable, if unpunished,—less so, if punished: That a triumphant criminal on a great scale, like Archelaus, is the most miserable of men.

Here, then, we commence with Kallikles: who interposes, to take up the debate with Sokrates. Polus (says Kallikles), from deference to the opinions of mankind, has erroneously conceded the point—That it is more disgraceful to do wrong, than to suffer wrong. This is indeed true (continues Kallikles), according to what is just by law or convention, that is, according to the general sentiment of mankind: but it is not true, according to justice by nature, or natural justice. Nature and Law are here opposed.¹ The justice of Nature is, that among men (as among other animals) the strong individual should govern and strip the weak, taking and keeping as much as he can

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 482 E. ὅτι τε πολλὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις ἔστιν, ἢ τε φύσιν καὶ δ νόμος.

grasp. But this justice will not suit the weak, who are the many, and who defeat it by establishing a different justice—justice according to law—to curb the strong man, and prevent him from having more than his fair share.¹ The many, feeling their own weakness and thankful if they can only secure a fair and equal division, make laws and turn the current of praise and blame for their own protection, in order to deter the strong man from that encroachment and oppression to which he is disposed. *The just according to law* is thus a tutelary institution, established by the weak to defend themselves against *the just according to nature*. Nature measures right by might, and by nothing else: so that according to the right of nature, suffering wrong is more disgraceful than doing wrong. Hēraklēs takes from Geryon his cattle, by the right of nature or of the strongest, without either sale or gift.²

But (rejoins Sokrates) the many are by nature stronger than the one; since, as you yourself say, they make and enforce laws to restrain him and defeat his projects. Therefore, since the many are the strongest, the right which they establish is the right of (or by) nature. And the many, as you admit, declare themselves in favour of the answer given by Polus—That to do wrong is more disgraceful than to suffer wrong.³ Right by nature, and right by institution, sanction it alike.

Several commentators have contended, that the doctrine which Plato here puts into the mouth of Kalliklēs was taught by the Sophists at Athens: who are said to have inculcated on their hearers that true wisdom and morality consisted in acting upon the right of the strongest and taking whatever they could get, without any regard to law or justice. I have already

What Kalliklēs says is not to be taken as a sample of the teachings of Athenian sophists.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B. *ἀλλ, οἶμαι, οἱ τιθέμενοι τοὺς νόμους οἱ ἀσθενεῖς ἄνθρωποι εἰσι καὶ οἱ πολλοί. Πρὸς αὐτοὺς οὖν καὶ τὸ αὐτοῖς συμφέρον τοὺς τε νόμους τίθενται καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινοὺς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ τοὺς ψέγους ψέγουσιν, ἐκφοβοῦντές τε τοὺς ἐπρωμενεστέρους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ δυνατοὺς ὄντας πλέον*

ἔχειν, ἵνα μὴ αὐτῶν πλέον ἔχωσιν, λέγουσιν ὡς εἰσάρχον καὶ ἄδικον τὸ πλεονεκτήειν, καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ ζητεῖν τῶν ἄλλων πλέον ἔχειν· ἀγαπᾷσι γάρ, οἶμαι, αὐτοὶ ἂν τὸ ἴσον ἔχουσι φαυλότεροι ὄντες.

² Plato, Gorgias, pp. 484-488.

³ Plato, Gorgias, p. 488 D-E.

Kalliklēs—endeavoured to show, in my History of Greece, that
rhetor and the Sophists cannot be shown to have taught either
politician this doctrine, or any other common doctrine: that one at least
 among them (Prodikos) taught a doctrine inconsistent with it:
 and that while all of them agreed in trying to impart rhetorical
 accomplishments, or the power of handling political, ethical,
 judicial, matters in a manner suitable for the Athenian public—
 each had his own way of doing this. Kalliklēs is not presented
 by Plato as a Sophist, but as a Rhetor aspiring to active political
 influence; and taking a small dose of philosophy, among the
 preparations for that end.¹ He depreciates the Sophists as much
 as the philosophers, and in fact rather more.² Moreover Plato
 represents him as adapting himself, with accommodating subservi-
 vience, to the Athenian public assembly, and saying or unsaying
 exactly as they manifested their opinion.³ Now the Athenian
 public assembly would repudiate indignantly all this pretended
 right of the strongest, if any orator thought fit to put it forward
 as over-ruling established right and law. Any aspiring or sub-
 servient orator, such as Kalliklēs is described, would know better
 than to address them in this strain. The language which Plato
 puts into the mouth of Kalliklēs is noway consistent with the
 attribute which he also ascribes to him—slavish deference to the
 judgments of the Athenian Dēmos.

Kalliklēs is made to speak like one who sympathises with the
 right of the strongest, and who decorates such iniquity
 with the name and authority of that which he calls
 Nature. But this only shows the uncertainty of re-
 ferring to Nature as an authority.⁴ It may be
 pleaded in favour of different and opposite theories.
 Nature prompts the strong man to take from weaker
 men what will gratify his desires: Nature also
 prompts these weaker men to defeat him and protect
 themselves by the best means in their power. The

Uncertainty
 of referring
 to Nature as
 an autho-
 rity. It may
 be pleaded
 in favour
 of opposite
 theories.
 The theory
 of Kalliklēs
 is made to
 appear re-
 pulsive by

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 437 C, 435.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 520 A.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 431-432.

⁴ Aristotle (*Sophist.* Elench. 12, p. 173, a. 10) makes allusion to this argu-
 ment of Kalliklēs in the *Gorgias*, and
 notices it as a frequent point made by
 disputants in *Dialectics*—to insist on

the contradiction between the Just ac-
 cording to Nature and the Just accord-
 ing to Law: which contradiction (Ari-
 stotle says) all the ancients recognised
 as a real one (οἱ ἀρχαῖοι πάντες ὡς
 συμβαίνειν). It was doubtless a point
 on which the Dialectician might find
 much to say on either side.

many are weaker, taken individually—stronger taken collectively : hence they resort to defensive combination, established rules, and collective authority.¹ The right created on one side, and the opposite right created on the other, flow alike from Nature : that is, from propensities and principles natural, and deeply seated, in the human mind. The authority of Nature, considered as an enunciation of actual and wide-spread facts, may be pleaded for both alike. But a man's sympathy and approbation may go either with the one or the other ; and he may choose to stamp that which he approves, with the name of Nature as a personified law-maker. This is what is here done by Kalliklēs as Plato exhibits him.² He

the language in which he expresses it.

¹ In the conversation between Sokrates and Kritobulus, one of the best in Xenophon's Memorabilia (li. 6, 21), respecting the conditions on which friendship depends, we find Sokrates clearly stating that the causes of friendship and the causes of enmity, though different and opposite, nevertheless both exist by nature. 'Αλλ' ἔχει μὲν, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ποικίλους πως ταῦτα: Φύσει γὰρ ἔχουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν φιλικὰ—δέονται τε γὰρ ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀεοῦσι, καὶ συνεργοῦντες ἐφελούνται, καὶ τοῦτο συνέντες χάριν ἔχουσιν ἀλλήλοις—τὰ δὲ πολεμικά—τὰ τε γὰρ αὐτὰ καλὰ καὶ ἡδὲ νομίζοντες ὑπὲρ τούτων μάχονται καὶ διχογνωμοῦντες ἐναντιοῦνται. πολεμικὸν δὲ καὶ ἔρις καὶ ὀργή, καὶ θυμὸς μὲν ὁ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἔρως, μισθὸν δὲ ὁ φόβος. 'Αλλ' ὅμως διὰ τούτων πάντων ἡ φιλία διαδυνάμει συνάπτεται τοὺς καλοὺς τε κἀγαθοὺς, &c.

We read in the speech of Hermokrates the Syracusan, at the congress of Gela in Sicily, when exhorting the Sicilians to unite for the purpose of repelling the ambitious schemes of Athens, Thucyd. iv. 61: καὶ τοὺς μὲν Ἀθηναίους ταῦτα πλεονεκτεῖν τε καὶ προσεῖσθαι πολλὰ ξυγγνώμη, καὶ οὐ τοις ἔργοις βουλευμένοις μέφομαι ἀλλὰ τοὺς ὑπακούειν ἐτοιμότεροι οὖσι. πότε γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον διὰ παντὸς ἀρχεῖν μὲν τοῦ εἰκότος, φυλάσσεισθαι δὲ τὸ ἐπὶ τὸν ὄσον δὲ γινώσκοντες αὐτὰ μὴ ὁρῶς προσκοπόμεν, μὴδὲ τοῦτό τις προσβύτατον ἔχει κρίνας, τὸ κοινὸς φοβερὸν ἀπαντὰς εὖ δεῖσθαι, ἀμαρτάνομεν. A like sentiment is pronounced by the Athenian envoys in their debate with the Melians, Thuc. v. 105: ἡγοῦμεθα

γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξῃ, τὸ ἀνθρώπειον τε σαφὲς διὰ παντός, ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκάσας, οὐδ' ἂν κρατῇ, ἀρχεῖν. Some of the Platonists would have us believe that this last-cited sentiment emanates from the corrupt teaching of Athenian Sophists : but Hermokrates the Syracusan had nothing to do with Athenian Sophists.

² Respecting the vague and indeterminate phrases—Natural Justice, Natural Right, Law of Nature—see Mr. Austin's Province of Jurisprudence Determined, p. 100, ed. 2nd. [Jurisp., 4th ed. pp. 179, 591-2], and Sir H. S. Maine's Ancient Law, chapters iii. and iv.

Among the assertions made about the Athenian Sophists, it is said by some commentators that they denied altogether any Just or Unjust by nature—that they recognised no Just or Unjust, except by law or convention.

To say that the Sophists (speaking of them collectively) either affirmed or denied anything, is, in my judgment, incorrect. Certain persons are alluded to by Plato (Theætét. 172 B) as adopting partially the doctrine of Protagoras (*Homo Mensura*) and as denying altogether the Just by nature.

In another Platonic passage (Protagor. 357) which is also cited as contributing to prove that the Sophists denied τὸ δίκαιον φύσει—nothing at all is said about τὸ δίκαιον. Hippias the Sophist is there introduced as endeavouring to appease the angry feeling between Protagoras and Sokrates by reminding them, "I am of opinion that we all (i.e. men of literature and study) are kinsmen, friends, and fellow-citizens by nature though not by law : for law, the despot of mankind, carries

sympathises with, and approves, the powerful individual. Now the greater portion of mankind are, and always have been, governed upon this despotic principle, and brought up to respect it: while many, even of those who dislike Kalliklēs because

many things by force, contrary to nature". The remark is very appropriate from one who is trying to restore good feeling between literary disputants: and the cosmopolitan character of literature is now so familiar a theme, that I am surprised to find Heindorf (in his note) making it an occasion for throwing the usual censure upon the Sophist, because some of them distinguished Nature from the Laws, and despised the latter in comparison with the former.

Kalliklēs here, in the *Gorgias*, maintains an opinion not only different from, but inconsistent with, the opinion alluded to above in the *Theætētus*, 172 E. The persons noticed in the *Theætētus* said—There is no Natural Justice: no Justice, except Justice by Law. Kalliklēs says—There is a Natural Justice quite distinct from (and which he esteems more than) Justice by Law: he then explains what he believes Natural Justice to be—That the strong man should take what he pleases from the weak.

Though these two opinions are really inconsistent with each other, yet we see Plato in the *Leges* (x. 889 E, 890 A) alluding to them both as the same creed, held and defended by the same men; whom he denounces with extreme acrimony. Who they were, he does not name; he does not mention σοφιστᾶι, but calls them ἀνδρῶν σοφῶν, ἰδιωτῶν τε καὶ ποιητῶν.

We see, in the third chapter of Sir H. S. Maine's excellent work on Ancient Law, the meaning of these phrases—Natural Justice, Law of Nature. It designated or included "a set of legal principles entitled to supersede the existing laws, on the ground of intrinsic superiority". It denoted an ideal condition of society, supposed to be much better than what actually prevailed. This at least seems to have been the meaning which began to attach to it in the time of Plato and Aristotle. What this ideal perfection of human society was, varied in the minds of different speakers. In each speaker's mind the word and sentiment was much the same, though the objects to which it attached were often different. Empedoklēs proclaims in

solemn and emphatic language that the Law of Nature preempts forbids us to kill any animal. (Aristot. *Rhetor.* i. 13, 1373 b. 15.) Plato makes out to his own satisfaction, that his Republic is thoroughly in harmony with the Law of Nature: and he insists especially on this harmony, in the very point which even the Platonic critics admit to be wrong—that is, in regard to the training of women and the relations of the sexes (*Republic*, v. 456 C, 466 D). We learn from Plato himself that the propositions of the Republic were thoroughly adverse to what other persons revered as the Law of Nature.

In the notes of Beck and Heindorf on Protagor. p. 357 we read, "Hippias præ cæteris Sophistis contemptat leges, sique opposuit Naturam. Naturam legibus plures certè Sophistarum opposuisse, easque præ illâ contempsisse, multis veterum locis constat." Now this allegation is more applicable to Plato than to the Sophists. Plato speaks with the most unmeasured contempt of existing communities and their laws: the scheme of his Republic, radically departing from them as it does, shows what he considered as required by the exigencies of human nature. Both the Stoics and the Epicureans extolled what they called the Law of Nature above any laws actually existing.

The other charge made against the Sophists (quite opposite, yet sometimes advanced by the same critics) is, that they recognised no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law: i.e. all the actual laws and customs considered as binding in each different community. This is what Plato ascribes to some persons (Sophists or not) in the *Theætētus*, p. 172. But in this sense it is not exact to call Kalliklēs (as Heindorf does, Protagor. p. 337) "germanus ille Sophistarum alumnus in Gorgia Callicles," nor to affirm (with Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum *Theætēt.* p. 183) that Plato meant to refute Aristippus under the name of Kalliklēs, Aristippus maintaining that there was no Just by Nature, but only Just by Law or Convention.

they regard him as the representative of Athenian democracy (to which however his proclaimed sentiments stand pointedly opposed), when they come across a great man or so-called hero, such as Alexander or Napoleon, applaud the most exorbitant ambition if successful, and if accompanied by military genius and energy—regarding communities as made for little else except to serve as his instruments, subjects, and worshippers. Such are represented as the sympathies of Kalliklēs: but those of the Athenians went with the second of the two rights—and mine go with it also. And though the language which Plato puts into the mouth of Kalliklēs, in describing this second right, abounds in contemptuous rhetoric, proclaiming offensively the individual weakness of the multitude¹—yet this very fact is at once the most solid and most respectable foundation on which rights and obligations can be based. The establishment of them is indispensable, and is felt as indispensable, to procure security for the community: whereby the strong man whom Kalliklēs extols as the favourite of Nature, may be tamed by discipline and censure, so as to accommodate his own behaviour to this equitable arrangement.² Plato himself, in his Republic,³ traces the generation of a city to the fact that each man individually taken is not self-sufficing, but stands in need of many things: it is no less true, that each man stands also in fear of many things, especially of depredations from animals, and depredations from powerful individuals of his own species. In the mythe of Protagoras,⁴ we have fears from hostile animals—in the speech here ascribed to Kalliklēs, we have fears from hostile strong men—assigned as the generating cause, both of political communion and of established rights and obligations to protect it.

Kalliklēs now explains, that by *stronger* men, he means better, wiser, braver men. It is they (he says) who ought, Sokrates according to right by nature, to rule over others and to have larger shares than others. Sokr.—Ought

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 B, p. 492 A. οἱ πολλοί, ἀποκρινόμενοι τῇ ἐαυτῶν ἀδυναμίᾳ, &c.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 483 E.

³ Plato, Republic, II. p. 369 B. οἱ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐταρκτὴς ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἐνδεής.

⁴ Plato, Protag. p. 322 B.

and moderation is requisite for the strong man as well as for others. Kallikles defends the negative.

they not to rule themselves as well as others :¹ to control their own pleasures and desires : to be sober and temperate? *Kall.*—No: they would be foolish if they did. The weak multitude must do so; and there grows up accordingly among *them* a sentiment which requires such self-restraint from all. But it is the privilege of the superior few to be exempt from this necessity. The right of nature authorises them to have the largest desires, since their courage and ability furnish means to satisfy the desires. It would be silly if a king's son or a despot were to limit himself to the same measure of enjoyment with which a poor citizen must be content; and worse than silly if he did not enrich his friends in preference to his enemies. He need not care for that public law and censure which must reign paramount over each man among the many. A full swing of enjoyment, if a man has power to procure and maintain it, is virtue as well as happiness.²

Sokr.—I think on the contrary that a sober and moderate life, regulated according to present means and circumstances, is better than a life of immoderate indulgence.³ *Kall.*—The man who has no desires will have no pleasure, and will live like a stone. The more the desires, provided they can all be satisfied, the happier a man will be. *Sokr.*—You mean that a man shall be continually hungry, and continually satisfying his hunger: continually thirsty, and satisfying his thirst; and so forth. *Kall.*—By having and by satisfying those and all other desires, a man will enjoy happiness. *Sokr.*—Do you mean to include all varieties of desire and satisfaction of desire: such for example as itching and scratching yourself:⁴ and other bodily appetites which might be named? *Kall.*—Such things are not fit for discussion. *Sokr.*—It is you who drive me to mention them, by laying down the principle, that men who enjoy, be the enjoyment of what sort it may, are

Whether the largest measure of desires is good for a man, provided he has the means of satisfying them? Whether all varieties of desire are good? Whether the pleasurable and the good are identical?

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 491 D.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 492 A-C.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 498 C. εἴν πως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπερὶ μεταβάλλειν καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ

ἀπαισθητὸς καὶ ἀκαταστάτος ἔχοντος βίον τὸν κοσμίως καὶ τοῖς δὲ παροῦσιν ἰκανῶς καὶ ἐφαρκούντως ἔχοντα βίον ἐλίσσθαι.

⁴ Plato, *Gorg.* p. 494 E.

happy ; and by not distinguishing what pleasures are good and what are evil. Tell me again, do you think that the pleasurable and the good are identical ? Or are there any pleasurable things which are not good ?¹ *Kall*.—I think that the pleasurable and the good are the same.

Upon this question the discussion now turns : whether pleasure and good are the same, or whether there are not some pleasures good, others bad. By a string of questions much protracted, but subtle rather than conclusive, Sokrates proves that pleasure is not the same as good—that there are such things as bad pleasures and good pains. And Kalliklēs admits that some pleasures are better, others worse.² Profitable pleasures are good : hurtful pleasures are bad. Thus the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, if they impart to us health and strength—bad, if they produce sickness and weakness. We ought to choose the good pleasures and pains, and avoid the bad ones. It is not every man who is competent to distinguish what pleasures are good, and what are bad. A scientific and skilful adviser, judging upon general principles, is required to make this distinction.³

Kalliklēs maintains that pleasurable and good are identical. Sokrates refutes him. Some pleasures are good, others bad. A scientific adviser is required to discriminate them.

This debate between Sokrates and Kalliklēs, respecting the "Quomodo vivendum est,"⁴ deserves attention on more than one account. In the first place, the relation which Sokrates is here made to declare between the two pairs of general terms, Pleasurable—Good : Painful—Evil : is the direct reverse of that which he both declares and demonstrates in the Protagoras. In that dialogue, the Sophist Protagoras is represented as holding an opinion very like that which is maintained

Contradiction between Sokrates in the Gorgias, and Sokrates in the Protagoras.

¹ Plato, *Gorg.* pp. 494-496. ἢ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἔγω ἵπταμαι, ἢ ἕκαστος δεῖν ἂν φησὶ ἀνέδην οὕτω τοὺς χαίροντας, ὅπως ἂν χαίρουν, εὐδαιμόνους εἶναι, καὶ μὴ διαρίζονται τῶν ἡδονῶν ὁποῖαι ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά ; ἀλλ' ἔτι καὶ τὴν λέγε, πότερον φησὶ εἶναι τὸ αἰὲν ἡδὲ καὶ ἀγαθόν, ἢ εἶναι τι τῶν ἡδονῶν ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν ;

² Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 498-499.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 499-500. 'Απ' οὐν παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἔστιν ἐκλίσσασθαι ποτα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἔστι καὶ ὁποῖα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἑκαστον ; Τεχνικοῦ.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 492 D. ἵνα τῷ ὄντι κατὰ ἄλλον γίνηται, πὺς βουδον, &c. 500 G : ὅστινα χρὴ τρόπον ἔχει.

by Sokrates in the *Gorgias*. But Sokrates (in the *Protagoras*) refutes him by an elaborate argument; and demonstrates that pleasure and good (also pain and evil) are names for the same fundamental ideas under different circumstances: pleasurable and painful referring only to the sensation of the present moment—while good and evil include, besides, an estimate of its future consequences and accompaniments, both pleasurable and painful, and represent the result of such calculation. In the *Gorgias*, Sokrates demonstrates the contrary, by an argument equally elaborate but not equally convincing. He impugns a doctrine advocated by Kalliklès, and in impugning it, proclaims a marked antithesis and even repugnance between the pleasurable and the good, the painful and the evil: rejecting the fundamental identity of the two, which he advocates in the *Protagoras*, as if it were a disgraceful heresy.

The subject evidently presented itself to Plato in two different ways at different times. Which of the two is earliest, we have no means of deciding. The commentators, who favour generally the view taken in the *Gorgias*, treat the *Protagoras* as a juvenile and erroneous production: sometimes, with still less reason, they represent Sokrates as arguing in that dialogue, from the principles of his opponents, not from his own. For my part, without knowing whether the *Protagoras* or the *Gorgias* is the earliest, I think the *Protagoras* an equally finished composition, and I consider that the views which Sokrates is made to propound in it, respecting pleasure and good, are decidedly nearer to the truth.

That in the list of pleasures there are some which it is proper to avoid,—and in the list of pains, some which it is proper to accept or invite—is a doctrine maintained by Sokrates alike in both the dialogues. Why? Because some pleasures are good, others bad: some pains bad, others good—says Sokrates in the *Gorgias*. The same too is said by Sokrates in the *Protagoras*; but then, he there explains what he means by the appellation. All pleasure (he there says), so far as it goes, is good—all pain is bad. But there are some pleasures which cannot be enjoyed without debarring us from greater pleasures or entailing upon us greater pains: on that ground therefore, such pleasures are bad.

Comparison
and appreciation
of the reason-
ing of
Sokrates
in both
dialogues.

So again, there are some pains, the suffering of which is a condition indispensable to our escaping greater pains, or to our enjoying greater pleasures: such pains therefore are good. Thus this apparent exception does not really contradict, but confirms, the general doctrine—That there is no good but the pleasurable, and the elimination of pain—and no evil except the painful, or the privation of pleasure. Good and evil have no reference except to pleasures and pains; but the terms imply, in each particular case, an estimate and comparison of future pleasurable and painful consequences, and express the result of such comparison. "You call enjoyment itself evil" (says Sokrates in the *Protagoras*),¹ "when it deprives us of greater pleasures or entails upon us greater pains. If you have any other ground, or look to any other end, in calling it evil, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not be able to tell us. So too, you say that pain is a good, when it relieves us from greater pains, or when it is necessary as the antecedent cause of greater pleasures. If you have any other end in view, when you call pain good, you may tell us what that end is; but you will not be able to tell us."²

In the *Gorgias*, too, Sokrates declares that some pleasures are good, others bad—some pains bad, others good. But here he stops. He does not fulfil the reasonable demand urged by Sokrates in the *Protagoras*—"If you make such a distinction, explain the ground on which you make it, and the end to which you look". The distinction in the *Gorgias* stands without any assigned ground or end to rest upon. And this want

Distinct statement in the *Protagoras*. What are good and evil, and upon what principles the scientific adviser is to

¹ Plato, *Protagoras*, p. 354 D. *ἐπεὶ, εἰ κατ' ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ τὸ χαίρειν κακὸν καλεῖται καὶ εἰς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέψαντες, ἔχομεν ἂν καὶ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε. . . . ἐπεὶ εἰ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τέλος ἀποβλέπετε, ὅταν καλῆτε αὐτὸ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἀγαθόν, ἢ πρὸς ὃ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἔχετε ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐχ ἔξετε.*

² In a remarkable passage of the *De Legibus*, Plato denies all essential distinction between Good and Pleasure, and all reality of Good apart from Pleasure (*Legg.* II. pp. 662-663). *εἰ δ' αὖ τὸν δικαιοτάτον εὐδαιμονίστατον ἀποφαινοῖτο βίαν εἶναι, ζητοῖ πᾶν πᾶς ἂν ὁ ἀκούων, ὅμαι, τί ποῦ ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς κρείττον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλὸν ὃ νόμος εἶναι*

ἐπαινεῖ; τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῃ χωριζόμενον ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γένοιτο;

Plato goes on to argue as follows: Even though it were not true, as I affirm it to be, that the life of justice is a life of pleasure, and the life of injustice a life of pain—still the lawgiver must proclaim this proposition as a useful falsehood, and compel every one to chime in with it. Otherwise the youth will have no motive to just conduct. For no one will willingly consent to obey any recommendation from which he does not expect more pleasure than pain; οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἐκὼν ἑλθοῖ πείθεσθαι πράττειν τούτο ὃ, τῷ μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἔπεται (663 B).

proceed in
discriminat-
ing them.
No such dis-
tinct state-
ment in the
Gorgias.

is the more sensibly felt, when we read in the same dialogue, that—"It is not every man who can distinguish the good pleasures from the bad : a scientific man, proceeding on principle, is needed for the purpose".¹ But upon what criterion is the scientific man to proceed? Of what properties is he to take account, in pronouncing one pleasure to be bad, another good—or one pain to be bad and another good—the estimate of consequences, measured in future pleasures and pains, being by the supposition excluded? No information is given. The problem set to the scientific man is one of which all the quantities are unknown. Now Sokrates in the Protagoras² also lays it down, that a scientific or rational calculation must be had, and a mind competent to such calculation must be postulated, to decide which pleasures are bad or fit to be rejected—which pains are good, or proper to be endured. But then he clearly specifies the elements which alone are to be taken into the calculation—viz., the future pleasures and pains accompanying or dependent upon each with the estimate of their comparative magnitude and durability. The theory of this calculation is clear and intelligible : though in many particular cases, the data necessary for making it, and the means of comparing them, may be very imperfectly accessible.

According to various ethical theories, which have chiefly
Modern ethical theories. Intuition. Moral sense—not recognised by Plato in either of the dialogues.
obtained currency in modern times, the distinction—between pleasures good or fit to be enjoyed, and pleasures bad or unfit to be enjoyed—is determined for us by a moral sense or intuition : by a simple, peculiar, sentiment of right and wrong, or a conscience, which springs up within us ready-made, and decides on such matters without appeal ; so that a man has only to look into his own heart for a solution. We need not take account of this hypothesis, in reviewing Plato's philosophy : for he evidently does not proceed upon it. He expressly affirms, in the Gorgias as well as in the Protagoras, that the question is one requiring science or knowledge to determine it, and upon

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 500 A. 'Ἀπ' οὗν παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἐστιν ἐκλέεσθαι τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰν ἡδέων ἵστί καὶ ἐνοεῖα κακά; ἢ

τεχνικοῦ δεῖ εἰς ἕκαστον; Τεχνικοῦ.

² Plato, Protagoras, pp. 357 B, 356 E.

which none but the man of science or *expert* (τεχνικός) is a competent judge.

Moreover, there is another point common to both the two dialogues, deserving of notice. I have already remarked when reviewing the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras, that it appears to me seriously defective, inasmuch as it takes into account the pleasures and pains of the agent only, and omits the pleasures and pains of other persons affected by his conduct. But this is not less true respecting the doctrine of Sokrates in the Gorgias: for whatever criterion he may there have in his mind to determine which among our pleasures are bad, it is certainly not this—that the agent in procuring them is obliged to hurt others. For the example which Sokrates cites as specially illustrating the class of bad pleasures—*viz.*, the pleasure of scratching an itching part of the body¹—is one in which no others besides the agent are concerned. As in the Protagoras, so in the Gorgias—Plato in laying down his rule of life, admits into the theory only what concerns the agent himself, and makes no direct reference to the happiness of others as affected by the agent's behaviour.

In both dialogues the doctrine of Sokrates is self-regarding as respects the agent: not considering the pleasures and pains of other persons, so far as affected by the agent.

There are however various points of analogy between the Protagoras and the Gorgias, which will enable us, after tracing them out, to measure the amount of substantial difference between them; I speak of the reasoning of Sokrates in each. Thus, in the Protagoras,² Sokrates ranks health, strength, preservation of the community, wealth, command, &c., under the general head of Good things, but expressly on the ground that they are the producing causes and conditions of pleasures and of exemption from pains: he also ranks sickness and poverty under the head of Evil things, as productive causes of pain and suffering. In the Gorgias also, he numbers wisdom, health, strength, perfection of body, riches, &c., among Good things or profitable things³—(which two words he treats as

Points wherein the doctrine of the two dialogues is in substance the same, but differing in classification.

¹ The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have reckoned this among the bad pleasures, because the discomfort and distress of body out of which it arises more than countervails the pleasure.

² Plato, Protagor. pp. 358 D, 354 A.

³ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467-468-490.

equivalent)—and their contraries as Evil things. Now he does not expressly say here (as in the *Protagoras*) that these things are good, because they are productive causes of pleasure or exemption from pain: but such assumption must evidently be supplied in order to make the reasoning valid. For upon what pretence can any one pronounce strength, health, riches, to be good—and helplessness, sickness, poverty, to be evil—if no reference be admitted to pleasures and pains? Sokrates in the *Gorgias*¹ declares that the pleasures of eating and drinking are good, in so far as they impart health and strength to the body—evil, in so far as they produce a contrary effect. Sokrates in the *Protagoras* reasons in the same way—but with this difference—that he would count the pleasure of the repast itself as one item of good: enhancing the amount of good where the future consequences are beneficial, diminishing the amount of evil where the future consequences are unfavourable: while Sokrates in the *Gorgias* excludes immediate pleasure from the list of good things, and immediate pain from the list of evil things.

This last exclusion renders the theory in the *Gorgias* untenable and inconsistent. If present pleasure be not admitted as an item of good so far as it goes—then neither can the future and consequent aggregates of pleasure, nor the causes of them, be admitted as good. So likewise, if present pain be no evil, future pain cannot be allowed to rank as an evil.²

Each of the two dialogues, which I am now comparing, is in Kallikles, truth an independent composition: in each, Sokrates whom has a distinct argument to combat; and in the latest Sokrates refutes in of the two (whichever that was), no heed is taken of

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 499 D.

² Compare a passage in the *Republic* (II. p. 357) where Sokrates gives (or accepts, as given by Glaukon) a description of Good much more coincident with the *Protagoras* than with the *Gorgias*. The common property of all Good is to be desired or loved; and there are three varieties of it—1. That which we desire for itself, and for its own sake, apart from all ulterior consequences, such as innocuous pleasures or enjoyments. 2. That which we desire both for itself and for its ulterior consequences, such as good health, good vision, good sense, &c. 3. That which

we do not desire—nay, which we perhaps hate or shun, *per se*: but which we nevertheless desire and invite, in connection with and for the sake of ulterior consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment when we are sick, labour in our trade or profession.

Here Plato admits the immediately pleasurable *per se* as one variety of good, always assuming that it is not counterbalanced by consequences or accompaniments of a painful character. This is the doctrine of the *Protagoras*, as distinguished from the *Gorgias*, where Sokrates sets pleasure in marked opposition to good.

the argumentation in the earlier. In the Protagoras, he exalts the dignity and paramount force of knowledge or prudence : if a man knows how to calculate pleasures and pains, he will be sure to choose the result which involves the greater pleasure or the less pain, on the whole : to say that he is overpowered by immediate pleasure or pain into making a bad choice, is a wrong description—the real fact being, that he is deficient in the proper knowledge how to choose. In the Gorgias, the doctrine assigned to Kalliklēs and impugned by Sokrates is something very different. That justice, temperance, self-restraint, are indeed indispensable to the happiness of ordinary men ; but if there be any one individual, so immensely superior in force as to trample down and make slaves of the rest, this one man would be a fool if he restrained himself : having the means of gratifying all his appetites, the more appetites he has, the more enjoyments will he have and the greater happiness.¹ Observe—that Kalliklēs applies this doctrine only to the one omnipotent despot : to all other members of society, he maintains that self-restraint is essential. This is the doctrine which Sokrates in the Gorgias undertakes to refute, by denying community of nature between the pleasurable and the good—between the painful and the evil.

To me his refutation appears altogether unsuccessful, and the position upon which he rests it incorrect. The only parts of the refutation really forcible, are those in which he unconsciously relinquishes this position, and slides into the doctrine of the Protagoras. Upon this latter doctrine, a refutation might be grounded : you may show that even an omnipotent despot (regard for the comfort of others being excluded by the hypothesis) will gain by limiting the gratification of his appetites to-day so as not to spoil his appetites of to-morrow. Even in his case, prudential restraint is required, though his motives for it would be much less than in the case of ordinary social men. But Good, as laid down by Plato in the Gorgias, entirely disconnected from plea-

the Gorgias, maintains a different argument from that which Sokrates combats in the Protagoras.

The refutation of Kalliklēs by Sokrates in the Gorgias, is unsuccessful—it is only so far successful as he adopts unintentionally the doctrine of Sokrates in the Protagoras.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 492 B.

sure—and Evil, entirely disconnected from pain—have no application to this supposed despot. He has no desire for such Platonic Good—no aversion for such Platonic Evil. His happiness is not diminished by missing the former or incurring the latter. In fact, one of the cardinal principles of Plato's ethical philosophy, which he frequently asserts both in this dialogue and elsewhere,¹—That every man desires Good, and acts for the sake of obtaining Good, and avoiding Evil—becomes untrue, if you conceive Good and Evil according to the Gorgias, as having no reference to pleasure or the avoidance of pain: untrue, not merely in regard to a despot under these exceptional conditions, but in regard to the large majority of social men. They desire to obtain Good and avoid Evil, in the sense of the Protagoras: but not in the sense of the Gorgias.² Sokrates himself proclaims in this dialogue: "I and philosophy stand opposed to Kalliklēs and the Athenian public. What I desire is, to reason consistently with myself." That is, to speak the language of Sokrates in the Protagoras—"To me, Sokrates, the consciousness of inconsistency with myself and of an unworthy character, the loss of my own self-esteem and the pungency of my own self-reproach, are the greatest of all pains: greater than those which you, Kalliklēs, and the Athenians generally, seek to avoid at all price and urge me also to avoid at all price—poverty, political nullity, exposure

¹ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 467 C, 499 E.

² The reasoning of Plato in the Gorgias, respecting this matter, rests upon an equivocal phrase. The Greek phrase *εὖ πράττειν* has two meanings; it means *recte agere*, to act rightly; and it also means *felicitatem esse*, to be happy. There is a corresponding double sense in *κακῶς πράττειν*. Heindorf has well noticed the fallacious reasoning founded by Plato on this double sense. We read in the Gorgias, p. 507 C: *ἀνάγκη τὸν σώφρονα, δίκαιον ὄντα καὶ ἀνδρείον καὶ ὀσίον, ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι τελευτῶν, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὸν εὖ τε καὶ καλῶς πράττειν ἢ ἂν πράττῃ, τὸν δ' εὖ πράττοντα μακάριόν τε καὶ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, τὸν δὲ πονηρὸν καὶ κακῶς πράττοντα ἄθλιον*. Upon which Heindorf remarks, citing a note of Routh, who says, "Vix enim potest credi, Platonem duplici sensu verborum *εὖ πράττειν* ad argumentum probandum abuti voluisse, quæ fallacia esset amphibolias". "Non me-

minerat" (says Heindorf) "*vir doctus ceteros in Platone locos, ubi eodem modo ex duplici illâ potestate argumentatio ducitur, cujusmodi plura attulimus ad Charmidem, 42, p. 172 A.*" Heindorf observes, on the Charmides l. c.: "*Argumenti hujus vim positam apparet in duplici dictionis *εὖ πράττειν* significatu: quum vulgo sit *felicitatem esse*, non *recte facere*. Hoc aliaque ejusdem generis sapientis sic animam præbuerunt sophismatis magis quam justis syllogismis.*" Heindorf then refers to analogous passages in Plato, *Repub.* l. p. 364 A: *Alkib.* l. p. 116 B, p. 124 A. A similar fallacy is found in Aristotle, *Polit.* vii. l. p. 1323, a. 17, b. 32—*ἄριστα γὰρ πράττειν προσήκει τοῖς ἀρίστοις πολιτευομένοις—δύναται δὲ καλῶς πράττειν τοῖς μὴ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντι*. This fallacy is recognised and properly commented on as a "logisches Wortspiel," by Bernays, in his instructive volume, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, pp. 80-81 (Berlin, 1863).

to false accusation, &c."¹ The noble scheme of life, here recommended by Sokrates, may be correctly described according to the theory of the Protagoras: without any resort to the paradox of the Gorgias, that Good has no kindred or reference to Pleasure, nor Evil to Pain.

Lastly—I will compare the Protagoras and the Gorgias (meaning always, the reasoning of Sokrates in each of them) under one more point of view. How does each of them describe and distinguish the permanent elements, and the transient elements, involved in human agency? What function does each of them assign to the permanent element? The distinction of these two is important in its ethical bearing. The whole life both of the individual and of society consists of successive moments of action or feeling. But each individual (and the society as an aggregate of individuals) has within him embodied and realised an element more or less permanent—an established character, habits, dispositions, intellectual acquirements, &c.—a sort of capital accumulated from the past. This permanent element is of extreme importance. It stands to the transient element in the same relation as the fixed capital of a trader or manufacturer to his annual produce. The whole use and value of the fixed capital, of which the skill and energy of the trader himself make an important part, consists in the amount of produce which it will yield: but at the same time the trader must keep it up in its condition of fixed capital, in order to obtain such amount: he must set apart, and abstain from devoting to immediate enjoyment, as much of the annual produce as will suffice to maintain the fixed capital unimpaired—and more, if he desires to improve his condition. The capital cannot be commuted into interest; yet nevertheless its whole value depends upon, and is measured by, the interest which it yields. Doubtless the mere idea of possessing the capital is pleasurable to the possessor, because he knows that it can and will be profitably employed, so long as he chooses.

Permanent elements—and transient elements—of human agency—how each of them is appreciated in the two dialogues.

Now in the Protagoras, the permanent element is very pointedly distinguished from the transient, and is called Knowledge—the Science or Art of Calculation.

In the Protagoras.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 481 D, 482 B.

Its function also is clearly announced—to take comparative estimate and measurement of the transient elements; which are stated to consist of pleasures and pains, present and future—near and distant—certain and uncertain—faint and strong. To these elements, manifold yet commensurable, the calculation is to apply. “The safety of life” (says Sokrates¹) “resides in our keeping up this science or art of calculation.” No present enjoyment must be admitted, which would impair it; no present pain must be shunned, which is essential to uphold it. Yet the whole of its value resides in its application to the comparison of the pleasures and pains.

In the Gorgias the same two elements are differently described, and less clearly explained. The permanent is termed, *In the Gorgias*. Order, arrangement, discipline, a lawful, just, and temperate, cast of mind (opposed to the doctrine ascribed to Kallikles, which negatived this element altogether, in the mind of the despot), parallel to health and strength of body: the unordered mind is again the parallel of the corrupt; distempered, helpless, body; life is not worth having until this is cured.² This corresponds to the knowledge or Calculating Science in the Protagoras; but we cannot understand what its function is, in the Gorgias, because the calculable elements are incompletely enumerated.

In the Protagoras, these calculable elements are two-fold—immediate pleasures and pains—and future or distant pleasures and pains. Between these two there is intercommunity of nature, so that they are quite commensurable; and the function of the calculating reason is, to make a right estimate of the one against the other.³ But in the Gorgias, no mention is made of future or distant pleasures and pains: the calculable element is represented only by immediate pleasure or pain—and from thence we pass at once to the permanent calculator—the mind, sound or corrupt. You must abstain from a particular enjoyment, because it will

¹ Plato, *Protag.* p. 357 A. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὁρῇ τῇ αἰρεῖται ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὕσα, τοῦ τε πλεόνος καὶ ἐλάττωτος καὶ μειζρόνος καὶ μικροτέρου καὶ πορρωτέρου καὶ ἐγγυτέρου, &c.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 504 B-C, 506 D-E. Τάξις—κόσμος—ψυχὴ κοσμία ἀμείνων τοῦ ἀκοσμήτου.

³ There would be also the like inter-

community of nature, if along with the pains and pleasures of the agent himself (which alone are regarded in the calculation of Sokrates in the Protagoras) you admit into the calculation the pleasures and pains of others concerned, and the rules established with a view to both the two together—with a view to the joint interest both of the agent and of others.

taint the soundness of your mind : this is a pertinent reason (and would be admitted as such by Sokrates in the Protagoras, who instead of sound mind would say, calculating intelligence), but it is neither the ultimate reason (since this soundness of mind is itself valuable with a view to future calculations), nor the only reason : for you must also abstain, if it will bring upon yourself (or upon others) preponderating pains in the particular case—if the future pains would preponderate over the present pleasure. Of this last calculation no notice is taken in the Gorgias : which exhibits only the antithesis (not merely marked but even overdone¹) between the immediate pleasure or pain and the calculating efficacy of mind, but leaves out the true function which gives value to the sound mind as distinguished from the unsound and corrupt. That function consists in its application to particular cases : in right dealing with actual life, as regards the agent himself and others : in *ἐνεργεῖα*, as distinguished from *εἶς*, to use Aristotelian language.² I am far from supposing that this part of the case was absent from Plato's mind. But the theory laid out in the Gorgias (as compared with that in the Protagoras) leaves no room for it ; giving exclusive prominence to the other elements, and acknowledging only the present pleasure or pain, to be set against the permanent condition of mind, bad or good as it may be.

Indeed there is nothing more remarkable in the Gorgias, than the manner in which Sokrates not only condemns the unmeasured, exorbitant, maleficent desires, but also depreciates and degrades all the actualities of life—all the recreative and elegant arts, including music and poetry, tragic as well as dithyrambic—all provision for the most essential wants, all protection against particular

Character of the Gorgia generally—discrediting all the actualities of life.

¹ Epikurus and his followers assigned the greatest value, in their ethical theory, to the permanent element, or established character of the agent, intellectual and emotional. But great as they reckoned this value to be, they resolved it all into the diminution or mitigation of pains, and, in a certain though inferior degree, the multiplication of pleasures. They did not put it in a separate category of its own, altogether disparate and foreign to pleasures and pains.

See the letter of Epikurus to Menoikeus, Diog. L. x. 128-132 ; Lucetius, v. 18-45, vi. 12-25 ; Horat. Epist. i. 2, 48-60.

² Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 7. The remark of Aristotle in the same treatise, i. 5—*δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδεχέσθαι καὶ καθύπερθε ἔχοντα τῇ ἀρετῇ, ἣ ἀνακτεῖν διὰ βίον*—might be applied to the theory of the Gorgias. Compare also Ethic. Nik. vii. 3 (vil. 4, p. 1146, b. 31, p. 1147, a. 12).

sufferings and dangers, even all service rendered to another person in the way of relief or of rescue¹—all the effective maintenance of public organised force, such as ships, docks, walls, arms, &c. Immediate satisfaction or relief, and those who confer it, are treated with contempt, and presented as in hostility to the perfection of the mental structure. And it is in this point of view that various Platonic commentators extol in an especial manner the Gorgias : as recognising an Idea of Good superhuman and supernatural, radically disparate from pleasures and pains of any human being, and incommensurable with them : an Universal Idea, which, though it is supposed to cast a distant light

¹ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 501-502-511-512-517-519. ἀνεν γὰρ δικαιοσύνης καὶ σωφροσύνης λιμίνων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ ταχυῶν καὶ φέρον καὶ τοιοῦτων φλυαρίων ἐμπεσθήσασιν τὴν πόλιν.

This is applied to the provision of food, drink, clothing, bedding, for the hunger, thirst, &c., of the community (p. 517 D), to the saving of life (p. 511 D). The boatman between Ægina and Peiræus (says Plato) brings over his passengers in safety, together with their families and property, preserving them from all the dangers of the sea. The engineer, who constructs good fortifications, preserves from danger and destruction all the citizens with their families and their property (p. 512 B). But neither of these persons takes credit for this service : because both of them know that it is doubtful whether they have done any real service to the persons preserved, since they have not rendered them any better ; and that it is even doubtful whether they may not have done them an actual mischief. Perhaps these persons may be wicked and corrupt ; in that case it is a misfortune to them that their lives should be prolonged ; it would be better for them to die. It is under this conviction (says Plato) that the boatman and the engineer, though they do preserve our lives, take to themselves no credit for it.

We shall hardly find any greater rhetorical exaggeration than this, among all the compositions of the rhetors against whom Plato declares war in the Gorgias. Moreover, it is a specimen of the way in which Plato colours and misinterprets the facts of

social life, in order to serve the purpose of the argument of the moment. He says truly that when the passage boat from Ægina to Peiræus has reached its destination, the steersman receives his fare and walks about on the shore, without taking any great credit to himself, as if he had performed a brilliant deed or conferred an important service. But how does Plato explain this ? By supposing in the steersman's mind feelings which never enter into the mind of a real agent ; feelings which are put into words only when a moralist or a satirist is anxious to enforce a sentiment. The service which the steersman performs is not only adequately remunerated, but is, on most days, a regular and easy one, such as every man who has gone through a decent apprenticeship can perform. But suppose an exceptional day—suppose a sudden and terrible storm to supervene on the passage—suppose the boat full of passengers, with every prospect of all on board being drowned—suppose she is only saved by the extraordinary skill, vigilance, and efforts of the steersman. In that case he will, on reaching the land, walk about full of elate self-congratulation and pride : the passengers will encourage this sentiment by expressions of the deepest gratitude ; while friends as well as competitors will praise his successful exploit. How many of the passengers there are for whom the preservation of life may be a curse rather than a blessing—is a question which neither they themselves, nor the steersman, nor the public, will ever dream of asking.

upon its particulars, is separated from them by an incalculable space, and is discernible only by the Platonic telescope.

We have now established (continues Sokrates) that pleasure is essentially different from good, and pain from evil : also, that to obtain good and avoid evil, a scientific choice is required—while to obtain pleasure and avoid pain, is nothing more than blind imitation or irrational knack. There are some arts and pursuits which aim only at procuring immediate pleasure—others which aim at attaining good or the best ;¹ some arts, for a single person,—others for a multitude. Arts and pursuits which aim only at immediate pleasure, either of one or of a multitude, belong to the general head of Flattery. Among them are all the musical, choric, and dithyrambic representations at the festivals—tragedy as well as comedy—also political and judicial rhetoric. None of these arts aim at any thing except to gratify the public to whom they are addressed : none of them aim at the permanent good : none seek to better the character of the public. They adapt themselves to the prevalent desires : but whether those desires are such as, if realised, will make the public worse or better, they never enquire.²

Argument of Sokrates resumed—multifarious arts of flattery, aiming at immediate pleasure.

Sokr.—Do you know any public speakers who aim at anything more than gratifying the public, or who care to make the public better? *Kall.*—There are some who do, and others who do not. *Sokr.*—Which are those who do? and which of them has ever made the public

The Rhetors aim only at flattering the public—even the best part

¹ The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have admitted a twofold distinction of aims, but would have stated the distinction otherwise. Two things (he would say) may be looked at in regard to any course of conduct : first, the immediate pleasure or pain which it yields ; secondly, this item, not alone, but combined with all the other pleasures and pains which can be foreseen as its conditions, consequences, or concomitants. To obey the desire of immediate pleasure, or the fear of immediate pain, requires no science ;

to foresee, estimate, and compare the consequences, requires a scientific calculation often very difficult and complicated—a τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη μετρίως.

Thus we are told not only in what cases the calculation is required, but what are the elements to be taken into the calculation. In the Gorgias, we are not told on what elements the calculation of good and evil is to be based : we are told that there *must be science*, but we learn nothing more.

² Plato, Gorgias, pp. 502-503.

Rhetors better? ¹ *Kall.*—At any rate, former statesmen did so; such as Miltiades, Themistokles, Kimon, Perikles. *Sokr.*—None of them. If they had, you would have seen them devoting themselves systematically and obviously to their one end. As a builder labours to construct a ship or a house, by putting together its various parts with order and symmetry—so these statesmen would have laboured to implant order and symmetry in the minds and bodies of the citizens: that is, justice and temperance in their minds, health and strength in their bodies. ² Unless the statesman can do this, it is fruitless to supply the wants, to fulfil the desires and requirements, to uphold or enlarge the power, of the citizens. This is like supplying ample nourishment to a distempered body: the more such a body takes in, the worse it becomes. The citizens must be treated with refusal of their wishes and with punishment, until their vices are healed, and they become good. ³

We ought to do (continues Sokrates) what is pleasing for the sake of what is good: not *vice versa*. But every thing becomes good by possessing its appropriate virtue or regulation. The regulation appropriate to the mind is, to be temperate. The temperate man will do what is just—his duty towards men: and what is holy—his duty towards the Gods. He will be just and holy. He will therefore also be courageous: for he will seek only such pleasures as duty permits, and he will endure all such pains as duty requires. Being thus temperate, just, brave, holy, he will be a perfectly good man, doing well and honourably throughout. The man who does well, will be happy: the man who does ill and is wicked, will be miserable. ⁴ It ought to be our principal aim, both for ourselves individually and for the city, to attain temperance and to keep clear of intemperance: not to let our desires run immoderately (as you, Kallikles, advise), and then seek repletion for them: which is an endless mischief, the life of a pirate. He who pursues this plan can neither be the friend of any other man, nor of the Gods: for he is incapable of communion, and therefore of friendship. ⁵

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 508 C.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 504 D.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 505 B.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 507 D (with

Routh and Heindorf's notes).

⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 507 E. *κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἀδύνατος· ὅτι δὲ μὴ ἐνὶ κοινωνίᾳ, φιλία οὐκ ἔστιν.*

Now, Kallikles (pursues Sokrates), you have reproached me with standing aloof from public life in order to pursue philosophy. You tell me that by not cultivating public speaking and public action, I am at the mercy of any one who chooses to accuse me unjustly and to bring upon me severe penalties. But I tell you, that it is a greater evil to do wrong than to suffer wrong; and that my first business is, to provide for myself such power and such skill as shall guard me against doing wrong.¹ Next, as to suffering wrong, there is only one way of taking precautions against it. You must yourself rule in the city: or you must be a friend of the ruling power. Like is the friend of like:² a cruel despot on the throne will hate and destroy any one who is better than himself, and will despise any one worse than himself. The only person who will have influence is, one of the same dispositions as the despot: not only submitting to him with good will, but praising and blaming the same things as he does—accustomed from youth upwards to share in his preferences and aversions, and assimilated to him as much as possible.³ Now if the despot be a wrong-doer, he who likens himself to the despot will become a wrong-doer also. And thus, in taking precautions against suffering wrong, he will incur the still greater mischief and corruption of doing wrong, and will be worse off instead of better.

Kall.—But if he does not liken himself to the despot, the despot may put him to death, if he chooses? *Sokr.*—Perhaps he may: but it will be death inflicted by a bad man upon a good man.⁴ To prolong life is not the foremost consideration, but to decide by rational thought what is the best way of passing that length of life which the Fates allot.⁵ Is it my best plan to do as you

Impossible to succeed in public life, unless a man be thoroughly akin to and in harmony with the ruling force.

Danger of one who dissents from the public, either for better or for worse.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 509 C. Compare *Leges*, viii. 829 A, where τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖν is described as easy of attainment; τὸ μὴ ἀδικεῖσθαι, as being πᾶσι χεῖρον: and both equally necessary πρὸς τὸ εὐδαιμόνως ζῆν.

² *Plat. Gorg.* 510 B. φίλος—ὁ ὅμοιος τῷ ὁμοίῳ. We have already seen this principle discussed and rejected in the *Lysis*, p. 214. See above, ch. xx., p. 179.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 510 C. λέγεται

ὅτι ἐκεῖνος μόνος ἄξιος λόγου φίλος τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὅς ἂν, ὁμοίησιν ὢν, ταῦτα φέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν, ἐβίη ἀρχεσθαι καὶ υποκεῖσθαι τῷ ἀρχοντι. Οὗτος μέγα ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει δυνήσεται, τούτων οὐδεὶς χαίρων ἀδικήσει. . . . Αὕτη ὁδὸς ἐστίν, εὐθύς ἐκ νέου ἰβίζειν αὐτὸν τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἀχθεσθαι τῷ δεσπότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὃ τι μάλιστα ὁμοίος ἔσται ἐκείνῳ.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 511 B.

⁵ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 511 B, 512 E.

recommend, and to liken myself as much as possible to the Athenian people—in order that I may become popular and may acquire power in the city? For it will be impossible for you to acquire power in the city, if you dissent from the prevalent political character and practice, be it for the better or for the worse. Even imitation will not be sufficient: you must be, by natural disposition, homogeneous with the Athenians, if you intend to acquire much favour with them. Whoever makes you most like to them, will help you forward most towards becoming an effective statesman and speaker: for every assembly delight in speeches suited to their own dispositions, and reject speeches of an opposite tenor.¹

Such are the essential conditions of political success and popularity. But I, Kalliklēs, have already distinguished two schemes of life; one aiming at pleasure, the other aiming at good: one, that of the statesman who studies the felt wants, wishes, and impulses of the people, displaying his genius in providing for them effective satisfaction—the other, the statesman who makes it his chief or sole object to amend the character and disposition of the people. The last scheme is the only one which I approve: and if it be that to which you invite me, we must examine whether either you, Kallikles, or I, have ever yet succeeded in amending or improving the character of any individuals privately, before we undertake the task of amending the citizens collectively.² None of the past statesmen whom you extol, Miltiades, Kimon, Themistokles, Perikles, has produced any such amendment.³ Considered as ministers, indeed, they were skilful and effective; better than the present statesmen. They were successful in furnishing satisfaction to the prevalent wants and desires of the citizens: they provided docks, walls, ships, tribute, and other such follies, abundantly:⁴

Sokrates resolves upon a scheme of life for himself—to study permanent good, and not immediate satisfaction.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 518 A. καὶ νῦν δὲ ἄρα δεῖ σε ὥς ὁμοϊότατον γίγνεσθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῷ Ἀθηναίων, εἰ μὲλλεις τοῦτο προσφιλὲς εἶναι καὶ μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει. . . . εἰ δὲ σοι οἶσι ὀντινοῦν ἀνθρώπων παραβάσειν τέχνην πυνά τοιαύτην, ἥ τίς σε πείσῃσι μέγα δύνασθαι ἐν τῇ πόλει τῇδε, ἀνέμοιοι οὗτα τῇ πολιτείᾳ εἶς ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον εἶς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον οὐκ ὁρᾷς βουλεύει· οὐ γὰρ

μικτὴν δεῖ εἶναι, ἀλλ' αὐτοφύως ὁμοῖον τοῖσι, εἰ μὲλλεις τι γνήσιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι εἰς φιλίαν τῷ Ἀθηναίων δήμῳ.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 515 A.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 518, 517.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 517, 519. ἄνευ γὰρ σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης λιμέντων καὶ νεωρίων καὶ τειχῶν καὶ φόρων καὶ τοιούτων φλυαρίων ἐμπηλῆκας τὴν πόλιν.

but they did nothing to amend the character of the people—to transfer the desires of the people from worse things to better things—or to create in them justice and temperance. They thus did no real good by feeding the desires of the people: no more good than would be done by a skilful cook for a sick man, in cooking for him a sumptuous meal before the physician had cured him.

I believe myself (continues Sokrates) to be the only man in Athens,—or certainly one among a very few,—who am a true statesman, following out the genuine purposes of the political art.¹ I aim at what is best for the people, not at what is most agreeable. I do not value those captivating accomplishments which tell in the Dikastery. If I am tried, I shall be like a physician arraigned by the confectioner before a jury of children. I shall not be able to refer to any pleasures provided for them by me: pleasures which *they* call benefits, but which I regard as worthless. If any one accuses me of corrupting the youth by making them sceptical, or of libelling the older men in my private and public talk—it will be in vain for me to justify myself by saying the real truth.—Dikasts, I do and say all these things justly, for your real benefit. I shall not be believed when I say this, and I have nothing else to say: so that I do not know what sentence may be passed on me.² My only refuge and defence will be, the innocence of my life. As for death, no one except a fool or a coward fears *that*: the real evil, and the greatest of all evils, is to pass into Hades with a corrupt and polluted mind.³

Sokrates announces himself as almost the only man at Athens, who follows out the true political art. Danger of doing this.

Sokrates then winds up the dialogue, by reciting a *Nékyia*, a mythic or hypothesis about judgment in Hades after death, and rewards and punishments to be apportioned to deceased men, according to their merits during life, by Rhadamanthus and Minos. The greatest sufferers by these judgments (he says) will be the kings, despots, and men politically powerful, who have during their lives committed the greatest in-

Mythe respecting Hades, and the treatment of deceased persons therein, according to their merits during life—

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 521 D.

² Plato, Gorgias, pp. 521-522.

³ Plato, Gorgias, p. 522 E. αὐτὸ μὲν

γὰρ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν οὐδεὶς φοβέται, ὅστις μὴ παντάπασιν ἀλόγιστός τε καὶ ἀνάνδρὸς ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ ἀδικεῖν φοβέται, &c.

the philosopher, who stood aloof from public affairs, will then be rewarded.

justices,—which indeed few of them avoid.¹ The man most likely to fare well and to be rewarded, will be the philosopher, “who has passed through life minding his own business, and not meddling with the affairs of others”.²

“Dicuntur ista magnifice,”³—we may exclaim, in Ciceronian words, on reaching the close of the Gorgias. It is pre-eminently solemn and impressive; all the more so, from the emphasis of Sokrates, when proclaiming the isolation in which he stands at Athens, and the contradiction between his ethico-political views and those of his fellow-citizens. In this respect it harmonises with the Apology, the Kriton, Republic, and Leges: in all which, the peculiarity of his ethical points of view stands proclaimed—especially in the Kriton, where he declares that his difference with his opponents is fundamental, and that there can be between them no common ground for debate—nothing but reciprocal contempt.⁴

The argument of Sokrates in the Gorgias is interesting, not merely as extolling the value of ethical self-restraint, but also as considering political phenomena under this point of view: that is, merging politics in ethics. The proper and paramount function of statesmen (we find it eloquently proclaimed) is to serve as spiritual teachers in the community: for the purpose of amending the lives and characters of the citizens, and of converting them from bad dispositions to good. We are admonished that until this is effected, more is lost than gained by realising the actual wants and wishes of the community, which are disorderly and distempered: like the state of a sick man,

He merges politics in Ethics—he conceives the rulers as spiritual teachers and trainers of the community.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 525-526.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 526 C. φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος, καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῷ βίῳ.

It must be confessed that these terms do not correspond to the life of Sokrates, as he himself describes it in the

Platonic Apology. He seems to have fancied that no one was πολυπραγμονῶν, except those who spoke habitually in the Ekklesia and the Dikastery.

³ Cicero, De Finib. iii. 3, 11.

⁴ Plato, Kriton, p. 49 D.

who would receive harm and not benefit from a sumptuous banquet.

This is the conception of Plato in the *Gorgias*, speaking through the person of Sokrates, respecting the ends for which the political magistrate ought to employ his power. The magistrate, as administering law and justice, is to the minds of the community what the trainer and the physician are to their bodies: he produces goodness of mind, as the two latter produce health and strength of body. The Platonic *idéal* is that of a despotic law-giver and man-trainer, wielding the compulsory force of the secular arm for what he believes to be spiritual improvement. However instructive it is to study the manner in which a mind like that of Plato works out such a purpose in theory, there is no reason for regret that he never had an opportunity of carrying it into practice. The manner in which he always keeps in view the standing mental character, as an object of capital importance to be attended to, and as the analogon of health in the body—deserves all esteem. But when he assumes the sceptre of King *Nomos* (as in *Republic* and *Leges*) to fix by unchangeable authority what shall be the orthodox type of character, and to suppress all the varieties of emotion and intellect, except such as will run into a few predetermined moulds—he oversteps all the reasonable aims and boundaries of the political office.

Idéal of Plato—a despotic law-giver or man-trainer, on scientific principles, fashioning all characters pursuant to certain types of his own.

Plato forgets two important points of difference, in that favourite and very instructive analogy which he perpetually reproduces, between mental goodness and bodily health. First, good health and strength of the body (as I have observed already) are states which every man knows when he has got them. Though there is much doubt and dispute about causes, preservative, destructive, and restorative, there is none about the present fact. Every sick man derives from his own sensations an anxiety to get well. But virtue is not a point thus fixed, undisputed, indubitable: it is differently conceived by different persons, and must first be discovered and settled by a process of enquiry; the Platonic Sokrates himself, in many of the dialogues—after declaring that neither he nor any

Platonic analogy between mental goodness and bodily health—incomplete analogy—circumstances of difference.

one else within his knowledge, knows what it is—tries to find it out without success. Next, the physician, who is the person actively concerned in imparting health and strength, exercises no coercive power over any one: those who consult him have the option whether they will follow the advice given, or not. To put himself upon the same footing with the physician, the political magistrate ought to confine himself to the function of advice; a function highly useful, but in which he will be called upon to meet argumentative opposition, and frequent failure, together with the mortification of leaving those whom he cannot convince, to follow their own mode of life. Here are two material differences, modifying the applicability of that very analogy on which Plato so frequently rests his proof.

In Plato's two imaginary commonwealths, where he is himself despotic law-giver, there would have been no tolerable existence possible for any one not shaped upon the Platonic spiritual model. But in the Gorgias, Plato (speaking in the person of Sokrates) is called upon to define his plan of life in a free state, where he was merely a private citizen. Sokrates receives from Kallikles the advice, to forego philosophy and to aspire to the influence and celebrity of an active public speaker. His reply is instructive, as revealing the interior workings of every political society. No man (he says) can find favour as an adviser—either of a despot, where there is one, or of a people where there is free government—unless he be in harmony with the sentiments and ideas prevalent, either with the ruling Many or the ruling One. He must be moulded, from youth upwards, on the same spiritual pattern as they are:¹ his love and hate, his praise and blame, must turn towards the same things: he must have the same tastes, the same morality, the same *ideal*, as theirs: he must be no imitator, but a chip of the same block. If he be either better than they or worse than they,² he will fail in acquiring popularity, and his efforts as a competitor for public

¹ Plato, Gorgias, p. 510 C-D. ὁμοφ-
θης ὢν, ταῦτά ψέγων καὶ ἐπαινῶν τῷ
ἄρχοντι. . . εὐδὸς ἐκ νῦν ἰθὺς αὐτὸν
τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν καὶ ἄχθεσθαι τῷ δεσ-
πότῃ, καὶ παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ὃ τι μά-

λιστα ὁμοίως εἶναι ἐκείνῳ. 513 B: οὐ
μμετῆρὸν δεῖ εἶναι ἀλλ' αὐτοφύως ὁμοίον
τούτοις.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 513 A. εἴρ' ἐπὶ
τὸ βέλτιον εἴρ' ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

influence will be not only abortive, but perhaps dangerous to himself.

The reasons which Sokrates gives here (as well as in the Apology, and partly also in the Republic) for not embarking in the competition of political aspirants, are of very general application. He is an innovator in religion; and a dissenter from the received ethics, politics, social sentiment, and estimate of life and conduct.¹ Whoever dissents upon these matters from the governing force (in whatever hands that may happen to reside) has no chance of being listened to as a political counsellor, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes without personal hurt or loss. Whether his dissent be for the better or for the worse, is a matter of little moment: the ruling body always think it worse, and the consequences to the dissenter are the same.

Sokrates feels his own isolation from his countrymen. He is thrown upon individual speculation and dialectic.

Herein consists the real antithesis between Sokrates, Plato, and philosophy, on the one side—Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Demosthenes, and rhetoric, on the other. "You," (says Sokrates to Kalliklês),² "are in love with the Athenian people, and take up or renounce such opinions as they approve or discountenance: I am in love with philosophy, and follow her guidance. You and other active politicians do not wish to have more than a smattering of philosophy; you are afraid of becoming unconsciously corrupted, if you carry it beyond such elementary stage."³ Each of these

Antithesis between philosophy and rhetoric.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 522 B; *Theætetus*, p. 179; *Menon*, p. 79.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 481 E.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 487 C. *ἔνικα ἐς ὑμῖν τοιῶδε τις δοξά, μὴ προθυμείσθαι εἰς τὴν ἀκριβείαν φιλοσοφεῖν, ἀλλὰ εὐλαβεῖσθαι. . . . ὅπως μὴ πέρα τοῦ δέοντος σοφώτεροι γινόμενοι λήσετε διαφθαρέντες.*

The view here advocated by Kalliklês:—That philosophy is good and useful, to be studied up to a certain point in the earlier years of life, in order to qualify persons for effective discharge of the duties of active citizenship, but that it ought not to be made the main occupation of mature life, nor be prosecuted up to the pitch of accurate theorising: this view, since Plato here assigns it to Kalliklês, is

denounced by most of the Platonic critics as if it were low and worthless. Yet it was held by many of the most respectable citizens of antiquity; and the question is, in point of fact, that which has always been in debate between the life of theoretical speculation and the life of action.

Isokrates urges the same view both in *Orat.* xv. *De Fermutatione*, sect. 232-237, pp. 485-486, Bekker; and *Orat.* xii. *Panathenaic*, sect. 29-32, p. 321, Bekker. *διατρίβει μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς παλαιὰς ταύτας χρόνον τινὰ συμβουλευσάμ' ἐν τοῖς νεωτέροις, μὴ μὲντοι περιβεῖν τὴν φύσιν τὴν αὐτῶν κατασκευασθεῖσαν ἐπὶ τούτοις, &c.* Cicero quotes a similar opinion put by Ennius the poet into the mouth of Neoptolemus, *Tusc. D. li. 1, 1*; Aulus

orators, discussing political measures before the public assembly, appealed to general maxims borrowed from the received creed of morality, religion, taste, politics, &c. His success depended mainly on the emphasis which his eloquence could lend to such maxims, and on the skill with which he could apply them to the case in hand. But Sokrates could not follow such an example. Anxious in his research after truth, he applied the test of analysis to the prevalent opinions—found them, in his judgment, neither consistent nor rational—constrained many persons to feel this, by an humiliating cross-examination—but became disqualified from addressing, with any chance of assent, the assembled public.

That in order to succeed politically, a man must be a genuine believer in the creed of King Nomos or the ruling force—cast in the same spiritual mould—(I here take the word *creed* not as confined to religion, but as embracing the whole of a man's critical *ideal*, on moral or social practice, politics, or taste—the ends which he deems worthy of being aspired to, or proper to be shunned, by himself or others) is laid down by Sokrates as a general position: and with perfect truth. In disposing of the force or influence of government, whoever possesses that force will use it conformably to his own maxims. A man who dissents from these maxims will find no favour in the public assembly; nor, probably, if his dissent be grave and wide, will he ever be able to speak out his convictions aloud in it, without incurring dangerous antipathy. But what is to become of such a dissenter¹—the man who frequents the same porticos with the people, but does not hold the same creed,

Position of one who dissents, upon material points, from the fixed opinions and creed of his countrymen.

Gell. v. 16—"de gustandum ex philosophia censet, non in eam ingurgitandum".

Tacitus, in describing the education of Agricola, who was taken by his mother in his earlier years to study at Massilia, says, c. 4:—"Memoria teneo, solitum ipsum narrare, se in prima juventutis studium philosophiae, ultra quam concessum Romano et senatori, hausisse; ni prudentis matris incensum ac flagrantem animum coercuisset."

I have already cited this last passage, and commented upon the same

point, in my notes at the end of the chapter on the Euthydēmus, p. 230.

¹ Horat. Epist. l. 1, 70—

"Quod si me populus Romanus forte roget, cur Non ut porticibus, sic iudiciis fruam
Iisdem,
Nec sequar aut fugiam quae diligit
Ipse vel odit:
Olim quod vulpes agroto canta leoni
Respondit, referam: Quia me vestigia
terrent
Omnia te adversum spectantis, nulla
retrosum."

nor share their judgments respecting social *expetenda* and *fugienda*? How is he to be treated by the government, or by the orthodox majority of society in their individual capacity? Debarred, by the necessity of the case, from influence over the public councils—what latitude of pursuit, profession, or conduct, is to be left to him as a citizen? How far is he to question, or expose, or require to be proved, that which the majority believe without proof? Shall he be required to profess, or to obey, or to refrain from contradicting, religious or ethical doctrines which he has examined and rejected? Shall such requirement be enforced by threat of legal penalties, or of ill-treatment from individuals, which is not less intolerable than legal penalties? What is likely to be his character, if compelled to suppress all declaration of his own creed, and to act and speak as if he were believer in another?

The questions here suggested must have impressed themselves forcibly on the mind of Plato when he recollected the fate of Sokrates. In spite of a blameless life, Sokrates had been judicially condemned and executed for publicly questioning received opinions, innovating upon the established religion, and instilling into young persons habits of doubt. To dissent only for the better, afforded no assurance of safety: and Plato knew well that his own dissent from the Athenian public was even wider and more systematic than that of his master. The position and plan of life for an active-minded reasoner, dissenting from the established opinions of the public, could not but be an object of interesting reflection to him.¹ The *Gorgias* (written, in my judgment, long after the death of Sokrates, probably after the Platonic school was established) announces the vocation of the philosopher, and claims an open field for speculation, apart from the actualities of politics—for the self-acting reason of the individual doubter and investigator, against the authority of

Probable feelings of Plato on this subject. Claim put forward in the *Gorgias* of an independent *locus standi* for philosophy, but without the indiscriminate cross-examination pursued by Sokrates.

¹ I have already referred to the treatise of Mr. John Stuart Mill "On Liberty," where this important topic is discussed in a manner equally profound and enlightened. The co-existence of individual reasoners enquiring and philosophising for themselves, with the fixed opinions of the majority, is one of the main conditions which distinguish a progressive from a stationary community.

numbers and the pressure of inherited tradition. A formal assertion to this effect was worthy of the founder of the Academy—the earliest philosophical school at Athens. Yet we may observe that while the Platonic Sokrates in the *Gorgias* adopts the life of philosophy, he does not renew that farther demand with which the historical Sokrates had coupled it in his *Apology*—the liberty of oral and aggressive cross-examination, addressed to individuals personally and indiscriminately¹—to the *primores populi* as well as to the *populum tributum*. The fate of Sokrates rendered Plato more cautious, and induced him to utter his ethical interrogations and novelties of opinion in no other way except that of lectures to chosen hearers and written dialogue: borrowing the name of Sokrates or some other speaker, and refraining upon system (as his letters² tell us that he did) from publishing any doctrines in his own name.

As a man dissenting from received opinions, Sokrates had his path marked out in the field of philosophy or individual speculation. To such a mind as his, the fullest liberty ought to be left, of professing and defending his own opinions, as well as of combating other opinions, accredited or not, which he may consider false or uncertified.³ The public guidance of the state thus falls to one class of minds, the activity of speculative discussion to another: though accident

Importance of maintaining the utmost liberty of discussion. Tendency of all ruling orthodoxy towards intolerance.

¹ Plat. *Apol. Sokr.* pp. 21-22-23-28 E. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ πάντωντος, ὡς ἐγὼ ψήθημι τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφούντᾳ με δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ἐξετάζοντᾳ ἑμαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, &c.

² Plat. *Epist.* ii. 314 B. K. F. Hermann (Ueber Platon's Schriftstellerische Motive, p. 290) treats any such prudential discretion, in respect to the form and mode of putting forward unpopular opinions, as unworthy of Plato, and worthy only of Protagoras and other Sophists. I dissent from this opinion altogether. We know that Protagoras was very circumspect as to form (*Timon ap. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathemat.* ix. a. 57); but the passage of Plato cited by Hermann does not prove it.

³ So Sokrates also says in the Platonic *Apology*, pp. 31-32. Οἱ γὰρ ὅτινι ὅστις ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὗτε ὅμιν οὗτε ἄλλῳ πλεῖον οὐδενὶ γρηγόριος ἐνταυτοῖς, καὶ διακελεύων πολλὰ εἶπεν καὶ παρὰ

νομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεσθαι· ἀλλ' ἀνὰ καὶν ἔστι τὸν τῷ ὅπτι μαχόμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὀλίγον χρόνον σωθήσεται, ἰδωμεν εἶναι ἀλλὰ μὴ εὐχρηστίζεσθαι.

The reader will find the speculative individuality of Sokrates illustrated in the sixty-eighth chapter of my *History of Greece*.

The antithesis of the philosophising or speculative life, against the rhetorical, political, forensic life—which is put so much to the advantage of the former by Plato in the *Gorgias*, *Theætétus* (p. 173, seq.), and elsewhere—was the theme of Cicero's lost dialogue called *Hortensius*: wherein Hortensius was introduced pleading the cause against philosophy, (see Orelli, *Fragm. Ciceron.* pp. 479-480), while the other speakers were provided by Cicero with arguments mainly in defence of philosophy, partly also against

may produce, here and there, a superior individual, comprehensive or dexterous enough to suffice for both. But the main desideratum is that this freedom of discussion should exist: that room shall be made, and encouragement held out, to the claims of individual reason, and to the full publication of all doubts or opinions, be they what they may: that the natural tendency of all ruling force, whether in few or in many hands, to perpetuate their own dogmas by proscribing or silencing all heretics and questioners, may be neutralised as far as possible. The great expansive vigour of the Greek mind—the sympathy felt among the best varieties of Greeks for intellectual superiority in all its forms—and the privilege of free speech (*παρρησία*), on which the democratical citizens of Athens prided themselves—did in fact neutralise very considerably these tendencies in Athens. A greater and more durable liberty of philosophising was procured for Athens, and through Athens for Greece generally, than had ever been known before in the history of mankind.

This antithesis of the philosophical life to the rhetorical or political, constitutes one of the most interesting features of the Platonic Gorgias. But when we follow the pleadings upon which Plato rests this grand issue, and the line which he draws between the two functions, we find much that is unsatisfactory. Since Plato himself pleads both sides of the case, he is bound in fairness to set forth the case which he attacks (that of rhetoric), as it would be put by com-

Issue between philosophy and rhetoric not satisfactorily handled by Plato. Injustice done to rhetoric. Ignoble manner in

rhetoric. The competition between the teachers of rhetoric and the teachers of philosophy continued to be not merely animated but bitter, from Plato downward throughout the Ciceronian age. (Cicero, *De Orat.* i. 45-46-47-75, &c.)

We read in the treatise of Plutarch against the Epikurean Kolôtes, an acrimonious invective against Epikurus and his followers, for recommending a scheme of life such as to withdraw men from active political functions (Plutarch, *adv. Kolôt.* pp. 1125 C, 1137-1128); the like also in his other treatise, *Non Posse Suaviter Vivere secundum Epicurum*. But Plutarch at the same time speaks as if Epikurus were the only philosopher who had recommended this, and as if all the other philosophers

had recommended an active life; nay, he talks of Plato among the philosophers actively engaged in practical reformatory legislation, through Dion and the pupils of the Academy (p. 1126, B, C). Here Plutarch mistakes: the Platonic tendencies were quite different from what he supposes. The Gorgias and Theætétus enforce upon the philosopher a life quite apart from politics, pursuing his own course, and not meddling with others—*φιλοσόφου τὰ αὐτοῦ πράξαντος καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονήσαντος ἐν τῇ βίῃ* (Gorg. 526 C); which is the same advice as Epikurus gave. It is set forth eloquently in the poetry of Lucretius, but it had been set forth previously, not less eloquently, in the rhetoric of Plato.

which it is presented by Polus and Kallikles. petent and honourable advocates—by Perikles, for example, or Demosthenes, or Isokrates, or Quintilian. He does this, to a certain extent, in the first part of the dialogue, carried on by Sokrates with Gorgias. But in the succeeding portions—carried on with Pölus and Kalliklēs, and occupying three-fourths of the whole—he alters the character of the defence, and merges it in ethical theories which Perikles, had he been the defender, would not only have put aside as misplaced, but disavowed as untrue. Perikles would have listened with mixed surprise and anger, if he had heard any one utter the monstrous assertion which Plato puts into the mouth of Polus—That rhetors, like despots, kill, impoverish, or expel any citizen at their pleasure. Though Perikles was the most powerful of all Athenian rhetors, yet he had to contend all his life against fierce opposition from others, and was even fined during his last years. He would hardly have understood how an Athenian citizen could have made any assertion so completely falsified by all the history of Athens, respecting the omnipotence of the rhetors. Again, if he had heard Kalliklēs proclaiming that the strong giant had a natural right to satiate all his desires at the cost of the weaker Many—and that these latter sinned against Nature when they took precautions to prevent him—Perikles would have protested against the proclamation as emphatically as Plato.¹

If we suppose Perikles to have undertaken the defence of the rhetorical element at Athens, against the dialectic element represented by Sokrates, he would have accepted it, though not a position of his own choosing, on the footing on which Plato places it in the mouth of Gorgias: "Rhetoric is an engine of persuasion addressed to numerous assembled auditors: it ensures freedom to the city (through the free exercise of such a gift by many competing orators) and political ascendancy or command to the ablest rhetor. It thus confers great power on him who possesses it in the highest measure: but he ought by no means to employ that power for unjust purposes." It is very probable that Perikles might have recommended rhetorical study to So-

¹ Perikles might indeed have referred to his own panegyric oration in Thucydides, ii. 37.

krates, as a means of defending himself against unjust accusations, and of acquiring a certain measure of influence on public affairs.¹ But he would have distinguished carefully (as Horace does) between defending yourself against unjust attacks, and making unjust attacks upon others: though the same weapon may suit for both.

Farther, neither Perikles, nor any defender of free speech, would assent to the definition of rhetoric—That it is a branch of the art of flattery, studying the immediately pleasurable, and disregarding the good.² This indeed represents Plato's own sentiment, and was true in the sense which the Platonic Sokrates assigns (in the Gorgias, though not in the Protagoras) to the words *good* and *evil*. But it is not true in the sense which the Athenian people and the Athenian public

The Athenian people recognised a distinction between the pleasurable and the good: but not the same as that which Plato conceived.

¹ Horat. Satir. li. 1, 29—

"Hic stilus haud petet ultro
Quemquam animantem; et me veluti
custodiet ensis
Vagina tectus; quem cur destringere
coner,
Tutus ab infestis latronibus? Oh pater
et rex
Jupiter! ut pereat positum rubigine
telum,
Nec quisquam noceat cupido mihi
paxis! At ille
Qui me commoritur (melius non tangere!
clamo)
Flebit, et insignis tota cantabitur
urbe."

We need only read the Memorabilia of Xenophon (li. 9), to see that the historical Sokrates judged of these matters differently from the Platonic Sokrates of the Gorgias. Kriton complained to Sokrates that life was difficult at Athens for a quiet man who wished only to mind his own business (τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν); because there were persons who brought unjust actions at law against him, for the purpose of extorting money to buy them off. The Platonic Sokrates of the Gorgias would have replied to him: "Never mind: you are just, and these assailants are unjust: they are by their own conduct entailing upon themselves a terrible distemper, from which, if you leave them unpunished, they will suffer all their lives: they injure themselves more than they injure you". But the

historical Sokrates in Xenophon replies in quite another spirit. He advises Kriton to look out for a clever and active friend, to attach this person to his interest by attention and favours, and to trust to him for keeping off the assailants. Accordingly, a poor but energetic man named Archdemus is found, who takes Kriton's part against the assailants, and even brings counter-attacks against them, which force them to leave Kriton alone, and to give money to Archdemus himself. The advice given by the Xenophonic Sokrates to Kriton is the same in principle as the advice given by Kallikles to the Platonic Sokrates.

² The reply composed by the rhetor Aristides to the Gorgias of Plato is well deserving of perusal, though (like all his compositions) it is very prolix and wordy. See Aristides, Orationes xlv. and xlii.—Περὶ ῥητορικῆς, and Ὑπερ τῶν Τερράδων. In the last of the two orations he defends the four eminent Athenians (Miltiades, Themistoklés, Periklés, Kimon) whom Plato disparages in the Gorgias.

Aristides insists forcibly on the partial and narrow view here taken by Plato of persuasion, as a working force both for establishing laws and carrying on government. He remarks truly that there are only two forces between which the choice must be made, intimidation and persuasion: that the substitution of persuasion in place of force is the great improvement which

men assigned to those words. Both the one and the other used the words *pleasurable* and *good* as familiarly as Plato, and had sentiments corresponding to both of them. The pleasurable and painful referred to present and temporary causes: the Good and Evil to prospective causes and permanent situations, involving security against indefinite future suffering, combined with love of national dignity and repugnance to degradation, as well as with a strong sense of common interests and common obligations to each other. To provide satisfaction for these common patriotic feelings—to sustain the dignity of the city by effective and even imposing public establishments, against foreign enemies—to protect the individual rights of citizens by an equitable administration of justice—counted in the view of the Athenians as objects *good* and *honourable*: while the efforts and sacrifices necessary for these permanent ends, were, so far as they went, a renuncia-

has made public and private life worth having (*μὴν βιωτὸν ἥνιν πεποιήκε τὸν βίον*, Orak. xiv. p. 64, Dindorf); that neither laws could be discussed and passed, nor judicial trial held under them, without *ῥητορικὴ* as the engine of persuasion (pp. 66-67-136); that Plato in attacking Rhetoric had no right to single out despots and violent conspirators as illustrations of it—*εἰ ἐλέγχειν μὲν βούλεται τὴν ῥητορικὴν, κατηγορεῖ δὲ τῶν τυράννων καὶ δυναστῶν, τὰ ἅμικτα μινύς*—*τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι ῥητορικὴ καὶ τυραννίς τοσοῦτον ἀλλήλων κεχωρισται, ὅσον τὸ πείθειν τοῦ βιάζεσθαι* (p. 99). He impugns the distinction which Plato has drawn between *ιατρικὴ*, *γυμναστικὴ*, *κυβερνητικὴ*, *νομοθετικὴ*, &c., on the one side, which Plato calls *τέχναι*, arts or sciences, and affirms to rest on scientific principles—and *ῥητορικὴ*, *μαγειρικὴ*, &c., on the other side, which Plato affirms to be only guess-work or groping, resting on empirical analogies. Aristides says that *ιατρικὴ* and *ῥητορικὴ* are in this respect both on a par; that both are partly reducible to rule, but partly also driven by necessity to conjectures and analogies, and the physician not less than the rhetor (pp. 45-48-49); which the Platonic Sokrates himself affirms in another dialogue, *Philébus*, p. 56 A.

The most curious part of the argument of Aristides is where he disputes the prerogative which Plato had

claimed for *ιατρικὴ*, *γυμναστικὴ*, &c., on the ground of their being arts or reducible to rules. The effects of human art (says Aristides) are much inferior to those of *θεῖα μοῖρα* or divine inspiration. Many patients are cured of disease by human art; but many more are cured by the responses and directions of the Delphian oracle, by the suggestion of dreams, and by other varieties of the divine prompting, delivered through the Pythian priestess, a woman altogether ignorant (p. 11). *καίτοι μικρὰ μὲν ἢ πάντας εὐδία λόγους ἱατρικὴ πρὸς τὰς ἐκ Δελφῶν δύναται λύσεις, ὅσαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ κοινῇ καὶ νόσων καὶ παθημάτων ἀπάντων ἀνθρωπίνων ἐδάδθησαν*. Patients who are cured in this way by the Gods without medical art, acquire a natural impulse which leads them to the appropriate remedy—*ἰατρονμία αὐτοῖς ἔχει ἐπὶ τὸ ὄρησεν* (p. 20). Aristides says that he can himself depose—from his own personal experience as a sick man seeking cure, and from personal knowledge of many other such—how much more efficacious in healing is aid from the Gods, given in dreams and other ways, than advice from physicians; who might well shudder when they heard the stories which he could tell (pp. 21-22). To undervalue science and art (he says) is the principle from which men start, when they flee to the Gods for help—*τοῦ καταφυγεῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς θεοὺς σχεδὸν ἀρχή, τὸ τῆς τέχνης ὑπεριδεῖν ἔστιν*.

tion of what they would call the *pleasurable*. When, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians, acting on the advice of Perikles, allowed all Attica to be ravaged, and submitted to the distress of cooping the whole population within the long walls, rather than purchase peace by abnegating their Hellenic dignity, independence, and security—they not only renounced much that was pleasurable, but endured great immediate distress, for the sake of what they regarded as a permanent good.¹ Eighty years afterwards, when Demosthenes pointed out to them the growing power and encroachments of the Macedonian Philip, and exhorted them to the efforts requisite for keeping back that formidable enemy, while there was yet time—they could not be wound up to the pitch requisite for affronting so serious an amount of danger and suffering. They had lost that sense of Hellenic dignity, and that association of self-respect with active personal soldiery and sailorship, which rendered submission to an enemy the most intolerable of all pains, at the time when Perikles had addressed them. They shut their eyes to an impending danger, which ultimately proved their ruin. On both these occasions, we have the *pleasurable* and the *good* brought into contrast in the Athenian mind; in both we have the two most eminent orators of Grecian antiquity enforcing the *good* in opposition to the *pleasurable*: the first successfully, the last vainly, in opposition to other orators.

Lastly, it is not merely the political power of the Athenians that Perikles employs his eloquence to uphold. He dwells also with emphasis on the elegance of taste, on the intellectual force and activity, which warranted him in decorating the city with the title of Preceptress of Hellas.² All this belongs, not to the pleasurable as distinguished from the good, but to

Rhetoric was employed at Athens in appealing to all the various established sentiments

¹ Nothing can be more at variance with the doctrine which Plato assigns to Kalliklēs in the *Gorgias*, than the three memorable speeches of Perikles in Thucydides, i. 144, ii. 35, ii. 60, seq. All these speeches are penetrated with the deepest sense of that κοινονία and φιλία which the Platonic Sokrates extols: not one of them countenances πλεονεξίαν, which the Platonic Sokrates forbids (*Gorg.* 508 E). Το προστα-

λαίμαρξεν τῷ δόξαντι καλῷ (to use the expressive phrase of Thucydides, ii. 53) was a remarkable feature in the character of the Athenians of that day: it was subdued for the moment by the overwhelming misery of pestilence and war combined.

² Thucyd. ii. 41-42. ἐνελάν τε λέγω τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδεύειν εἶναι, &c.

and opinions. Erroneous inferences raised by the Kallikles of Plato.

good (whether immediately pleasurable or not) in its most comprehensive sense, embracing the improvement and refinement of the collective mind. If Perikles, in this remarkable funeral harangue, flattered the sentiments of the people—as he doubtless did—he flattered them by kindling their aspirations towards good. And Plato himself does the same (though less nobly and powerfully), adopting the received framework of Athenian sentiment, in his dialogue called *Menexenus*, which we shall come to in a future chapter.

The issue, therefore, which Plato here takes against Rhetoric, must stand or fall with the Platonic Ideal of Good and Evil. But when he thus denounces both the general public and the most patriotic rhetors, to ensure exclusive worship for his own Ideal of Good—we may at least require that he shall explain, wherein consists that Good—by what mark it is distinguishable—and on what authority pre-eminence is claimed for it. So far, indeed, we advance by the help of Plato's similes¹—order, discipline, health and strength of body—that we are called upon to recognise, apart from all particular moments of enjoyment or suffering, of action or quiescence, a certain permanent mental condition and habit—a certain order, regulation, discipline—as an object of high importance to be attained. This (as I have before remarked) is a valuable idea which pervades, in one form or another, all the Hellenic social views, from Sokrates downward, and even before Sokrates; an idea, moreover, which was common to Peripateticks, Stoicks, Epikureans. But mental order and discipline is not in itself an end: it may be differently cast, and may subserve many different purposes. The Pythagorean brotherhood was intensely restrictive in its canons. The Spartan system exhibited the strictest order and discipline—an assemblage of principles and habits predetermined by authority and enforced upon all—yet neither Plato nor Aristotle approve of its results. Order and discipline attained full perfection in the armies of Julius Cæsar and the French Emperor Napoleon; in the middle ages, also,

The Platonic Ideal exacts, as good, some order, system, discipline. But order may be directed to bad ends as well as to good. Divergent ideas about virtues.

¹ Plat. Gorg. p. 504.

several of the monastic orders stood high in respect to finished discipline pervading the whole character: and the Jesuits stood higher than any. Each of these systems has included terms equivalent to justice, temperance, virtue, vice, &c., with sentiments associated therewith, yet very different from what Plato would have approved. The question—What is Virtue?—*Vir bonus est quis?*—will be answered differently in each. The Spartans—when they entrapped (by a delusive pretence of liberation and military decoration) two thousand of their bravest Helot warriors, and took them off by private assassinations,¹ did not offend against their own idea of virtue, or against the Platonic exigency of Order—Measure—System.

It is therefore altogether unsatisfactory, when Plato—professing to teach us how to determine scientifically, which pleasures are bad, and which pains are good—refers to a durable mental order and discipline. Of such order there existed historically many varieties; and many more are conceivable, as Plato himself has shown in the Republic and *Leges*. By what tests is the right order to be distinguished from the wrong? If by its results, by *what* results?—calculations for minimising pains, and maximising pleasures, being excluded by the supposition? Here the Sokrates of the *Gorgias* is at fault. He has not told us by what scientific test the intelligent Expert proceeds in determining what pleasures are bad, and what pains are good. He leaves such determination to the unscientific sentiment of each society and each individual. He has not, in fact, responded to the clear and pertinent challenge thrown out by the Sokrates of the *Protagoras*.

I think, for these reasons, that the logic of the *Gorgias* is not at all on a par with its eloquence. But there is one peculiar feature which distinguishes it among all the Platonic dialogues. Nowhere in ancient literature is the title, position, and dignity of individual dissenting opinion, ethical and political—against established ethical and political orthodoxy—so clearly marked out and so boldly asserted. “The Athenians will judge as they

How to discriminate the right order from the wrong. Plato does not advise us.

The *Gorgias* upholds the independence and dignity of the dissenting philosopher.

¹ Thucyd. iv. 80.

think right : none but those speakers who are in harmony with them, have any chance of addressing their public assemblies with effect, and acquiring political influence. I, Sokrates, dissent from them, and have no chance of political influence : but I claim the right of following out, proclaiming, and defending, the conclusions of my own individual reason, until debate satisfies me that I am wrong."

CHAPTER XXV.

PHÆDON.

THE Phædon is characterised by Proklus as a dialogue wherein Sokrates unfolds fully his own mental history, and communicates to his admirers the complete range of philosophical cognition.¹ This criticism is partly well founded. The dialogue generally is among the most affirmative and expository in the Platonic list. Sokrates undertakes to prove the immortality of the soul, delivers the various reasons which establish the doctrine to his satisfaction, and confutes some dissentient opinions entertained by others. In regard to the exposition, however, we must consider ourselves as listening to Plato under the name of Sokrates: and we find it so conducted as to specify both certain stages through which the mind of Plato had passed, and the logical process which (at that time) appeared to him to carry conviction.

The interest felt by most readers in the Phædon, however, depends, not so much on the argumentative exposition (which Wytténbach² justly pronounces to be

The Phædon is affirmative and expository.

Situation and circumstances

¹ Proklus, in Platon. Republ. p. 892. *ἐν θαύματι μὲν γὰρ ὅπου διαφερόντως ὁ Σωκράτης τῆς αὐτοῦ ζωῆς ἀναπλοῖ, καὶ πᾶν τὸ τῆς ἐπιστήμης πλῆθος ἀνοίγει τοῖς αὐτοῦ ζηλωταῖς, &c.* Wytténbach thinks (note, ad p. 108 E) that Plato was young when he composed the Phædon. But no sufficient grounds are given for this: and the concluding sentence of the dialogue affords good presumption that it was composed many years after the death of Sokrates — ἥδε ἡ τελευταία, ὁ Ἐγκράτης, τοῦ ἀταίρου ἡμῖν ἐγένετο, ἀνδρός, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαίμεν ἂν, τῶν τότε ὡν ἐπειράθημεν

ἀρίστον, καὶ ἄλλως φρονιμωτάτον καὶ δικαιοτάτον. The phrase τῶν τότε, which may probably have slipped unconsciously from Plato, implies that Sokrates belonged to the past generation. The beginning of the dialogue undoubtedly shows that Plato intended to place it shortly after the death of Sokrates; but the word τότε at the end is inconsistent with this supposition, and comes out unconsciously as a mark of the real time.

² See the Prolegomena prefixed to Wytténbach's edition of the Phædon, p. xxi. p. 10.

assumed
in the
Phædon.
Pathetic
interest
which they
inspire.

obscure and difficult as well as unsatisfactory) as on the personality of the expounding speaker, and the irresistible pathos of the situation. Sokrates had been condemned to death by the Dikastery on the day after the sacred ship, memorable in connection with the legendary voyage of Theseus to Krete, had been dispatched on her annual mission of religious sacrifice at the island of Delos. The Athenian magistrates considered themselves as precluded from putting any one to death by public authority, during the absence of the ship on this mission. Thirty days elapsed between her departure and her return: during all which interval, Sokrates remained in the prison, yet with full permission to his friends to visit him. They passed most of every day in the enjoyment of his conversation.¹ In the Phædon, we read the last of these conversations, after the sacred vessel had returned, and after the Eleven magistrates had announced to Sokrates that the draught of hemlock would be administered to him before sunset. On communicating this intelligence, the magistrates released Sokrates from the fetters with which he had hitherto been bound. It is shortly after such release that the friends enter the prison to see him for the last time. One of the number, Phædon, recounts to Echekratēs not only the conduct and discourse of Sokrates during the closing hours of his life, but also the swallowing of the poison, and the manner of his death.

More than fifteen friends of the philosopher are noted as present at this last scene: but the only two who take an active part in the debate, are, two young Thebans named Kebēs and Simmias.² These friends, though deeply attached to Sokrates, and full of sorrow at the irreparable loss impending over them, are represented as overawed and fascinated by his perfect fearlessness, serenity, and dignity.³ They are ashamed to give vent to their grief, when their master is seen to maintain his

¹ Plato, Phædon, pp. 68-69.

It appears that Kriton became bail before the Dikasta, in a certain sum of money, that Sokrates should remain in prison and not escape (Plat. Phædon, p. 115 D; Kriton, 45 B). Kriton would have been obliged to pay this

money if Sokrates had accepted his proposition to escape, noticed already in chap. x.

² Plato, Phædon, pp. 69 B, 80 A. τῶν νεωτέρων τῶν λόγων, &c. (p. 80 A).

³ Plato, Phædon, pp. 68-69.

ordinary frame of mind, neither disquieted nor dissatisfied. The fundamental conception of the dialogue is, to represent Sokrates as the same man that he was before his trial; unmoved by the situation—not feeling that any misfortune is about to happen to him—equally delighting in intellectual debate—equally fertile in dialectic invention. So much does he care for debate, and so little for the impending catastrophe, that he persists in a great argumentative effort, notwithstanding the intimation conveyed by Kriton from the gaoler, that if he heated himself with talking, the poison might perhaps be languid in its operation, so that two or three draughts of it would be necessary instead of one.¹ Sokrates even advances the position that death appears to him as a benefit rather than a misfortune, and that every true philosopher ought to prefer death to life, assuming it to supervene without his own act—suicide being forbidden by the Gods. He is represented as “*placidus ore, intrepidus verbis; intempestivas suorum lacrimas coercens*”—to borrow a phrase from Tacitus’s striking picture of the last hours of the Emperor Otho.² To see him thus undisturbed, and even welcoming his approaching end, somewhat hurts the feelings of his assembled friends, who are in the deepest affliction at the certainty of so soon losing him. Sokrates undertakes to defend himself before them as he had done before the Dikasts; and to show good grounds for his belief, that death is not a misfortune, but a benefit, to the philosopher.³ Simmias and Kebés, though at first not satisfied with the reasonings, are nevertheless reluctant to produce their doubts, from fear of mortifying him in his last moments: but Sokrates protests against such reluctance as founded on a misconception of his existing frame of mind.⁴ He is now the same man as he was before, and he calls upon them to keep up the freedom of debate unimpaired.

Indeed this freedom of debate and fulness of search—the paramount value of “reasoned truth”—the necessity of keeping up the force of individual reason by constant argumentative exercise—and the right of independent

Emphasis of
Sokrates in
insisting on
freedom of

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 63 D.

² Tacitus, Hist. ii. 48.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 68.

⁴ Plato, Phædon, p. 84 D-E.

debate,
active ex-
ercise of
reason, and
independ-
ent judg-
ment for
each rea-
soner.

judgment for hearer as well as speaker—stand emphatically proclaimed in these last words of the dying philosopher. He does not announce the immortality of the soul as a dogma of imperative orthodoxy; which men, whether satisfied with the proofs or not, must believe, or must make profession of believing, on pain of being shunned as a moral pestilence, and disqualified from giving testimony in a court of justice. He sets forth his own conviction, with the grounds on which he adopts it. But he expressly recognises the existence of dissentient opinions: he invites his companions to bring forward every objection: he disclaims all special purpose of impressing his own conclusions upon their minds: nay, he expressly warns them not to be biassed by their personal sympathies, then wound up to the highest pitch, towards himself. He entreats them to preserve themselves from becoming tinged with *misology*, or the hatred of free argumentative discussion: and he ascribes this mental vice to the early habit of easy, uninquiring, implicit, belief: since a man thus ready of faith, embracing opinions without any discriminative test, presently finds himself driven to abandon one opinion after another, until at last he mistrusts all opinions, and hates the process of discussing them, laying the blame upon philosophy instead of upon his own intellect.¹

“For myself” (says Sokrates). “I fear that in these my last hours I depart from the true spirit of philosophy—like unschooled men, who, when in debate, think scarcely at all how the real question stands, but care only to make their own views triumphant in the minds of the auditors. Between them and me there is only thus much of difference. I regard it as a matter of secondary consequence, whether my conclusions appear true to my hearers; but I shall do my best to make them appear as much as possible

¹ Plato, Phædon, pp. 89 C-D, 90. Πρῶτον εὐλαβεσθῆναι τι πάθος μὴ πάθωμεν. Τὸ ποῖον, ὅν δ' ἐγώ; Μὴ γινώσκω, ἢ δ' οἷ, μισολογοί, ὥσπερ οἱ μισανθρώποι γινώσκονται· ὥς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἔφη, δ, τι ἂν τις μείζον τούτου κακὸν

πάθος ἢ λόγους μισήσαι. p. 90 B. ἐπει-
δὲν τις πιστεύσῃ λόγῳ τι εἰληθεῖ εἶναι,
ἀνευ τῆς περὶ τοὺς λόγους τέχνης, καὶ περὶ
ἐλπίον ὄσπερ αὐτῷ δοξῇ ψευδὲς εἶναι,
ἐνίοτε μὲν ὦν, ἐνίοτε δ' οὐκ ὦν, καὶ αἰθεὶς
ἕτερος καὶ ἕτερος, &c.

true to myself.¹ My calculation is as follows : mark how selfish it is. If my conclusion as to the immortality of the soul is true, I am better off by believing it : if I am in error, and death be the end of me, even then I shall avoid importuning my friends with grief, during these few remaining hours : moreover my error will not continue with me—which would have been a real misfortune—but will be extinguished very shortly. Such is the frame of mind, Simmias and Kebes, with which I approach the debate. Do you follow my advice : take little thought of Sokrates, but take much more thought of the truth. If I appear to you to affirm any thing truly, assent to me : but if not, oppose me with all your powers of reasoning : Be on your guard lest, through earnest zeal, I should deceive alike myself and you, and should leave the sting in you, like a bee, at this hour of departure."

This is a remarkable passage, as illustrating the spirit and purpose of Platonic dialogues. In my preceding Chapters, I have already shown, that it is no part of the aim of Sokrates to thrust dogmas of his own into other men's minds as articles of faith. But then, most of these Chapters have dwelt upon Dialogues of Search, in which Sokrates has appeared as an interrogator, or enquirer jointly with others : scrutinising their opinions, but disclaiming knowledge or opinions of his own. Here, however, in the Phædon, the case is altogether different. Sokrates is depicted as having not only an affirmative opinion, but even strong conviction, on a subject of great moment : which conviction, moreover, he is especially desirous of preserving unimpaired, during his few remaining hours of life. Yet even here, he manifests no anxiety to get that conviction into the

tions of
their own
reason.

Remarkable
manifestation
of ear-
nest interest
for reasoned
truth and
the liberty
of individual
dissent.

dialogue of
search - is
"pursuing"

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 91 A-C. Οὐ γὰρ ὅπως τοῖς παροῦσιν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω δοξεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι, προθυμήσομαι, εἰ μὴ εἴη παρέρχον, ἀλλ' ὅπως αὐτῶ ἐμοὶ ὃ τι μέλιστα δοξεῖ οὕτως ἔχειν. λογίζομαι γάρ, ὃ φίλε ἑταῖρε—καὶ θέσσαι ὡς πλεονεκτικῶς—εἰ μὲν τυγχάνει ἀληθῆ ὅντα ἃ λέγω, καλῶς δι' ἔχει τὸ πεισθῆναι· εἰ δὲ μὴδὲν ἐστὶ τελευτήσαντι, ἀλλ' οὖν τούτων γε τὸν χρόνον αὐτὸν τὸν πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἦτον τοῖς παροῦσιν

ἀληθῆ ἔσομαι ὀδυρόμενος . . . ὑμεῖς μέν-
τοι, ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃσθε, μικρὸν φρον-
τίσαντες Σωκράτους, τῆς δὲ
ἀληθείας πολὺ μάλλον, εἰ μὲν
τί ὑμῖν δοκῇ ἀληθὲς λέ-
γειν, εὐνομολογήσατε· εἰ δὲ
μὴ, παντὶ λόγῳ ἀντιτείνετε,
εὐλαβούμενοι ὅπως μὴ ἐγὼ ὑπὸ προθυμίας
ἅμα ἑμαυτὸν τε καὶ ὑμᾶς ἐξαπατήσας,
ὥστερ' μέλιστα τὸ κέντρον ἐγκαταλίπων
οἰχίσσομαι.

minds of his friends, except as a result of their own independent scrutiny and self-working reason. Not only he does not attempt to terrify them into believing, by menace of evil consequences if they do not—but he repudiates pointedly even the gentler machinery of conversion, which might work upon their minds through attachment to himself and reverence for his authority.

✓ His devotion is to "reasoned truth": he challenges his friends to the fullest scrutiny by their own independent reason: he recognises the sentence which they pronounce afterwards as valid for them, whether concurrent with himself or adverse. Their reason is for them, what his reason is for him: requiring, both alike (as Sokrates here proclaims), to be stimulated as well as controlled by all-searching debate—but postulating equal liberty of final decision for each one of the debaters. The stress laid by
 ✓ Plato upon the full liberty of dissenting reason, essential to philosophical debate—is one of the most memorable characteristics of the Phædon. When we come to the treatise *De Legibus* (where Sokrates does not appear), we shall find a totally opposite view of sentiment. In the tenth book of that treatise Plato enforces the rigid censorship of an orthodox persecutor, who makes his own reason binding and compulsory on all.

The natural counterpart and antithesis to the Phædon, is
 Phædon and found in the Symposium.¹ In both, the personality of
 Symposium Sokrates stands out with peculiar force: in the one,
 —points of he is in the fulness of life and enjoyment, along with
 analogy and contrast festive comrades—in the other, he is on the verge of
 approaching death, surrounded by companions in deep affliction. The point common to both, is, the perfect self-command of Sokrates under a diversity of trying circumstances. In the Symposium, we read of him as triumphing over heat, cold, fatigue, danger, amorous temptation, unmeasured potations of wine, &c.:²

¹ Thus far I agree with Schleiermacher (*Einleitung zum Phædon*, p. 9, &c.); though I do not think that he has shown sufficient ground for his theory regarding the Symposium and the Phædon, as jointly intended to depict the character of the philosopher, promised by Plato as a sequel to the Sophist and the Statesman. (Plato, *Sophist*. p. 217; *Politic*. p. 257.)

² Plato, *Symposium*, pp. 214 A, 219 D, 220-221-223 D: compare Phædon, p. 116, c. 117. Marcus Antoninus (l. 16) compares on this point his father Antoninus Pius to Sokrates: both were capable of enjoyment as well as of abstinence, without ever losing their self-command. "Ἐπαρμόσιος δ' ἐν αὐτῷ (Antoninus P.) τοῦ περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους μετρεσθέντος, ἐν καὶ ἀνέχου καὶ

in the *Phædon*, we discover him rising superior to the fear of death, and to the contagion of an afflicted company around him. Still, his resolute volition is occasionally overpowered by fits of absorbing meditation, which seize him at moments sudden and unaccountable, and chain him to the spot for a long time. There is moreover, in both dialogues, a streak of eccentricity in his character, which belongs to what Plato calls the philosophical inspiration and madness, rising above the measure of human temperance and prudence.¹ The *Phædon* depicts in Sokrates the same intense love of philosophy and dialectic debate, as the *Symposium* and *Phædrus*: but it makes no allusion to that personal attachment, and passionate admiration of youthful beauty, with which, according to those two dialogues, the mental fermentation of the philosophical aspirant is asserted to begin.² Sokrates in the *Phædon* describes the initial steps whereby he had been led to philosophical study:³ but the process is one purely intellectual, without reference to personal converse with beloved companions, as a necessity of the case. His discourse is that of a man on the point of death—"abruptis vitæ blandimentis"⁴—and he already looks upon his body, not as furnishing the means of action and as requiring only to be trained by gymnastic discipline (as it appears in the *Republic*), but as an importunate and depraving companion, of which he is glad to get rid: so that the ethereal substance of the soul may be left to its free expansion and fellowship with the intelligible world, apart from sense and its solicitations.

We have here one peculiarity of the *Phædon*, whereby it stands distinguished both from the *Republic* and the *Phædon*—*Timæus*. The antithesis on which it dwells is that of compared

ἀπολαύειν ἐδύνατο τούτων, ὡς πολλοὶ πρὸς τε τὰς ἀποχὰς ἀσθενῶς, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀπολαύσεις ἐνδοτικῶς, ἔχουσιν. Τὸ δὲ ἰσχύειν, καὶ ἔτι καρτερεῖν καὶ ἐννέφειν ἑκατέρῳ, ἀνδρὸς ἐστὶν ἀριον καὶ αἰσθητὸν ψυχῇ ἔχοντος.

¹ Plato, *Symposium*, pp. 174-175-220 C-D. Compare *Phædon*, pp. 84 C, 95 E.

² Plato, *Sympos.* p. 215 A, p. 221 D. οἷος δὲ οὐτοσὶ γέγονε τὴν ἀποπείαν ἄνθρωπος, καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ λόγοι αὐτοῦ, οὐδ' ἔγγεσθ' ἂν εὖροι τις ζῆτῶν, &c. p. 218 B: πάντες γὰρ κοινοῦνται τῆς φιλοσοφίας μαγίας τε καὶ βακχείας,

&c. About the φιλόσοφος μαγία, compare Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 245-250.

Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 251-253. *Symposium*, pp. 210-211. ὅταν τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὁρθῶς κριθεῖται καὶ κατανοῇ τὸ καλὸν ἀρχεται καθορᾶν, &c. (211 B).

³ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 96 A. ἐγὼ οὖν σοὶ διαμὶ περὶ αὐτῶν τὰ γ' ἐμὰ πάθη, &c.

⁴ Tacitus, *Hist.* ii. 53. "Othonis libertus, habere se suprema ejus mandata respondit: ipsum viventem quidem relictum, sed solâ posteritatis curâ, et abruptis vitæ blandimentis."

with Re-
public and
Timæus.
No recogni-
tion of the
triple or
lower souls.
Antithesis
between
soul and
body.

the soul or mind, on one hand—the body on the other. The soul or mind is spoken of as one and indivisible: as if it were an inmate unworthily lodged or imprisoned in the body. It is not distributed into distinct parts, kinds, or varieties: no mention is made of that tripartite distribution which is so much insisted on in the Republic and Timæus:—the rational or intellectual (encephalic) soul, located in the head—the courageous or passionate (thoracic), between the neck and the diaphragm—the appetitive (abdominal), between the diaphragm and the navel. In the Phædon, the soul is noted as the seat of reason, intellect, the love of wisdom or knowledge, exclusively: all that belongs to passion and appetite, is put to account of the body:¹ this is distinctly contrary to the Philébus, in which dialogue Sokrates affirms that desire or appetite cannot belong to the body, but belongs only to the soul. In Phædon, nothing is said about the location of the rational soul, in the head,—nor about the analogy between its rotations in the cranium and the celestial rotations (a doctrine which we read both in the Timæus and in the Republic): on the contrary, the soul is affirmed to have lost, through its conjunction with the body, that wisdom or knowledge which it possessed during its state of pre-existence, while completely apart from the body, and while in commerce with those invisible Ideas to which its own separate nature was cognate.² That controul which in the Republic is exercised by the rational soul over the passionate and appetitive souls, is in the Phædon exercised (though imperfectly) by the one and only soul over the body.³ In the Republic and Timæus, the soul is a tripartite aggregate, a community of parts, a compound: in the Phædon, Sokrates asserts it to be uncompounded, making this fact a point in his argument.⁴ Again, in the Phædon, the soul is pronounced to be essentially uniform and incapable of change: as such, it is placed in antithesis with the

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 68. Compare Plato, Philébus, p. 35, C-D.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 76.

³ Compare Phædon, p. 94 C-E, with Republic, iv. pp. 439 C, 440 A, 441 E, 442 C.

⁴ Plato, Phædon, p. 78. ἀσύνθετον, μονοειδές (p. 80 B), contrasted with the

τρία εἶδη τῆς ψυχῆς (Republic, p. 430).

In the abstract given by Alkinous of the Platonic doctrine, we read in cap. 24 ὅτι τριμερὲς ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις, καὶ κατὰ λόγον τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς τότοις ἰδίους διανούμεται: in cap. 25 that the ψυχὴ is ἀσύνθετος, ἀδιέλωτος, ἀσύνθετος.

body, which is perpetually changing: while we read, on the contrary, in the *Symposion*, that soul and body alike are in a constant and unremitting variation, neither one nor the other ever continuing in the same condition.¹

The difference which I have here noted shows how Plato modified his doctrine to suit the purpose of each dialogue. The tripartite soul would have been found inconvenient in the *Phædon*, where the argument required that soul and body should be as sharply distinguished as possible. Assuming passion and appetite to be attributes belonging to the soul, as well as reason—Socrates will not shake them off when he becomes divorced from the body. He believes and expects that the post-existence of the soul will be, as its pre-existence has been, a rational existence—a life of intellectual contemplation and commerce with the eternal Ideas: in this there is no place for passion and appetite, which grow out of its conjunction with the body. The soul here represents Reason and Intellect, in commerce with their correlates, the objective *Entia Rationis*: the body represents passion and appetite as well as sense, in implication with their correlates, the objects of sensible perception.² Such is the doctrine of the *Phædon*; but Plato is not always consistent with himself on the point. His ancient as well as his modern commentators are not agreed, whether, when he vindicated the immortality of the soul, he meant to speak of the rational soul only, or of the aggregate soul with its three parts as above described. There are passages which countenance both suppositions.³ Plato seems to have leaned sometimes to the

Different doctrines of Plato about the soul. Whether all the three souls are immortal, or the rational soul alone.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 79-80; *Symposion*, pp. 207-208.

² This is the same antithesis as we read in Xenophon, ascribed to Cyrus in his dying address to his sons—ὁ ἀνθρώπος καὶ καθαροὶ νοῦς—τὸ ἀφρον σῶμα, *Cyropæd.* viii. 7, 20.

³ *Alcibiades*, *Introduc.* c. 25. ὅτι μὲν οὖν αἱ λογικαὶ ψυχὴν ἀθάνατοι ὑπάρχουσιν κατὰ τὸν ἀνδρα τοῦτον, βεβαιώσας δὲ τις· αἱ δὲ καὶ αἱ ἀλογαί, τοῦτο τὸν ἀμφισβητοῦμενον ὑπόκειται. Galen considers Plato as affirming that the two inferior souls are mortal—Περὶ τῶν τριῶν ψυχῶν τῶν, T. iv. p. 773. Kühn.

This subject is handled in an in-

structive Dissertation of K. F. Hermann—*De Partibus Animæ Immortalibus secundum Platonem*—delivered at Göttingen in the winter Session, 1850-1851. He inclines to the belief that Plato intended to represent only the rational soul as immortal, and the other two souls as mortal (p. 9). But the passages which he produces are quite sufficient to show, that Plato sometimes held one language, sometimes the other; and that Galen, who wrote an express treatise (now lost) to prove that Plato was inconsistent with himself in respect to the soul, might have produced good reasons for his

one view, sometimes to the other : besides which, the view taken in the Phædon is a third, different from both—*viz.* : That the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive, are not recognised as existing.

The philosopher (contends Sokrates) ought to rejoice when death comes to sever his soul altogether from his body : because he is, throughout all his life, struggling to sever himself from the passions, appetites, impulses and aspirations, which grow out of the body : and to withdraw himself from the perceptions of the corporeal senses, which teach no truth, and lead only to deceit or confusion : He is constantly attempting to do what the body hinders him from doing completely —to prosecute pure mental contemplation, as the only way of arriving at truth : to look at essences or things in themselves, by means of his mind or soul in itself apart from the body.¹ Until his mind be purified from all association with the

The life and character of a philosopher is a constant struggle to emancipate his soul from his body. Death alone enables him to do this completely.

opinion. The "inconstantia Platonis" (Cicero, Nat. Deor. i. 12) must be admitted here as on other matters. We must take the different arguments and doctrines of Plato as we find them in their respective places. Hermann (p. 4) says about the commentators—"De irrationali animâ alii accipites hæc-runt, alii claris verbis mortalem prædicarunt: quumque Neoplatonice sectæ principes, Numenius et Plotinus, non modo brutorum, sed ne plantarum quidem, animas immortalitate privare ausi sunt,—mox insequentibus in alia omnia digressi aut plane perire irracionales partes affirmarunt, aut mediâ quâdam viâ ingressi, quamvis corporum fato exemptis, mortalitatem tamen et ipsi tribuerunt." It appears that the divergence of opinion on this subject began as early as Xenokrates and Speusippus—see Olympiodorus, Scholia in Phædonem, § 175. The large construction adopted by Numenius and Plotinus is completely borne out by a passage in the Phædon, p. 70 E.

I must here remark that Hermann does not note the full extent of discrepancy between the Phædon and Plato's other dialogues, consisting in this—That in the Phædon, Plato suppresses all mention of the two non-rational souls, the passionate and appetitive : inasmuch that if we had only the Phædon remaining, we should not

have known that he had ever affirmed the triple partition of the soul, or the co-existence of the three souls.

I transcribe an interesting passage from M. Dégérando, respecting the belief in different varieties of soul, and partial immortality.

Dégérando—Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie, vol. i. p. 213.

"Les habitans du Thibet, du Groënland, du nord de l'Amérique admettent deux âmes : les Caraïbes en admettent trois, dont une, disent-ils, celle qui habite dans la tête, remonte seule au pays des âmes. Les habitans du Groënland croient d'ailleurs les âmes des hommes semblables au principe de la vie des animaux : ils supposent que les divers individus peuvent changer d'âmes entre eux pendant la vie, et qu'après la vie ces âmes exécutent de grands voyages, avec toutes sortes de fatigues et de périls. Les peuples du Canada se représentent les âmes sous la forme d'ombres errantes : les Palaïgons, les habitans du Sud de l'Asie, croient entendre leurs voix dans l'écho : et les anciens Romains eux-mêmes n'étaient pas étrangers à cette opinion. Les Nègres s'imaginent que la destinée de l'âme après la vie est encore liée à celle du corps, et fondent sur cette idée une foule de pratiques."

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 68 E. *εἰ μὴ λούην ποτε καθάρως τι εἶσθαι, ἀναλ-*

body, it cannot be brought into contact with pure essence, nor can his aspirations for knowledge be satisfied.¹ Hence his whole life is really a training or approximative practice for death, which alone will enable him to realise such aspirations.² Knowledge or wisdom is the only money in which he computes, and which he seeks to receive in payment.³ He is not courageous or temperate in the ordinary sense: for the courageous man, while holding death to be a great evil, braves it from fear of greater evils—and the temperate man abstains from various pleasures, because they either shut him out from greater pleasures, or entail upon him disease and poverty. The philosopher is courageous and temperate, but from a different motive: his philosophy purifies him from all these sensibilities, and makes him indifferent to all the pleasures and pains arising from the body: each of which, in proportion to its intensity, corrupts his perception of truth and falsehood, and misguides him in the search for wisdom or knowledge.⁴ While in the body, he feels imprisoned, unable to look for knowledge except through a narrow grating and by the deceptive media of sense. From this duration philosophy partially liberates him,—purifying his mind, like the Orphic or Dionysiac religious mysteries, from the contagion of body⁵ and sense: disengaging it, as far as may be during life, from sympathy with the body: and translating it out of the world of sense, uncertainty, and mere opinion, into the invisible region of truth and knowledge. If such purification has been fully achieved, the mind of the philosopher is at the moment of death thoroughly severed from the body, and passes clean away by itself, into commerce with the intelligible Entities or realities.

On the contrary, the soul or mind of the ordinary man, which has undergone no purification and remains in close implication with the body, cannot get completely separated even at the moment of death, but remains

Souls of the ordinary or unphilosophical

λατρίον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατὸν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 67 B. μὴ καθαρῶ γὰρ καθαροῦ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν ἢ.

² Plato, *Phædon*, p. 64 A. κινδυνεύουσι γὰρ ὅσοι τυγχάνουσιν ὁρθῶς ἀπτόμενοι φιλοσοφίας λελυθέναι τοῦ σώματος ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν

ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν τε καὶ τεθνήαι. P. 67 E. οἱ ὁρθῶς φιλοσοφούντες ἀποθνήσκειν μελετῶσιν.

³ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 69 A. ἀλλ' ὃ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τὸ νόμισμα ὁρθόν, ἀπὸ οὗ οἱ πάντες ταῦτα καταλλάττεσθαι φρονέουσιν.

⁴ Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 69-83-84.

⁵ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 82 E.

men pass
after death
into the
bodies of
different
animals.
The philo-
sopher
alone is re-
lieved from
all com-
munion
with body.

encrusted and weighed down by bodily accompaniments, so as to be unfit for those regions to which mind itself naturally belongs. Such impure minds or souls are the ghosts or shadows which haunt tombs; and which become visible, because they cling to the visible world, and hate the invisible.¹ Not being fit for separate existence, they return in process of time into conjunction with fresh bodies, of different species of men or animals, according to the particular temperament which they carry away with them.² The souls of despots, or of violent and rapacious men, will pass into the bodies of wolves or kites: those of the gluttonous and drunkards, into asses and such-like animals. A better fate will be reserved for the just and temperate men, who have been socially and politically virtuous, but simply by habit and disposition, without any philosophy or pure intellect: for their souls will pass into the bodies of other gentle and social animals, such as bees, ants, wasps,³ &c., or perhaps they may again return into the human form, and may become moderate men. It is the privilege only of him who has undergone the purifying influence of philosophy, and who has spent his life in trying to detach himself as much as possible from communion with the body—to be relieved after death from the obligation of fresh embodiment, that his soul may dwell by itself in a region akin to its own separate nature: passing out of the world of sense, of transient phenomena, and of mere opinion, into a distinct world where it will be in full presence of the eternal Ideas, essences, and truth; in companionship with the Gods, and far away from the miseries of humanity.⁴

Such is the creed which Sokrates announces to his friends in

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 81 C-D. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσα ἢ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἐλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ δειδοῦς τε καὶ Αἰδῶ, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ τὰ μύημά τε καὶ τοὺς τέφους κυλινδουμένη, περὶ ἃ δὴ καὶ ὥφθη ἅττα ψυχῶν σκοποειδῆ φάσματα [αἱ σκοποειδῆ φαντάσματα], οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαῦται ψυχαὶ εἰδῶλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεύσαι ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μέτεχουσαι, διὰ καὶ ὀρνῶνται.

² Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-84.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 82 A. Οὐκοῦν εὐδαιμονίστατοι καὶ τούτων εἰσὶ καὶ εἰς

βελτίστον τόπον ἰόντες οἱ τὴν δημοτικὴν τε καὶ πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτετηδεύοντες, ἣν δὴ καλοῦσι σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην, ἐξ ἑθους τε καὶ μελέτης γογγυῖαν ἀνὲν φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ; . . . Ὅτι τούτους εἰσὶ ἐστὶν εἰς τοιοῦτον πάλιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ἡμερον γένος, ἥπου μελιττῶν ἢ σφηκῶν ἢ μυρμηκῶν, &c.

⁴ Plato, Phædon, pp. 82 B, 83 B, 84 B. Compare p. 114 C: τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφίᾳ ἱκανῶς καθαρήμενοι ἀνὲν τε σωμάτων ζωοὶ τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον, &c. Also p. 115 D.

the Phædon, as supplying good reason for the readiness and satisfaction with which he welcomes death. It is upon the antithesis between soul (or mind) and body, that the main stress is laid. The partnership between the two is represented as the radical cause of mischief: and the only true relief to the soul consists in breaking up the partnership altogether, so as to attain a distinct, disembodied, existence. Conformably to this doctrine, the line is chiefly drawn between the philosopher, and the multitude who are not philosophers—not between good and bad agents, when the good agents are not philosophers. This last distinction is indeed noticed, but is kept subordinate. The unphilosophical man of social goodness is allowed to pass after death into the body of a bee, or an ant, instead of that of a kite or ass;¹ but he does not attain the privilege of dissolving connection altogether with body. Moreover the distinction is one not easily traceable: since Sokrates² expressly remarks that the large majority of mankind are middling persons, neither good nor bad in any marked degree. Philosophers stand in a category by themselves: apart from the virtuous citizens, as well as from the middling and the vicious. Their appetites and ambition are indeed deadened, so that they agree with the virtuous in abstaining from injustice: but this is not their characteristic feature. Philosophy is asserted to impart to them a special purification, like that of the Orphic mysteries to the initiated: detaching the soul from both the body and the world of sense, except in so far as is indispensable for purposes of life: replunging the soul, as much as possible, in the other world of intelligible essences, real forms or Ideas, which are its own natural kindred and antecedent companions. The process whereby this is accomplished is intellectual rather than ethical. It is the process of learning, or (in the sense of Sokrates) the revival in the mind of those essences or Ideas with which it had been familiar during its anterior and separate life: accompanied by the total abstinence from all other pleasures and temptations.³ Only by such love of learning,

Special privilege claimed for philosophers in the Phædon apart from the virtuous men who are not philosophers.

¹ Plato, Phædon, pp. 81-82.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 90 A.

³ Plato, Phædon, pp. 82-115.—τὰς δὲ (ἡδονὰς) περὶ τὸ μακάριον ἐκτρέφειν, &c. (p. 114 E).

These doctrines, laid down by Plato in the Phædon, bear great analogy to the Sanskrit philosophy called *Saṅkhya*, founded by Kapila, as expounded and criticised in the treatise of M. Barthé-

which is identical with philosophy (*φιλόσοφος, φιλομαθής*), is the mind rescued from the ignorance and illusions unavoidable in the world of sense.

In thus explaining his own creed, Sokrates announces a full conviction that the soul or mind is immortal, but he has not yet offered any proof of it: and Simmias as well as Kebés declare themselves to stand in need of proof. Both of them however are reluctant to obtrude upon him any doubts. An opportunity is thus provided, that Sokrates may exhibit his undisturbed equanimity—his unimpaired argumentative readiness—his keen anxiety not to relax the grasp of a subject until he has brought it to a satisfactory close—without the least reference to his speedily approaching death. This last-mentioned anxiety is made manifest in a turn of the dialogue, remarkable both for dramatic pathos and for originality.¹ We are thus brought to the more explicit statement of those reasons upon which Sokrates relies.

If the arguments whereby Sokrates proves the immortality of the soul are neither forcible nor conclusive, not fully satisfying even Simmias² to whom they are addressed—the adverse arguments, upon the faith of which the doctrine was denied (as we know it to have been by many philosophers of antiquity), cannot be said to be produced at all. Simmias and Kebés are represented as Sokratic companions, partly Pythagoreans; desirous to find the doctrine true, yet ignorant of the proofs. Both of them are earnest believers in the pre-existence of the soul, and in the objective reality of Ideas or intelligible essences. Simmias however adopts in part the opinion, not very clearly explained, "That the soul is a

Simmias and Kebés do not admit readily the immortality of the soul, but are unwilling to trouble Sokrates by asking for proof. Unabated interest of Sokrates in rational debate.

Simmias and Kebés believe fully in the pre-existence of the soul, but not in its post-existence. Doctrine—That the soul is a sort of harmony—refuted by Sokrates.

Jenny St. Hilaire (*Mémoire sur le Sankhyâ*, Paris, 1862, pp. 273-278)—and the other work, *Du Bouddhisme*, by the same author (Paris, 1866), pp. 116-127, 127-194, &c.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 89 B-C,—the remark made by Sokrates, when stroking down the head and handling the abundant hair of Phædon, in allusion

to the cutting off of all this hair, which would be among the acts of mourning performed by Phædon on the morrow, after the death of Sokrates: and the impressive turn given to this remark, in reference to the solution of the problem then in debate.

² Plato, *Phædon*, p. 107 B.

harmony or mixture": which opinion Sokrates refutes, partly by some other arguments, partly by pointing out that it is inconsistent with the supposition of the soul as pre-existent to the body, and that Simmias must make his election between the two. Simmias elects without hesitation, in favour of the pre-existence: which he affirms to be demonstrable upon premisses or assumptions perfectly worthy of trust: while the alleged harmony is at best only a probable analogy, not certified by conclusive reasons.¹ Kebès again, while admitting that the soul existed before its conjunction with the present body, and that it is sufficiently durable to last through conjunction with many different bodies—still expresses his apprehension that though durable, it is not eternal. Accordingly, no man can be sure that his present body is not the last with which his soul is destined to be linked; so that immediately on his death, it will pass away into nothing. The opinion of Kebès is remarkable, inasmuch as it shows how constantly the metempsychosis, or transition of the soul from one body to another, was included in all the varieties of ancient speculation on this subject.²

Before replying to Simmias and Kebès, Sokrates is described as hesitating and reflecting for a long time. He then enters into a sketch of³ his own intellectual history. How far the sketch as it stands depicts the real Sokrates, or Plato himself, or a supposed mind not exactly coincident with either—we cannot be certain: the final stage however must belong to Plato himself.

"You compel me (says Sokrates) to discuss thoroughly the cause of generation and destruction."⁴ I will tell you, if you like, my own successive impressions on these

Sokrates unfolds the intellectual changes or wanderings through which his mind had passed.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 92.

² Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 86-95. *κράσις καὶ ἀρμονία*, &c.

"Animam esse harmoniam complures quidem statuerant, sed aliam alii, et diversâ ratione," says Wyttenbach ad *Phædon*, p. 86. Lucretius as well as Plato impugn the doctrine, *ibid.* 97.

Galen, a great admirer of Plato, though not pretending to determine positively wherein the essence of the soul consists, maintains a doctrine substantially the same as what is here impugned—that it depends upon a certain *κράσις* of the elements and pro-

perties in the bodily organism—*Περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡρώων*, vol. iv. pp. 774-775, 779-782, ed. Kühn. He complains much of the unsatisfactory explanations of Plato on this point.

³ Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 96-102.

The following abstract is intended only to exhibit the train of thought and argument pursued by Sokrates; not adhering to the exact words, nor even preserving the interlocutory form. I could not have provided room for a literal translation.

⁴ Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 95 E-96. *Οὐ φαῦλον πρᾶγμα ζητεῖς· ὅπως γὰρ εἴ περὶ*

to cause.
Reasons
why he
rejected it.

subjects. When young, I was amazingly eager for that kind of knowledge which people call the investigation of Nature. I thought it matter of pride to know the causes of every thing—through what every thing is either generated, or destroyed, or continues to exist. I puzzled myself much to discover first of all such matters as these—Is it a certain putrefaction of the Hot and the Cold in the system (as some say), which brings about the nourishment of animals? Is it the blood through which we think—or air, or fire? Or is it neither one nor the other, but the brain, which affords to us sensations of sight, hearing, and smell, out of which memory and opinion are generated: then, by a like process, knowledge is generated out of opinion and memory when permanently fixed? ¹ I tried to understand destructions as well as generations, celestial as well as terrestrial phenomena. But I accomplished nothing, and ended by fancying myself utterly unfit for the enquiry. Nay—I even lost all the knowledge of that which I had before believed myself to understand. For example—From what cause does a man grow? At first, I had looked upon this as evident—that it was through eating and drinking: flesh being thereby added to his flesh, bone to his bone, &c. So too, when a tall and a short man were standing together, it appeared to me that the former was taller than the latter by the head—that ten were more than eight because two were added to them ²—that a rod of two cubits was greater than a rod of one cubit, because it projected beyond it by a half. Now—I am satisfied that I do not know the cause of any of these matters. I cannot explain why, when one is added to one, such addition makes them two; since in their separated state each was one. In this case, it is approximation or conjunction which is said to make the two: in another case, the opposite cause, *disjunction*, is said also to make two—when one body is bisected. ³ How two opposite causes can pro-

γίνεσθαι καὶ φθορὰς τὴν αἰρίαν διασπαρμαίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ οὖν σοὶ λέγω, ἰδὼν βούλη, τὰ γ' ἑὰν πᾶσι, &c.

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 96 B. ἀεὶ δὲ μνήμης καὶ δόξης, λαβούσης τὸ ἥρπειν, κατὰ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι ἐπιστήμην.

This is the same distinction between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, as that which Socrates gives in the Menon, though not

with full confidence (Menon, pp. 97-98). See *supra*, chap. xxii. p. 341.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 96 E. καὶ ἐν γε τούτων ἐναργέστερα, τὰ ἴδια μοι εἶδεν τὴν δεξιὰν κλειόμεν εἶναι, διὰ τὸ δύο αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, καὶ τὸ διατεχνεῖν τοῦ πηχέως μείζον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἡμίσην αὐτοῦ ὑπερέχειν.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 97 B.

duce the same effect—and how either conjunction or disjunction can produce two, where there were not two before—I do not understand. In fact, I could not explain to myself, by this method of research, the generation, or destruction, or existence, of any thing; and I looked out for some other method.

“It was at this time that I heard a man reading out of a book, which he told me was the work of Anaxagoras, the affirmation that Nous (Reason, Intelligence) was the regulator and cause of all things. I felt great satisfaction in this cause; and I was convinced, that if such were the fact, Reason would ordain every thing for the best: so that if I wanted to find out the cause of any generation, or destruction, or existence, I had only to enquire in what manner it was best that such generation or destruction should take place. Thus a man was only required to know, both respecting himself and respecting other things, what was the best: which knowledge, however, implied that he must also know what was worse—the knowledge of the one and of the other going together.¹ I thought I had thus found a master quite to my taste, who would tell me, first whether the earth was a disk or a sphere, and would proceed to explain the cause and the necessity why it must be so, by showing me how such arrangement was the best: next, if he said that the earth was in the centre, would proceed to show that it was best that the earth should be in the centre. Respecting the Sun, Moon, and Stars, I expected to hear the like explanation of their movements, rotations, and other phenomena: that is, how it was better that each should do and suffer exactly what the facts show. I never imagined that Anaxagoras, while affirming that they were regulated by Reason, would put upon them any other cause than this—that it was best for them to be exactly as they are. I presumed that, when giving account of the cause, both of each severally and all collectively, he would do it by setting forth what was best for each severally and for all in common. Such

Second doctrine. Hopes raised by the treatise of Anaxagoras.

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 97 C-D. *εἰ οὖν τις βούλοιντο τὴν αἰτίαν εὐρεῖν περὶ ἡδονῆς, πᾶσι γίγνεται ἢ ἀπολλύται ἢ ἔστι, τοῦτο δεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ εὐρεῖν, πᾶσι βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἔστιν ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν πέσχειν ἢ ποιεῖν· ἅς δὲ δὴ τοῦ λόγου τοῦτου οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν προσήκειν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ ἀριστον καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἀναγκαῖον δὲ εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον εἶδέναι· τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην περὶ αὐτῶν.*

was my hope, and I would not have sold it for a large price.¹ I took up eagerly the book of Anaxagoras, and read it as quickly as I could, that I might at once come to the knowledge of the better and worse.

“Great indeed was my disappointment when, as I proceeded with the perusal, I discovered that the author never employed Reason at all, nor assigned any causes calculated to regulate things generally: that the causes which he indicated were, air, ether, water, and many other strange agencies. The case seemed to me the same as if any one, while announcing that Sokrates acts in all circumstances by reason, should next attempt to assign the causes of each of my proceedings severally: ² As if he affirmed, for example, that the cause why I am now sitting here is, that my body is composed of bones and ligaments—that my bones are hard, and are held apart by commissures, and my ligaments such as to contract and relax, clothing the bones along with the flesh and the skin which keeps them together—that when the bones are lifted up at their points of junction, the contraction and relaxation of the ligaments makes me able to bend my limbs—and that this is the reason why I am now seated here in my present crumpled attitude: or again—as if, concerning the fact of my present conversation with you, he were to point to other causes of a like character—varieties of speech, air, and hearing, with numerous other similar facts—omitting all the while to notice the true causes, *viz.*,³—That inasmuch as the Athenians have deemed it best to condemn me, for that reason I too have deemed it best and most righteous to remain sitting here and to undergo the sentence which they impose. For, by the Dog, these bones and ligaments would have been long ago carried

Disappointment because Anaxagoras did not follow out the optimistic principle into detail. Distinction between causes efficient and causes co-efficient.

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 98 B. καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἀπεδόμην πολλοῦ τὰς ἐλπίδας, ἀλλὰ πᾶν σπουδῇ λαβὼν τὰς βίβλους, ὅτι τέχιστα οἶός τ' ἦν ἀνεγίγνωσκον, ἵν' ὡς τέχιστα εἰδείην τὸ βέλτιστον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 98 C. καὶ μοι δοκεῖν ὁμοιωτάτων ἀποκρίσθαι ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τις λέγων, ὅτι Σωκράτης πάντα ὅσα πράττει καὶ πράττει, κάμπτει ἐπιχειρήσας λέγειν τὰς αἰτίας ἐκείνων, ὅτι πράττει,

λέγει πρῶτον μὲν, ὅτι διὰ τὰντα νῦν ἐνθάδε κάμπτει, ὅτι ἐγγυμναίαι μου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ ὁσῶν καὶ νύμφων, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὁσῶν ἐστὶ στυρεὰ καὶ διαφρᾶς ἔχει χωρὶς ἀπ' ἄλλῳ, &c.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 98 E. ἀμφότως τὰς ὡς ἐλθέας αἰτίας λέγειν, ὅτι ἐνταῦθα Ἀθηναίους ἴδοις βέλτιον εἶναι ἢ καὶ καταφύσασθαι, διὰ τὰντα ὅτι καὶ ἐμοὶ βέλτιον εἰς ἐδόκεται ἐνθάδε κάμψασθαι, &c.

away to Thebes or Megara, by my judgment of what is best—if I had not deemed it more righteous and honourable to stay and affront my imposed sentence, rather than to run away. It is altogether absurd to call such agencies by the name of *causes*. Certainly, if a man affirms that unless I possessed such joints and ligaments and other members as now belong to me, I should not be able to execute what I have determined on, he will state no more than the truth. But to say that these are the causes why I, a rational agent, do what I am now doing, instead of saying that I do it from my choice of what is best—this would be great carelessness of speech: implying that a man cannot see the distinction between that which is the cause in reality, and that without which the cause can never be a cause.¹ It is this last which most men, groping as it were in the dark, call by a wrong name, as if it were itself the cause. Thus one man affirms that the earth is kept stationary in its place by the rotation of the heaven around it: another contends that the air underneath supports the earth, like a pedestal sustaining a broad kneading-trough: but none of them ever look out for a force such as this—That all these things now occupy that position which it is best that they should occupy. These enquirers set no great value upon this last-mentioned force, believing that they can find some other Atlas stronger, more everlasting, and more capable of holding all things together: they think that the Good and the Becoming have no power of binding or holding together any thing.

"Now, it is this sort of cause which I would gladly put myself under any one's teaching to learn. But I could neither find any teacher, nor make any way by myself. Having failed in this quarter, I took the second best course, and struck into a new path in search of causes.² Fatigued with studying objects through my eyes and perceptions of sense, I looked out for images

Sokrates could neither trace out the optimistic principle for himself, nor find any

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 99 A. ἀλλ' αἰτία μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα καλεῖν λίαν ἄτοπον· εἰ δέ τις λέγοι, ὅτι ἄνευ τοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν καὶ ὄντα καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἔχω, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ τ' ἦν ποιεῖν τὰ δέξαντά μοι, ἀληθῆς ἂν λέγοι· ὥς μόντοι διὰ ταῦτα ποῖα ἔσονται, καὶ ταύτην γὰρ πράττω, ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει, πολλὰ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ρηθυμία εἰς τοῦ λόγου. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ διελέσθαι οὐδὲν τ' εἶναι, ὅτι ἄλλο μὲν τί ἐστι τὸ αἰτίον τῷ ὄντι, ἄλλο δ' ὅπερ αἰτίον οὐ τὸ αἰτίον οὐκ ἂν ποτ' εἰς αἰτίον, &c.

² Plato, *Phædon*, p. 99 C-D. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ταύτης ἰσχυρότην, καὶ οὐτ' αὐτὸς εὐρεῖν οὐτε παρ' ἄλλων μαθεῖν οὐδὲν τι

teacher thereof. He renounced it, and embraced a third doctrine about cause.

or reflections of them, and turned my attention to words or discourses.¹ This comparison is indeed not altogether suitable: for I do not admit that he who investigates things through general words, has recourse to images, more than he who investigates sensible facts: but such, at all events, was the turn which my mind took. Laying down such general assumption or hypothesis as I considered to be the strongest, I accepted as truth whatever squared with it, respecting cause as well as all other matters. In this way I came upon the investigation of another sort of cause.²

He now assumes the separate existence of ideas. These ideas are the causes why particular objects manifest certain attributes.

"I now assumed the separate and real existence of Ideas by themselves—The Good in itself or the Self-Good, Self-Beautiful, Great, and all such others. Look what follows next upon this assumption. If any thing else be beautiful, besides the Self-Beautiful, that other thing can only be beautiful because it partakes of the Self-Beautiful: and the same with regard to other similar Ideas. This is the only cause that I can accept: I do not understand those other ingenious causes which I hear mentioned.³ When any one tells me that a thing is beautiful because it has a showy colour or figure, I pay no attention to him, but adhere simply to my own affirmation, that nothing else causes it to be beautiful, except the presence or participation of the Self-Beautiful. In what way such participation may take place, I cannot positively determine. But I feel confident in affirming that it does take place: that things which are beautiful, become so by partaking in the Self-Beautiful; things which are great or little, by partaking in Greatness or Littleness. If I am told that one man is taller than another by the head, and that this other is shorter than the first by the very same (by the head), I should not admit the proposition, but should repeat emphatically my own creed,—That whatever is greater than another is greater by nothing else

ἐπεὶ οὖν, τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ αἰτίου ζήτησιν ἢ πεπραγμένον, βούλει σοὶ ἐπιδείξω ποιῶμαι;

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 90 E. ἴσως μὲν οὖν ὃ εἰκάσω, τρόπον τινα οὐκ ἔοικεν· οὐ γὰρ πᾶν εὐγχαρὲς τὸν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις σκοπούμενον τὰ ὄντα ἐν εἰκάσει μάλλον

σκοπεῖν ἢ τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 100 B. ἔρχομαι γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχειρῶν σοὶ ἐπιδείξασθαι τῆς αἰτίας τὸ εἶδος ὃ πεπραγμένον, &c.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 100 C. οὐ τοῖον ἐπὶ μαθᾶναι, οὐδὲ δύναμαι τὰς ἄλλας αἰτίας τὰς σοφῆς ταύτας γινώσκειν.

except by Greatness and through Greatness—whatever is less than another is less only by Littleness and through Littleness. For I should fear to be entangled in a contradiction, if I affirmed that the greater man was greater and the lesser man less by the head—First, in saying that the greater was greater and that the lesser was less, by the very same—Next, in saying that the greater man was greater by the head, which is itself small : it being absurd to maintain that a man is great by something small.¹ Again, I should not say that ten is more than eight by two, and that this was the cause of its excess ;² my doctrine is, that ten is more than eight by Multitude and through Multitude : so the rod of two cubits is greater than that of one, not by half, but by Greatness. Again, when One is placed alongside of One, —or when one is bisected—I should take care not to affirm, that in the first case the juxtaposition, in the last case the bisection, was the cause why it became two.³ I proclaim loudly that I know no other cause for its becoming two except participation in the essence of the Dyad. What is to become two, must partake of the Dyad : what is to become one, of the Monad. I leave to wiser men than me these juxtapositions and bisections and other such refinements : I remain entrenched within the safe ground of my own assumption or hypothesis (the reality of these intelligible and eternal Ideas).

“Suppose however that any one impugned this hypothesis itself? I should make no reply to him until I had followed out fully the consequences of it : in order to ascertain whether they were consistent with, or contradictory to, each other. I should, when the proper time came, defend the hypothesis by itself, assuming some other hypothesis yet more universal,

Procedure of Sokrates if his hypothesis were impugned. He insists upon keeping apart the discus-

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 101 A. φοβούμενος μή τις σοι ἐναντίος λόγος ἀπαντήσῃ, εἰς τὴν κεφαλὴν μείζονά τινα φῆς εἶναι καὶ ἑλάττω, πρῶτον μὲν τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μείζον μείζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἑλάττω ἑλάττω, ἔπειτα τῇ κεφαλῇ μικρὰ οὕση τὸν μείζον μείζον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο δὴ τέρας εἶναι, τὸ μικρὰ τιμὴν μέγαν τινα εἶναι.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 101 B. Οὐκ οὐν τὰ δέκα τῶν ὀκτὼ δυοῖν πλείω εἶναι, καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπερβάλλειν, φοβόιο ἂν λέγειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλήθει καὶ διὰ τὸ πλεονεξίαν ; καὶ τὸ δίπληξον τοῦ

πληξαίου ἡμίσει μείζον εἶναι, ἀλλ' οὗ μὲν γένηται ;

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 101 B-C. τί δέ ; ἐνὶ ἐνὸς προσθέντος, τὴν πρόσθεσιν αἰτίαν εἶναι τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι, ἢ διασχισθέντος τὴν σχίσιν, οὐκ εὐλαβοῖο ἂν λέγειν, καὶ μέγα ἂν βοῶντες ὅτι οὐκ ὁλοθα ἄλλως πως ἑκάστον γιγνόμενον ἢ μετασχὼν τῆς ἰδίας οὐσίας ἑκάστον οὐ ἂν μετάσχη καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔχῃ ἄλλην τινα αἰτίαν τοῦ δύο γενέσθαι ἀλλ' ἢ τὴν τῆς δυνάδος μετάσχεσιν, &c.

sion of the hypothesis and the discussion of its consequences.

such as appeared to me best, until I came to some thing fully sufficient. But I would not permit myself to confound together the discussion of the hypothesis itself, and the discussion of its consequences.¹

This is a method which cannot lead to truth : though it is much practised by litigious disputants, who care little about truth, and pride themselves upon their ingenuity when they throw all things into confusion.”—

The exposition here given by Sokrates of successive intellectual tentatives (whether of Sokrates or Plato, or partly one, partly the other), and the reasoning embodied therein, is represented as welcomed with emphatic assent and approbation by all his fellow-dialogists.² It deserves attention on many grounds. It illustrates instructively some of the speculative points of view, and speculative transitions, suggesting themselves to an inquisitive intellect of that day.

If we are to take that which precedes as a description of the philosophical changes of Plato himself, it differs materially from Aristotle : for no allusion is here made to the intercourse of Plato with Kratylus and other advocates of the doctrines of Herakleitus : which intercourse is mentioned by Aristotle³ as having greatly influenced the early speculations of Plato. Sokrates describes three different phases of his (or Plato's) speculative point of view : all turning upon different conceptions of what constituted a true Cause. His first belief on the subject was, that which he entertained before he entered on physical and physiological investigations. It seemed natural to him that eating and drinking should be the cause why a young man grew taller : new bone and new flesh was added out of the food. So again, when a tall man appeared standing near to a short man, the former was tall by the head, or because of the head : ten were more than eight, because two were added on :

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 101 E. ἰκανὸν δὲ εἶναι αὐτῆς (τῆς ὑποθέσεως) δεῖν σε διδόναι λόγον, ὡσαύτως ἂν δίδοις, ἄλλαν αὖ ὑπόθεσιν ὑποθέμενος, ἥτις τῶν ἀνωθεν βελτίστη φαίνεται . . . ἀμα δὲ οὐκ ἂν φέροιτο, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ, περὶ τε τῆς ἀρχῆς διαλεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ

εἰρήνης ἀρμημένον, εἴπερ βούλοιο τε τῶν ὄντων εὐρεῖν.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 102 A. Such approbation is peculiarly signified by the intervention of Eukrates.

³ Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, a. 32.

the measure of two cubits was greater than that of one cubit, because it stretched beyond by one half. When one object was added on to another, the addition was the cause why they became two : when one object was bisected, this bisection was the cause why the one became two.

This was his first conception of a true Cause, which for the time thoroughly satisfied him. But when he came to investigate physiology, he could not follow out the same conception of Cause, so as to apply it to more novel and complicated problems ; and he became dissatisfied with it altogether, even in regard to questions on which he had before been convinced. New difficulties suggested themselves to him. How can the two objects, which when separate were each one, be made *two*, by the fact that they are brought together ? What alteration has happened in their nature ? Then again, how can the very same fact, the change from one to two, be produced by two causes perfectly contrary to each other—in the first case, by juxtaposition—in the last case, by bisection ?¹

That which is interesting here to note, is the sort of Cause which first gave satisfaction to the speculative mind of Sokrates. In the instance of the growing youth, he notes two distinct facts, the earliest of which is (assuming certain other facts as accompanying conditions) the cause of the latest. But in most of the other instances, the fact is one which does not admit of explanation. Comparisons of eight men with ten men, of a yard with half a yard, of a tall man with a short man, are mental appreciations, beliefs, affirmations, not capable of being farther explained or accounted for : if any one disputes your affirmation, you prove it to him, by placing him in a situation to make the comparison for himself, or to go through the computation which establishes the truth of what you affirm. It is not the juxtaposition of eight men which makes them to be eight (they were so just as much when separated by ever so wide an interval) : though it may dispose or enable the spectator to count them as eight. We may count the yard measure (whether actually bisected or not), either as one yard, or as two half yards, or as three feet, or thirty-

Problems
and difficulties
of which So-
krates first
sought
solution.

¹ Sextus Empiricus embodies this which he starts against the Dogmatists, argument of Plato among the difficulties adv. Mathematicos, x. a. 302-308.

six inches. Whether it be one, or two, or three, depends upon the substantive which we choose to attach to the numeral, or upon the comparison which we make (the unit which we select) on the particular occasion.

With this description of Cause Sokrates grew dissatisfied when he extended his enquiries into physical and physiological problems. Is it the blood, or air, or fire, whereby we think? and such like questions. Such enquiries—into the physical conditions of mental phenomena—did really admit of some answer, affirmative, or negative. But Sokrates does not tell us how he proceeded in seeking for an answer: he only says that he failed so completely, as even to be disabused of his supposed antecedent knowledge. He was in this perplexity when he first heard of the doctrine of Anaxagoras. “*Nous* or Reason is the regulator and the cause of all things.” Sokrates interpreted this to mean (what it does not appear that Anaxagoras intended to assert)¹ that the Kosmos was an animal or person² having mind or Reason analogous to his own: that this Reason was an agent invested with full power and perpetually operative, so as to regulate in the best manner all the phenomena of the Kosmos; and that the general cause to be assigned for every thing was one and the same—“It is best thus”; requiring that in each particular case you should show *how* it was for the best. Sokrates took the type of Reason from his own volition and movements; supposing that all the agencies in the Kosmos were stimulated or checked by cosmical Reason for her purposes, as he himself put in motion his own bodily members. This conception of Cause, borrowed from the analogy of his own rational volition, appeared to Sokrates very captivating, though it had not been his own first conception. But he found that Anaxagoras, though proclaiming the doctrine as a principium or initiatory influence, did not make applications of it in detail; but assigned as causes, in most of the particular cases, those agencies which Sokrates considered to be subordinate and instrumental, as his own muscles were to his own volition.

¹ I have given (in chap. i. p. 48 seq.) of Anaxagoras an abridgment and explanation of ² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 80 D. τὸν τοῦ κόσμου, ὡς ἐμψυχον ἔχοντα, &c.

Sokrates will not allow such agencies to be called Causes: he says that they are only co-efficients indispensable to the efficacy of the single and exclusive Cause—Reason. But he tells us himself that most enquirers considered them as Causes; and that Anaxagoras himself produced them as such. Moreover we shall see Plato himself in the *Timæus*, while he repeats this same distinction between Causes Efficient and Causes Co-efficient—yet treats these latter as Causes also, though inferior in regularity and precision to the Demiurgic Nous.¹

In truth, the complaint which Sokrates here raises against Anaxagoras—that he assigned celestial Rotation as the cause of phenomena, in place of a quasi-human Reason—is just the same as that which Aristophanes in the *Clouds* advances against Sokrates himself.² The comic poet accuses Sokrates of displacing Zeus to make room for Dinos or Rotation. According to the popular religious belief, all or most of the agencies in Nature were personified, or supposed to be carried on by persons—Gods, Goddesses, Dæmons, Nymphs, &c., which army of independent agents were conceived, by some thinkers, as more or less systematised and

Sokrates imputes to Anaxagoras the mistake of substituting physical agencies in place of mental. This is the same which Aristophanes and others imputed to Sokrates.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 46 C-D. αἰτία—*ὑψαίτια*—*ὑψαίτια*. He says that most persons considered the *ὑψαίτια* as αἰτία. And he himself registers them as such (*Timæus*, p. 68 E). He there distinguishes the αἰτία and *ὑψαίτια* as two different sorts of αἰτία, the *divine* and the *necessary*, in a remarkable passage: where he tells us that we ought to study the divine causes, with a view to the happiness of life, as far as our nature permits—and the necessary causes for the sake of the divine: for that we cannot in any way apprehend, or understand, or get sight of the divine causes alone, without the necessary causes along with them (69 A).

In *Timæus*, pp. 47-48, we find again *νόος* and *ἀνάγκη* noted as two distinct sorts of causes co-operating to produce the four elements. It is farther remarkable that Necessity is described as “the wandering or irregular description of Cause”—*ὅτι τῆς πλανωμένης εἰδὸς αἰτίας*. *Eros* and *Ἀνάγκη* are joined as co-operating—in *Symposium*, pp. 195 C, 197 B.

² Aristophan. *Nubes*, 879-815.

Δίνος βασιλεύει, τὸν Δι' ἱεληλακός. We find Proklus making this same complaint against Aristotle, “that he deserted theological *principia*, and indulged too much in physical reasonings”—*τὸν μὲν θεολογικῶν ἀρχῶν ἀφιστάμενος, τοῖς δὲ φυσικοῖς λόγοις πέρα τοῦ δέοντος ἐνδιατρίβων* (Proklus ad *Timæum*, li. 90 E, p. 212, Schneider). Pascal also expresses the like displeasure against the Cartesian theory of the vortices. Descartes recognised God as having originally established rotatory motion among the atoms, together with an equal, unvarying quantity of motion: these two points being granted, Descartes considered that all cosmical facts and phenomena might be deduced from them.

“Sur la philosophie de Descartes, Pascal était de son sentiment sur l'automate; et n'en était point sur la matière subtile, dont il se moquait fort. Mais il ne pouvait souffrir sa manière d'expliquer la formation de toutes choses; et il disait très souvent, —Je ne puis pardonner à Descartes: il voudrait bien, dans toute sa philosophie, pouvoir

consolidated under the central authority of the Kosmos itself. The causes of natural phenomena, especially of the grand and terrible phenomena, were supposed agents, conceived after the model of man, and assumed to be endowed with volition, force, affections, antipathies, &c. : some of them visible, such as Helios, Selênê, the Stars ; others generally invisible, though showing themselves whenever it specially pleased them.¹ Sokrates, as we see by the Platonic Apology, was believed by his countrymen to deny these animated agencies, and to substitute instead of them inanimate forces, not put in motion by the quasi-human attributes of reason, feeling and volition. The Sokrates in the Platonic Phædon, taken at this second stage of his speculative wanderings, not only disclaims such a doctrine, but protests against it. He recognises no cause except a *Nous* or Reason borrowed by analogy from that of which he was conscious within himself, choosing what was best for himself in every special situation.² He tells

se passer de Dieu : mais il n'a pu s'empêcher de lui accorder une chiquenaude pour mettre le monde en mouvement : après cela, il n'a que faire de Dieu." (*Apology*, *Pensées*, ch. xi. p. 237, edition de Louandre, citation from Mademoiselle Périer, Paris, 1854.)

Again, Lord Monboddo, in his *Ancient Metaphysics* (bk. II. ch. 19, p. 276), cites these remarks of Plato and Aristotle on the deficiencies of Anaxagoras, and expresses the like censure himself against the cosmical theories of Newton :—

"Sir Isaac puts me in mind of an ancient philosopher Anaxagoras, who maintained, as Sir Isaac does, that mind was the cause of all things ; but when he came to explain the particular phenomena of nature, instead of having recourse to mind, employed airs and æthers, subtle spirits and fluids, and I know not what—in short, any thing rather than mind : a cause which he admitted to exist in the universe ; but rather than employ it, had recourse to imaginary causes, of the existence of which he could give no proof. The Tragic poets of old, when they could not otherwise untie the knot of their fable, brought down a god in a machine, who solved all difficulties : but such philosophers as Anaxagoras will not, even when they cannot do better, employ *mind* or divinity. Our philosophers, since Sir Isaac's time, have

gone on in the same track, and still, I think, farther."

Lord Monboddo speaks with still greater asperity about the Cartesian theory, making a remark on it similar to what has been above cited from Pascal. (See his *Dissertation on the Newtonian Philosophy*, Appendix to *Ancient Metaphysics*, pp. 498-499.)

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 41 A. πάντες ὄντοι τε περιτολῶσι φανερώς καὶ ὄντοι φαίνονται καθ' ὅσον ἂν ἐθέλωσι θεοί, &c.

² What Sokrates understands by the theory of Anaxagoras, is evident from his language—Phædon, pp. 98-99. He understands an indwelling cosmical Reason or Intelligence, deliberating and choosing, in each particular conjuncture, what was best for the Kosmos ; just as his own (Sokrates) Reason deliberated and chose what was best for him (τῇ τοῦ βελτίστου αἰρέσει), in consequence of the previous determination of the Athenians to condemn and punish him.

This point deserves attention, because it is altogether different from Aristotle's conception of *Nous* or Reason in the Kosmos : in which he recognises no consciousness, no deliberation, no choice, no reference to any special situation : but a constant, instinctive, undeliberating, movement towards Good as a determining End—i.e. towards the reproduction and perpetuation of regular Forms.

us however that most of the contemporary philosophers dissented from this point of view. To them, such inanimate agencies were the sole and real causes, in one or other of which they found what they thought a satisfactory explanation.

It is however singular, that Sokrates, after he has extolled Anaxagoras for enunciating a grand general cause, and has blamed him only for not making application of it in detail, proceeds to state that neither he himself, nor any one else within his knowledge, could find the way of applying it, any more than Anaxagoras had done. If Anaxagoras had failed, no one else could do better. The facts before Sokrates could not be reconciled, by any way that he could devise, with his assumed principle of rational directing force, or constant optimistic purpose, inherent in the Kosmos. Accordingly he abandoned this track, and entered upon another: seeking a different sort of cause ($\tau\acute{\iota}\varsigma$

The supposed theory of Anaxagoras cannot be carried out, either by Sokrates himself, or anyone else. Sokrates turns to general words, and adopts the theory of ideas.

Hegel, in his *Geschichte der Philosophie* (Part i. pp. 365, 368-369, 2nd edit.), has given very instructive remarks, in the spirit of the Aristotelian Realism, both upon the principle announced by Anaxagoras, and upon the manner in which Anaxagoras is criticised by Sokrates in the Platonic *Phædon*. Hegel observes:—

“Along with this principle (that of Anaxagoras) there comes in the recognition of an Intelligence, or of a self-determining agency—which was wanting before. Herein we are not to imagine thought, subjectively considered: when thought is spoken of, we are apt to revert to thought as it passes in our consciousness: but here, on the contrary, what is meant is, the Idea, considered altogether objectively, or Intelligence as an effective agent: (N.B. *Intellectum*, or *Cogitatum*—not *Intellectio*, or *Cogitatio*, which would mean the conscious process—see this distinction illustrated by Trendelenburg ad Aristot. *De Anima*, i. 2, 5, p. 219: also Marbach, *Gesch. der Phil.* s. 54, 90 not. 2): as we say, that there is reason in the world,—or as we speak of Genera in nature, which are the Universal. The Genus Animal is the Essential of the Dog—it is the Dog himself: the laws of nature are her immanent Essence. Nature is not formed from without, as men construct

a table: the table is indeed constructed intelligently, but by an Intelligence extraneous to this wooden material. It is this extraneous form which we are apt to think of as representing Intelligence, when we hear it talked of: but what is really meant is, the Universal—the immanent nature of the object itself. The *Noûs* is not a thinking Being without, which has arranged the world: by such an interpretation the Idea of Anaxagoras would be quite perverted and deprived of all philosophical value. For to suppose an individual, particular, Something without, is to descend into the region of phantasms and its dualism: what is called, a thinking Being, is not an Idea, but a Subject. Nevertheless, what is really and truly Universal is not for that reason Abstract: its characteristic property, *quâ* Universal, is to determine in itself, by itself, and for itself, the particular accompaniments. While it carries on this process of change, it maintains itself at the same time as the Universal, always the same; this is a portion of its self-determining efficiency.”—What Hegel here adverts to seems identical with that which Dr. Henry More calls an *Emanative Cause* (*Immortality of the Soul*, ch. vi. p. 18), “the notion of a thing possible. An *Emanative Effect* is co-existent with the very substance of that which is

airias tò eidōs), not by contemplation of things, but by propositions and ratiocinative discourse. He now assumed as a principle an universal axiom or proposition, from which he proceeds to deduce consequences. The principle thus laid down is, That there exist substantial Ideas—universal Entia. Each of these Ideas communicates or imparts its own nature to the particulars which bear the same name: and such communion or participation is the cause why they are what they are. The cause why various objects are beautiful or great, is, because they partake of the Self-Beautiful or the Self-Great: the cause why they are two or three is, because they partake of the Dyad or the Triad.

Here then we have a third stage or variety of belief, in the speculative mind of Sokrates, respecting Causes. The self-existent Ideas ("propria Platonis suppellex," to use the words of Seneca¹) are postulated as Causes: and in this belief Sokrates at last finds satisfaction. But these Causative Ideas, or Ideal Causes, though satisfactory to Plato, were accepted by scarcely any one else. They were transformed—seemingly even by Plato himself before his death, into Ideal Numbers, products of the One implicated with Great and Little or the undefined Dyad—and still farther transformed by

said to be the Cause thereof. That which *emanates*, if I may so speak, is the same in reality with its Emanative Cause."

Respecting the criticism of Sokrates upon Anaxagoras, Hegel has further acute remarks which are too long to cite (p. 368 seq.)

¹ Seneca, Epistol.

About this disposition, manifested by many philosophers, and in a particular manner by Plato, to "embrace logical phantoms as real causes," I transcribe a good passage from Malebranche.

"Je me sens encore extrêmement porté à dire que cette colonne est dure par sa nature: ou bien que les petits liens dont sont composés les corps durs, sont des atomes, dont les parties ne se peuvent diviser, comme étant les parties essentielles et dernières des corps—et qui sont essentiellement crochues ou branchues.

"Mais je reconnois franchement, que

ce n'est point expliquer la difficulté: et que, quittant les préoccupations et les illusions de mes sens, j'aurais tort de recourir à une forme abstraite, et d'embrasser un fantôme de logique pour la cause que je cherche. Je veux dire, que j'aurais tort de concevoir, comme quelque chose de réel et de distinct, l'idée vague de nature et d'essence, qui n'exprime que ce que l'on sait: et de prendre ainsi une forme abstraite et universelle, comme une cause physique d'un effet très réel. Car il y a deux choses dont je ne saurais trop délier. La première est, l'impression de mes sens: et l'autre est, la facilité que j'ai de prendre les natures abstraites et les idées générales de logique, pour celles qui sont réelles et particulières: et je me souviens d'avoir été plusieurs fois séduit par ces deux principes d'erreur." (Malebranche—Recherche de la Vérité, vol. III., liv. VI., ch. 8, p. 345, ed. 1772.)

his successors Speusippus and Xenokrates : they were impugned in every way, and emphatically rejected, by Aristotle.

The foregoing picture given by Sokrates of the wanderings of his mind (*τὰς ἐμὰς πλάνας*) in search of Causes, is interesting, not only in reference to the Platonic age, but also to the process of speculation generally. Almost every one talks of a Cause as a word of the clearest meaning, familiar and understood by all hearers. There are many who represent the Idea of Cause as simple, intuitive, self-originated, universal ; one and the same in all minds. These philosophers consider the maxim—that every phenomenon must have a Cause—as self-evident, known *à priori* apart from experience : as something which no one can help believing as soon as it is stated to him.¹ The gropings of Sokrates are among the numerous facts which go to refute such a theory : or at least to show in what sense alone it can be partially admitted. There is no fixed, positive, universal Idea, corresponding to the word Cause. There is a wide divergence, as to the question what a Cause really is, between different ages of the same man (exemplified in the case of Sokrates) : much more between different philosophers at one time and another. Plato complains of Anaxagoras and other philosophers for assigning as Causes that which did not truly deserve the name : Aristotle also blames the defective conceptions of his predecessors (Plato included) on the same subject. If there be an intuitive idea corresponding to the word Cause, it must be a different intuition in

¹ Dugald Stewart, *Elem. Philos. Hum. Mind*, vol. I. ch. 1, sect. 2, pp. 98-99, ed. Hamilton, also note : same volume.

"Several modern philosophers (especially Dr. Reid, *On the Intell. Powers*) have been at pains to illustrate that law of our nature which leads us to refer every change we perceive in the universe to the operation of an efficient cause. This reference is not the result of reasoning, but necessarily accompanies the perception, so as to render it impossible for us to see the change, without feeling a conviction of the operation of some cause by which it is produced ; much in the same manner in which we find it impossible to conceive a sensation, without being impressed with a belief of the existence of a sentient being. Hence I conceive

it is that when we see two events constantly conjoined, we are led to associate the idea of causation or efficiency with the former, and to refer to it that power or energy by which the change is produced ; in consequence of which association we come to consider philosophy as the knowledge of efficient causes, and lose sight of the operation of mind in producing the phenomena of nature. It is by an association somewhat similar that we connect our sensations of colour with the primary qualities of body. A moment's reflection must satisfy any one that the sensation of colour can only reside in a mind. . . . In the same way we are led to associate with inanimate matter the ideas of power, force, energy, causation, which are all attributes of mind, and can exist in a mind only."

Plato and Aristotle—in Plato himself at one age and at another age : in other philosophers, different from both and from each other. The word is equivocal—*πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον*, in Aristotelian phrase—men use it familiarly, but vary much in the thing signified. *That* is a Cause, to each man, which gives satisfaction to the inquisitive feelings—curiosity, anxious perplexity, speculative embarrassment of his own mind. Now doubtless these inquisitive feelings are natural and widespread : they are emotions of our nature, which men seek (in some cases) to appease by some satisfactory hypothesis. That answer which affords satisfaction, looked at in one of its aspects, is called Cause ; Beginning or Principle—Element—represent other aspects of the same *Quæsitum* :—

“Felix, qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas,
Atque metus omnes et inexorabile Fatum
Subiecit pedibus strepitumque Acherontis avari,”

is the exclamation of that sentiment of wonder and uneasiness out of which, according to Plato and Aristotle, philosophy springs.¹ But though the appetite or craving is common, in greater or less degree, to most persons—the nourishment calculated to allay it is by no means the same to all. Good (says Aristotle) is that which all men desire :² but all men do not agree in their judgment, what Good is. The point of communion between mankind is here emotional rather than intellectual : in the painful feeling of difficulty to be solved, not in the manner of conceiving what the difficulty is, nor in the direction where solution is to be sought, nor in the solution itself when suggested.³

¹ Virgil, *Georg.* ii. 490-92. Compare Lucretius, vi. 50-55, and the letter of Epikurus to Herodotus, p. 25, ed. Orrell. Plato, *Theætét.* p. 155 D. *μᾶλα γὰρ φιλοσόφον τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν· οὐ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἄλλη φιλοσοφίας, ἢ αὕτη* :—Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. p. 983, b. 10-20. *διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφῆν, ὃ δὲ ἀπαρὼν καὶ θαυμάζειν οἰεται ἐγγενές.*

² Aristotel. *Ethic. Nikom.* i. 1. *διὰ καλῶς ἀποφάναντο τάχαθόν, ὃ πάντες ἐφίευνται.* Plato, *Republ.* vi. p. 505 E. *Ὁ δὲ δίδωκε μὲν ἀπάντα ψυχῇ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαρτυρομένη τι εἶναι, ἀπορούσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα*

λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' εἴσιν, &c.

Seneca, *Epistol.* 118. “Bonum est, quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet.”

³ Aristotle recognises the different nature of the difficulties and problems which present themselves to the speculative mind : he looks back upon the embarrassments of his predecessors as antiquated and even silly, *Metaphysic.* N. 1089, a. 2. *Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ αἰτία τῆς ἐπὶ ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας ἐκτροπῆς, μέγιστα δὲ τὸ ἀπορῆσαι ἀρχαίως, which Alexander of Aphrodisias paraphrases by ἀρχαίως καὶ εὐήθως.* Compare A 993, a. 15.

In another passage of the same book,

When Sokrates here tells us that as a young man he felt anxious curiosity to know what the cause of every phenomenon was, it is plain that at this time he did not know what he was looking for: that he proceeded only by successive steps of trial, doubt, discovered error, rejection: and that each trial was adapted to the then existing state of his own mind. The views of Anaxagoras he affirms to have presented themselves to him as a new revelation: he then came to believe that the only true Cause was, a cosmical reason and volition like to that of which he was conscious in himself. Yet he farther tells us, that others did not admit this Cause, but found other causes to satisfy them: that even Anaxagoras did not follow out his own general conception, but recognised Causes quite unconnected with it: lastly, that neither could he (Sokrates) trace out the conception for himself.¹ He was driven to renounce it, and to turn to another sort of Cause—the hypothesis of self-existent Ideas, in which he then acquiesced. And this last hypothesis, again, was ultimately much modified in the mind of Plato himself, as we know from Aristotle. All this shows that the Idea of Cause—far from being one and the same to all, like the feeling of uneasiness which prompts the search for it—is complicated, diverse, relative, and modifiable.

The last among the various revolutions which Sokrates represents himself to have undergone—the transition from designing and volitional agency of the Kosmos conceived as an animated system, to the sovereignty of universal Ideas—is analogous to that transition which Auguste Comte considers to be the natural

Disension and perplexity on the question,—What is a cause? revealed by the picture of Sokrates—no intuition to guide him.

Different notions of Plato and Aristotle about causation, causes

Aristotle notes and characterises the emotion experienced by the mind in possessing what is regarded as truth—the mental satisfaction obtained when a difficulty is solved, 1090, a. 38. Οἱ δὲ χωριστὸν ποιοῦντες (τὸν ἀριθμὸν), ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν οὐκ ἔσται τὰ αἰώματα, ἀληθὴ δὲ τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ σαίνει τὴν ψυχὴν, εἶναι τε ὑπολαμβάνουσι καὶ χωριστὰ εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ τὰ μεγέθη τὰ μαθηματικά.

The subjective origin of philosophy—the feelings which prompt to the theorising process, striking out different hypotheses and analogies—are well

stated by Adam Smith, 'History of Astronomy,' sect. ii. and iii.

¹ The view of Cause, which Sokrates here declares himself to renounce from inability to pursue it, is substantially the same as what he lays down in the *Philæbus*, pp. 23 D, 27 A, 30 E.

In the *Timæus* Plato assigns to Timæus the task (to which Sokrates in the *Phædon* had confessed himself incompetent) of following into detail the schemes and proceedings of the Demiurgic or optimising *Nous*. But he also assumes the *εἰδη* or Ideas as co-ordinate and essential conditions.

regular and
irregular.
Inductive
theory of
causation,
elaborated
in modern
times.

progress of the human mind : to explain phenomena at first by reference to some personal agency, and to pass from this mode of explanation to that by metaphysical abstractions. It is true that these are two distinct modes of conceiving Causation ; and that in each of them the human mind, under different states of social and individual instruction, finds satisfaction. But each of the two theories admits of much diversity in the mode of conception. Plato seems to have first given prominence to these metaphysical causes ; and Aristotle in this respect follows his example : though he greatly censures the incomplete and erroneous theories of Plato. It is remarkable that both these two philosophers recognised Causes irregular and unpredictable, as well as Causes regular and predictable. Neither of them included even the idea of regularity, as an essential part of the meaning of Cause.¹ Lastly, there has been elaborated in modern times, owing to the great extension of inductive science, another theory of Causation, in which unconditional regularity is the essential constituent : recognising no true Causes except the phenomenal causes certified by experience, as interpreted inductively and deductively—the assemblage of phenomenal antecedents, uniform and unconditional, so far as they can be discovered and verified.

¹ Monboddo, *Ancient Metaphysics*, B. I. ch. iv. p. 32. "Plato appears to have been the first of the Ionic School that introduced *formal causes* into natural philosophy. These he called *Ideas*, and made the principles of all things. And the reason why he insists so much upon this kind of cause, and so little upon the other three, is given us by Aristotle in the end of his first book of *Metaphysics*, viz., that he studied mathematics too much, and instead of using them as the handmaid of philosophy, made them philosophy itself. . . . Plato, however, in the *Phædon* says a good deal about final causes ; but in the system of natural philosophy which is in the *Timæus*, he says very little of it."

I have already observed that Plato in the *Timæus* (48 A) recognises erratic or irregular Causation—*ἡ πλανώμενη αἰτία*. Aristotle recognises *Αἰτία* among the equivocal words *πολλὰς λέγονται* ; and he enumerates *Τύχη* and *Αὐτόματον*—irregular causes or causes

by accident—among them (*Physic.* ii. 195-198 ; *Metaphys.* K. 1065, a.) Schwegler, ad *Aristot. Metaphys.* vi. 4, 3, "Das Zufällige ist ein nothwendiges Element alles Geschehens". Alexander of Aphrodisias, the best of the Aristotelian commentators, is at pains to defend this view of *Τύχη*—Causation by accident, or irregular.

Proklus, in his Commentary on the *Timæus* (ii. 80-81, p. 188, Schneider), notices the labour and prolixity with which the commentators before him set out the different varieties of Cause ; distinguishing sixty-four according to Plato, and forty-eight according to Aristotle. Proklus adverts also (ad *Timæum*, iii. p. 176) to an animated controversy raised by Theophrastus against Plato, about Causes and the speculations thereupon.

An enumeration, though very incomplete, of the different meanings assigned to the word Cause, may be seen in Professor Fleming's *Vocabulary of Philosophy*.

Certain it is that these are the only causes obtainable by induction and experience: though many persons are not satisfied without looking elsewhere for transcendental or ontological causes of a totally different nature. All these theories imply—what Sokrates announces in the passage just cited—the deep-seated influence of speculative curiosity, or the thirst for finding the Why of things and events, as a feeling of the human mind: but all of them indicate the discrepant answers with which, in different enquirers, this feeling is satisfied, though under the same equivocal name *Cause*. And it would have been a proceeding worthy of Plato's dialectic, if he had applied to the word Cause the same cross-examining analysis which we have seen him applying to the equally familiar words—Virtue—Courage—Temperance—Friendship, &c. "First, let us settle what a Cause really is: then, and not till then, can we succeed in ulterior enquiries respecting it."¹

¹ See Sir William Hamilton, *Discussions on Philosophy*, Appendix, p. 585. The debates about what was meant in philosophy by the word Cause are certainly older than Plato. We read that it was discussed among the philosophers who frequented the house of Perikles; and that that eminent statesman was ridiculed by his dissolute son Xanthippus for taking part in such useless refinements (Plutarch, *Perikles*, c. 36). But the Platonic dialogues are the oldest compositions in which any attempts to analyse the meaning of the word are preserved to us.

Αἰτιαί, *Ἀρχαί*, *Στοιχεῖα* (Aristot. *Metaph.* A.), were the main objects of search with the ancient speculative philosophers. While all of them set to themselves the same problem, each of them hit upon a different solution. That which gave mental satisfaction to one, appeared unsatisfactory and even inadmissible to the rest. The first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* gives an instructive view of this discrepancy. His own analysis of Cause will come before us hereafter. Compare the long discussions on the subject in Sextus Empiricus, *Pyrrhon. Hypo.* iii. 13-30; and adv. *Mathemat.* ix. 195-250. The discrepancy was so great among the dogmatical philosophers, that he pronounces the reality of the causal sequence to be indeter-

minable—*ἴσταν μὲν οὐκ ἐπὶ τοῖς Ἀρχαῖς ἐνὸς τῶν δογματικῶν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐννοῆσαι τις τὸ αἷτιον δύνατο, εἰ γὰρ πρὸς τῷ διαφώνοντι καὶ ἀλλοκότῳ (ἀποδιδομένῳ) ἐννοίας τοῦ αἰτίου ἐπὶ καὶ τῇ ὑπόστασιν αὐτοῦ πεποιθήκασι ἀνεύρετον διὰ τὴν περὶ αὐτῷ διαφωνίαν*. Seneca (*Epist.* 65) blends together the Platonic and the Aristotelian views, when he ascribes to Plato a quintuple variety of Causa.

The quadruple variety of Causation established by Aristotle governed the speculations of philosophers during the middle ages. But since the decline of the Aristotelian philosophy, there are few subjects which have been more keenly debated among metaphysicians than the Idea of Cause. It is one of the principal points of divergence among the different schools of philosophy now existing. A volume, and a very instructive volume, might be filled with the enumeration and contrast of the different theories on the subject. Upon the view which a man takes on this point will depend mainly the scope or purpose which he sets before him in philosophy. Many seek the solution of their problem in transcendental, ontological, extra-phenomenal causes, lying apart from and above the world of fact and experience; Reid and Stewart, while acknowledging the existence of such causes as the true efficient causes, consider them as being

There is yet another point which deserves attention in this history given by Sokrates of the transitions of his own mind. His last transition is represented as one from things to words, that is, to general propositions:¹ to the assumption in each case of an universal proposition or hypothesis calculated to fit that case. He does not seem to consider the optimistic doctrine, which he had before vainly endeavoured to follow out, as having been an hypothesis, or universal proposition assumed as true and as a principle from which to deduce consequences. Even if it were so, however, it was one and the same assumption intended to suit all cases: whereas the new doctrine to which he passed included many distinct assumptions, each adapted to a certain number of cases and not to the rest.² He assumed an untold multitude of self-existent Ideas—The Self-Beautiful, Self-Just, Self-Great, Self-Equal, Self-Unequal, &c.—each of them adapted to a certain number of particular cases: the Self-Beautiful was assumed as the cause why all particular things were beautiful—as that, of which all and each of them partakes—and so of the rest.³ Plato then explains his procedure. He

out of the reach of human knowledge; others recognise no true cause except personal, quasi-human, voluntary, agency, grounded on the type of human volition. Others, again, with whom my own opinion coincides, following out the analysis of Hume and Brown, understand by causes nothing more than phenomenal antecedents constant and unconditional, ascertainable by experience and induction. See the copious and elaborate chapter on this subject in Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' Book iii. ch. 5, especially as enlarged in the fourth, fifth, and sixth editions of that work, including the criticism on the opposite or volitional theory of Causation; also the work of Professor Bain, 'The Emotions and the Will,' pp. 472-584. The opposite view, in which Causes are treated as something essentially distinct from Laws, and as ultra-phenomenal, is set forth by Dr. Whewell, 'Novum Organon Renovatum,' ch. vii. p. 118 seq.

¹ Aristotle (*Metaphysic.* A. 987, b. 31, c. 1060, b. 35) calls the Platonic

οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις: see the note of Bonitz.

² Plato, *Phædon*, p. 100 A. ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔστι ταύτη γε ὥρμησα, καὶ ὑποθέμενος ἐκάστοτε λόγον ἐν ᾧ κρινῶ ἐρρωμένε-στατον εἶναι, ἃ μὲν ἂν μοι δοκῇ τούτων συμφωνεῖν, τίθημι ὡς ἀληθῆ ὄντα, καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· ἃ δ' ἂν μὴ, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ.

³ Aristotle controverts this doctrine of Plato in a pointed manner, *De Gen. et Corrupt.* ii. 9, p. 335, b. 10, also *Metaphys.* A. 991, b. 3. The former passage is the most animated in point of expression, where Aristotle says—ὡς περὶ ἐν τῷ Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ἐπιτιμήσας τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡς οὐδὲν εἰρηκόσιν, ὑποτίθεται—which is very true about the Platonic dialogue *Phædon*, &c. But in both the two passages, Aristotle distinctly maintains that the Ideas cannot be *Causes* of any thing.

This is another illustration of what I have observed above, that the meaning of the word *Cause* has been always fluctuating and undetermined.

We see that, while Aristotle affirmed

first deduced various consequences from this assumed hypothesis, and examined whether all of them were consistent or inconsistent with each other. If he detected inconsistencies (as *e.g.* in the last half of the *Parmenidès*), we must suppose (though Plato does not expressly say so) that he would reject or modify his fundamental assumption : if he found none, he would retain it. The point would have to be tried by dialectic debate with an opponent : the logical process of inference and counter-inference is here assumed to be trustworthy. But during this debate Plato would require his opponent to admit the truth of the fundamental hypothesis provisionally. If the opponent chose to impugn the latter, he must open a distinct debate on that express subject. Plato insists that the discussion of the consequences flowing from the hypothesis, shall be kept quite apart from the discussion on the credibility of the hypothesis itself. From the language employed, he seems to have had in view certain disputants known to him, by whom the two were so blended together as to produce much confusion in the reasoning.

But if your opponent impugns the hypothesis itself, how are you to defend it? Plato here tells us : by means of some other hypothesis or assumption, yet more universal than itself. You must ascend upwards in the scale of generality, until you find an assumption suitable and sufficient.¹

Ultimate
appeal to
hypothesis
of extreme
generality.

We here see where it was that Plato looked for full, indisputable, self-recommending and self-assuring, certainty and truth. Among the most universal propositions. He states the matter here as if we were to provide defence for an hypothesis less universal by ascending to another hypothesis more universal. This is illustrated by what he says in the *Timæus*—Propositions are cognate with the matter which they affirm : those whose affirmation is purely intellectual, comprising only matter of the intelligible world, or of genuine Essence, are solid and inexpugnable : those which take in more or less of the sensible world, which is a mere copy of the intelligible exemplar, become less and less trustworthy—mere probabilities. Here we have the Platonic worship of the most universal propositions, as the only primary

that the Ideas could not be Causes of anything, Plato here maintains that they are the only true Causes.

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 101 E.

and evident truths.¹ But in the sixth and seventh books of the Republic, he delivers a precept somewhat different, requiring the philosopher not to rest in any hypothesis as an ultimatum, but to consider them all as stepping-stones for enabling him to ascend into a higher region, above all hypothesis—to the first principle of every thing : and he considers geometrical reasoning as defective because it takes its departure from hypothesis or assumptions of which no account is rendered.² In the Republic he thus contemplates an intuition by the mind of some primary, clear, self-evident truth, above all hypotheses or assumptions even the most universal, and transmitting its own certainty to every thing which could be logically deduced from it : while in the Phædon, he does not recognise any thing higher or more certain than the most universal hypothesis—and he even presents the theory of self-existent Ideas as nothing more than an hypothesis, though a very satisfactory one. In the Republic, Plato has come to imagine the Idea of Good as distinguished from and illuminating all the other Ideas : in the Timæus, it seems personified in the Demiurgus ; in the Phædon, that Idea of Good appears to be represented by the Nous or Reason of Anaxagoras. But Sokrates is unable to follow it out, so that it becomes included, without any pre-eminence, among the Ideas generally : all of them transcendental, co-ordinate, and primary sources of truth to the intelligent mind—yet each of them exercising a causative influence in its own department, and bestowing its own special character on various particulars.

It is from the assumption of these Ideas as eternal Essences, that Plato undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul. One Idea or Form will not admit, but peremptorily excludes, the approach of that other

¹ Plato, Timæus, p. 29 B. ἄτε οὐκ περὶ τε εἰκόνας καὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος διαρίσσειν, ὡς ἄρα τοὺς λόγους, ἀντίρρουν ἐξήγηται, τοῦτον αὐτῶν καὶ ἐν γένει οὐκ ὄντων. Τοῦ μὲν οὐκ ὄντος καὶ βεβαίον καὶ μετὰ τοῦ καταφανοῦς, νοῦτον καὶ ἀμετακίνητον . . . τοῦ δὲ τοῦ πρὸς μὲν ἐκείνῳ ἀπεκασθέντος, ὅντος δὲ εἰκότος, εἰκότος ἀπὸ λόγου τε ἐκείνου ὄντος· ὁ, πῶς πρὸς γένεσιν οὐσία, τοῦτο πρὸς τίσιν ἀληθεία.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511. τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω δεβαίνουσιν

. . . τὸ ἕτερον τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ, ὃ αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπαιτεῖται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιοῦμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ὑποθέσεις, ὅλον ἐκτελέσας τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἰνὰ μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐν τῇ τῷ παρὰ τὸς ἀρχὴν ἰδῶν, ἀφίκεται αὐτῇ, πάλιν αὖ ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχόμενων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευταίῳ καταβέβηκεν, αἰσθητῆς κατὰ τῶν οὐδὲν προσγράμμετος, ἀλλ' εἶδεν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ, καὶ τελευταίῃ εἰς εἶδη. Compare vii. p. 532.

Form which is opposite to it. Greatness will not receive the form of littleness : nor will the greatness which is in any particular subject receive the form of littleness. If the form of littleness be brought to bear, greatness will not stay to receive it, but will either retire or be destroyed. The same is true likewise respecting that which essentially has the form : thus fire has essentially the form of heat, and snow has essentially the form of cold. Accordingly fire, as it will not receive the form of cold, so neither will it receive snow : and snow, as it will not receive the form of heat, so neither will it receive fire. If fire comes, snow will either retire or will be destroyed. The Triad has always the Form of Oddness, and will never receive that of Evenness : the Dyad has always the Form of Evenness, and will never receive that of Oddness—upon the approach of this latter it will either disappear or will be destroyed : moreover the Dyad, while refusing to receive the Form of Oddness, will refuse also to receive that of the Triad, which always embodies that Form—although three is not in direct contrariety with two. If then we are asked, What is that, the presence of which makes a body hot? we need not confine ourselves to the answer—It is the Form of Heat—which, though correct, gives no new information : but we may farther say—It is Fire, which involves the Form of Heat. If we are asked, What is that, the presence of which makes a number odd, we shall not say—It is Oddness : but we shall say—It is the Triad or the Pentad—both of which involve Oddness.

In like manner, the question being asked, What is that, which, being in the body, will give it life? we must answer—It is the soul. The soul, when it lays hold of any body, always arrives bringing with it life. Now death is the contrary of life. Accordingly the soul, which always brings with it life, will never receive the contrary of life. In other words, it is deathless or immortal.¹

the soul rests upon the assumption of the Platonic ideas. Reasoning to prove this.

The soul always brings life, and is essentially living. It cannot receive death; in other words, it is immortal.

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 105 C-E. 'Αποκρίνουν δὲ, ὅτι ἂν τί ἐγγένηται σώματι, ζῶν ἔσται; 'Οὐκ ἂν ψυχὴ, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν αἰὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχί; ἢ δ' ὅτι. 'Ἡ ψυχὴ ἀρα δ, τι ἂν αὐτὴ κατέσχη, αἰὶ ἔκει ἐκ' ἐκεῖνο φέρουσα ζωὴν; 'Ἐκεῖ μέντοι, ἔφη. Πότερον δ' ἔστι τι ζωὴ ἐναντίον, ἢ οὐδέν; 'Ἐστίν, ἔφη. Τί; Θάνατος. Οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ἐναντίον ὃ αὐτὴ ἐπιφέρει αἰὶ οὐ μὴ ποτε δέξηται, ὥς ἐκ τῶν πρόσθεν ὁμολόγηται; Καὶ μάλα σφόδρα, ἔφη ὁ Κρίτης. . . . 'Ὅ δ'

Such is the ground upon which Sokrates rests his belief in the immortality of the soul. The doctrine reposes, in Plato's view, upon the assumption of eternal, self-existent, unchangeable, Ideas or Forms:¹ upon the congeniality of nature, and inherent correlation, between these Ideas and the Soul: upon the fact, that the soul knows these Ideas, which knowledge must have been acquired in a prior state of existence: and upon the essential participation of the soul in the Idea of life, so that it cannot be conceived as without life, or as dead.² The immortality of the soul is conceived as necessary and entire, including not merely post-existence, but also pre-existence. In fact the reference to an anterior time is more essential to Plato's theory than that to a posterior time; because it is employed to explain the cognitions of the mind, and the identity of learning with reminiscence: while Simmias, who even at the close is not without

The proof of immortality includes pre-existence as well as post-existence—animals as well as man—also the metempsychosis, or transmigration of the soul from one body to another.

ἀν θάνατον μὴ δέχεται, τί καλοῦμεν; Ἀθάνατον, ἔφη. Ἀθάνατον ἄρα ἢ ψυχῆ; Ἀθάνατον.

Nemesius, the Christian bishop of Emesa, declares that the proofs given by Plato of the immortality of the soul are knotty and difficult to understand, such as even adepts in philosophical study can hardly follow. His own belief in it he rests upon the inspiration of the Christian Scriptures (Nemesius de Nat. Homin. c. 2, p. 56, ed. 1565).

¹ Plato, Phædon, pp. 76 D-E, 100 B-C. It is remarkable that in the Republic also, Sokrates undertakes to demonstrate the immortality of the soul: and that in doing so he does not make any reference or allusion to the arguments used in the Phædon, but produces another argument totally distinct and novel: an argument which Meiners remarks truly to be quite peculiar to Plato, Republic, i. pp. 609 E, 611 C; Meiners, Geschichte der Wissenschaften, vol. ii. p. 780.

² Zeller, Philosophie der Griech. Part ii. p. 267.

"Die Seele ist ihrem Begriffe nach dasjenige, zu dessen Wesen es gehört zu leben—es kann also in keinem Augenblicke als nicht lebend gedacht werden: In diesem ontologischen Beweise für die Unsterblichkeit, laufen

nicht bloss alle die einzelnen Beweise des Phædon zusammen, sondern derselbe wird auch schon im Phædon vorgetragen," &c. Compare Phædrus, p. 245.

Hegel, in his Geschichte der Philosophie (Part ii. pp. 186-187-188, ed. 2), maintains that Plato did not conceive the soul as a separate thing or reality—that he did not mean to affirm, in the literal sense of the words, its separate existence either before or after the present life—that he did not descend to so crude a conception (zu dieser Rohheit herabzusinken) as to represent to himself the soul as a thing, or to enquire into its duration or continuance after the manner of a thing—that Plato understood the soul to exist essentially as the Universal Notion or Idea, the comprehensive aggregate of all other Ideas, in which sense he affirmed it to be immortal—that the descriptions which Plato gives of its condition, either before life or after death, are to be treated only as poetical metaphors. There is ingenuity in this view of Hegel, and many separate expressions of Plato receive light from it: but it appears to me to refine away too much. Plato had in his own mind and belief both the soul as a particular thing—and the soul as an universal. His language implies sometimes the one sometimes the other.

reserve on the subject of the post-existence, proclaims an emphatic adhesion on that of the pre-existence.¹ The proof, moreover, being founded in great part on the Idea of Life, embraces every thing living, and is common to animals² (if not to plants) as well as to men : and the metempsychosis—or transition of souls not merely from one human body to another, but also from the human to the animal body, and *vice versa*—is a portion of the Platonic creed.

Having completed his demonstration of the immortality of the soul, Sokrates proceeds to give a sketch of the condition and treatment which it experiences after death. The *Nekyia* here following is analogous, in general doctrinal scope, to those others which we read in the Republic and in the Gorgias : but all of them are different in particular incidents, illustrative circumstances, and scenery. The sentiment of belief in Plato's mind attaches itself to general doctrines, which appear to him to possess an evidence independent of particulars. When he applies these doctrines to particulars, he makes little distinction between such as are true, or problematical, or fictitious : he varies his mythes at pleasure, provided that they serve the purpose of illustrating his general view. The mythe which we read in the Phædon includes a description of the Earth which to us appears altogether imaginative and poetical : yet it is hardly more so than several other current theories, proposed by various philosophers antecedent and contemporary, respecting Earth and Sea. Aristotle criticises the views expressed in the Phædon, as he criticises those of Demokritos and Empedokles.³ Each soul of a deceased person is conducted by his Genius to the proper place, and there receives sentence of condemnation to suffering, greater or less according

After finishing his proof that the soul is immortal, Sokrates enters into a description, what will become of it after the death of the body. He describes a *Nekyia*.

¹ Plato, Phædon, pp. 92 D, 107 B.

² See what Sokrates says about the swans, Phædon, p. 85 A-B.

³ Plato, Phædon, pp. 107-111. Olympiodorus pronounces the mythe to be a good imitation of the truth, Republ. x. 620 seq. ; Gorgias, p. 520 ; Aristotle, Meteorol. ii. pp. 355-356. Compare also 356, b. 10, 357, a. 25, where he states and canvasses the doctrines of Demokritos and Empedokles ; also

352, a. 35, about the ἀρχαῖοι θεόλογοι. He is rather more severe upon these others than upon Plato. He too considers, like Plato, that the amount of evidence which you ought to require for your belief depends upon the nature of the subject ; and that there are various subjects on which you ought to believe on slighter evidence : see Metaphysic. A. 996, a. 2-16 ; Ethic. Nikom. i. 1, 1094, b. 12-14.

to his conduct in life, in the deep chasm called Tartarus, and in the rivers of mud and fire, Styx, Kokytus, Pyriphlegethon.¹ To those who have passed their lives in learning, and who have detached themselves as much as they possibly could from all pleasures and all pursuits connected with the body—in order to pursue wisdom and virtue—a full reward is given. They are emancipated from the obligation of entering another body, and are allowed to live ever afterwards disembodied in the pure regions of Ideas.²

Such, or something like it, Sokrates confidently expects will be the fate awaiting himself.³ When asked by Kriton, among other questions, how he desired to be buried, he replies with a smile—"You may bury me as you choose, if you can only catch me. But you will not understand me when I tell you, that I, Sokrates, who am now speaking, shall not remain with you after having drunk the poison, but shall depart to some of the enjoyments of the blest. You must not talk about burying or burning Sokrates, as if I were suffering some terrible operation. Such language is inauspicious and depressing to our minds. Keep up your courage, and talk only of burying the body of Sokrates: conduct the burial as you think best and most decent."⁴

Sokrates then retires with Kriton into an interior chamber to bathe, desiring that the women may be spared the task of washing his body after his decease. Having taken final leave of his wife and children, he returns to his friends as sunset is approaching. We are here made to see the contrast between him and other prisoners under like circumstances. The attendant of the Eleven Magistrates comes to warn him that the

¹ Plato, Phædon, pp. 111-112. Compare Eusebius, *Præp. Ev.* xiii. 13, and Arnobius *adv. Gentes*, ii. 14. Arnobius blames Plato for inconsistency in saying that the soul is immortal in its own nature, and yet that it suffers pain after death—"Rem inenodabilem suscipit (Plato) ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, et ex corporali soliditate privatas, puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris afficiat sensu. Quis autem hominum non videt quod sit immortale, quod simplex, nullum posse

dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem, immortalitatem habere non posse?"

² Plato, Phædon, p. 114 C-E. τοῦτων δὲ αὐτῶν οἱ φιλοσοφία ἱκανῶς καθάρσμενοι ἀπὸν τὰ σωματικὰ ζῶσι τὸ παράπαν εἰς τὸν ἑταῖον χρόνον, &c.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 115 A.

⁴ Plato, Phædon, p. 115 D. ὡς ἐπεὶ δὲν πῶς τὸ φάρμακον οὐκ ἐστὶ ὑμῖν παραμυθῆναι, ἀλλ' οἰχίσσεται ἀπὸν εἰς μακρὸν δὲ τινος εὐδαιμονίας.

hour has come for swallowing the poison: expressing sympathy and regret for the necessity of delivering so painful a message, together with admiration for the equanimity and rational judgment of Sokrates, which he contrasts forcibly with the discontent and wrath of other prisoners under similar circumstances. As he turned away with tears in his eyes, Sokrates exclaimed—"How courteous the man is to me—and has been from the beginning! how generously he now weeps for me! Let us obey him, and let the poison be brought forthwith, if it be prepared: if not, let him prepare it." "Do not hurry" (interposed Kriton): "there is still time, for the sun is not quite set. I have known others who, even after receiving the order, deferred drinking the poison until they had had a good supper and other enjoyments." "It is natural that they should do so" (replied Sokrates). "They think that they are gainers by it: for me, it is natural that I should not do so—for I shall gain nothing but contempt in my own eyes, by thus clinging to life, and saving up when there is nothing left."¹

Kriton accordingly gave orders, and the poison, after a certain interval, was brought in. Sokrates, on asking for directions, was informed, that after having swallowed it, he must walk about until his legs felt heavy: he must then lie down and cover himself up: the poison would do its work. He took the cup without any symptom of alarm or change of countenance: then looking at the attendant with his usual full and fixed gaze, he asked whether there was enough to allow of a libation. "We prepare as much as is sufficient" (was the answer), "but no more." "I understand" (said Sokrates): "but at least I may pray, and I must pray, to the Gods, that my change of abode from here to there may be fortunate." He then put the cup to his lips, and drank it off with perfect ease and tranquillity.²

His friends, who had hitherto maintained their self-control, were overpowered by emotion on seeing the cup swallowed, and broke out into violent tears and lamentation. No one was unmoved, except Sokrates him-

Sokrates
swallows
the poison.
Conversa-
tion with
the gaoler.

Ungovern-
able sorrow
of the
friends

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 117 A. γλαῦρος τοῦ ᾧ, καὶ φειδόμενος οὐδενὸς ἐνὶ ἐνὶ θυμῷ φειδῶ.
ἀνδρὸς.

² Plato, Phædon, p. 117 C.

present.
Self-com-
mand of
Sokrates.
Last words
to Kriton,
and death.

self: who gently remonstrated with them, and exhorted them to tranquil resignation: reminding them that nothing but good words was admissible at the hour of death. The friends, ashamed of themselves, found means to repress their tears. Sokrates walked about until he felt heavy in the legs, and then lay down in bed. After some interval, the attendant of the prison came to examine his feet and legs, pinched his foot with force, and enquired whether he felt it. Sokrates replied in the negative. Presently the man pinched his legs with similar result, and showed to the friends in that way that his body was gradually becoming chill and benumbed: adding that as soon as this should get to the heart, he would die.¹ The chill had already reached his belly, when Sokrates uncovered his face, which had been hitherto concealed by the bed-clothes, and spoke his last words:² "Kriton,

Plato, Phædon, p. 118. These details receive interesting confirmation from the remarkable scene described by Valerius Maximus, as witnessed by himself at Julius in the island of Keos, when he accompanied Sextus Pompeius into Asia (Val. M. ii. 6, 8). A Keian lady of rank, ninety years of age, well in health, comfortable, and in full possession of her intelligence, but deeming it prudent (according to the custom in Keos, Strabo, x. p. 496) to retire from life while she had as yet nothing to complain of—took poison, by her own deliberate act, in the presence of her relatives and of Sextus Pompeius, who vainly endeavoured to dissuade her. "Cupido hausta mortiferam traxit potionem, ac sermone significans quam subinde partes corporis sui rigor occuparet, cum jam visceribus eum et cordi imminere esset elocuta, filiarum manus ad supremum opprimendorum oculorum officium advocavit. Nostros autem, tametsi novo spectaculo obstupetacti erant, suffusos tamen lacrimis dimisit."

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 118. ᾗδ' οὖν σχεδόν τι αὐτοῦ ἦν τὰ περὶ τὸ ἔσθ' οὖν φυχόμενα, καὶ ἐκκαλυφόμενος (ἐνεκείνου γὰρ) εἶπεν, ὃ δὲ τελευταίων ἰδέσθ' ἔσθ'· Ὁ Κρίτων, ἴδ' οὖν, τὸ Ἀσκληπιοῦς οὐφείλομεν ἀνακτῆρα· ἄλλ' ἀνέδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελεῖσθαι.

Cicero, after recovering from a bilious attack, writes to his wife Terentia (Epist. Famil. xiv. 7): "Omnes molestias et sollicitudines deposui et ejeci.

Quid causæ autem fuerit, postridiè intellexi quam à vobis discessi. Χολήν δευτερον noctu ejeci: statim ita sum levatus, ut mihi Deus aliquis medicinam fecisse videatur. Cui quidem Deo, quemadmodum tu soles, piè et castè satisfacis: id est, Apollini et Æsculapio." Compare the rhetor Aristides, Orat. xlv. pp. 22-23-155, ed. Dindorf. About the habit of sacrificing a cock to Æsculapius, see also a passage in the Τερῶν Λόγοι of the rhetor Aristides (Orat. xxvii. p. 545, ed. Dindorf, at the top of the page). I will add that the five Τερῶν Λόγοι of that Rhetor (Orat. xxiii.-xxvii.) are curious as testifying the multitude of dreams and revelations vouchsafed to him by Æsculapius: also the implicit faith with which he acted upon them in his maladies, and the success which attended the curative prescriptions thus made known to him. Aristides declares himself to place more confidence in these revelations than in the advice of physicians, and to have often acted on them in preference to such advice (Orat. xlv. pp. 20-22, Dind.).

The direction here given by Sokrates to Kriton (though some critics, even the most recent, see Kriche, Lehren der Griechischen Denker, p. 227, interpret it in a mystical sense) is to be understood simply and literally, in my judgment. On what occasion, or for what, he had made the vow of the cock, we are not told. Sokrates was a very religious man, much influenced

we owe a cock to *Æsculapius*: pay the debt without fail." "It shall be done" (answered *Kriton*); "have you any other injunctions?" *Sokrates* made no reply, but again covered himself up.¹ After a short interval, he made some movement: the attendant presently uncovered him, and found him dead, with his eyes stiff and fixed. *Kriton* performed the last duty of closing both his eyes and his mouth.

The pathetic details of this scene—arranged with so much dramatic beauty, and lending imperishable interest to the *Phædon* of Plato—may be regarded as real facts, described from the recollection of an eye-witness, though many years after their occurrence. They present to us the personality of *Sokrates* in full harmony with that which we read in the Platonic *Apology*. The tranquil ascendancy of resolute and rational conviction, satisfied with the past, and welcoming instead of fearing the close of life—is exhibited as triumphing in the one case over adverse accusers and judges, in the other case over the unnerving manifestations of afflicted friends.

Extreme pathos, and probable trustworthiness of these personal details.

But though the personal incidents of this dialogue are truly *Sokratic*—the dogmatic emphasis, and the apparatus of argument and hypothesis, are essentially Platonic. In these respects, the dialogue contrasts remarkably with the *Apology*. When addressing the *Dikasts*, *Sokrates* not only makes no profession of dogmatic certainty, but expressly disclaims it. Nay more—he considers that the false persuasion of such dogmatic certainty, universally prevalent among his countrymen, is as pernicious as it is illusory: and that his own superiority over others consists merely in consciousness of his own ignorance, while they are unconscious of theirs.² To dissipate such false persuasion of knowledge, by perpetual cross-examination of every one around, is the special mission imposed upon him by the Gods: in which mission, indeed, he has the firmest belief—but it is a belief, like

Contrast between the Platonic *Apology* and the *Phædon*.

by prophecies, oracles, dreams, and special revelations (*Plato*, *Apol. Sokr.* pp. 21-29-33; also *Phædon*, p. 60).

¹ *Euripid. Hippol.* 1455.

Κακατέρηται τῶν· ὅλως γὰρ, παρέρ.

*Κρῦψεν δὲ μου πρόσωπον ὡς τάχος πέν-
λοις.*

² *Plato, Apol. Sokr.* pp. 21-29, καὶ τοῦτο πῶς οὐκ ἀμαθία εἶναι αὐτῇ ἢ ἐπονείδιστος, ἢ τοῦ οἰεσθαι εἰδέναι & οὐκ εἶδεν; (29 A-B).

that in his Dæmon or divine sign, depending upon oracles, dreams, and other revelations peculiar to himself, which he does not expect that the Dikasts will admit as genuine evidence.¹ One peculiar example, whereby Sokrates exemplifies the false persuasion of knowledge where men have no real knowledge, is borrowed from the fear of death. No man knows (he says) what death is, not even whether it may not be a signal benefit: yet every man fears it as if he well knew that it was the greatest evil.² Death must be one of two things: either a final extinction—a perpetual and dreamless sleep—or else a transference of the soul to some other place. Sokrates is persuaded that it will be in either case a benefit to him, and that the Gods will take care that he, a good man, shall suffer no evil, either living or dead: the proof of which is, to him, that the divine sign has

¹ Plato, Apol. Sokr. pp. 31-23, 31 D; 33 C: ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, προστέταται ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαρτυρῶν καὶ ἐξ ἐνθυμίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, φάνη τις ποτε καὶ ἄλλῃ θεῖα μοῖρα ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὁσίων προστάζει πράττειν. p. 37 E: εἰδὲν γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδυνάτον ἡσυχίαν εἶναι, οὐ πείσασθαι μοι ὡς εἰρηνομήνῃ.

² Plato, Apol. S. p. 29 B.

In the Xenophontic Apology of Sokrates, no allusion is made to the immortality of the soul. Sokrates is there described as having shaped his defence under a belief that he had arrived at a term when it was better for him to die than to live, and that prolonged life would only expose him to the unavoidable weaknesses and disabilities of senility. It is a proof of the benevolence of the Gods that he is withdrawn from life at so opportune a moment. This is the explanation which Xenophon gives of the haughty tone of the defence (sects. 6-15-23-27). In the Xenophontic Cyropsedia, Cyrus, on his death-bed, addresses earnest exhortations to his two sons: and to give greater force to such exhortations, reminds them that his own soul will still survive and will still exercise a certain authority after his death. He expresses his own belief not only that the soul survives the body, but also that it becomes more rational when disembodied; because—1. Murderers are disturbed by the souls of murdered men. 2. Honours are paid to deceased persons, which practice would not con-

tinue, unless the souls of the deceased had efficacy to enforce it. 3. The souls of living men are more rational during sleep than when awake, and sleep affords the nearest analogy to death (viii. 7, 17-21). (Much the same arguments were urged in the dialogues of Aristotle. Bernays, Dialog. Aristot. pp. 23-105.) He however adds, that even if he be mistaken in this point, and if his soul perish with his body, still he conjures his sons, in the name of the Gods, to obey his dying injunctions (a. 22). Again, he says (a. 27), "Invite all the Persians to my tomb, to join with me in satisfaction that I shall now be in safety, so as to suffer no farther harm, whether I am united to the divine element, or perish altogether" (συνησθησομένους ἐμοί, ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἀσφαλεὶ ἤδη ἔσομαι, ὡς μηδὲν ἂν εἴη κακὸν παθεῖν, μήτε ἢν μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ γένημαι, μήτε ἢν μηδὲν εἴη ᾧ). The view taken here by Cyrus, of death in its analogy with sleep (ὕπνος καὶ θάνατος διδύμοσιν, Iliad, xvi. 672) as a refuge against impending evil for the future, is much the same as that taken by Sokrates in his Apology. Sokrates is not less proud of his past life, spent in dialectic debate, than Cyrus of his glorious exploits. Ὁ θάνατος, λυγρὴν κακὴν τοῖς δυσδαίμονεσιν, Longinus, de Subl. c. 9, p. 23. Compare also the Oration of Julius Cesar in Sallust, Bell. Catilin. c. 51—"in luctu atque miseriis, mortem ærumnarum requiem, non cruciatum esse; illam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere: ultra neque curæ neque gaudii locum esse".

never interposed any obstruction in regard to his trial and sentence. If (says he) I am transferred to some other abode, among those who have died before me, how delightful will it be to see Homer and Hesiod, Orpheus and Musæus, Agamemnon, Ajax or Palamêdes—and to pass my time in cross-examining each as to his true or false knowledge!¹ Lastly, so far as he professes to aim at any positive end, it is the diffusion of political, social, human virtue, as distinguished from acquisitions above the measure of humanity. He tells men that it is not wealth which produces virtue, but virtue which produces wealth and other advantages, both public and private.²

If from the Apology we turn to the Phædon, we seem to pass, not merely to the same speaker after the interval of one month (the ostensible interval indicated) but to a different speaker and over a long period. We have Plato speaking through the mouth of Sokrates, and Plato too at a much later time.³ Though the moral character (*ἦθος*) of Sokrates is fully maintained and even strikingly dramatised—the intellectual personality is altogether transformed. Instead of a speaker who avows his own ignorance, and blames others only for believing themselves to know when they are equally ignorant—we have one who indulges in the widest range of theory and the boldest employment of hypothesis. Plato introduces his own dogmatical and mystical views, leaning in part on the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds.⁴ He declares the distinctness of nature, the incompatibility, the forced temporary union and active conflict, between the soul and the body. He includes this in the still wider and more general declaration, which recognises antithesis between the two worlds: the world of Ideas, Forms, Essences, not perceivable but only cogitable, eternal, and unchangeable, with which the soul or mind was in kindred and communion—the world of sense, or of transient and ever-

Abundant dogmatic and poetical invention of the Phædon compared with the profession of ignorance which we read in the Apology.

¹ Plato, Apol. S. pp. 40-41.

² Plato, Apol. S. pp. 20 C, 29-30. λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα, καὶ τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντα, καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ (30 B). Compare Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 8-9.

³ In reviewing the Apology (supra,

vol. i. ch. ix. p. 410) I have already noticed this very material discrepancy, which is insisted upon by Ast as an argument for disallowing the genuineness of the Apology.

⁴ Plato, Phædon, pp. 69 C, 70 C, 81 C, 82 B.

changing appearances or phenomena, never arriving at permanent existence, but always coming and going, with which the body was in commerce and harmony. The philosopher, who thirsts only after knowledge and desires to look at things¹ as they are in themselves, with his mind by itself—is represented as desiring, throughout all his life, to loosen as much as possible the implication of his soul with his body, and as rejoicing when the hour of death arrives to divorce them altogether.

Such total renunciation of the body is put, with dramatic propriety, into the mouth of Sokrates during the last hour of his life. But it would not have been in harmony with the character of Sokrates as other Platonic dialogues present him—in the plenitude of life—manifesting distinguished bodily strength and soldierly efficiency, proclaiming gymnastic training for the body to be co-ordinate with musical training for the mind, and impressed with the most intense admiration for the personal beauty of youth. The human body, which in the Phædon is discredited as a morbid incumbrance corrupting the purity of the soul, is presented to us by Sokrates in the Phædrus as the only sensible object which serves as a mirror and reflection of the beauty of the ideal world:² while the Platonic Timæus proclaims (in language not unsuitable to Locke) that sight, hearing, and speech are the sources of our abstract Ideas, and the generating causes of speculative intellect and philosophy.³ Of these, and of the world of sense generally, an opposite view was appropriate in the Phædon; where the purpose of Sokrates is to console his distressed friends by showing

¹ Plato, Phædon, p. 66 E. ἀπαλλάκτον αὐτοῦ (τοῦ σώματος) καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ θεατὸν αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα.

² Plato, Charmides, p. 155 D. Protagoras, init. Phædrus, p. 250 D. Symposium, pp. 177 C, 210 A.

³ Aechines, one of the Socratici viri or fellow disciples of Sokrates along with Plato, composed dialogues (of the same general nature as those of Plato) wherein Sokrates was introduced conversing or arguing. Aechines placed in the mouth of Sokrates the most intense expressions of passionate admiration towards the person of Alkibiades. See the Fragments cited by the Rhetor

Aristeides, Orat. xiv. pp. 20-22, ed. Dindorf. Aristeides mentions (p. 24) that various persons in his time mistook these expressions ascribed to Sokrates for the real talk of Sokrates himself. Compare also the Symposium of Xenophon, iv. 27.

³ Plato, Timæus, p. 47, A-D. Consult also the same dialogue, pp. 87-88, where Plato insists on the necessity of co-ordinate attention both to mind and to body, and on the mischiefs of highly developed force in the mind unless it be accompanied by a corresponding development of force in the body.

that death was no misfortune, but relief from a burthen. And Plato has availed himself of this impressive situation,¹ to recommend, with every charm of poetical expression, various characteristic dogmas respecting the essential distinction between Ideas and the intelligible world on one side—Perceptions and the sensible world on the other: respecting the soul, its nature akin to the intelligible world, its pre-existence anterior to its present body, and its continued existence after the death of the latter: respecting the condition of the soul before birth and after death, its transition, in the case of most men, into other bodies, either human or animal, with the condition of suffering penalties commensurate to the wrongs committed in this life: finally, respecting the privilege accorded to the souls of such as have passed their lives in intellectual and philosophical occupation, that they shall after death remain for ever disembodied, in direct communion with the world of Ideas.

The main part of Plato's argumentation, drawn from the general assumptions of his philosophy, is directed to prove the separate and perpetual existence of the soul, before as well as after the body. These arguments, interesting as specimens of the reasoning which satisfied Plato, do not prove his conclusion.² But even if

Plato's argument does not prove the immortality of the soul. Even if it

¹ Compare the description of the last discourse of Pætus Thrasea. Tacitus, *Annal.* xvi. 34.

² Wytttenbach has annexed to his edition of the *Phædon* an instructive review of the argumentation contained in it respecting the Immortality of the soul. He observes justly—"Videamus jam de Phædone, qui ab omni antiquitate in habitus est liber, in quo rationes immortalitatis animarum gravissimè luculentissimèque exposita essent. Quæ quidem libro laus et auctoritas conciliata est, non tam firmitate argumentorum, quam eloquentiâ Platonis," &c. (*Disputat. De Placit. Immort. Anim.* p. 10). The same feeling, substantiated, is expressed by one of the disputants in Cicero's *Tusculan Disputations*, who states that he assented to the reasoning while he was reading the dialogue, but that as soon as he had laid down the book, his assent all slipped away from him. I have already mentioned that Panætius, an extreme admirer of Plato on most points, dis-

sented from him about the immortality of the soul (Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 11, 24—i. 32, 79), and declared the *Phædon* to be spurious. Galen also mentions (*De Format. Fœtus*, vol. iv. pp. 700-702. Kühn) that he had written a special treatise (now lost) to prove that the reasonings in the *Phædon* were self-contradictory, and that he could not satisfy himself, either about the essence of the soul, or whether it was mortal or immortal. Compare his treatise *Περὶ ὁρίσας τῶν ψυχικῶν δυνάμεων*—iv. pp. 762-763—and *Περὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἰσχύων*, iv. 773. In this last passage, he represents the opinion of Plato to be—That the two inferior souls, the courageous and the appetitive, are mortal, in which he (Galen) agrees, and that the rational soul alone is immortal, of which he (Galen) is not persuaded. Now this view of Plato's opinion is derived from the *Republic* and *Timæus*, not from the *Phædon*, in which last the triple soul is not acknowledged. We may thus partly

did prove that, yet the mode of pre-existence, and the mode of post-existence, of the soul, would be quite undetermined.

that conclusion were admitted to be proved, the condition of the soul, during such anterior and posterior existence, would be altogether undetermined, and would be left to the free play of sentiment and imagination. There is no subject upon which the poetical genius of Plato has been more abundantly exercised.¹ He has given us two different descriptions of the state of the soul before its junction with the body (*Timæus*, and *Phædrus*), and three different descriptions of its destiny after separation from the body (*Republic*, *Gorgias*, *Phædon*). In all the three, he supposes an adjudication and classification of the departed souls, and a better or worse fate allotted to each according to the estimate which he forms of their merits or demerits during life : but in each of the three, this general idea is carried out by a different machinery. The Hades of Plato is not announced even by himself as anything more than approximation to the truth : but it embodies his own ethical and judicial sentence on the classes of men around him—as the *Divina Commedia* embodies that of Dante on antecedent individual persons. Plato distributes rewards and penalties in the measure which he conceives to be deserved : he erects his own approbation and disapprobation, his own sympathy and antipathy, into laws of the unknown future state : the Gods, whom he postulates, are imaginary agents introduced to execute the sentences which he dictates. While others, in their conceptions of posthumous existence, assured the happiest fate, sometimes even divinity itself, to great warriors and law-givers—to devoted friends and patriots like *Harmodius* and *Aristogeiton*—to the exquisite beauty of *Helen*—or to favourites of the Gods like *Ganymædes* or *Pelops*²—Plato claims that supreme distinction for the departed philosopher.

understand the inconsistencies, which *Galen* pointed out in his lost Treatise, in the argumentation of the *Phædon* : wherein one of the proofs presented to establish the immortality of the soul is—That the soul is inseparably and essentially identified with life, and cannot admit death (p. 105 D). This argument, if good at all, is just as good to prove the immortality of the two inferior souls, as of the superior and rational soul. *Galen* might there-

fore remark that it did not consist with the conclusion which he drew from the *Timæus* and the *Republic*.

¹ Wyttenbach, l. c. p. 19. "Vidimus de philosophia hujus loci parte, quâ demonstratur, Animos esse immortales. Altera pars, quâ ostenditur, qualis sit ille post hanc vitam status, fabulosæ et poeticæ à Platone tractata est," &c.

² *Skolion* of *Kallistratus*, *Antholog. Græc.* p. 155. *Isokrates*, *Encomium*

The Philosopher, as a recompense for having detached himself during life as much as possible from the body and all its functions, will be admitted after death to existence as a soul pure and simple, unattached to any body. The souls of all other persons, dying with more or less of the taint of the body attached to each of them,¹ and for that reason haunting the tombs in which the bodies are buried, so as to become visible there as ghosts—are made subject, in the Platonic Hades, to penalty and purification suitable to the respective condition of each ; after which they become attached to new bodies, sometimes of men, sometimes of other animals. Of this distributive scheme it is not possible to frame any clear idea, nor is Plato consistent with himself except in a few material features. But one feature there is in it which stands conspicuous—the belief in the metempsychosis, or transfer of the same soul from one animal body to another : a belief very widely diffused throughout the ancient world, associated with the immortality of the soul, pervading the Orphic and Pythagorean creeds, and having its root in the Egyptian and Oriental religions.²

The philosopher will enjoy an existence of pure soul, unattached to any body.

Helena, Or. x. s. 70-72. Compare the *Nekyia* of the *Odyssey* and that of the *Æneid*, respecting the heroes—

"Quæ gratia currum
Armorumque fuit vivis, quæ cura
nitentes

Pascere equos, eadem sequitur tel-
lure repositos." (*Æn.* vi. 653-5.)

¹ Plato, *Phædon*, p. 81 C-D. ὁ δὲ καὶ ἔχουσα ἡ τοιαύτη ψυχὴ βαρύνεται τε καὶ ἑλκεται πάλιν εἰς τὸν ὁρατὸν τόπον, φόβῳ τοῦ αἰδοῦς τε καὶ αἰδῶν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, περὶ δὲ μνημάτων τε καὶ τοῖς τάφοις καλυνουμένη. περὶ δὲ καὶ ὥσθ' ἅπτα ψυχῶν σκοτεινῇ φαντάσματα οἷα παρέχονται αἱ τοιαύται ψυχαὶ εἰδωλα, αἱ μὴ καθαρῶς ἀπολυθεῖσαι, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ μετέχουσαι, διὸ καὶ ὁρῶνται.

Lactantius—in replying to the arguments of Demokritos, Epikurus, and Diksearchus against the immortality of the soul—reminded them that any *Magus* would produce visible evidence to refute them ; by calling up before them the soul of any deceased person to give information and predict the future—"qui profecto non auderent de animarum interitu mago presente dis-

serere, qui sciret certis carminibus cieri ab infernis animas et adesse et præbere se videndas et loqui et futura prædicere : et si auderent, re ipsa et documentis præsentibus vincerentur" (*Lactant. Inst.* vii. 13). See Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 31.

² Compare the closing paragraph of the Platonic Timæus : Virgil, *Æneid* vi. 713, Herodot. ii. 123, Pausanias, iv. 32, 4, Sextus Empiric. adv. Math. ix. 127, with the citation from Empedokles :—

"Tum pater Anchises : 'Animas quibus altera fato
Corpora debentur, Lethæi ad fluminis
undam
Securos latice et longa oblivio potant'."

The general doctrine, upon which the Metempsychosis rests, is set forth by Virgil in the fine lines which follow, 723-751 ; compare Georgic iv. 218. The souls of men, beasts, birds, and fishes, are all of them detached fragments or portions from the universal soul, mind, or life, æthereal or igneous, which pervades the whole Kosmos. The soul of each individual thus detached to be conjoined with a distinct body, be-

We are told that one vehement admirer of Plato—the Ambrakiot Kleombrotus—was so profoundly affected and convinced by reading the Phædon, that he immediately terminated his existence by leaping from a high wall; though in other respects well satisfied with life. But the number of persons who derived from it such settled conviction, was certainly not considerable. Neither the doctrine nor the reasonings of Plato were adopted even by the immediate successors in his school: still less by Aristotle and the Peripatetics—or by the Stoics—or by the Epikureans. The Epikureans denied altogether the survivorship of soul over body: Aristotle gives a definition of the soul which involves this same negation, though he admits as credible the separate existence of the rational soul, without individuality or personality. The Stoics, while affirming the soul to

comes tainted by such communion; after death it is purified by penalties, measured according to the greater or less taint, and becomes then fit to be attached to a new body, yet not until it has drunk the water of Lethé (Plato, *Philebus*, p. 30 A; *Timæus*, p. 30 B).

The statement of Nemesius is remarkable, that all Greeks who believed the immortality of the soul, believed also in the metempsychosis—*Κοιτῶν οὖν πάντες Ἕλληνες, οἱ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον ἀποφράμμενοι, τὴν μετεμψύχωσιν δογματίζουσιν* (*De Natura Hominis*, cap. ii. p. 50, ed. 1565). Plato accepted the Egyptian and Pythagorean doctrine, continued in the Orphic mysteries (*Arnob. adv. Gentes*, ii. 16), making no essential distinction between the souls of men and those of animals, and recognising reciprocal interchange from the one to the other. The Platonists adhered to this doctrine fully, down to the third century A.D., including Plotinus, Numenius, and others. But Porphyry, followed by Jamblichus, introduced a modification of this creed, denying the possibility of transition of a human soul into the body of another animal, or of the soul of any other animal into the body of a man,—yet still recognising the transition from one human body to another, and from one animal body to another. (See *Altkinois*, *Introd.* in *Platon*. c. 25.) This subject is well

handled in a learned work published in 1712 by a Jesuit of Toulouse, Michel Mourgues. He shows (in opposition to Dacier and others, who interpreted the doctrine in a sense merely spiritual and figurative) that the metempsychosis was a literal belief of the Platonists down to the time of Proklos. “Les quatre Platoniciens qui ont tenu la Transmigration bornée” (i.e. from one human body into another human body) “n’ont pas laissé d’admettre la pluralité d’animations ou de vies d’une même âme: et cela sans figure et sans métaphore. Cet article, qui est l’essentiel, n’a jamais trouvé un seul contradicteur dans les sectes qui ont cru l’âme immortelle: ni Porphyre, ni Hiérocle, ni Procle, ni Salluste, n’ont jamais touché à ce point que pour l’approuver. D’où il suit que la réalité de la Métempsychose est indubitable; c’est à dire, qu’il est indubitable que tous les sectateurs de Pythagore et de Platon l’ont soutenue dans un sens très réel quant à la pluralité des vies et d’animations” (*Tom. i. p. 525*; also *Tom. ii. p. 432*). M. Cousin and M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire are of the same opinion.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire observes, in his *Premier Mémoire sur le Sankhyâ*, p. 416, Paris, 1852.

“Voilà donc la transmigration dans les plus grands dialogues de Platon—le *Timée*, la *République*, le *Phédon*. On peut en retrouver la

be material as well as the body, considered it as a detached fragment of the all-pervading cosmical or mundane soul, which was re-absorbed after the death of the individual into the great whole to which it belonged. None of these philosophers were persuaded by the arguments of Plato. The popular orthodoxy, which he often censures harshly, recognised some sort of posthumous existence as a part of its creed; and the uninquiring multitude continued in the teaching and traditions of their youth. But literary and philosophical men, who sought to form some opinion for themselves without altogether rejecting (as the Epikureans rejected) the basis of the current traditions—were in no better condition for deciding the question with the assistance of Plato, than they would have been without him. While the knowledge of the bodily organism, and of mind or soul as embodied therein, received important additions, from Aristotle down to Galen—no new facts either were known or could become known, respecting soul *per se*, considered as pre-existent or post-existent to body. Galen expressly records his dissatisfaction with Plato on this point, though generally among his warmest admirers. Questions of this kind remained always problematical, standing themes for rhetoric or dialectic.¹ Every man could do,

trace manifeste dans d'autres dialogues moins considérables, le Menon et le Politique, par exemple. La transmigration est même positivement indiquée dans le dixième Livre des Lois, où Platon traite avec tant de force et de solennité de la providence et de la justice divines.

"En présence de témoignages si sérieux, et de tant de persistance à revenir sur des opinions qui ne varient pas, je crois que tout esprit sensé ne peut que partager l'avis de M. Cousin. Il est impossible que Platon ne se fasse de l'exposition de ces opinions qu'un pur badinage. Il les a répétées, sans les modifier en rien, au milieu des discussions les plus graves et les plus étendues. Ajoutez que ces doctrines tiennent intimement à toutes celles qui sont le fond même du platonisme, et qu'elles s'y entrelacent si étroitement, que les en détacher, c'est le mutiler et l'amoindrir. Le système des Idées ne se comprend pas tout entier sans la réminiscence: et la réminiscence elle-même implique nécessairement l'existence antérieure de l'âme."

Dr. Henry More, in his 'Treatise on the Immortality of the Soul,' argues at considerable length in defence of the pre-existence of each soul, as a part of the doctrine. He considers himself to have clearly proved—"That the pre-existence of the soul is an opinion both in itself the most rational that can be maintained, and has had the suffrage of the most renowned philosophers in all ages of the world". Of these last-mentioned philosophers he gives a list, as follows—Moses, on the authority of the Jewish Cabbala—Zoroaster, Pythagoras, Epicharmus, Empedocles, Cætes, Euripides, Plato, Euclid, Philo, Virgil, Marcus Cicerò, Plotinus, Jamblichus, Proclus, Boethius, Pællus, Synæsius, Origen, Marsilius Ficinus, &c. See chapters xii. and xiii. pages 116, 117, 121 of his Treatise. Compare also what he says in Sect. 18 of his Preface General, page xx.-xxiv.

¹ Seneca says, Epist. 88. "Innumerabiles sunt questiones de animo: unde sit, qualis sit, quando esse incipiat, quando sit; an aliunde alio transeat, et domicilium mutet, ad alias animalium formas aliasque conjectus, an

though not with the same exuberant eloquence, what Plato had done—and no man could do more. Every man could coin his own hopes and fears, his own æsthetical preferences and repugnances, his own ethical aspiration to distribute rewards and punishments among the characters around him—into affirmative prophecies respecting an unknowable future, where neither verification nor Elenchus were accessible. The state of this discussion throughout the Pagan world bears out the following remark of Lord Macaulay, with which I conclude the present chapter :—

“There are branches of knowledge with respect to which the law of the human mind is progress. . . . But with theology, the case is very different. As respects natural religion—revelation being for the present altogether left out of the question—it is not easy to see that a philosopher of the present day is more favourably situated than Thales or Simonides. . . . As to the other great question—the question, what becomes of man after death—we do not see that a highly educated European, left to his unassisted reason, is more likely to be in the right than a Blackfoot Indian. Not a single one of the many sciences in which we surpass the Blackfoot Indians, throws the smallest light on the state of the soul after the animal life is extinct. In truth, all the philosophers, ancient and modern, who have attempted, without the help of revelation, to prove the immortality of man—from Plato down to Franklin—appear to us to have failed deplorably. Then again, all the great enigmas which perplex the natural theologian are the same in all ages. The ingenuity of a people just emerging from barbarism, is quite sufficient to propound them. The genius of Locke or Clarke is quite unable to solve them. . . . Natural Theology, then, is not a progressive science.”¹

non amplius quam semel serviat, et emissus evagetur in toto; utrum corpus sit, an non sit: quid sit facturus, quum per nos aliquid facere desiderit: quomodo libertate usus, cum ex hac exierit caves: an obliviscatur priorum et illic nosse incipiat, postquam de corpore abductus in sublime secessit.” Compare Lucretius, l. 113.

¹ Macaulay, Ranke's History of the Popes (Crit. and Hist. Essays, vol. iii. p. 210). Sir Wm. Hamilton observes (Lectures on Logic, Lect. 26, p. 55): “Thus Plato, in the Phædon, demonstrates the immortality of the soul from its simplicity: in the Republic, he demonstrates its simplicity from its immortality.”

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
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
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CHAPTER XXVI.

PLATO.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PHÆDRUS—SYMPOSITION.

I PUT together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to, another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.

These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both.

The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense, and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different sex—it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic point of view,¹ upon which Plato builds, the attachment of man to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic, social, sentiment;

Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece.

¹ Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 267) describes this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen und anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle composed *ἑταίρειος ἔρωτος* or

ἑρωτικός, Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, p. 183, Berlin, 1863.

Compare the dialogue called *ἑρωτικός*, among the works of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers,

yet as belonging to a common-place rather than to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving: that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her husband: ¹ that her sphere of duty and exertion was

especially Protagoras, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction of *ἔρεος-ἀλγύρεος* δὲ ἑρμῆος οὐδ' ὁμοῖον τῇ γυναικείᾳ μέλει, *etc.* (750 C, 761 B, &c.)

In the *Treatise De Educatione Puerorum* (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction proper to be imposed on youth; he is much impressed with the authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aischines, Kebes, καὶ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ἐκείνους τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἱ τοὺς ἀρρενας ἐδουκίμασαν ἔρωτα, &c. See the anecdote about Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon, in Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable passage about Zeno the Stoic, *Diog. Laert.* vii. 13. Respecting the general subject of *παιδεία* in Greece, there is a valuable Excursus in Bekker's *Charikles*, vol. i. pp. 347-377, Excurs. II. I agree generally with his belief about the practice in Greece, see Cicero, *Tusc.* Disp. iv. 33, 70. Bekker quotes abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the Xenophontic Symposium, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and Eleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the other—*Ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ πάντα νόμιμα, ἡμῖν δὲ ἐπὶ τοὺς νόμους.* We must interpret passages of the classical authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.

If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neera (which is full of information about Athenian manners),

we find the speaker Apollodorus distributing the relations of men with women in the following manner (p. 1386)—*τὸ γὰρ συντεκεῖν τοὺς ἐστίς, δὲ αὖ παιδεύειν καὶ εὐαγγεῖν οἷς τε τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους τοὺς πατέρας, καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐκείνους οἷς αὐτοὺς οὐκ αὖτε τοὺς ἀνθρώπους. Τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἑταίρας, ἡδονῇ ἐνεκα ἔχουσιν—τὰς δὲ πύλας, τῇ καὶ ἡμῶν θεωρείᾳ τοῦ σώματος—τὰς δὲ γυναῖκες, τοὺς παιδεύειν γινώσκουσιν, καὶ τὸν ὅλον φύλακα τίσιν ἔχουσιν.*

To the same purpose, the speaker in *Lysias* (Ὑμῖν τοῦ Ἑρακλεοθέου φέρον—sect. 7), describing his wife, says—*ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ πρώτῃ χρόνῳ παῶν ἢ βελτίστη· καὶ γὰρ οὐκ αὖτε δεινὴ καὶ φιλικὴ ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀκριβὴς πάντα διοκοῦσα.*

Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the Platonic vein of sentiment and idealism: neither of them led to any grand results either in war—or political ambition—or philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other of which the Grecian idealism travelled. We know from the Republic that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who, in his *(Economicus)*, enlarges much (in the discourse of Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to prudential results and good management of the household; while he illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the story of Pantheia and Abradates (*Cyropædia*).

¹ See the *(Economicus)* of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii. 5.

confined to the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those too of the best families and education, were seen habitually uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public festival-matches; engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form, in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful emotional sympathy, blended with æsthetic sentiment, which in the more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language affords—and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically denounce and forbid.¹ In their

¹ The beginning of the Platonic Charmides illustrates what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and Lysis, pp. 205-206.

Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus (companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).

If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 508-508 C). Athenæus remarks farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses (23-5) on the *ἠρωτικὴ* of Sokrates, makes the same remark as Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposium; he farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they assailed him upon so many other

points), but had incurred great censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he replies—*τοὺς νυνὶ κατηγοροῦν* (23, 6-7). The comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very curious.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the *ἐγκώμια* on Eros in the Symposium, as “unworthy of serious handling or of Sokrates”. (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)

But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is Herakleitus—author of the Allegoriæ Homerice. Herakleitus repels, as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of Homer—which he admits to be full of immorality if literally understood—had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the character of his own writings—*ἐπὶ ῥῶμα δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ὁ κόλαξ, Ὁμήρου συκοφάντης*—*τοὺς δὲ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους, ἅντα καὶ κάτω παιδικοὶ καθυβρίζουσιν ἠρώτες, οὐδαμοῦ δὲ οὐχὶ τῆς ἀρρένης ἐπιθυμίας μεστός ἐστιν ὁ ἀνὴρ* (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden, 1851).

view, it was an idealising passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palaestra.¹

Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory—this passion presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the work of philosophy—an impulse at first impetuous and undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty (this is² the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant representative of itself among concrete objects—the Ideas of Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the

only way of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character, of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would presently be farther enlarged.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by Thucydides, vi. 54-57.

These two citizens were gratefully recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.

The like sentiment would be inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which pervades and gives common character to all these particulars—Beauty in the abstract—or the Self-Beautiful—the Idea or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of “the great ocean of the beautiful,” was the most glorious privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and happiness.¹

Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or aspires to *happiness*: this is the fundamental or primordial law of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness: accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of them—and nothing else.³ But different men have different ways of pursuing this same

All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name *Eros* is confined to one special case of this large variety.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 210-211.

Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the *Hippias Major*, p. 757. “Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, *pulchrum hoc Plato vocat*: formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia, ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.

“Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum ordine infinitè decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis dis-

cursibus ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam.”

² Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 204-205. Φέρε, ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῷ. Καὶ τί ἐστὶν ἐκεῖν ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰγαθὰ; Τοῦτ' εὐπορώτερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαίμων ἐστὶν. Κτῆσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες. Καὶ οὐκ ἐτι προσδεῖ ἐρέσθαι, ἵνα τί δι βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἢ ἀπόκρισις. . . . Ταύτην δὲ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἐρωτα τοῦτον, πότερα κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντας τὰγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀεὶ, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων.

³ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 206 A. ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἐρωσιν ἀνθρώποις ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

object. One man aspires to good or happiness by way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by gymnastics—or music—or philosophy. Still no one of these is said to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is reserved exclusively for one special variety of it—the impulse towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality by generating a new individual to replace himself.¹ In fact even mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together, either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going—so likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions, cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.² As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual generation of new individuals.

The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body. Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty—or rather, of procreation in the beautiful—whereby satisfaction is obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.³ With some, this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards women, and inducing them

Desire of mental copulation and procreation, as the only attainable likeness of immortality, requires the sight of personal beauty as an originating stimulus.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 207 C.

² Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 207-208.

³ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 206 E. *ὅθεν ὁ γὰρ κινεῖται τε καὶ ὁ σπαραγνύει πολλὰ ἢ*

πύσσει γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλῃς ὁδοῖος ἀπολύνει τὸν ἔχοντα. Ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλὰ—τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ.

to immortalise themselves by begetting children : with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind, and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products. In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and youthful beauty : but when, along with this beauty of person, there is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous, intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is overwhelming ; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring intelligences—poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like Lykurgus and Solon—the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings respecting virtue and goodness—new excellences of disposition—and new force of intellectual combination, in both the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong that they can hardly live apart : so anxious are both of them to foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each is respectively conscious in himself.¹

Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to the contemplation of beauty *in genere*, not merely in bodies and minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the highest pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent : but which, when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he will have no eyes for the individual manifestations

Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds, when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty *in genere*. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 209.

of it in gold, fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.¹ Herein we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to youth.²

It is thus that Plato, in the Symposium, presents Love, or erotic impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some individual person—but gradually becoming both more intense and more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty.³ The main purpose of the Symposium is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros or Love—which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named Diotima⁴—with different views assigned to other speakers. Each of the guests at the Banquet—Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates—engages to deliver a panegyric on Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates towards Alkibiades himself—his inflexible self-command under the extreme of trial and temptation—the unbounded ascendancy which he had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates—are emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.

¹ Plato, Symposium, p. 211.

² Plato, Symposium, p. 211 B. *ὅταν δὲ τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὁρᾶν παιδερασθεῖν ἐναντὶν ἐκείνῳ τὸ καλὸν ἀρχῇται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἀπτοῖτο τοῦ τέλους, &c.*

³ Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. *γυναικὲς μαντικὴς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταῦτά τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ, καὶ Ἀθηναίοις ποτὶ θυσαμένους πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἣ δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τὰ ἐρωτικά δίδαξεν.*

Instead of *γυναικὲς μαντικὴς*, which was the old reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write *γυναικὲς*

μαντικῆς, also 211 D. I cannot but think that *μαντικῆς* is right. There is no pertinence or fit meaning in *μαντικῆς*, whereas the word *μαντικῆς* is in full keeping with what is said about the special religious privileges and revelations of Diotima—that she procured for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had obtained from the Μοῖραι a postponement of the ruin of the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from them no more (Herodot. i. 91).

Both Phædrus¹ and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent, sensual—and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity—Eros Pandemus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius² or Cœlestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon—the first is medical, physiological, cosmical³—the second is comic and imaginative, even to exuberance—the third is poetical or dithyrambic: immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess Diotima.

Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.

Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as interpreting agents of communication between the two.⁴ Eros is the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Poros).⁵ He represents the state of aspiration and

Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men,

¹ Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii. 604) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus, is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced phrases (ισόκωλα, *enriðera*), which Aristophanes parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the *Thesmophoriazuse*, *Athenæus*, v. 187 C.

² Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 180-181.

³ Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a cosmical, all-pervading,

procreative impulse, compare Euripides, *Frag. Incert.* 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (*Griech. Trag.* p. 737) to the lost drama—the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.

⁴ Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 202-203.

⁵ What Sokrates says here in the *Symposium* about Eros is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphrodite (Phædrus, pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).

PLATO.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PHÆDRUS—SYMPOSION.

I PUT together these two dialogues, as distinguished by a marked peculiarity. They are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. They have one great and interesting subject common to both: though in the Phædrus, this subject is blended with, and made contributory to, another. They agree also in the circumstance, that Phædrus is, in both, the person who originates the conversation. But they differ materially in the manner of handling, in the comparisons and illustrations, and in the apparent purpose.

These two are the two erotic dialogues of Plato. Phædrus is the originator of both.

The subject common to both is, Love or Eros in its largest sense, and with its manifold varieties. Under the totally different vein of sentiment which prevails in modern times, and which recognises passionate love as prevailing only between persons of different sex—it is difficult for us to enter into Plato's eloquent exposition of the feeling as he conceives it. In the Hellenic point of view,¹ upon which Plato builds, the attachment of man to woman was regarded as a natural impulse, and as a domestic, social, sentiment;

Eros as conceived by Plato. Different sentiment prevalent in Hellenic antiquity and in modern times. Position of women in Greece.

¹ Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Symp. p. 367) describes this view of Eros as Hellenic, and as "gerade den anti-modernen und anti-christlichen Pol der Platonischen Denkungsart". Aristotle composed *Ἐρωτικὰ* or

Ἐρωτικά, Diogenes Laert. v. 22-24. See Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles*, p. 133, Berlin, 1863.

Compare the dialogue called *Ἐρωτικός*, among the works of Plutarch, p. 750 seq., where some of the speakers,

yet as belonging to a common-place rather than to an exalted mind, and seldom or never rising to that pitch of enthusiasm which overpowers all other emotions, absorbs the whole man, and aims either at the joint performance of great exploits or the joint prosecution of intellectual improvement by continued colloquy. We must remember that the wives and daughters of citizens were seldom seen abroad: that the wife was married very young: that she had learnt nothing except spinning and weaving: that the fact of her having seen as little and heard as little as possible, was considered as rendering her more acceptable to her husband: ¹ that her sphere of duty and exertion was

especially Protagoras, illustrate and enlarge upon this Platonic construction of Eros—*ἀλγῶνι δὲ ἔρωτος οὐδ' ὀνείων τῇ γυναικωνίτιδι μετέστιν*, &c. (750 C, 761 B, &c.)

In the Treatise *De Educatione Puerorum* (c. 15, p. 11 D-F) Plutarch hesitates to give a decided opinion on the amount of restriction proper to be imposed on youth; he is much impressed with the authority of Sokrates, Plato, Xenophon, Æschines, Kebes, and τῶν πάντα χρόνον ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν, οἱ τοὺς ἀρετὰς δοκιμάσαντες ἔρωτας, &c. See the anecdote about Episthenes, an officer among the Ten Thousand Greeks under Xenophon, in Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vii. 4, 7, and a remarkable passage about Zeno the Stoic, *Diog. Laert.* vii. 12. Respecting the general subject of *παιδαγωγία* in Greece, there is a valuable *Excursus* in Bekker's *Charikles*, vol. i. pp. 347-377, *Excurs. ii.* I agree generally with his belief about the practice in Greece, see *Cicero*, *Tusc.* *Disp.* iv. 33, 70. Bekker quotes abundant authorities, which might be farther multiplied if necessary. In appreciating the evidence upon this point, we cannot be too careful to keep in mind what Sokrates says (in the Xenophontic Symposium, viii. 34) when comparing the Thebans and Kleians on one side with the Athenians and Spartans on the other—*Ἐκείνοις μὲν γὰρ τὰτα νόμιμα, ἡμῖν δὲ ἰσυνεθίστα.* We must interpret passages of the classical authors according to their fair and real meanings, not according to the conclusions which we might wish to find proved.

If we read the oration of Demosthenes against Neera (which is full of information about Athenian manners),

we find the speaker Apollodorus distributing the relations of men with women in the following manner (p. 1386)—*τὸ γὰρ συνοικεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτε ἂν παιδοποιῇται καὶ εἰσάγῃ εἰς τοὺς δημότας καὶ τοὺς φράτορας τοὺς νείεις, καὶ τὰς θυγατέρας ἐκιδῇ ὡς αὐτοῦ οὔσας τοῖς ἀνδράσι. Τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἑταίρας, ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα ἔχομεν—τὰς δὲ παλλακὰς, τῆς καὶ ἡμέραν θεραπεύειας τοῦ σώματος—τὰς δὲ γυναικας, τοῦ παιδοποιεῖσθαι γνησίως, καὶ τῶν ἐνδον φύλακα πιστὴν ἔχειν.*

To the same purpose, the speaker in *Lysias* (*Ἦνερ τοῦ Ἐρατοσθένους φόνου*—sect. 7), describing his wife, says—*ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ πρώτῳ χρόνῳ πασῶν ἦν βελτίστη· καὶ γὰρ οἰκονόμος δεινὴ καὶ φιλοβουλὴ ἀγαθὴ καὶ ἀκριβὴς πάντα διοικούσα.*

Neither of these three relations lent itself readily to the Platonic vein of sentiment and idealism: neither of them led to any grand results either in war—or political ambition—or philosophical speculation; the three great roads, in one or other of which the Grecian idealism travelled. We know from the Republic that Plato did not appreciate the value of the family life, or the purposes for which men marry, according to the above passage cited from Demosthenes. In this point, Plato differs from Xenophon, who, in his *Œconomicus*, enlarges much (in the discourse of Ischomachus) upon the value of the conjugal union, with a view to prudential results and good management of the household; while he illustrates the sentimental and affectionate side of it, in the story of Pantheia and Abradates (*Cyropædia*).

¹ See the *Œconomicus* of Xenophon, cap. iii. 12, vii. 5.

confined to the interior of the family. The beauty of women yielded satisfaction to the senses, but little beyond. It was the masculine beauty of youth that fired the Hellenic imagination with glowing and impassioned sentiment. The finest youths, and those too of the best families and education, were seen habitually uncovered in the Palæstra and at the public festival-matches; engaged in active contention and graceful exercise, under the direction of professional trainers. The sight of the living form, in such perfection, movement, and variety, awakened a powerful emotional sympathy, blended with æsthetic sentiment, which in the more susceptible natures was exalted into intense and passionate devotion. The terms in which this feeling is described, both by Plato and Xenophon, are among the strongest which the language affords—and are predicated even of Sokrates himself. Far from being ashamed of the feeling, they consider it admirable and beneficial; though very liable to abuse, which they emphatically denounce and forbid.¹ In their

¹ The beginning of the Platonic Charmides illustrates what is here said, pp. 154-155; also that of the Protagoras and Lysis, pp. 205-206.

Xenophon, Sympos. i. 8-11; iv. 11, 15. Memorab. i. 3, 8-14 (what Sokrates observes to Xenophon about Kritobulus). Dikæarchus (companion of Aristotle) disapproved the important influence which Plato assigned to Eros (Cicero, Tusc. D. iv. 34-71).

If we pass to the second century after the Christian Era, we find some speakers in Athenæus blaming severely the amorous sentiments of Sokrates and the narrative of Alkibiades, as recited in the Platonic Symposium (v. 180-187; xi. 506-508 C). Athenæus remarks farther, that Plato, writing in this strain, had little right to complain (as we read in the Republic) of the licentious compositions of Homer and other poets, and to exclude them from his model city. Maximus Tyrius, in one of his four discourses (23-5) on the *ἔρωτικὴ* of Sokrates, makes the same remark as Athenæus about the inconsistency of Plato in banishing Homer from the model city, and composing what we read in the Symposium; he farther observes that the erotic dispositions of Sokrates provoked no censure from his numerous enemies at the time (though they assailed him upon so many other

points), but had incurred great censure from contemporaries of Maximus himself, to whom he replies—*τοὺς νυνὶ κατηγόρους* (23, 6-7). The comparisons which he institutes (23, 9) between the sentiments and phrases of Sokrates, and those of Sappho and Anakreon, are very curious.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus speaks of the *ἐγκώμια* on Eros in the Symposium, as "unworthy of serious handling or of Sokrates". (De Admir. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1027.)

But the most bitter among all the critics of Plato, is Herakleitus—author of the Allegoriæ Homericae. Herakleitus repels, as unjust and calumnious, the sentence of banishment pronounced by Plato against Homer, from whom all mental cultivation had been derived. He affirms, and tries to show, that the poems of Homer—which he admits to be full of immorality if literally understood—had an allegorical meaning. He blames Plato for not having perceived this; and denounces him still more severely for the character of his own writings—*ἐπρίφω δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ὁ κόλαξ, Ὅμηρον συκοφάντης*—*Τοὺς δὲ Πλάτωνος διαλόγους, ἅνω καὶ κάτω παιδικοὶ καθυβρίζουσιν ἔρωτες, οὐδαμοῦ δὲ οὐχὶ τῆς ἀρρένης ἐπιθυμίας μεστός ἐστιν ὁ ἀνὴρ* (Herakl. All. Hom., c. 4-74, ed. Mehler, Leiden, 1851).

view, it was an idealising passion, which tended to raise a man above the vulgar and selfish pursuits of life, and even above the fear of death. The devoted attachments which it inspired were dreaded by the despots, who forbade the assemblage of youths for exercise in the palæstra.¹

Especially to Plato, who combined erotic and poetical imagination with Sokratic dialectics and generalising theory—this passion presented itself in the light of a stimulus introductory to the work of philosophy—an impulse at first impetuous and undistinguishing, but afterwards regulated towards improving communion and colloquy with an improvable youth. Personal beauty (this is² the remarkable doctrine of Plato in the Phædrus) is the main point of visible resemblance between the world of sense and the world of Ideas: the Idea of Beauty has a brilliant representative of itself among concrete objects—the Ideas of Justice and Temperance have none. The contemplation of a beautiful youth, and the vehement emotion accompanying it, was the

only way of reviving in the soul the Idea of Beauty which it had seen in its antecedent stage of existence. This was the first stage through which every philosopher must pass; but the emotion of love thus raised, became gradually in the better minds both expanded and purified. The lover did not merely admire the person, but also contracted the strongest sympathy with the feelings and character, of the beloved youth: delighting to recognise and promote in him all manifestations of mental beauty which were in harmony with the physical, so as to raise him to the greatest attainable perfection of human nature. The original sentiment of admiration, having been thus first transferred by association from beauty in the person to beauty in the mind and character, became gradually still farther generalised; so that beauty was perceived not as exclusively specialised in any one individual, but as invested in all beautiful objects, bodies as well as minds. The view would presently be farther enlarged.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* 182 C. The proceedings of Harmodius and Aristogiton, which illustrate this feeling, are recounted by Thucydides, vi. 54-57.

These two citizens were gratefully recollected and extensively admired by the Athenian public.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 249 E, 250 B-E.

The like sentiment would be inspired, so as to worship beauty in public institutions, in administrative arrangements, in arts and sciences. And the mind would at last be exalted to the contemplation of that which pervades and gives common character to all these particulars—Beauty in the abstract—or the Self-Beautiful—the Idea or Form of the Beautiful. To reach this highest summit, after mounting all the previous stages, and to live absorbed in the contemplation of “the great ocean of the beautiful,” was the most glorious privilege attainable by any human being. It was indeed attainable only by a few highly gifted minds. But others might make more or less approach to it: and the nearer any one approached, the greater measure would he ensure to himself of real good and happiness.¹

Such is Plato's conception of Eros or Love and its object. He represents it as one special form or variety of the universal law of gravitation pervading all mankind. Every one loves, desires, or aspires to *happiness*: this is the fundamental or primordial law of human nature, beyond which we cannot push enquiry. Good, or good things, are nothing else but the means to happiness:² accordingly, every man, loving happiness, loves good also, and desires not only full acquisition, but perpetual possession of good. In this wide sense, love belongs to all human beings: every man loves good and happiness, with perpetual possession of them—and nothing else.³ But different men have different ways of pursuing this same

All men love Good, as the means of Happiness, but they pursue it by various means. The name *Eros* is confined to one special case of this large variety.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 210-211.

Respecting the Beautiful, I transcribe here a passage from Ficinus, in his Argument prefixed to the *Hippias Major*, p. 757. “Unumquodque è singulis pulchris, *pulchrum hoc Plato vocat*: formam in omnibus, pulchritudinem; speciem et ideam supra omnia, ipsum pulchrum. Primum sensus attingit opinioque. Secundum ratio cogitat. Tertium mens intuetur.

“Quid ipsum Bonum? Ipsum rerum omnium principium, actus purus, actus sequentia cuncta vivificans. Quid ipsum Pulchrum? Vivificus actus e primo fonte bonorum effluens, Mentem primo divinam idearum ordine infinite decorans, Numina deinde sequentia mentesque rationum serie complens, Animas tertio numerosis dis-

cursibus ornans, Naturas quarto seminibus, formis quinto materiam.”

² Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 204-205. Φέρει, ὁ ἔρως τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τί ἐρᾷ; Γενέσθαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αὐτῷ. Καὶ τί ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ᾧ ἂν γένηται τὰγαθὰ; Τοῦτ' εὐπωρότερον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἔχω ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὅτι εὐδαίμων ἐσται. Κτῆσει γάρ, ἔφη, ἀγαθῶν, οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες. Καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἱρῆσθαι, ἵνα τί δὲ βούλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἢ ἀπόκρισις. . . . Ταύτην δὲ τὴν βούλησιν καὶ τὸν ἔρωτα τοῦτον, πότερα κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ πάντας τὰγαθὰ βούλεσθαι αὐτοῖς εἶναι ἀεὶ, ἢ πῶς λέγεις; Οὕτως, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, κοινὸν εἶναι πάντων.

³ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 206 A. ὡς οὐδὲν γε ἄλλο ἐστὶν οὐ ἔρωσιν ἀνθρώπων ἢ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

object. One man aspires to good or happiness by way of money-getting, another by way of ambition, a third by gymnastics—or music—or philosophy. Still no one of these is said to love, or to be under the influence of Eros. That name is reserved exclusively for one special variety of it—the impulse towards copulation, generation, and self-perpetuation, which agitates both bodies and minds throughout animal nature. Desiring perpetual possession of good, all men desire to perpetuate themselves, and to become immortal. But an individual man or animal cannot be immortal: he can only attain a quasi-immortality by generating a new individual to replace himself.¹ In fact even mortal life admits no continuity, but is only a succession of distinct states or phenomena: one always disappearing and another always appearing, each generated by its antecedent and generating its consequent. Though a man from infancy to old age is called the same, yet he never continues the same for two moments together, either in body or mind. As his blood, flesh, bones, &c., are in perpetual disappearance and renovation, always coming and going—so likewise are his sensations, thoughts, emotions, dispositions, cognitions, &c. Neither mentally nor physically does he ever continue the same during successive instants. The old man of this instant perishes and is replaced by a new man during the next.² As this is true of the individual, so it is still more true of the species: continuance or immortality is secured only by perpetual generation of new individuals.

The love of immortality thus manifests itself in living beings through the copulative and procreative impulse, which so powerfully instigates living man in mind as well as in body. Beauty in another person exercises an attractive force which enables this impulse to be gratified: ugliness on the contrary repels and stifles it. Hence springs the love of beauty—or rather, of procreation in the beautiful—whereby satisfaction is obtained for this restless and impatient agitation.³ With some, this erotic impulse stimulates the body, attracting them towards women, and inducing them

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¹ Plato, Sympos. p. 207 C.

² Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.

³ Plato, Sympos. p. 206 E. ὅθεν δὴ τῇ ψυχῇ κινεῖται καὶ ἡδὴ σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἡ

πύξις γέγονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλῃς αἰδίνος ἀπολῶν τὸν ἔχοντα. Ἐστὶ γὰρ οὐ τοῦ καλοῦ ὁ ἔρως, ἀλλὰ—τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τέκνου ἐν τῇ καλῇ.

to immortalise themselves by begetting children : with others, it acts far more powerfully on the mind, and determines them to conjunction with another mind for the purpose of generating appropriate mental offspring and products. In this case as well as in the preceding, the first stroke of attraction arises from the charm of physical, visible, and youthful beauty : but when, along with this beauty of person, there is found the additional charm of a susceptible, generous, intelligent mind, the effect produced by the two together is overwhelming ; the bodily sympathy becoming spiritualised and absorbed by the mental. With the inventive and aspiring intelligences—poets like Homer and Hesiod, or legislators like Lykurgus and Solon—the erotic impulse takes this turn. They look about for some youth, at once handsome and improvable, in conversation with whom they may procreate new reasonings respecting virtue and goodness—new excellences of disposition—and new force of intellectual combination, in both the communicants. The attachment between the two becomes so strong that they can hardly live apart : so anxious are both of them to foster and confirm the newly acquired mental force of which each is respectively conscious in himself.¹

Occasionally, and in a few privileged natures, this erotic impulse rises to a still higher exaltation, losing its separate and exclusive attachment to one individual person, and fastening upon beauty in general, or that which all beautiful persons and beautiful minds have in common. The visible charm of beautiful body, though it was indispensable as an initial step, comes to be still farther sunk and undervalued, when the mind has ascended to the contemplation of beauty *in genere*, not merely in bodies and minds, but in laws, institutions, and sciences. This is the highest pitch of philosophical love, to which a few minds only are competent, and that too by successive steps of ascent : but which, when attained, is thoroughly soul-satisfying. If any man's vision be once sharpened so that he can see beauty pure and absolute, he will have no eyes for the individual manifestations

Highest exaltation of the erotic impulse in a few privileged minds. when it ascends gradually to the love of Beauty in *genere*. This is the most absorbing sentiment of all.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 209.

of it in gold, fine raiment, brilliant colours, or beautiful youths.¹ Herein we have the climax or consummation of that erotic aspiration which first shows itself in the form of virtuous attachment to youth.²

It is thus that Plato, in the Symposium, presents Love, or erotic impulse: a passion taking its origin in the physical and mental attributes common to most men, and concentrated at first upon some individual person—but gradually becoming both more intense and more refined, as it ascends in the scale of logical generalisation and comes into intimate view of the pure idea of Beauty.³ The main purpose of the Symposium is to contrast this Platonic view of Eros or Love—which is assigned to Sokrates in the dialogue, and is repeated by him from the communication of a prophetic woman named Diotima⁴—with different views assigned to other speakers. Each of the guests at the Banquet—Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Sokrates—engages to deliver a panegyric on Eros: while Alkibiades, entering intoxicated after the speeches are finished, delivers a panegyric on Sokrates, in regard to energy and self-denial generally, but mainly and specially in the character of Erastes. The pure and devoted attachment of Sokrates towards Alkibiades himself—his inflexible self-command under the extreme of trial and temptation—the unbounded ascendancy which he had acquired over that insolent youth, who seeks in every conceivable manner to render himself acceptable to Sokrates—are emphatically extolled, and illustrated by singular details.

¹ Plato, Symposium, p. 211.

² Plato, Symposium, p. 211 B. *ὅταν δὴ τις ἀπὸ τῶνδε διὰ τὸ ὀρθῶς παιδερασθεῖν ἐπαινῶν ἐκείνο τὸ καλὸν ἀρχῆται καθορᾶν, σχεδὸν ἂν τι ἀπαιτοῦτο τοῦ τέλους, &c.*

³ Plat. Sympos. p. 201 D. *γυναικὸς μαντικῆς Διοτίμας, ἣ ταῦτά τε σοφὴ ἦν καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ, καὶ Ἀθηναίους ποτὶ θυσαμένους πρὸ τοῦ λοιμοῦ δέκα ἔτη ἀναβολὴν ἐποίησε τῆς νόσου, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ τὸ ἐρωτικὰ ἰδούσας.*

Instead of *γυναικὸς μαντικῆς*, which was the old reading, Stallbaum and other editors prefer to write *γυναικὸς*

Μαντικῆς, also 211 D. I cannot but think that *μαντικῆς* is right. There is no pertinence or fit meaning in *Μαντινικῆς*, whereas the word *μαντικῆς* is in full keeping with what is said about the special religious privileges and revelations of Diotima—that she procured for the Athenians an adjournment of the plague for ten years. The Delphian oracle assured the Lydian king Kroesus that Apollo had obtained from the Moirai a postponement of the ruin of the Lydian kingdom for three years, but that he could obtain from them no more (Herodot. i. 91).

Both Phædrus¹ and Pausanias, in their respective encomiums upon Eros, dwell upon that God as creating within the human bosom by his inspirations the noblest self-denial and the most devoted heroism, together with the strongest incentives to virtuous behaviour. Pausanias however makes distinctions: recognising and condemning various erotic manifestations as abusive, violent, sensual—and supposing for these a separate inspiring Deity—Eros Pandêmus, contrasted with the good and honourable Eros Uranius² or Cœlestis. In regard to the different views taken of Eros by Eryximachus, Aristophanes, and Agathon—the first is medical, physiological, cosmical³—the second is comic and imaginative, even to exuberance—the third is poetical or dithyrambic: immediately upon which follows the analytical and philosophical exposition ascribed to Sokrates, opened in his dialectic manner by a cross-examination of his predecessor, and proceeding to enunciate the opinions communicated to him by the prophetess Diotima.

Views of Eros presented by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon.

Sokrates treats most of the preceding panegyrics as pleasing fancies not founded in truth. In his representation (cited from Diotima) Eros is neither beautiful, nor good, nor happy; nor is he indeed a God at all. He is one of the numerous intermediate body of Dæmons, inferior to Gods yet superior to men, and serving as interpreting agents of communication between the two.⁴ Eros is the offspring of Poverty and Resource (Poros).⁵ He represents the state of aspiration and

Discourse of Sokrates from revelation of Diotima. He describes Eros as not a God, but an intermediate Dæmon between Gods and men,

¹ Sydenham conceives and Boeckh (ad Plat. Legg. iii. 604) concurs with him, that this discourse, assigned to Phædrus, is intended by Plato as an imitation of the style of Lysias. This is sufficiently probable. The encomium on Eros delivered by Agathon, especially the concluding part of it (p. 197), mimics the style of florid effeminate poetry, overcharged with balanced phrases (*ισόκωλα, ἀντιθέτα*), which Aristophanes parodies in Agathon's name at the beginning of the *Thesmophoriazuse*, *Athenæus*, v. 187 C.

² Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 180-181.

³ Respecting this view of Eros or Aphrodite, as a cosmical, all-pervading,

procreative impulse, compare Euripides, *Frag. Incert.* 3, 6, assigned by Welcker (*Griech. Trag.* p. 737) to the lost drama—the first Hippolytus; also the beautiful invocation with which the poem of Lucretius opens, and the fragmentary exordium remaining from the poem of Parmenides.

⁴ Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 202-203.

⁵ What Sokrates says here in the *Symposium* about Eros is altogether at variance with what Sokrates says about Eros in Phædrus, wherein we find him speaking with the greatest reverence and awe about Eros as a powerful God, son of Aphrodite (Phædrus, pp. 242 D, 243 D, 257 A).

constantly
aspiring to
divinity,
but not
attaining
it.

striving, with ability and energy, after goodness and beauty, but never actually possessing them: a middle condition, preferable to that of the person who neither knows that he is deficient in them, nor cares to possess them: but inferior to the condition of him who is actually in possession. Eros is always Love of something—in relation to something yet unattained, but desired: Eros is to be distinguished carefully from the object desired.¹ He is the parallel of the philosopher, who is neither ignorant nor wise: not ignorant, because genuine ignorance is unconscious of itself and fancies itself to be knowledge: not wise, because he does not possess wisdom, and is well aware that he does not possess it. He is in the intermediate stage, knowing that he does not possess wisdom, but constantly desiring it and struggling after it. Eros, like philosophy, represents this continual aspiration and advance towards a goal never attained.²

Analogy of
the erotic
aspiration
with that of
the philo-
sopher, who
knows his
own igno-
rance, and
thirsts for
knowledge.

It is thus that the truly Platonic conception of Love is brought out, materially different from that of the preceding speakers—Love, as a state of conscious want, and of aspiration or endeavour to satisfy that want, by striving after good or happiness—Philosophy as the like intermediate state, in regard to wisdom. And Plato follows out this coalescence of love and philosophy in the manner which has been briefly sketched above: a vehement impulse towards mental communion with some favoured youth, in the view of producing mental improvement, good, and happiness to both persons concerned: the same impulse afterwards expanding, so as to grasp the good and beautiful in a larger sense, and ultimately to fasten on goodness and beauty in the pure Idea: which is absolute—independent of time, place, circumstances, and all variable elements—moreover the object of the one and supreme science.³

¹ Plato, Symposium, pp. 199-200. 'Ο Έρως έρως έστιν ουδένος ή τινός· Πάνν μέν ούν έστιν. . . . Πότερον δ' Έρως εκείνου οδ έστιν έρως, επιθυμεί αὐτοῦ ή ού· Πάνν γε. . . . Ανάγκη τὸ επιθυμῶν επιθυμῆναι οὐ ένδεές έστιν, ή μη επιθυμῆναι, εάν μη ένδεές ή.

² Plato, Sympos. p. 204 A. Τίνες ούν οί φιλοσοφούντες, εἰ μήτε οί σοφοί

μήτε οί άμαθείς· . . . Οί μεταφύ τούτων άμφοτέρων, άν αὐ και δ' Έρως. 'Εστί γάρ, οδ τῶν καλλίστων ή σοφία, Έρως δ' έστιν έρως περί τὸ καλόν· ώστε άναγκαίον Έρως φιλόσοφον εἶναι, φιλόσοφον δέ όντα μεταφύ εἶναι σοφού και άμαθούς.

³ Plato, Symposium, pp. 210-211.

I will now compare the Symposium with the Phædrus. In the first half of the Phædrus also, Eros, and the Self-Beautiful or the pure Idea of the Beautiful, are brought into close coalescence with philosophy and dialectic—but they are presented in a different manner. Plato begins by setting forth the case against Eros in two competing discourses (one cited from Lysias,¹ the other pronounced by Sokrates himself as competitor with Lysias in eloquence) supposed to be addressed to a youth, and intended to convince him that the persuasions of a calm and intelligent friend are more worthy of being listened to than the exaggerated promises and protestations of an impassioned lover, from whom he will receive more injury than benefit: that the inspirations of Eros are a sort of madness, irrational and misguiding as well as capricious and transitory: while the calm and steady friend, unmoved by any passionate inspiration, will show himself worthy of permanent esteem and gratitude.² By a sudden revulsion of feeling, Sokrates becomes ashamed of having thus slandered the divine Eros, and proceeds to deliver a counter-panegyric or palinode upon that God.³

Eros (he says) is, mad, irrational, superseding reason and prudence in the individual mind.⁴ This is true: yet still Eros exercises a beneficent and improving influence. Not all madness is bad. Some varieties of it are bad, but others are good. Some arise from human malady, others from the inspirations of the Gods: both of them supersede human reason and the orthodoxy of established custom⁵—but the former substitute what is worse, the latter what is better. The greatest blessings enjoyed by man arise from madness, when it is imparted by divine inspiration.

Eros as presented in the Phædrus—Discourse of Lysias, and counter-discourse of Sokrates, adverse to Eros—Sokrates is seized with remorse, and recants in a high-flown panegyric on Eros.

Panegyric—Sokrates admits that the influence of Eros is a variety of madness, but distinguishes good and bad varieties of madness, both coming from the Gods. Good

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 230 seq.

² Plato, Phædrus, p. 237 seq.

³ Eros, in the Phædrus, is pronounced to be a God, son of Aphroditê (p. 242 E); in the Symposium he is not a God but a Daemon, offspring of Poros and Penia, and attendant on Aphroditê, according to Diotima and Sokrates (p. 203).

⁴ Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. τὸ ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἐν τι κοινῇ εἶδος. . . . τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἐν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος. Compare p. 236 A.

⁵ Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. Μανίας δὲ γε εἶδη δύο· τὴν μὲν, ὑπὸ νοσημάτων ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ, ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εὐθετῶν νομίμων γιγνομένην. Compare 249 D.

madness is
far better
than so-
briety.

And it is so imparted in four different phases and by four different Gods: Apollo infuses the prophetic madness—Dionysus, the ritual or religious—The Muses, the poetical—and Eros, the erotic.¹ This last sort of madness greatly transcends the sober reason and concentration upon narrow objects which is so much praised by mankind generally.² The inspired and exalted lover deserves every preference over the unimpassioned friend.

Plato then illustrates, by a highly poetical and imaginative mythe, the growth and working of love in the soul. All soul or mind is essentially self-moving, and the cause of motion to other things. It is therefore immortal, without beginning or end: the universal or cosmic soul, as well as the individual souls of Gods and men.³ Each soul may be compared to a chariot with a winged pair of horses. In the divine soul, both the horses are excellent, with perfect wings: in the human soul, one only of them is good, the other is violent and rebellious, often disobedient to the charioteer, and with feeble or half-grown wings.⁴ The Gods, by means of their wings, are enabled to ascend up to the summit of the celestial firmament—to place themselves upon the outer circumference or back of the heaven—and thus to be carried round along with the rotation of the celestial sphere round the Earth. In the course of this rotation they contemplate the pure essences and Ideas, truth and reality without either form or figure or colour: they enjoy the vision of the Absolute—Justice, Temperance, Beauty, Science. The human souls, with their defective wings, try to accompany the Gods; some attaching themselves

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 244 A. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν ἀπλὸν τὸ μανίαν κακὸν εἶναι, καλὸς ἂν ἐλέγετο· νῦν δὲ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν γίνονται διὰ μανίας, θεία μὲντοι δόσσι διδομένη.

Compare Plutarch, *Ἐρωτικός*, c. 16. pp. 758-759, &c.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 245 B. μηδὲ τις ἡμᾶς λόγος θορυβεῖται δεδιγμένος ὡς πρὸ τοῦ κεννημένου τὸν σῶφρανα δεῖ προαιρεῖσθαι φίλον.

P. 256 E: ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ἐρώοντος οἰκειότης, σφροσύνη θνητῇ κεραμένη, θηητά τε καὶ φειδωλά οικονομούσα, ἀνελευθερίαν ὑπὸ πλῆθους ἐπανουμένην

ὡς ἀρετὴν τῇ φίλῃ ψυχῇ ἐντεκοῦσα, &c.

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 245-246. Compare Kriech, *De Platonis Phædro*, pp. 49-50 (Göttingen, 1848).

Plato himself calls this panegyric in the mouth of Sokrates a μυθικός τις ὕμνος (*Phædr.* p. 265 D).

⁴ The reader will recollect Homer, *Iliad*, xvi. 152, where the chariot and horses of Patroklos are described, when he is about to attack the Trojans; the mortal horse Pedasos is harnessed to it alongside of the two immortal horses Xanthus and Balius.

to one God, some to another, in this ascent. But many of them fail in the object, being thrown back upon earth in consequence of their defective equipment, and the unruly character of one of the horses : some however succeed partially, obtaining glimpses of Truth and of the general Ideas, though in a manner transient and incomplete.

Those souls which have not seen Truth or general Ideas at all, can never be joined with the body of a man, but only with that of some inferior animal. It is essential that some glimpse of truth should have been obtained, in order to qualify the soul for the condition of man :¹ for the mind of man must possess within itself the capacity of comparing and combining particular sensations, so as to rise to one general conception brought together by reason.² This is brought about by the process of reminiscence ; whereby it recalls those pure, true, and beautiful Ideas which it had partially seen during its prior extra-corporeal existence in companionship with the Gods. The rudimentary faculty of thus reviving these general Conceptions—the visions of a prior state of existence—belongs to all men, distinguishing them from other animals : but in most men the visions have been transient, and the power of reviving them is faint and dormant. It is only some few philosophers, whose minds, having been effectively winged in their primitive state for ascent to the super-celestial regions, have enjoyed such a full contemplation of the divine Ideas as to be able to recall them with facility and success, during the subsequent corporeal existence. To the reminiscence of the philosopher, these Ideas present themselves with such brilliancy and fascination, that he forgets all other pursuits and interests. Hence he is set down as a madman by the generality of mankind, whose minds have not ascended beyond particular and present phenomena to the revival of the anterior Ideas.

Operation of such pre-natal experience upon the intellectual faculties of man—Comparison and combination of particular sensations indispensable—Reminiscence.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 249-250. *πᾶσα μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴ φύσει τεθείσται τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἂν ᾔδειν εἰς τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀναμνησκεισθαι δ' ἐκ τῶνδε ἑκείνα οὐ βέβαιον ἀπάσῃ, &c.*

² Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 249 B. *Οἱ γὰρ ἢ γε μὴ ποτε ἰδούσα τὴν ἀλήθειαν*

εἰς τὸδε ᾔδει τὸ σχῆμα. Δεῖ γὰρ ἀνθρώπον ξυνίεναι κατ' εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰδὼν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἓν λογισμῷ ξυναιρούμενον. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἑκείνων, ἃ ποτ' εἶδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ συμπορευθεῖσα θεῶν καὶ ὑπερῖδουσα ἃ νῦν εἶναι φάμεν, καὶ ἀνακύψασα εἰς τὸν ὄν οὕτως.

It is by the aspect of visible beauty, as embodied in distinguished youth, that this faculty of reminiscence is first kindled in minds capable of the effort. It is only the embodiment of beauty, acting as it does powerfully upon the most intellectual of our senses, which has sufficient force to kindle up the first act or stage of reminiscence in the mind, leading ultimately to the revival of the Idea of Beauty. The embodiments of justice, wisdom, temperance, &c., in particular men, do not strike forcibly on the senses, nor approximate sufficiently to the original Idea, to effect the first stroke of reminiscence in an unprepared mind. It is only the visible manifestation of beauty, which strikes with sufficient shock at once on the senses and the intellect, to recall in the mind an adumbration of the primitive Idea of Beauty. The shock thus received first develops the reminiscent faculty in minds apt and predisposed to it, and causes the undeveloped wings of the soul to begin growing. It is a passion of violent and absorbing character; which may indeed take a sensual turn, by the misconduct of the unruly horse in the team, producing in that case nothing but corruption and mischief—but which may also take a virtuous, sentimental, imaginative turn, and becomes in that case the most powerful stimulus towards mental improvement in both the two attached friends. When thus refined and spiritualised, it can find its satisfaction only in philosophical communion, in the generation of wisdom and virtue; as well as in the complete cultivation of that reminiscent power, which vivifies in the mind remembrance of Forms or Ideas seen in a prior existence. To attain such perfection, is given to few; but a greater or less approximation may be made to it. And it is the only way of developing the highest powers and virtues of the mind; which must spring, not from human prudence and sobriety, but from divine madness or erotic inspiration.¹

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 256 B. *ὁ μὲν ζῶν ἀγαθὸν οὐτε σμικροτέρῃ ἀνθρώπινῃ οὐτε θεῖα μανία δύναται ποιεῖναι ἀνθρώπου.* —245 B: *ἐν εὐτυχίᾳ τῇ μεγίστῃ παρὰ θεῶν ἢ τοιαύτῃ μανία δίδεται.*

The long and highly poetical myth, of

of which I have given some of the leading points, occupies from c. 51 to c. 83 (pp. 244-257) of the dialogue. It is adapted to the Hellenic imagination, and requires the reader to keep before him the palæstra of Athens, as de-

Such is the general tenor of the dialogue *Phædrus*, in its first half : which presents to us the Platonic love, conceived as the source and mainspring of exalted virtue—as the only avenue to philosophy—as contrasted, not merely with sensual love, but also with the sobriety of the decent citizen who fully conforms to the teaching of Law and Custom. In the *Symposium*, the first of these contrasts appears prominently, while the second is less noticed. In the *Phædrus*, Sokrates declares emphatically that madness, of a certain sort, is greatly preferable to sobriety : that the temperate, respectable, orthodox citizen, is on the middle line, some madmen being worse than he, but others better : that madness springing from human distemper is worse, but that when it springs from divine inspiration, it is in an equal degree better, than sobriety : that the philosophical *æstrus*, and the reminiscence of the eternal Ideas (considered by Plato as the only true and real *Entia*), is inconsistent with that which is esteemed as sobriety : and is generated only by special inoculation from Eros or some other God. This last contrast, as I have just observed, is little marked in the *Symposium*. But on the other hand, the *Symposium* (especially the discourse of Sokrates and his repetition of the lessons of Diotima), insists much more upon the generalisation of the erotic impulse. In the *Phædrus*, we still remain on the ground of fervent attachment between two individuals—an attachment sentimental and virtuous, displaying itself in an intercourse which elicits from both of them active intelligence and exalted modes of conduct : in the *Symposium*, such intercourse is assimilated explicitly to copulation with procreative consequences, but it is represented as the first stage of a passion which becomes more and more expanded and comprehensive : dropping all restriction to any single individual, and enlarging itself not merely to embrace pursuits, and institutions, but also to the plenitude and great ocean of Beauty in its largest sense.

The picture here presented by Plato, of the beneficent and elevating influence of Eros Philosophus, is repeated by Sokrates as a revelation made to him by the prophetess Diotima. It was much taken to heart by

Elevating
influence
ascribed,
both in

ascribed in the *Lysis*, *Erastæ*, and *Char- mides* of Plato—visited both by men like Sokrates and by men like Kritias (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 29).

Phædrus and Symposium, to Eros Philosopher. Mixture in the mind of Plato, of poetical fancy and religious mysticism, with dialectic theory.

the Neo-Platonists.¹ It is a striking manifestation of the Platonic characteristics : transition from amorous impulse to religious and philosophical mysticism—implication of poetical fancy with the conception of the philosophising process—surrender of the mind to metaphor and analogy, which is real up to a certain point, but is forcibly stretched and exaggerated to serve the theorising purpose of the moment. Now we may observe, that the worship of youthful masculine beauty, and the belief that contemplation of such a face and form was an operative cause, not only raising the admiration but also quickening the intelligence of the adult spectator, and serving as a provocative to instructive dialogue—together with a decided attempt to exalt the spiritual side of this influence and depreciate the sensual—both these are common to Plato with Sokrates and Xenophon. But what is peculiar to Plato is, that he treats this merely as an initial point to spring from, and soars at once into the region of abstractions, until he gets clear of all particulars and concomitants, leaving nothing except Beauty Absolute—τὸ Καλὸν—τὸ αὐτὸ-καλὸν—the “full sea of the beautiful”. Not without reason does Diotima express a doubt whether Sokrates (if we mean thereby the historical Sokrates) could have followed so bold a flight. His wings might probably have failed

¹ Porphyry, Vit. Plotini, 23.

Plato's way of combining, in these two dialogues—so as to pass by an easy thread of association from one to the other—subjects which appear to us unconnected and even discordant, is certainly remarkable. We have to recognise material differences in the turn of imagination, as between different persons and ages. The following remark of Professor Mohl, respecting the Persian lyric poet Hafiz, illustrates this point. “Au reste, quand même nous serions mieux renseignés sur sa vie, il resterait toujours pour nous le singulier spectacle d'un homme qui tantôt célèbre l'absorption de l'âme dans l'essence de Dieu, tantôt chante le vin et l'amour, sans grossièreté, il est vrai, mais avec un laisser aller et un naturel qui exclut toute idée de symbolisme—et qui généralement glisse de l'une dans l'autre de ces deux manières de sentir, qui nous paraissent

si différentes, sans s'apercevoir lui-même qu'il change de sujet. Les Orientaux ont cherché la solution de cette difficulté dans une interprétation mystique de toutes ses poésies; mais les textes s'y refusent. Des critiques modernes ont voulu l'expliquer en supposant une hypocrisie de l'auteur, qui lui aurait fait mêler une certaine dose de piété mystique, à ses vers plus légers, pour les faire passer; mais ce calcul paraît étranger à la nature de l'homme. Je crois qu'il faut trouver le mot de l'énigme dans l'état général des esprits et de la culture de son temps: et la difficulté pour nous est seulement de nous représenter assez vivement l'état des esprits en Perse à cette époque, et la nature de l'influence que le Soufisme y exerçait depuis des siècles sur toutes les classes cultivées de la nation.”—Mohl (Rapport Annuel à la Société Asiatique, 1861, p. 89.)

and dropped him : as we read in the Phædrus respecting the unprepared souls who try to rise aloft in company with the Gods. Plato alone is the true Dædalus equal to this flight, borne up by wings not inferior to those of Pindar¹—according to the comparison of Dionysius of Halikarnassus.

Various remarks may be made, in comparing this exposition of Diotima in the Symposium with that which we read in the Phædrus and Phædon.

First, in the Phædrus and Phædon (also in the Timæus and elsewhere), the pre-existence of the soul, and its antecedent familiarity, greater or less, with the world of Ideas,—are brought into the foreground ; so as to furnish a basis for that doctrine of reminiscence, which is one of the peculiar characteristics of Plato. The Form or Idea, when once disengaged from the appendages by which it has been overgrown, is said to be recognised by the mind and welcomed as an old acquaintance. But in the Symposium, no such doctrine is found. The mind is described as rising by gradual steps from the concrete and particular to the abstract and general, by recognising the sameness of one attribute as pervading many particulars, and by extending its comparisons from smaller groups of particulars to larger ; until at length one and the same attribute is perceived to belong to all. The mind is supposed to evolve out of itself, and to generate in some companion mind, certain abstract or general conceptions, correlating with the Forms or Concepts without. The fundamental postulate here is, not that of pre-existence, but that of in-dwelling conceptions.

Differences between Symposium and Phædrus. In-dwelling conceptions assumed by the former, pre-natal experiences by the latter.

Secondly, in the Phædrus and Phædon, the soul is declared to be immortal, *à parte post* as well as *à parte ante*. But in the Symposium, this is affirmed to be impossible.² The soul yearns for, but is forbidden to reach, immortality : or at least can only reach immortality in a metaphorical sense, by its prolific operation—by generating in itself as long as it lasts, and in other minds who will survive it, a self-renewing series of noble thoughts and

Nothing but metaphorical immortality recognised in Symposium.

¹ Dionys. Hal. De Adm. VI Dic. in Demosth., p. 972, Reiske.

² Plato, Sympos. pp. 207-208.

feelings—by leaving a name and reputation to survive in the memory of others.

Thirdly, in Phædrus, Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, Plato recognises many distinct Forms or Ideas—a world or aggregate of such Entia Rationis¹—among which Beauty is one, but only one. It is the exalted privilege of the philosophic mind to come into contemplation and cognition of these Forms generally. But in the Symposium, the Form of Beauty (τὸ καλόν) is presented singly and exclusively—as if the communion with this one Form were the sole occupation of the most exalted philosophy.

Fourthly, The Phædrus and Symposium have, both of them in common, the theory of Eros as the indispensable, initiatory, stimulus to philosophy. The spectacle of a beautiful youth is considered necessary to set light to various elements in the mind, which would otherwise remain dormant and never burn : it enables the pregnant and capable mind to bring forth what it has within and to put out its hidden strength. But if we look to the Phædon, Theætétus, Sophistés, or Republic, we shall not find Eros invoked for any such function. The Republic describes an elaborate scheme for generating and developing the philosophic capacity : but Eros plays no part in it. In the Theætétus, the young man so named is announced as having a pregnant mind requiring to be disburthened, and great capacity which needs foreign aid to develop it : the service needed is rendered by Sokrates, who possesses an obstetric patent, and a marvellous faculty of cross-examination. Yet instead of any auxiliary stimulus arising from personal beauty, the personal ugliness of both persons in the dialogue is emphatically signified.

I note these peculiarities, partly of the Symposium, partly of the Phædrus along with it—to illustrate the varying points of view which the reader must expect to meet in travelling through the numerous Platonic dialogues.

¹ Plat. Repub. v. 476. He recog- as well as Forms of δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, nises Forms of αἰσχρόν, κακόν, αἰσχρόν, καλόν, &c.

In the strange scene with which the Symposium is wound up, the main purpose of the dialogue is still farther worked out. The spirit and ethical character of Eros Philosophus, after having been depicted in general terms by Diotima, are specially exemplified in the personal history of Sokrates, as recounted and appreciated by Alkibiades. That handsome, high-born, and insolent youth, being in a complete state of intoxication, breaks in unexpectedly upon the company, all of whom are as yet sober : he enacts the part of a drunken man both in speech and action, which is described with a vivacity that would do credit to any dramatist. His presence is the signal for beginning to drink hard, and he especially challenges Sokrates to drink off, after him, as much wine as will fill the large water-vessel serving as cooler ; which challenge Sokrates forthwith accepts and executes, without being the least affected by it. Alkibiades instead of following the example of the others by delivering an encomium on Eros, undertakes to deliver one upon Sokrates. He proceeds to depict Sokrates as the votary of Eros Philosophus, wrapped up in the contemplation of beautiful youths, and employing his whole time in colloquy with them—yet as never losing his own self-command, even while acquiring a magical ascendancy over these companions.¹ The abnormal exterior of Sokrates, resembling that of a Satyr, though concealing the image of a God within—the eccentric pungency of his conversation, blending banter with seriousness, homely illustrations with impressive principles—has exercised an influence at once fascinating, subjugating, humiliating. The impudent Alkibiades has been made to feel painfully his own unworthiness, even while receiving every mark of admiration from others. He has become enthusiastically devoted to Sokrates, whom he has sought to attach to himself, and to lay under obligation, by tempting offers of every kind. The details of these offers are given with a fulness which cannot be translated to modern readers, and which even then required to be excused as the revelations of a drunken man. They present one of the boldest fictions in the Greek language—if we look at them in conjunction with the real character of

Concluding scene and speech of Alkibiades in the Symposium—Behaviour of Sokrates to Alkibiades and other handsome youths.

¹ Plato, Sympos. p. 216 C-D.

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¹ Plat. Repub. v. 476. Ideas Forms of *idéas*, *forms*.

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Plato insists upon the *χρεία τῆς μέθης*,
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413 E), the *φύλακες* are required to
be tested, in regard to their capacity
of resisting pleasurable temptation, as
well as pain and danger.

Among the titles of the lost treatises
of Theophrastus, we find one *Περὶ
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the compliments that the Emperor
Marcus Antoninus (i. 16) pays to his
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Alkibiades as an historical person.¹ Sokrates is found proof against every variety of temptation, however seductive to Grecian feeling. In his case, Eros Philosophus maintains his dignity as exclusively pure, sentimental, and spiritual: while Alkibiades retires more humiliated than ever. We are given to understand that the like offers had been made to Sokrates by many other handsome youths also—especially by Charmides and Euthydemus—all of them being treated with the same quiet and repellent indifference.² Sokrates had kept on the vantage-ground as regards all:—and was regarded by all with the same mixture of humble veneration and earnest attachment.

Not merely upon this point but upon others also, Alkibiades Perfect self- recounts anecdotes of the perfect self-mastery of Sokrates: in endurance of cold, heat, hunger, and fatigue Sokrates— in contempt of the dangers of war, in bravery on proof against every sort of trial. the day of battle—even in the power of bearing more wine than any one else, without being intoxicated, whenever the occasion was such as to require him to drink: though he never drank much willingly. While all his emotions are thus described as under the full control of Reason and Eros Philosophus—his special gift and privilege was that of conversation—not less

¹ Plato, Sympos. p. 219. See also, respecting the historical Alkibiades and his character, Thucyd. vi. 15; Xenoph. Memor. i. 1; Antisthenes, apud Athenæum, xii. 534.

The invention of Plato goes beyond that of those ingenious men who recounted how Phryné and Lais had failed in attempts to overcome the continence of Xenokrates, Diog. L. iv. 7; and the saying of Lais, *ὅς οὐκ ἄν ἀνδρὶς, ἀλλ' ἄν ἀνδριανός, ἀναστραίν.* Quintilian (viii. 4, 22-23) aptly enough compares the description given by Alkibiades—as the maximum of testimony to the “invicta continentia” of Sokrates—with the testimony to the surpassing beauty of Helen, borne by such witnesses as the Trojan *δημογέροντες* and Priam himself (Hom. *Iliad* iii. 156). One of the speakers in Athenæus censures severely this portion of the Platonic Symposium, xi. 506 C, 508 D, v. 187 D. Porphyry (in his life of Plotinus, 15) tells us that the rhetor Diophanes delivered an apology for Alkibiades, in the presence

of Plotinus; who was much displeased, and directed Porphyry to compose a reply.

² Plato, Symp. p. 222 B.

In the Hieron of Xenophon (xi. 11) —a conversation between the despot Hieron and the poet Simonides—the poet, exhorting Hieron to govern his subjects in a mild, beneficent, and careful spirit, expatiates upon the popularity and warm affection which he will thereby attract to himself from them. Of this affection one manifestation will be (he says) as follows:—*ὥστε οὐ μόνον φιλοῖσι αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄρῳ, ὡς ἀνθρώπων· καὶ τοὺς καλοὺς οὐ περιφύει, ἀλλὰ περιφύμενον ὡς αὐτὸν ἀνέχουσθαι αὐτὸν σε δέοι, &c.*

These words illustrate the adventure described by Alkibiades in the Platonic Symposium.

Herakleides of Pontus, Dikmarchus, and the Peripatetic Hieronymus, all composed treatises *Περὶ Ἐρωτος*, especially *περὶ παιδικῶν ἐρωτῶν* (Athenæ. xiii. 602-603).

eccentric in manner, than potent, soul-subduing,¹ and provocative in its effects.

After the speech of Alkibiades is concluded, the close of the banquet is described by the primary narrator. He himself, with Agathon and Aristophanes, and several other fresh revellers, continue to drink wine until all of them become dead drunk. While Phædrus, Eryximachus, and others retire, Sokrates remains. His competency to bear the maximum of wine without being disturbed by it, is tested to the full. Although he had before, in acceptance of the challenge of Alkibiades, swallowed the contents of the wine cooler, he nevertheless continues all the night to drink wine in large bowls, along with the rest. All the while, however, he goes on debating his ordinary topics, even though no one is sufficiently sober to attend to him. His companions successively fall asleep, and at day-break, he finds himself the only person sober,² except Aristodemus (the narrator of the whole scene), who has recently waked after a long sleep. Sokrates quits the house of Agathon, with unclouded senses and undiminished activity—bathes—and then visits the

Drunkenness of others at the close of the Symposium—Sokrates is not affected by it, but continues his dialectic process.

¹ Plato, *Sympos.* pp. 221-222.

Alkibiades recites acts of distinguished courage performed by Sokrates, at the siege of Potidæa as well as at the battle of Delium.

About the potent effect produced by the conversation of Sokrates upon his companions, compare *Sympos.* p. 173 C-D.

In the Xenophontic *Apology* (s. 18), Sokrates adverts to the undisturbed equanimity which he had shown during the long blockade of Athens after the battle of Ægospotami, while others were bewailing the famine and other miseries.

² In *Sympos.* p. 176 B, Sokrates is recognised as *δυνατώτατος πίνειν*, above all the rest: no one can be compared with him. In the two first books of the *Treatise De Legibus*, we shall find much to illustrate what is here said (in the *Symposium*) about the power ascribed to him of drinking more wine than any one else, without being at all affected by it. Plato discusses the subject of strong potations (*μέθη*) at great length; indeed he seems to fear that his readers will think he says too much upon it (i. 642 A). He con-

siders it of great advantage to have a test to apply, such as wine, for the purpose of measuring the reason and self-command of different men, and of determining how much wine is sufficient to overthrow it, in each different case (i. 649 C-E). You can make this trial (he argues) in each case, without any danger or harm; and you can thus escape the necessity of making the trial in a real case of emergency. Plato insists upon the *χρεία τῆς μέθης*, as a genuine test, to be seriously employed for the purpose of testing men's reason and force of character (ii. p. 673). In the *Republic*, too (iii. p. 413 E), the *φύλακες* are required to be tested, in regard to their capacity of resisting pleasurable temptation, as well as pain and danger.

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gymnasium at the Lykeion ; where he passes all the day in his usual abundant colloquy.¹

The picture of Sokrates, in the Symposium, forms a natural contrast and complement to the picture of him in the Phædon ; though the conjecture of Schleiermacher²—that the two together are intended to make up the Philosophus, or third member of the trilogy promised in the Sophistês—is ingenious rather than convincing.

The Phædon depicts Sokrates in his last conversation with his friends, immediately before his death ; the Symposium presents him in the exuberance of life, health, and cheerfulness : in both situations, we find the same attributes manifested—perfect equanimity and self-command, proof against every variety of disturbing agency—whether tempting or terrible—absorbing interest in philosophical dialectic. The first of these two elements, if it stood alone, would be virtuous sobriety, yet not passing beyond the limit of mortal virtue : the last of the two superadds a higher element, which Plato conceives to transcend the limit of mortal virtue, and to depend upon divine inspiration or madness.³

The Symposium of Plato affords also an interesting subject of comparison with that of his contemporary Xenophon, as to points of agreement as well as of difference.⁴ Xenophon states in the beginning that he intends to describe what passed in a scene where he himself was

¹ Plato, Sympos. p. 223.

² Einleitung zum Gastmahl, p. 359 seq.

³ Plato, Phædrus, p. 256 C-E. *σωφροσύνη θνητῇ—ἔρωτικὴ μανία : σωφροσύνη ἀνθρώπων—θεία μανία*. Compare p. 244 B.

⁴ Pontianus, one of the speakers in Athenæus (xi. 504), touches upon some points of this comparison, with a view of illustrating the real or supposed enmity between Plato and Xenophon ; an enmity not in itself improbable, yet not sufficiently proved.

Athenæus had before him the Symposium of Epikurus (not preserved) as well as those of Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle (xv. 674) ; and we learn from him some of its distinctive points. Masurius (the speaker in Athenæus, v. init.) while he recognises in the

Symposia of Xenophon and Plato a dramatic variety of characters and smartness—finds fault with both, but especially with Plato, for levity, rudeness, indecency, vulgarity, sneering, &c. The talk was almost entirely upon love and joviality. In the Symposium of Epikurus, on the contrary, nothing was said about these topics ; the guests were fewer, the conversation was grave and dull, upon dry topics of science, such as the atomic theory (*προφῆτας ἀτόμων*, v. 3, 187 B, 177 B. *Ἐπικουρὸς δὲ συμπόσιον φιλοσόφων μόνον πεποιήσας*), and even upon bodily ailments, such as indigestion or fever (187 C). The philosophers present were made by Epikurus to carry on their debate in so friendly a spirit, that the critic calls them “ flatterers praising each other ” ; while he terms the

present; because he is of opinion that the proceedings of excellent men, in hours of amusement, are not less worthy of being recorded than those of their serious hours. Both Plato and Xenophon take for their main subject a festive banquet, destined to celebrate the success of a young man in a competitive struggle. In Plato, the success is one of mind and genius—Agathon has gained the prize of tragedy: in Xenophon, it is one of bodily force and skill—Autolykus victor in the pankration. The Symposium of Xenophon differs from that of Plato, in the same manner as the Memorabilia of Xenophon generally differ from the Sokratic dialogues of Plato—that is, by approaching much nearer to common life and reality. It describes a banquet such as was likely enough to take place, with the usual accompaniments—a professional jester, and a Syracusan ballet-master who brings with him a dancing-girl, a girl to play on the flute and harp, and a handsome youth. These artists contribute to the amusement of the company by music, dancing, throwing up balls and catching them again, jumping into and out of a circle of swords. All this would have occurred at an ordinary banquet: here, it is accompanied and followed by remarks of pleasantry, buffoonery and taunt, interchanged between the guests. Nearly all the guests take part, more or less: but Sokrates is made the prominent figure throughout. He repudiates the offer of scented unguents: but he recommends the drinking of wine, though moderately, and in small cups. The whole company are understood to be somewhat elevated with wine, but not one of them becomes intoxicated. Sokrates not only talks as much fun as the rest, but even sings, and speaks of learning to dance, jesting on his own corpulence.¹ Most part of the scene is broad farce, in the manner, though not with all the humour, of Aristophanes.²

Platonic guests "sneerers insulting each other" (*μυκτηριστῶν ἀλλήλους τωθάζοντων*, 182 A), though this is much more true about the Xenophontic Symposium than about the Platonic. He remarks farther that the Symposium of Epikurus included no libation or offering to the Gods (179 D).

It is curious to note these peculiarities in the compositions (now lost) of a philosopher like Epikurus, whom many historians of philosophy represent as

thinking about nothing but convivial and sexual pleasure.

¹ Xenophon, *Sympos.* vii. 1; ii. 18-19. *προγίστωρ*, &c.

² The taunt ascribed to the jester Philippus, about the cowardice of the demagogue Peisander, is completely Aristophanic, ii. 14; also that of Antisthenes respecting the bad temper of Xanthippé, ii. 10; and the caricature of the movements of the ἀρχιστρωγίτης by Philippus, ii. 21. Compare also iii. 11.

The number and variety of the persons present is considerable, greater than in most of the Aristophanic plays.¹ Kallias, Lykon, Autolykus, Sokrates, Antisthenes, Hermogenes, Nikeratus, Kritobulus, have each his own peculiarity: and a certain amount of vivacity and amusement arises from the way in which each of them is required, at the challenge of Sokrates, to declare on what it is that he most prides himself. Sokrates himself carries the burlesque farther than any of them; pretending to be equal in personal beauty to Kritobulus, and priding himself upon the function of a pander, which he professes to exercise. Antisthenes, however, is offended, when Sokrates fastens upon him a similar function: but the latter softens the meaning of the term so as to appease him. In general, each guest is made to take pride in something the direct reverse of that which really belongs to him; and to defend his thesis in a strain of humorous parody. Antisthenes, for example, boasts of his wealth. The Syracusan ballet-master is described as jealous of Sokrates, and as addressing to him some remarks of offensive rudeness; which Sokrates turns off, and even begins to sing, for the purpose of preventing confusion and ill-temper from spreading among the company:² while he at the same time gives prudent advice to the Syracusan about the exhibitions likely to be acceptable.

Though the Xenophontic Symposion is declared to be an alternat mixture of banter and seriousness,³ yet the only long serious argument or lecture delivered is that by Sokrates; in which he pronounces a professed panegyric upon Eros, but at the same time pointedly distinguishes the sentimental from the sensual. He denounces the latter, and confines his panegyric to the former—selecting Kallias and Autolykus as honourable examples of it.⁴

¹ Xen. Symp. c. 4-5.

² Xen. Symp. vi. *Αὐτὴ μὲν ἡ παρρησία οὕτω κατασβέσθῃ*, vii. 1-5.

Epiktétus insists upon this feature in the character of Sokrates—his patience and power of soothing angry men (ii. 12-14).

³ Xen. Symp. iv. 23. *ἀναμῖξ ἰσχυρὸν τε καὶ ἰσχυροῦσθαι*, viii. 41.

⁴ Xen. Symp. viii. 24. The argument against the sensual is enforced with so much warmth that Sokrates is made to advert to the fact of his being

elate with wine—*ὃ γε γὰρ οἶνος συνεπαίρει, καὶ ὃ ἀεὶ σύννοικος ἡμῶι ἔρως κεντρίγει εἰς τὸν ἀντίπαλον ἔρωτα αὐτοῦ παροργισέσθαι*.

The contrast between the customs of the Thebans and Eleians, and those of the Lacedæmonians, is again noted by Xenophon, Rep. Laced. ii. 13. Plato puts (Symp. 182) a like contrast into the mouth of Pausanias, assimilating the customs of Athens in this respect to those of Sparta. The comparison between Plato and Xenophon is here

The Xenophontic Symposium closes with a pantomimic scene of Dionysus and Ariadnē as lovers represented (at the instance of Sokrates) by the Syracusan ballet-master and his staff. This is described as an exciting spectacle to most of the hearers, married as well as unmarried, who retire with agreeable emotions. Sokrates himself departs with Lykon and Kallias, to be present at the exercise of Autolykus.¹

We see thus that the Platonic Symposium is much more ideal, and departs farther from common practice and sentiment, than the Xenophontic. It discards all the common accessories of a banquet (musical or dancing artists), and throws the guests altogether upon their own powers of rhetoric and dialectic, for amusement. If we go through the different encomiums upon Eros, by Phædrus, Pausanias, Eryximachus, Aristophanes, Agathon, Diotima—we shall appreciate the many-coloured forms and exuberance of the Platonic imagination, as compared with the more restricted range and common-place practical sense of Xenophon.² All the Platonic speakers are accomplished persons—a man of letters, a physician, two successful poets, a prophetess: the Xenophontic personages, except Sokrates and Antisthenes, are persons of ordinary capacity. The Platonic Symposium, after presenting Eros in five different points of view, gives pre-eminence and emphasis to a sixth, in which Eros is regarded as the privileged minister and conductor to the mysteries of philosophy, both the lowest and the highest: the Xenophontic Symposium dwells upon one view only of Eros (developed by Sokrates) and cites Kallias as example of it, making no mention of philosophy. The Platonic Symposium exalts Sokrates, as the representative of Eros Philosophus, to a pinnacle of elevation which places him above human fears and weaknesses³—coupled however with that

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phontic.

curious; we see how much more copious and inventive is the reasoning of Plato.

¹ Xen. Symp. viii. 5, ix. 7. The close of the Xenophontic Symposium is, to a great degree, in harmony with modern sentiment, though what is there expressed would probably be left to be understood. The Platonic Symposium departs altogether from that sentiment.

² The difference between the two coincides very much with that which is drawn by Plato himself in the Phædrus—θεία μανία as contrasted with σωφροσύνη θνητή (p. 256 E). Compare Athenæus, v. 187 B.

³ Plato, Phædrus, p. 249 D. νοουθεύεται μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ὡς παρὰ κινῶν, ἐνθουσιάζων δὲ ἀέληθε τοὺς πολλοὺς. . . . αἰτίαν ἔχει ὡς μαρτυρῶς διακειμενος.

eccentricity which makes the vulgar regard a philosopher as out of his mind : the Xenophontic Symposium presents him only as a cheerful, amiable companion, advising temperance, yet enjoying a convivial hour, and contributing more than any one else to the general hilarity.

Such are the points of comparison which present themselves between the same subject as handled by these two eminent contemporaries, both of them companions, and admirers of Sokrates : and each handling it in his own manner.¹

I have already stated that the first half of the Phædrus differs materially from the second ; and that its three discourses on the subject of Eros (the first two depreciating Eros, the third being an effusion of high-flown and poetical panegyric on the same theme) may be better understood by being looked at in conjunction with the Symposium. The second half of the Phædrus passes into a different discussion, criticising the discourse of Lysias as a rhetorical composition : examining the principles upon which the teaching of Rhetoric as an Art either

Second half of the Phædrus—passes into a debate on Rhetoric. Eros is considered as a subject for rhetorical exercise.

¹ Which of these two Symposia was latest in date of composition we cannot determine with certainty : though it seems certain that the latest of the two was not composed in imitation of the earliest.

From the allusion to the *δαικίσις* of Mantinea (p. 193 A) we know that the Platonic Symposium must have been composed after 385 B.C. : there is great probability also, though not full certainty, that it was composed during the time when Mantinea was still an aggregate of separate villages and not a town—that is, between 385-370 B.C., in which latter year Mantinea was re-established as a city. The Xenophontic Symposium affords no mark of date of composition : Xenophon reports it as having been himself present. It does indeed contain, in the speech delivered by Sokrates (viii. 32), an allusion to, and a criticism upon, an opinion supported by Pausanias δ' *Ἀγέλαρος τοῦ πολεμικοῦ ἱππάρχης*, who discourses in the Platonic Symposium : and several critics think that this is an allusion by Xenophon to the Platonic Symposium. I think this opinion improbable. It would require us to suppose that Xenophon is inaccurate, since

the opinion which he ascribes to Pausanias is not delivered by Pausanias in the Platonic Symposium, but by Phædrus. Athenæus (v. 216) remarks that the opinion is not delivered by Pausanias, but he does not mention that it is delivered by Phædrus. He remarks that there was no known written composition of Pausanias himself : and he seems to suppose that Xenophon must have alluded to the Platonic Symposium, but that he quoted it inaccurately or out of another version of it, different from what we now read. Athenæus wastes reasoning in proving that the conversation described in the Platonic Symposium cannot have really occurred at the time to which Plato assigns it. This is unimportant : the speeches are doubtless all composed by Plato. If Athenæus was anxious to prove anachronism against Plato, I am surprised that he did not notice that of the *δαικίσις* of Mantinea mentioned in a conversation supposed to have taken place in the presence of Sokrates, who died in 399 B.C.

I incline to believe that the allusion of Xenophon is not intended to apply to the Symposium of Plato. Xenophon ascribes one opinion to Pausanias,

is founded, or ought to be founded : and estimating the efficacy of written discourse generally, as a means of working upon or instructing other minds.

I heard one of our active political citizens (says Phædrus) severely denounce Lysias, and fasten upon him with contempt, many times over, the title of a logographer. Active politicians will not consent to compose and leave behind them written discourses, for fear of being called Sophists.¹ To write discourses (replies Sokrates) is noway discreditable: the real question is, whether he writes them well.² And the same question is the only one proper to be asked about other writers on all subjects—public or private, in prose or in verse. How to speak *well*, and how to write *well*—is the problem.³ Is there any art or systematic method, capable of being laid down beforehand and defended upon principle, for accomplishing the object *well*? Or does a man succeed only by unsystematic knack or practice, such as he can neither realise distinctly to his own consciousness, nor describe to others?

Lysias is called a logographer by active politicians. Contempt conveyed by the word. Sokrates declares that the only question is, Whether a man writes well or ill?

Plato ascribes another; this is noway inconceivable. I therefore remain in doubt whether the Xenophontic or the Platonic Symposium is earliest. Compare the Præf. of Schneider to the former, pp. 140-143.

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 257 C.

² Plato, Phædrus, pp. 257 E, 258 D.

The two appellations—λογγράφος and σοφιστής—are here coupled together as terms of reproach, just as they stand coupled in Demosthenes, Fals. Leg. p. 417. It is plain that both appellations acquired their discreditable import mainly from the collateral circumstance that the persons so denominated took money for their compositions or teaching. The λογγράφος wrote for pay, and on behalf of any client who could pay him. In the strict etymological sense, neither of the two terms would imply any reproach.

Yet Plato, in this dialogue, when he is discussing the worth of the reproachful imputation fastened on Lysias, takes the term λογγράφος only in this etymological, literal sense, omitting to notice the collateral association which

really gave point to it and made it serve the purpose of a hostile speaker. This is the more remarkable, because we find Plato multiplying opportunities, even on unsuitable occasions, of taunting the Sophists with the fact that they took money. Here in the Phædrus, we should have expected that if he noticed the imputation at all, he would notice it in the sense intended by the speaker. In this sense, indeed, it would not have suited the purpose of his argument, since he wishes to make it an introduction to a philosophical estimate of the value of writing as a means of instruction.

Heindorf observes, that Plato has used a similar liberty in comparing the λογγράφος to the proposer of a law or decree. "Igitur, quum solemnne legum initium ejusmodi esset, εδοξε τῇ βουλῇ, &c., Plato aliter longè quam vulgo acciperetur, neque sine calumniâ quâdam, interpretatus est" (ad p. 258).

³ Plato, Phædrus, p. 259 E. ὁπῶτε καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν τε καὶ γράφειν, καὶ ὁπῶτε μὴ, σκεπτόμενος.—p. 258 D. τίς ὁ τρόπος τοῦ καλῶς τε καὶ μὴ γράφειν.

First let us ask—When an orator addresses himself to a listening crowd upon the common themes—Good and Evil, Just and Unjust—is it necessary that he should know what is really and truly good and evil, just and unjust? Most rhetorical teachers affirm, that it is enough if he knows what the audience or the people generally believe to be so: and that to that standard he must accommodate himself, if he wishes to persuade.¹

Question about teaching the art of writing well or speaking well. Can it be taught upon system or principle? Or does the successful rhetor succeed only by unsystematic knack?

Theory of Sokrates—That all art of persuasion must be founded upon a knowledge of the truth, and of gradations of resemblance to the truth.

He may persuade the people under these circumstances (replies Sokrates), but if he does so, it will be to their misfortune and to his own. He ought to know the real truth—not merely what the public whom he addresses believe to be the truth—respecting just and unjust, good and evil, &c. There can be no genuine art of speaking, which is not founded upon knowledge of the truth, and upon adequate philosophical comprehension of the subject-matter.² The rhetorical teachers take too narrow a view of rhetoric, when they confine it to public harangues addressed to the assembly or to the Dikastery. Rhetoric embraces all guidance of the mind through words, whether in public harangue or private conversation, on matters important or trivial. Whether it be a controversy between two litigants in a Dikastery, causing the Dikasts to regard the same matters now as being just and good, presently as being unjust and evil: or between two dialecticians like Zeno, who could make his hearers view the same subjects as being both like and unlike—both one and many—both in motion and at rest: in either case the art (if there be any art) and its principles are the same. You ought to assimilate every thing to every thing, in all cases where assimilation is possible: if your adversary assimilates in like manner, concealing the process from his hearers, you must convict and expose his proceedings. Now the possibility or facility of deception in this way will depend upon the extent of likeness between things. If there be much real likeness, deception is easy, and one of them may easily be passed off as the other: if there be little likeness,

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 260 A.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 260-261.

deception will be difficult. An extensive acquaintance with the real resemblances of things, or in other words with truth, constitutes the necessary basis on which all oratorical art must proceed.¹

Sokrates then compares the oration of Lysias with his own two orations (the first depreciating, the second extolling, Eros) in the point of view of art ; to see how far they are artistically constructed. Among the matters of discourse, there are some on which all men are agreed, and on which therefore the speaker may assume established unanimity in his audience : there are others on which great dissension and discord prevail. Among the latter (the topics of dissension), questions about just and unjust, good and evil, stand foremost :² it is upon these that deception is most easy, and rhetorical skill most efficacious. Accordingly, an orator should begin by understanding to which of these two categories the topic which he handles belongs : If it belongs to the second category (those liable to dissension) he ought, at the outset, to define what he himself means by it, and what he intends the audience to understand. Now Eros is a topic on which great dissension prevails. It ought therefore to have been defined at the commencement of the discourse. This Sokrates in his discourse has done : but Lysias has omitted to do it, and has assumed Eros to be obviously and unanimously apprehended by every one. Besides, the successive points in the discourse of Lysias do not hang together by any thread of necessary connection, as they ought to do, if the discourse were put together according to rule.³

Farthermore, in the two discourses of Sokrates, not merely was the process of *logical definition* exemplified in the case of Eros—but also the process of *logical division*, in the case of Madness or Irrationality. This last extensive genus was divided first into two species—Madness, from human distemper—Madness, from divine inspiration, carrying a man out of the customary orthodoxy.⁴ Next, this last species was again divided into

Comparison made by Sokrates between the discourse of Lysias and his own. Eros is differently understood : Sokrates defined what he meant by it : Lysias did not define.

Logical processes—Definition and Division—both of them exemplified in the two discourses of Sokrates.

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 262.

² Plato, Phædrus, p. 263 B. Compare Plato, Alkibiad. i. p. 109.

³ Plato, Phædrus, pp. 263-265.

⁴ Plato, Phædrus, p. 265 A. ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰσότητων νομίων.

four branches or sub-species, according to the God from whom the inspiration proceeded, and according to the character of the inspiration—the prophetic, emanating from Apollo—the ritual or mystic, from Dionysus—the poetic, from the Muses—the amatory, from Eros and Aphroditê.¹ Now both these processes, *definition* and *division*, are familiar to the true dialectician or philosopher: but they are not less essential in rhetoric also, if the process is performed with genuine art. The speaker ought to embrace in his view many particular cases, to gather together what is common to all, and to combine them into one generic concept, which is to be embodied in words as the definition. He ought also to perform the counter-process: to divide the genus not into parts arbitrary and incoherent (like a bad cook cutting up an animal without regard to the joints) but into legitimate species;² each founded on some positive and assignable characteristic. “It is these divisions and combinations (says Sokrates) to which I am devotedly attached, in order that I may become competent for thought and discourse: and if there be any one else whom I consider capable of thus contemplating the One and the Many as they stand in nature—I follow in the footsteps of that man as in those of a God. I call such a man, rightly or wrongly, a Dialectician.”

This is Dialectic (replies Phædrus); but it is not Rhetoric, as Thrasymachus and other professors teach the art.

What else is there worth having (says Sokrates), which these professors teach? The order and distribution of a discourse: first, the exordium, then recital, proof, second proof, refutation, recapitulation at the close: advice how to introduce maxims or similes: receipts for moving the anger or compassion of the dikasts.

View of
Sokrates—
That there
is no real
Art of Rhetoric except
what is already com-

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 265.

² Plato, Phædrus, pp. 265-266. 265 D: εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνωρῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ διασπαρμέναν, ἵν' ἑκαστον ὀριζόμενος ἔσθλον ποιῇ περὶ οὗ ἂν αἰεὶ διδάσκειν ἐθέλῃ. 265 E: τὸ πάλιν κατ' εἶδη δύνασθαι τέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα, ἢ πέφυκε, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνῖναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγεῖρον τρόπον χρώμενον.

Seneca, Epist. 89, p. 395, ed. Gronov. “Faciam ergo quod exigis, et philosophiam in partes, non in frusta, dividam.

Dividi enim illam, non concidi, utile est.”

³ Plato, Phædrus, p. 266 B. Τούτων δὲ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵν' οἷός τε ᾧ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν· ἐάν τέ τιν' ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατόν εἰς ἐν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκὸς ὄρεσθαι, τούτων διώκω κατόπισθε μετ' ἱχνίον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ ὄρεσθαι εἰ μὲν ὁρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσπαρορούς, θεὸς οἶδε· καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικόν.

Such teaching doubtless enables a speaker to produce considerable effect upon popular assemblies :¹ but it is not the art of rhetoric. It is an assemblage of preliminary accomplishments, necessary before a man can acquire the art : but it is not the art itself. You must know when, how far, in what cases, and towards what persons, to employ these accomplishments :² otherwise you have not learnt the art of rhetoric. You may just as well consider yourself a physician because you know how to bring about vomit and purging—or a musician, because you know how to wind up or unwind the chords of your lyre. These teachers mistake the preliminaries or antecedents of the art, for the art itself. It is in the right, measured, seasonable, combination and application of these preliminaries, in different doses adapted to each special matter and audience—that the art of rhetoric consists. And this is precisely the thing which the teacher does not teach, but supposes the learner to acquire for himself.³

The true art of rhetoric (continues Sokrates) embraces a larger range than these teachers imagine. It deals with mind, as the medical researches of Hippokrates deal with body—as a generic total with all its species and varieties, and as essentially relative to the totality of external circumstances. First, Hippokrates investigates how far the body is, in every particular man, simple, homogeneous, uniform : and how far it is complex, heterogeneous, multiform, in the diversity of individuals. If it be one and the same, or in so far as it is one and the same, he examines what are its properties in relation to each particular substance acting upon it or acted upon by it. In so far as it is multiform and various, he examines and compares each of the different varieties, in the same manner, to ascertain its properties in relation to every substance.⁴ It is in this way that Hippo-

prised in
Dialectic—
The rhetorical
teaching is
empty and
useless.

What the
Art of Rhetoric
ought to be—
Analogy of
Hippokrates
and the
medical Art.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 267-268.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 268 B. *ἄρσθαι εἰ προσενίσταται καὶ οὐστίνας δεῖ καὶ ὅποτε ἕκαστα τούτων ποιεῖν, καὶ μέχρι ὅπου;*

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 269.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 270 D. **Ἄρ' οὐχ ἔδε δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι περὶ ὅπου οὐν φύσεως. Πρῶτον μὲν, ἀπλοῦν ἢ πολυει-*

δές ἐστιν, οὐ περὶ βουλήσμεθα εἶναι αὐτοὶ τεχνικοί καὶ ἄλλων δυνατοὶ ποιεῖν; ἔπειτα δέ, εἰ μὲν ἀπλοῦν ἢ, σκοπεῖν τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ, τίνα πρὸς τί πέφυκεν εἰς τὸ δρᾶν ἔχον ἢ τίνα εἰς τὸ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ; εἰ δὲ πλείω εὐθὺ ἐχῇ, ταῦτα ἀριθμώμενος, ὅπερ ἐφ' ἐνός, τοῦτ' ἴδεν ἐφ' ἑκάστου, τῷ τί ποιεῖν αὐτὸ πέφυκεν ἢ τῷ τί παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ;

krates discovers the nature or essence of the human body, distinguishing its varieties, and bringing the medical art to bear upon each, according to its different properties. This is the only scientific or artistic way of proceeding.

Art of Rhetoric ought to include a systematic classification of minds with all their varieties, and of discourses with all their varieties. The Rhetor must know how to apply the one to the other, suitably to each particular case.

Now the true rhetor ought to deal with the human mind in like manner. His task is to work persuasion in the minds of certain men by means of discourse. He has therefore, first, to ascertain how far all mind is one and the same, and what are the affections belonging to it universally in relation to other things: next, to distinguish the different varieties of minds, together with the properties, susceptibilities, and active aptitudes, of each: carrying the subdivision down until he comes to a variety no longer admitting division.¹ He must then proceed to distinguish the different varieties of discourse, noting the effects which each is calculated to produce or to hinder, and the different ways in which it is likely to impress different minds.² Such and such men are persuadable by such and such discourses—or the contrary. Having framed these two general classifications, the rhetor must on each particular occasion acquire a rapid tact in discerning to which class of minds the persons whom he is about to address belong: and therefore what class of discourses will be likely to operate on them persuasively.³ He must farther know those subordinate artifices of speech on which the professors insist; and he must also be aware of the proper season and limit within which each can be safely employed.⁴

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 B. ὁρισμένους τε πάλιν κατ' εἶδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀτμήτου τέμνουν ἐπιστηθῆ.

² Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 A. Πρῶτον, πάσῃ ἀκριβεῖα γράψει τε καὶ ποιήσει ψυχὴν ἰδεῖν, πότερον ἐν καὶ ὁμοίον πέφυκεν ἢ κατὰ σώματος μορφὴν πολυειδές· τοῦτο γὰρ φάμεν φύσιν εἶναι δεικνύσαι. Δεύτερον δὲ γε, ὅτε τί ποιεῖν ἢ παθεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ πέφυκεν.

Τρίτον δὲ διὰ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γίνῃ καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, δίδου· τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἑκάστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὕσα ὑφ' οἷων λόγων δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὴν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεῖ.

³ Plato, Phædrus, p. 271 D. δεῖ μὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεωμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα τε καὶ πραττόμενα, ὁξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, &c.

⁴ Plato, Phædrus, p. 272 A. ταῦτα δὲ ᾗδῃ πάντ' ἔχοντι, προσλαβόντι καιροῦς τοῦ πότε λεκτέον καὶ ἐπισχετέον, βραχυλογίας τε καὶ ἀκρολογίας καὶ διεισώσεως, ἐκείτων τε ὅσ' ἂν εἶδη μάθῃ λόγων, τούτων τῇ ἐν καιρίᾳ τε καὶ ἀκαιρίᾳ διαγνόντι, καλῶς τε καὶ τελῶς ἔστιν ἢ τέχνη ἀπειραγμένη, πρότερον δ' οὐ.

Nothing less than this assemblage of acquirements (says Sokrates) will suffice to constitute a real artist, either in speaking or writing. Arduous and fatiguing indeed the acquisition is : but there is no easier road. And those who tell us that the rhetor need not know what is really true, but only what his audience will believe to be true—must be reminded that this belief, on the part of the audience, arises from the likeness of that which they believe, to the real truth. Accordingly, he who knows the real truth will be cleverest in suggesting apparent or quasi-truth adapted to their feelings. If a man is bent on becoming an artist in rhetoric, he must go through the process here marked out : yet undoubtedly the process is so laborious, that rhetoric, when he has acquired it, is no adequate reward. We ought to learn how to speak and act in a way agreeable to the Gods, and this is worth all the trouble necessary for acquiring it. But the power of speaking agreeably and effectively to men, is not of sufficient moment to justify the expenditure of so much time and labour.¹

We have now determined what goes to constitute genuine art, in speaking or in writing. But how far is writing, even when art is applied to it, capable of producing real and permanent effect? or indeed of having art applied to it at all? Sokrates answers himself—Only to a small degree. Writing will impart amusement and satisfaction for the moment : it will remind the reader of something which he knew before, if he really did know. But in respect to any thing which he did not know before, it will neither teach nor persuade him : it may produce in him an impression or fancy that he is wiser than he was before, but such impression is illusory, and at best only transient. Writing is like painting—one and the same to all readers, whether young or old, well or ill informed. It cannot adapt itself to the different state of mind of different persons, as we have declared that every finished speaker ought to do. It cannot answer questions, supply deficiencies, reply to objections, rectify misunderstanding. It is

The Rhetorical Artist must farther become possessed of real truth, as well as that which his auditors believe to be truth. He is not sufficiently rewarded for this labour.

Question about Writing—As an Art, for the purpose of instruction, it can do little—Reasons why.—Writing may remind the reader of what he already knows.

defenceless against all assailants. It supersedes and enfeebles the memory, implanting only a false persuasion of knowledge without the reality.¹

Any writer therefore, in prose or verse—Homer, Solon, or Lysias—who imagines that he can by a ready-made composition, however carefully turned,² *if simply heard or read without cross-examination or oral comment*, produce any serious and permanent effect in persuading or teaching, beyond a temporary gratification—falls into a disgraceful error. If he intends to accomplish any thing serious, he must be competent to originate spoken discourse more effective than the written. The written word is but a mere phantom or ghost of the spoken word : which latter is the only legitimate offspring of the teacher, springing fresh and living out of his mind, and engraving itself profoundly on the mind of the hearer.³ The speaker must know, with discriminative comprehension, and in logical subdivision, both the matter on which he discourses, and the minds of the particular hearers to whom he addresses himself. He will thus be able to adapt the order, the distribution, the manner of presenting his subject, to the apprehension of the particular hearers and the exigencies of the particular moment. He will submit to cross-examination,⁴ remove difficulties, and furnish all additional explanations which the case requires. By this process he will not indeed produce that immediate, though flashy and evanescent, impression of suddenly acquired knowledge, which arises from the perusal of what is written. He will sow seed which for a long time appears buried under ground ; but which, after such interval, springs up and ripens into complete

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 D-E. τῶν δὲ καὶ οἱ λόγοι (οἱ γεγραμμένοι)· δόξαι μὲν ἂν ὥς τι φρονούντας αὐτοὺς λέγειν, ἐὰν δέ τι ἔρη τῶν λεγομένων βουλούμενος μαθεῖν, ἐν τῇ σημαίνει μόνον ταῦτόν αὐτί. Ὅταν δὲ ἀπαξ γραφῇ, κυλινδεῖται μὲν πανταχοῦ πᾶς λόγος ὁμοίως παρὰ τοῖς ἰταλοῦσιν, ὥς δ' αὖτως παρ' οἷς οὐδὲν προσήκει, καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστάται λέγειν οἷς δεῖ γὰρ καὶ μὴ.

² Plato, Phædrus, pp. 277-278. ὥς οἱ βαυβελούμενοι (λόγοι) ἂν ἐν ἀνακρίσει καὶ διδασκῇ πειθεὶς ἐνέκα ἐλέγχθωσαν, &c.

³ Plato, Phædrus, p. 276 A. ἄλλον ὄραμεν λόγον τούτου ἀδελφὸν γνήσιον

τῷ τρόπῳ τε γίγνεται, καὶ ὅση ἐμείνων καὶ δυνατώτερος τούτου φύεται ; . . .

⁴ Ὃς μετ' ἐπιστήμης γράφεται ἐν τῇ τοῦ μαρβάνοντος ψυχῇ, δυνατὸς μὲν αἰνῶναι ἑαυτῷ, ἐπιστήμων δὲ λέγειν τε καὶ σιγῇ πρὸς οὓς δεῖ. Τὸν τοῦ εἰδότες λόγον λέγεις ζῶντα καὶ ἐμψυχον, ὃς ἔ γεγραμμένος εἰδὼλον ἂν τι λέγοιτο δικαίως, &c. 278 A.

⁴ Plato, Phædrus, p. 278 C. εἰ μὲν εἰδὼς ἢ τάλῃθις ἔχει συνόψιν ταῦτα (τὰ συγγράμματα) καὶ ἔχων βοηθεῖν, εἰς ἐλεγχον ἰὼν περὶ ἂν ἔγραψε, καὶ λόγον αὐτὸς δυνατὸς τὰ γεγραμμένα φάσθαι ἀποδείξαι &c.

and lasting fruit.¹ By repeated dialectic debate, he will both familiarise to his own mind and propagate in his fellow-dialogists, full knowledge ; together with all the manifold reasonings bearing on the subject, and with the power also of turning it on many different sides, of repelling objections and clearing up obscurities. It is not from writing, but from dialectic debate, artistically diversified and adequately prolonged, that full and deep teaching proceeds ; prolific in its own nature, communicable indefinitely from every new disciple to others, and forming a source of intelligence and happiness to all.²

This blending of philosophy with rhetoric, which pervades the criticisms on Lysias in the *Phædrus*, is farther illustrated by the praise bestowed upon Isokrates in contrast with Lysias. Isokrates occupied that which Plato in *Euthydémus* calls "the border country between philosophy and politics". Many critics declare (and I think with probable reason³) that Isokrates is the person intended (without being named) in the passage just cited from the *Euthydémus*. In the *Phædrus*, Isokrates is described as the intimate friend of Sokrates, still young ; and is pronounced already superior in every way to Lysias—likely to become superior in future to all the rhetors that have ever flourished—and destined probably to arrive even at the divine mysteries of philosophy.⁴

When we consider that the *Phædrus* was pretty sure to bring upon Plato a good deal of enmity—since it attacked, by name, both Lysias, a resident at Athens of great influence and ability, and several other contemporary rhetors more or less celebrated—we can understand how Plato became disposed to lighten this amount of enmity by a compliment paid to Isokrates. This latter rhetor, a few years older than Plato, was the son of opulent parents at Athens, and received a good education ; but when his family became impoverished by the disasters at the close of the Peloponnesian war, he established himself as a teacher of rhetoric at Chios : after some time, however, he returned to Athens, and followed the same profession there. He engaged himself also, like Lysias, in composing discourses for pleaders before the

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 276 A.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 276-277.

³ See above, vol. ii. ch. xxi. p. 227.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 279 A.

dikastery¹ and for speakers in the assembly; by which practice he acquired both fortune and reputation. Later in life, he relinquished these harangues destined for real persons on real occasions, and confined himself to the composition of discourses (intended, not for contentious debate, but for the pleasure and instruction of hearers) on general questions—social, political, and philosophical: at the same time receiving numerous pupils from different cities of Greece. Through such change, he came into a sort of middle position between the rhetoric of Lysias and the dialectic of Plato: insomuch that the latter, at the time when he composed the *Phædrus*, had satisfaction in contrasting him favourably with Lysias, and in prophesying that he would make yet greater progress towards philosophy. But at the time when Plato composed the *Euthydēmus*, his feeling was different.² In the *Phædrus*, Isocrates is compared with Lysias and other rhetors, and in that comparison Plato presents him as greatly superior: in the *Euthydēmus*, he is compared with philosophers as well as with rhetors, and is even announced as disparaging philosophy generally: Plato then declares him to be a presumptuous half-bred, and extols against him even the very philosopher whom he himself had just been caricaturing. To apply a Platonic simile, the most beautiful ape is ugly compared with man—the most beautiful man is an ape compared with the Gods:³ the same intermediate position between rhetoric and philosophy is assigned by Plato to Isocrates.

From the pen of Isocrates also, we find various passages apparently directed against the *viri Socratici* including Plato

¹ Dion. Hal. *De Isocrate Judicium*, p. 576. *δεσμός πάντων πολλὰς δικαστικῶν λόγων περιφέρεισθαι φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν βιβλιοπωλῶν Ἀριστοτέλης, &c.*

Plutarch, *Vit. x. Oratt.* pp. 837-838.

The Athenian Polykrates had been forced, by loss of property, to quit Athens and undertake the work of a Sophist in Cyprus. Isocrates expresses much sympathy for him: it was a misfortune like what had happened to himself (*Orat. xi. Basilis 1*). Compare *De Permutation. Or. xv. s. 172*.

The assertion made by Isocrates—that he did not compose political and judicial orations, to be spoken by individuals for real causes and public discussions—may be true compara-

tively, and with reference to a certain period of his life. But it is only to be received subject to much reserve and qualification. Even out of the twenty-one orations of Isocrates which we possess, the last five are composed to be spoken by pleaders before the dikastery. They are such discourses as the logographers, Lysias among the rest, were called upon to furnish, and paid for furnishing.

² Plato, *Euthydēm.* p. 306. I am inclined to agree with Ueberweg in thinking that the *Euthydēmus* is later than the *Phædrus*. Ueberweg, *Aechtheit der Platon. Schriften*, pp. 256-259-265.

³ Plato, *Hipp. Major*, p. 239.

(though without his name): depreciating,¹ as idle and worthless, new political theories, analytical discussions on the principles of ethics, and dialectic subtleties: maintaining that the word philosophy was erroneously interpreted and defined by many contemporaries, in a sense too much withdrawn from practical results: and affirming that his own teaching was calculated to impart genuine philosophy. During the last half of Plato's life, his school and that of Isokrates were the most celebrated among all that existed at Athens. There was competition between them, gradually kindling into rivalry. Such rivalry became vehement during the last ten years of Plato's life, when his scholar Aristotle, then an aspiring young man of twenty-five, proclaimed a very contemptuous opinion of Isokrates, and commenced a new school of rhetoric in opposition to him.² Kephisodôrus, a pupil of Isokrates, retaliated; publishing against Aristotle, as well as against Plato, an acrimonious work which was still read some centuries afterwards. Theopompus, another eminent pupil of Isokrates, commented unfavourably upon Plato in his writings: and other writers who did the same may probably have belonged to the Isokratean school.³

This is the true philosopher (continues Sokrates)—the man who alone is competent to teach truth about the just, good,

¹ Isokrates, *Orat.* x. 1 (Hel. Enc.); *Orat.* v. (Philipp.) 12; *Or.* xiii. (Sophist.) 9-24; *Orat.* xv. (Permut.) sect. 285-290. φιλοσοφίαν μὲν οὖν οὐκ οἶμαι δεῖν προσαγορεύειν τὴν μὴδὲν ἐν τῷ παρόντι μῆτε πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μῆτε πρὸς τὸ πράττειν ὠφελοῦσαν—τὴν καλουμένην ὑπὸ τινων φιλοσοφίαν οὐκ εἶναι φημί, &c.

² Cicero, *De Oratore*, iii. 35, 141; *Orator*, 19, 62; Numenius, ap. Euseb. *Præp. Evang.* xiv. 6, 9. See Stahr, *Aristotelia*, i. p. 63 seq., ii. p. 44 seq.

Schroeder's *Questiones Isocratæ* (Utrecht, 1859), and Spengel's work, *Isokrates und Plato*, are instructive in regard to these two contemporary luminaries of the intellectual world at Athens. But, unfortunately, we can make out few ascertainable facts. When I read the *Oration De Permut.*, *Or.* xv. (composed by Isokrates about fifteen years before his own death, and about five years before the death of Plato, near 353 B.C.), I am impressed with the belief that many of his com-

plaints about unfriendly and bitter criticism refer to the Platonic School of that day, Aristotle being one of its members. See sections 48-90-276, and seq. He certainly means the Sokratic men, and Plato as the most celebrated of them, when he talks of οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ ἀποκρίσεις, οὓς ἀντιλογικοὺς καλοῦσιν—οἱ περὶ τὰς ἐρίδας σπουδάζοντες—those who are powerful in contentious dialectic, and at the same time cultivate geometry and astronomy, which others call ἀδολεσχία and μικρολογία (280)—those who exhorted hearers to virtue about which others knew nothing, and about which they themselves were in dispute. When he complains of the περιτρολογία of the ancient Sophists, Empedokles, Ion, Parmenides, Melissus, &c., we cannot but suppose that he had in his mind the *Timæus* of Plato also, though he avoids mention of the name.

³ *Athenæus*, iii. p. 122, ii. 60; *Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pomp.* p. 757.

The Dialectician and Cross-Examiner is the only man who can really teach. If the writer can do this, he is more than a writer. and honourable.' He who merely writes, must not delude himself with the belief that upon these important topics his composition can impart any clear or lasting instruction. To mistake fancy for reality hereupon, is equally disgraceful, whether the mistake be made by few or by many persons. If indeed the writer can explain to others orally the matters written—if he can answer all questions, solve difficulties, and supply the deficiencies, of each several reader—in that case he is something far more and better than a writer, and ought to be called a philosopher. But if he can do no more than write, he is no philosopher: he is only a poet, or nomographer, or logographer.²

In this latter class stands Lysias. I expect (concludes Sokrates) something better from Isokrates, who gives promise of aspiring one day to genuine philosophy.³

Lysias is only a logographer: Isokrates promises to become a philosopher.

Date of the Phædrus—not an early dialogue.

I have already observed that I dissent from the hypothesis of Schleiermacher, Ast, and others, who regard the Phædrus either as positively the earliest, or at least among the earliest, of the Platonic dialogues, composed several years before the death of Sokrates. I agree with Hermann, Stallbaum, and those other critics, who refer it to a much later period of Plato's life: though I see no sufficient evidence to determine more exactly either its date or its place in the chronological series of dialogues. The views opened in the second half of the dialogue, on the theory of rhetoric and on the efficacy of written compositions as a means of instruction, are very interesting and remarkable.

The written discourse of Lysias (presented to us as one greatly admired at the time by his friends, Phædrus among them) is contrasted first with a pleading on the same subject (though not directed towards the attainment of the same end) by Sokrates (supposed to be impro-

Criticism given by Plato on the three discourses—His theory

¹ Plato, Phædrus, p. 277 D-E.

² Plato, Phædrus, pp. 278-279.

³ Respecting the manner in which

Plato speaks of Isokrates in the Phædrus, see what I have already observed upon the Euthydæmus, vol. ii. ch. xxi. pp. 227-229.

vised on the occasion); next with a second pleading of Sokrates directly opposed to the former, and intended as a recantation. These three discourses are criticised from the rhetorical point of view,¹ and are made the handle for introducing to us a theory of rhetoric. The second discourse of Sokrates, far from being Sokratic in tenor, is the most exuberant effusion of mingled philosophy, poetry, and mystic theology, that ever emanated from Plato.

of Rhetoric is more Platonic than Sokratic.

The theory of rhetoric too is far more Platonic than Sokratic. The peculiar vein of Sokrates is that of confessed ignorance, ardour in enquiry, and testing cross-examination of all who answer his questions. But in the *Phædrus* we find Plato (under the name of Sokrates) assuming, as the basis of his theory, that an expositor shall be found who *knows* what is really and truly just and unjust, good and evil, honourable and dishonourable—distinct from, and independent of, the established beliefs on these subjects, traditional among his neighbours and fellow-citizens:² assuming (to express the same thing in other words) that all the doubts and difficulties, suggested by the Sokratic cross-examination, have been already considered, elucidated, and removed.

His theory postulates, in the Rhetor, knowledge already assured—it assumes that all the doubts have been already removed.

The expositor, master of such perfect knowledge, must farther be master (so Plato tells us) of the arts of logical definition and division: that is, he must be able to gather up many separate fragmentary particulars into one general notion, clearly identified and embodied in a definition: and he must be farther able to subdivide such a general notion into its constituent specific notions, each marked by some distinct characteristic feature.³ This is the only way to follow out truth in a manner clear and consistent with itself: and truth is equally honourable in matters small or great.⁴

The Expositor, with knowledge and logical process, teaches minds unoccupied and willing to learn.

Thus far we are in dialectic: logical exposition proceeding by

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 235 A.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 259 E, 260 E, 262 E.

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 266.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 261 A.

That truth upon matters small and

contemptible deserves to be sought out and proved as much as upon matters great and sublime, is a doctrine affirmed in the *Sophistæ*, *Politikus*, *Parmenidæ*: *Sophist.* pp. 218 E, 227 A; *Politik.* 266 D; *Parmenid.* 130 E.

way of classifying and declassifying: in which it is assumed that the expositor will find minds unoccupied and unprejudiced, ready to welcome the truth when he lays it before them. But there are many topics on which men's minds are, in the common and natural course of things, both pre-occupied and dissentient with each other. This is especially the case with Justice, Goodness, the Honourable, &c.¹ It is one of the first requisites for the expositor to be able to discriminate this class of topics, where error and discordance grow up naturally among those whom he addresses. It is here that men are liable to be deceived, and require to be undeceived—contradict each other, and argue on opposite sides: such disputes belong to the province of Rhetoric.

The Rhetor is one who does not teach (according to the logical process previously described), but persuades; guiding the mind by discourse to or from various opinions or sentiments.² Now if this is to be done *by art* and methodically—that is, upon principle or system explicable and defensible—it pre-supposes (according to Plato) a knowledge of truth, and can only be performed by the logical expositor. For when men are deceived, it is only because they mistake what is like truth for truth itself: when they are undeceived, it is because they are made to perceive that what they believe to be truth is only an apparent likeness thereof. Such resemblances are strong or faint, differing by many gradations. Now no one can detect, or bring into account, or compare, these shades of resemblance, except he who knows the truth to which they all ultimately refer. It is through the slight differences that deception is operated. To deceive a man, you must carry him gradually away from the truth by transitional stages, each resembling that which immediately precedes, though the last in the series will hardly at all resemble the first: to undeceive him (or to avoid being deceived yourself), you must conduct him back by the counter-process from error to truth, by a series of transitional resemblances tending in that direction. You cannot do this like an artist (on system and by pre-determination), unless you know

The Rhetor does not teach, but persuades persons with minds pre-occupied—guiding them methodically from error to truth.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 263 A.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 261 A. ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη ψυχαγωγία τις διὰ λόγων, &c.

what the truth is.¹ By any one who does not know, the process will be performed without art, or at haphazard.

The Rhetor—being assumed as already knowing the truth—if he wishes to make persuasion an art, must proceed in the following manner:—He must distribute the multiplicity of individual minds into distinct classes, each marked by its characteristic features of differences, emotional and intellectual. He must also distribute the manifold modes of discourse into distinct classes, each marked in like manner. Each of these modes of discourse is well adapted to persuade some classes of mind—badly adapted to persuade other classes: for such adaptation or non-adaptation there exists a rational necessity,² which the Rhetor must examine and ascertain, informing himself which modes of discourse are adapted to each different class of mind. Having mastered this general question, he must, whenever he is about to speak, be able to distinguish, by rapid perception,³ to which class of minds the hearer or hearers whom he is addressing belong: and accordingly, which mode of discourse is adapted to their particular case. Moreover, he must also seize, in the case before him, the seasonable moment and the appropriate limit, for the use of each mode of discourse. Unless the Rhetor is capable of fulfilling all these exigencies, without failing in any one point, his Rhetoric is not entitled to be called an Art. He requires, in order to be an artist in persuading the mind, as great an assemblage of varied capacities as Hippokrates declares to be necessary for a physician, the artist for curing or preserving the body.⁴

He must then classify the minds to be persuaded, and the means of persuasion or varieties of discourse. He must know how to fit on the one to the other in each particular case.

The total, thus summed up by Plato, of what is necessary to constitute an Art of Rhetoric, is striking and comprehensive. It is indeed an *ideal*, but merely unattainable by reason of its magnitude, but also including

Plato's *ideal* of the Rhetorical Art—in-

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 262 A-D, 273 D.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 270 E, 271 A-D. Τρίτον δὲ δὴ διαταξάμενος τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη, καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, δίδωσι τὰς αἰτίας, προσαρμόττων ἕκαστον ἑκάστῳ, καὶ διδάσκων οἷα οὕσα ὑφ' οἷων λόγων δέῃ ἢν αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ μὲν πείθεται, ἢ δὲ ἀπειθεί.

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 271 D-E. δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὅσα τε καὶ παρτόμενα, ὅξέως τῇ αἰσθησει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν, ἢ μὴδε εἰδέναι πῶς πλεόν αὐτῶν ὧν τότε ἤκουε λόγων ξυνών.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 270 C.

volves in
part incom-
patible con-
ditions—
the Wise
man or
philosopher
will never
be listened
to by the
public.

impracticable conditions. He begins by postulating a perfectly wise man, who knows all truth on the most important social subjects; on which his countrymen hold erroneous beliefs, just as sincerely as *he* holds his true beliefs. But Plato has already told us, in the *Gorgias*, that such a person will not be listened to: that in order to address auditors with effect, the rhetor must be in genuine harmony of belief and character with them, not dissenting from them either for the better or the worse: nay, that the true philosopher (so we read in one of the most impressive portions of the *Republic*) not only has no chance of guiding the public mind, but incurs public obloquy, and may think himself fortunate if he escapes persecution.¹ The dissenter will never be allowed to be the guide of a body of orthodox believers; and is even likely enough, unless he be prudent, to become their victim. He may be permitted to lecture or discuss, in the gardens of the Academy, with a few chosen friends, and to write eloquent dialogues: but if he embodies his views in motions before the public assembly, he will find only strenuous opposition, or something worse. This view, which is powerfully set forth by Sokrates both in the *Gorgias* and *Republic*, is founded on a just appreciation of human societies: and it is moreover the basis of the Sokratic procedure—That the first step to be taken is to disabuse men's minds of their false persuasion of knowledge—to make them conscious of ignorance—and thus to open their minds for the reception of truth. But if this be the fact, we must set aside as impracticable the postulate advanced by Sokrates here in the *Phædrus*—of a perfectly wise man as the employer of rhetorical artifices. Moreover I do not agree with what Sokrates is here made to lay down as the philosophy of Error:—that it derives its power of misleading from resemblance to truth. This is the case to a certain extent: but it is very incomplete as an account of the generating causes of error.

But the other portion of Plato's sum total of what is necessary to an Art of Rhetoric, is not open to the same objection. It involves no incompatible conditions: and we can say nothing against it, except that it requires

The other
part of the
Platonic
ideal is

¹ Plato, *Gorg.* p. 513 B, see *supra*, ch. xxiv.; *Republic*, vi. pp. 495-496.

a breadth and logical command of scientific data, far greater than there is the smallest chance of attaining. That Art is an assemblage of processes, directed to a definite end, and prescribed by rules which themselves rest upon scientific data—we find first announced in the works of Plato.¹ A vast amount of scientific research, both inductive and deductive, is here assumed as an indispensable foundation—and even as a portion—of what he calls the Art of Rhetoric: first, a science of psychology, complete both in its principles and details: next, an exhaustive catalogue and classification of the various modes of operative speech, with their respective impression upon each different class of minds. So prodigious a measure of scientific requirement has never yet been filled up: of course, therefore, no one has ever put together a body of precepts commensurate with it. Aristotle, following partially the large conceptions of his master, has given a comprehensive view of many among the theoretical postulates of Rhetoric; and has partially enumerated the varieties both of persuasive auditors, and of persuasive means available to the speaker for guiding them. Cicero, Dionysius of Halikarnassus, Quintilian, have furnished valuable contributions towards this last category of data, but not much towards the first: being all of them defective in breadth of psychological theory. Nor has

grand but
unattainable
—breadth of
psychological
data and
classified
modes of
discourse.

¹ I repeat the citation from the *Phædrus*, one of the most striking passages in Plato, p. 271 D.

ἔπειδὴ λόγου δύναμις τυγχάνει ψυχῶν οὐσα, τὸν μέλλοντα ῥητορικὸν ἔσσεσθαι ἀνάγκη εἶδέναι ψυχῇ ὅσα εἶδη ἔχει. ἔστιν οὖν τόσα καὶ τόσα, καὶ τοια καὶ τοια· ὅθεν οἱ μὲν τοιοῦδε, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦδε γίνονται. τούτων δὲ δὴ διηρημένων, λόγων αὖ τόσα καὶ τόσα ἔστιν εἶδη, τοιῶνδε ἕκαστον. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦδε ἐπὶ τὸν τοιῶνδε λόγον διὰ τήνδε τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπὶ τὰ τοιῶδε εὐπειθεῖς, οἱ δὲ τοιοῦδε διὰ τὰδε δυσπειθεῖς, &c. Comp. p. 261 A.

The relation of Art to Science is thus perspicuously stated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the concluding chapter of his *System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive* (Book vi. ch. xii. § 2):

"The relation in which rules of Art stand to doctrines of Science may be thus characterised. The Art proposes to itself an end to be attained, defines the end, and hands it over to the

Science. The Science receives it, considers it as a phenomenon or effect to be studied, and having investigated its causes and conditions, sends it back to Art with a theorem of the combinations of circumstances by which it could be produced. Art then examines these combinations of circumstances, and according as any of them are or are not in human power, pronounces the end attainable or not. The only one of the premisses, therefore, which Art supplies, is the original major premiss, which asserts that the attainment of the given end is desirable. Science then lends to Art the proposition (obtained by a series of inductions or of deductions) that the performance of certain actions will attain the end. From these premisses Art concludes that the performance of these actions is desirable; and finding it also practicable, converts the theorem into a rule or precept."

Plato himself done anything to work out his conception in detail or to provide suitable rules for it. We read it only as an impressive sketch—a grand but unattainable *idéal*—"qualem nequeo monstrare et sentio tantum".

Indeed it seems that Plato himself regarded it as unattainable—and as only worth aiming at for the purpose of pleasing the Gods, not with any view to practical benefit, arising from either speech or action among mankind.¹ This is a point to be considered, when we compare his views on Rhetoric with those of Lysias and the other rhetors, whom he here judges unfavourably and even contemptuously. The work of speech and action among mankind, which Plato sets aside as unworthy of attention, was the express object of solicitude to Lysias, Isokrates, and rhetors generally: that which they practised efficaciously themselves, and which they desired to assist, cultivate, and improve in others: that which Perikles, in his funeral oration preserved by Thucydides, represents as the pride of the Athenian people collectively²—combination of full freedom of preliminary contentious debate, with energy in executing the resolution which might be ultimately adopted. These rhetors, by the example of their composed speeches as well as by their teaching, did much to impart to young men the power of expressing themselves with fluency and effect before auditors, either in the assembly or in the dikastery: as Sokrates here fully admits.³ Towards this purpose it was useful to analyse the constituent parts of a discourse, and to give an appropriate name to each part. Accordingly, all the rhetorical teachers (Quintilian included) continued such analysis, though differing more or less in their way of performing it, until the extinction of Pagan civilisation. Young men were taught to learn by heart regular discourses,⁴—to compose the like for themselves—to understand the difference between such as were well or ill composed—and to acquire a command of oratorical means for moving or convincing the hearer. All this instruction had a practical value:

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 273-274. ἢν οὐχ ἕνεκα τοῦ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν πρὸς ἀνθρώπους δεῖ διαπονέσθαι τὸν σὺφφωνα, ἀλλὰ τοῦ θεοῖς κεχαρισμένα μὲν λέγειν δύνασθαι, &c. (273 E).

² Thucyd. ii. 39-40-41.

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 268 A.

⁴ See what is said by Aristotle about ἡ Γοργίου πραγματεία in the last chapter of *De Sophisticis Elenchiis*.

though Plato, both here and elsewhere, treats it as worthless. A citizen who stood mute and embarrassed, unable to argue a case with some propriety before an audience, felt himself helpless and defective in one of the characteristic privileges of a Greek and a freeman: while one who could perform the process well, acquired much esteem and influence.¹ The Platonic Sokrates in the *Gorgias* consoles the speechless men by saying—What does this signify, provided you are just and virtuous? Such consolation failed to satisfy: as it would fail to satisfy the sick, the lame, or the blind.

The teaching of these rhetors thus contributed to the security, dignity, and usefulness of the citizens, by arming them for public speech and action. But it was essentially practical, or empirical: it had little system, and was founded upon a narrow theory. Upon these points Plato in the *Phædrus* attacks them. He sets little value upon the accomplishments arming men for speech and action (*λεκτικούς καὶ πρακτικούς εἶναι*)—and he will not allow such teaching to be called an Art. He explains, in opposition to them, what he himself conceived the Art of Rhetoric to be, in the comprehensive way which I have above described.

The Rhetorical teachers conceived the Art too narrowly: Plato conceived it too widely. The principles of an Art are not required to be explained to all learners.

But if the conception of the Art, as entertained by the Rhetors, is too narrow—that of Plato, on the other hand, is too wide.

First, it includes the whole basis of science or theory on which the Art rests: it is a Philosophy of Rhetoric, expounded by a theorist—rather than an Art of Rhetoric, taught to learners by a master. To teach the observance of certain rules or precepts is one thing: to set forth the reasons upon which those rules are founded, is another—highly important indeed, and proper to be known by the teacher; yet not necessarily communicated, or even communicable, to all learners. Quintilian, in his *Institutio Rhetorica*, gives both:—an ample theory, as well as an ample

¹ I have illustrated this point in my *History of Greece*, by the example of Xenophon in his command of the Cyreian army during its retreat.

His democratical education, and his powers of public speaking, were of the

greatest service not only in procuring influence to himself, but also in conducting the army through its many perils and difficulties.

See Aristot. *Rhet.* I. 1, 3, p. 1355, b. 1.

development of rules, of his professional teaching. But he would not have thought himself obliged to give this ample theory to all learners. With many, he would have been satisfied to make them understand the rules, and to exercise them in the ready observance thereof.

Secondly, Plato, in defining the Art of Rhetoric, includes not only its foundation of science (which, though intimately connected with it, ought not to be considered as a constituent part), but also the application of it to particular cases; which application lies beyond the province both of science and of art, and cannot be reduced to any rule. "The Rhetor" (says Plato) "must teach his pupils, not merely to observe the rules whereby persuasion is operated, but also to know the particular persons to whom those rules are to be applied—on what occasions—within what limits—at what peculiar moments, &c.¹ Unless the Rhetor can teach thus much, his pretended art is no art at all: all his other teaching is of no value." Now this is an amount of exigence which can never be realised. Neither art nor science can communicate that which Plato here requires. The rules of art, together with many different hypothetical applications thereof, may be learnt: when the scientific explanation of the rules is superadded, the learner will be assisted farther towards fresh applications: but after both these have been learnt, the new cases which will arise can never be specially foreseen. The proper way of applying the general precepts to each case must be suggested by conjecture adapted to the circumstances, under the corrections of past experience.² It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing

¹ Plato, Phædr. pp. 268 B, 272 A.

² What Longinus says about critical skill is applicable here also—πολλὴς ἐστὶ πείρας τελευταῖον ἐπιγένημα. Isokrates (De Permut. Or. xv. sect. 290-312-316) has some good remarks about the impossibility of ἐπιστήμη respecting particulars. Plato, in the Gorgias, puts τέχνη, which he states to depend upon reason and foreknowledge, in opposition to ἐμπειρία and τριβή, which he considers as dependant on the φύσις στοχαστικῇ. But in applying the knowledge or skill called Art to particular cases, the φύσις στοχαστικῇ is

the best that can be had (p. 463 A-B). The conception of τέχνη given in the Gorgias is open to the same remark as that which we find in the Phædrus. Plato, in another passage of the Phædrus, speaks of the necessity that φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, and μελέτη, shall concur to make an accomplished orator. This is very true; and Lysias, Isokrates, and all the other rhetors whom Plato satirises, would have concurred in it. In his description of τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη, and in the estimate which he gives of all that it comprises, he leaves no outlying ground for μελέτη.

deserves the name of art¹ except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand—then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases ; the analogy of the medical art, which he here instructively invokes, would be against him on this point.

While therefore Plato's view of the science or theory of Rhetoric is far more comprehensive and philosophical than any thing given by the rhetorical teachers—he has not made good his charge against them, that what they taught as an art of Rhetoric was useless and illusory. The charge can only be sustained if we grant —what appears to have been Plato's own feeling—that the social and political life of the Athenians was a dirty and corrupt business, unworthy of a virtuous man to meddle with. This is the argument of Sokrates (in the Gorgias,² the other great anti-rhetorical dialogue), proclaiming himself to stand alone and aloof, an isolated, free-thinking dissenter. As representing his sincere conviction, and interpreting Plato's plan of life, this argument deserves honourable recognition. But we must remember that Lysias and the rhetorical teachers repudiated such a point of view. They aimed at assisting and strengthening others to perform their parts, not in speculative debate on philosophy, but in active citizenship ; and they succeeded in this object to a great degree. The rhetorical ability of Lysias personally is attested not merely by the superlative encomium on him assigned to Phædrus,³ but also by his great celebrity—by the frequent demand for his services as a logographer or composer of discourses for others—by the number of his discourses preserved and studied after his death. He, and a fair proportion of the other rhetors named in the Phædrus, performed well the useful work which they undertook.

When Plato selects, out of the very numerous discourses before him composed by Lysias, one hardly intended for any real auditors—neither deliberative, nor judicial, nor panegyrical, but an ingenious erotic paradox for a

Plato's charge against the Rhetorical teachers is not made out.

Plato has not treated Lysias fairly, in neglect-

Compare Xenophon, Memor. iii. 1, 11 ; also Isokrates contra Sophistas, s. 16 ; and a good passage of Dionysius Halik. De Compos. Verborum, in which that rhetor remarks that *καὶ* or opportunity neither has been nor can be reduced to art and rule.

¹ Plato, Gorgias, pp. 464-465.

² Plato, Gorg. 521 D.

³ Plato, Phædr. p. 228 A.

ing his greater works, and selecting for criticism an erotic exercise for a private circle.

private circle of friends—this is no fair specimen of the author. Moreover Plato criticises it as if it were a philosophical exposition instead of an oratorical pleading. He complains that Lysias does not begin his discourse by defining—but neither do Demosthenes and other great orators proceed in that manner.

He affirms that there is no organic structure, or necessary sequence, in the discourse, and that the sentences of it might be read in an inverted order:¹—and this remark is to a certain extent well-founded. In respect to the skilful marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, so as to give best effect to the whole, Dionysius of Halikarnassus² declares Lysias to be inferior to some other orators—while ascribing to him marked oratorical superiority on various other points. Yet Plato, in specifying his objections against the erotic discourses of Lysias, does not show that it offends against the sound general principle which he himself lays down respecting the art of persuasion—That the topics insisted on by the persuader shall be adapted to the feelings and dispositions of the persuadend. Far from violating this principle, Lysias kept it in view, and employed it to the best of his power—as we may see, not merely by his remaining orations, but also by the testimonies of the critics:³ though he did not go through the large preliminary work of scientific classification, both of different minds and different persuasive apparatus, which Plato considers essential to a thorough comprehension and mastery of the principle.

The first discourse assigned by Plato to Sokrates professes to be placed in competition with the discourse of Lysias, and to aim at the same object. But in reality it aims

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 263-264.

² Dionysius (*Judicium De Lysia*, pp. 487-493) gives an elaborate criticism on the *πρᾶγματις χαρακτήρ* of Lysias. The special excellence of Lysias (according to this critic) lay in his judicial orations, which were highly persuasive and plausible: the manner of presenting thoughts was ingenious and adapted to the auditors: the narration of facts and details, especially, was performed with unrivalled skill. But as to the marshalling of the different parts of a discourse, Dionysius considers Lysias as inferior to some other orators—and

still more inferior in respect to *δαιμονότης* and to strong emotional effects.

³ Dionys. Hal. (*Ars Rhetorica*, p. 381) notices the severe exigencies which Plato here imposes upon the Rhetor, remarking that scarcely any rhetorical discourse could be produced which came up to them. The defect did not belong to Lysias alone, but to all other rhetors also—*ὅποτε γὰρ καὶ Ἀντίων ἐλέγχει, πᾶσαν τὴν ἡμετέραν ῥητορικὴν τοῦτον ἐλέγχειν*. Demosthenes almost alone (in the opinion of Dionysius) contrived to avoid the fault, because he imitated Plato.

at a different object: it gives the dissuasive arguments, but omits the persuasive—as Phædrus is made to point out: so that it cannot be fairly compared with the discourse of Lysias. Still more may this be said respecting the second discourse of Sokrates: which is of a character and purpose so totally disparate, that no fair comparison can be taken between it and the ostensible competitor. The mixture of philosophy, mysticism, and dithyrambic poetry, which the second discourse of Sokrates presents, was considered by a rhetorical judge like Dionysius as altogether inconsistent with the scope and purpose of reasonable discourse.¹ In the Menexenus, Plato has brought himself again into competition with Lysias, and there the competition is fairer:² for Plato has there entirely neglected the exigencies enforced in the Phædrus, and has composed a funeral discourse upon the received type; which Lysias and other orators before him had followed, from Perikles downward. But in the Phædrus, Plato criticises Lysias upon principles which are a medley between philosophy and rhetoric. Lysias, in defending himself, might have taken the same ground as we find Sokrates himself taking in the Euthydémus. “Philosophy and politics are two distinct walks, requiring different aptitudes, and having each its own practitioners. A man may take whichever he pleases; but he must not arrogate to himself superiority by an untoward attempt to join the two together.”³

Another important subject is also treated in the Phædrus. Sokrates delivers views both original and characteristic, respecting the efficacy of continuous discourse—either written to be read, or spoken to be heard without cross-examination—as a means of instruction. They are re-stated—in a manner substantially the same, though with some variety and fulness of illustration—in Plato’s seventh Epistle⁴ to the surviving friends of Dion. I have already touched upon these views in my fourth Chapter, on the Platonic Dialogues generally, and have

between this exercise of Lysias and the discourses delivered by Sokrates in the Phædrus.

Continuous discourse, either written or spoken, is efficacious as a means of instruction to the ignorant.

¹ See the Epistol. of Dion. Halikarn. baum, Comm. in Menexenem, pp. 10-11.
to Cneius Pompey—De Platone—pp. 755-765.

² Plato, Menexen. p. 237 seq. Stall-

³ Plato, Euthydém. p. 306 A-C.

⁴ Plato, Epistol. vii. pp. 341-344.

pointed out how much Plato understood to be involved in what he termed *knowledge*. No man (in his view) could be said to know, who was not competent to sustain successfully, and to apply successfully, a Sokratic cross-examination. Now knowledge, involving such a competency, certainly cannot be communicated by any writing, or by any fixed and unchangeable array of words, whether written or spoken. You must familiarise learners with the subject on many different sides, and in relation to many different points of view, each presenting more or less chance of error or confusion. Moreover, you must apply a different treatment to each mind, and to the same mind at different stages: no two are exactly alike, and the treatment adapted for one will be unsuitable for the other. While it is impossible, for these reasons, to employ any set forms of words, it will be found that the process of reading or listening leaves the reader or listener comparatively passive: there is nothing to stir the depths of the mind, or to evolve the inherent forces and dormant capacities. Dialectic conversation is the only process which can adapt itself with infinite variety to each particular case and moment—and which stimulates fresh mental efforts ever renewed on the part of each respondent and each questioner. Knowledge—being a slow result generated by this stimulating operation, when skilfully conducted, long continued, and much diversified—is not infused into, but evolved out of, the mind. It consists in a revival of those unchangeable Ideas or Forms, with which the mind during its state of eternal pre-existence had had communion. There are only a few privileged minds, however, that have had sufficient communion therewith to render such revival possible: accordingly, none but these few can ever rise to knowledge.¹

Though knowledge cannot be first communicated by written matters, yet if it has been once communicated and subsequently forgotten, it may be revived by written matters. Writing has thus a real, though secondary, usefulness, as a memorandum. And Plato doubtless accounted written dialogues the most useful of all

Written
matter is
useful as a
memoran-
dum for
persons
who know

¹ Schleiermacher, in his Introduction to the *Phædrus*, justly characterises this doctrine as genuine Sokratism —“die echt Sokratische erhabene Verachtung alles Schreibens und alles rednerischen Redens,” p. 70.

written compositions, because they imitated portions of that long oral process whereby alone knowledge had been originally generated. His dialogues were reports of the conversations purporting to have been held by Sokrates with others.

—or as an elegant pastime.

It is an excellent feature in the didactic theories of Plato, that they distinguish so pointedly between the passive and active conditions of the intellect; and that they postulate as indispensable, an habitual and cultivated mental activity, worked up by slow, long-continued, colloquy. To read or hear, and then to commit to memory, are in his view elegant recreations, but nothing more. But while, on this point, Plato's didactic theories deserve admiration, we must remark on the other hand that they are pitched so high as to exceed human force, and to overpass all possibility of being realised.¹ They mark out an *idéa*, which no person ever attained, either then or since—like the Platonic theory of rhetoric. To be master of any subject, in the extent and perfection required for sustaining and administering a Sokratic cross-examination—is a condition which scarce any one can ever fulfil: certainly no one, except upon a small range of subjects. Assuredly, Plato himself never fulfilled it.

Plato's didactic theories are pitched too high to be realised.

Such a cross-examination involved the mastery of all the openings for doubt, difficulty, deception, or refutation, bearing on the subject: openings which a man is to profit by, if assailable—to keep guarded, if defendant. Now when we survey the Greek negative philosophy, as it appears in Plato, Aristotle, and Sextus Empiricus—and when we recollect that between the second and the third of these names, there appeared three other philosophers equally or more formidable in the same vein, all whose arguments have perished (Arkesilaus, Karneades, Ænesidémus)—we shall see that no man has ever been known competent both to strike and parry with these weapons, in a manner so skilful and ready as to

No one has ever been found competent to solve the difficulties raised by Sokrates, Arkesilaus, Karneades, and the negative vein of philosophy.

¹ A remark made by Sextus Empiricus (upon another doctrine which he is discussing) may be applied to this view of Plato—τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὅτι τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τῶν πράξεων καταλα-

βάνομεν τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον τέχνην, ὑπερφθεγγόμενων ἔστι τὴν ἀνθρώπων φύσιν, καὶ εὐχόμενων μᾶλλον ἢ ἀληθῆ λεγόντων (Pyrrh. Hyp. iii. 244).

amount to knowledge in the Platonic sense. But in so far as such knowledge is attainable or approachable, Plato is right in saying that it cannot be attained except by long dialectic practice. Reading books, and hearing lectures, are undoubtedly valuable aids, but insufficient by themselves. Modern times recede from it even more than ancient. Regulated oral dialectic has become unknown; the logical and metaphysical difficulties—which negative philosophy required to be solved before it would allow any farther progress—are now little heeded, amidst the multiplicity of observed facts, and theories adapted to and commensurate with those facts. This change in the character of philosophy is doubtless a great improvement. It is found that by acquiescing provisionally in the *axiomata media*, and by applying at every step the control of verification, now rendered possible by the multitude of ascertained facts—the sciences may march safely onward: notwithstanding that the logical and metaphysical difficulties, the puzzles (*ἀπορίαι*) involved in *philosophia prima* and its very high abstractions, are left behind unsolved and indeterminate. But though the modern course of philosophy is preferable to the ancient, it is not for that reason to be considered as satisfactory. These metaphysical difficulties are not diminished either in force or relevancy, because modern writers choose to leave them unnoticed. Plato and Aristotle were quite right in propounding them as problems, the solution of which was indispensable to the exigencies and consistent schematism of the theorising intelligence, as well as to any complete discrimination between sufficient and insufficient evidence. Such they still remain, overlooked yet not defunct.

Now all these questions would be solved by the *ideal* philosopher whom Plato in the Phædrus conceives as possessing knowledge: a person who shall be at once a negative Sokrates in excogitating and enforcing all the difficulties—and an affirmative match for Sokrates, as respondent in solving them: a person competent to apply this process to all the indefinite variety of individual minds, under the inspirations of the moment. This is a magnificent *ideal*. Plato affirms truly, that those teachers who taught rhetoric and philosophy by writing, could never produce such a pupil:

Plato's *ideal* philosopher can only be realised under the hypothesis of a pre-existent and omniscient soul, stimulated into full reminiscence here.

and that even the Sokratic dialectic training, though indispensable and far more efficacious, would fail in doing so, unless in those few cases where it was favoured by very superior capacity—understood by him as superhuman, and as a remnant from the pre-existing commerce of the soul with the world of Forms or Ideas. The foundation therefore of the whole scheme rests upon Plato's hypothesis of an antecedent life of the soul, proclaimed by Sokrates here in his second or panegyric discourse on Eros. The rhetorical teachers, with whom he here compares himself and whom he despises as aiming at low practical ends—might at any rate reply that they avoided losing themselves in such unmeasured and unwarranted hypotheses.

One remark yet remains to be made upon the doctrine here set forth by Plato: that no teaching is possible by means of continuous discourse spoken or written—^{Different proceeding of Plato in the *Timæus*.} none, except through prolonged and varied oral dialectic.¹ To this doctrine Plato does not constantly conform in his practice: he departs from it on various important occasions. In the *Timæus*, Sokrates calls upon the philosopher so named for an exposition on the deepest and most mysterious cosmical subjects. *Timæus* delivers the exposition in a continuous harangue, without a word of remark or question addressed by any of the auditors: while at the beginning of the *Kritias* (the next succeeding dialogue) Sokrates greatly commends what *Timæus* had spoken. The *Kritias* itself too (though unfinished) is given in the form of continuous exposition. Now, as the *Timæus* is more abstruse than any other Platonic writing, we cannot imagine that Plato, at the time when he composed it, thought so meanly about continuous exposition, as a vehicle of instruction, as we find him declaring in the *Phædrus*. I point this out, because it illustrates my opinion that the different dialogues of Plato represent very different, sometimes even opposite,

¹ The historical Sokrates would not allow his oral dialectic process to be called teaching. He expressly says "I have never been the teacher of any one" (*Plat. Apol. Sokr.* pp. 33 A, 19 E); and he disclaimed the possession of knowledge. Aristotle too considers teaching as a presentation of truths, ready made and supposed to be known, by the teacher to learners, who are bound to believe them, *ἔτι γὰρ πιστεύειν*

τὸν μαθήροντα. The Platonic Sokrates, in the *Phædrus* and *Symposium*, differs from both; he recognises no teaching except the perpetual generation of new thoughts and feelings, by means of stimulating dialectic colloquy, and the revival in the mind thereby of the experience of an antecedent life, during which some communion has been enjoyed with the world of Ideas or Forms.

points of view : and that it is a mistake to treat them as parts of one preconceived and methodical system.

Plato is usually extolled by his admirers, as the champion of the Absolute—of unchangeable forms, immutable truth, objective necessity cogent and binding on every one. He is praised for having refuted Protagoras ; who can find no standard beyond the individual recognition and belief, of his own mind or that of some one else. There is no doubt that Plato often talks in that strain : but the method followed in his dialogues, and the general principles of method which he lays down, here as well as elsewhere, point to a directly opposite conclusion. Of this the Phædrus is a signal instance. Instead of the extreme of generality, it proclaims the extreme of specialty. The objection which the Sokrates of the Phædrus advances against the didactic efficacy of written discourse, is founded on the fact, that it is the same to all readers—that it takes no cognizance of the differences of individual minds nor of the same mind at different times. Sokrates claims for dialectic debate the valuable privilege, that it is constant action and re-action between two individual minds—an appeal by the inherent force and actual condition of each, to the like elements in the other—an ever shifting presentation of the same topics, accommodated to the measure of intelligence and cast of emotion in the talkers and at the moment. The individuality of each mind—both questioner and respondent—is here kept in view as the governing condition of the process. No two minds can be approached by the same road or by the same interrogation. The questioner cannot advance a step except by the admission of the respondent. Every respondent is the measure to himself. He answers suitably to his own belief ; he defends by his own suggestions ; he yields to the pressure of contradiction and inconsistency, *when he feels them*, and not before. Each dialogist is (to use the Protagorean phrase) the measure to himself of truth and falsehood, according as he himself believes it. Assent or dissent, whichever it may be, springs only from the free working of the individual mind, in its actual condition then and there. It is to the individual mind alone, that appeal is made, and this is what Protagoras asks for.

Opposite tendencies co-existent in Plato's mind—Extreme of the Transcendental or Absolute—Extreme of specialising adaptation to individuals and occasions.

We thus find, in Plato's philosophical character, two extreme opposite tendencies and opposite poles co-existent. We must recognise them both : but they can never be reconciled : sometimes he obeys and follows the one, sometimes the other.

If it had been Plato's purpose to proclaim and impose upon every one something which he called "Absolute Truth," one and the same alike imperative upon all—he would best proclaim it by preaching or writing. To modify this "Absolute," according to the varieties of the persons addressed, would divest it of its intrinsic attribute and excellence. If you pretend to deal with an Absolute, you must turn away your eyes from all diversity of apprehending intellects and believing subjects.

CHAPTER XXVII.

PARMENIDES.

IN the dialogues immediately preceding—Phædon, Phædrus, Symposium—we have seen Sokrates manifesting his usual dialectic, which never fails him : but we have also seen him indulging in a very unusual vein of positive affirmation and declaration. He has unfolded many novelties about the states of pre-existence and post-existence : he has familiarised us with Ideas, Forms, Essences, eternal and unchangeable, as the causes of all the facts and particularities of nature : he has recognised the inspired variety of madness, as being more worthy of trust than sober, uninspired, intelligence : he has recounted, with the faith of a communicant fresh from the mysteries, revelations made to him by the prophetess Diotima,—respecting the successive stages of exaltation whereby gifted intelligences, under the stimulus of Eros Philosophus, ascend into communion with the great sea of Beauty. All this is set forth with as much charm as Plato's eloquence can bestow. But after all, it is not the true character of Sokrates :—I mean, the Sokrates of the Apology, whose mission it is to make war against the chronic malady of the human mind—false persuasion of knowledge, without the reality. It is, on the contrary, Sokrates himself infected with the same chronic malady which he combats in others, and requiring medicine against it as much as others. Such is the exact character in which Sokrates appears in the Parmenides : which dialogue I shall now proceed to review.

The Parmenides announces its own purpose as intended to

repress premature forwardness of affirmation, in a young philosophical aspirant: who, with meritorious eagerness in the search for truth, and with his eyes turned in the right direction to look for it—has nevertheless not fully estimated the obstructions besetting his path, nor exercised himself in the efforts necessary to overcome them. By a curious transposition, or perhaps from deference on Plato's part to the Hellenic sentiment of Nemesis,—Sokrates, who in most Platonic dialogues stands forward as the privileged censor and victorious opponent, is here the juvenile defendant under censorship by a superior. It is the veteran Parmenides of Elea who, while commending the speculative impulse and promise of Sokrates, impresses upon him at the same time that the theory which he had advanced—the self-existence, the separate and substantive nature, of Ideas—stands exposed to many grave objections, which he (Sokrates) has not considered and cannot meet. So far, Parmenides performs towards Sokrates the same process of cross-examining refutation as Sokrates himself applies to Theætétus and other young men elsewhere. But we find in this dialogue something ulterior and even peculiar. Having warned Sokrates that his intellectual training has not yet been carried to a point commensurate with the earnestness of his aspirations—Parmenides proceeds to describe to him what exercises he ought to go through, in order to guard himself against premature assertion or hasty partiality. Moreover, Parmenides not only indicates in general terms what ought to be done, but illustrates it by giving a specimen of such exercise, on a topic chosen by himself.

Passing over the dramatic introduction¹ whereby the per-

¹ This dramatic introduction is extremely complicated. The whole dialogue, from beginning to end, is recounted by Kephalus of Klazomenæ; who heard it from the Athenian Antiphon—who himself had heard it from Pythodórus, a friend of Zeno, present when the conversation was held. A string of circumstances are narrated by Kephalus, to explain how he came to wish to hear it, and to find out Antiphon. Plato appears anxious to throw the event back as far as possible into

the past, in order to justify the bringing Sokrates into personal communication with Parmenides: for some unfriendly critics tried to make out that the two could not possibly have conversed on philosophy (Athenæus, xi. 506). Plato declares the ages of the persons with remarkable exactness: Parmenides was 66, completely grey-headed, but of noble mien: Zeno about 40, tall and graceful: Sokrates very young. (Plat. Parmen. p. 127 B-C.)

It required some invention in Plato

Sokrates is the juvenile defendant—Parmenides the veteran censor and cross-examiner. Parmenides gives a specimen of exercises to be performed by the philosophical aspirant.

Circumstances and persons of the Parmenides. sonages discoursing are brought together, we find Sokrates, Parmenides, and the Eleatic Zeno (the disciple of Parmenides), engaged in the main dialogue. When Parmenides begins his illustrative exercise, a person named Aristotle (afterwards one of the Thirty oligarchs at Athens), still younger than Sokrates, is made to serve as respondent.

Sokrates is one among various auditors, who are assembled to hear Zeno reading aloud a treatise of his own composition, intended to answer and retort upon the opponents of his preceptor Parmenides.

The main doctrine of the real Parmenides was, "That Ens, the absolute, real, self-existent, was One and not many": which doctrine was impugned and derided by various opponents, deducing from it absurd conclusions. Zeno defended his master by showing that the opposite doctrine (—"That Ens, the absolute, self-existent universe, is Many—") led to conclusions absurd in an equal or greater degree. If the Absolute Ens were Many, the many would be both like and unlike: but they cannot have incompatible and contradictory attributes: therefore Absolute Ens is not Many. Ens, as Parmenides conceived it, was essentially homogeneous and unchangeable: even assuming it to be Many, all its parts must be homogeneous, so that what was predicable of one must be predicable of all; it might be all alike, or all unlike: but it could not be both. Those who maintained the plurality of Ens, did so on the ground of apparent severalty, likeness, and unlikeness, in the sensible world. But Zeno, while admitting these phenomena in the sensible world, as *relative to us*, apparent, and subject to the varieties of individual estimation—denied their applicability to absolute and self-existent Ens.¹ Since absolute Ens or Entia are Many (said the opponents of Parmenides), they will be both like and unlike: and thus we can explain the phenomena of the sensible world. The absolute (replied Zeno) cannot be both like and unlike; therefore it cannot be many. We must recollect

to provide a narrator, suitable for recounting events so long antecedent as the young period of Sokrates.

¹ I have already given a short account of the Zenonian Dialectic, ch. ii. p. 93 seq.

that both Parmenides and Zeno renounced all attempt to explain the sensible world by the absolute and purely intelligible Ena. They treated the two as radically distinct and unconnected. The one was absolute, eternal, unchangeable, homogeneous, apprehended only by reason. The other was relative, temporary, variable, heterogeneous; a world of individual and subjective opinion, upon which no absolute truth, no pure objectivity, could be reached.

Sokrates, depicted here as a young man, impugns this doctrine of Zeno: and maintains that the two worlds, though naturally disjoined, were not incommunicable. He advances the Platonic theory of Ideas: that is, an intelligible world of many separate self-existent Forms or Ideas, apprehended by reason only—and a sensible world of particular objects, each participating in one or more of these Forms or Ideas. "What you say (he remarks to Zeno), is true of the world of Forms or Ideas: the Form of Likeness *per se* can never be unlike, nor can the Form of Unlikeness be ever like. But in regard to the sensible world, there is nothing to hinder you and me, and other objects which rank and are numbered as separate individuals, from participating both in the Form of likeness and in the Form of unlikeness.¹ In so far as I, an individual object, participate in the Form of Likeness, I am properly called like; in so far as I participate in the Form of Unlikeness, I am called unlike. So about One and Many, Great and Little, and so forth: I, the same individual, may participate in many different and opposite Forms, and may derive from them different and opposite denominations. I am one and many—like and unlike—great and little—all at the same time. But no such combination is possible between the Forms themselves, self-existent and opposite: the Form of Likeness cannot become unlike, nor *vice versa*. The Forms themselves stand permanently apart, incapable of fusion or coalescence with each other: but different and even opposite Forms may lend

Sokrates here impugns the doctrine of Zeno. He affirms the Platonic theory of Ideas separate from sensible objects, yet participable by them.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 129 A. οὐ δυνατόν, ὃ ἔστιν ἀνόμοιον; τοῦτον δὲ νομίζεις εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ εἰδὸς τι δυοῖν ὄντων καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἃ ἐμοῦσθητος, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ εἰς ἄλλο τι δὴ πολλὰ καλούμεν, μεταλαμβάνειν;

themselves to participation and partnership in the same sensible individual object."¹

Parmenides and Zeno are represented as listening with surprise and interest to this language of Sokrates, recognising two distinct worlds : one, of invisible but intelligible Forms,—the other that of sensible objects, participating in these Forms. "Your ardour for philosophy" (observes Parmenides to Sokrates), "is admirable. Is this distinction your own?"²

Plato now puts into the mouth of Parmenides—the advocate of One absolute and unchangeable Ens, separated by an impassable gulf from the sensible world of transitory and variable appearances or phenomena—objections against what is called the Platonic theory of Ideas : that is, the theory of an intelligible world, comprising an indefinite number of distinct intelligible and unchangeable Forms—in partial relation and communication with another world of sensible objects, each of which participates in one or more of these Forms. We thus have the Absolute One pitted against the Absolute Many.

What number and variety of these intelligible Forms do you recognise—(asks Parmenides)? Likeness and Unlikeness—One and Many—Just, Beautiful, Good, &c.—are all these Forms absolute and existent *per se*? *Sokr.*—Certainly they are. *Parm.*—Do you farther recognise an absolute and self-existent Form of Man, apart from us and all other individuals?—or a Form of fire, water, and the like? *Sokr.*—I do not well know how to answer:—I have often been embarrassed with the question. *Parm.*—Farther, do there exist distinct intelligible Forms of hair, mud, dirt, and all the other mean and contemptible objects of sense which we see around? *Sokr.*—No—certainly—no such Forms as these exist. Such objects are as we see them, and nothing beyond : it would be too absurd to suppose Forms of such like things.³ Nevertheless there are

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 129-130.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 130 A. "Ὁ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἄξιός ἐστι ἀγαθῶν τῆς ὁμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ τοῦ λόγου· καὶ μοι εἰσὶν αὐτὸς σὸς οὕτως διήρησαι ὡς λέγεις, χωρὶς μὲν εἶδη αὐτὰ εἶναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὰ τούτων αὐτὰ μετέχοντα;

³ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 130 D. Οὐδὰ μὲν, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτην, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ, ὡς ὁρῶμεν, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι· εἶδος δὲ τι αὐτῶν οἰσθῆναι εἶναι μὴ λίαν ἤ ἀρεσκον.

Alexander, who opposes the doctrine of the Platonists about Ideas, treats it

times when I have misgivings on the point ; and when I suspect that there must be Forms of them as well as of the others. When such reflections cross my mind, I shrink from the absurdity of the doctrine, and try to confine my attention to Forms like those which you mentioned first.

Parm.—You are still young, Sokrates :—you still defer to the common sentiments of mankind. But the time will come when philosophy will take stronger hold of you, and will teach you that no object in nature is mean or contemptible in her view.¹

Parmenides declares that no object in nature is mean to the philosopher.

Remarks upon this—Contrast between emotional and scientific classification.

This remark deserves attention. Plato points out the radical distinction, and frequent antipathy between classifications constructed by science, and those which grow up spontaneously under the associating influence of a common emotion. What he calls “the opinions of men,”—in other words, the associations naturally working in an untaught and unlettered mind—bring together the ideas of objects according as they suggest a like emotion—veneration, love, fear, antipathy, contempt, laughter, &c.² As things which inspire like emotions are thrown into the same category and receive the same denomination, so the opposite proceeding inspires great repugnance, when things creating antipathetic emotions are forced into the same category. A large proportion of objects in nature come to be regarded as unworthy of any serious attention, and fit only to serve for discharging on them our laughter, contempt, or antipathy. The investigation of the structure and manifestations of insects is one of the marked features which Aristophanes ridicules in Sokrates : moreover the same poet also brings odium on the philosopher for alleged study of astronomy and meteorology—the heavenly bodies being as it were at the opposite emotional pole, objects of such reverential admiration and worship,

as understood that they did not recognise Ideas of worms, gnats, and such like animals. Schol. ad Aristot. *Metaphys.* A. 901 a. p. 575, a. 30 Brandis.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 130 E. Νέος γάρ εἰ ἐγώ, καὶ οὐκ οὐκ ἀντιλήπεται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἐστὶ ἀντιλήπεται, κατ' ἐμὴν

δόξαν, ὅτε οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσεις· νῦν δὲ ἐγὼ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπεις δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

² Plato, himself, however, occasionally appeals πρὸς ἀνθρώπων δόξας, and becomes ἀτεχνὸς δημήγορος, when it suits his argument ; see *Gorgias*, 494 C.

that it was impious to watch or investigate them, or calculate their proceedings beforehand.¹ The extent to which anatomy and physiology were shut out from study in antiquity, and have continued to be partially so even in modern times, is well known. And the proportion of phenomena is both great and important, connected with the social relations, which are excluded both from formal registration and from scientific review ; kept away from all rational analysis either of causes or remedies, because of the strong repugnances connected with them. This emotional view of nature is here noted by Plato as conflicting with the scientific. No object (he says) is mean in the eyes of philosophy. He remarks to the same effect in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, and the remark is illustrated by the classifying processes there exhibited :² mean objects and esteemed objects being placed side by side.

Parmenides now produces various objections against the Platonic variety of dualism : the two distinct but partially intercommunicating worlds—one, of separate, permanent, unchangeable, Forms or Ideas—the other, of individual objects, transient and variable ; participating in, and receiving denomination from, these Forms.

1. How (asks Parmenides) can such participation take place ?

¹ Aristophan. *Nubes*, 145-170-1490.

*τί γὰρ μαθόντ' ἐς τοὺς θεοὺς ὑβρίζον,
καὶ τῆς σολήνης ἐσκοπεῖσθε τὴν ἔδραν ;*

Compare Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 1, 11-13, iv. 7, 6-7 ; Plutarch, *Perikles*, 23 ; also the second chapter of the first Book of Macrobius, about the discredit which is supposed to be thrown upon grand and solemn subjects by a plain and naked exposition. "Inimicam esse naturæ nudam expositionem sui."

² Plato, *Sophist.* p. 227 B ; *Politik.* p. 266 D ; also *Theæstet.* p. 174 D.

Both the Platonic Sokrates, and the Xenophontic Sokrates, frequently illustrate the education of men by comparison with the bringing up of young animals as well as with the training of horses : they also compare the educator of young men with the trainer of young

horses. Indeed this comparison occurs so frequently, that it excites much displeasure among various modern critics (Forchhammer, Köchly, Socher, &c.), who seem to consider it as unseemly and inconsistent with "the dignity of human nature". The frequent allusions made by Plato to the homely arts and professions are noted by his interlocutors as tiresome.

See Plato, *Apolog. Sokr.* p. 20 A. *ὦ Καλλία, εἰ μὲν σου τὸ νῦν πάλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, &c.*

The Zoological works of Aristotle exhibit a memorable example of scientific intelligence, overcoming all the contempt and disgust usually associated with minute and repulsive organisms. To Plato, it would be repugnant to arrange in the same class the wolf and the dog. See *Sophist.* p. 231 A.

Is the entire Form in each individual object? No: for one and the same Form cannot be at the same time in many distant objects. A part of it therefore must be in one object; another part in another. But this assumes that the Form is divisible—or is not essentially One. Equality is in all equal objects: but how can a part of the Form equality, less than the whole, make objects equal? Again, littleness is in all little objects: that is, a part of the Form littleness is in each. But the Form littleness cannot have parts; because, if it had, the entire Form would be greater than any of its parts,—and the Form littleness cannot be greater than any thing. Moreover, if one part of littleness were added to other parts, the sum of the two would be less, and not greater, than either of the factors. It is plain that none of these Forms can be divisible, or can have parts. Objects therefore cannot participate in the Form by parts or piecemeal. But neither can each object possess the entire Form. Accordingly, since there remains no third possibility, objects cannot participate in the Forms at all.¹

Objections of Parmenides—How can objects participate in the Ideas? Each cannot have the whole Idea, nor a part thereof.

2. Parmenides now passes to a second argument. The reason why you assume that each one of these Forms exists, is—That when you contemplate many similar objects, one and the same ideal phantom or Concept is suggested by all.² Thus, when you see many *great* objects, one common impression of *greatness* arises from all. Hence you conclude that The Great, or the Form of Greatness, exists as One. But if you take this Form of Greatness, and consider it in comparison with each or all the great individual objects, it will have in common with them something that makes it great. You must therefore search for some higher Form, which represents what belongs in common both to the Form of Greatness and to individual great objects. And this higher Form again, when compared with the rest, will have

Comparing the Idea with the sensible objects partaking in the Idea, there is a likeness between them which must be represented by a higher Idea—and so on *ad infinitum*.

¹ Plato, Parmenid. p. 131. A similar argument, showing the impossibility of such μέθεξις, appears in Sextus Empiric. adv. Arithmeticos, sect. 11-20, p. 334 Fab., p. 724 Bek.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 132. Οἰμαί σε

ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶδος οἰσθαι εἶναι. "Ὅταν πολλά ἅπτα μεγάλα σοι δοξῇ εἶναι, μία τις ἰσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἢ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἡγεῖ εἶναι.

something in common which must be represented by a Form yet higher : so that there will be an infinite series of Forms, ascending higher and higher, of which you will never reach the topmost.¹

3. Perhaps (suggests Sokrates) each of these Forms is a Conception of the mind and nothing beyond : the Form is not competent to exist out of the mind.² How? (replies Parmenides.) There cannot be in the mind any Conception, which is a Conception of nothing. Every Conception must be of something really existing : in this case, it is a Conception of some one thing, which you conceive as belonging in common to each and all the objects considered. The Something thus conceived as perpetually One and the same in all, is, the Form. Besides, if you think that individual objects participate in the Forms, and that these Forms are Conceptions of the mind,—you must suppose, either that all

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 132 A. See this process, of comparing the Form with particular objects denominated after the Form, described in a different metaphysical language by Mr. John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, book iv. ch. 2, sect. 8. "As the general conception is itself obtained by a comparison of particular phenomena, so, when obtained, the mode in which we apply it to other phenomena is again by comparison. We compare phenomena with each other to get the conception; and we then compare those and other phenomena with the conception. We get the conception of an animal by comparing different animals, and when we afterwards see a creature resembling an animal, we compare it with our general conception of an animal: and if it agrees with our general conception, we include it in the class. The conception becomes the type of comparison. We may perhaps find that no considerable number of other objects agree with this first general conception: and that we must drop the conception, and beginning again with a different individual case, proceed by fresh comparisons to a different general conception."

The comparison, which the argument of the Platonic Parmenides assumes to be instituted, between τὸ εἶδος and τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ, is denied by Proklos; who says that there can

be no comparison, nor any κοινωνία, except between τὰ ὁμοειδή; and that the Form is not ὁμοειδές with its participant particulars. (Proklos ad *Parmenidem*, p. 125, p. 684 ed. Stallbaum.)

This argument of Parmenides is the memorable argument known under the name of ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρώπων. Against the Platonic εἶδη considered as χωριστά, it is a forcible argument. See *Aristot.* *Metaphys.* A. 990, b. 15 seq., where it is numbered among εἰ ἀκριβέστερον τὸν λόγον. We find from the Scholion of Alexander (p. 566 Brandis) that it was advanced in several different ways by Aristotle, in his work *Περὶ Ἰδεῶν*: by his scholar Eudemos ἐν τοῖς περὶ Ἀδέσσεως; and by a contemporary σοφιστῆς named Polyxenus, as well as by other Sophists.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 132 B. μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τοῦτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῶ προσήκη ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἀλλοδαίῃ ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς. . . . Τί οὖν; φάναι, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἴσθι τὸν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδένος; Ἄλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἶναι. Ἀλλὰ τίος; Ναί. Ὅτιος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; Ὅντος. Οὐχ ἑνὸς τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πάντων ἔκτιστο τὸ νόημα ἑνὸς νοαί, μίαν τινὰ οὐσαν ἰδέαν; Ναί.

Aristotle (*Topic.* ii. 113, a. 25) indicates one way of meeting this argument, if advanced by an adversary in dialectic debate—εἰ τὰς ἰδέας ἐν ἡμῖν ἐφύοντο εἶναι.

objects are made up of Conceptions, and are therefore themselves Concipients: or else that these Forms, though Conceptions, are incapable of conceiving. Neither one nor the other is admissible.¹

4. Probably the case stands thus (says Sokrates). These Forms are constants and fixtures in nature, as models or patterns. Particular objects are copies or likenesses of them: and the participation of such objects in the Form consists in being made like to it.² In that case (replies Parmenides), the Form must itself be like to the objects which have been made like to it. Comparing the Form with the objects, that in which they resemble must itself be a Form: and thus you will have a higher Form above the first Form—and so upwards in the ascending line. This follows necessarily from the hypothesis that the Form is like the objects. The participation of objects in the Form, therefore, cannot consist in being likened to it.³

The Ideas are types or exemplaria, and objects partake of them by being likened to them? Impossible.

5. Here are grave difficulties (continues Parmenides) opposed to this doctrine of yours, affirming the existence of self-existent, substantive, unchangeable, yet participated, Forms. But difficulties still graver remain behind. Such Forms as you describe cannot be cognizable by us: at least it is hard to show how they can be cognizable. Being self-existent and substantive, they are not *in us*: such of them as are relative, have their relation with each other, not with those particular objects among us, which are called *great, little*, and so forth, from being supposed to be similar to or participant in the forms, and bearing names the same as those of the Forms. Thus, for example, if I, an individual man, am in the relation of master, I bear that relation to another indi-

If Ideas exist, they cannot be knowable by us. We can know only what is relative to ourselves. Individuals are relative to Individuals, Ideas relative to Ideas.

¹ Plato, Parmenid. p. 132 D. οὐκ ἀνάγκη, εἰ τὰλλα φησὶ τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν, ἢ δοκεῖν σοὶ ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον.

The word ἀνόητα here is used in its ordinary sense, in which it is the negation, not of νοητός but of νοητικός. There is a similar confusion, Plato, Phædon, p. 80 B. Proklus (pp. 690-701, Stall.) is prolix but very obscure.

² Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 991, a. 20) characterises this way of presenting the Platonic Ideas as mere κενολογία and poetical metaphor. See also the remarkable Scholion of Alexander, pp. 574-575, Brandis.

³ Plato, Parmenid. pp. 132-133.

This is again a repetition, though differently presented, of the same argument—ὁ τρίτος ἀνθρώπος—enunciated p. 132 A.

vidual man who is my servant, not to servanthship in general (i.e. the Form of servanthship, the *Servus per se*). My servant, again, bears the relation of servant to me, an individual man as master, —not to mastership in general (i.e. to the Form of mastership, the *Dominus per se*). Both terms of the relation are individual objects. On the other hand, the Forms also bear relation to each other. The Form of servanthship (*Servus per se*) stands in relation to the Form of mastership (*Dominus per se*). Neither of them correlates with an individual object. The two terms of the relation must be homogeneous, each of them a Form.¹

Now apply this to the case of cognition. The Form of Cognition correlates exclusively with the Form of Truth : the Form of each special Cognition, geometrical or medical, or other, correlates with the Form of Geometry or Medicine. But Cognition as we possess it, correlates only with Truth relatively to us : also, each special Cognition of ours has its special correlating Truth, relatively to us.² Now the Forms are not in or with us, but apart from us : the Form of Cognition is not our Cognition, the Form of Truth is not our Truth. Forms can be known only through the Form of Cognition, which we do not possess : we cannot therefore know Forms. We have our own cognition, whereby we know what is relative to us ; but we know nothing more. Forms, which are not relative to us, lie out of our knowledge. *Bonum per se*, *Pulchrum per se*, and the other self-existent Forms or Ideas, are to us altogether unknowable.³

6. Again, if there be a real self-existent Form of Cognition, apart from that which we or others possess—it must doubtless be far superior in accuracy and perfection

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 133 E.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 134 A. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, τῆς δ' ἐστὶν ἀλήθεια, αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη; . . . Ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη; καὶ ἀδ' ἐκάστη ἢ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη σύμβαιον εἶναι.

Aristotle (*Topica*, vi. p. 147, a. 6) adverts to this as an argument against the theory of Ideas, but without alluding to the *Parmenides*; indeed he puts the argument in a different way—τὸ

δ' εἶδος πρὸς τὸ εἶδος δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι, ὅλον αὐτῇ ἐπιθυμία αὐτοῦ ἡδέος, καὶ αὐτῇ βούλησις αὐτοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. Aristotle argues that there is no place in this doctrine for the φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν, which nevertheless men often wish for, and he remarks, in the *Nikom. Ethica*, i. 4, 1096 b. 33—that the αὐτὸ-ἀγαθόν is neither πρακτὸν nor κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ.

³ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 134 C. Ἄγαν-στον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἐστὶ, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ πάντα ἃ δι' ὧς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὐσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

to that which we possess.¹ The Form of Beauty and the other Forms, must be in like manner superior to that which is found under the same name in individual objects. This perfect Form of Cognition must therefore belong to the Gods, if it belong to any one. But if so, the Gods must have a Form of Truth, the proper object of their Form of Cognition. They cannot know the truth relatively to us, which belongs to *our* cognition—any more than we can know the more perfect truth belonging to them. So too about other Forms. The perfect Form of mastership belongs to the Gods, correlating with its proper Form of servanthip. *Their* mastership does not correlate with individual objects like us : in other words, they are not our masters, nor are we their servants. *Their* cognition, again, does not correlate with individual objects like us : in other words, they do not know us, nor do we know them. In like manner, we in our capacity of masters are not masters of them—we as cognizant beings know nothing of them or of that which they know. They can in no way correlate with us, nor can we correlate with them.²

Here are some of the objections, Sokrates (concludes Parmenides), which beset your doctrine, that there exist substantive, self-standing, Forms of Ideas, each respectively definable. Many farther objections might also be urged.³ So that a man may reasonably maintain, either that none such exist—or that, granting their existence, they are essentially unknowable by us. He must put forth great ingenuity to satisfy himself of the affirmative ; and still more wonderful ingenuity to find arguments for the satisfaction of others, respecting this question.

Cognition, belongs to the Gods. We cannot know them, nor can they know us.

Sum total of objections against the Ideas is grave. But if we do not admit that Ideas exist, and that they are knowable, there can be no dialectic discussion.

¹ An argument very similar is urged by Aristotle (Metaph. Θ. 1050, b. 34) *εἰ ἄρα τίς τις εἰσι φύσεις τοιαύται ἢ οὐσίαι οἷας λέγουσιν οἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τὰς ἰδέας, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμον ἂν τι εἴη τῆς αὐτοεπιστήμης καὶ κινούμενον ἢ κίνησις.*

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 A. *Ταῦτα μὲντοι, ὃ Ζώκρᾳτες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἶδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὐταὶ αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων, &c.*

³ Plato, Parmenid. p. 134 D-E. *Οὐκ*

οὐκ εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία τῶν ἐκείνων (ἰ. ε. τῶν θεῶν) ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσποσύνειν, οὐτ' ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνῶσιν οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν· ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τ' ἐκείνων οὐκ ἀρχομεν τῇ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ, οὐδὲ γινώσκουμεν τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ (sc. οἱ θεοί) κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὐτε δεσποταὶ ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὐτε γινώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.

Nevertheless, on the other side (continues Parmenides), unless we admit the existence of such Forms or Ideas—substantive, eternal, unchangeable, definable—philosophy and dialectic discussion are impossible.¹

Here then, Parmenides entangles himself and his auditors in the perplexing dilemma, that philosophical and dialectic speculation is impossible, unless these Forms or Ideas, together with the participation of sensible objects in them, be granted; while at the same time this cannot be granted, until objections, which appear at first sight unanswerable, have been disposed of.

The acuteness with which these objections are enforced, is remarkable. I know nothing superior to it in all the Platonic writings. Moreover the objections point directly against that doctrine which Plato in other dialogues most emphatically insists upon, and which Aristotle both announces and combats as characteristic of Plato—the doctrine of separate, self-existent, absolute, Forms or Ideas. They are addressed moreover to Sokrates, the chief exponent of that doctrine here as well as in other dialogues. And he is depicted as unable to meet them.

It is true that Sokrates is here introduced as juvenile and untrained; or at least as imperfectly trained. And accordingly, Stallbaum with others think, that this is the reason of his inability to meet the objections: which (they tell us), though ingenious and plausible, yet having no application to the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, might easily have been answered if Plato had thought fit, and are answered in other

¹ Ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη (Sokrates), ἡ θανάσιμος ὁ λόγος, εἰ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.

The inference here drawn by Parmenides supplies the first mention of a doctrine revived by (if not transmitted to) Averroes and various scholastic doctors of the middle ages, so as to be formally condemned by theological councils. M. Renan tells us—"En 1269, Étienne Tempier, évêque de Paris, ayant rassemblé le conseil des

maîtres en théologie... condamna, de concert avec eux, treize propositions qui ne sont presque toutes que les axiomes familiers de l'averroïsme: Quod intellectus hominum est unus et idem numero. Quod mundus est æternus. Quod nunquam fuit primus homo. Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia," &c. (Renan, *Averroës*, p. 212, 2nd ed., p. 268.)

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 135 B.

dialogues.¹ But to me it appears, that the doctrine which is challenged in the *Parmenidês* is the genuine Platonic doctrine about Ideas, as enunciated by Plato in the *Republic*, *Phædon*, *Philêbus*, *Timæus*, and elsewhere—though a very different doctrine is announced in the *Sophistês*. Objections are here made against it in the *Parmenidês*. In what other dialogue has Plato answered them? and what proof can be furnished that he was able to answer them? There are indeed many other dialogues in which a real world of Ideas absolute and unchangeable, is affirmed strenuously and eloquently, with various consequences and accompaniments traced to it: but there are none in which the Parmenidean objections are elucidated, or even recited. In the *Phædon*, *Phædrus*, *Timæus*, *Symposion*, &c., and elsewhere, Sokrates is made to talk confidently about the existence and even about the cognoscibility of these Ideas; just as if no such objections as those which we read in the *Parmenidês* could be produced.² In these other dialogues, Plato accepts implicitly one horn of the Parmenidean dilemma; but without explaining to us upon what grounds he allows himself to neglect the other.

Socher has so much difficulty in conceiving that Plato can have advanced such forcible objections against a doctrine, which nevertheless in other Platonic dialogues is proclaimed as true and important,—that he declares the *Parmenidês* (together with the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*) not to be genuine, but to have been composed by some unknown Megaric contemporary. To pass over the improbability that any unknown author should have been capable of composing works of so much ability as these—Socher's decision about spuriousness is founded upon an estimate of Plato's philosophical character, which I think incorrect. Socher

Views of Stallbaum and Socher. The latter maintains that Plato would never make such objections against his own theory, and denies the authenticity of the *Parmenidês*.

¹ Stallbaum, *Prolegom.* pp. 52-226-332.

² According to Stallbaum (*Prolegg.* pp. 277-337) the *Parmenidês* is the only dialogue in which Plato has discussed, with philosophical exactness, the theory of Ideas; in all the other dialogues he handles it in a popular and superficial manner. There is truth in this—indeed more truth (I think)

than Stallbaum himself supposed: otherwise he would hardly have said that the objections in the *Parmenides* could easily have been answered, if Plato had chosen.

Stallbaum tells us, not only respecting Socher but respecting Schleiermacher (pp. 324-332), "*Parmenidem omnino non intellexit*". In my judgment, Socher understands the dialogue

expects (or at least reasons as if he expected) to find in Plato a preconceived system and a scheme of conclusions to which every thing is made subservient.

In most philosophers, doubtless, this is what we do find. Each starts with some favourite conclusions, which he believes to be true, and which he supports by all the arguments in their favour, as far as his power goes. If he mentions the arguments against them, he usually answers the weak, slurs over or sneers at the strong : at any rate, he takes every precaution that these counter arguments shall appear unimportant in the eyes of his readers. His purpose is, like that of a speaker in the public assembly, to obtain assent and belief : whether the hearers understand the question or not, is a matter of comparative indifference : at any rate, they must be induced to embrace his conclusion. Unless he thus foregoes the character of an impartial judge, to take up that of an earnest advocate ; unless he bends the whole force of his mind to the establishment of the given conclusion—he becomes suspected as deficient in faith or sincerity, and loses much in persuasive power. For an earnest belief, expressed with eloquence and feeling, is commonly more persuasive than any logic.

Now whether this exclusive devotion to the affirmative side of certain questions be the true spirit of philosophy or not, it is certainly not the spirit of Plato in his Dialogues of Search ; wherein he conceives the work of philosophy in a totally different manner. He does not begin by stating, even to himself, a certain conclusion at which he has arrived, and then proceed to prove that conclusion to others. The search or debate (as I have observed in a preceding chapter) has greater importance in his eyes than the conclusion : nay, in a large proportion of his dialogues, there is no conclusion at all : we see something disproved, but nothing proved. The negative element has with him a value and importance of its own, apart from the affirmative. He is anxious to set forth what can be said against a given conclusion ; even though not prepared to establish any thing in its place.

better than Stallbaum, when he says, that the objections in the first half bear against the genuine Platonic Ideas ; though I do not agree with his inference about the spuriousness of the dialogue.

Such negative element, manifested as it is in so many of the Platonic dialogues, has its extreme manifestation in the *Parmenidês*. When we see it here applied to a doctrine which Plato in other dialogues insists upon as truth, we must call to mind (what sincere believers are apt to forget) that a case may always be made out against truth as well as in its favour: and that its privilege as a certified portion of "reasoned truth," rests upon no better title than the superiority of the latter case over the former. It is for testing the two cases—for determining where the superiority lies—and for graduating its amount—that the process of philosophising is called for, and that improvements in the method thereof become desirable. That Plato should, in one of his many diversified dialogues, apply this test to a doctrine which, in other dialogues, he holds out as true—is noway inconsistent with the general spirit of these compositions. Each of his dialogues has its own point of view, worked out on that particular occasion; what is common to them all, is the process of philosophising applied in various ways to the same general topics.

Those who, like Socher, deny Plato's authorship of the *Parmenidês*, on the ground of what is urged therein against the theory of Ideas, must suppose, either that he did not know that a negative case could be made out against that theory; or that knowing it, he refrained from undertaking the duty.¹ Neither supposition is consistent with what we know both of his negative ingenuity, and of his multifarious manner of handling.

The negative case, made out in the *Parmenidês* against the

The *Parmenidês* is the extreme manifestation of the negative element. That Plato should employ one dialogue in setting forth the negative case against the Theory of Ideas is not unnatural.

¹ Plato, *Philêbus*, p. 14, where the distinction taken coincides accurately enough with that which we read in Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 129 A-D.

Strümpell thinks that the *Parmenidês* was composed at a time of Plato's life when he had become sensible of the difficulties and contradictions attaching to his doctrine of self-existent Forms or Ideas, and when he was looking about for some way of extrication from them: which way he afterwards thought that he found in that approximation to Pythagorism—that exchange of Ideas for Ideal numbers, &c.—which

we find imputed to him by Aristotle (*Gesch. der Griech. Phil.* sect. 96, 3). This is not impossible; but I find no sufficient ground for affirming it. Nor can I see how the doctrine which Aristotle ascribes to Plato about the Ideas (that they are generated by two στοιχεῖα or elements, τὸ ἐν along with τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρόν) affords any escape from the difficulties started in the *Parmenidês*.

Strümpell considers the dialogue *Parmenidês* to have been composed "ganz ausdrücklich zur dialektischen Übung," *ib.* s. 96, 2, p. 123.

Force of
the negative
case in the
Parme-
nides.
Difficulties
about par-
ticipation
of sensible
objects in
the world
of Ideas.

theory of Ideas, is indeed most powerful. The hypothesis of the Ideal World is unequivocally affirmed by Sokrates, with its four principal characteristics. 1. Complete essential separation from the world of sense. 2. Absolute self-existence. 3. Plurality of constituent items, several contrary to each other. 4. Unchangeable sameness and unity of each and all of them.—Here we have full satisfaction given to the Platonic sentiment, which often delights in soaring above the world of sense, and sometimes (see Phædon) in heaping contemptuous metaphors upon it. But unfortunately Sokrates cannot disengage himself from this world of sense: he is obliged to maintain that it partakes of, or is determined by, these extra-sensible Forms or Ideas. Here commence the series of difficulties and contradictions brought out by the Elenchus of Parmenides. Are all sensible objects, even such as are vulgar, repulsive, and contemptible, represented in this higher world? The Platonic sentiment shrinks from the admission: the Platonic sense of analogy hesitates to deny it. Then again, how can both assertions be true—first that the two worlds are essentially separate, next, that the one participates in, and derives its essence from, the other? How (to use Aristotelian language¹) can the essence be separated from that of which it is the essence? How can the Form, essentially One, belong at once to a multitude of particulars?

Two points deserve notice in this debate respecting the doctrine of Ideas:—

1. Parmenides shows, and Sokrates does not deny, that these
Difficulties about the
Cognizability of
Ideas. If
Ideas are
absolute,
they cannot
Forms or Ideas described as absolute, self-existent, unchangeable, must of necessity be unknown and unknowable to us.² Whatever we do know, or can know, is relative to us;—to our actual cognition, or to our cognitive power. If you declare an object to

¹ Arist. Met. A. 991, b. 1. ἀδύνατον, χωρίς εἶναι τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὐ ἡ οὐσία.

² Plato, Parmenid. 133 B. εἰ τις φαίη μὴδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γινώσκεισθαι ὅντα τοιαῦτα οἷα φάμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἶδη. . . . ἀπίθανος ἂν εἴη ὁ ἀγνώστη αὐτὰ ἀναγκά-
ζων εἶναι. 134 A. ἡ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπι-

στήμη οὐ τῆς παρ' ἡμῖν ἀν' ἀληθείας εἴη; καὶ αὐτὴ ἐκάστη ἡ παρ' ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρ' ἡμῖν ὄντων ἐκάστου ἀν' ἐπιστήμῃ ξυμβαίνει εἶναι; 134 C. ἀγνώστον ἀρα ἡμῖν ἔστι καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι, καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ πάντα ἃ δι' ὧς ιδέας αὐτὰς οὐσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.

be absolute, you declare it to be neither known nor knowable by us: if it be announced as known or knowable by us, it is thereby implied at the same time not to be absolute. If these Forms or Objects called absolute are known, they can be known only by an absolute Subject, or the Form of a cognizant Subject: that is, by God or the Gods. Even thus, to call them *absolute* is a misnomer: they are relative to the Subject, and the Subject is relative to them.

be cognizable: if they are cognizable, they must be relative. Doctrine of Homo Mensura.

The opinion here advanced by the Platonic Parmenides asserts, in other words, what is equivalent to the memorable dictum of Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things—of things existent, that they do exist—and of things non-existent, that they do not exist". This dictum affirms universal relativity, and nothing else: though Plato, as we shall see in the elaborate argument against it delivered by Sokrates in the *Theætétus*, mixed it up with another doctrine altogether distinct and independent—the doctrine that knowledge is sensible perception.¹ Parmenides here argues that if these Forms or Ideas are known by us, they can be known only as relative to us: and that if they be not relative to us, they cannot be known by us at all. Such relativity belongs as much to the world of Conception, as to the world of Perception. And it is remarkable that Plato admits this essential relativity not merely here, but also in the *Sophistês*: in which latter dialogue he denies the Forms or Ideas to be absolute existences, on the special ground that they are known:—and on the farther ground that what is known must act upon the knowing mind, and must be acted upon thereby, *i.e.*, must be relative. He there defines the existent to be, that which has power to act upon something else, or to be acted upon by something else. Such relativity he declares to constitute *existence*:² defining existence to mean potentiality.

2. The second point which deserves notice in this portion of the *Parmenidês*, is the answer of Sokrates (when embarrassed by some of the questions of the Eleatic

Answer of Sokrates—That Ideas

¹ I shall discuss this in the coming chapter upon the *Theætétus*.

² Plato, *Sophistês*, pp. 248-249.

This reasoning is put into the mouth of the Eleatic Stranger, the principal person in that dialogue.

are mere
conceptions
of the mind.
Objection
of Parmenides
correct,
though
undeve-
loped.

veteran)—“That these Forms or Ideas are conceptions of the mind, and have no existence out of the mind”. This answer gives us the purely Subjective, or negation of Object: instead of the purely Objective (Absolute), or negation of Subject.¹ Here we have what Porphyry calls the deepest question of philosophy² explicitly raised: and, as far as we know, for the first time. Are the Forms or Ideas mere conceptions of the mind and nothing more? Or are they external, separate, self-existent realities? The opinion which Sokrates had first given declared the latter: that which he now gives declares the former. He passes from the pure Objective (i.e., without Subject) to the pure Subjective (i.e., without Object). Parmenides, in his reply, points out that there cannot be a conception of nothing: that if there be *Conceptio*, there must be *Conceptum aliquid*:³ and that this *Conceptum* or *Concept* is what is common to a great many distinct similar *Percepta*.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 132 A-B.

The doctrine, that *νοήματα*, having no existence without the mind, was held by Antisthenes as well as by the Eretrian sect of philosophers, contemporary with Plato and shortly after him. Simplicius, *Schol. ad Aristot. Categ.* p. 68, a. 30, Brandis. See, respecting Antisthenes, the first volume of the present work, p. 166.

² See the beginning of Porphyry's Introduction to the *Categories* of Aristotle. *βαθυτάτης ούσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας, &c.*—περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν, εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν, εἴτε καὶ ἂν μόναις ψυχαῖς ἐννοηταῖς κεῖται, &c. Simplicius (in *Schol. ad Aristot. Categ.* p. 68, a. 28, ed. Brandis) alludes to the Eretrian philosophers and Theopompus, who considered τὰς νοήματας ὡς ψυχᾶς μόναις ἐννοιαῖς διακενῶς λεγόμενας κατ' οὐδεμίας ὑποστάσεως, οἷον ἀνθρωπότητα ἢ ἰσότητά, &c.

³ Compare *Republic*, v. p. 476 B. ὁ γινώσκων γινώσκει τι ἢ οὐδέν; Γινώσκει τί, &c.

The following passage in the learned work of Cudworth bears on the portion of the *Parmenides* which we are now considering. Cudworth, *Treatise of Immutability*, pp. 243-245.

“But if any one demand here, where this ἀκίνητος οὐσία, these im-

mutable Entities do exist? I answer, first, that as they are considered formally, they do not properly exist in the Individuals without us, as if they were from them imprinted upon the Understanding, which some have taken to be Aristotle's opinion; because no Individual Material thing is either Universal or Immutable. . . . Because they perish not together with them, it is a certain argument that they exist independently upon them. Neither, in the next place, do they exist somewhere else apart from the Individual Sensibles, and without the Mind, which is that opinion that Aristotle justly condemns, but either unjustly or unskillfully attributes to Plato. . . . Wherefore these Intelligible Ideas or Essences of Things, those Forms by which we understand all Things, exist nowhere but in the mind itself; for it was very well determined long ago by Sokrates, in Plato's *Parmenides*, that these things are nothing else but *Noēmata*: ‘These Species or Ideas are all of them nothing but *Noēmata* or Notions that exist nowhere but in the Soul itself’. . . .

“And yet notwithstanding, though these Things exist only in the Mind, they are not therefore mere *Figments* of the Understanding. . . .

“It is evident that though the Mind

This reply, though scanty and undeveloped, is in my judgment both valid, as it negatives the Subject pure and simple, and affirms that to every conception in the mind, there must correspond a Concept out of (or rather along with) the mind (the one correlating with or implying the other)—and correct as far as it goes, in declaring what that Concept is. Such Concept is, or may be, the Form. Parmenides does not show that it is not so. He proceeds to impugn, by a second argument, the assertion of Sokrates—that the form is a Conception *wholly within* the mind: he goes on to argue that individual things (which are *out of* the mind) cannot participate in these Forms (which are asserted to be altogether *in* the mind): because, if that were admitted, either every such thing must be a Conciptent, or must run into the contradiction of being a *Conceptio non concipiens*.¹ Now this argument may refute the affirmation of Sokrates literally taken, that the Form is a Conception entirely belonging to the mind, and having nothing Objective corresponding to it—but does not refute the doctrine that the Form is a Concept correlating with the mind—or out of the mind as well as in it. In this as in other Concepts, the subjective point of view preponderates over the objective, though Object is not altogether eliminated: just as, in the particular external things, the objective point of view predominates, though Subject cannot be altogether dismissed. Neither Subject nor Object can ever entirely disappear: the one is the inseparable correlative and complement of the other: but sometimes the subjective point of view may preponderate, some-

thinks of these Things at pleasure, yet they are not arbitrarily framed by the Mind, but have certain, determinate, and immutable Natures of their own, which are independent upon the Mind, and which are blown (*quare not blown*) away into Nothing at the pleasure of the same Being that arbitrarily made them."

It is an inadvertence on the part of Cudworth to cite this passage of the Parmenides as authenticating Plato's opinion that Forms or Ideas existed only in the mind. Certainly Sokrates is here made to express that opinion, among others; but the opinion is refuted by Parmenides and dropped by Sokrates. But the very different opinion, which Cudworth accuses Aristotle of *wrongly* attributing to Plato,

is repeated by Sokrates in the Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere, and never refuted.

¹ On this point the argument in the dialogue itself, as stated by Parmenides, is not clear to follow. Strümpell remarks on the terms employed by Plato. "Der Umstand, dass die Ausdrücke εἶδος und ἰδέα nicht sowie λόγος den Unterschied, zwischen Begriff und dem durch diesen begriffenen Realen, hervortreten lassen—sondern, weil dieselben bald im subjektiven Sinne den Begriff, bald im objektiven Sinne das Reale bezeichnen—bald in der einen bald in der andern Bedeutung zu nehmen sind—kann leicht eine Verwechslung und Unklarheit in der Auffassung veranlassen," &c. (Gesch. der Gr. Philos. s. 90, p. 115).

times the objective. Such preponderance (or logical priority), either of the one or the other, may be implied or connoted by the denomination given. Though the special connotation of the name creates an illusion which makes the preponderant point of view seem to be all, and magnifies the Relatum so as to eclipse and extinguish the Correlatum—yet such preponderance, or logical priority, is all that is really meant when the Concepts are said to be "*in the mind*"—and the Percepts (Percepta, things perceived) to be "*out of the mind*": for both Concepts and Percepts are "*of the mind, or relative to the mind*".¹

The question—What is the real and precise meaning attached to abstract and general words?—has been debated down to this day, and is still under debate. It seems to have first derived its importance, if not its origin, from Sokrates, who began the practice of inviting persons to define the familiar generalities of ethics and politics, and then tested by cross-examination the definitions given by men who thought that common sense would enable any one to define.² But I see no ground for believing that Sokrates ever put to himself the question—Whether that which an abstract term denotes is a mental conception, or a separate and self-existent reality. That question was raised by Plato, and first stands clearly brought to view here in the Parmenidēs.

If we follow up the opinion here delivered by the Platonic Sokrates, together with the first correction added to it by Parmenides, amounting to this—That the Form is a Conception of the mind with its corresponding Concept: if, besides, we dismiss the doctrine held by Plato, that the Form is a separate self-

¹ This preponderance of the Objective point of view, though without altogether eliminating the Subjective, includes all that is true in the assertion of Aristotle, that the *Perceptum* is prior to the *Perceptant*—the *Perceptum* prior to the *Perceptionis Capax*. He assimilates the former to a *Movens*, the latter to a *Motum*. But he declares that he means not a priority in time or real existence, but simply a *priority in nature or logical priority*; and he also declares the two to be relatives or reciproca. The *Prius* is relative to the

Posterior, as the Posterior is relative to the *Prius*.—*Metaphys.* Γ. 1010, b. 36 seq. ἀλλ' ἔστι τι καὶ ἔτερον παρὰ τὴν αἰσθησίν, ὃ ἀνάγκη πρότερον εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως· τὸ γὰρ κινεῖν τοῦ κινουμένου φύσει πρότερόν ἐστι· καὶ εἰ λέγεται πρὸς ἄλλα ταῦτα, οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

See respecting the πρότερον φύσει, *Aristot. Categor.* p. 12, b. 5-15, and *Metaphys.* Δ. 1018, b. 12—ἀπλῶς καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερον.

² *Aristotel. Metaphys.* A. 987, b. 3. M. 1078, b. 18-32.

existent unchangeable Ens (*ἐν παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ*): there will then be no greater difficulty in understanding how it can be partaken by, or be at once in, many distinct particulars, than in understanding (what is at bottom the same question) how one and the same attribute can belong at once to many different objects: how hardness or smoothness can be at once in an indefinite number of hard and smooth bodies dispersed everywhere.¹ The object and the attribute are both of them relative to the same percipient and concipient mind: we may perceive or conceive many objects as distinct individuals—we may also conceive them all as resembling in a particular manner, making abstraction of the individuality of each: both these are psychological facts, and the latter of the two is what we mean when we say, that all of them possess or participate in one and the same attribute. The concrete term, and its corresponding abstract, stand for the same facts of sense differently conceived. Now the word *one*, when applied to the attribute, has a different meaning from *one* when applied to an individual object. Plato speaks sometimes elsewhere as if he felt this diversity of meaning: not however in the *Parmenidēs*, though there is great demand for it. But Aristotle (in this respect far superior) takes much pains to point out that

¹ That "the attribute is in its subject," is explained by Aristotle only by saying That it is in its subject, not as a part in the whole, yet as that which cannot exist apart from its subject (*Categor.* 1, a. 30—3, a. 30). Compare Hobbes, *Comput. or Logic.* iii. 3, vii. 3. Respecting the number of different modes *τοῦ ἐν τινι εἶναι*, see *Aristot. Physic.* iii. p. 210, a. 18 seq., with the *Scholia*, p. 373 Brandis, and p. 446, 10 Brand. The commentators made out, variously, nine, eleven, sixteen distinct *τρόποις τοῦ ἐν τινι εἶναι*. In the language of Aristotle, *genus, species, εἶδος*, and even *differentia* are not *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ*, but are predicated *καθ' ὑποκειμένον* (see *Cat.* p. 3, a. 20). The *propriūm* and *accidens* alone are *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ*. Here is a difference between his language and that of Plato, according to whom *τὸ εἶδος* is *ἐν ἐκάστῳ τῶν πολλῶν* (*Parmenid.* 181 A). But we remark in that same dialogue, that when *Parmenides* questions *Sokrates* whether he recognises *εἶδη αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά*, he first asks whether *Sokrates*

admits *δικαίον τι εἶδος αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό, καὶ καλοῦ, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ πάντων τῶν τοιούτων*. *Sokrates* answers without hesitation, *Yes*. Then *Parmenides* proceeds to ask, Do you recognise an *εἶδος* of man, separate and apart from all of us individual men?—or an *εἶδος* of fire, water, and such like? Here *Sokrates* hesitates: he will neither admit nor deny it (130 D). The first list, which *Sokrates* at once accepts, is of what Aristotle would call *accidents*: the second, which *Sokrates* doubts about, is of what Aristotle would call *second substances*. We thus see that the conception of a self-existent *εἶδος* realised itself most easily and distinctly to the mind of Plato in the case of *accidents*. He would, therefore, naturally conceive *τὰ εἶδη* as being *ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ*, agreeing substantially, though not in terms, with Aristotle. It is in the case of accidents or attributes that abstract names are most usually invented; and it is the abstract name, or the neuter adjective used as its equivalent, which suggests the belief in an *εἶδος*.

Unum Ens—and the preposition *In* (to be *in* any thing)—are among the *πολλαχῶς λεγόμενα*, having several different meanings derived from one primary or radical by diverse and distant ramifications.¹ The important logical distinction between *Unum numero* and *Unum specie* (or *genere*, &c.) belongs first to Aristotle.²

Plato has not followed out the hint which he has here put into the mouth of Sokrates in the *Parmenides*—That the Ideas or Forms are conceptions existing only in the mind. Though the opinion thus stated is not strictly correct and is so pointed out by himself, as falling back too exclusively on the subjective—yet if followed out, it might have served to modify the too objective and absolute character which in most dialogues (though not in the *Sophistês*) he ascribes to his Forms or Ideas: laying stress upon them as objects—and as objects not of sensible perception—but overlooking or disallowing the fact of their being relative to the concipient mind. The bent of Plato's philosophy was to dwell upon these Forms, and to bring them into harmonious conjunction with each other: he neither took pains, nor expected, to make them fit on to the world of sense. With Aristotle, on the contrary, this last-mentioned purpose is kept very generally in view. Amidst all the extreme abstractions

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. 1015-1016, I. 1052, a. 29 seq. τὰ μὲν δὲ οὕτως ἐν ἡ συννεχὲς ἢ ὅλον· τὰ δὲ ὧν ἂν ὁ λόγος εἰς ἴψ' τοιαῦτα δὲ ὧν ἡ νόσις μία, &c.

About abstract names, or the names of attributes, see Mr. John Stuart Mill's 'System of Logic,' i. 2, 4, p. 30, edit. 6th. "When only one attribute, neither variable in degree nor in kind, is designated by the name—as visible-ness, tangibleness, equality, &c.—though it denotes an attribute of many different objects, the attribute itself is always considered as *one*, not as *many*." Compare, also, on this point, p. 153, and a note added by Mr. Mill to the fifth edition, p. 203, in reply to Mr. Herbert Spencer. The *oneness* of the attribute, in different subjects, is not conceded by every one. Mr. Spencer thinks that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in Subject A, and another attribute, though exactly like it, in Subject B (*Principles of Psychology*, p. 128 seq.) Mr. Mill's view appears the correct one; but the dis-

tinction (pointed out by Archbishop Whately) between *undistinguishable likeness* and *positive identity*, becomes in these cases imperceptible or forgotten.

Aristotle, however, in the beginning of the *Categories* ranks ἡ τίς γοαυματικὴ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ (pp. 1, 8, 8), which I do not understand; and it seems opposed to another passage, pp. 3, 6, 15.

The argument between two such able thinkers as Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer, illustrates forcibly the extreme nicety of this question respecting the One and the Many, under certain supposable circumstances. We cannot be surprised that it puzzled the dialecticians of the Platonic Aristotelian age, who fastened by preference on points of metaphysical difficulty.

² See interesting remarks on the application of this logical distinction in Galen, *De Methodo Medendi*, Book iii. vol. x. p. 130 seq. Aristotle and Theophrastus both dwelt upon it.

which he handles, he reverts often to the comparison of them with sensible particulars : indeed Substantia Prima was by him, for the first time in the history of philosophy, brought down to designate the concrete particular object of sense : in Plato's Phædon, Republic, &c., the only Substances are the Forms or Ideas.

Parmenides now continues the debate. He has already fastened upon Sokrates several difficult problems : he now proposes a new one, different and worse. Which way are we to turn then, if these Forms be beyond our knowledge? I do not see my way (says Sokrates) out of the perplexity. The fact is, Sokrates (replies Parmenides), you have been too forward in producing your doctrine of Ideas, without a sufficient preliminary exercise and enquiry. Your love of philosophical research is highly praiseworthy : but you must employ your youth in exercising and improving yourself, through that continued philosophical discourse which the vulgar call *useless prosing* : otherwise you will never attain truth.¹ You are however right in bestowing your attention, not on the objects of sense, but on those objects which we can best grasp in discussion, and which we presume to exist as Forms.²

Continuation of the Dialogue—Parmenides admonishes Sokrates that he has been premature in delivering a doctrine, without sufficient preliminary exercise.

What sort of exercise must I go through? asks Sokrates. Zeno (replies Parmenides) has already given you a good specimen of it in his treatise, when he followed out the consequences flowing from the assumption—"That the self-existent and absolute Ens is plural". When you are trying to find out the truth on any question, you must assume provisionally, first the affirmative and then the negative, and you must then follow out patiently the consequences deducible from one hypothesis as well as from the other. If you are enquiring about the Form of Likeness, whether it exists or does not exist, you must assume successively

What sort of exercise? Parmenides describes : To assume provisionally both the affirmative and the negative of many hypotheses about the most general terms, and to trace

¹ Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 C. Πρὶν γάρ, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὃ Σώκρατες, ὀρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν . . . καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὐ ἰσθί, ἣ ὁρμὴ ἦν ὁρμᾶς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἔλκυσον

δὲ σπυρὸν καὶ γυμνάσαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀκρίστου εἶναι καὶ καλοῦ μένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἴ· εἰ δὲ μὴ, σὲ διαφενέεται ἢ ἀλήθεια.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 135 E.

the consequences of each. both one and the other ;¹ marking the deductions which follow, both with reference to the thing directly assumed, and with reference to other things also. You must do the like if you are investigating other Forms—Unlike-ness, Motion, and Rest, or even Existence and Non-Existence. But you must not be content with following out only one side of the hypothesis : you must examine both sides with equal care and impartiality. This is the only sort of preparatory exercise which will qualify you for completely seeing through the truth.²

You propose to me, Parmenides (remarks Sokrates), a work of awful magnitude. At any rate, show me an example of it yourself, that I may know better how to begin. —Parmenides at first declines, on the ground of his old age : but Zeno and the others urge him, so that he at length consents.—The process will be tedious (observes Zeno) ; and I would not ask it from Parmenides unless among an audience small and select as we are here. Before any numerous audience, it would be an unseemly performance for a veteran like him. For most people are not aware that, without such discursive survey and travelling over the whole field, we cannot possibly attain truth or acquire intelligence.³

It is especially on this ground—the small number and select character of the auditors—that Parmenides suffers himself to be persuaded to undertake what he calls “amusing ourselves with a laborious pastime”.⁴ He selects, as the subject of his dialectical exhibition, his own doctrine respecting the One. He proceeds to

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 136 A. καὶ αὐθὺς αὖ ἐὰν ὑποθῇ, εἰ ἴσθιν ὁμοιότης ἢ εἰ μὴ ἴσθιν, τί ἐφ' ἑκατέρας τῆς ὑποθέσεως συμβήσεται, καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑποθετοῦσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 136 B.

³ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 136 D. εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ᾗμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἄξιον ᾗν δεῖσθαι· ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἀλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτω· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης, ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεῖ νοῦν σχεῖν. Hobbes re-

marks (*Computatio sive Logica*, i. 3, 12): “Learners ought to go through logical exercises silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly”. Proklos tells us, that the difficulty of the *γυμνασία*, here set out by the Platonic Parmenides, is so prodigious, that no one after Plato employed it. (*Prok. ad Parmen.* p. 801, Stallh.)

⁴ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 137 A. οἷ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν . . . ἢ βούλεσθε ἐπειδὴ περ δοκεῖ πραγματεῖσθαι καὶ διὰν παίζειν, &c.

trace out the consequences which flow, first, from assuming the affirmative thesis, *Unum Est*: next, from assuming the negative thesis, or the Antithesis, *Unum non Est*. The consequences are to be deduced from each hypothesis, not only as regards *Unum* itself, but as regards *Cætera*, or other things besides *Unum*. The youngest man of the party, Aristoteles, undertakes the duty of respondent.

The remaining portion of the dialogue, half of the whole, is occupied with nine distinct deductions or demonstrations given by Parmenides. The first five start from the assumption, *Unum Est*: the last four from the assumption, *Unum non Est*. The three first draw out the deductions from *Unum Est*, in reference to *Unum*: the fourth and fifth draw out the consequences from the same premiss, in reference to *Cætera*. Again, the sixth and seventh start from *Unum non Est*, to trace what follows in regard to *Unum*: the eighth and ninth adopt the same hypothesis, and reason it out in reference to *Cætera*.

Of these demonstrations, one characteristic feature is, that they are presented in antagonising pairs or Antinomies: except the third, which professes to mediate between the first and second, though only by introducing new difficulties. We have four distinct Antinomies: the first and second, the fourth and fifth, the sixth and seventh, the eighth and ninth, stand respectively in emphatic contradiction with each other. Moreover, to take the demonstrations separately—the first, fifth, seventh, ninth, end in conclusions purely negative: the other four end in double and contradictory conclusions. The purpose is formally proclaimed, of showing that the same premisses, ingeniously handled, can be made to yield these contradictory results.¹ No attempt is made to reconcile the contradictions, except partially by means of the third, in reference to the two preceding. In regard to the fourth and fifth, sixth and seventh, eighth and ninth, no hint is given that they

Exhibition of Parmenides—Nine distinct deductions or Demonstrations, first from *Unum est*—next from *Unum non est*.

The Demonstrations in antagonising pairs, or Antinomies. Perplexing entanglement of conclusions given without any explanation.

¹ See the connecting words between the first and second demonstration, pp. 142 A, 159. *Ὁκούν ταῦτα μὲν ἦδη ἴμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἐν εἰ ἔστιν, ἀρα καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ οὕτω μόνον;* Also p. 163 B.

can be, or afterwards will be, reconciled. The dialogue concludes abruptly at the end of the ninth demonstration, with these words: "We thus see that—whether Unum exists or does not exist—Unum and Cætera both are, and are not, all things in every way—both appear, and do not appear, all things in every way—each in relation to itself, and each in relation to the other".¹ Here is an unqualified and even startling announcement of double and contradictory conclusions, obtained from the same premisses both affirmative and negative: an announcement delivered too as the fulfilment of the purpose of Parmenides. Nothing is said at the end to intimate how the demonstrations are received by Sokrates, nor what lesson they are expected to administer to him: not a word of assent, or dissent, or surprise, or acknowledgment in any way, from the assembled company, though all of them had joined in entreating Parmenides, and had expressed the greatest anxiety to hear his dialectic exhibition. Those who think that an abrupt close, or an abrupt exordium, is sufficient reason for declaring a dialogue not to be the work of Plato (as Platonic critics often argue), are of course consistent in disallowing the Parmenides. For my part, I do not agree in the opinion. I take Plato as I find him, and I perceive both here and in the Protagoras and elsewhere, that he did not always think it incumbent upon him to adapt the end of his dialogues to the beginning. This may be called a defect, but I do not feel called upon to make out that Plato's writings are free from defects; and to acknowledge nothing as his work unless I can show it to be faultless.

The demonstrations or Antinomies in the last half of the Parmenides are characterised by K. F. Hermann and others as a masterpiece of speculative acuteness. Yet if these same demonstrations, constructed with care and labour for the purpose of proving that the same premisses will conduct to double and contradictory conclusions, had come down to us from antiquity under the name either of the Megaric Eukleides, or Protagoras, or Gorgias—many of the Platonic critics would probably have

¹ Plato, Parmenid. ad fin. Εἰρήσθω τὰλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα τοῖνυν τοῦτό τε καὶ ὅτι, ὡς εἴκεν, ἐν πάντα πάντως ἐστὶ τε καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ καὶ εἰς ἐστὶν εἴτε μὴ ἐστὶν, αὐτό τε καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.

said of them (what is now said of the sceptical treatise remaining to us under the name of Gorgias) that they were poor productions worthy of such Sophists, who are declared to have made a trade of perverting truth. Certainly the conclusions of the demonstrations are specimens of that "Both and Neither," which Plato (in the Euthydemus¹) puts into the mouth of the Sophist Dionysodorus as an answer of slashing defiance—and of that intentional evolution of contradictions which Plato occasionally discountenances, both in the Euthydemus and elsewhere.² And we know from Proklus³ that there were critics in ancient times, who depreciated various parts of the Parmenides as sophistical. Proklus himself denies the charge with some warmth. He as well as the principal Neo-Platonists between 200-530 A.D. (especially his predecessors and instructors at Athens, Jamblichus, Syrianus, and Plutarchus) admired the Parmenides as a splendid effort of philosophical genius in its most exalted range, inspired so as to become cognizant of superhuman persons and agencies. They all agreed so far as to discover in the dialogue a sublime vein of mystic theology and symbolism: but along with this general agreement, there was much discrepancy in their interpretation of particular parts and passages. The commentary of Proklus attests the existence of such debates, reporting his own dissent from the interpretations sanctioned by his venerated masters, Plutarchus and Syrianus. That commentary, in spite of its prolixity, is curious to read as a specimen of the fifth century, A.D., in one of its most eminent representatives. Proklus discovers a string of theological symbols and a mystical meaning throughout the whole dialogue: not merely in the acute argumentation which characterises its middle part, but also in the perplexing antinomies of its close, and even in the dramatic

¹ Plato, Euthydem. p. 300 C. 'Ἄλλ' οὐ τοῦτο ἐρωτῶ, ἀλλὰ τὰ πάντα σιγῇ ἢ λέγει: Οὐδέτερα καὶ ἀμφοτέρω, εἴη ὑφαρπάσας ὁ Διονυσόδωρος· ἐγὼ γὰρ οἶδα ὅτι τῇ ἀποκρίσει οὐχ ἔξεις ὁ, τι χρῆσθαι.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 259 B. εἶπε ὅτι τι χαλεπὸν κατανενοηκώς χαίρει, τοτὶ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τοτὶ δ' ἐπὶ θάτερα τοῦ λόγου ἔλκων, οὐκ ἔστι πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐσπούδακεν, ὥς οἱ νῦν λόγοι φασίν.—Also p. 259 D. Τὸ δὲ ταῦτόν ἕτερον ἀποφαίνειν ἀμύνει γέ πῃ, καὶ τὸ θάτερον

ταῦτόν, καὶ τὸ μέγα σμικρόν, καὶ τὸ ὁμοῖον ἀνόμοιον, καὶ χαίρειν οὕτω τάναντία αἰεὶ προφέροντα ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ τέ τις ἐλεγχος οὕτως ἀληθινός, ἀρτί τε τῶν ὄντων τινὲς ἐφαπτομένου δηλὸς νεογενῆς ὢν.

³ Proklus, ad Platon. Parmen. p. 963, ed. Stallb.; compare p. 976 in the last book of the commentary, probably composed by Damaskius. K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der Platon. Philos. p. 507.

details of places, persons, and incidents, with which it begins.¹

The various explanations of it given by more recent commentators may be seen enumerated in the learned Prolegomena of Stallbaum,² who has also set forth his own views at considerable length. And the prodigious opposition between the views

¹ This commentary is annexed to Stallbaum's edition of the Parmenides. Compare also the opinion of Marinus (disciple and biographer of Proklus) about the Parmenides—Suidas v. *Μαρίνος*. Jamblichus declared that Plato's entire theory of philosophy was embodied in the two dialogues, Parmenides and Timæus: in the Parmenides, all the intelligible or universal *Entia* were deduced from τὸ εἶναι: in the Timæus, all cosmical realities were deduced from the Demiurgus. Proklus ad Timæum, p. 5 A, p. 10 Schneider.

Altkinos, in his Introduction to the Platonic Dialogues (c. 6, p. 159, in the Appendix Platonica attached to K. F. Hermann's edition of Plato) quotes several examples of syllogistic reasoning from the Parmenides, and affirms that the ten categories of Aristotle are exhibited therein.

Plotinus (Ennead. v. 1, 8) gives a brief summary of what he understood to be contained in the Antinomies of the Platonic Parmenides; but the interpretation departs widely from the original.

I transcribe a few sentences from the argument of Ficinus, to show what different meanings may be discovered in the same words by different critics. (Ficini Argum. in Plat. Parmen. p. 756.) "Cum Plato per omnes ejus dialogos totius sapientie semina sparserit, in libris De Republica cuncta moralis philosophiae instituta collegit, omnem naturalium rerum scientiam in Timæo, universam in Parmenide complexus est Theologiam. Cumque in aliis longo intervallo cæteros philosophos antecesserit, in hoc tandem seipsum superasse videtur. Hic enim divus Plato de ipso Uno subtilissimè disputat: quemadmodum Ipsum Unum rerum omnium principium est, super omnia, omniaque ab illo: quo pacto ipsum extra omnia sit et in omnibus: omniaque ex illo, per illud, atque ad illud. Ad hujus, quod super essentiam est, Unius intelligentiam gradatim ascendit. In his quæ fiunt et sensibus subjiciuntur et sensibilia nominantur: In his

etiam quæ semper eadem sunt et sensibilia nuncupantur, non sensibus amplius sed solâ mente percipienda: Nec in his tantum, verum etiam supra sensum et sensibilia, intellectumque et intelligibilia:—Ipsum Unum existit. —Illud insuper advertendum est, quod in hoc dialogo cum dicitur *Unum*, Pythagoreorum more quæque substantia a materiâ penitus absolute significari potest: ut Deus, Mens, Anima. Cum vero dicitur Aliud et Alia, tam materia, quam illa quæ in materiâ sunt, intelligere licet."

The Prolegomena, prefixed by Thomson to his edition of the Parmenides, interpret the dialogue in the same general way as Proklus and Ficinus: they suppose that by Unum is understood Summus Deus, and they discover in the concluding Antinomies theological demonstrations of the unity, simplicity, and other attributes of God. Thomson observes, very justly, that the Parmenides is one of the most difficult dialogues in Plato (Prolegom. iv.-x.) But in my judgment, his mode of exposition, far from smoothing the difficulties, adds new ones greater than those in the text.

² Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Parmen. ii. 1, pp. 244-285. Compare K. F. Hermann, Gesch. und Syst. der Platon. Phil. pp. 507-668-670.

To the works which he has there enumerated, may be added the Dissertation by Dr. Kuno Fischer, Stuttgart, 1851, De Parmenide Platónico, and that of Zeller, Platonische Studien, p. 169 seqq.

Kuno Fischer (pp. 102-103) after Hegel (Gesch. der Griech. Phil. i. p. 202), and some of the followers of Hegel, extol the Parmenides as a masterpiece of dialectics, though they complain that "der philosophirende Pöbel" misunderstand it, and treat it as obscure. Werder, Logik, pp. 92-176, Berlin, 1841. Carl Beck, Platon's Philosophie im Abriss ihrer genetischen Entwicklung, p. 75, Reutlingen, 1852. Marbach, Gesch. der Griech. Phil. sect. 96, pp. 210-211.

of Proklus (followed by Ficinus in the fifteenth century), who extols the Parmenides as including in mystic phraseology sublime religious truths—and those of the modern Tiedemann, who despises them as foolish subtleties and cannot read them with patience—is quite sufficient to inspire a reasonable Platonic critic with genuine diffidence.

In so far as these different expositions profess, each in its own way, to detect a positive dogmatical result or purpose in the Parmenides,¹ none of them carry conviction to my mind, any more than the mystical interpretations

No dogmatical solution or purpose is

¹ I agree with Schleiermacher, in considering that the purpose of the Parmenides is nothing beyond *γυμνασία*, or exercise in the method and perplexities of philosophising (Einkl. p. 83): but I do not agree with him, when he says (pp. 90-105) that the objections urged by Parmenides (in the middle of the dialogue) against the separate substantiality of Forms or Ideas, though noway answered in the dialogue itself, are sufficiently answered in other dialogues (which he considers later in time), especially in the Sophistes (though, according to Brandis, Handb. Gr.-Röm. Phil. p. 241, the Sophistes is earlier than the Parmenides). Zeller, on the other hand, denies that these objections are at all answered in the Sophistes; but he maintains that the second part of the Parmenides itself clears up the difficulties propounded in the first part. After an elaborate analysis (in the Platon. Studien, pp. 168-178) of the Antinomies or contradictory Demonstrations in the concluding part of the dialogue, Zeller affirms the purpose of them to be "die richtige Ansicht von den Ideen als der Einheit in dem Mannichfaltigen der Erscheinung dialektisch zu begründen, die Ideenlehre möglichen Einwürfen und Missverständnissen gegenüber dialektisch zu begründen" (pp. 180-182). This solution has found favour with some subsequent commentators. See Susemihl, Die genetische Entwicklung der Platon. Philosophie, pp. 341-353; Heinrich Stein, Vorgeschichte und System des Platonismus, pp. 217-220.

To me it appears (what Zeller himself remarks in p. 188, upon the discovery of Schleiermacher that the objections started in the Parmenides are answered in the Sophistes) that it

requires all the acuteness of so able a writer as Zeller to detect any such result as that which he here extracts from the Parmenidean Antinomies—from what Aristeides calls (Or. xlvii. p. 430) "the One and Many, the multiplied twists and doublings, of this divine dialogue". I confess that I am unable to perceive therein what Zeller has either found or elicited. Objections and misunderstandings (Einwürfe und Missverständnisse), far from being obviated or corrected, are accumulated from the beginning to the end of these Antinomies, and are summed up in a formidable total by the final sentence of the dialogue. Moreover, none of these objections which Parmenides had advanced in the earlier part of the dialogue are at all noticed, much less answered, in the concluding Antinomies.

The general view taken by Zeller of the Platonic Parmenides, is repeated by him in his Phil. der Griech. vol. ii. pp. 394-415-429, ed. 2nd. In the first place, I do not think that he sets forth exactly (see p. 415) the reasoning as we read it in Plato; but even if that were exactly set forth, still what we read in Plato is nothing but an assemblage of difficulties and contradictions. These are indeed suggestive, and such as a profound critic may meditate with care, until he finds himself put upon a train of thought conducting him to conclusions sound and tenable in his judgment. But the explanations, sufficient or not, belong after all not to Plato but to the critic himself. Other critics may attach, and have attached, totally different explanations to the same difficulties. I see no adequate evidence to bring home any one of them to Plato; or to prove (what is the main point to be determined) that any one of them

wrapped up in the dialogue. The purpose is negative, to make a theorist keenly feel all the difficulties of theorising.

which we read in Proklus. If Plato had any such purpose, he makes no intimation of it, directly or indirectly. On the contrary, he announces another purpose not only different, but contrary. The veteran Parmenides, while praising the ardour of speculative research displayed by Sokrates, at the same time reproves gently, but distinctly, the confident forwardness of two such immature youths as Sokrates and Aristotle in laying down positive doctrines without the preliminary exercise indispensable for testing them.¹ Parmenides appears from the beginning to the end of the dialogue as a propounder of doubts and objections, not as a doctrinal teacher. He seeks to restrain the haste of Sokrates—to make him ashamed of premature affir-

was present to his mind when he composed the dialogue.

Schwegler also gives an account of what he affirms to be the purpose and meaning of the Parmenides—"The positive meaning of the antinomies contained in it can only be obtained by inferences which Plato does not himself expressly enunciate, but leaves to the reader to draw" (*Geschichte der Philosophie im Umrisse*, sect. 14, 4 c. pp. 52-53, ed. 5).

A learned man like Schwegler, who both knows the views of other philosophers, and has himself reflected on philosophy, may perhaps find affirmative meaning in the Parmenides; just as Sokrates, in the Platonic Protagoras, finds his own ethical doctrine in the song of the poet Simonides. But I venture to say that no contemporary reader of Plato could have found such a meaning in the Parmenides; and that if Plato intended to communicate such a meaning, the whole structure of the dialogue would be only an elaborate puzzle calculated to prevent nearly all readers from reaching it.

By assigning the leadership of the dialogue to Parmenides (Schwegler says) Plato intends to signify that the Platonic doctrine of Ideas is coincident with the doctrine of Parmenides, and is only a farther development thereof. How can this be signified, when the discourse assigned to Parmenides consists of a string of objections against the doctrine of Ideas, concluding with an intimation that there are other objections, yet stronger, remaining behind?

The fundamental thought of the

Parmenides (says Schwegler) is, that the One is not conceivable in complete abstraction from the Many, nor the Many in complete abstraction from the One,—that each reciprocally supposes and serves as condition to the other. Not so; for if we follow the argumentation of Parmenides (p. 131 E), we shall see that what he principally insists upon, is the entire impossibility of any connection or participation between the One and the Many—there is an impassable gulf between them.

Is the discussion of $\tau\acute{o} \delta\epsilon$ (in the closing Antinomies) intended as an example of dialectic investigation—or is it *per se* the special object of the dialogue? This last is clearly the truth (says Schwegler), "otherwise the dialogue would end without result, and its two portions would be without any internal connection". Not so; for if we read the dialogue, we find Parmenides clearly proclaiming and singling out $\tau\acute{o} \delta\epsilon$ as only one among a great many different notions, each of which must be made the subject of a bilateral hypothesis, to be followed out into its consequences on both sides (p. 136 A). Moreover, I think that the "internal connection" between the first and the last half of the dialogue, consists in the application of this dialectic method, and in nothing else. If the dialogue ends without result, this is true of many other Platonic dialogues. The student is brought face to face with logical difficulties, and has to find out the solution for himself; or perhaps to find out that no solution can be obtained.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 135 C.

mation and the false persuasion of knowledge—to force upon him a keen sense of real difficulties which have escaped his notice. To this end, a specimen is given of the exercise required. It is certainly well calculated to produce the effect intended—of hampering, perplexing, and putting to shame, the affirmative rashness of a novice in philosophy. It exhibits a tangled skein of ingenious contradiction which the novice must somehow bring into order, before he is in condition to proclaim any positive dogma. If it answers this purpose, it does all that Parmenides promises. Sokrates is warned against attaching himself exclusively to one side of an hypothesis, and neglecting the opposite : against surrendering himself to some pre-conception, traditional, or self-originated, and familiarising his mind with its consequences, while no pains are taken to study the consequences of the negative side, and bring them into comparison. It is this one-sided mental activity, and premature finality of assertion, which Parmenides seeks to correct. Whether the corrective exercises which he prescribes are the best for the purpose, may be contested : but assuredly the malady which he seeks to correct is deeply rooted in our human nature, and is combated by Sokrates himself, though by other means, in several of the Platonic dialogues. It is a rare mental endowment to study both sides of a question, and suspend decision until the consequences of each are fully known.

Such, in my judgment, is the drift of the contradictory demonstrations here put into the mouth of Parmenides respecting Unum and Cætera. Thus far at least, we are perfectly safe : for we are conforming strictly to the language of Plato himself in the dialogue : we have no proof that he meant anything more. Those who presume that he must have had some ulterior dogmatical purpose, place themselves upon hypothetical ground : but when they go farther and attempt to set forth what this purpose was, they show their ingenuity only by bringing out what they themselves have dropped in. The number of discordant hypotheses attests¹ the difficulty of the problem. I agree with those

This negative purpose is expressly announced by Plato himself. All dogmatical purpose, extending farther, is purely hypothetical, and even inconsistent with what is declared.

¹ Proklus ad Platon. Parmen. l. pp. 482-485, ed. Stallb. ; compare pp. 497-498-788-791, where Proklus is himself copious upon the subject of exercise in dialectic method. Stallbaum, after reciting many dif-

early Platonic commentators (mentioned and opposed by Proklus) who could see no other purpose in these demonstrations than that of dialectical exercise. In this view Schleiermacher, Ast, Strümpell, and others mainly concur: the two former however annexing to it a farther hypothesis—which I think improbable—that the dialogue has come to us incomplete; having once contained at the end (or having been originally destined to contain, though the intention may never have been realised) an appendix elucidating the perplexities of the demonstrations.¹ This would have been inconsistent with the purpose declared by Parmenides: who, far from desiring to facilitate the onward march of Sokrates by clearing up difficulties, admonishes him that he is advancing too rapidly, and seeks to keep him back by giving him a heap of manifest contradictions to disentangle. Plato conceives the training for philosophy or for the highest exercise of intellectual force, to be not less laborious than that which was required for the bodily perfections of an Olympic athlete. The student must not be helped out of difficulties at once: he must work his own way slowly out of them.

That the demonstrations include assumption both unwarranted and contradictory, mingled with sophistical subtlety (in the modern sense of the words), is admitted by most of the commentators: and I think that the real

The Demon-
strations or
Antinomies
considered.

ferent hypothetical interpretations from those interpreters who had preceded him, says (Prolegg. p. 266), "En lustravimus tandem varias interpretum de hoc libro opiniones. Quid igitur? verumne fui, quum supra dicerem, tantam fuisse hominum eruditorum in eo explicando fluctuationem atque disensionem, ut quamvis plurimi de eo disputaverint, tamen fere alius aliter judicaverit? Nimrum his omnibus cognitâ, facilis alicui in mentem veniat Terentianum illud—*Fecisti propâ, multo sin quam dudum incertior.*"

Brandis (Handbuch Gr.-Röm. Phil. s. 105, pp. 257-258) cannot bring himself to believe that dialectical exercise was the only purpose with which Plato composed the Parmenides. He then proceeds to state what Plato's ulterior purpose was, but in such very vague language, that I hardly understand what he means, much less can I find it in the Antinomies themselves. He has some clearer language, p. 241, where

he treats these Antinomies as preparatory *ἄσκησις*.

¹ Ast, Platon's Leben und Schriften, pp. 239-244; Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Parmen. pp. 94-99; Strümpell, Geschichte der Theoretischen Philosophie der Griechen, sect. 96, pp. 128-129.

I do not agree with Socher's conclusion, that the Parmenides is not a Platonic composition. But I think he is quite right in saying that the dialogue as it now stands performs all that Parmenides promises, and leaves no ground for contending that it is an unfinished fragment (Socher, Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 286), so far as philosophical speculation is concerned. The dialogue as a dramatic or literary composition undoubtedly lacks a proper close; it is *ἀσπύς* or *κόλοβος* (Aristot. Rhetor. iii. 8), sinning against the strict exigence which Plato in the Phædrus applies to the discourse of Lysias.

amount of it is greater than they admit. How far Plato was himself aware of this, I will not undertake to say. Perhaps he was not. The reasonings which have passed for sublime and profound in the estimation of so many readers, may well have appeared the same to their author. I have already remarked that Plato's ratiocinative force is much greater on the negative side than on the positive : more ingenious in suggesting logical difficulties than sagacious in solving them. Impressed, as Sokrates had been before him, with the duty of combating the false persuasion of knowledge, or premature and untested belief, —he undertook to set forth the pleadings of negation in the most forcible manner. Many of his dialogues manifest this tendency, but the *Parmenides* more than any other. That dialogue is a collection of unexplained *ἀπορίαι* (such as those enumerated in the second book of Aristotle's *Metaphysica*) brought against a doctrine which yet Plato declares to be the indispensable condition of all reasoning. It concludes with a string of demonstrations by which contradictory conclusions (*Both* and *Neither*) are successively proved, and which appear like a *reductio ad absurdum* of all demonstration. But at the time when Plato composed the dialogue, I think it not improbable that these difficulties and contradictions appeared even to himself unanswerable : in other words, that he did not himself see any answers and explanations of them. He had tied a knot so complicated, that he could not himself untie it. I speak of the state of Plato's mind when he wrote the *Parmenides*. At the dates of other dialogues (whether earlier or later), he wrote under different points of view ; but no key to the *Parmenides* does he ever furnish.

If however we suppose that Plato must have had the key present to his own mind, he might still think it right to employ, in such a dialogue, reasonings recognised by himself as defective. It is the task imposed upon Sokrates to find out and expose these defective links. There is no better way of illustrating how universal is the malady of human intelligence—unexamined belief and over-confident affirmation—as it stands proclaimed to be in the Platonic Apology. Sokrates is exhibited in the *Parmenides* as placed under the screw of the *Elenchus*, and no more able than others

They include much unwarranted assumption and subtlety. Collection of unexplained perplexities or *ἀπορίαι*.

Even if Plato himself saw through these subtleties, he might still choose to impose and to heap up difficulties in the way of a forward affirmative aspirant.

to extricate himself from it, when it is applied by Parmenides : though he bears up successfully against Zeno, and attracts to himself respectful compliments, even from the aged dialectician who tests him. After the Elenchus applied to himself, Sokrates receives a farther lesson from the "Neither and Both" demonstrations addressed by Parmenides to the still younger Aristotle. Sokrates will thus be driven, with his indefatigable ardour for speculative research; to work at the problem—to devote to it those seasons of concentrated meditation, which sometimes exhibited him fixed for hours in the same place and almost in the same attitude¹—until he can extricate himself from such difficulties and contradictions. But that he shall not extricate himself without arduous mental effort, is the express intention of Parmenides: just as the Xenophontic Sokrates proceeds with the youthful Euthydemus—and the Platonic Sokrates with Lysis, Theætetus, and others. Plausible subtlety was not unsuitable for such a lesson.² Moreover, in the Parmenides, Plato proclaims explicitly that the essential condition of the lesson is to be strictly private: that a process so roundabout and tortuous cannot be appreciated by ordinary persons, and would be unseemly before an audience.³ He selects as respondent the youngest person in the company, one still younger than Sokrates: because (he says) such a person will reply with artless simplicity, to each question as the question may strike him—not carrying his mind forward to the ulterior questions for which his reply may furnish the handle—not afraid of being entangled in puzzling inconsistencies—not solicitous to baffle the purpose of

¹ Plato, Symposium, p. 220 C-D: compare pp. 174-175.

In the dialogue Parmenides (p. 130 E), Parmenides himself is introduced as predicting that the youthful Sokrates will become more and more absorbed in philosophy as he advances in years.

Proklos observes in his commentary on the dialogue—ὁ γὰρ Σωκράτης ἀγεται τὰς ἀπορίας, &c. (L. v. p. 252).

² Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2, ad fin.

³ Plato, Parmenid. pp. 136 C, 137 A. Hobbes remarks (Computatio sive Logica, Part I. ch. iii. s. 12). "Learners ought to go through logical exercises

silently and by themselves: for it will be thought both ridiculous and absurd, for a man to use such language publicly".

Proklos tells us, that the difficulty of the γυμνασία here enjoined by the Platonic Parmenides is so prodigious, that no one after Plato employed it (Prokl. ad Parmenid. p. 306, p. 801, Stallb.).

εἰ μὲν οὖν πλείους ἦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ἔξιον ἦν δεῖσθαι. ἀπρεπὴ γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πολλῶν ἐναντίον λέγειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ τηλικούτων· ἀγνοοῦσι γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὅτι ἀνευ ταύτης τῆς διὰ πάντων διεξόδου καὶ πλάνης ἀδύνατον ἐντυχόντα τῷ ἀληθεὶ νοῦν σχεῖν.

the interrogator.¹ All this betokens the plan of the dialogue—to bring to light all those difficulties which do not present themselves except to a keen-sighted enquirer.

We must remark farther, that the two hypotheses here handled at length by Parmenides are presented by him only as examples of a dialectical process which he enjoins the lover of truth to apply equally to many other hypotheses.² As he shows that in the case of Unum, each of the two assumptions (Unum est—Unum non est) can be traced through different threads of deductive reasoning so as to bring out double and contradictory results—Both and Neither: so also in the case of those other assumptions which remain to be tested afterwards in like manner, antinomies of the same character may be expected: antinomies apparent at least, if not real—which must be formally propounded and dealt with, before we can trust ourselves as having attained reasoned truth. Hence we see that, negative and puzzling as the dialogue called Parmenides is, even now—it would be far more puzzling if all that it prescribes in general terms had been executed in detail. While it holds out, in the face of an aspirant in philosophy, the necessity of giving equal presumptive value to the affirmative and negative sides of each hypothesis, and deducing with equal care, the consequences of both—it warns him at the same time of the contradictions in which he will thereby become involved. These contradictions are presented in the most glaring manner: but we must recollect a striking passage in the Republic, where Plato declares that to confront the aspirant with manifest contradictions, is the best way of provoking him to intellectual effort in the higher regions of speculation.³

The exercises exhibited by Parmenides are exhibited only as illustrative specimens of a method enjoined to be applied to many other Antinomies.

I have already had occasion, when I touched upon the other *viri*

¹ Plato, Parmenides, p. 137 B; compare Sophistes, p. 217 D.

To understand the force of this remark of Parmenides, we should contrast it with the precepts given by Aristotle in the Topica for dialectic debate; precepts teaching the questioner how to puzzle, and the respondent how to avoid being puzzled. Such precautions are advised to the

respondent by Aristotle, not merely in the Topica but also in the Analytica—*καὶ δ' ὅταν φυλάττεσθαι παραγγέλλομεν ἀποκρινόμενους, αὐτοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας πειράσθαι λανθάνειν* (Anal. Priora, ii. p. 66, a. 33).

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 B.

³ Plato, Repub. vii. p. 524 E, and indeed the whole passage, pp. 523-524.

These Platonic Antinomies are more formidable than any of the sophisms or subtleties broached by the Megaric philosophers.

Socratici, contemporaneous with or subsequent to Plato, to give some account of the Zenonian and Megaric dialecticians, and of their sophisms or logical puzzles, which attracted so much attention from speculative men, in the fourth and third centuries B.C. These Megarics, like the Sophists, generally receive very harsh epithets from the historian of philosophy. They took the negative side, impugned affirmative dogmas, insisted on doubts and difficulties, and started problems troublesome to solve. I have tried to show, that such disputants, far from deserving all the censure which has been poured upon them, presented one indispensable condition to the formation of any tolerable logical theory.¹ Their sophisms were challenges to the logician, indicating various forms of error and confusion, against which a theory of reasoning, in order to be sufficient, was required to guard. And the demonstrations given by Plato in the latter half of the *Parmenides* are challenges of the same kind: only more ingenious, elaborate, and effective, than any of those (so far as we know them) proposed by the Megarics—by Zeno, or Eukleides, or Diodorus Kronus. The Platonic *Parmenides* here shows, that in regard to a particular question, those who believe the affirmative, those who believe the negative, and those who believe neither—can all furnish good reasons for their respective conclusions. In each case he gives the proof confidently as being good: and whether unimpeachable or not, it is certainly very ingenious and subtle. Such demonstrations are in the spirit of Sextus Empiricus, who rests his theory of scepticism upon the general fact, that there are opposite and contradictory conclusions, both of them supported by evidence equally good: the affirmative no more worthy of belief than the negative.² Zeno (or, as Plato calls him, the Eleatic

¹ Among the commentators on the *Categories* of Aristotle, there were several whose principal object it was to propound all the most grave and troublesome difficulties which they could think of. Simplicius does not commend the style of these men, but he expresses his gratitude to them for the pains which they had taken in the exposition of the negative case, and for the stimulus and opportunity which they had thus administered to the work

of affirmative exposition (Simplicius, *Schol. ad Categ. Aristot.* p. 40, a. 22-30; *Schol. Brandis*). David the Armenian, in his *Schol. on the Categories* (p. 27, b. 41, *Brandis*), defends the *Topica* of Aristotle as having been composed γυμνασίας χάριν, ἵνα θάβομαιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν ἐφ' ἐκείναις ἀπαιρημάτων ἀπογεννήσῃ τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας φῶς.

² *Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot.* i. 8-12. Ἔστι δὲ ἡ σκεπτικὴ δύναμις ἀντιθετικὴ

Palamêdes¹) did not profess any systematic theory of scepticism ; but he could prove by ingenious and varied dialectic, both the thesis and the antithesis on several points of philosophy, by reasons which few, if any, among his hearers could answer. In like manner the Platonic Parmenides enunciates his contradictory demonstrations as real logical problems, which must exercise the sagacity and hold back the forward impulse of an eager philosophical aspirant. Even if this dilemma respecting *Unum Est* and *Unum non Est*, be solved, Parmenides intimates that he has others in reserve : so that either no tenable positive result will ever be attained—or at least it will not be attained until after such an amount of sagacity and patient exercise as Sokrates himself declares to be hardly practicable.² Herein we may see the germ and premisses of that theory which was afterwards formally proclaimed by *Ænesidemus* and the professed Sceptics : the same holding back (*ἐποχή*), and protest against precipitation in dogmatising,³ which these latter converted into a formula and vindicated as a system.

Schleiermacher has justly observed,⁴ that in order to understand properly the dialectic manœuvres of the Parmenides, we ought to have had before us the works of that philosopher himself, of Zeno, Melissus, Gorgias, and other sceptical reasoners of the age immediately preceding—which have unfortunately perished. Some reference to these must probably have been present to Plato in the composition of this dialogue.⁵ At the same time, if we accept the dialogue as being (what it declares itself to be) a string of objections and dialectical problems, we shall take care not to look for

In order to understand fully the Platonic Antinomies, we ought to have before us the problems of the Megarics and others. Uselessness of searching for a positive result.

φαινομένων τε καὶ νοουμένων καθ' οἰονδήποτε τρόπον, ἀφ' ἧς ἐρχόμεθα, διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀντικειμένοις πράγμασι καὶ λόγοις ἰσοσθένειαν, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς ἐποχὴν τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦτο εἰς ἀταράξιαν . . . ἰσοσθένειαν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν κατὰ πίστιν καὶ ἀπιστίαν ἰσότητά, ὡς μηδὲνα μηδενὸς προκεισθαι τῶν μαχομένων λόγων ὡς πιστότερον . . . συντάσσει δὲ τῆς σκεπτικῆς ἰσότητος ἀρχὴν μάλιστα τὸ παντὶ λόγον λόγον ἰσὸν ἀντικεῖσθαι.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 261 D.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 136 C-D.

³ *Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hyp.* i. 20-212.

τὴν τῶν δογματικῶν προπέτειαν — τὴν δογματικὴν προπέτειαν.

⁴ Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Parmen.* pp. 97-99.

⁵ Indeed, the second demonstration, among the nine given by Parmenides (pp. 143 A, 155 C), coincides to a great degree with the conclusion which Zeno is represented as having maintained in his published dissertation (p. 127 E); and shows that the difficulties and contradictions belong to the world of invisible Ideas, as well as to that of

any other sort of merit than what such a composition requires and admits. If the objections are forcible, the problems ingenious and perplexing, the purpose of the author is satisfied. To search in the dialogue for some positive result, not indeed directly enunciated but discoverable by groping and diving—would be to expect a species of fruit inconsistent with the nature of the tree. *Ζητῶν εὐρήσεις οὐ ρόδον ἀλλὰ βάτον.*

It may indeed be useful for the critic to perform for himself the process which Parmenides intended Sokrates to perform; and to analyse these subtleties with a view to measure their bearing upon the work of dogmatic theorising. We see double and contradictory conclusions elicited, in four separate Antinomies, from the same hypothesis, by distinct chains of interrogatory deduction; each question being sufficiently plausible to obtain the acquiescence of the respondent. The two assumptions successively laid down by Parmenides as *principia* for deduction—*Si Unum est—Si Unum non est*—convey the very minimum of determinate meaning. Indeed both words are essentially indeterminate. Both Unum and Ens are declared by Aristotle to be not univocal or generic words,¹ though at the same time not absolutely equivocal: but words bearing several distinct transi-

sensible particulars, which Sokrates had called in question (p. 129 C-E).

The Aristotelian treatise (whether by Aristotle, Theophrastus, or any other author) *De Zenone, Melisso, Xenophane, et Gorgia*—affords some curious comparisons with the Parmenides of Plato. Aristotel. p. 974 seq. Bekk.; also *Fragments Philosophorum Græcorum*, ed. Didot, pp. 273-309.

¹ Aristot. *Metaphys.* iv. 1015-1017, ix. 1062, a. 15; *Anal. Poster.* ii. p. 92, b. 14. τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐκ οὐσία οὐδενί, οὐ γὰρ γένος τὸ ὅν.—*Topica*, iv. p. 127, a. 28. πλείω γὰρ τὰ πᾶσιν ἐπομένω· ὅλον τὸ ὅν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῶν πᾶσιν ἐπομένω ἔστιν, *Physica*, i. p. 185, b. 6.

Simplikius noted it as one among the differences between Plato and Aristotle—That Plato admitted Unum as having only one meaning, not being aware of the diversity of meanings which it bore; while Aristotle expressly pointed it out as a *πολλὰς λέγμενον*. Παρμενίδης γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὅν φησι, Πλάτων δὲ

τὸ ἐν μοναχῶς λέγεσθαι, ὃ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀμφότερα πολλάς (Schol. ad Aristot. *Sophist.* Elench. p. 320, b. 3, Brandis). Aristotle farther remarks that Plato considered τὸ γένος as ἐν ἀριθμῷ, and that this was an error; we ought rather to say that Plato did not clearly discriminate ἐν ἀριθμῷ from ἐν εἶδει (Aristot. *Topic.* vi. 143, b. 30).

Simplikius farther remarks, that it was Aristotle who first rendered to Logic the important service of bringing out clearly and emphatically the idea of τὸ ὁμώνυμον—the same word with several meanings either totally distinct and disparate, or ramifying in different directions from the same root, so that there came to be little or no affinity between many of them. It was Aristotle who first classified and named these distinctions (*συνώνυμον—ὁμώνυμον*, and the intermediate *κατ' ἀναλογίαν*), though they had been partially noticed by Plato and even by Sokrates. *ἔως*

tional meanings, derived either from each other, or from some common root, by an analogy more or less remote. Aristotle characterises in like manner all the most indeterminate predicates, which are not included in any one distinct category among the ten, but are made available to predication sometimes in one category, sometimes in another: such as *Ens*, *Unum*, *Idem*, *Diversum*, *Contrarium*, &c. Now in the Platonic *Parmenides*, the two first among these words are taken to form the proposition assumed as fundamental datum, and the remaining three are much employed in the demonstration: yet Plato neither notices nor discriminates their multifarious and fluctuating significations. Such contrast will be understood when we recollect that the purpose of the Platonic *Parmenides* is, to propound difficulties; while that of Aristotle is, not merely to propound, but also to assist in clearing them up.

Certainly, in Demonstrations 1 and 2 (as well as 4 and 5), the foundation assumed is in words the same proposition—*Si Unum est*: but we shall find this same proposition used in two very different senses. In the first Demonstration, the proposition is equivalent to *Si Unum est Unum*:¹ in the second, to *Si Unum est Ens*, or *Si Unum existit*. In the first the proposition is identical and the verb *est* serves only as copula: in the second, the verb *est* is not merely a copula but implies *Ens* as a predicate, and affirms existence. We might have imagined that the identical proposition—*Unum est Unum*—since it really affirms nothing—would have been barren of all consequences: and so indeed it is barren of all affirmative consequences. But Plato obtains for it one first step in the way of negative predicates—*Si Unum est Unum, Unum non est Multa*: and from hence he proceeds, by a series of gentle transitions ingeniously managed, to many other negative predications respecting the subject *Unum*. Since it is not *Multa*, it can have no parts, nor can it be a whole: it has neither beginning, middle, nor end: it has no boundary, or it is boundless: it has no figure, it is neither straight nor circular: it has therefore no place, being

In the Platonic Demonstrations the same proposition in words is made to bear very different meanings.

Αριστοτέλους οὐ πάντων ἐκδηλον ἦν τὸ ὁμώνυμον· ἀλλὰ Πλάτων τε ἤρξατο περὶ τούτου ἢ μᾶλλον ἐκείνου Σωκράτης,

Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. p. 323, b. 24, Brandis.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 137 C, 142 B.

neither in itself, nor in anything else : it is neither in motion nor at rest : it is neither the same with anything else, nor the same with itself : ¹ it is neither different from any thing else, nor different from itself : it is neither like, nor unlike, to itself, nor to anything else : it is neither equal, nor unequal, to itself nor to any thing else : it is neither older nor younger, nor of equal age, either with itself or with anything else : it exists therefore not in time, nor has it any participation with time : it neither has been nor will be, nor is : it does not exist in any way : it does not even exist so as to be Unum : you can neither name it, nor reason upon it, nor know it, nor perceive it, nor opine about it.

All these are impossibilities (concludes Plato). We must

First Demonstration ends in an assemblage of negative conclusions. *Reductio ad Absurdum* of the assumption—Unum non Multa.

therefore go back upon the fundamental principle from which we took our departure, in order to see whether we shall not obtain, on a second trial, any different result.²

Here then is a piece of dialectic, put together with ingenuity, showing that everything can be denied, and that nothing can be affirmed of the subject—

Unum. All this follows, if you concede the first step, that Unum is not Multa. If Unum be said to have any other attribute except that of being Unum, it would become at once Multa. It cannot even be declared to be either the same with itself, or different from any thing else ; because Idem and Diversum are distinct natures from Unum, and if added to it would convert it into Multa.³ Nay it cannot even be affirmed to be itself : it cannot be named or enunciated : if all predicates are denied, the subject is denied along with them : the subject is nothing but the sum total of its predicates—and when they are all withdrawn, no subject remains. As far as I can understand the bearing of this self-contradictory demonstration, it appears a *reductio ad absurdum* of the proposition—*Unum is not Multa*. Now *Unum which is not Multa* designates the *Αἰὼν-Ἐν* or Unum Ideale ; which Plato himself affirmed, and which Aristotle impugned.⁴ If this be what is meant, the dialogue Parmenides

¹ This part of the argument is the extreme of dialectic subtlety, p. 139 C-D-E. stration 1, and is stated pp. 139 D, 140 A, compared with p. 137 C.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 142 A.

³ This is the main point of Demon-

⁴ Aristot. Metaph. A. 987, b. 20 ; A. 992, a. 8 ; B. 1001, a. 27 ; I. 1053, b. 18. Some ancient expositors thought that

would present here, as in other places, a statement of difficulties understood by Plato as attaching to his own doctrines.

Parmenides now proceeds to his second demonstration : professing to take up again the same hypothesis—*Si* Second De. *Unum est*—from which he had started in the first ¹—monstration. but in reality taking up a different hypothesis under the same words. In the first hypothesis, *Si Unum est*, was equivalent to, *Si Unum est Unum* : nothing besides *Unum* being taken into the reasoning, and *est* serving merely as copula. In the second, *Si Unum est*, is equivalent to, *Si Unum est Ens*, or exists : so that instead of the isolated *Unum*, we have now *Unum Ens*.² Here is a duality consisting of *Unum* and *Ens* : which two are considered as separate or separable factors, coalescing to form the whole *Unum Ens*, each of them being a part thereof. But each of these parts is again dual, containing both *Unum* and *Ens* : so that each part may be again divided into lesser parts, each of them alike dual : and so on ad infinitum. *Unum Ens* thus contains an infinite number of parts, or is *Multa*.³ But even *Unum*

the purpose of Plato in the Parmenides was to demonstrate this *Αὐτὸ·ἓν* ; see Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph. p. 786, a. 10, Brandis.

It is not easy to find any common bearing between the demonstrations given in this dialogue respecting *ἓν* and *Πολλά*—and the observations which Plato makes in the *Philébus* upon *ἓν* and *Πολλά*. Would he mean to include the demonstrations which we read in the Parmenides, in the category of what he calls in *Philébus* “childish, easy, and irrational debates on that vexed question?” (Plato, *Philébus*, p. 14 D). Hardly : for they are at any rate most elaborate as well as ingenious and suggestive. Yet neither do they suit the description which he gives in *Philébus* of the genuine, serious, and difficult debates on the same question.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 142 A. *Βούλει οὖν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπόθεσιν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπανιλεῖν, εἰς τι ἡμῖν ἐπανιούσιν ἀλοῦτον φανῆ;*

² This shifting of the real hypothesis, though the terms remain unchanged, is admitted by implication a little afterwards, p. 142 B. *νῦν δὲ οὐχ αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἡ ὑπόθεσις, εἰ ἓν ἓν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἓν ἐστὶν.*

³ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 142-143. This

is exactly what Sokrates in the early part of the dialogue (p. 129 B-D) had pronounced to be utterly inadmissible, viz. : That *δὲ ἐστὶν ἓν* should be *πολλά*—that *δὲ ἐστὶν ὁμοίον* should be *ἀνόμοιον*. The essential characteristic of the Platonic Ideas is here denied. However, it appears to me that Plato here reasons upon two contradictory assumptions ; first, that *Unum Ens* is a total composed of two parts separately assignable—*Unum* and *Ens* ; next, that *Unum* is not assignable separately from *Ens*, nor *Ens* from *Unum*. Proceeding upon the first, he declares *Unum Ens* to be divisible : proceeding upon the second, he declares that the division must be carried on ad infinitum, because you can never reach either the separate *Ens* or the separate *Unum*. But these two assumptions cannot be admitted both together. Plato must make his election ; either he takes the first, in which case the total *Unum Ens* is divisible, and its two factors, *Unum* and *Ens*, can be assigned separately ; or he takes the second, in which case *Unum* and *Ens* cannot be assigned separately—are not distinguishable factors,—so that *Unum Ens* instead of being infinitely divisible, is not divisible at all.

The reasoning as it now stands is, in my judgment, fallacious.

itself (Parmenides argues), if we consider it separately from *Ens* in which it participates, is not *Unum* alone, but *Multa* also. For it is different from *Ens*, and *Ens* is different from it. *Unum* therefore is not merely *Unum* but also *Diversum*: *Ens* also is not merely *Ens* but *Diversum*. Now when we speak of *Unum* and *Ens*—of *Unum* and *Diversum*—or of *Ens* and *Diversum*—we in each case speak of two distinct things, each of which is *Unum*. Since each is *Unum*, the two things become three—*Ens*, *Diversum*, *Unum*—*Unum*, *Diversum*, *Unum*—*Unum* being here taken twice. We thus arrive at two and three—twice and thrice—odd and even—in short, number, with its full extension and properties. *Unum* therefore is both *Unum* and *Multa*—both *Totum* and *Partes*—both finite and infinite in multitude.¹

Parmenides proceeds to show that *Unum* has beginning, middle, and end—together with some figure, straight or curved: and that it is both in itself, and in other things: that it is always both in motion and at rest:² that it is both the same with itself and different from itself—both the same with *Cætera*, and different from *Cætera*:³ both like to itself, and unlike to itself—both like to *Cætera*, and unlike to *Cætera*:⁴ that it both touches, and does not touch, both itself and *Cætera*:⁵ that it is both equal, greater, and less, in number, as compared with itself and as compared with *Cætera*:⁶ that it is both older than itself, younger than itself, and of the same age with itself—both older than *Cætera*, younger than *Cætera*, and of the same age as *Cætera*—also that it is not older nor younger either than itself or than *Cætera*:⁷ that it grows both older and younger than itself, and than *Cætera*.⁸ Lastly, *Unum* was, is, and will be; it has been, is, and will be generated: it has had, has now, and will have, attributes and predicates: it can be named, and can be the object of perception, conception, opinion, reasoning, and cognition.⁹

¹ Plato, *Parmen.* pp. 144 A-E, 145 A.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 146 A-B.

³ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 146-147 C.

⁴ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 148 A-D.

⁵ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 149 A-D.

⁶ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 150-151 D.

⁷ Plato, *Parmen.* pp. 152-153-154 A.

⁸ Plato, *Parmenid.* pp. 154 B, 155 C.
κατὰ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα, τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων πρεσβύτερον καὶ νεώτερον ἔστι τε καὶ γίγνεται, καὶ οὐτε πρεσβύτερον οὐτε νεώτερον οὐδ' ἔστιν οὐτε γίγνεται οὐτε αὐτοῦ οὐτε τῶν ἄλλων.

⁹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 155 C-D.

Here Parmenides finishes the long *Demonstratio Secunda*, which completes the first Antinomy. The last conclusion of all, with which it winds up, is the antithesis of that with which the first Demonstration wound up: affirming (what the conclusion of the first had denied) that *Unum* is thinkable, perceivable, nameable, knowable. Comparing the second Demonstration with the first, we see—That the first, taking its initial step, with a negative proposition, carries us through a series of conclusions every one of which is negative (like those of the second figure of the Aristotelian syllogism):—That whereas the conclusions professedly established in the first Demonstration are all in *Neither* (*Unum* is neither in itself nor in any thing else—neither at rest nor in motion—neither the same with itself nor different from itself, &c.), the conclusions of the second Demonstration are all in *Both* (*Unum* is both in motion and at rest, both in itself and in other things, both the same with itself and different from itself):—That in this manner, while the first Demonstration denies both of two opposite propositions, the second affirms them both.

Such a result has an air of startling paradox. We find it shown, respecting various pairs of contradictory propositions, first, that both are false—next, that both are true. This offends doubly against the logical canon, which declares, that of two contradictory propositions, one must be true, the other must be false. We must remember, that in the Platonic age, there existed no systematic logic—no analysis or classification of propositions—no recognised distinction between such as were contrary, and such as were contradictory. The Platonic Parmenides deals with propositions which are, to appearance at least, contradictory: and we are brought, by two different roads, first to the rejection of both, next to the admission of both.¹

Startling paradox—Open offence against logical canon—No logical canon had then been laid down.

¹ Prantl (in his *Geschichte der Logik*, vol. i. s. 3, pp. 70-71-73) maintains, if I rightly understand him, not only that Plato did not adopt the *principium identitatis et contradictionis* as the basis of his reasonings, but that one of Plato's express objects was to demonstrate the contrary of it, partly in the *Philébus*, but especially in the *Parmenides*:—

“Eine arge Täuschung ist es, zu glauben, dass das principium identitatis et contradictionis oberstes logisches Princip des Plato sei . . . Es ist gerade eine Hauptaufgabe, welche sich Plato stellen musste, die Coexistenz der Gegensätze nachzuweisen, wie diess bekanntlich im *Philébus* und besonders im *Parmenides* geschieht.”

According to this view, the Antino-

How can this be possible? How can these four propositions all be true—*Unum est Unum—Unum est Multa—Unum non est Unum—Unum non est Multa*? Plato suggests a way out of the difficulty, in that which he gives as Demonstration 3. It has been shown that Unum "partakes of time"—was, is, and will be. The propositions are all true, but true at different times: one at this time, another at that time.¹ Unum acquires and loses existence, essence, and other attributes: *now*, it exists and is Unum—*before*, it did not exist and was not Unum: so too it is alternately like and unlike, in motion and at rest. But how is such alternation or change intelligible? At each time, whether present or past, it must be either in motion or at rest: at no time, neither present nor past, can it be *neither* in motion *nor* at rest. It cannot, while in motion, change to rest—nor, while at rest, change to motion. No time can be assigned for the change: neither the present, nor the past, nor the future: how then can the change occur at all?²

To this question the Platonic Parmenides finds an answer in what he calls the *Sudden* or the *Instantaneous*: an anomalous nature which lies out of, or apart from, the course of time, being neither past, present, nor future. That which changes, changes at once and suddenly: at an instant when it is neither in motion nor at rest. This *Suddenly* is a halt or break in the flow of time:³ an extra-temporal condition, in which the subject has

mies in the Parmenides are all of them good proofs, and the conclusions of all of them, summed up as they are in the final sentence of the dialogue, constitute an addition to the positive knowledge of Sokrates. I confess that this to me is unintelligible. I understand these Antinomies as *aporias* to be cleared up, but in no other character.

Frankl speaks (p. 73) of "die antinomische Begründung der Ideenlehre im Parmenides," &c. This is the same language as that used by Zeller, upon which I have already remarked.

¹ This is a distinction analogous to that which Plato points out in the Sophistes (pp. 242-243) between the theories of Herakleitos and Empedoklēs.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 156.

³ Plato, Parmenid. p. 156 E. ἀλλ' ἡ ἐξαίφνης αὕτη φύσις ἀνωπός τις ἐγκάθεται μεταξὺ τῆς κινήσεως τε καὶ στάσεως, ἐν χρόνῳ οὐδενὶ οὖσα, καὶ εἰς ταύτην δὴ καὶ ἐκ ταύτης τό τε κινούμενον μεταβάλλει ἐνὶ τῷ ἰσθάναι, καὶ τὸ ἰσθάνε ἐνὶ τῷ κινεῖσθαι. καὶ τὸ ἐν δὴ, εἴπερ ἰσθάνε τε καὶ κινεῖται, μεταβάλλει ἐν ἐφ' ἑκάτερα· μόνος γὰρ ἐν οὕτως ἀμφοτέρω τοιοῦ· μεταβάλλον δ' ἐξαίφνης μεταβάλλει, καὶ ὅτε μεταβάλλει, ἐν οὐδενὶ χρόνῳ ἐν εἴῃ, οὐδὲ κινεῖτ' ἐν τότε, οὐδ' ἐν σναιε.

Τὸ ἐξαίφνης—ἡ ἐξαίφνης φύσις ἀνωπός τις—may be compared to an infinitesimal; analogous to what is recognised in the theory of the differential calculus.

no existence, no attributes—though it revives again forthwith clothed with its new attributes: a point of total negation or annihilation, during which the subject with all its attributes disappears. At this interval (the *Suddenly*) all predicates may be truly denied, but none can be truly affirmed.¹ Unum is neither at rest, nor in motion—neither like nor unlike—neither the same with itself nor different from itself—neither Unum nor Multa. Both predicates and Subject vanish. Thus all the negations of the first Demonstration are justified. Immediately before the *Suddenly*, or point of change, Unum was in motion—immediately after the change, it is at rest: immediately before, it was like—equal—the same with itself—Unum, &c.—immediately after, it is unlike—unequal—different from itself—Multa, &c. And thus the double and contradictory affirmative predications, of which the second Demonstration is composed, are in their turn made good, as successive in time. This discovery of the extra-temporal point *Suddenly*, enables Parmenides to uphold both the double negative of the first Demonstration, and the double affirmative of the second.

The theory here laid down in the third Demonstration respecting this extra-temporal point—the *Suddenly*—deserves all the more attention, because it applies not merely to the first and second Demonstration which precede it, but also to the fourth and fifth, the sixth and seventh, the eighth and ninth, which follow it. I have already observed, that the first and second Demonstration form a corresponding pair, branching off from the same root or hypothetical proposition (at least the same in terms), respecting the subject *Unum*; and destined to prove, one the Neither, the other the Both, of several different predicates. So also the fourth and fifth form a pair applying to the subject *Cætera*; and destined to prove, that from

Review of the successive pairs of Demonstrations or Antinomies in each, the first proves the Neither, the second proves the Both.

¹ This appears to be an illustration of the doctrine which Lassalle ascribes to Herakleitus; perpetual implication of negativity and positivity—des Nichtseins mit dem Sein: perpetual absorption of each particular into the universal; and perpetual reappearance as an opposite particular. See the two elaborate volumes of Lassalle upon

Herakleitus, especially i. p. 358, ii. p. 258. He scarcely however takes notice of the Platonic Parmenides.

Some of the Stoics considered τὸ νῦν as μὴδὲν—and nothing in time to be real except τὸ παρῳχρὸς and τὸ μέλλον (Plutarch, De Commun. Notitiis contra Stoicos, p. 1081 D).

the same hypothetical root—*Si Unum est*—we can deduce the Neither as well as the Both, of various predicates of *Cætera*. When we pass on to the four last Demonstrations, we find that in all four, the hypothesis *Si Unum non est* is substituted for that of *Si Unum est*: but the parallel couples, with the corresponding purpose, are still kept up. The sixth and seventh apply to the subject *Unum*, and demonstrate respecting that subject (proceeding from the hypothesis *Si Unum non est*) first the *Both*, then the *Neither*, of various predicates: the eighth and ninth arrive at the same result, respecting the subject *Cætera*. And a sentence at the close sums up in few words the result of all the four pairs (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9, that is, of all the Demonstrations excepting the third)—the Neither and the Both respecting all of them.

To understand these nine Demonstrations properly, therefore, we ought to consider eight among them (1-2, 4-5, 6-7, 8-9) as four Antinomies, or couples establishing dialectic contradictions: and the third as a mediator between the couples—announced as if it reconciled the contradictions of the first Antinomy, and capable of being adapted, in the same character with certain modifications, to the second, third, and fourth Antinomy. Whether it reconciles them successfully—in other words, whether the third Demonstration will itself hold good—is a different question. It will be found to involve the singular and paradoxical (Plato's own phrase) doctrine of the extra-temporal *Suddenly*—conceiving Time as a *Discretum* and not a *Continuum*. This doctrine is intended by Plato here as a means of rendering the fact of change logically conceivable and explicable. He first states briefly the difficulty (which we know to have been largely insisted on by Diodorus Kronus and other Megarics) of logically explaining the fact of change—and then enunciates this doctrine as the solution. We plainly see that it did not satisfy others—for the puzzle continued to be a puzzle long after—and that it did not even satisfy Plato, except at the time when he composed the *Parmenides*—since neither the doctrine itself (the extra-temporal break or transition) nor the very peculiar phrase in which it is embodied (*τὸ ἐξαίφνης, ἀνωτάς τις φύσις*) occur in any of his other dialogues. If the doctrine were really tenable, it would have been of use in dialectic, and as such, would have

The third Demonstration is mediatorial, but not satisfactory.—The hypothesis of the Sudden or Instantaneous found no favour.

been called in to remove the theoretical difficulties raised among dialectical disputants, respecting time and motion. Yet Plato does not again advert to it, either in Sophistes or Timæus, in both of which there is special demand for it.¹ Aristotle, while he adopts a doctrine like it (yet without employing the peculiar phrase τὸ ἐξαιφνης) to explain qualitative change, does not admit the same either as to quantitative change, or as to local motion, or as to generation and destruction.² The doctrine served the purpose of the Platonic Parmenides, as ingenious, original, and provocative to intellectual effort: but it did not acquire any permanent footing in Grecian dialectics.

The two last Antinomies, or four last Demonstrations, have, in common, for their point of departure, the negative proposition, *Si Unum non est*: and are likewise put together in parallel couples (6-7, 8-9), a Demonstration and a Counter-Demonstration—a Both and a Neither: first with reference to the subject *Unum*—next with reference to the subject *Cætera*.

Si Unum est—Si Unum non est. Even from such a proposition as the first of these, we might have thought it difficult to deduce any string of consequences—which Plato has already done: from such a proposition as the second, not merely difficult, but impossible. Nevertheless the ingenious dialectic of Plato accomplishes the task, and elicits from each proposition a Both, and a Neither, respecting several predicates of *Unum* as well as of *Cætera*. When you say *Unum non est* (so argues the Platonic Parmenides in Demonstration 6), you deny existence respecting *Unum*: but the proposition *Unum non est*, is distinguishable from *Magnitudo non est—Parvitas non est*—and such like: propositions wherein the subject is different, though the predicate is the same: so that

Review of
the two
last Anti-
nomies.
Demonstra-
tions VI.
and VII.

¹ Steinhart represents this idea of τὸ ἐξαιφνης—the extra-temporal break or zero of transition—as an important progress made by Plato, compared with the Theætetus, because it breaks down the absolute Gegensatz between Sein and Werden, Ruhe and Bewegung (Einleitung zum Parmen. p. 300).

Surely, if Plato had considered it a progress, we should have seen the same idea repeated in various other dialogues—which is not the case.

² Aristotel. Physic. v. p. 235, b. 82,

with the Scholion of Simplicius, p. 410, b. 20, Brandis.

The discussion occupies two or three pages of Aristotle's Physica. In regard to ἀλλοίωσις or qualitative change, he recognised what he called ἀδρόαν μεταβολήν—a change all at once, which occupied no portion of time. It is plain, however, that even his own scholars Theophrastus and Eudemus had great difficulty in accepting the doctrine; see Scholia, pp. 409-410-411, Brandis.

Unum non Ens is still a Something knowable, and distinguishable from other things—a logical subject of which various other predicates may be affirmed, though the predicate of existence cannot be affirmed.¹ It is both like and unlike, equal and unequal—like and equal to itself, unlike and unequal to other things.² These its predicates being all true, are also real existences: so that *Unum* partakes *quodam modo* in existence: though *Unum* be *non-Ens*, nevertheless, *Unum non-Ens est*. Partaking thus both of non-existence and of existence, it changes: it both moves and is at rest: it is generated and destroyed, yet is also neither generated nor destroyed.³

Having thus deduced from the fundamental principle this string of Both opposite predicates, the Platonic Parmenides reverts (in Demonstration 7) to the same principium (*Si Unum non est*) to deduce by another train of reasoning the Neither of these predicates. When you say that *Unum non est*, you must mean that it does not partake of existence in any way—absolutely and without reserve. It therefore neither acquires nor loses existence: it is neither generated nor destroyed: it is neither in motion nor at rest: it partakes of nothing existent: it is neither equal nor unequal—neither like nor unlike—neither great nor little—neither this, nor that: neither the object of perception, nor of knowledge, nor of opinion, nor of naming, nor of debate.⁴

These two last counter-demonstrations (6 and 7), forming the third Antinomy, deserve attention in this respect—That the seventh is founded upon the genuine Parmenidean or Eleatic doctrine about Non-Ens, as not merely having no attributes, but as being unknowable, unperceivable, unnameable: while the sixth is founded upon a different apprehension of Non-Ens, which is explained and defended by Plato in the Sophistes, as a substitute for, and refutation of, the Eleatic doctrine.⁵ According to

¹ Plato, Parmenid. pp. 160-161 A. εἶναι μὲν ὅτι τῷ ἐνὶ οὐκ οἶόν τε, εἴπερ γε μὴ ἔστιν, μετέγειν δὲ πολλῶν οὐδὲν πωλεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀνάγκη, εἴπερ τὸ γε ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο μὴ ἔστιν. εἰ μόντοι μῆτε τὸ ἐν μῆτ' ἐκείνῳ μὴ ἔσται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἄλλου τοῦ ὁ λόγος, οὐδὲ φθέγγεσθαι δεῖ οὐδέν· εἰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἐκείνῳ καὶ μὴ ἄλλο ὑποκαίται μὴ εἶναι, καὶ τοῦ ἐκείνου

καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν ἀνάγκη αὐτῷ μεταίνα.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 161 C-D.

³ Plato, Parmenid. pp. 162-163 A.

The steps by which these conclusions are made out are extremely subtle, and hardly intelligible to me.

⁴ Plato, Parmenid. pp. 163-164 A.

⁵ Plato, Sophistes, pp. 258-259.

Number 7, when you deny, of *Unum*, the predicate existence, you deny of it also all other predicates: and the name *Unum* is left without any subject to apply to. This is the Eleatic dogma. *Unum* having been declared to be *Non-Ens*, is (like *Non-Ens*) neither knowable nor nameable. According to Number 6, the proposition *Unum est non-Ens*, does not carry with it any such consequences. Existence is only one predicate, which may be denied of the subject *Unum*, but which, when denied, does not lead to the denial of all other predicates—nor, therefore, to the loss of the subject itself. *Unum* still remains *Unum*, knowable, and different from other things. Upon this first premiss are built up several other affirmations; so that we thus arrive circuitously at the affirmation of existence, in a certain way: *Unum*, though non-existent, does nevertheless exist *quodam modo*. This coincides with that which the Eleatic stranger seeks to prove in the *Sophistes*, against *Parmenides*.

If we compare the two foregoing counter-demonstrations (7 and 6), we shall see that the negative results of the seventh follow properly enough from the assumed premisses: but that the affirmative results of the sixth are not obtained without very unwarrantable jumps in the reasoning, besides its extreme subtlety. But apart from this defect, we farther remark that here also (as in Numbers 1 and 2) the fundamental principle assumed is in terms the same, in signification materially different. The signification of *Unum non est*, as it is construed in Number 7, is the natural one, belonging to the words: but as construed in Number 6, the meaning of the predicate is altogether effaced (as it had been before in Number 1): we cannot tell what it is which is really denied about *Unum*. As, in Number 1, the proposition *Unum est* is so construed as to affirm nothing except *Unum est Unum*—so in Number 7, the proposition *Unum non est* is so construed as to deny nothing except *Unum non est Unum*, yet conveying along with such denial a farther affirmation—*Unum non est Unum, sed tamen est aliquid scibile, differens ab aliis*.¹ Here this *aliquid scibile* is assumed as a

Demonstrations VI and VII considered—Unwarrantable steps in the reasoning—The fundamental premiss differently interpreted, though the same in words.

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 160 C.

substratum underlying *Unum*, and remaining even when *Unum* is taken away: contrary to the opinion—that *Unum* was a separate nature and the fundamental Subject of all—which Aristotle announces as having been held by Plato.¹ There must be always some meaning (the Platonic Parmenides argues) attached to the word *Unum*, even when you talk of *Unum non Est*: and that meaning is equivalent to *Aliquid scilicet, differeus ab aliis*. From this he proceeds to evolve, step by step, though often in a manner obscure and inconclusive, his series of contradictory affirmations respecting *Unum*.

The last couple of Demonstrations—8 and 9—composing the fourth Antinomy, are in some respects the most ingenious and singular of all the nine. *Si Unum non est*, what is true about *Cætera*? The eighth demonstrates the *Both* of the affirmative predicates, the ninth proves the *Neither*.

Si Unum non est (is the argument of the eighth), *Cætera* must nevertheless somehow still be *Cætera*: otherwise you could not talk about *Cætera*.² (This is an argument like that in Demonstration 6: What is talked about must exist, somehow.) But if *Cætera* can be named and talked about, they must be different from something—and from something, which is also different from them. What can this Something be? Not certainly *Unum*: for *Unum*, by the Hypothesis, does not exist, and cannot therefore be the term of comparison. *Cætera* therefore must be different among themselves and from each other. But they cannot be compared with each other by units: for *Unum* does not exist. They must therefore be compared with each other by heaps or multitudes: each of which will appear at first sight to be an unit, though it be not an unit in reality. There will be numbers of such heaps, each in appearance one, though not in reality:³ numbers odd and even, great and little, in appearance: heaps appearing to be greater and less than each other, and equal to each other, though not being really so. Each of these heaps will appear to have a beginning, middle, and end, yet will not really have any such:

¹ Aristot. *Metaph.* B. 1001, a. 6-20.
² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 164 B. Ἄλλα μὲν πον δεῖ εἶναι εἶναι· εἰ γὰρ μηδὲ ἄλλα εἶναι, οὐκ ἂν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων λέγοιτο.

³ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 164 D. Οὐκ οὐ πολλοὶ ὄντοι εἴσονται, οἷς ἄριστος φαίνεται, ὅν δεῖ εἶναι, αὐτοὶ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. Οὕτως.

for whenever you grasp any one of them in your thoughts, there will appear another beginning before the beginning,¹ another end after the end, another centre more central than the centre,—minima ever decreasing because you cannot reach any stable unit. Each will be a heap without any unity; looking like one, at a distance,—but when you come near, each a boundless and countless multitude. They will thus appear one and many, like and unlike, equal and unequal, at rest and moving, separate and coalescing: in short, invested with an indefinite number of opposite attributes.²

This Demonstration 8, with its strange and subtle chain of inferences, purporting to rest upon the admission of Cætera without Unum, brings out the antithesis of the Apparent and the Real, which had not been noticed in the preceding demonstrations. Demonstration 8 is in its character Zenonian. It probably coincides with the proof which Zeno is reported (in the earlier half of this dialogue) to have given against the existence of any real Multa. If you assume Multa (Zeno argued), they must be both like and unlike, and invested with many other opposite attributes; but this is impossible; therefore the assumption is untrue.³ Those against whom Zeno reasoned, contended for real Multa, and against a real Unum. Zeno probably showed, and our eighth Demonstration here shows also,—that Multa under this supposition are nothing real, but an assemblage of indefinite, ever-variable, contradictory appearances: an ἄπειρον, Infinite, or Chaos: an object not real and absolute, but relative and variable according to the point of view of the subject.

To the eighth Demonstration, ingenious as it is, succeeds a countervailing reversal in the ninth: the Neither following the Both. The fundamental supposition is in terms the same. *Si Unum non est*, what is to be-

Demonstration VIII.
is very
subtle and
Zenonian.

Demonstration IX.—
Neither fol-
lowing Both.

¹ Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 A. Ὅτι αἰεὶ αὐτῶν ὅταν τίς τι λάβῃ τῇ διανοίᾳ ὥς τι τούτων ὄν, πρό τε τῆς ἀρχῆς ἄλλη αἰεὶ φαίνεται ἀρχή, μετὰ τε τὴν τελευτὴν ἑτέρα ὑπολειπομένη τελευτή, ἐν τε τῇ μέσῃ ἄλλα μεσαίτερα τοῦ μέσου, σμικρότερα δὲ διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι ἐνδὲς αὐτῶν ἐκαστον λαμβάνεσθαι, ἀτε οὐκ ὄντος τοῦ ἐνδὲς.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 165 E. Compare p. 158 E. τοῖς ἄλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἐνδὲς . . . ἢ δὲ αὐτῶν φύσις καθ' αὐτὰ ἀπειρίαν (πάρεσχε).

³ Plato, Parmenid. p. 127 E; compare this with the close of the eighth Demonstration, p. 165 E—εἰ ἐνδὲς μὴ ὄντος πολλὰ ἔστιν.

come of *Cætera*? *Cætera* are not *Unum*: yet neither are they *Multa*: for if there were any *Multa*, *Unum* would be included in them. If none of the *Multa* were *Unum*, all of them would be nothing at all, and there would be no *Multa*. If therefore *Unum* be not included in *Cætera*, *Cætera* would be neither *Unum* nor *Multa*: nor would they appear to be either *Unum* or *Multa*: for *Cætera* can have no possible communion with *Non-Entia*: nor can any of the *Non-Entia* be present along with any of *Cætera*—since *Non-Entia* have no parts. We cannot therefore conceive or represent to ourselves *Non-Ens* as along with or belonging to *Cætera*. Therefore, *Si Unum non est*, nothing among *Cætera* is conceived either as *Unum* or as *Multa*: for to conceive *Multa* without *Unum* is impossible. It thus appears, *Si Unum non est*, that *Cætera* neither are *Unum* nor *Multa*. Nor are they conceived either as *Unum* or *Multa*—either as like or as unlike—either as the same or as different—either as in contact or as apart.—In short, all those attributes which in the last preceding Demonstration were shown *to belong to them* in appearance, are now shown *not to belong to them* either in appearance or in reality.¹

Here we find ourselves at the close of the Parmenides. Plato announces his purpose to be, to elicit contradictory conclusions, by different trains of reasoning, out of the same fundamental assumption.² He declares, in the concluding words, that—on the hypothesis of *Unum est*, as well as on that of *Unum non est*—he has succeeded in demonstrating the Both and the Neither of many distinct propositions, respecting *Unum* and respecting *Cætera*.

The close of the Parmenides, as it stands here, may be fairly compared to the enigma announced by Plato in his Republic—"A man and no man, struck and did not

¹ Plato, Parmenid. p. 166 A-B. *Ἐν δ' ἂν εἰ μὴ ἴσιν, τὰλλα οὐτε ἴσιν οὐτε δοξάζεται ἔν οὔτε πολλὰ. . . . Οὐδ' ἂν ὁμοία οὐδὲ ἀνόμοια. . . . Οὐδὲ μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ γὰρ οὐδ' ἑτέρα, οὐδὲ ἀπτόμενα οὐδὲ χωρὶς, οὐδὲ δ' ἅλλ' ὅσα ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν διελέθμεν (compare διελθεῖν, p. 166 E) ὡς φαίνόμενα αὐτὰ, τοῦτων οὐτε τι ἴσιν οὐτε φαίνεται τὰλλα, ἔν εἰ μὴ ἴσιν.

² Compare, with the passage cited

in the last note, another passage, p. 159 B, at the beginning of Demonstration 5.

Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὴν ἤδη ἴσμεν ὡς φανερά, ἐπισκοπῶμεν δὲ πάλιν, ἔν εἰ ἴσιν, ἂν καὶ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει τὰλλα τοῦ ἐνός ἢ οὕτω μένον; Here the purpose to prove οὐχ οὕτως, immediately on the heels of οὕτως, is plainly enunciated.

strike, with a stone and no stone, a bird and no bird, sitting upon wood and no wood".¹ This is an enigma, propounded for youthful auditors to guess : stimulating their curiosity, and tasking their intelligence to find it out. As far as I can see, the puzzling antinomies in the Parmenides have no other purpose. They drag back the forward and youthful Sokrates from affirmative dogmatism to negative doubt and embarrassment. There is however this difference between the enigma in the Republic, and the Antinomies in the Parmenides. The constructor of the enigma had certainly a preconceived solution to which he adapted the conditions of his problem : whereas we have no sufficient ground for asserting that the author of the Antinomies had any such solution present or operative in his mind. How much of truth Plato may himself have recognised, or may have wished others to recognise, in them, we have no means of determining. We find in them many equivocal propositions and unwarranted inferences —much blending of truth with error, intentionally or unintentionally. The veteran Parmenides imposes the severance of the two, as a lesson, upon his youthful hearers Sokrates and Aristoteles.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* v. 479 C. The allusion was to an eunuch knocking down a bat seated upon a reed. Αἰνός τις ἔστιν ὡς ἀνὴρ τε καὶ οὐκ ἀνὴρ, Ὁρνιθά τε καὶ οὐκ ὄρνιθ' ἰδών τε καὶ οὐκ ἰδών, Ἐπὶ ξύλου τε καὶ ξύλου καθήμενον Λίθω τε καὶ λίθω βάλλει τε καὶ βάλλει.

I read with astonishment the

amount of positive philosophy which a commentator like Steinhart extracts from the concluding enigma of the Parmenides, and which he even affirms that no attentive reader of the dialogue can possibly miss (*Einleitung zum Parmenides*, pp. 302-303).

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THEÆTETUS.

IN this dialogue, as in the *Parmenides* immediately preceding, Subject and Plato dwells upon the intellectual operations of mind : introducing the ethical and emotional only in personages in the *Theætétus*. a partial and subordinate way. The main question canvassed is, What is Knowledge—Cognition—Science? After a long debate, turning the question over in many distinct points of view, and examining three or four different answers to the question—all these answers are successively rejected, and the problem remains unsolved.

The two persons who converse with Sokrates are, Theodôrus, an elderly man, eminent as a geometrician, astronomer, &c., and teaching those sciences—and Theætétus, a young man of great merit and still greater promise: acute, intelligent, and inquisitive—high-principled and courageous in the field, yet gentle and conciliatory to all: lastly, resembling Sokrates in physiognomy and in the flatness of his nose. The dialogue is supposed to have taken place during the last weeks of the life of Sokrates, when his legal appearance as defendant is required to answer the indictment of Melétus, already entered in the official record.¹ The dialogue is here read aloud to Eukleides of Megara and his fellow-citizen Terpsion, by a slave of Eukleides: this last person had recorded it in writing from narrative previously made to him by Sokrates.² It is prefaced by a short discourse between

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* ad fin. p. 210.

² Plato, *Theætét.* i. pp. 142 E, 143 A.

Plato hardly keeps up the fiction about the time of this dialogue with perfect consistency. When it took place, the indictment of Melétus had already been recorded: Sokrates breaks

off the conversation for the purpose of going to answer it: Eukleides hears the dialogue from the mouth of Sokrates afterwards. "Immediately on getting home to Megara" (says Eukleides) "I wrote down memoranda (of what I had heard): then afterwards I

Eukleides and Terpsion, intended to attract our sympathy and admiration towards the youthful Theætétus.

In answer to the question put by Sokrates—What is Knowledge or Cognition? Theætétus at first replies—That there are many and diverse cognitions :—of geometry, of arithmetic, of arts and trades, such as shoemaking, joinery, &c. Sokrates points out (as in the Menon, Hippias Major, and other dialogues) that such an answer involves a misconception of the question : which was general, and required a general answer, setting forth the characteristic common to all cognitions. No one can know what cognition is in shoemaking or any particular case—unless he first knows what is cognition generally.¹ Specimens of suitable answers to general questions are then given (or of definition of a general term), in the case of clay—and of numbers square and oblong.²

Question raised by Sokrates—What is Knowledge or Cognition? First answer of Theætétus enumerating many different cognitions. Corrected by Sokrates.

called it back to my mind at leisure, and as often as I visited Athens I questioned Sokrates about such portions as I did not remember, and made corrections on my return here, so that now nearly all the dialogue has been written out."

Such a process would require longer time than is consistent with the short remainder of the life of Sokrates. Socher indeed tries to explain this by assuming a long interval between the indictment and the trial, but this is noway satisfactory. (Ueber Platon's Schriften, p. 251.)

Mr. Lewis Campbell, in the Preface to his very useful edition of this dialogue (p. lxxi. Oxford, 1861), considers that the battle in which Theætétus is represented as having been wounded, is probably meant for that battle in which Iphikrates and his pelasts destroyed the Spartan Mora, B.C. 390: if not that, then the battle at the Isthmus of Corinth against Epaminondas, B.C. 369. Schleiermacher in his Einleitung to the dialogue (p. 185) seems to prefer the supposition of some earlier battle or skirmish under Iphikrates. The point can hardly be determined. Still less can we fix the date at which the dialogue was written, though the mention of the battle of Corinth certifies that it was later than 394 B.C. Ast affirms confidently that it was the first dialogue

composed by Plato after the Phædon, which last was composed immediately after the death of Sokrates (Ast, Platon's Leben, &c., p. 192). I see no ground for this affirmation. Most of the commentators rank it among the dialectical dialogues, which they consider to belong to a later period of Plato's life than the ethical, but to an earlier period than the constructive, such as Republic, Timæus, &c. Most of them place the Theætétus in one or other of the years between 393-388 B.C., though they differ much among themselves whether it is to be considered as later or earlier than other dialogues—Kratylus, Euthydemus, Menon, Gorgias, &c. (Stallbaum, Proleg. Theæt. pp. 6-10; Steinhart, Einleit. zum Theæt. pp. 100-213.) Munk and Ueberweg, on the contrary, place the Theætétus at a date considerably later, subsequent to 368 B.C. Munk assigns it to 358 or 357 B.C. after Plato's last return from Sicily (Munk, Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon. Schr. pp. 557-597: Ueberweg, Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon. Schr. pp. 228-236).

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 147 A.

Οὐδ' ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποθήματων συνήσιν, ὃ ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς; Οὐ γάρ.

² Plato, Theætét. p. 148. Oblong (ὑπομήκεις) numbers are such as can be produced only from two unequal factors. The explanation of this

I have already observed more than once how important an object it was with Plato to impress upon his readers an exact and adequate conception of the meaning of general terms, and the proper way of defining them. For this purpose he brings into contrast the misconceptions likely to arise in the minds of persons not accustomed to dialectic.

Theætétus, before he attempts a second answer, complains how much the subject had embarrassed him. Impressed with what he had heard about the interrogatories of Sokrates, he had tried to solve this problem : but he had not been able to satisfy himself with any attempted solution—nor yet to relinquish the search altogether. “You are in distress, Theætétus” (observes Sokrates), “because you are not empty, but pregnant.¹ You have that within you, of which you need to be relieved ; and you cannot be relieved without obstetric aid. It is my peculiar gift from the Gods to afford such aid, and to stimulate the parturition of pregnant minds which cannot of themselves bring forth what is within them.² I can produce no truth myself : but

I can, by my art inherited from my mother the midwife Phæ-nareté, extract truth from others, and test the answers given by others : so as to determine whether such answers are true and valuable, or false and worthless. I can teach nothing : I only bring out what is already struggling in the minds of youth : and if there be nothing within them, my procedure is unavailing. My most important function is, to test the answers given, how far they are true or false. But most people, not comprehending my drift, complain of me as a most eccentric person, who only makes others sceptical. They reproach me, and that truly enough, with always asking questions, and never saying any thing of my own : because I have nothing to say worth hearing.³

difficult passage, requiring us to keep in mind the geometrical conception of numbers usual among the Greek mathematicians, will be found clearly given in Mr. Campbell's edition of this dialogue, pp. 20-22.

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 148 E. ὥδεις, διὰ τὸ μὴ κεῖνός ἐστιν ἐγκύμων εἶναι.

² Plato, Theætét. p. 149 A, p. 150 A.

³ Plato, Theætét. p. 149 A. οἱ δέ, ἄρα οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦ, ὅτι δὲ ἀποστρατός εἰμι, καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀποστῆναι. 150 B-C. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τῇ μετρίᾳ τῆς γῆς, βασανίζειν δυνατὸν εἶναι πᾶσι τῶν τε, πότῃ εἰδωλὸν ἢ ψεύδος ἀποδείκναι τοῦ λόγου ἢ διανοία, ἢ γινώσκον τε καὶ ἀγνοῶν· ἐπεὶ τόδε γε καὶ ἐμοὶ ὑπάρχει, ὅτι περ ταῖς μαίας· ἐργαστής εἰμι σοφίας, &c.

The young companions who frequent my society, often suffer long-continued pains of parturition night and day, before they can be delivered of what is within them. Some, though apparently stupid when they first come to me, make great progress, if my divine coadjutor is favourable to them: others again become tired of me, and go away too soon, so that the little good which I have done them becomes effaced. Occasionally, some of these impatient companions wish to return to me afterwards—but my divine sign forbids me to receive them: where such obstacle does not intervene, they begin again to make progress.”¹

This passage, while it forcibly depicts the peculiar intellectual gift of Sokrates, illustrates at the same time the Platonic manner of describing, full of poetry and metaphor. Cross-examination by Sokrates communicated nothing new, but brought out what lay buried in the mind of the respondent, and tested the value of his answers. It was applicable only to minds endowed and productive: but for them it was indispensable, in order to extract what they were capable of producing, and to test its value when extracted. “Do not think me unkind,” (says Sokrates,) “or my procedure useless, if my scrutiny exposes your answers as fallacious. Many respondents have been violently angry with me for doing so: but I feel myself strictly forbidden either to admit falsehood, or to put aside truth.”² Here we have a suitable prelude to a dialogue in which four successive answers are sifted and rejected, without reaching, even at last, any satisfactory solution.

The first answer given by Theætétus is—“Cognition is sensation (or sensible perception)”. Upon this answer Sokrates remarks, that it is the same doctrine, though in other words, as what was laid down by Protagoras—“Man is the measure of all things: of things existent, that they exist: of things non-existent, that they do not exist. As things appear to me, so they

Ethical basis of the cross-examination of Sokrates—He is forbidden to pass by falsehood without challenge.

Answer of Theætétus—Cognition is sensible perception: Sokrates says that this is the same doc-

¹ Plato, Theætét. pp. 150 E, 151 A. *ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκαλύπτει ἔμπειραι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐγὼ· καὶ πᾶσιν οὗτοι ἐπιδιδόσκειν.*

We here see (what I have already adverted to in reviewing the Theagétēs,

vol. ii. ch. xv. pp. 105-7) the character of mystery, unaccountable and unpredictable in its working on individuals, with which Plato invests the colloquy of Sokrates.

² Plato, Theætét. p. 151 D.

trine as the *Homo Mensura* laid down by Protagoras, and that both are in close affinity with the doctrines of Homer, Herakleitus, Empedoklēs, &c., all except Parmenides.

are to me: as they appear to you, so they are to you."¹ Sokrates then proceeds to say, that these two opinions are akin to, or identical with, the general view of nature entertained by Herakleitus, Empedoklēs, and other philosophers, countenanced moreover by poets like Homer and Epicharmus. The philosophers here noticed (he continues), though differing much in other respects, all held the doctrine that nature consisted in a perpetual motion, change, or flux: that there was no real Ens or permanent substratum, but perpetual genesis or transition.² These philosophers were opposed to Parmenides, who maintained (as I have already stated in a previous chapter) that there was nothing real except Ens—One, permanent, and unchangeable: that all change was unreal, apparent, illusory, not capable of being certainly known, but only matter of uncertain opinion or estimation.

The one main theme intended for examination here (as Sokrates³ expressly declares) is the doctrine—That Cognition is sensible perception. Nevertheless upon all the three opinions, thus represented as cognate or identical,⁴ Sokrates bestows a lengthened comment

¹ Plato, *Theætēt.* pp. 151 E—152 A. *Theætēt.* οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ αἴσθησις. . .

Sokrat. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρῆναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἀλλ' ὃν ἔλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας· τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἰρήκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. Φησὶ γὰρ πον—Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἀνθρώπου εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστὶ—τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶν. Ἀντίρρως γὰρ πον;

Theætēt. Ἀντίρρως καὶ πολλάκις. *Sokrat.* Οὐκ οὖν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἕκαστα ἑμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἐστὶν ἑμοὶ—οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί. Ἀνθρώπος δὲ σὺ τε καὶ ἐγώ.

Theætēt. Δέγει γὰρ οὐδ' οὕτως. Here Plato appears to transcribe the words of Protagoras (compare p. 161 B, and the *Kratylus*, p. 386 A) which distinctly affirm the doctrine of *Homo Mensura*—Man is the measure of all things,—but do not affirm the doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception. The identification between the two doctrines is asserted by Plato himself. It is Plato who asserts "that Protagoras

affirmed the same doctrine in another manner," citing afterwards the manner in which he supposed Protagoras to affirm it. If there had been in the treatise of Protagoras any more express or peremptory affirmation of the doctrine "that knowledge is sensible perception," Plato would probably have given it here.

² Plato, *Theætēt.* p. 152 E. καὶ περὶ τούτου πάντες ἐξ ἧς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ἐυμφορέσθων, Πρωταγόρας τε καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως ἑκατέρας, κωμῆδιαι μὲν Ἐπὶ χαρμῶς, τραγῳδίαι δὲ Ὀμηρος.

³ Plato, *Theætēt.* p. 163 A.

⁴ Plato, *Theætēt.* p. 160 D. *Sokrat.* Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἰρηται ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις· καὶ εἰς ταῦτ' ὃν συμπεπτακέ, κατὰ μὲν Ὀμηρον καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιοῦτον φύλον, ὅλον βεβήματα κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα—κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον, πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπου μέτρον εἶναι—κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον, τούτων οὐκ ἔχοντων, αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίνεσθαι.

(occupying a half of the dialogue) in conversation, principally with Theætétus, but partly also with Theodórus. His strictures are not always easy to follow with assurance, because he often passes with little notice from one to the other of the three doctrines which he is examining: because he himself, though really opposed to them, affects in part to take them up and to suggest arguments in their favour: and further because, disclaiming all positive opinion of his own, he sometimes leaves us in doubt what is his real purpose—whether to expound, or to deride, the opinions of others—whether to enlighten Theætétus, or to test his power of detecting fallacies.¹ We cannot always distinguish between the ironical and the serious. Lastly, it is a still greater difficulty, that we have not before us either of the three opinions as set forth by their proper supporters. There remains no work either of Protagoras or of Herakleitus: so that we do not clearly know the subject matter upon which Plato is commenting—nor whether these authors would have admitted as just the view which he takes of their opinions.²

It is not improbable that the three doctrines, here put together by Plato and subjected to a common scrutiny, may have been sometimes held by the same philosophers. Nevertheless, the language³ of Plato himself shows us that Protagoras never expressly affirmed knowledge to be sensible Perception: and that the substantial identity between this doctrine, and the different doctrine maintained by Protagoras, is to be regarded as a construction put upon the two by Plato. That the theories of Herakleitus and Empedokles differed

of confuting them: yet he also professes to urge what can be said in favour of them. Difficulty of following his exposition.

The doctrine of Protagoras is completely distinct from the other doctrines. The identification of them as one and the same is only constructive—

¹ See the answer of Theætétus and the words of Sokrates following, p. 157 C.

² It would be hardly necessary to remark, that when Plato professes to put a pleading into the mouth of Protagoras (pp. 165-166) we have no other real speaker than Plato himself, if commentators did not often forget this. Steinbart indeed tells us (Einleit. zum Theætét. pp. 36-47) positively—that Plato in this pleading keeps in the most accurate manner (auf das genaueste) to the thoughts of Protagoras,

perhaps even to his words. How Steinbart can know this I am at a loss to understand. To me it seems very improbable. The mere circumstance that Plato forces into partnership three distinct theories, makes it probable that he did not adhere to the thoughts or language of any one of them.

³ See Theætét. p. 152 A. This is admitted (to be a construction put by Plato himself) by Steinbart in his note 7, p. 214, Einleitung zum Theætétus, though he says that Plato's construction is the right one.

the interpretation of Plato himself.

materially from each other, we know certainly: the theory of each, moreover, differed from the doctrine of Protagoras—"Man is the measure of all things".

How this last doctrine was defended by its promulgator, we cannot say. But the defence of it noway required him to maintain—That knowledge is sensible perception. It might be consistently held by one who rejected that definition of knowledge.¹ And though Plato tries to refute both, yet the reasonings which he brings against one do not at all tell against the other.

The Protagorean doctrine—Man is the measure of all things—is simply the presentation in complete view of a common fact—uncovering an aspect of it which the received phraseology hides. Truth and Falsehood have reference to some believing subject—and the words have no meaning except in that relation.

Protagoras brings to view this subjective side of the same complex fact, of which Truth and Falsehood denote the objective side. He refuses to admit the object absolute—the pretended *thing in itself*—Truth without a believer. His doctrine maintains the indefeasible and necessary involution of the percipient mind in every perception—of the concipient mind in every conception—of the cognizant mind in every cognition. Farther, Protagoras acknowledges many distinct believing or knowing Subjects: and affirms that every object known must be relative to (or in his language, *measured by*) the knowing Subject: that every *cognitum* must have its *cognoscens*, and every *cognoscibile* its *cognitionis capax*: that the words have no meaning unless this be supposed: that these two names designate two opposite poles or aspects of the indivisible fact of cognition—actual or potential—not two factors, which are in themselves separate or separable, and which come together to make a compound product. A man cannot in any case get clear of or discard his own mind as a Subject. Self is necessarily omnipresent;

¹ Dr. Routh, in a note upon his edition of the Euthydēmus of Plato (p. 286 C) observes:—"Protagoras docebat, Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι· τῶν μὲν ὄντων, ὡς ἐστὶ· τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστὶ. Quā quidem opinione qualitatum sensillum sine animi perceptione existentiam

sustulisse videtur."

The definition here given by Routh is correct as far as it goes, though too narrow. But it is sufficient to exhibit the Protagorean doctrine as quite distinct from the other doctrine, ὅτι ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστὶν ἢ αἰσθησις.

concerned in every moment of consciousness, and equally concerned in all, though more distinctly attended to in some than in others.¹ The Subject, self, or Ego, is that which all our moments of consciousness have in common and alike: Object is that in which they do or may differ—although some object or other there always must be. The position laid down by Descartes—*Cogito, ergo sum*—might have been stated with equal truth—*Cogito, ergo est (cogitatum aliquid): sum cogitans—est cogitatum*—are two opposite aspects of the same indivisible mental fact—*cogitatio*. In some cases, doubtless, the objective aspect may absorb our attention, eclipsing the subjective: in other cases, the subjective attracts exclusive notice: but in all cases and in every act of consciousness, both are involved as co-existent and correlative. That alone exists, to every man, which stands, or is believed by him to be capable of standing, in some mode of his consciousness as an Object correlative with himself as a Subject. If he believes in its existence, his own believing mind is part and parcel of such fact of belief, not less than the object believed in: if he disbelieves it, his own disbelieving mind is the like. Consciousness in all varieties has for its two poles Subject and Object: there cannot be one of these poles without the opposite pole—north without south—any more than there can be concave without convex (to use a comparison familiar with Aristotle), or front

¹ In regard to the impossibility of carrying abstraction so far as to discard the thinking subject, see Hobbes, *Computation or Logic*, ch. vii. 1.

"In the teaching of natural philosophy I cannot begin better than from *privation*; that is, from feigning the world to be annihilated. But if such annihilation of all things be supposed, it may perhaps be asked what would remain for any man (*whom only I except from this universal annihilation of things*) to consider as the subject of philosophy, or at all to reason upon; or what to give names unto for ratiocination's sake.

"I say, therefore, there would remain to that man ideas of the world, and of all such bodies as he had, before their annihilation, seen with his eyes, or perceived by any other sense; that is to say, the memory and imagination of magnitudes, motions, sounds, colours, &c., as also of their order and parts. All which things, though they be

nothing but ideas and phantasms, happening internally to him that imagineth, yet they will appear as if they were external and not at all depending upon any power of the mind. And these are the things to which he would give names and subtract them from, and compound them with one another. For seeing that after the destruction of all other things I suppose man still remaining, and namely that he thinks, imagines, and remembers, there can be nothing for him to think of but what is past. . . . Now things may be considered, that is, be brought into account, *either as internal accidents of our mind*, in which manner we consider them when the question is about *some faculty of the mind*: or, *as species of external things*, not as really existing, but appearing only to exist, or to have a being without us. And in this manner we are now to consider them."

without back : which are not two things originally different and coming into conjunction, but two different aspects of the same indivisible fact.

In declaring that "Man is the measure of all things"—Protagoras affirms that Subject is the measure of Object, or that every object is relative to a correlative Subject. When a man affirms, believes, or conceives, an object as existing, his own believing or concipient mind is one side of the entire fact. It may be the dark side, and what is called the *Object* may be the light side, of the entire fact : this is what happens in the case of tangible and resisting substances, where Object, being the light side of the fact, is apt to appear all in all :¹ a man thinks of the Something which resists, without attending to the other aspect of the fact of resistance, viz. : his own energy or pressure, to which resistance is made. On the other hand, when we speak of enjoying any pleasure or suffering any pain, the enjoying or suffering Subject appears all in all, distinguished plainly from other Subjects, supposed to be not enjoying or suffering in the same way : yet it is no more than the light side of the fact, of which Object is the dark side. Each particular pain which we suffer has its objective or differential peculiarity, distinguishing it from other sensations, correlating with the same sentient Subject.

The Protagorean dictum will thus be seen, when interpreted correctly, to be quite distinct from that other doctrine with which Plato identifies it : that Cognition is nothing else but sensible Perception. If, rejecting this last doctrine, we hold that cognition includes mental elements distinct from, though co-operating with, sensible perception—the principle of relativity laid down by Protagoras will not be the less true. My intellectual activity—my powers of remembering, imagining, ratiocinating, combining, &c., are a part of

¹ "Nobiscum semper est ipsa quam querimus (anima); adest, tractat, loquitur—et, si fas est dicere, inter ista nescitur." (Cassiodorus, *De Anima*, c. 1, p. 594, in the edition of his *Opera Omnia*, Venet. 1729).

"In the primitive dualism of consciousness, the Subject and Object

being inseparable, either of them apart from the other must be an unknown quantity : the separation of either must be the annihilation of both." (F. W. Farrar, *Chapters on Language*, c. 23, p. 292 : which chapter contains more on the same topic, well deserving of perusal.)

my mental nature, no less than my powers of sensible perception: my cognitions and beliefs must all be determined by, or relative to, this mental nature: to the turn and development which all these various powers have taken in my individual case. However multifarious the mental activities may be, each man has his own peculiar allotment and manifestations thereof, to which his cognitions must be relative. Let us grant (with Plato) that the Nous or intelligent Mind apprehends intelligible Entia or Ideas distinct from the world of sense: or let us assume that Kant and Reid in the eighteenth century, and M. Cousin with other French writers in the nineteenth, have destroyed the Lockian philosophy, which took account (they say) of nothing but the *à posteriori* element of cognition—and have established the existence of other elements of cognition *à priori*: intuitive beliefs, first principles, primary or inexplicable Concepts of Reason.¹ Still we must recollect that all such *à priori* Concepts, Intuitions, Beliefs, &c., are summed up in the mind: and that thus each man's mind, with its peculiar endowments, natural or supernatural, is still the measure or limit of his cognitions, acquired and acquirable. The Entia Rationis exist relatively to

¹ See M. Jouffroy, Préface à sa Traduction des Œuvres de Reid, pp. xcvi.-xciv.

M. Jouffroy, following in the steps of Kant, declares these *à priori* beliefs or intuitions to be altogether relative to the human mind. "Kant, considérant que les conceptions de la raison sont des croyances aveugles auxquelles notre esprit se sent fatalement déterminé par sa nature, en conclut qu'elles sont relatives à cette nature: que si notre nature était autre, elles pourraient être différentes: que par conséquent, elles n'ont aucune valeur absolue: et qu'ainsi notre vérité, notre science, notre certitude, sont une vérité, une science, une certitude, purement subjective, purement humaine—à laquelle nous sommes déterminés à nous fier par notre nature, mais qui ne supporte pas l'examen et n'a aucune valeur objective" (p. clxvii.). . . "C'est ce que répète Kant quand il soutient que l'on ne peut objectiver le subjectif: c'est à dire, faire que la vérité humaine cesse d'être humaine, puisque la raison qui la trouve est humaine. On peut exprimer de vingt manières différentes cette impossibilité: elle reste toujours

la même, et demeure toujours insurmontable," p. cxc. Compare p. xcvi. of the same Preface.

M. Pascal Galuppi (in his *Lettres Philosophiques sur les Vicissitudes de la Philosophie*, translated from the Italian by M. Peisse, Paris, 1844) though not agreeing in this variety of *à priori* philosophy, agrees with Kant in declaring the *à priori* element of cognition to be purely subjective, and the objective element to be *à posteriori* (Lett. xiv. pp. 337-338), or the facts of sense and experience. "L'ordre *à priori*, que Kant appelle *transcendental*, est purement idéal, et dépourvu de toute réalité. Je vis, qu'en fondant la connaissance sur l'ordre *à priori*, on arrive nécessairement au scepticisme: et je reconnus que la doctrine Ecossaise est la mère légitime du Criticisme Kantien, et par conséquent, du scepticisme, qui est la conséquence de la philosophie critique. Je considérai comme de haute importance ce problème de Kant. Il convient de déterminer ce qu'il y a d'objectif, et ce qu'il y a de subjectif, dans la connaissance. Les Empiriques n'admettent dans la connaissance d'autres éléments que les objectifs," &c.

Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. This is a point upon which Plato himself insists, in this very dialogue. You do not, by producing this fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intuent mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the Protagorean principle.¹ Each intuitive belief, whether correct or erroneous—whether held unanimously by every one *semper et ubique*, or only held by a proportion of mankind—is (or would be, if proved to exist) a fact of our

¹ See this point handled in Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. viii. 355-362. We may here cite a remark of Simplicius in his Commentary on the Categories of Aristotle (p. 64, a. in Schol. Brandis). Aristotle (De Anima, iii. 2, 426, a. 19; Categor. p. 7, b. 23) lays down the doctrine that in most cases *Relata* or (τὰ πρὸς τι) are "simul Naturā, και συναναρπει ἄλλαλα": but that in some *Relata* this is not true: for example, τὸ ἐπιστητὸν is relative to ἐπιστήμη, yet still it would seem prior to ἐπιστήμη (πρότερον ἂν δόξαι τῆς ἐπιστήμης εἶναι). There cannot be ἐπιστήμη without some ἐπιστητὸν: but there may be ἐπιστητὸν without any ἐπιστήμη. There are few things, if any (he says), in which the ἐπιστητὸν (cognoscibile) is simul naturā with ἐπιστήμη (or cognitio), and cannot be without it.

Upon which Simplicius remarks, What are these few things? Τίνα δὲ τὰ ὀλίγα ἐστίν, ἐφ' ἃν ἅμα τὸ ἐπιστητὸν ἢ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν; Τὰ ἄνω ὕλης, τὰ νοητά, ἅμα τῇ κατ' ἐνεργείαν ἀεὶ ἐστῶσιν ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, εἴτε καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν ἐστὶ τις τοιαύτη ἀεὶ ἄνω μόνουσα, . . . εἴτε καὶ ἐν τῇ κατ' ἐνεργείαν νῦν εἰ τις καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐκείνην ἐπιστήμην ἔλοιτο καλεῖν. δύναται δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν τῶν κοινῶν ὑπόστασιν εἰρησθαι, τὴν ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ ὑποστάσει τούτων καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. ἀληθὲς δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπλασμάτων τὴν τε ἐν τῇ φαντασίᾳ καὶ τὴν τοχινῶν. ἅμα γὰρ χίμαιρα καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη χίμαιρα.

We see from hence that Simplicius recognises Concepts, Abstractions, and Fictions, to be dependent on the Conceiving, Abstracting, Imagining, Mind—as distinguished from objects of Sense, which he does not recognise as dependent in the like manner. He agrees in the doctrine of Protagoras as to the former, but not as to the latter. This illustrates what I have affirmed. That the Protagorean doctrine of "*Homo Mensura*" is not only unconnected with

the other principle (that Knowledge is resolvable into sensible perception) to which Aristotle and Plato would trace it—but that there is rather a repugnance between the two. The difficulty of proving the doctrine, and the reluctance to admit it, is greatest in the case of material objects, least in the case of Abstractions, and General Ideas. Yet Aristotle, in reasoning against the Protagorean doctrine (Metaphysic. I. pp. 1009-1010, &c.) treats it like Plato, as a sort of corollary from the theory that Cognition is Sensible Perception.

Simplicius farther observes (p. 65, b. 14) that Aristotle is not accurate in making ἐπιστητὸν correlate with ἐπιστήμη: that in *Relata*, the potential correlates with the potential, and the actual with the actual. The Cognoscible is correlative, not with actual cognition (ἐπιστήμη) but with potential Cognition, or with a potential Cognoscens. Aristotle therefore is right in saying that there may be ἐπιστητὸν without ἐπιστήμη, but this does not prove what he wishes to establish.

Themistius, in another passage of the Aristotelian Scholia, reasoning against Boethus, observes to the same effect as Simplicius, that in relatives, the actual correlates with the actual, and the potential with the potential:—

Καίτοι, φησὶ γὰρ ὁ Βοηθός, οὐδὲν καλῶς τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι καὶ δίχα τοῦ ἀριθμοῦντος, ὥστε οἶμαι τὸ αἰσθητὸν καὶ δίχα τοῦ αἰσθανομένου· σφάλλεται δέ, ἅμα γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τί, καὶ τὰ δυνάμει πρὸς τὰ δυνάμει ὥστε εἰ μὴ καὶ ἀριθμητικόν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀριθμοῦν (Schol. ad Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 223, a. p. 393, Schol. Brandis).

Compare Aristot. Metaphysic. M. 1087, a. 15, about τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι δυνάμει and τὸ ἐπιστάσθαι ἐνεργείᾳ.

About the essential co-existence of relatives—Sublato uno, tollitur alterum—see also Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, vii. 395, p. 449, Fabric.

nature; capable of being looked at either on the side of the believing Subject, which is its point of community with all other parts of our nature—or on the side of the Object believed, which is its point of difference or peculiarity. The fact with its two opposite aspects is indivisible. Without Subject, Object vanishes: without Object (some object or other, for this side of the fact is essentially variable), Subject vanishes.

That this general doctrine is true, not merely respecting the facts of sense, but also respecting the facts of mental Evidence from Plato proving implication of Subject and Object, in regard to the intelligible world. conception, opinion, intellection, cognition—may be seen by the reasoning of Plato himself in other dialogues. How, for example, does Plato prove, in his *Timæus*, the objective reality of Ideas or Forms? He infers them from the subjective facts of his own mind. The subjective fact called Cognition (he argues) is generically different from the subjective fact called True Opinion: therefore the Object correlating with the One must be distinct from the Object correlating with the other: there must be a *Noumenon* or νοητόν τι correlating with *Nous*, distinct from the δοξαστόν τι which correlates with δόξα.¹ So again, in the *Phædon*,² Sokrates proves the pre-existence of the human soul from the fact that there were pre-existent cognizable Ideas: if there were knowable Objects, there must also have been a Subject

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 51 B-E, compare *Republic*, v. p. 477.

See this reasoning of Plato set forth in Zeller, *Die Phil. der Griech.* vol. ii. pp. 412-416, ed. 2nd.

Nous, according to Plato (*Tim.* 51 E), belongs only to the Gods and to a select few among mankind. It is therefore only to the Gods and to these few men that Νοητά exist. To the rest of mankind Νοητά are non-apparent and non-existent.

² Plato, *Phædon*, pp. 76-77. ἰσὴ ἀνάγκη ταῦτά τε (Ideas or Forms) εἶναι, καὶ τὰς ἡμετέρας ψυχὰς πρὶν καὶ ἡμᾶς γεγονέναι—καὶ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ τότε. Ὑπερφύως, εἶπεν ὁ Σιμμίας, δοκεῖ μοι ἢ αὐτὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι, καὶ εἰς καλὸν γε καταφεύγει ὁ λόγος εἰς τὸ ὁμοίως εἶναι τὴν τε ψυχὴν ἡμῶν πρὶν γενέσθαι ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἣν σὺ νῦν λέγεις.

Compare p. 92 E of the same dialogue with the notes of Wyttenbach and Heindorf—"Hæc autem οὐσία Idearum,

rerum intelligibilium, αὐτῆς ἐστὶν (sc. τῆς ψυχῆς) ut hoc loco dicitur, est propria et possessio animæ nostræ," &c.

About the essential implication of *Nous* with the Νοητά, as well as of τὸ δόξαζον with τὰ δοξαζόμενα, and of τὸ αἰσθανόμενον with τὰ αἰσθητά, see Plutarch, *De Animæ Procreat.* in *Timæo*, pp. 1012-1024; and a curious passage from Joannes Philoponus ad Aristot. *Physica*, cited by Karsten in his *Commentatio De Empedoclis Philosophiâ*, p. 372, and Olympiodorus ad *Platon.* *Phædon.* p. 21. τὸν νοῦν φαμέν ἀκριβῶς γινώσκειν, διότι αὐτὸς ἐστὶ τὸ νοητόν.

Sydenham observes, in a note upon his translation of the *Philébus* (note 76, p. 118), "Being Intelligent and Being Intelligible are not only correlatives, but are so in their very essence: neither of them can be at all, without the Being of the other".

Cognoscens or Cognitionis capax. The two are different aspects of one and the same conception : upon which we may doubtless reason abstractedly under one aspect or under the other, though they cannot be separated in fact. Now Both these two inferences of Plato rest on the assumed implication of Subject and Object.¹

In truth, the Protagorean measure or limit is even more plainly applicable to our mental intuitions and mental processes (remembering, imagining, conceiving, comparing, abstracting, combining of hypotheses, transcendental or inductive) than to the matter of our sensible experience.² In regard to the Entia Rationis, divergence between one theorist and another is quite as remarkable as the divergence between one perceptive and another in the most disputable region of Entia Perceptionis. Upon the separate facts of sense, there is a nearer approach to unanimity among mankind, than upon the theories whereby theorising men connect together those facts to their own satisfaction. An opponent of Protagoras would draw his most plausible arguments from the undisputed facts of sense. He would appeal to matter and what are called its primary

¹ I think that the inference in the Phædon is not necessary to prove that conclusion, nor in itself just. For when I speak of Augustus and Antony as having once lived, and as having fought the battle of Actium, it is noway necessary that I should believe myself to have been then alive and to have seen them : nor when I speak of civil war as being now carried on in the United States of America, is it necessary that I should believe myself to be or to have been on the spot as a perceptive witness. I believe, on evidence which appears to me satisfactory, that both these are real facts : that is, if I had been at Actium on the day of the battle, or if I were now in the United States, I should see and witness the facts here affirmed. These latter words describe the subjective side of the fact, without introducing any supposition that I have been myself present and perceptive.

² Bacon remarks that the processes called mental or intellectual are quite as much relative to man as those called

sensational or perceptive. "Idola Tribus sunt fundata in ipsa natura humana. Falso enim assertitur, Sensum humanum esse mensuram rerum : quin contra, omnes perceptiones, tam Sensus quam Mentis, sunt ex analogiâ hominis, non ex analogiâ Universi."

Nemesius, the Christian Platonist, has a remark bearing upon this question. He says that the lower animals have their intellectual movements all determined by Nature, which acts alike in all the individuals of the species, but that the human intellect is not wholly determined by Nature ; it has a freer range, larger stores of ideas, and more varied combinations : hence its manifestations are not the same in all, but different in different individuals — *ἐλευθερον γὰρ τι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικόν, ὅθεν οὐχ ἐν καὶ ταῦτόν πᾶσιν ἔργον ἀνθρώποις, ὡς ἐκαστὴ εἶδει τὴν ἀλόγων ζῶων· φύσει γὰρ μόνη τὰ τοιαῦτα κινεῖται, τὰ δὲ φύσει ὁμοίως παρὰ πᾶσιν ἔστιν· αἱ δὲ λογικαὶ πράξεις ἄλλαι παρὰ ἄλλοις καὶ οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αἱ αὐταὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν* (De Nat. Hom., c. ii. p. 53. ed. 1565).

qualities, as refuting the doctrine. For in describing mental intuitions, Mind or Subject cannot well be overlaid or ignored: but in regard to the external world, or material substance with its primary qualities, the objective side is so lighted up and magnified in the ordinary conception and language—and the subjective side so darkened and put out of sight—that Object appears as if it stood single, apart, and independent.

A man conceives objects, like houses and trees, as existing when he does not actually see or touch them, just as much as when he does see or touch them. He conceives them as existing independent of any actual sensations of his own: and he proceeds to describe them as independent altogether of himself as a Subject—or as absolute, not relative, existences. But this distinction, though just as applied in ordinary usage, becomes inadmissible when brought to contradict the Protagorean doctrine; because the speaker professes to exclude, what cannot be excluded, himself as concipient Subject.¹ It is he who conceives

¹ Bishop Berkeley observes:—

"But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so—there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call *books* and *trees*, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? *But do not you yourself perceive or think of them all the while?* This therefore is nothing to the purpose. It only shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind: but it doth not show that you can conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without the mind. *To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy.* When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas. *But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought of or without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended by or exist in itself.*"

Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, sect. xxiii. p. 34, ed. of Berkeley's Works, 1820. The same

argument is enforced in Berkeley's First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous, pp. 145-146 of the same volume.

I subjoin a passage from the work of Professor Bain on Psychology, where this difficult subject is carefully analysed (*The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 370). "There is no possible knowledge of the world except in reference to our minds. Knowledge means a state of mind: the knowledge of material things is a mental thing. We are incapable of discussing the existence of an independent material world: the very act is a contradiction. We can speak only of a world presented to our own minds. By an illusion of language we fancy that we are capable of contemplating a world which does not enter into our own mental existence: but the attempt belies itself, for this contemplation is an effort of mind."

"Solidity, extension, space—the foundation properties of the material world—mean, as has been said above, certain movements and energies of our own bodies, and exist in our minds in the shape of feelings of force, allied with visible and tactile, and other sensible impressions. The sense of the external is the consciousness of particular energies and activities of our own."

absent objects as real and existing, though he neither sees nor touches them: he believes fully, that if he were in a certain

(P. 376). "We seem to have no better way of assuring ourselves and all mankind, that with the conscious movement of opening the eyes there will always be a consciousness of light, than by saying that the light exists as an independent fact, without any eyes to see it. But if we consider the fact fairly we shall see that this assertion errs, not simply in being beyond any evidence that we can have, but also in being a self-contradiction. We are affirming *that* to have an existence out of our minds, which we cannot know but as in our minds. In words we assert independent existence, while in the very act of doing so we contradict ourselves. Even a possible world implies a possible mind to conceive it, just as much as an actual world implies an actual mind. The mistake of the common modes of expression on this matter is the mistake of supposing the abstractions of the mind to have a separate and independent existence. Instead of looking upon the doctrine of an external and independent world as a generalisation or abstraction grounded on our particular experiences, summing up the past and predicting the future, we have got into the way of maintaining the abstraction to be an independent reality, the foundation, or cause, or origin, of all these experiences."

To the same purpose Mr. Mansel remarks in his Bampton Lectures on "The Limits of Religious Thought," page 52:

"A second characteristic of Consciousness is, that it is only possible in the form of a *relation*. There must be a Subject or person conscious, and an Object or thing of which he is conscious. There can be no consciousness without the union of these two factors; and in that union each exists only as it is related to the other. The subject is a subject only in so far as it is conscious of an object: the object is an object only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject: and the destruction of either is the destruction of consciousness itself. It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the Absolute is equally self-contradictory with that of the Infinite. . . Our whole notion of Existence is necessarily relative, for it is existence as conceived by us. But

Existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several ways in which objects are presented to our consciousness—a general term embracing a variety of relations. . . To assume Absolute Existence as an object of thought is thus to suppose a relation existing when the related terms exist no longer. An object of thought exists, as such, in and through its relation to a thinker; while the Absolute, as such, is independent of all relation."

Dr. Henry More has also a passage asserting the essential correlation on which I am here insisting (Immortality of the Soul, ch. ii. p. 3). And Professor Ferrier, in his Institutes of Metaphysic, has given much valuable elucidation respecting the essential relativity of cognition.

Though this note is already long, I shall venture to add from an eminent German critic—Trendelenburg—a passage which goes to the same point.

"Das Sein ist als die absolute Position erklärt worden. Der Begriff des Seins drücke bloß das aus: es werde bei dem einfachen Setzen eines *Was* sein Bewenden haben. Es hat sich hier die abstracte Vorstellung des Seins nur in eine verwandte Anschauung umgekleidet; denn das Gesetzte steht in dem Raum da; und insofern fordert die absolute Position schon den Begriff des seiendem Etwas, das gesetzt wird. Fragt man weiter, so ist in der absoluten Position schon derjenige mitgedacht, der da setzt. Das Sein wird also nicht unabhängig aus sich selbst bestimmt, sondern zur Erklärung in Verhältnisse zu der Thätigkeit des Gedankens herbezogen."

"Ähnlich würde jede von vorn herein versuchte Bestimmung des Denkens ausfallen. Man würde es nur durch einen Bezug zu den Dingen erläutern können, welche in dem Denken Grund und Mass finden. Wir begeben uns daher jeder Erklärung, und setzen eine Vorstellung des Denkens und Seins voraus, in der Hoffnung dass beide mit jedem Schritt der Untersuchung sich in sich selbst bestimmen werden." "Indem wir Denken und Sein unterscheiden, fragen wir, wie ist es möglich, dass sich im Erkennen Denken und Sein vereinigt? Diese Vereinigung sprechen wir vorläufig als eine Thatsache aus, die das Theore-

position near them, he would experience those appropriate sensations of sight and touch, whereby they are identified. Though he eliminates himself as a *percipient*, he cannot eliminate himself as a *conceiving*: i.e., as conceiving and believing. He can conceive no object without being himself the Subject conceiving, nor believe in any future contingency without being himself the Subject believing. He may part company with himself as percipient, but he cannot part company with himself altogether. His conception of an absent external object, therefore, when fully and accurately described, does not contradict the Protagorean doctrine. But it is far the most plausible objection which can be brought against that doctrine, and it is an objection deduced from the facts or cognitions of sense.

I cannot therefore agree with Plato in regarding the Protagorean doctrine—*Homo Mensura*—as having any dependence upon, or any necessary connection with, the other theory (canvassed in the *Theætétus*) which pronounces cognition to be sensible perception. Objects of thought exist in relation to a thinking Subject; as Objects of sight or touch exist in relation to a seeing or touching Subject. And this we shall find Plato himself declaring in the *Sophistes* (where his Eleatic disputant is introduced as impugning a doctrine substantially the same as that of Plato himself in the *Phædon*, *Timæus*, and elsewhere) as well as here in the *Theætétus*. In the *Sophistes*, certain philosophers (called the Friends of Forms or Ideas) are noticed, who admitted that all sensible or perceivable existence (*γένησις*—*Fientia*) was relative to a (capable) sentient or percipient—but denied the relativity of Ideas, and maintained that Ideas, Concepts, Intelligible Entia, were not relative but absolute. The Eleate combats these philosophers, and establishes against them—That the Cogitable or Intelligible existence, *Ens Rationis*, was just as much relative to an Intelligent or Cogitant subject, as perceivable existence was relative to a Subject capable of perceiving—That Existence, under both varieties, was nothing more than a potentiality, correlating with a counter-potentiality

Object
always
relative to
Subject—
Either
without
the other,
impossible.
Plato ad-
mits this in
Sophistes.

tische wie das Praktische beherrscht." ungen, sect. 3, pp. 103-104, Berlin, Trendelenburg, *Logische Untersuch-* 1840.

(τὸ γνωστὸν with τὸ γνωστικόν, τὸ αἰσθητὸν with τὸ αἰσθητικόν), and never realised except in implication therewith.¹

This doctrine of the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistes coincides with the Protagorean—*Homo Mensura*—construed in its true meaning : Object is implicated with, limited or measured by, Subject : a doctrine proclaiming the relativity of all objects perceived, conceived, known, or felt—and the omnipresent involution of the perceiving, conceiving, knowing, or feeling, Subject : the object varying with the Subject. “As things appear to me, so they are to me : as they appear to you, so they are to you.” This theory is just and important, if rightly understood and explained : but whether Protagoras did so explain or understand it, we cannot say ; nor does the language of Plato enable us to make out. Plato passes on from this theory to another, which he supposes Protagoras to have held without distinctly stating it : That there is no Ens distinguishable in itself, or permanent, or stationary : that all existences are in perpetual flux, motion, change—acting and reacting upon each other, combining with or disjoining from each other.²

Turning to the special theory of Protagoras (*Homo Mensura*), and producing arguments, serious or ironical in its defence, Sokrates says—What you call colour has no definite place or existence either within you or without you. It is the result of the passing collision between your eyes and the flux of things suited to act upon them.

¹ Plato, *Sophistes*, pp. 247-248.

The view taken of this matter by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in the third chapter of the first Book of his *System of Logic*, is very instructive ; see especially pp. 65-66 (ed. 4th).

Aristippus (one of the Sokratici viri, contemporary of Plato) and the Kyrenaic sect affirmed the doctrine—ὅτι μόνον τὰ πάθη καταληπτὰ. Aristokles refutes them by saying that there can be no πάθος without both Object and Subject—ποιούν and πάσχον. And he goes on to declare that these three are of necessary co-existence or consubstantiality. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνάγκη γε τρία ταῦτα συνυφίστασθαι—τὸ γε πάθος αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν, καὶ τὸ πάσχον (ap. Eusebium, *Præp. Ev.* xiv. 19, 1).

I apprehend that Aristokles by these

words does not really refute what

Aristippus meant to affirm. Aristippus meant to affirm the Relative, and to decline affirming anything beyond ; and in this Aristokles agrees, making the doctrine even more comprehensive by showing that Object as well as Subject are relative also ; implicated both with each other and in the πάθος.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 152 D.

Though Plato states the grounds of this theory in his ironical way, as if it were an absurd fancy, yet it accidentally coincides with the largest views of modern physical science. Absolute rest is unknown in nature : all matter is in perpetual movement, molecular as well as in masses.

It is neither in the agent nor in the patient, but is something special and momentary generated in passing between the two. It will vary with the subject: it is not the same to you, to another man, to a dog or horse, or even to yourself at different times. The object measured or touched cannot be in itself either great, or white, or hot: for if it were, it would not appear different to another Subject. Nor can the Subject touching or measuring be in itself great, or white, or hot: for if so, it would always be so, and would not be differently modified when applied to a different object. *Great, white, hot*, denote no positive and permanent attribute either in Object or Subject, but a passing result or impression generated between the two, relative to both and variable with either.

To illustrate this farther (continues Sokrates)—suppose we have here six dice. If I compare them with three other dice placed by the side of them, I shall call the six dice *more* and *double*: if I put twelve other dice by the side of them, I shall call the six *fewer* and *half*. Or take an old man—and put a growing youth by his side. Two years ago the old man was taller than the youth: now, the youth is grown, so that the old man is the shorter of the two. But the old man, and the six dice, have remained all the time unaltered, and equal to themselves. How then can either of them become either greater or less? or how can either *really be* so, when they were not so before? ²

Relations are nothing in the object purely and simply, without a comparing subject.

The illustration here furnished by Sokrates brings out forcibly the negation of the absolute, and the affirmation of universal relativity in all conceptions, judgments, and predications, which he ascribes to Protagoras and Herakleitus. The predication respecting the six dice denotes nothing real, independent, absolute, inhering in them: for they have undergone no change. It is relative, and expresses a mental comparison made by me or some one else. It is therefore relative in two different senses:—1. To some other object with which the comparison of the dice is

Relativity twofold—to the comparing Subject—to another Object, besides the one directly described.

¹ Plato, *Theaetét.* pp. 153-154. ὁ δὲ ἑκαστον εἶναι φησιν χρώμα, οὐτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὐτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον ἴσται, ἀλλὰ μετὰ τὴν ἑκάστην ἰδίαν γεγονότες.

² Plato, *Theaetét.* pp. 154-155. Compare the reasoning in the *Phædon*, pp. 96-97-101.

made:—2. To me as comparing Subject, who determine the objects with which the comparison shall be made.¹—Though relativity in both senses is comprehended by the Protagorean affirmation—*Homo Mensura*—yet relativity in the latter sense is all which that affirmation essentially requires. And this is true of all propositions, comparative or not—whether there be or be not reference to any other object beyond that which is directly denoted. But Plato was here illustrating the larger doctrine which he ascribes to Protagoras in common with Herakleitus: and therefore the more complicated case of relativity might suit his purpose better.

Sokrates now re-states that larger doctrine, in general terms, as follows.

The universe is all flux or motion, divided into two immense concurrent streams of force, one active, the other passive; adapted one to the other, but each including many varieties. One of these is Object: the other is, sentient, cognizant, concipient, Subject. Object as well as Subject is, in itself and separately, indeterminate and unintelligible—a mere chaotic Agent or Patient. It is only by copulation and friction with each other that they generate any definite or intelligible result. Every such copulation, between parts adapted to each other, generates a twin offspring: two correlative and inseparable results infinitely diversified, but always born in appropriate pairs:² a

¹ The Aristotelian Category of Relation (*τὰ πρὸς τί, Categor. p. 6, a. 36*) designates one object apprehended and named relatively to some other object—as distinguished from object apprehended and named not thus relatively, which Aristotle considers as *per se καθ' αὐτό* (*Ethica Nikomach. i. p. 1096, a. 21*). Aristotle omits or excludes relativity of the object apprehended to the percipient or concipient subject, which is the sort of relativity directly noted by the Protagorean doctrine.

Occasionally Aristotle passes from relativity in the former sense to relativity in the latter; as when he discusses *ἐπιστήμη* and *ἐπιστήμη*, alluded to in one of my former notes on this dialogue. But he seems unconscious of any transition. In the Categories, Object, as implicated with

Subject, does not seem to have been distinctly present to his reflection. In the third book of the *Metaphysica*, indeed, he discusses professedly the opinion of Protagoras; and among his objections against it, one is, that it makes everything relative or *πρὸς τί* (*Metaph. Γ. p. 1011, a. 20, b. 5*). This is hardly true in the sense which *πρὸς τί* bears as one of his Categories; but it is true in the other sense to which I have adverted.

A clear and full exposition of what is meant by the Relativity of Human Knowledge, will be found in Mr. John Stuart Mill's most recent work, 'Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,' ch. ii. pp. 6-15.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 156 A. *ὅς τε πᾶν κίνησις ἐστίν, καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο οὐδέν, τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλεόνει*

definite perception or feeling, on the subjective side—a definite thing perceived or felt, on the objective. There cannot be one of these without the other : there can be no objective manifestation without its subjective correlate, nor any subjective without its objective. This is true not merely about the external senses—touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing—but also about the internal,—hot and cold, pleasure and pain, desire, fear, and all the countless variety of our feelings which have no separate names.¹ Each of these varieties of feeling has its own object co-existent and correlating with it. Sight, hearing, and smell, move and generate rapidly and from afar ; touch and taste, slowly and only from immediate vicinity : but the principle is the same in all. Thus, *e.g.*, when the visual power of the eye comes into reciprocal action with its appropriate objective agent, the result between them is, that the visual power passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into a concrete and particular act of vision—the seeing a white stone or wood : while the objective force also passes out of its abstract and indeterminate state into concrete—so that it is no longer whiteness, but a piece of white stone or wood actually seen.²

Accordingly, nothing can be affirmed to exist separately and by itself. All existences come only as twin and correlative manifestations of this double agency. In fact neither of these agencies can be conceived independently and apart from the other : each of them is a nullity without the other.³ If either of them be varied, the result also will vary proportionally : each may be in its turn agent or patient, according to the different partners with which it comes into confluence.⁴ It is therefore improper to say—Such or such a

μὲν ἄπειρον ἐκότερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. Ἐκ δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τριβῆς πρὸς ἄλλα γίνεται ἔκγονα πλεῖσθαι μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα δὲ—τὸ μὲν αἰσθητόν, τὸ δὲ αἰσθησίς, ἃί συνεκκρίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ.

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 156 B.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 156 E. ὁ μὲν ὀφθαλμὸς ἀρα ὀφείως ἐμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ ὁρᾷ δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ τι ὀψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, τὸ δὲ ἐγγεννήσαν τὸ χρῶμα λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ λευκότης αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ λευκόν, εἴτε ξύλον

εἴτε λίθος εἴτε ὀτιοῦν ξυνέβη χρῆμα χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιοῦτῳ χρώματι.

Plato's conception of the act of vision was—That fire darted forth from the eyes of the percipient and came into confluence or coalescence with fire approaching from the perceived object (Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 45 C, 67 C).

³ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 157 A. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν εἶναι τι καὶ τὸ πάσχειν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ ἐνὸς νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι παγίως. Οὔτε γὰρ ποιοῦν ἐστὶ τι, πρὶν ἂν τῷ πάσχειντι ξυνέλθῃ—οὔτε πάσχειν, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 157 A. τὸ τί

thing *exists*. Existence absolute, perpetual, and unchangeable is nowhere to be found : and all phrases which imply it are incorrect, though we are driven to use them by habit and for want of knowing better. All that is real is, the perpetual series of changeful and transient conjunctions ; each Object, with a certain Subject,—each Subject, with a certain Object.¹ This is true not merely of individual objects, but also of those complex aggregates rationally apprehended which receive generic names, *man*, *animal*, *stone*, &c.² You must not therefore say that any thing *is*, absolutely and perpetually, good, honourable, hot, white, hard, great—but only that it is so felt or esteemed by certain subjects more or less numerous.³

The arguments advanced against this doctrine from the phenomena of dreams, distempers, or insanity, admit (continues Sokrates) of a satisfactory answer. A man who is dreaming, sick, or mad, believes in realities different from, and inconsistent with, those which he would believe in when healthy. But this is because he is, under those peculiar circumstances, a different Subject, unlike what he was before. One of the two factors of the result being thus changed, the result itself is changed.⁴ The cardinal principle of Protagoras—the essential correlation, and indefeasible fusion, of Subject and Object, exhibits itself in a perpetual series of definite manifestations. To say that I (the Subject) perceive,—is to say that I perceive some Object : to perceive and perceive nothing, is a contradiction. Again, if an Object be sweet, it must be sweet to some percipient Subject : sweet, but sweet to no one, is impossible.⁵ Necessity binds the essence of the percipient to that of something perceived : so that every name which you bestow upon either of them implies some reference to

τινι φυνεσθον και ποιουν ελλη αδ προσ-
πεσον πασχοι ανεφανη.

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 157 A. ουδεν
ειναι εν αυτω καθ' αυτω, αλλα τινι δει
γιγνεσθαι, το δ' ειναι πανταχοθεν εξαίρε-
τον, &c.

² Plato, Theætét. p. 157 B. δει δε
και κατα μέρος ουτω λεγειν και περι
πολλων αδροισθεντων, ο δὲ αδροισματι
απορωπων τε τιθενται και λιθον και εκασ-
τον ζωνει τε και ειδος.

In this passage I follow Heindorf's

explanation which seems dictated by
the last word *ειδος*. Yet I am not sure
that Plato does really mean here the
generic aggregates. He had before
talked about sights, sounds, hot, cold,
hard, &c., the separate sensations. He
may perhaps here mean simply indi-
vidual things as aggregates or αδροισ-
ματα—a man, a stone, &c.

³ Plato, Theætét. p. 157 E.

⁴ Plato, Theætét. p. 159.

⁵ Plato, Theætét. p. 160 A.

the other ; and no name can be truly predicated of either, which implies existence (either perpetual or temporary) apart from the other.¹

Such is the exposition which Sokrates is here made to give, of the Protagorean doctrine. How far the arguments, urged by him in its behalf, are such as Protagoras himself either really urged, or would have adopted, we cannot say. In so far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and implication between Subject and Object, with actual multiplicity of distinct Subjects—denying the reality either of absolute and separate Subject, or of absolute and separate Object²—I think it true and instructive. We are reminded that when we affirm any thing about an Object, there is always (either expressed or tacitly implied) a Subject or Subjects (one, many, or all), to whom the Object is what it is declared to be. This is the fundamental characteristic of consciousness, feeling, and cognition, in all their actual varieties. All of them are bi-polar or bi-lateral, admitting of being looked at either on

Exposition of the Protagorean doctrine, as given here by Sokrates, is to a great degree just. You cannot explain the facts of consciousness by independent Subject and Object.

¹ Plato, Theaetét. p. 180 B. *ἐπειπερ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνθεῖ μέν, συνθεῖ δὲ οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ' αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς· ἄλλοις δὲ ἡ λείπεται συνθεῖσθαι (i. e. τὸν αἰσθανόμενον and τὸ ποιοῦν αἰσθάνεσθαι). Ὅστε εἴτε τις εἶναι τί ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἶναι, ἢ τινός, ἢ πρὸς τι, ῥητέον αὐτῷ, εἴτε γίνεσθαι· αὐτὸ δὲ εἴθ' αὐτοῦ τι ἢ ὃν ἢ γινόμενον οὔτε αὐτῷ λεκτέον, οὐτ' ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον.*

Compare Aristot. *Metaphys.* Γ. 6, p. 1011, a. 23.

² Aristotle, in a passage of the treatise *De Animâ* (iii. 1, 2-4-7-8, ed. Trendelenburg, p. 426, b. 26, p. 426, a. 15-25, Bekk.), impugns an opinion of certain antecedent φυσιοῶλογοι whom he does not specify; which opinion seems identical with the doctrine of Protagoras. These philosophers said, that "there was neither white nor black without vision, nor savour without the sense of taste". Aristotle says that they were partly right, partly wrong. They were right in regard to the actual, wrong in regard to the potential. The actual manifestation of the perceived is one and the same with that of the percipient, though the

two are not the same logically in the view of the reflecting mind (ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ μία, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταῦτον αὐταῖς). But this is not true when we speak of them potentially—διχῶς γὰρ λεγόμενης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τὴν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν δὲ κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἐτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει. Ἄλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἀπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγόμενων οὐχ ἀπλῶς.

I think that the distinction, which Aristotle insists upon as a confutation of these philosophers, is not well founded. What he states, in very just language, about actual perception is equally true about potential perception. As the present fact of actual perception implicates essentially a determinate percipient subject with a determinate perceived object, and admits of being looked at either from the one point of view or from the other—so the concept of potential perception implicates in like manner an indeterminate perceivable with an indeterminate subject competent to perceive. The perceivable or cogitable has no meaning except in relation to some Capax Percipiendi or Capax Cogitandi.

the subjective or on the objective side. Comparisons and contrasts, gradually multiplied, between one consciousness and another, lead us to distinguish the one of these points of view from the other. In some cases, the objective view is brought into light and prominence, and the subjective thrown into the dark and put out of sight: in other cases, the converse operation takes place. Sometimes the Ego or Subject is prominent, sometimes the Mecum or Object.¹ Sometimes the Objective is as it were divorced from the Subject, and projected outwards, so as to have an illusory appearance of existing apart from and independently of any Subject. In other cases, the subjective view is so exclusively lighted up and conspicuous, that Object disappears, and we talk of a mind conceiving, as if it had no correlative Concept. It is possible, by abstraction, to indicate, to

¹ The terms Ego and Mecum, to express the antithesis of these two λόγος μόνον χωριστά, are used by Professor Ferrier in his very acute treatise, *Institutes of Metaphysic*, pp. 93-96. The same antithesis is otherwise expressed by various modern writers in the terms Ego and non-Ego—le moi et le non-moi. I cannot think that this last is the proper way of expressing it. You do not want to negative the Ego, but to declare its essential implication with a variable correlate; to point out the bilateral character of the act of consciousness. The two are not merely *Relata secundum dici* but *Relata secundum esse*, to use a distinction recognised in the scholastic logic.

The implication of Subject and Object is expressed in a peculiar manner (though still clearly) by Aristotle in the treatise *De Anima*, iii. 8, 1, 431, b. 21. ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστί πάντα· ἡ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἡ νοητὰ. ἐστὶ δ' ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητὰ πῶς, ἡ δ' αἰσθησις τὰ αἰσθητὰ. The adverb πῶς (πῶς ὅσον τινα, as Simplicius explains it, fol. 78, b. 1) here deserves attention. "The soul is all existing things in a certain way (or looked at under a certain aspect). All things are either Percepta or Cogitata: now Cognition is in a certain sense the Cognita—Perception is the Percepta." He goes on to say that the Percipient Mind is the Form of Percepta, while the matter of Percepta is without: but that the Cogitant Mind is identical with Cogitata, for they have no matter

(iii. 4, 12, p. 430, a. 3, with the commentary of Simplicius p. 78, b. 17, f. 19, a. 12). This is in other words the Protagorean doctrine—That the mind is the measure of all existences: and that this is even more true about νοητὰ than about αἰσθητὰ. That doctrine is completely independent of the theory, that ἐπιστήμη is αἰσθησις.

It is in conformity with this affirmation of Aristotle (partially approved even by Cudworth—see Mosheim's *Transl. of Intell. Syst.* Vol. II. ch. viii. pp. 27-28)—ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστί πάντα—that Mr. John Stuart Mill makes the following striking remark about the number of ultimate Laws of Nature:—

"It is useful to remark, that the ultimate Laws of Nature cannot possibly be less numerous than the distinguishable sensations or other feelings of our nature: those, I mean, which are distinguishable from one another in quality, and not merely in quantity or degree. For example, since there is a phenomenon *sui generis* called colour, which our consciousness testifies to be not a particular degree of some other phenomenon, as heat, or odour, or motion, but intrinsically unlike all others, it follows that there are ultimate laws of colour. The ideal limit therefore of the explanation of natural phenomena would be to show that each distinguishable variety of our sensations or other states of consciousness has only one sort of cause." (*System of Logic*, Book iii. ch. 14, s. 2.)

name, and to reason about, the one of these two points of view without including direct notice of the other: this is abstraction or logical separation—a mental process useful and largely applicable, yet often liable to be mistaken for real distinctness and duality. In the present case, the two abstractions become separately so familiar to the mind, that this supposed duality is conceived as the primordial and fundamental fact: the actual, bilateral, consciousness being represented as a temporary derivative state, generated by the copulation of two factors essentially independent of each other. Such a theory, however, while aiming at an impracticable result, amounts only to an inversion of the truth. It aims at explaining our consciousness as a whole; whereas all that we can really accomplish, is to explain, up to a certain point, the conditions of conjunction and sequence between different portions of our consciousness. It also puts the primordial in the place of the derivative, and transfers the derivative to the privilege of the primordial. It attempts to find a generation for what is really primordial—the total series of our manifold acts of consciousness, each of a bilateral character, subjective on one side and objective on the other: and it assigns as the generating factors two concepts obtained by abstraction from these very acts,—resulting from multiplied comparisons,—and ultimately exaggerated into an illusion which treats the logical separation as if it were bisection in fact and reality.

In Plato's exposition of the Protagorean theory, the true doctrine held by Protagoras,¹ and the illusory explanation (whether belonging to him or to Plato himself), are singularly blended together. He denies expressly

Plato's attempt to get behind the phenomena.

¹ The elaborate Dissertation of Sir William Hamilton, on the Philosophy of the Unconditioned (standing first in his 'Discussions on Philosophy'), is a valuable contribution to metaphysical philosophy. He affirms and shows, "That the Unconditioned is incognisable and inconceivable: its notion being only a negation of the Conditioned, which last can alone be positively known and conceived" (p. 12); refuting the opposite doctrine as proclaimed, with different modifications, both by Schelling and Cousin.

In an Appendix to this Dissertation, contained in the same volume (p. 606),

Sir W. Hamilton not only re-asserts the doctrine ("Our whole knowledge of mind and matter is relative, conditioned—relatively conditioned. Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they external, be they internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incognisable," &c.)—but affirms farther that philosophers of every school, with the exception of a few late absolute theorists in Germany, have always held and harmoniously re-echoed the same doctrine.

In proof of such unanimous agreement, he cites passages from seventeen different philosophers.

Reference to a double potentiality—Subjective and Objective. all separate existence either of Subject or Object—all possibility of conceiving or describing the one as a reality distinct from the other. He thus acknowledges consciousness and cognition as essentially bilateral. Nevertheless he also tries to explain the generation of these acts of consciousness, by the hypothesis of a *latens processus* behind them and anterior to them—two continuous moving forces, agent and patient, originally distinct, conspiring as joint factors to a succession of compound results. But when we examine the language in which Plato describes these forces, we see that he conceives them only as Abstractions and Potentialities;¹ though he ascribes to them a metaphorical copulation and generation. "Every thing is motion (or change): of which there are two sorts, each infinitely manifold: one, having power to act—the other having power to suffer." Here instead of a number of distinct facts of consciousness, each bilateral—we find ourselves translated by abstraction into a general potentiality of consciousness, also essentially bilateral and multiple. But we ought to recollect, that the Potential is only a concept abstracted from the actual,—and differing from it in this respect, that it includes what has been and what may be, as well as what is. But it is nothing new and distinct by itself: it cannot be produced as a substantive antecedent to the actual, and as if it afforded explanation thereof. The general proposition about motion or change (above cited in the words of Plato), as far as it purports to get behind the fact of consciousness and to assign its cause or antecedent—is illusory. But if considered as a general expression for that fact itself, in the most comprehensive terms—indicating the continuous thread of separate, ever-changing acts of consciousness, each essentially bilateral, or subjective as well

The first name on his list stands as follows:—"1. Protagoras—(as reported by Plato, Aristotle, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, &c.)—Man is (for himself) the measure of all things".

Sir William Hamilton understands the Protagorean doctrine as I understand it, and as I have endeavoured to represent it in the present chapter. It has been very generally misconceived.

I cannot, however, agree with Sir

William Hamilton, in thinking that this theory respecting the Unconditioned and the Absolute, has been the theory generally adopted by philosophers. The passages which he cites from other authors are altogether insufficient to prove such an affirmation.

¹ Plato, *Theættét.* p. 156 A. τῆς δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἶδη, πλεῖσθαι μὲν ἀπειρον ἐκότερον, δύναμιν δὲ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.

as objective—in this point of view the proposition is just and defensible.

It is to be remembered, that the doctrine here criticised is brought forward by the Platonic Sokrates as a doctrine not his own, but held by others ; among whom he ranks Protagoras as one.

Having thus set forth in his own language, and as an advocate, the doctrine of Protagoras, Sokrates proceeds to impugn it : in his usual rambling and desultory way, but with great dramatic charm and vivacity. He directs his attacks alternately against the two doctrines : 1. *Homo Mensura* : 2. Cognition is sensible perception.

I shall first notice what he advances against *Homo Mensura*. It puts every man (he says) on a par as to wisdom and intelligence : and not only every man, but every horse, dog, frog, and other animal along with him. Each man is a measure for himself : all his judgments and beliefs are true : he is therefore as wise as Prota-

Arguments advanced by the Platonic Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine.

¹ In that distinction, upon which Aristotle lays so much stress, between *Actus* and *Potentia*, he declares *Actus* or actuality to be the *Prius*—*Potentia* or potentiality to be the *Posterius*. See *Metaphysics*, *Θ*. 8, 1049, b. 5 seqq. ; *De Anima*, *ii*. 4, 415, a. 17. The *Potential* is a derivative from the *Actual*—derived by comparison, abstraction, and logical analysis : a Mental concept, helping us to describe, arrange, and reason about, the multifarious acts of sense or consciousness—but not an anterior generating reality.

Turgot observes (*Œuvres*, vol. iii. pp. 108-110 : Article in the *Encyclopédie*, *Existence*) :—

“Le premier fondement de la notion de l'existence est la conscience de notre propre sensation, et le sentiment du *moi* qui résulte de cette conscience. La relation nécessaire entre l'être apercevant, et l'être aperçu considéré hors du *moi*, suppose dans les deux termes la même réalité. Il y a dans l'un et dans l'autre un fondement de cette relation, que l'homme, s'il avoit un langage, pourroit désigner par le nom commun d'*existence* ou de *présence* : car ces deux notions ne seroient point encore distinguées l'une de l'autre. . . .

“Mais il est très-important d'observer que ni la simple sensation des objets présents, ni la peinture que fait l'imagination des objets absens, ni le simple rapport de distance ou d'activité réciproque, commun aux uns et aux autres, ne sont précisément la chose que l'esprit voudroit désigner par le nom général d'*existence* : c'est le fondement même de ces rapports, supposé commun au *moi*, à l'objet vu et à l'objet simplement distant, sur lequel tombe véritablement et le nom d'*existence* et notre affirmation, lorsque nous disons qu'une chose *existe*. Ce fondement n'est ni ne peut être connu immédiatement, et ne nous est indiqué que par les rapports différents qui le supposent : nous nous en formons cependant une espèce d'idée que nous tirons par voie d'abstraction du témoignage que la conscience nous rend de nous-mêmes et de notre sensation actuelle : c'est-à-dire, que nous transportons en quelque sorte cette conscience du *moi* sur les objets extérieurs, par une espèce d'assimilation vague, démentie aussitôt par la séparation de tout ce qui caractérise le *moi*, mais qui ne suffit pas moins pour devenir le fondement d'une abstraction ou d'un signe commun, et pour être l'objet de nos jugemens.”

He says that it puts the wise and foolish on a par—that it contradicts the common consciousness. Not every one, but the wise man only, is a measure.

goras and has no need to seek instruction from Protagoras.¹ Reflection, study, and dialectic discussion, are superfluous and useless to him : he is a measure to himself on the subject of geometry, and need not therefore consult a professed geometrician like Theodorus.²

The doctrine is contradicted (continues Sokrates) by the common opinions of mankind : for no man esteems himself a measure on all things. Every one believes that there are some things on which he is wiser than his neighbour—and others on which his neighbour is wiser than he. People are constantly on the look out for teachers and guides.³ If Protagoras advances an opinion which others declare to be false, he must, since he admits their opinion to be true, admit his own opinion to be false.⁴ No animal, nor any common man, is a measure ; but only those men, who have gone through special study and instruction in the matter upon which they pronounce.⁵

In matters of present and immediate sensation, hot, cold, dry, moist, sweet, bitter, &c., Sokrates acknowledges that every man must judge for himself, and that what each man pronounces is true *for himself*. So too, about honourable or base, just or unjust, holy or unholy—whatever rules any city may lay down, are true *for itself* : no man, no city,—is wiser upon these matters than any other.⁶ But in regard to what is good, profitable, advantageous, healthy, &c., the like cannot be conceded. Here (says Sokrates) one man, and one city, is decidedly wiser, and judges more truly, than another. We cannot say that the judgment of each is true ;⁷ or that what every man or every city anticipates to promise good or profit, will necessarily realise such anticipations. In such cases, not merely present sentiment, but future consequences are involved.

Here then we discover the distinction which Plato would

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 161. Compare Plato, *Kratylus*, p. 886 C, where the same argument is employed.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 160 A.

³ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 170.

⁴ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 171 B. *Οἰκοῦν*

τὴν αὐτοῦ ἐν ψευδῇ ἐνθυμησί, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψευδισθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ;

⁵ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 171 C.

⁶ Plato, *Theætét.* pp. 172 A, 177 E.

⁷ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 172.

draw.¹ Where present sentiment alone is involved, as in hot and cold, sweet and bitter, just and unjust, honourable and base, &c., there each is a judge for himself, and one man is no better judge than another. But where future consequences are to be predicted, the ignorant man is incapable: none but the professional Expert, or the prophet,² is competent to declare the truth. When a dinner is on table, each man among the guests can judge whether it is good: but while it is being prepared, none but the cook can judge whether it *will be* good.³ This is one Platonic objection against the opinion of Protagoras, when he says that every opinion of every man is true. Another objection is, that opinions of different men are opposite and contradictory,⁴ some of them contradicting the Protagorean dictum itself.

Such are the objections urged by Sokrates against the Protagorean doctrine—*Homo Mensura*. There may have been perhaps in the treatise of Protagoras, which unfortunately we do not possess, some reasonings or phrases countenancing the opinions against which Plato here directs his objections. But so far as I can collect, even from the words of Plato himself when he professes to borrow the phraseology of his opponent, I cannot think that Protagoras ever delivered the opinion which Plato here refutes—*That every opinion of every man is true*. The opinion really delivered by Protagoras appears to have been⁵—*That every opinion delivered by every man is true, to that man*

Plato, when he impugns the doctrine of Protagoras, states that doctrine without the qualification properly belonging to it. All belief relative to the condition of the believing mind.

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 178.

² Plato, Theætét. p. 179. εἰ πῃ τοὺς συνόντας ἐπειθεῖν, οὐ καὶ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι τε καὶ δοῦναι οὐτε μάντις οὐτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνεινεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ.

³ Plato, Theætét. p. 178.

⁴ Plato, Theætét. p. 179 B.

Theodor. Ἐκείνη μοι δοκεῖ μάλιστα ἀλίσκασθαι ὁ λόγος, ἀλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτην, ἥ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὐτὰ δὲ ἐφάνησαν τοῖς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμενα.

δοκταί. Πολλαχῇ καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε τοιοῦτον ἀλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθῆ δόξαν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τὸ παρὸν ἐκάστῳ πάθος, εἴ ἂν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ αἱ κατὰ ταύτας δόξαι γίγνονται . . . ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω, ἀνάλωτοι γάρ, εἰ ἔτυχον, αἰσίν.

⁵ Plato, Theætét. p. 152 A. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει (Protagoras), ὡς οἱ μὲν ἕκαστα ἐμοὶ φαίνονται, τοιαῦτα μὲν εἰναι ἐμοὶ—οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὐ σοί. 158 A. τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι τοῦτω φ φαίνεται. 160 C. Ἀληθὴς ἀρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμῇ αἰσθήσει· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐστὶ· καὶ ἐγὼ κριτὴς κατὰ τὸν Πρωταγόραν τῶν τε ὄντων ἐμοὶ, ὡς ἐστὶ, καὶ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν.

Comp. also pp. 166 D, 170 A, 177 C. Instead of saying αἰσθήσεις (in the passage just cited, p. 160 D), we might with quite equal truth put Ἀληθὴς ἀρα ἐμοὶ ἢ ἐμῇ νόησις· τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεὶ ἐστίν. In this respect αἰσθήσεις and νόησις are on a par. Νόησις is just as much relative to ὁ νοῶν ὡς αἰσθήσεις to ὁ αἰσθανόμενος.

himself. But Plato, when he impugns it, leaves out the final qualification; falling unconsciously into the fallacy of passing (as logicians say) *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*.¹ The qualification thus omitted by Plato forms the characteristic feature of the Protagorean doctrine, and is essential to the phraseology founded upon it. Protagoras would not declare any proposition to be true absolutely, or false absolutely. The phraseology belonging to that doctrine is forced upon him by Plato. Truth Absolute there is none, according to Protagoras. All truth is and must be truth relative to some one or more persons, either actually accepting and believing in it, or conceived as potential believers under certain circumstances. Moreover since these believers are a multitude of individuals, each with his own peculiarities—so no truth can be believed in, except under the peculiar measure of the believing individual mind. What a man adopts as true, and what he rejects as false, are conditioned alike by this limit: a limit not merely different in different individuals, but variable and frequently varying in the same individual. You cannot determine a dog, or a horse, or a child

Sextus Empiricus adverts to the doctrines of Protagoras (mainly to point out how they are distinguished from those of the Sceptical school, to which he himself belongs) in Pyrrhon. Hypot., i. sects. 215-219; adv. Mathematicos, vii. a. 60-64-388-400. He too imputes to Protagoras both the two doctrines. 1. That man is the measure of all things: that what appears to each person is, *to him*: that all truth is thus relative. 2. That all phantasms, appearances, opinions, are true. Sextus reasons at some length (390 seq.) against this doctrine No. 2, and reasons very much as Protagoras himself would have reasoned, since he appeals to individual sentiment and movement of the individual mind (οὐκ ὁσάυτως γὰρ κινούμεθα, 391-400). It appears to me perfectly certain that Protagoras advanced the general thesis of Relativity: we see this as well from Plato as from Sextus—καὶ οὗτος εἰσέγει τὸ πρὸς τι—τὸν πρὸς τι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν (Steinhart is of opinion that these words τὸν πρὸς τι εἶναι τὴν ἀληθείαν are an addition of Sextus himself, and do not describe the doctrine of Protagoras; an opinion from which I dissent, and which is contradicted by

Plato himself: Steinhart, Einleitung, note 8). If Protagoras also advanced the doctrine—all opinions are true—this was not consistent with his cardinal principle of relativity. Either he himself did not take care always to enunciate the qualifications and limitations which his theory requires, and which in common parlance are omitted.—Or his opponents left out the limitations which he annexed, and impugned the opinion as if it stood without any. This last supposition I think the most probable.

The doctrine of Protagoras is correctly given by Sextus in the Pyrrhon. Hypot.

¹ Aristotle, in commenting on the Protagorean formula, falls into a similar inaccuracy in slurring over the restrictive qualification annexed by Protagoras. Metaphysic. Γ. p. 1009, a. 6. Compare hereupon Bonitz's note upon the passage, p. 199 of his edition.

This transition without warning, *a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*, is among the artifices ascribed by Plato to the Sophists Euthydemus and Dionysodorus (Plat. Euthyd. p. 297 D).

to believe in the Newtonian astronomy : you could not determine the author of the *Principia* in 1687 to believe what the child Newton had believed in 1647.¹ To say that what is true to one man, is false to another—that what *was* true to an individual as a child or as a youth, becomes false to him in his advanced years, is no real contradiction : though Plato, by omitting the qualifying words, presents it as if it were such. In every man's mind, the beliefs of the past have been modified or reversed, and the beliefs of the present are liable to be modified or reversed, by subsequent operative causes : by new supervening sensations, emotions, intellectual comparisons, authoritative teaching, or society, and so forth.

The fact, that all exposition and discussion is nothing more than an assemblage of individual judgments, depositions, affirmations, negations, &c., is disguised from us by the elliptical form in which it is conducted. For example :—I, who write this book—can give nothing more than my own report, as a witness, of facts known to me, and of what has been said, thought, or done by others,—for all which I cite authorities :—and my own conviction, belief or disbelief, as to the true understanding thereof, and the conclusions deducible. I produce the reasons which justify my opinion : I reply to those reasons which have been supposed by others to justify the opposite. It is for the reader to judge how far my reasons appear satisfactory to his mind.² To deliver my

All exposition and discussion is an assemblage of individual judgments and affirmations. This fact is disguised by elliptical forms of language.

¹ The argument produced by Plato to discredit the Protagorean theory—that it puts the dog or the horse on a level with man—furnishes in reality a forcible illustration of the truth of the theory.

Mr. James Harris, the learned Aristotelian of the last century, remarks, in his *Dialogue on Happiness* (Works, ed. 1772, pp. 143-168) :—

“Every particular Species is, itself to itself, the Measure of all things in the Universe. As things vary in their relations to it, they vary also in their value. If their value be ever doubtful, it can noway be adjusted but by recurring with accuracy to the natural State of the Species, and to those several Relations which such a State of course creates.”

² M. Destutt Tracy observes as follows :—

“De même que toutes nos propositions peuvent être ramenées à la forme de propositions énonciatives, parce qu'au fond elles expriment toutes un jugement ; de même, toutes nos propositions énonciatives peuvent ensuite être toujours réduites à n'être qu'une de celles-ci : ‘je pense, je sens, ou je perçois, que telle chose est de telle manière, ou que tel être produit tel effet’—*propositions dont nous sommes nous-mêmes le sujet, parce qu'au fond nous sommes toujours le sujet de tous nos jugemens, puisqu'ils n'expriment jamais qu'une impression que nous éprouvons.*” (Idéologie : Supplément à la première Section, vol. iv. p. 166, ed. 1825 duodec.)

own convictions, is all that is in my power : and if I spoke with full correctness and amplitude, it would be incumbent on me to avoid pronouncing any opinion to be *true* or *false* simply : I ought to say, it is *true to me*—or *false to me*. But to repeat this in every other sentence, would be a tiresome egotism. It is understood once for all by the title-page of the book : an opponent will know what he has to deal with, and will treat the opinions accordingly. If any man calls upon me to give him *absolute truth*, and to lay down the canon of evidence for identifying it—I cannot comply with the request, any farther than to deliver my own best judgment, what is truth—and to declare what is the canon of evidence which guides my own mind. Each reader must determine for himself whether he accepts it or not. I might indeed clothe my own judgments in oracular and vehement language : I might proclaim them as authoritative dicta : I might speak as representing the Platonic Ideal, Typical Man,—or as inspired by a *δαίμων* like Sokrates : I might denounce opponents as worthless men, deficient in all the sentiments which distinguish men from brutes, and meriting punishment as well as disgrace. If I used all these harsh phrases, I should only imitate what many authors of repute think themselves entitled to say, about *THEIR* beliefs and convictions. Yet in reality, I should still be proclaiming nothing beyond my own feelings :—the force of emotional association, and antipathy towards opponents, which had grown round these convictions in my own mind. Whether I speak in accordance with others, or in opposition to others, in either case I proclaim my own reports, feelings and judgments—nothing farther. I cannot escape from the Protagorean limit or measures.¹

"On peut même dire que comme nous ne sentons, ne savons, et ne connaissons, rien que par rapport à nous, l'idée, sujet de la proposition, est toujours en définitif notre moi ; car quand je dis cet arbre est vert, je dis réellement je sens, je sais, je vois, que cet arbre est vert. Mais précisément parce que ce préambule se trouve toujours et nécessairement compris dans toutes nos propositions, nous le supprimons quand nous voulons ; et toute idée peut être le sujet de la proposition." (Principes Logiques, vol. iv. ch. viii. p. 231.)

¹ Sokrates himself states as much as this in the course of his reply to the doctrine of Protagoras, Theætét. 171 D. : ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, οἶμαι, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς . . . καὶ τὰ δοκούντα αἰεὶ ταῦτα λέγειν.

The necessity (ἀνάγκη) to which Sokrates here adverts, is well expressed by M. Degérando. "En jugeant ce que pensent les autres hommes, en comprenant ce qu'ils éprouvent, nous ne sortons point en effet de nous-mêmes, comme on seroit tenté de le croire. C'est dans nos propres idées

To this theory Plato imputes as a farther consequence, that it equalises all men and all animals. No doubt, the measure or limit as generically described, bears alike upon all: but it does not mark the same degree in all. Each man's bodily efforts are measured or limited by the amount of his physical force: this is alike true of all men: yet it does not follow that the physical force of all men is equal. The dog, the horse, the new-born child, the lunatic, is each a measure of truth to himself: the philosopher is so also to himself: this is alike true, whatever may be the disparity of intelligence: and is rather more obviously true when the disparity is great, because the lower intelligence has then a very narrow stock of beliefs, and is little modifiable by the higher. But though the Protagorean doctrine declares the dog or the child to be a measure of truth—each to himself—it does not declare either of them to be a measure of truth to me, to you, or to any ordinary by-stander. How far any person is a measure of truth to others, depends upon the estimation in which he is held by others: upon the belief which they entertain respecting his character or competence. Here is a new element let in, of which Plato, in his objection to the Protagorean doctrine, takes no account. When he affirms that Protagoras by his equalising doctrine acknowledged himself to be no better in point of wisdom and judgment than a dog or a child, this inference must be denied.¹ The Protagorean doctrine is perfectly consistent with great diversities of knowledge, intellect, emotion, and character, between one man and another. Such diversities are recognised in individual belief and estimation, and are thus comprehended in the doctrine. Nor does Protagoras deny that men are teachable and modifiable. The scholar after being taught

Argument—That the Protagorean doctrine equalises all men and animals. How far true. Not true in the sense requisite to sustain Plato's objection.

que nous voyons leurs idées, leurs manières d'être, leur existence même. Le monde entier ne nous est connu que dans une sorte de chambre obscure: et lorsqu'on sort d'une société nombreuse nous croyons avoir lu dans les esprits et dans les cœurs, avoir observé des caractères, et senti (si je puis dire ainsi) la vie d'un grand nombre d'hommes—nous ne faisons en effet que sortir d'une grande galerie

dont notre imagination a fait tous les frais; dont elle a créé tous les personnages, et dessiné, avec plus ou moins de vérité, tous les tableaux." (Dégérando, Des Signes et de l'Art de Penser, vol. i. ch. v. p. 182.)

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 161 D. ὁ δ' ἀρα ἐτύγγανεν ὡς εἰς φρόνησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρίνου, μή ὅτι ἄλλου του ἀνθρώπου. I substitute the dog or horse as illustrations

will hold beliefs different from those which he held before. Protagoras professed to know more than others, and to teach them : others on their side also believed that he knew more than they, and came to learn it. Such belief on both sides, noway contradicts the general doctrine here under discussion. What the scholar believes to be true, is still true to him : among those things which he believes to be true, one is, that the master knows more than he : in coming to be taught, he acts upon his own conviction. To say that a man is wise, is to say, that he is wise *in some one's estimation*: your own or that of some one else. Such estimation is always implied, though often omitted in terms. Plato remarks very truly, that every one believes some others to be on certain matters wiser than himself. In other words, what is called authority—that predisposition to assent, with which we hear the statements and opinions delivered by some other persons—is one of the most operative causes in determining human belief. The circumstances of life are such as to generate this predisposition in every one's mind to a greater or less degree, and towards some persons more than towards others.

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself, like all his other beliefs, according to the Protagorean doctrine : and in acting upon it,—in following the guidance of A, and not following the guidance of B,—he is still a measure to himself. It is not to be supposed that, Protagoras ever admitted all men to be equally wise, though Plato puts such an admission into his mouth as an inference undeniable and obvious. His doctrine affirms something altogether different :—that whether you believe yourself to be wise or unwise, in either case the belief is equally your own—equally the result of your own mental condition and predisposition,—equally true to yourself,—and equally an item among the determining conditions of your actions. That the beliefs and convictions of one person might be modified by another, was a principle held by Protagoras not less than by Sokrates : the former employed as his modifying instrument, eloquent lecturing—the latter, dialectical cross-examination. Both of them recognise the belief of the person to whom they address themselves as true to him, yet at the same time as something which may be modified and corrected,

Belief on authority is true to the believer himself—The efficacy of authority resides in the believer's own mind.

by appealing to what they thought the better parts of it against the worse.

Again—Sokrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—“Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons: but you admit that the belief of all persons is true: therefore your doctrine is false”.¹ Here also Plato omits the qualification annexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man’s belief is true—that is, true *to him*. That a belief should be true, to one man, and false to another—is not only no contradiction to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates. He of course could only proclaim it as true to himself. It is the express purpose of his doctrine to disallow the absolutely true and the absolutely false. His own formula, like every other opinion, is false to those who dissent from it: but it is not false absolutely, any more than any other doctrine. Plato therefore does not make out his charge of contradiction.

Protagorean formula—is false, to those who dissent from it.

Some men (says Sokrates) have learnt,—have bestowed study on special matters,—have made themselves wise upon those matters. Others have not done the like, but remain ignorant. It is the wise man only who is a measure: the ignorant man neither is so, nor believes himself to be so, but seeks guidance from the wise.²

Plato’s argument—That the wise man alone is a measure—Reply to it.

Upon this we may remark—First, that even when the untaught men are all put aside, and the erudites or Experts remain alone—still these very erudites or Experts, the men of special study, are perpetually differing among themselves; so that we cannot recognise one as a measure, without repudiating the authority of the rest.³ If by a measure, Plato means an infallible measure, he will not find it in this way: he is as far from the absolute as before. Next, it is perfectly correct that if any man be known to have studied or acquired experience on special matters, his opinion obtains an authority with others (more or

¹ Plato, *Thæstét.* p. 171 A. Sextus Empiric. (*adv. Mathem.* vii. 61) gives a pertinent answer to this objection.

² Plato, *Thæstét.* pp. 171 C, 179 B.

³ “Nam, quod dicunt omnino, se credere ei quem judicent fuisse sapientem—probarem, si id ipsum rudes

et indocti judicare potuissent (statuere enim, qui sit sapiens, vel maximè videtur esse sapientis). Sed, ut potuerint, potuerunt, omnibus rebus auditis, cognititis etiam reliquorum sententiis: judicaverunt autem re semel auditâ, atque ad unius se auctoritatem contulerunt.” (Cicero, *Acad. Priora*, ii. 3, 9.)

fewer), such as the opinion of an ignorant man will not possess. This is a real difference between the graduated man and the non-graduated. But it is a difference not contradicting the theory of Protagoras; who did not affirm that every man's opinion was equally trustworthy in the estimation of others, but that every man's opinion was alike a measure to the man himself. The authority of the guide resides in the belief and opinion of those who follow him, or who feel prepared to follow him if necessity arises. A man gone astray on his journey, asks the way to his destination from residents whom he believes to know it, just as he might look at a compass, or at the stars, if no other persons were near. In following their direction, he is acting on his own belief, that he himself is ignorant on the point in question and that they know. He is a measure to himself, both of the extent of his own ignorance, and of the extent of his own knowledge. And in this respect all are alike—every man, woman, child, and animal;¹ though they are by no means alike in the estimation of others, as trustworthy authorities.

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 171 E. I transcribe the following from the treatise of Fichte (*Beruf des Menschen, Destination de l'Homme*; Traduction de Barchou de Penhoën, ch. i. *Le Doute*, pp. 54-55):—

“De la conscience de chaque individu, la nature se contemplant sous un point de vue différent, il en résulte que je m'appelle moi, et que tu t'appelles toi. Pour toi, je suis hors de toi; et pour moi, tu es hors de moi. Dans ce qui est hors de moi, je me saisis d'abord de ce qui m'avoisine le plus, de ce qui est le plus à ma portée: toi, tu fais de même. Chacun de notre côté, nous allons ensuite au delà. Puis, ayant commencé à cheminer ainsi dans le monde de deux points de départ différents, nous suivons, pendant le reste de notre vie, des routes qui se coupent çà et là, mais qui jamais ne suivent exactement la même direction, jamais ne courent parallèlement l'une à l'autre. Tous les individus possibles peuvent être: par conséquent aussi, tous les points de vue de conscience possibles. *La somme de ces consciences individuelles fait la conscience universelle: il n'y a pas d'autre.* Ce n'est en effet que dans l'individu que se trouve à la fois et la limitation et la réalité. Dans l'individu la con-

science est entièrement déterminée par la nature intime de l'individu. Il n'est donné à personne de savoir autre chose que ce qu'il sait. Il ne pourrait pas davantage savoir les mêmes choses d'une autre façon qu'il ne les sait.”

The same doctrine is enforced with great originality and acuteness in a recent work of M. Eugène Véron, *Du Progrès Intellectuel dans l'Humanité, Supériorité des Arts Modernes sur les Arts Anciens* (Paris, 1862, Guillaumin). M. Véron applies his general doctrine mainly to the theory of Art and Aesthetics: moreover he affirms more than I admit respecting human progress as a certain and constant matter of fact. But he states clearly, as an universal truth, the relative point of view—the necessary measurement for itself, of each individual mind—and the consequent obligation, on each, to allow to other minds the like liberty. We read, pp. 14-16-17:—

“Cela revient à dire que dans quel cas que nous supposons, nous ne pouvons sentir que dans la mesure de notre sensibilité, comprendre et juger que dans la mesure de notre intelligence; et que nos facultés étant en perpétuel développement, les variations de notre personnalité entraînent nécessairement celles de nos jugemens,

A similar remark may be made as to Plato's distinction between the different matters to which belief may apply : present sensation or sentiment in one case—anticipation of future sensations or sentiments, in another. Upon matters of present sensation and sentiment (he argues), such as hot or cold, sweet or bitter, just or unjust, honourable or base, &c., one man is as good a judge as another : but upon matters involving future contingency, such as what is healthy or unhealthy,—profitable and good, or hurtful and bad,—most men judge badly : only a few persons, possessed of special skill and knowledge, judge well, each in his respective province.

Plato's argument as to the distinction between present sensation and anticipation of the future.

I for my part admit this distinction to be real and important. Most other persons admit the same.¹ In acting upon it, I follow out my belief,—and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the circumstances which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it operates relatively to the individual mind, and thus falls under that general canon of relativity, which it is the express purpose of the Protagorean formula to

The formula of Relativity does not imply that every man believes himself to be infallible.

même quand nous n'en avons pas conscience. . . Chaque homme a son esprit particulier. Ce que l'un comprend sans peine, un autre ne le peut saisir ; ce qui répugne à l'un, plaît à l'autre ; ce qui me paraît odieux, mon voisin l'approuve. Quelque bonne envie que nous semblions avoir de nous perdre dans la foule, de dépouiller notre individualité pour emprunter des jugemens tout faits et des opinions taillées à la mesure et à l'usage du public—il est facile de voir que, tout en ayant l'air de répéter la leçon apprise, nous jugeons à notre manière, quand nous jugeons : que notre jugement, tout en paraissant être celui de tout le monde, n'en reste pas moins personnel, et n'est pas une simple imitation : que cette ressemblance même est souvent plus apparente que réelle : que l'identité extérieure des formules et des expressions ne prouve pas absolument celle de la pensée. Rien n'est élastique comme les mots, et comme les principes généraux dans lesquels on pense enfermer les intelligences. C'est souvent quand le langage est le plus semblable qu'on est le plus loin de s'entendre.

"Du reste, quand même cette ressem-

blance serait aussi réelle qu'elle est fautive, en quoi prouverait-elle l'identité nécessaire des intelligences ? Qu'y aurait-il d'étonnant qu'au milieu de ce communisme intellectuel qui régit l'éducation de chaque classe, et détermine nos habitudes intellectuelles et morales, les distinctions natives disparaissent ou s'atténuassent ? Ne faut-il pas plutôt admirer l'opiniâtre vitalité des différences originelles qui résistent à tant de causes de nivellement ? L'identité primitive des intelligences n'est qu'une fiction logique sans réalité—une simple abstraction de langage, qui ne repose que sur l'identité du mot avec lui-même. Tout se réduit à la possibilité abstraite des mêmes développemens, dans les mêmes conditions d'hérédité et d'éducation—mais aussi de développemens différens dans des circonstances différentes : c'est à dire, que l'intelligence de chacun n'est identique à celle de tous, qu'au moment où elle n'est pas encore proprement une intelligence."

¹ Plato, Theæstét. p. 179 A. *vās av*
ὁμοιογενεῖς.

affirm. Sokrates impugns the formula of relativity, as if it proclaimed every one to believe himself more competent to predict the future than any other person. But no such assumption is implied in it. To say that a man is a measure to himself, is not to say that he is, or, that he believes himself to be, omniscient or infallible. A sick man may mistake the road towards future health, in many different directions. One patient may over-estimate his own knowledge,—that is one way, but only one among several : another may be diffident, and may undervalue his own knowledge : a third may over-estimate the knowledge of his professional adviser, and thus follow an ignorant physician, believing him to be instructed and competent : a fourth, instead of consulting a physician, may consult a prophet, whom Plato¹ here reckons among the authoritative infallible measures in respect to future events : a fifth may (like the rhetor Ælius Aristides²) disregard the advice of physicians, and follow prescriptions enjoined to him in his own dreams, believing them to be sent by Æsculapius the Preserving God. Each of these persons judges differently about the road to future health : but each is alike a measure to himself : the belief of each is relative to his own mental condition and predispositions. You, or I, may believe that one or other of them is mistaken : but here another measure is introduced—*your mind or mine*.

But the most unfounded among all Plato's objections to the Protagorean formula, is that in which Sokrates is made to allege, that if it be accepted, the work of dialectical discussion is at an end : that the Sokratic Elenchus, the reciprocal scrutiny of opinions between two dialogists, becomes nugatory—since every man's opinions are *right*. Instead of *right*, we must add the requisite qualification, here as elsewhere, by reading, *right to the man himself*. Now, dealing with

Plato's argument is untenable—That if the Protagorean formula be admitted, dialectic discussion would be annulled—The reverse

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 179 A, where Mr. Campbell observes in his note—“The μένεις is introduced as being *προσέτιμος* of the future generally ; just as the physician is of future health and disease, the musician of future harmony,” &c.

² See the five discourses of the rhetor Aristides—Ἰερὸν Λόγιον, Oratt. xxiii.

xxvii.—containing curious details about his habits and condition, and illustrating his belief ; especially Or. xxiii. p. 462 seqq. The perfect faith which he reposed in his dreams, and the confidence with which he speaks of the benefits derived from acting upon them, are remarkable.

³ Plato, Theætét. p. 161 E.

Plato's affirmation thus corrected, we must pronounce not only that it is not true, but that the direct reverse of it is true. Dialectical discussion and the Sokratic procedure, far from implying the negation of the Protagorean formula, involve the unqualified recognition of it. Without such recognition the procedure cannot even begin, much less advance onward to any result. Dialectic operates altogether by question and answer: the questioner takes all his premisses from the answers of the respondent, and cannot proceed in any direction except that in which the respondent leads him. Appeal is always directly made to the affirmative or negative of the individual mind, which is thus installed as measure of truth or falsehood *for itself*. The peculiar and characteristic excellence of the Sokratic Elenchus consists in thus stimulating the interior mental activity of the individual hearer, in eliciting from him all the positive elements of the debate, and in making him feel a shock when one of his answers contradicts the others. Sokrates not only does not profess to make himself a measure for the respondent, but expressly disclaims doing so: he protests against being considered as a teacher, and avows his own entire ignorance. He undertakes only the obstetric process of evolving from the respondent mind what already exists in it without the means of escape—and of applying interrogatory tests to the answer when produced: if there be nothing in the respondent's mind, his art is inapplicable. He repudiates all appeal to authority, except that of the respondent himself.¹ Accordingly there

is true—
Dialectic
recognises
the auto-
nomy of
the indi-
vidual
mind.

¹ Read the animated passage in the conversation with Pólos: Plato, *Gorg.* 472, and *Theætét.* 161 A, pp. 375, 376.

In this very argument of Sokrates (in the *Theætétus*) against the Protagorean theory, we find him unconsciously adopting (as I have already remarked) the very language of that theory, as a description of his own procedure, p. 171 D. Compare with this a remarkable passage in the colloquy of Sokrates with Thrasymachus, in *Republic*, i. 387 C.

Moreover, the long and striking contrast between the philosopher and the man of the world, which Plato embodies in this dialogue (the *Theætétus*, from p. 172 to p. 177), is so far from assisting his argument against Prota-

goras, that it rather illustrates the Protagorean point of view. The beliefs and judgments of the man of the world are presented as flowing from his mental condition and predispositions: those of the philosopher, from his. The two are radically dissentient: each appears to the other mistaken and misguided. Here is nothing to refute Protagoras. Each of the two is a measure for himself.

Yes, it will be said; but Plato's measure is right, and that of the man of the world is wrong. Perhaps I may think so. As a measure for myself, I speak and act accordingly. But the opponents have not agreed to accept me any more than Plato as their judge. The case remains unsettled as before.

is neither sense nor fitness in the Sokratic cross-examination, unless you assume that each person, to whom it is addressed, is a measure of truth and falsehood to himself. Implicitly indeed, this is assumed in rhetoric as well as in dialectic: wherever the speaker aims at persuading, he adapts his mode of speech to the predispositions of the hearer's own mind; and he thus recognises that mind as a measure for itself. But the Sokratic Dialectic embodies the same recognition, and the same essential relativity to the hearer's mind, more forcibly than any rhetoric. And the Platonic Sokrates (in the Phædrus) makes it one of his objections against orators who addressed multitudes, that they did not discriminate either the specialties of different minds, or the specialties of discourse applicable to each.¹

Though Sokrates, and Plato so far forth as follower of Sokrates, employed a colloquial method based on the fundamental assumption of the Protagorean formula—autonomy of each individual mind—whether they accepted the formula in terms, or not; yet we shall find Plato at the end of his career, in his treatise *De Legibus*, constructing an imaginary city upon the attempted deliberate exclusion of this formula. We shall find him there monopolising all teaching and culture of his citizens from infancy upwards, barring out all freedom of speech or writing by a strict censorship, and severely punishing dissent from the prescribed orthodoxy. But then we shall also find that Plato in that last stage of his life—when he constitutes himself as lawgiver, the measure of truth or falsehood for all his citizens—has at the same time discontinued his early commerce with the Sokratic Dialectics.

On the whole then, looking at what Plato says about the Protagorean doctrine of Relativity—*Homo Mensura*—first, his statement what the doctrine really is, next his strictures upon it—we may see that he ascribes to it consequences which it will not fairly carry. He impugns it as if it excluded philosophy and argumentative scrutiny: whereas, on the contrary, it is the only basis upon which philosophy or “reasoned truth” can stand. Whoever denies the Protagorean auto-

Contrast with the Treatise *De Legibus*—Plato assumes infallible authority—sets aside Dialectic.

Plato in denying the Protagorean formula, constitutes himself the measure for all. Counter-proposition to the formula.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 271 D-E; compare 268 A.

nomy of the individual judgment, must propound as his counter theory some heteronomy, such as he (the denier) approves. If I am not allowed to judge of truth and falsehood for myself, who is to judge for me? Plato, in the Treatise *De Legibus*, answers very unequivocally :—assuming to himself that infallibility which I have already characterised as the prerogative of King Nomos : “I, the lawgiver, am the judge for all my citizens : you must take my word for what is true or false : you shall hear nothing except what my censors approve—and if, nevertheless, any dissenters arise, there are stringent penalties in store for them”. Here is an explicit enunciation of the Counter-Proposition,¹ necessary to be maintained by those who deny the Protagorean doctrine. If you pronounce a man unfit to be the measure of truth for himself, you constitute yourself the measure, in his place : either directly as lawgiver—or by nominating censors according to your own judgment. As soon as he is declared a lunatic, some other person must be appointed to manage his property for him. You can only exchange one individual judgment for another. You cannot get out of the region of individual judgments, more or fewer in number : the King, the Pope, the Priest, the Judges or Censors, the author of some book, or the promulgator of such and such doctrine. The infallible measure which you undertake to provide, must be found in some person or persons—if it can be found at all : in some person selected by yourself—that is, in the last result, *yourself*.²

¹ Professor Ferrier's Institutes of Metaphysic exhibit an excellent example of the advantages of setting forth explicitly the Counter-Proposition—that which an author intends to deny, as well as the Proposition which he intends to affirm and prove.

² Aristotle says (*Ethic. Nikomach.* x. 1176, a. 15) *δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἀρεσὶ τοῖς τοιοῦτοῖς εἶναι, τὸ φαινόμενον τῇ σπουδαίᾳ*. “That is, which appears to be in the judgment of the wise or virtuous man.” The ultimate appeal is thus acknowledged to be, not to an abstraction, but to some one or more individual persons whom Aristotle recognises as wise. That is truth which this wise man declares to be truth. You cannot escape from the Relative by any twist of reasoning.

What Platonic critics call “Der

Gegensatz des Seins und des Scheins” (see Steinhart, *Einleit. zum Theæstët.* p. 37) is unattainable. All that is attainable is the antithesis between that which appears to one person, and that which appears to one or more others, choose them as you will : between that which appears at a first glance, or at a distance, or on careless inspection—and that which appears after close and multiplied observations and comparisons, after full discussion, &c. *Das Sein* is that which appears to the person or persons whom we judge to be wise, under these latter favourable circumstances.

Epiktētus, l. 28, 1. *Τί ἐστιν αἴτιον τοῦ συγκατατίθεσθαι τινι ; Τὸ φαίνεσθαι ὅτι ὑπάρχει. Τῷ οὖν φαινόμενῳ ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει, συγκατατίθεσθαι οὐχ ὁλόν τε.*

It is only when the Counter-Proposition to the Protagorean formula is explicitly brought out, that the full meaning of that formula can be discerned. If you deny it, the basis of all free discussion and scrutiny is withdrawn : philosophy, or what is properly called reasoned truth, disappears. In itself it says little.

Import of the Protagorean formula is best seen when we state explicitly the counter-proposition.

Unpopularity of the Protagorean formula—Most believers insist upon making themselves a measure for others, as well as for themselves. Appeal to Abstractions.

Yet little as its positive import may seem to be, it clashes with various illusions, omissions, and exigencies, incident to the ordinary dogmatising process. It substitutes the concrete in place of the abstract—the complete in place of the elliptical. Instead of Truth and Falsehood, which present to us the Abstract and impersonal as if it stood alone—the Objective divested of its Subject—we are translated into the real world of beliefs and disbeliefs, individual believers and disbelievers : matters affirmed or denied by some Subject actual or supposable—by you, by me, by him or them, perhaps by all persons within our knowledge. All men agree in the subjective fact, or in the mental states called belief and disbelief ; but all men do not agree in the matters believed and disbelieved, or in what they speak of as Truth and Falsehood. No infallible objective mark, no common measure, no canon of evidence, recognised by all, has yet been found. What is Truth to one man, is not truth, and is often Falsehood, to another : that which governs the mind as infallible authority in one part of the globe, is treated with indifference or contempt elsewhere.¹ Each man's belief, though in part deter-

¹ Respecting the grounds and conditions of belief among the Hindoos, Sir William Sleeman (Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official, ch. xxvi. vol. i. pp. 226-228) observes as follows :—

“Every word of this poem (the Ramæna, Ramayana) the people assured me was written, if not by the hand of the Deity himself, at least by his inspiration, which was the same thing, and it must consequently be true. Ninety-nine out of a hundred, among the Hindoos, implicitly believe, not only every word of this poem, but every word of every poem that has ever been written in Sanscrit. If you ask a man whether he really believes any

very egregious absurdity quoted from these books, he replies with the greatest naïveté in the world, ‘Is it not written in the book ; and how should it be there written if not true?’ . . . The greater the improbability, the more monstrous and preposterous the fiction, the greater is the charm that it has over their minds ; and the greater their learning in the Sanscrit, the more are they under the influence of this charm. Believing all to be written by the Deity, or by his inspirations, and the men and things of former days to have been very different from the men and things of the present day, and the heroes of these fables to have been demigods, or people en-

mined by the same causes as the belief of others, is in part also determined by causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks of Truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be Truth ; unless he expressly superadds the indication of some other persons believing in it. This is the reality of the case, which the Protagorean formula brings into full view ; but which most men dislike to recognise, and disguise from themselves as well as from others in the common elliptical forms of speech. In most instances a believer entirely forgets that his own mind is the product of a given time and place, and of a conjunction of circumstances always peculiar, amidst the aggregate of mankind—for the most part narrow. He cannot be content (like Protagoras) to be a measure for himself and for those whom his arguments may satisfy. This would be to proclaim what some German critics denounce as Subjectivism.¹

dowed with powers far superior to those of the ordinary men of their own day, the analogies of nature are never for a moment considered ; nor do questions of probability, or possibility, according to those analogies, ever obtrude to dispel the charm with which they are so pleasingly bound. They go on through life reading and talking of these monstrous fictions, which shock the taste and understanding of other nations, without once questioning the truth of one single incident, or hearing it questioned. There was a time, and that not very distant, when it was the same in England and in every other European nation ; and there are, I am afraid, some parts of Europe where it is so still. But the Hindoo faith, so far as religious questions are concerned, is not more capacious or absurd than that of the Greeks and Romans in the days of Sokrates and Cicero ; the only difference is, that among the Hindoos a greater number of the questions which interest mankind are brought under the head of religion."

¹ This is the objection taken by Schwegler, Prantl, and other German thinkers, against the Protagorean doctrine (Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, vol. i. p. 12 seq. ; Schwegler, *Gesch. der Philos. im Umrisse*, s. 11, b. p. 26, ed. 5th). I had transcribed from each of these works a passage of some length, but I cannot find room for them in this note.

These authors both say, that the Protagorean canon, properly understood, is right, but that Protagoras laid it down wrongly. They admit the principle of Subjectivity, as an essential aspect of the case, in regard to truth ; but they say that Protagoras was wrong in appealing to individual, empirical, accidental, subjectivity of each man at every varying moment, whereas he ought to have appealed to an ideal or universal subjectivity. "What ought to be held true, right, good, &c.," (says Schwegler) "must be decided doubtless by *me*, but by *me* so far forth as a rational, and thinking being. Now *my* thinking, *my* reason, is not something specially belonging to me, but something common to all rational beings, something universal ; so far therefore as I proceed as a rational and thinking person, my subjectivity is an universal subjectivity. Every thinking person has the consciousness that what he regards as right, duty, good, evil, &c., presents itself not merely to him as such, but also to every rational person, and that, consequently, his judgment possesses the character of universality, universal validity : in one word, Objectivity."

Here it is explicitly asserted, that wherever a number of individual men employ their reason, the specialities of each disappear, and they arrive at the same conclusions—Reason being a guide impersonal as well as infallible. And this same view is expressed by

He insists upon constituting himself—or some authority worshipped by himself—or some abstraction interpreted by himself—a measure for all others besides, whether assentient or dissentient. That which *he* believes, all ought to believe.

This state of mind in reference to belief is usual with most men, not less at the present day than in the time of Plato and Protagoras. It constitutes the natural intolerance prevalent among mankind; which each man (speaking generally), in the case of his own beliefs, commends and exults in, as a virtue. It flows as a natural corollary from the sentiment of belief, though it may be corrected by reflection and social sympathy. Hence the doctrine of Protagoras—equal right of private judgment to each man for himself—becomes inevitably unwelcome.

We are told that Demokritus, as well as Plato and Aristotle, wrote against Protagoras. The treatise of Demokritus is lost: but we possess what the two latter said against the Protagorean formula. In my judgment both

Aristotle failed in his attempts to refute the

Prantl in other language, when he reforms the Protagorean doctrine by saying, "Das Denken ist der Mass der Dinge".

To me this assertion appears so distinctly at variance with notorious facts, that I am surprised when I find it advanced by learned historians of philosophy, who recount the very facts which contradict it. Can it really be necessary to repeat that the reason of one man differs most materially from that of another—and the reason of the same person from itself, at different times—in respect of the arguments accepted, the authorities obeyed, the conclusions embraced? The impersonal Reason is a mere fiction; the universal Reason is an abstraction, belonging alike to all particular reasoners, consentient or dissentient, sound or unsound, &c. Schwegler admits the Protagorean canon only under a reserve which nullifies its meaning. To say that the Universal Reason is the measure of truth is to assign no measure at all. The Universal Reason can only make itself known through an interpreter. The interpreters are dissentient; and which of them is to hold the privilege of infallibility? Neither Schwegler nor Prantl are forward to specify who the interpreter is, who is entitled to put dissentients to silence;

both of them keep in the safe obscurity of an abstraction—"Das Denken"—the Universal Reason. Protagoras recognises in each dissentient an equal right to exercise his own reason, and to judge for himself.

In order to show how thoroughly incorrect the language of Schwegler and Prantl is, when they talk about the Universal Reason as unanimous and unerring, I transcribe from another eminent historian of philosophy a description of what philosophy has been from ancient times down to the present.

Degrando, *Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie*, vol. i. p. 43:—"Une multitude d'hypothèses, élevées en quelque sorte au hasard, et rapidement détruites; une diversité d'opinions, d'autant plus sensible que la philosophie a été plus développée; des sectes, des partis même, des disputes interminables, des spéculations stériles, des erreurs maintenues et transmises par une imitation aveugle; quelques découvertes obtenues avec lenteur, et mêlées d'idées fausses; des réformes annoncées à chaque siècle et jamais accomplies; une succession de doctrines qui se renversent les unes les autres sans pouvoir obtenir plus de solidité; la raison humaine ainsi proméée dans un triste cercle de vicissitudes, et ne s'élevant à quelques épo-

failed in refuting it. Each of them professed to lay down objective, infallible, criteria of truth and falsehood : Democritus on his side, and the other dogmatical philosophers, professed to do the same, each in his own way—and each in a different way.¹ Now the Protagorean formula neither allows nor disallows any one of these proposed objective criteria : but it enunciates the appeal to which all of them must be submitted—the subjective condition of satisfying the judgment of each hearer. Its protest is entered only when that condition is overleaped, and when the dogmatist enacts his canon of belief as imperative, peremptory, binding upon all (allgemeingültig) both assentient and dissentient. I am grateful to Aristotle for his efforts to lay down objective canons in the research of truth ; but I claim the right of examining those canons for myself, and of judging whether that, which satisfied Aristotle, satisfies me also. The same right which I claim for myself, I am bound to allow to all others. The general expression of this compromise is, the Protagorean formula. No one demands more emphatically to be a measure for himself, even when all authority is opposed to him, than Sokrates in the Platonic Gorgias.²

Protagorean formula—Every reader of Aristotle will claim the right of examining for himself Aristotle's canons of truth.

After thus criticising the formula—Homo Mensura—Plato proceeds to canvass the other doctrine, which he ascribes to Protagoras along with others, and which he puts into the mouth of Theætétus—"That know-

Plato's examination of the other doctrine—

ques fortunées que pour retomber bientôt dans de nouveaux écarts, &c. . . . les mêmes questions, enfin, qui partagentent il y a plus de vingt siècles les premiers génies de la Grèce, agitées encore aujourd'hui après tant de volumineux écrits consacrés à les discuter".

¹ Plutarch, adv. Kolot. p. 1108.

According to Democritus all sensible perceptions were conventional, or varied according to circumstances, or according to the diversity of the percipient Subject; but there was an objective reality—minute, solid, invisible atoms, differing in figure, position, and movement, and vacuum along with them. Such reality was intelligible only by Reason. Νόμος γλυκύ, νόμος πικρόν, νόμος θερμόν, νόμος ψυχρόν, νόμος χροῖή· ἐστὶ δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν. Ἄπερ νομίζεται μὲν εἶναι καὶ δοξάζεται τὰ αἰσθητά,

οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κατὰ ἀληθείαν ταῦτα· ἅλλα τὰ ἄτομα μόνον καὶ κενόν.

Sextus Empiric. adv. Mathemat. vii. 185-189; Diog. Laert. ix. 72. See Mullach, Democriti Fragn. pp. 204-208.

The discourse of Protagoras Περὶ τοῦ ὄντος, was read by Porphyry, who apparently cited from it a passage verbatim, which citation Eusebius unfortunately has not preserved (Eusebius, Præpar. Evang. x. 3, 17). One of the speakers in Porphyry's dialogue (describing a repast at the house of Longinus at Athens to celebrate Plato's birthday) accused Plato of having copied largely from the arguments of Protagoras—πρὸς τοὺς ἐν τῷ ὄν εἰσάγοντας. Allusion is probably made to the Platonic dialogues Parmenides and Sophistes.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 472.

That knowledge is Sensible Perception. He adverts to sensible facts which are different with different Perceptants.

ledge is sensible perception". He connects that doctrine with the above-mentioned formula, by illustrations which exhibit great divergence between one percipient Subject and another. He gives us, as examples of sensible perception, the case of the wind, cold to one man, not cold to another: that of the wine, sweet to a man in health, bitter if he be sickly.¹

Perhaps Protagoras may have dwelt upon cases like these, as best calculated to illustrate the relativity of all affirmations: for though the judgments are in reality both equally relative, whether two judges pronounce alike, or whether they pronounce differently, under the same conditions—yet where they judge differently, each stands forth in his own individuality, and the relativity of the judgment is less likely to be disputed.

Such is not the case with all the facts of sense. The conditions of unanimity are best found among select facts of sense—weighing, measuring, &c. But though some facts of sense are thus equivocal, generating dissension rather than unanimity among different individuals—such is by no means true of the facts of sense taken generally.² On the contrary, it is only these facts—the world of reality, experience, and particulars—which afford a groundwork and assurance of unanimity in human belief, under all varieties of teaching or locality. Counting, measuring, weighing, are facts of sense simple and fundamental, and comparisons of those facts: capable of being so exhibited that no two persons shall either see them differently or mistrust them. Of two persons exposed to the same wind, one may feel cold, and the other not: but both of them will see the barometer or thermometer alike.³ Πάντα μέτρῃ καὶ ἀριθμῷ

¹ Plato, Theætét. pp. 152 A, 159 C.

² Aristotle (Metaphysic. I. p. 1010, a. 25 seq.) in arguing against Heraclitus and his followers, who dwell upon τὰ αἰσθητὰ as ever fluctuating and undefinable, urges against them that this is not true of *all* αἰσθητὰ, but only of those in the sublunary region of the Kosmos. But this region is (he says) only an imperceptibly small part of the entire Kosmos; the objects in the vast superlunary or celestial region of the Kosmos were far more numerous, and were also eternal and unchangeable, in constant and uniform circular rotation. Accordingly, if you predicate

one or other about αἰσθητὰ generally, you ought to predicate constancy and unchangeability, not flux and variation, since the former predicates are true of much the larger proportion of αἰσθητὰ. See the Scholia on the above passage of Aristotle's Metaphysica, and also upon Book A, 991, a. 9.

³ Mr. Campbell, in his Preface to the Theætétus (p. lxxviii.), while comparing the points in the dialogue with modern metaphysical views, observes, "Modern Experimental Science is equally distrustful of individual impressions of sense, but has found means of measuring the motions by which

καὶ σταθμῶ—would be the perfection of science, if it could be obtained. Plato himself recognises, in more than one place, the irresistible efficacy of weight and measure in producing unanimity; and in forestalling those disputes which are sure to arise where weight and measure cannot be applied.¹ It is therefore among select facts of sense, carefully observed and properly compared, that the groundwork of unanimity is to be sought, so far as any rational and universal groundwork for it is attainable. In other words, it is here that we must seek for the basis of knowledge or cognition.

A loose adumbration of this doctrine is here given by Plato as the doctrine of Protagoras, in the words—Knowledge is sensible perception. To sift this doctrine is announced as his main purpose;² and we shall see how he performs the task. *Sokr.*—Shall we admit, that when we perceive things by sight or hearing, we at the same time *know* them all? When foreigners talk to us in a strange language, are we to say that we do not hear what they say, or that we both hear

Arguments of Sokrates in examining this question. Divergence between one man and another arises, not merely from different

they are caused, through the effect of the same motions upon other things besides our senses. When the same wind is blowing one of us feels warm and another cold (*Theætét.* p. 152), but the mercury of the thermometer tells the same tale to all. And though the individual consciousness remains the sole judge of the exact impression momentarily received by each person, yet we are certain that the sensation of heat and cold, like the expansion and contraction of the mercury, is in every case dependent on a universal law."

It might seem from Mr. Campbell's language (I do not imagine that he means it so) as if Modern Experimental Science had arrived at something more trustworthy than "individual impressions of sense". But the expansion or contraction of the mercury are just as much facts of sense as the feeling of heat or cold; only they are facts of sense determinate and uniform to all, whereas the feeling of heat or cold is indeterminate and liable to differ with different persons. The certainty about "universal law governing the sensations of heat and cold," was not at all felt in the days of Plato.

¹ Thus in the *Philébus* (pp. 55-56) Plato declares that numbering, measuring, and weighing, are the characteristic marks of all the various processes which deserve the name of Arts; and that among the different Arts those of the carpenter, builder, &c., are superior to those of the physician, pilot, husbandman, military commander, musical composer, &c., because the two first-named employ more measurement and a greater number of measuring instruments, the rule, line, plummet, compass, &c.

"When we talk about iron or silver" (says Sokrates in the *Platonic Phædrus*, p. 263 A-B) "we are all of one mind, but when we talk about the Just and the Good we are all at variance with each other, and each man is at variance with himself". Compare an analogous passage, *Alkibiad.* i. p. 100.

Here Plato himself recognises the verifications of sense as the main guarantee for accuracy; and the compared facts of sense, when select and simplified, as ensuring the nearest approach to unanimity among believers.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 163 A. εἰς γὰρ τοῦτό που πᾶς ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔστιν, καὶ τοῦτο χάριν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοκα ταῦτα ἐκινήσαμεν.

sensual
impressi-
bility, but
from mental
and asso-
ciative
difference.

and know it? When unlettered men look at an inscription, shall we contend that they do not see the writing, or that they both see and know it? *Theætēt.*—We shall say, under these supposed circumstances, that what we see and hear, we also know. We hear and we know the pitch and intonation of the foreigner's voice. The unlettered man sees, and also knows, the colour, size, forms, of the letters. But that which the schoolmaster and the interpreter could tell us respecting their meaning, *that* we neither see, nor hear, nor know. *Sokr.*—Excellent, *Theætētus*. I have nothing to say against your answer.¹

This is an important question and answer, which Plato unfortunately does not follow up. It brings to view, though without fully unfolding, the distinction between what is really perceived by sense, and what is inferred from such perception: either through resemblance or through conjunctions of past experience treasured up in memory—or both together. Without having regard to such distinction, no one can discuss satisfactorily the question under debate.² Plato here abandons, moreover,

¹ Plato, *Theætēt.* p. 163 C.

² I borrow here a striking passage from Dugald Stewart, which illustrates both the passage in Plato's text, and the general question as to the relativity of Cognition. Here, the fact of relative Cognition is brought out most conspicuously on its intellectual side, not on its perceptive side. The fact of sense is the same to all, and therefore, though really relative, has more the look of an absolute; but the mental associations with that fact are different with different persons, and therefore are more obviously and palpably relative.—Dugald Stewart, *First Preliminary Dissertation* on *Encyclopæd. Britannica*, pp. 66, 8th ed.

"To this reference of the sensation of colour to the external object, I can think of nothing so analogous as the feelings we experience in surveying a library of books. We speak of the volumes piled up on its shelves as *treasures* or *magazines* of the knowledge of past ages; and contemplate them with gratitude and reverence as inexhaustible *sources* of instruction and delight to the mind. Even in looking at a page of print or manuscript, we are apt to say that the ideas we acquire

are received by the sense of sight; and we are scarcely conscious of a metaphor when we apply this language. On such occasions we seldom recollect that nothing is perceived by the eye but a multitude of black strokes drawn upon white paper, and that it is our own acquired habits which communicate to these strokes the whole of that significance whereby they are distinguished from the unmeaning scrawling of an infant. The knowledge which we conceive to be preserved in books, like the fragrance of a rose, or the gilding of the clouds, depends, for its existence, on the relation between the object and the percipient mind: and the only difference between the two cases is, that, in the one, this relation is the local and temporary effect of conventional habits: in the other, it is the universal and the unchangeable work of nature. . . . What has now been remarked with respect to written characters, may be extended very nearly to oral language. When we listen to the discourse of a public speaker, eloquence and persuasion seem to issue from his lips; and we are little aware that we ourselves infuse the soul into every word that he utters. The case is exactly the same when we enjoy the

the subjective variety of impression which he had before noticed as the characteristic of sense :—(the wind which blows cold, and the wine which tastes sweet, to one man, but not to another). Here it is assumed that all men hear the sounds, and see the written letters alike: the divergence between one man and another arises from the different prior condition of percipient minds, differing from each other in associative and reminiscent power.

Sokrates turns to another argument. If knowledge be the same thing as sensible perception, then it follows, that so soon as a man ceases to see and hear, he also ceases to know. The memory of what he has seen or heard, upon that supposition, is not knowledge. But Theætétus admits that a man who remembers what he has seen or heard does know it. Accordingly, the answer that knowledge is sensible perception, cannot be maintained.¹

Argument—That sensible Perception does not include memory—Probability that those who held the doctrine meant to include memory.

Here Sokrates makes out a good case against the answer in its present wording. But we may fairly doubt whether those who affirmed the matter of knowledge to consist in the facts of sense, ever meant to exclude memory. They meant probably the facts of sense both as perceived and as remembered; though the wording cited by Plato does not strictly include so much. Besides, we must recollect, that Plato includes in the meaning of the word Knowledge or Cognition an idea of perfect infallibility: distinguishing it generically from the highest form of opinion. But memory is a fallible process: sometimes quite trustworthy—under other circumstances, not so. Accordingly, memory, in a general sense, cannot be put on a level with present perception, nor said to generate what Plato calls knowledge.

The next argument of Plato is as follows. You can see, and not see, the same thing at the same time: for you may close one of your eyes, and look only with the other. But it is impossible to know a thing, and not

Argument from the analogy of seeing and

conversation of a friend. We ascribe the charm entirely to his voice and accents; but without our co-operation, its potency would vanish. How very small the comparative proportion is, which in

such cases the words spoken contribute to the intellectual and moral effect, I have elsewhere endeavoured to show."

¹ Plato, Theætét. pp. 163, 164.

not seeing at the same time to know it, at the same time. Therefore to know is not the same as to see.¹

This argument is proclaimed by Plato as a terrible puzzle, leaving no escape.² Perhaps he meant to speak ironically. In reality, this puzzle is nothing but a false inference deduced from a false premiss. The inference is false, because if we grant the premiss, that it is possible both to see a thing, and not to see it, at the same time—there is no reason why it should not also be possible to know a thing, and not to know it, at the same time. Moreover, the premiss is also false in the ordinary sense which the words bear: and not merely false, but logically impossible, as a sin against the maxim of contradiction. Plato procures it from a true premiss, by omitting an essential qualification. I see an object with my open eye: I do not see it with my closed eye. From this double proposition, alike intelligible and true, Plato thinks himself authorised to discard the qualification, and to tell me that I see a thing and do not see it—passing *à dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*. This is the same liberty which he took with the Protagorean doctrine. Protagoras having said—“Every thing which any man believes is true to that man”—Plato reasons against him as if he had said—“Every thing which any man believes is true”.

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 165 B.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 165 B. τὸ δεῖν ὁρᾶν ἰσχυρὰ—ἀδύνατον ἰσχυρῶς, &c.

Mr. Campbell observes upon this passage:—“Perhaps there is here a trace of the spirit which was afterwards developed in the sophisms of Eubulides”. Stallbaum, while acknowledging the many subtleties of Sokrates in this dialogue, complains that other commentators make the ridiculous mistake (“errore perquam ridiculo”) of accepting all the reasoning of Sokrates as seriously meant, whereas much of it (he says) is mere mockery and sarcasm, intended to retort upon the Sophists their own argumentative tricks and quibbles.—“Itaque sæpe per petulantiam quandam argutis indulget (Socrates), quibus isti handquaquam abstinebant; sæpe ex adversariorum mente disputat, sed ita tamen disputat, ut eos suis ipsorum capiat laqueis; sæpe denique in disputando iisdem artificibus utitur, quibus illi uti consueverant, sicuti etiam in Menone, Cratylō, Euthydemo, fieri meminimus”.

(Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Theæt.* pp. 12-13, 22-29).

Stallbaum pushes this general principle so far as to contend that the simile of the waxen tablet (p. 191 C), and that of the pigeon-house (p. 200 C), are doctrines of opponents, which Sokrates pretends to adopt with a view to hold them up to ridicule.

I do not concur in this opinion of Stallbaum, which he reproduces in commenting on many other dialogues, and especially on the *Kratylus*, for the purpose of exonerating Plato from the reproach of bad reasoning and bad etymology, at the cost of opponents “inauditi et indefensi”. I see no ground for believing that Plato meant to bring forward these arguments as paralogisms obviously and ridiculously silly. He produced them, in my judgment, as suitable items in a dialogue of search: plausible to a certain extent, admitting both of being supported and opposed, and necessary to be presented to those who wish to know a question in all its bearings.

Again, argues Plato,¹ you cannot say—I *know* sharply, dimly, near, far, &c.—but you may properly say, I *see* sharply, dimly, near, far, &c.: another reason to show that knowledge and sensible perception are not the same. After a digression of some length directed against the disciples of Herakleitus—(partly to expose their fundamental doctrine that every thing was in flux and movement, partly to satirise their irrational procedure in evading argumentative debate, and in giving nothing but a tissue of mystical riddles one after another),² Sokrates returns back to the same debate, and produces more serious arguments, as follows:—

Sokr.—If you are asked, With what does a man perceive white and black? you will answer, with his eyes: shrill Sokrates
or grave sounds? with his ears. Does it not seem to maintains
you more correct to say, that we see *through* our eyes that we do
rather than *with* our eyes:—that we hear *through* our not see *with*
ears, not *with* our ears. *Theætt.*—I think it is more our eyes,
but that the
mind sees
through the

¹ Plato, *Theætt.* p. 165 D. The reasonings here given by Plato from the mouth of Sokrates, are compared by Steinhart to the Trug-schlüsse, which in the Euthydémus he ascribes to that Sophist and Dionysodorus. But Steinhart says that Plato is here reasoning in the style of Protagoras: an assertion thoroughly gratuitous, for which there is no evidence at all (Steinhart, *Einführung zum Theætt.* p. 53).

² Plato, *Theætt.* pp. 179-183. The description which we read here (put into the mouth of the geometer Theodorus) of the persons in Ephesus and other parts of Ionia, who speculated in the vein of Herakleitus—is full of vivid fancy and smartness, but is for that reason the less to be trusted as accurate.

The characteristic features ascribed to these Herakleiteans are quite unlike to the features of Protagoras, so far as we know them; though Protagoras, nevertheless, throughout this dialogue, is spoken of as if he were an Herakleitean. These men are here depicted as half mad—incapable of continuous attention—hating all systematic speech and debate—answering, when addressed, only in brief, symbolical, enigmatical phrases, of which they had a quiver-full, but which they never condescended to explain (*ὥστε ἐκ φάρεως ῥηματισία αἰνγματικῶν ἀνασώριτες*

ἀπορρέουσαι, see Lassalle, vol. i. pp. 32-39—springing up by spontaneous inspiration, despising instruction, p. 180 A), and each looking down upon the others as ignorant. It we compare the picture thus given by Plato of the Herakleiteans, with the picture which he gives of Protagoras in the dialogue so called, we shall see that the two are as unlike as possible.

Lassalle, in his elaborate work on the philosophy of Herakleitus, attempts to establish the philosophical affinity between Herakleitus and Protagoras: but in my judgment unsuccessfully. According to Lassalle's own representation of the doctrine of Herakleitus, it is altogether opposed to the most eminent Protagorean doctrine, *ἄνθρωπος ἑαυτῷ μέτρον*—and equally opposed to that which Plato seems to imply as Protagorean—*αἴσθησις* = *ἔπιστήμη*. The elucidation given by Lassalle of Herakleitus, through the analogy of Hegel, is certainly curious and instructive. The Absolute Process of Herakleitus is at variance with Protagoras, not less than the Absolute Object or Substratum of the Eleates, or the Absolute Ideas of Plato. Lassalle admits that Herakleitus is the entire antithesis to Protagoras, yet still contends that he is the prior stage of transition towards Protagoras (vol. i. p. 64).

eyes: that the mind often conceives and judges by itself, without the aid of any bodily organ.

correct. *Sokr.*—It would be strange if there were in each man many separate reservoirs, each for a distinct class of perceptions.¹ All perceptions must surely converge towards one common form or centre, call it soul or by any other name, which perceives *through* them, as organs or instruments, all perceptible objects.—

We thus perceive objects of sense, according to Plato's language, *with* the central form or soul, and *through* various organs of the body. The various Percepta or Percipienda of tact, vision, hearing—sweet, hot, hard, light—have each its special bodily organ. But no one of these can be perceived through the organ affected to any other. Whatever therefore we conceive or judge respecting any two of them, is not performed through the organ special to either. If we conceive any thing common both to sound and colour, we cannot conceive it either through the auditory or through the visual organ.²

Now there are certain judgments (*Sokrates* argues) which we make common to both, and not exclusively belonging to either. First, we judge that they are two: that each is one, different from the other, and the same with itself: that each is something, or has existence, and that one is *not* the other. Here are predicates—existence, non-existence, likeness, unlikeness, unity, plurality, sameness, difference, &c., which we affirm, or deny, not respecting either of these sensations exclusively, but respecting all of them. Through what bodily organ do we derive these judgments respecting what is common to all? There is no special organ: the mind perceives, through itself, these common properties.³

Some matters therefore there are, which the soul or mind apprehends through itself—others, which it perceives through the bodily organs. To the latter class belong the sensible qualities, hardness, softness, heat, sweetness, &c., which it perceives through the bodily or-

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 184 D. δεινὸν γὰρ πού, εἰ πολλοὶ τινες ἐν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκάθηνται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν, εἴτε ψυχὴν εἴτε ὁ, τι δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα συντίθενται, ἢ διὰ τούτων ὅλον ὄργανον αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά.

² Plato, *Theætét.* pp. 184-185.

³ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 185 D. δοκεῖ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐδ' εἶναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τοῦτο ὄργανον ἰδίον, ὥσπερ ἐκείνους, ἀλλ' αὐτῇ δὲ αὐτῇ ἡ ψυχῇ τὰ κοινὰ μοι φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν.

gans; and which animals, as well as men, are by nature competent to perceive immediately at birth. To the former class belong existence (substance, essence), sameness, difference, likeness, unlikeness, honourable, base, good, evil, &c., which the mind apprehends through itself alone. But the mind is not competent to apprehend this latter class, as it perceives the former, immediately at birth. Nor does such competence belong to all men and animals; but only to a select fraction of men, who acquire it with difficulty and after a long time through laborious education. The mind arrives at these purely mental apprehensions, only by going over, and comparing with each other, the simple impressions of sense; by looking at their relations with each other; and by computing the future from the present and past.¹ Such comparisons and computations are a difficult and gradual attainment; accomplished only by a few, and out of the reach of most men. But without them, no one can apprehend real existence (essence, or substance), or arrive at truth: and without truth, there can be no knowledge.

The result therefore is (concludes Sokrates), *That knowledge is not sensible perception*: that it is not to be found in the perceptions of sense themselves, which do not apprehend real essence, and therefore not truth—but in the comparisons and computations respecting them, and in the relations between them, made and apprehended by the mind itself.² Plato declares good and evil, honourable and base, &c., to be among matters most especially relative, perceived by the

Sokrates maintains that knowledge is to be found, not in the Sensible Perceptions themselves, but in the comparisons and compu-

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 186 B. Τὴν δὲ γὰρ οὐσίαν καὶ ὅ τι ἴσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐναντιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλῳ (of hardness and softness) καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς ἐναντιότητος, αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπανιούσα καὶ ξυμβάλλουσα πρὸς ἀληθῆα κρίνειν περὶ αὐτῶν ἡμῖν . . . Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένους παρῶν φύσει αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα δὲ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τεῖναι· τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα, πρὸς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ὠφελείαν μόγις καὶ ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ διὰ πολλῶν πραγμάτων καὶ παιδείας παραγίγνεται, οἷς ἂν καὶ

παραγίγνεται.

² Plato, Theætét. p. 186 C. ἐν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἐν ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐν δὲ τῇ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ· οὐσίας γὰρ καὶ ἀληθείας ἵστασθαι μὲν, ὡς δοικε, δυνατόν ἐθέλει, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. The term συλλογισμὸς is here interesting, before it had received that technical sense which it has borne from Aristotle downwards. Mr. Campbell explains it properly as "nearly equivalent to abstraction and generalisation" (Preface to Theætétus p. lxxiv., also note, p. 144).

tations of
the mind
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Distinction
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mind computing past and present in reference to future.¹

Such is the doctrine which Plato here lays down, respecting the difference between sensible perception, and knowledge or cognition. From his time to the present day, the same topic has continued to be discussed, with different opinions on the part of philosophers. Plato's views are interesting, as far as his language enables us to make them out. He does not agree with those who treat sensation or sensible perception (in his language, the two are not distinguished) as a bodily phenomenon, and intelligence as a mental phenomenon. He regards both as belonging to the mind or soul. He considers that the mind is sentient as well as intelligent: and moreover, that the sentient mind is the essential basis and preliminary—universal among men and animals, as well as coæval with birth—furnishing all the matter, upon which the intelligent mind has to work. He says nothing, in this dialogue, about the three distinct souls or minds (rational, courageous, and appetitive), in one and the same body, which form so capital a feature in his *Timæus* and *Republic*: nothing about eternal, self-existent, substantial Ideas, or about the pre-existence of the soul and its reminiscence as the process of acquiring knowledge. Nor does he countenance the doctrine of innate ideas, instinctive beliefs, immediate mental intuitions, internal senses, &c., which have been recognised by

¹ Plato, *Theætt.* p. 186 A. καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μέ-
λιστα πρὸς ἀλλήλα σκοπεῖ-
σθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογίζο-
μένη (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὰ γεγο-
νότα καὶ τὰ παρόντα πρὸς τὰ
μέλλοντα.

Base and honourable, evil and good, are here pointed out by Sokrates as most evidently and emphatically *relative*. In the train of reasoning here terminated, Plato had been combating the doctrine *Διόθησις* = *Ἐπιστήμη*. In his sense of the word *Διόθησις* he has refuted the doctrine. But what about the other doctrine, which he declares to be a part of the same programme—*Homo Mensura*—the Protagorean formula? That formula, so far from being refuted, is actually sus-

tained and established by this train of reasoning. Plato has declared *οὐσία*, *ἀληθεία*, *ἐναντιότης*, *ἀγαθόν*, *κακόν*, &c., to be a distinct class of Objects not perceived by Sense. But he also tells us that they are apprehended by the Mind through its own working, and that they are apprehended always in relation to each other. We thus see that they are just as much relative to the percipient mind, as the Objects of sense are to the percipient and sentient mind. The Subject is the correlative limit or measure (to use Protagorean phrases) of one as well as of the other. This confirms what I observed above, that the two doctrines, 1. *Homo Mensura*, 2. *Διόθησις* = *Ἐπιστήμη*,—are completely distinct and independent, though Plato has chosen to implicate or identify them.

many philosophers. Plato supposes the intelligent mind to work altogether upon the facts of sense ; to review and compare them with one another ; and to compute facts present or past, with a view to the future. All this is quite different from the mental intuitions and instincts, assumed by various modern philosophers as common to all mankind. The operations, which Plato ascribes to the intelligent mind, are said to be out of the reach of the common man, and not to be attainable except by a few, with difficulty and labour. The distinctive feature of the sentient mind, according to him, is, that it operates through a special bodily organ of sense : whereas the intelligent mind has no such special bodily organ.

But this distinction, in the first place, is not consistent with Timæus—wherein Plato assigns to each of his three human souls a separate and special region of the bodily organism, as its physical basis. Nor, in the second place, is it consistent with that larger range of observed facts which the farther development of physiology has brought to view. To Plato and Aristotle the nerves and the nervous system were wholly unknown : but it is now ascertained that the optic, auditory, and other nerves of sense, are only branches of a complicated system of sensory and motory nerves, attached to the brain and spinal cord as a centre : each nerve of sense having its own special mode of excitability or manifestation. Now the physical agency whereby sensation is carried on, is, not the organ of sense alone, but the cerebral centre acting along with that organ : whereas in the intellectual and memorial processes, the agency of the cerebral centre and other internal parts of the nervous system are sufficient, without any excitement beginning at the peripheral extremity of the special organ of sense, or even though that organ be disabled. We know the intelligent mind only in an embodied condition : that is, as working along with and through its own physical agency. When Plato, therefore, says that the mind thinks, computes, compares, &c., by itself—this is true only as signifying that it does so without the initiatory stimulus of a special organ of sense ; not as signifying that it does so without the central nervous force or currents—an agency essential alike to thought, to sensation, to emotion, and to appetite.

Different
views given
by Plato
in other
dialogues.

Putting ourselves back to the Platonic period, we must recognise that the discussion of the theory Ἐπιστήμη = Αἴσθησις, as it is conducted by Plato, exhibits a remarkable advance in psychological analysis. In analysing the mental phenomena, Plato displayed much more subtlety and acuteness than his predecessors—as far at least as we have the means of appreciating the latter. It is convenient to distinguish intellect from sensation (or sensible perception) and emotion, though both of them are essential and co-ordinate parts of our mental system, and are so recognised by Plato. It is also true that the discrimination of our sensations from each other, comparisons of likeness or unlikeness between them, observation of co-existence or sequence, and apprehension of other relations between them, &c., are more properly classified as belonging to intellect than to sense. But the language of psychology is, and always has been, so indeterminate, that it is difficult to say how much any writer means to include under the terms Sense¹—Sensation—Sensible Perception—Αἴσθησις. The

Plato's discussion of this question here exhibits a remarkable advance in analytical psychology. The mind rises from Sensation, first to Opinion, then to Cognition.

¹ The discussion in pp. 184-185-186 of the *Theætetus* is interesting as the earliest attempt remaining to classify psychological phenomena. What Demokritus and others proposed with the same view—the analogy or discrepancy between τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and τὸ νοεῖν—we gather only from the brief notices of Aristotle and others. Plato considers himself to have established, that “cognition is not to be sought at all in sensible perception, but in that function, whatever it be, which is predicated of the mind when it busies itself *per se* (i.e. not through any special bodily organ) about existences” (p. 187 A). We may here remark, as to the dispute between Plato and Protagoras, that Plato here does not at all escape from the region of the Relative, or from the Protagorean formula, *Homo Mensura*. He passes from Mind Percipient to Mind Cogitant; but these new *Entia cogitationis* (as his language implies) are still relative, though relative to the Cogitant and not to the Percipient. He reduces Mind Sentient to the narrowest functions, including only each isolated impression of one or other among the five senses. When

we see a clock on the wall and hear it strike twelve—we have a visual impression of black from the hands, of white from the face, and an audible impression from each stroke. But this is all (according to Plato) which we have from sense, or which addresses itself to the sentient mind. All beyond this (according to him) is apprehended by the cogitant mind: all discrimination, comparison, and relation—such as the succession, or one, two, three, &c., of the separate impressions, the likeness of one stroke to the preceding, the contrast or dissimilarity of the black with the white—even the simplest acts of discrimination or comparison belong (in Plato's view) to mental powers beyond and apart from sense; much more, of course, apprehension of the common properties of all, and of those extreme abstractions to which we apply the words *Ens* and *Non-Ens* (τὸ ἔστι καὶ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐστὶν ἀπορροπῆς καὶ τὸ οὐκ ἔστιν, p. 188 C).

When Plato thus narrows the sense of αἴσθησις, it is easy to prove that νοεῖν is not αἴσθησις; but I doubt whether those who affirmed this proposition intended what he here refutes.

propositions in which our knowledge is embodied, affirm—not sensations detached and isolated, but—various relations of ante-

Neither unreflecting men, nor early theorists, would distinguish the impressions of sense from the feeling of such impressions being *successive, distinct from one another, resembling, &c.* Mr. John Stuart Mill observes (*Logic*, Book i. chap. iii. sects. 10-13)—“The simplest of all relations are those expressed by the words antecedent and consequent, and by the word simultaneous. If we say dawn preceded sunrise, the fact in which the two things dawn and sunrise were jointly concerned, consisted only of the two things themselves. No third thing entered into the fact or phenomenon at all, unless indeed we choose to call the succession of the two objects a third thing; but their succession is not something added to the things themselves, it is something involved in them. To have two feelings at all, implies having them either successively or simultaneously. The relations of succession and simultaneity, of likeness and unlikeness, not being grounded on any fact or phenomenon distinct from the related objects themselves, do not admit of the same kind of analysis. But these relations, though not (like other relations) grounded on states of consciousness, are themselves states of consciousness. Resemblance is nothing but our feeling of resemblance: succession is nothing but our feeling of succession.”

By all ordinary (non-theorising) persons, these familiar relations, involved in the facts of sense, are conceived as an essential part of *αἰσθησις*: and are so conceived by those modern theorists who trace all our knowledge to sense—as well as (probably) by those ancient theorists who defined *ἐπιστήμη* to be *αἰσθησις*, and against whom Plato here reasons. These theorists would have said (as ordinary language recognises)—“We see the dissimilarity of the black hands from the white face of the clock; we hear the likeness of one stroke of the clock to another, and the succession of the strokes one, two, three, one after the other.”

The reasoning of Plato against these opponents is thus open to many of the remarks made by Sir William Hamilton, in the notes to his edition of Reid's works, upon Reid's objections against Locke and Berkeley: Reid restricted the word *Sensation* to a much narrower

meaning than that given to it by Locke and Berkeley. “Berkeley's *Sensation*” (observes S. W. Hamilton) “was equivalent to Reid's *Sensation* plus *Perception*. This is manifest even by the passages adduced in the text” (note to p. 289). But Reid in his remarks omits to notice this difference in the meaning of the same word. The case is similar with Plato when he refutes those who held the doctrine *Ἐπιστήμη = Αἰσθησις*. The last-mentioned word, in his construction, includes only a part of the meaning which they attributed to it; but he takes no notice of this verbal difference. Sir William Hamilton remarks, respecting M. Royer Collard's doctrine, which narrows prodigiously the province of Sense,—“Sense he so limits that, if rigorously carried out, no sensible perception, as no consciousness, could be brought to bear.” This is exactly true about Plato's doctrine narrowing *αἰσθησις*. See Hamilton's edit. of Reid, Appendix, p. 844.

Aristotle understands *αἰσθησις* — *αἰσθητικὴ ψυχὴ* or *ζωή*—as occupying a larger sphere than that which Plato assigns to them in the *Theætétus*. Aristotle recognises the five separate *αἰσθήσεις*, each correlating with and perceiving its *ἰδίον αἰσθητόν*: he also recognises ἡ κοινὴ αἰσθησις—common sensation or perception—correlating with (or perceiving) τὰ κοινὰ αἰσθητά, which are *motion, rest, magnitude, figure, number*. The κοινὴ αἰσθησις is not a distinct or sixth sense, apart from the five, but a general power inhering in all of them. He farther recognises *αἰσθησις* as discriminating, judging, comparing, knowing: this characteristic, τὸ κριτικὸν and γνωστικόν, is common to *αἰσθήσεις, φαντασία, νόησις*, and distinguishes them all from appetito—τὸ ὁρεκτικόν, κινητικόν, &c. See the first and second chapters of the third Book of the Treatise *De Anima*, and the Commentary of Simplicius upon that Treatise, especially p. 56, b. Aristotle tells us that all animals *ἔχει δυνάμει σὺμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἢ καλοῦσιν αἰσθησιν*. Anal. Poster. ii. p. 99, b. 35. And Sir William Hamilton adopts a similar view, when he remarks, that Judgment is implied in every act of Consciousness.

Occasionally indeed Aristotle partitions the soul between νοῦς and σῶψις

cedence and consequence, likeness, difference, &c., between two or more sensations or facts of sense. We rise thus to a state of mind more complicated than simple sensation: including (along with sensation), association, memory, discrimination, comparison of sensations, abstraction, and generalisation. This is what Plato calls opinion¹ or belief; a mental process, which, though presupposing sensations and based upon them, he affirms to be carried on by the mind through itself, not through any special bodily organ. In this respect it agrees with what he calls knowledge or cognition. Opinion or belief is the lowest form, possessed in different grades by all men, of this exclusively mental process: knowledge or cognition is the highest form of

—Intelligence and Appetite—recognising Sense as belonging to the head of Intelligence—see *De Motu Animalium*, δ, p. 700, b. 20. ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἀνάγεται εἰς νοῦν καὶ ὄρεξιν· καὶ γὰρ ἡ φαντασία καὶ ἡ αἰσθήσις τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ νῆϊ χώραν ἔχουσιν· κριτικὰ γὰρ πάντα. Compare also the *Topica*, ii. 4, p. 111, a. 18.

It will thus be seen that while Plato severs pointedly αἰσθήσις from anything like discrimination, comparison, judgment, even in the most rudimentary form—Aristotle refuses to adopt this extreme abstraction as his basis for classifying the mental phenomena. He recognises a certain measure of discrimination, comparison, and judgment, as implicated in sensible perceptions. Moreover, that which he calls κοινὴ αἰσθήσις is unknown to Plato, who isolates each sense, and indeed each act of each sense, as much as possible. Aristotle is opposed, as Plato is, to the doctrine Ἐπιστήμη = Αἰσθήσις, but he employs a different manner of reasoning against it. See, *inter alia*, *Anal. Poster.* i. 31, p. 87, b. 28. He confines ἐπιστήμη to one branch of the νοητικῇ.

The Peripatetic Straton, the disciple of Theophrastus, denied that there was any distinct line of demarcation between τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι and τὸ νοεῖν: maintaining that the former was impossible without a certain measure of the latter. His observation is very worthy of note. Plutarch, *De Solertia Animalium*, iii. 6, p. 961 A. Καίτοι Στράτωνος γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστίν, ἀποδεικνύναι ὡς οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τοπαράταν ἂν τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιτυρενόμενα τῇ

δύσει, καὶ λόγοι προσκείμεντοι τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἰτ' αἰθερὶς ἐπανήλθε καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ μεταδίδωκε τῶν προτεμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλέγδμενος· ἧ καὶ ἀλέκται. Νοῦς ὅρῃ, καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφρά· ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ θώματα καὶ ὅτα πάθους, ἀν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονεῖν, αἰσθῇσιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.

Straton here notices that remarkable fact (unnoticed by Plato and even by Aristotle, so far as I know) in the process of association, that impressions of sense are sometimes unheeded when they occur, but force themselves upon the attention afterwards, and are recalled by the mind in the order in which they occurred at first.

¹ Plato, *Theæt.* p. 187 A. Σοκρ. ὁμοῦς δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, ὥστε μὴ ζητεῖν αὐτὴν (ἐπιστήμην) ἐν αἰσθήσει τοπαράταν, ἀλλ' ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ὀνόματι, ὅ, τι ποτ' ἔχει ἡ ψυχὴ, ὅταν αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν πραγματεύηται περὶ τὰ ὄντα. *Theæt.* Ἀλλὰ μὲν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὡς ἐγὼ μαι, δοξάζειν. Σοκρ. Ὅρθως γὰρ οἶσι.

Plato is quite right in distinguishing between αἰσθήσις and δόξα, looking at the point as a question of psychological classification. It appears to me, however, most probable that those who maintained the theory Ἐπιστήμη = Αἰσθήσις, made no such distinction, but included that which he calls δόξα in αἰσθήσις. Unfortunately we do not possess their own exposition; but it cannot have included much of psychological analysis.

the same, attained only by a select few. Both opinion, and cognition, consist in comparisons and computations made by the mind about the facts of sense. But cognition (in Plato's view) has special marks:—

1. That it is infallible, while opinion is fallible. You have it¹ or you have it not—but there is no mistake possible.

2. That it apprehends what Plato calls the real essence of things, and real truth, which, on the contrary, Opinion does not apprehend.

3. That the person who possesses it can maintain his own consistency under cross-examination, and can test the consistency of others by cross-examining them (*λόγον δοῦναι καὶ δέξασθαι*).

This at least is the meaning which Plato assigns to the two words corresponding to Cognition and to Opinion, in the present dialogue, and often elsewhere. But he also frequently employs the word *Cognition* in a lower and more general signification, not

¹ Schleiermacher represents Plato as discriminating Knowledge (the region of infallibility, you either possess it or not) from Opinion (the region of fallibility, true or false, as the case may be) by a broad and impassable line—

“Auch hieraus erwächst eine sehr entscheidende, nur ebenfalls nicht ausdrücklich gezogene, Folgerung, dass die reine Erkenntniss gar nicht auf demselben Gebiet liegen könne mit dem Irrthum—und es in Beziehung auf sie kein Wahr und Falsch gebe, sondern nur ein Haben oder Nicht Haben.” (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 176.)

Steinhart (in his Einleit. zum Theæt. p. 94) contests this opinion of Schleiermacher (though he seems to give the same opinion himself, p. 92). He thinks that Plato does not recognise so very marked a separation between Knowledge and Opinion: that he considers Knowledge as the last term of a series of mental processes, developed gradually according to constant laws, and ascending from Sensible Perception through Opinion to Knowledge: that the purpose of the Theætétus is to illustrate this theory.

Ueberweg, on the contrary, defends the opinion of Schleiermacher and maintains that Steinhart is mistaken (Aechtheit und Zeit. Platon. Schriften, p. 279).

Passages may be produced from

Plato's writings to support both these views: that of Schleiermacher, as well as that of Steinhart. In *Timæus*, p. 51 E, the like infallibility is postulated for *Noûs* (which there represents *Ἐπιστήμη*) as contrasted with *δόξα*. But I think that Steinhart ascribes to the Theætétus more than can fairly be discovered in it. That dialogue is purely negative. It declares that *ἐπιστήμη* is not *αἰσθησις*. It then attempts to go a step farther towards the affirmative, by declaring also that *ἐπιστήμη* is a mental process of computation, respecting the impressions of *αἰσθησις*—that it is *τὸ συλλογίζεσθαι*, which is equivalent to *τὸ δοξάζειν*: compare Phædrus, 249 B. But this affirmative attempt breaks down: for Sokrates cannot explain what *τὸ δοξάζειν* is, nor how *τὸ δοξάζειν ψευδῆ* is possible: in fact he says (p. 200 B) that this cannot be explained until we know what *ἐπιστήμη* is. The entire result of the dialogue is negative, as the closing words proclaim emphatically. On this point many of the commentators agree—Ast, Socher, Stallbaum, Ueberweg, Zeller, &c.

Whether it be true, as Schleiermacher, with several others, thinks (Einl. pp. 184-185), that Plato intends to attack Aristippus in the first part of the dialogue, and Antisthenes in the latter part, we have no means of determining.

restricted, as it is here, to the highest philosophical reach, with infallibility—but comprehending much of what is here treated only as *opinion*. Thus, for example, he often alludes to the various professional men as possessing *Cognition*, each in his respective department: the general, the physician, the gymnast, the steersman, the husbandman, &c.¹ But he certainly does not mean, that each of them has attained what he calls real essence and philosophical truths—or that any of them are infallible.

One farther remark must be made on Plato's doctrine. His remark—That Cognition consists not in the affections of sense, but in computation or reasoning respecting those affections. (i. e. abstraction, generalisation, &c.) —is both true and important. But he has not added, nor would he have admitted, that if we are to decide whether our computation is true and right, or false and erroneous—our surest way is to recur to the simple facts of sense. Theory must be verified by observation; wherever that cannot be done, the best guarantee is wanting. The facts themselves are not cognition: yet they are the test by which all computations, pretending to be cognitions, must be tried.²

We have thus, in enquiring—What is Knowledge or Cognition? advanced so far as to discover—That it does not consist in sensible perception, but in some variety of that purely mental process which is called opining, believing, judging, conceiving, &c. And here Theætetus, being called upon for a second definition, answers—*That Knowledge consists in right or true opinion.* All opinion is not knowledge, because opinion is often false.³

Sokr.—But you are here assuming that there *are* false opinions?

¹ Compare Plato, *Sophistes*, pp. 232 E, 233 A.

² See the remarks on the necessity of Verification, as a guarantee for the Deductive Process, in Mr. John Stuart Mill's *System of Logic*, Book iii. ch. xi. s. 3. Newton puts aside his own computation or theory respecting gravity as the force which kept the moon in its orbit, because the facts reported by

observers respecting the lunar motions were for some time not in harmony with it. Plato certainly would not have surrendered any *συλλογισμός* under the same respect to observed facts. Aristotle might probably have done so; but this is uncertain.

³ Plato, *Theæt.* p. 187 B. It is scarcely possible to translate *δοξάζειν* always by the same English word.

How is this possible? How can any man judge or opine falsely? What mental condition is it which bears that name? I confess that I cannot tell: though I have often thought of the matter myself, and debated it with others.¹ Every thing comes under the head either of what a man knows, or of what he does not know. If he conceives, it must be either the known, or the unknown. He cannot mistake either one known thing for another known thing: or a known thing for an unknown: or an unknown for a known: or one unknown for another unknown. But to form a false opinion, he must err in one or other of these four ways. It is therefore impossible that he can form a false opinion.²

Objection by Sokrates
—This definition assumes that there are false opinions. But how can false opinions be possible? How can we conceive Non-Ens; or confound together two distinct realities?

If indeed a man ascribed to any subject a predicate which was non-existent, this would be evidently a false opinion. But how can any one conceive the non-existent? He who conceives must conceive *something*: just as he who sees or touches, must see or touch *something*. He cannot see or touch the non-existent: for that would be to see or touch nothing: in other words, not to see or touch at all. In the same manner, to conceive the non-existent, or *nothing*, is impossible.³ *Theet.*—Perhaps he conceives two realities, but confounds them together, mistaking the one for the other. *Sokr.*—Impossible. If he conceives two distinct realities, he cannot suppose the one to be the other. Suppose him to conceive just and unjust, a horse and an ox—he can never believe just to be unjust, or the ox to be the horse.⁴ If, again, he conceives one of the two alone and singly, neither could he on that hypothesis suppose it to be the other: for that would imply that he conceived the other also.

Let us look again in another direction (continues Sokrates). We have been hasty in our concessions. Is it really impossible for a man to conceive, that a thing, which he knows, is another thing which he does not know? Let us see. Grant me the hypothesis (for the sake of illustration), that each man has in his mind a waxen

Waxen memorial tablet in the mind, on which past impressions are engrav-

¹ Plato, *Theet.* p. 187 C.

² Plato, *Theet.* p. 188.

³ Plato, *Theet.* pp. 188-189.

⁴ Plato, *Theet.* p. 190.

ed. False opinion consists in wrongly identifying present sensations with past impressions.

tablet—the wax of one tablet being larger, firmer, cleaner, and better in every way, than that of another: the gift of Mnemosynê, for inscribing and registering our sensible perceptions and thoughts. Every man remembers and knows these, so long as the impressions of them remain upon his tablet: as soon as they are blotted out, he has forgotten them and no longer knows them.¹ Now false opinion may occur thus. A man having inscribed on his memorial tablet the impressions of two objects A and B, which he has seen before, may come to see one of these objects again; but he may by mistake identify the present sensation with the wrong past impression, or with that past impression to which it does not belong. Thus on seeing A, he may erroneously identify it with the past impression B, instead of A: or *vice versa*.² False opinion will thus lie, not in the conjunction or identification of sensations with sensations—nor of thoughts (or past impressions) with thoughts—but in that of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts.³

Having laid this down, however, Sokrates immediately proceeds to refute it. In point of fact, false conceptions are found to prevail, not only in the wrong identification of present sensations with past impressions or thoughts, but also in the wrong identification of one past impression or thought with another. Thus a man, who has clearly engraved on his memorial tablet the conceptions of five, seven, eleven, twelve,—may nevertheless, when asked what is the sum of seven and five, commit error and answer eleven: thus mistaking eleven for twelve.

We are thus placed in this dilemma—Either false opinion is an impossibility:—Or else, it is possible that what a man knows, he may not know. Which of the two do you choose?⁴

To this question no answer is given. But Sokrates,—after remarking on the confused and unphilosophical manner in which the debate has been conducted, both he and Theætétus having perpetually employed the

He draws distinction between possessing
¹ Plato, Theæt. p. 191 C. ἀπίστων ἀμνησίων.

² Plato, Theæt. pp. 193-194.

³ Plato, Theæt. p. 195 D.

⁴ Plato, Theæt. p. 196 C. οὐκ ἔστι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς δόξα, ἢ ἂν τις οἴδῃ, οἷον τε μὴ εἰδέναι· καὶ τοῦτων πῶς τε αἰετῇ;

words *know*, *knowledge*, and their equivalents, as if the meaning of the words were ascertained, whereas the very problem debated is, to ascertain their meaning¹—takes up another path of enquiry. He distinguishes between possessing knowledge,—and having it actually in hand or on his person : which distinction he illustrates by comparing the mind to a pigeon-cage. A man hunts and catches pigeons, then turns them into the cage, within the limits of which they fly about : when he wants to catch any one of them for use, he has to go through a second hunt, sometimes very troublesome : in which he may perhaps either fail altogether, or catch the wrong one instead of the right. The first hunt Sokrates compares to the acquisition of knowledge : the second, to the getting it into his hand for use.² A man may *know*, in the first sense, and *not know*, in the second : he may have to hunt about for the cognition which (in the first sense) he actually possesses. In trying to catch one cognition, he may confound it with another : and this constitutes false opinion—the confusion of two *cognita* one with another.³

Yet how can such a confusion be possible? (Sokrates here again replies to himself.) How can knowledge betray a man into such error? If he knows A, and knows B—how can he mistake A for B? Upon this supposition, knowledge produces the effect of ignorance : and we might just as reasonably imagine ignorance to produce the effects of knowledge.⁴—Perhaps (suggests Theætétus), he may have *non-cognitions* in his mind, mingled with the cognitions : and in hunting for a cognition, he may catch a non-cognition. Herein may lie false opinion.—That can hardly be (replies Sokrates). If the man catches what is really a non-cognition, he will not suppose it to be such, but to be a cognition. He will believe himself fully to *know*, that in which he is mistaken. But how is it possible that he should confound a non-cognition with a cognition, or *vice*

knowledge, and having it actually in hand. Simile of the pigeon-cage with caught pigeons turned into it and flying about.

Sokrates refutes this. Suggestion of Theætétus—That there may be non-cognitions in the mind as well as cognitions, and that false opinion may consist in confounding one with the other. Sokrates rejects this.

¹ Plato, Theæt. p. 196 D.

² Plato, Theæt. pp. 197-198.

³ Plato, Theæt. p. 199 C. ἡ τῶν

ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλάξις.

⁴ Plato, Theæt. p. 199 E.

versâ? Does not he know the one from the other? We must then require him to have a separate cognition of his own cognitions or non-cognitions—and so on *ad infinitum*.¹ The hypothesis cannot be admitted.

We cannot find out (continues Sokrates) what false opinion is : and we have plainly done wrong to search for it, until we have first ascertained what knowledge is.²

Moreover, as to the question, Whether knowledge is identical with true opinion, Sokrates produces another argument to prove that it is not so : and that the two are widely different. You can communicate true opinion without communicating knowledge : and the powerful class of rhetors and litigants make it their special business to do so. They persuade, without teaching, a numerous audience.³ During the hour allotted to them for discourse, they create, in the minds of the assembled dikasts, true opinions respecting complicated incidents of robbery or other unlawfulness, at which none of the dikasts have been personally present. Upon this opinion the dikasts decide, and decide rightly. But they cannot possibly *know* the facts without having been personally present and looking on. That is essential to knowledge or cognition.⁴ Accordingly, they have acquired true and right opinions ; yet without acquiring knowledge. Therefore the two are not the same.⁵

¹ Plato, Theæt. p. 200 B.

² Plato, Theæt. p. 200 C.

³ Plato, Theæt. p. 201 A. οἱ τοὶ γὰρ πον τῇ αὐτῶν τέχῃ πείθουσιν, οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες αὐτὸν βούλονται.

⁴ Plato, Theæt. p. 201 B-C. Οἰκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πισθῶσι δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ δὲ μὴ, ταῦτα τότε εἰς ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δοξάν λαβόντες, αὐτοὺς ἐπιστήμητι ἐκρίναν, ὁρᾷ πισθόντες, εἴπερ εἰς δίκασαν.

⁵ The distinction between persuading and teaching—between creating opinion and imparting knowledge—has been brought to view in the Gorgias, and is noted also in the Timæus. As it stands here, it deserves notice, because Plato not only professes to affirm what knowledge is, but also identifies it with

sensible perception. The Dikasts (according to Sokrates) would have *known* the case, had they been present when it occurred, so as to see and hear it : there is no other way of acquiring knowledge.

Hearing the case only by the narration of speakers, they can acquire nothing more than a *true opinion*. Hence we learn wherein consists the difference between the two. That which I see, hear, or apprehend by any sensible perception, I *know* : compare a passage in Sophistes, p. 267 A-B, where τὸ γινώσκαι is explained in the same way. But that which I learn from the testimony of others amounts to nothing more than opinion ; and at best to a true opinion.

Plato's reasoning here involves an admission of the very doctrine which

Theætétus now recollects another definition of knowledge, learnt from some one whose name he forgets. Knowledge is (he says) true opinion, coupled with rational explanation. True opinion without such rational explanation, is not knowledge. Those things which do not admit of rational explanation, are not knowable.¹

New answer of Theætétus—Cognition is true opinion, coupled with rational explanation.

Taking up this definition, and elucidating it farther, Sokrates refers to the analogy of words and letters. Letters answer to the primordial elements of things ; which are not matters either of knowledge, or of true opinion, or of rational explanation—but simply of sensible perception. A letter, or a primordial element, can only be perceived and called by its name. You cannot affirm of it any predicate or any epithet : you cannot call it *existing*, or *this*, or *that*, or *each*, or *single*, or by any other name than its own :² for if you do, you attach to it something extraneous to itself, and then it ceases to be an element. But syllables, words, propositions—i. e., the compounds made up by putting together various letters or elements—admit of being known, explained, and described, by enumerating the component elements. You may indeed conceive them correctly, without being able to explain them or to enumerate their component elements : but then you do not know them. You can only be said to know

Criticism on the answer by Sokrates. Analogy of letters and words, primordial elements and compounds. Elements cannot be explained : compounds alone can be explained.

he had before taken so much pains to confute—the doctrine that Cognition is Sensible Perception. Yet he takes no notice of the inconsistency. An occasion for sneering at the Rhetors and Dikasts is always tempting to him.

So, in the Menon (p. 97 B), the man who has been at Larissa is said to *know* the road to Larissa ; as distinguished from another man who, never having been there, opines correctly which the road is. And in the Sophistes (p. 263) when Plato is illustrating the doctrine that false propositions, as well as true propositions, are possible, and really occur, he selects as his cases, *Θεαίτητος κάθηται*, *Θεαίτητος πέτεται*. That one of these propositions is false and the other true, can be known only by *αἰσθῆσις*—in the sense of that word commonly understood.

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 201 D. *τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ ἔδειξεν ἐπιστήμην*

εἶναι· τὴν δὲ ἄλογον, ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὣν μὲν μὴ ἐστὶ λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὕτως σὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δ' ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.

The words *οὕτως καὶ ὀνομάζων* are intended, according to Heindorf and Schleiermacher, to justify the use of the word *ἐπιστητά*, which was then a neologism. Both this definition, and the elucidation of it which Sokrates proceeds to furnish, are announced as borrowed from other persons not named.

² Plato, *Theæt.* pp. 201 E—202 A. *αὐτὸ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσεσιπτεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὐθ' ὡς ἐστίν, οὐθ' ὡς οὐκ ἐστίν· ᾗδ γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον μόνον τις πρὸς τοῦ οὐδὲ τὸ αὐτό, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον, οὐδὲ τὸ ἕκαστον, οὐδὲ τὸ μόνον, οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, προσιστίον, οὐδ' ἄλλα*

them, when besides conceiving them correctly, you can also specify their component elements¹—or give explanation.

Having enunciated this definition, as one learnt from another person not named, Sokrates proceeds to examine and confute it. It rests on the assumption (he says), that the primordial elements are themselves unknowable; and that it is only the aggregates compounded of them which are knowable. Such an assumption cannot be granted. The result is either a real sum total, including both the two component elements: or it is a new form, indivisible and uncompounded, generated by the two elements, but not identical with them nor including them in itself. If the former, it is not knowable, because if neither of the elements are knowable, both together are not knowable: when you know neither A nor B you cannot know either the sum or the product of A and B. If the latter, then the result, being indivisible and uncompounded, is unknowable for the same reason as the elements are so: it can only be named by its own substantive name, but nothing can be predicated respecting it.²

Nor can it indeed be admitted as true—That the elements are unknowable, and the compound alone knowable. On the contrary, the elements are more knowable than the compound.³

When you say (continues Sokrates) that knowledge is true opinion coupled with rational explanation, you may mean by *rational explanation* one of three things. 1. The power of enunciating the opinion in clear and appropriate words. This every one learns to do, who is not dumb or an idiot: so that in this sense true opinion will always carry with it rational explanation.—2. The power of describing the thing in question by its component elements. Thus Hesiod says that there are a hundred distinct wooden pieces in a waggon: you and I do not know nor can we describe them all: we can distinguish only the more obvious fractions—the wheels, the axle, the body, the yoke,

πολλά τοιαῦτα· τὰυτὰ μὲν γὰρ περιτρίχοντα πᾶσι προσφύρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὅντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται. Also p. 206 C.

¹ Plato, Theæt. p. 202.

² Plato, Theæt. pp. 203-206.

³ Plato, Theæt. p. 206.

&c. Accordingly, we cannot be said to know a waggon: we have only a true opinion about it. Such is the second sense of λόγος or rational explanation. But neither in this sense will the proposition hold—That knowledge is right opinion coupled with rational explanation. For suppose that a man can enumerate, spell, and write correctly, all the syllables of the name *Theætétus*—which would fulfil the conditions of this definition: yet, if he mistakes and spells wrongly in any other name, such as *Theodórus*, you will not give him credit for knowledge. You will say that he writes *Theætétus* correctly, by virtue of right opinion simply. It is therefore possible to have right opinion coupled with rational explanation, in this second sense also,—yet without possessing knowledge.¹

3. A third meaning of this same word λόγος or rational explanation, is, that in which it is most commonly understood—To be able to assign some mark whereby the thing to be explained differs from every thing else—to differentiate the thing.² Persons, who understand the word in this way, affirm, that so long as you only seize what the thing has in common with other things, you have only a *true opinion* concerning it: but when you seize what it has peculiar and characteristic, you then possess *knowledge* of it. Such is their view: but though it seems plausible at first sight (says Sokrates), it will not bear close scrutiny. For in order to have a true opinion about any thing, I must have in my mind not only what it possesses in common with other things, but what it possesses peculiar to itself also. Thus if I have a true opinion about *Theætétus*, I must have in my mind not only the attributes which belong to him in common with other men, but also those which belong to him specially and exclusively. Rational explanation (λόγος) in this sense is already comprehended in true opinion, and is an essential ingredient in it—not any new element superadded. It will not serve therefore as a distinction between true opinion and knowledge.³

will the definition of Cognition hold.

Third meaning. To assign some mark, whereby the thing to be explained differs from everything else. The definition will not hold. For rational explanation, in this sense, is already included in true opinion.

¹ Plato, *Theæt.* pp. 207-208 B. ἔστιν ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον ἄρα μετὰ λόγου ὁρθὴ δόξα, ἣν οὕτω δεῖ εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῶν πάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἔρω-
² πιστή μιν καλεῖν. τηθέν.

³ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 208 C. Ὅτι οὐκ

³ Plato, *Theætét.* p. 200.

Such is the result (continues Sokrates) of our researches concerning knowledge. We have found that it is neither sensible perception—nor true opinion—nor true opinion along with rational explanation. But what it is, we have not found. Are we still pregnant with any other answer, Theætétus, or have we brought forth all that is to come?—I have brought forth (replies Theætétus) more than I had within me, through your furtherance. Well (rejoins Sokrates)—and my obstetric science has pronounced all your offspring to be mere wind, unworthy of being preserved!¹ If hereafter you should again become pregnant, your offspring will be all the better for our recent investigation. If on the other hand you should always remain barren, you will be more amiable and less vexatious to your companions—by having a just estimate of yourself, and by not believing yourself to know what you really do not know.²

The concluding observations of this elaborate dialogue deserve particular attention as illustrating Plato's point of view, at the time when he composed the Theætétus. After a long debate, set forth with all the charm of Plato's style, no result is attained. Three different explanations of knowledge have been rejected as untenable.³ No other can be found; nor is any suggestion offered, showing in what quarter we are to look for the true one. What then is the purpose or value of the dialogue? Many persons would pronounce it to be a mere piece of useless ingenuity and elegance: but such is not the opinion of Plato himself. Sufficient gain (in his view) will have been ensured, if Theætétus has acquired a greater power

¹ Plato, Theætét. p. 210 B. οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν ἅπαντα ἢ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν τέχνη ἀναιμείδι φησὶ γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια τροφῆς;

² Plato, Theæt. p. 210 C. ἴδαν τε γίγνη (ἐγκύμων), βελτιόωνται ἵσται πλήρης διὰ τὴν νῦν ἐξέτασιν· ἴδαν τε κενὸς ἦς, ἦτον ἵσται βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, σωφρόνους οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι.

Compare also an earlier passage in the dialogue, p. 187 B.

³ I have already observed, however, that in one passage of the interrogation carried on by Sokrates (p. 201 A-B, where he is distinguishing between persuasion and teaching), he unconsciously admits the identity between knowledge and sensible perception.

of testing any fresh explanation which he may attempt of this difficult subject: or even if he should attempt none such, by his being disabused, at all events, of the false persuasion of knowing where he is really ignorant. Such false persuasion of knowledge (Plato here intimates) renders a man vexatious to associates; while a right estimate of his own knowledge and ignorance fosters gentleness and moderation of character. In this view, false persuasion of knowledge is an ethical defect, productive of positive mischief in a man's intercourse with others: the removal of it improves his character, even though no ulterior step towards real and positive knowledge be made. The important thing is, that he should acquire the power of testing and verifying all opinions, old as well as new. This, which is the only guarantee against the delusive self-satisfaction of sham knowledge, must be firmly established in the mind before it is possible to aspire effectively to positive and assured knowledge. The negative arm of philosophy is in its application prior to the positive, and indispensable, as the single protection against error and false persuasion of knowledge. Sokrates is here depicted as one in whom the negative vein is spontaneous and abundant, even to a pitch of discomfort—as one complaining bitterly, that objections thrust themselves upon him, unsought and unwelcome, against conclusions which he had himself just previously taken pains to prove at length.¹

To form in men's minds this testing or verifying power, is one main purpose in Plato's dialogues of Search—and in some of them the predominant purpose; as he himself announces it to be in the *Theætétus*. I have already made the same remark before, and I repeat it here; since it is absolutely necessary for appreciating these dialogues of Search in their true bearing and value. To one who does not take account of the negative arm of philosophy, as an auxiliary without which the positive arm will strike at random—half of the Platonic dialogues will teach nothing, and will even appear as enigmas—the *Theætétus* among the foremost. Plato excites and strengthens the interior mental wakefulness of the

Formation of the testing or verifying power in men's minds. Value of the *Theætétus*, as it exhibits Sokrates demolishing his own suggestions.

¹ See the emphatic passage, p. 196 B-C.

hearer, to judge respecting all affirmative theories, whether coming from himself or from others. This purpose is well served by the manner in which Sokrates more than once in this dialogue first announces, proves, and builds up a theory—then unexpectedly changes his front, disproves, and demolishes it. We are taught that it is not difficult to find a certain stock of affirmative argument which makes the theory look well from a distance: we must inspect closely, and make sure that there are no counter-arguments in the background.¹ The way in which Sokrates pulls to pieces his own theories, is farther instructive, as it illustrates the exhortation previously addressed by him to Theætétus—not to take offence when his answers were canvassed and shown to be inadmissible.²

A portion of the dialogue to which I have not yet adverted, illustrates this anxiety for the preliminary training of the ratiocinative power, as an indispensable qualification for any special research. "We have plenty of leisure for investigation" (says Sokrates). We are not tied to time, nor compelled to march briefly and directly towards some positive result. Engaged as we are in investigating philosophical truth, we stand in pointed contrast with politicians and rhetors in the public assembly or dikastery. We are like freemen; they, like slaves. They have before them the Dikasts, as their masters, to whose temper and approbation they are constrained to adapt themselves. They are also in presence of antagonists, ready to entrap and confute them. The personal interests, sometimes even the life, of an individual are at stake; so that every thing must be sacrificed to the purpose of obtaining a verdict. Men brought up in these habits become sharp in observation and emphatic in expression; but merely with a view to win the assent and approbation of the master before them, as to the case in hand. No free aspirations or spontaneous enlargement can have place in their minds. They become careless of true and sound reasoning—slaves to the sentiment of those whom they address—and adepts in crooked artifice which they take for wisdom.³

¹ Plato, *Theætt.* p. 208 E.

² Plato, *Theætt.* p. 161 C.

³ Plato, *Theætt.* p. 155. ὡς πρὸς νόλ-

λόν σκολῶν ἔργων, πάλιν ἐπ' ἀνακρίσεσιν, &c.; also p. 172.

⁴ Plato, *Theætt.* pp. 172-173.

Of all this (continues Sokrates) the genuine philosopher is the reverse. He neither possesses, nor cares to possess, the accomplishments of the lawyer and politician. He takes no interest in the current talk of the city; nor in the scandals afloat against individual persons. He does not share in the common ardour for acquiring power or money; nor does he account potentates either happier or more estimable for possessing them. Being ignorant and incompetent in the affairs of citizenship as well as of common life, he has no taste for club-meetings or joviality. His mind, despising the particular and the practical, is absorbed in constant theoretical research respecting universals. He spares no labour in investigating—What is man in general? and what are the attributes, active and passive, which distinguish man from other things? He will be overthrown and humiliated before the Dikastery by a clever rhetor. But if this opponent chooses to ascend out of the region of speciality, and the particular ground of injustice alleged by A against B—into the general question, What is justice or injustice? Wherein do they differ from each other or from other things? What constitutes happiness and misery? How is the one to be attained and the other avoided?—If the rhetor will meet the philosopher on this elevated ground, then he will find himself put to shame and proved to be incompetent, in spite of all the acute stratagems of his petty mind.¹ He will look like a child and become ashamed of himself:² but the philosopher is noway ashamed of his incompetence for slavish pursuits, while he is passing a life of freedom and leisure among his own dialectics.³

The Philosopher is master of his own debates.

In these words of Sokrates we read a contrast between practice and theory—one of the most eloquent passages in the dialogues—wherein Plato throws overboard the ordinary concerns and purposes both of public and private life, admitting that true philosophers are unfit for them. The passage, while it teaches us caution in

Purpose of Dialogue to qualify for a life of philosophical Search.

I give only an abstract of this eloquent passage, not an exact translation. Steinhart (*Einführung zum Theätet*, p. 37) calls it "a sublime Hymn" (*einen erhabenen Hymnus*). It is a fine piece of poetry or rhetoric, and shows that Plato was by nature quite as rhetorical

as the rhetors whom he depreciates—though he had also, besides, other lofty intellectual peculiarities of his own, beyond these rivals.

¹ Plato, *Theæt.* pp. 175-176.

² Plato, *Theæt.* p. 177 E.

³ Plato, *Theæt.* p. 175 E.

receiving his criticisms on the defects of actual statesmen and men of action, informs us at the same time that he regarded philosophy as the only true business of life—the single pursuit worthy to occupy a freeman.¹ This throws light on the purpose of many of his dialogues. He intends to qualify the mind for a life of philosophical research, and with this view to bestow preliminary systematic training on the ratiocinative power. To announce at once his own positive conclusions with their reasons, (as I remarked before) is not his main purpose. A pupil who, having got all these by heart, supposed himself to have completed his course of philosophy, so that nothing farther remained to be done, would fall very short of the Platonic exigency. The life of the philosopher—as Plato here conceives it—is a perpetual search after truth, by dialectic debate and mutual cross-examination between two minds, aiding each other to disembroil that confusion and inconsistency which grows up naturally in the ordinary mind. For such a life a man becomes rather disqualified than prepared, by swallowing an early dose of authoritative dogmas and proofs dictated by his teacher. The two essential requisites for it are, that he should acquire a self-acting ratiocinative power, and an earnest, untiring, interest in the dialectic process. Both these aids Plato's negative dialogues are well calculated to afford : and when we thus look at his purpose, we shall see clearly that it did not require the presentation of any positive result.

The course of this dialogue—the Theætétus—has been already described as an assemblage of successive perplexities without any solution. But what deserves farther notice is—That the perplexities, as they are not solved in this dialogue, so they are not solved in any other dialogue. The view taken by Schleiermacher and other critics—that Plato lays out the difficulties in one anterior dialogue, in order to furnish the solution in another posterior—is not borne out by the facts. In the Theætétus, many objections are propounded against the doctrine, That Opinion is sometimes true, sometimes false. Sokrates shows that false opinion is an impossibility : either therefore all

Difficulties
of the Theætétus
are not
solved in
any other
Dialogue.

¹ Plato, *Sophistæ*, p. 253 C : ἡ τῶν ἀλευθέρων ἐπιστήμη.

opinions are true, or no opinion is either true or false. If we turn to the Sophistês, we shall find this same question discussed by the Eleatic Stranger who conducts the debate. He there treats the doctrine—That false opinion is an impossibility and that no opinion could be false—as one which had long embarrassed himself, and which formed the favourite subterfuge of the impostors whom he calls Sophists. He then states that this doctrine of the Sophists was founded on the Parmenidean dictum—That Non-Ens was an impossible supposition. Refuting the dictum of Parmenides (by a course of reasoning which I shall examine elsewhere), he arrives at the conclusion—That Non-Ens exists in a certain fashion, as well as Ens: That false opinions are possible: That there may be false opinions as well as true. But what deserves most notice here, in illustration of Plato's manner, is—that though the Sophistês¹ is announced as a continuation of the Theætétus (carried on by the same speakers, with the addition of the Eleate), yet the objections taken by Sokrates in the Theætétus against the possibility of false opinion, are not even noticed in the Sophistês—much less removed. Other objections to it are propounded and dealt with: but not those objections which had arrested the march of Sokrates in the Theætétus.² Sokrates and Theætétus hear the Eleatic Stranger

¹ See the end of the Theætétus and the opening of the Sophistês. Note, moreover, that the Politikus makes reference not only to the Sophistês, but also to the Theætétus (pp. 258 A, 266 D, 284 B, 286 B).

² In the Sophistês, the Eleate establishes (to his own satisfaction) that τὸ μὴ ὂν is not ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος, but ἕτερον τοῦ ὄντος (p. 257 B), that it is one γένος among the various γένη (p. 260 B), and that it (τὸ μὴ ὂν κοινῶναι) enters into communion or combination with δόξα, λόγος, φαντασία, &c. It is therefore possible that there may be ψευδὴς δόξα or ψευδὴς λόγος, when you affirm, respecting any given subject, ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων or τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα (p. 263 B-C). Plato considers that the case is thus made out against the Sophist, as the impostor and dealer in falsehoods; false opinion being proved to be possible and explicable.

But if we turn to the Theætétus (p. 189 seq.), we shall see that this

very explication of ψευδὴς δόξα is there enunciated and impugned by Sokrates in a long argument. He calls it there ἀλλοδοξία, ἑτεροδοξία, τὸ ἑτεροδοξεῖν (pp. 189 A, 190 E, 193 D). No man (he says) can mistake one thing for another; if this were so, he must be supposed both to know and not to know the same thing, which is impossible (pp. 196 A, 200 A). Therefore ψευδὴς δόξα is impossible.

Of these objections, urged by Sokrates in the Theætétus, against the possibility of ἀλλοδοξία, no notice is taken in the Sophistês either by Sokrates, or by Theætétus, or by the Eleate in the Sophistês. Indeed the Eleate congratulates himself upon the explanation as more satisfactory than he had expected to find (p. 264 B): and speaks with displeasure of the troublesome persons who stir up doubts and contradictions (p. 259 C): very different from the tone of Sokrates in the Theætétus (p. 195 B-C).

I may farther remark that Plato, in the Republic, reasons about τὸ μὴ ὂν

discussing this same matter in the *Sophistæ*, yet neither of them allude to those objections against his conclusion which had appeared to both of them irresistible in the preceding dialogue known as *Theætétus*. Nor are the objections refuted in any other of the Platonic dialogues.

Such a string of objections never answered, and of difficulties without solution, may appear to many persons nugatory as well as tiresome. To Plato they did not appear so. At the time when most of his dialogues were composed, he considered that the Search after truth was at once the noblest occupation, and the highest pleasure, of life. Whoever has no sympathy with such a pursuit—whoever cares only for results, and finds the chase in itself fatiguing rather than attractive—is likely to take little interest in the Platonic dialogues. To repeat what I said in Chapter VI.—Those who expect from Plato a coherent system in which affirmative dogmas are first to be laid down, with the evidence in their favour—next, the difficulties and objections against them enumerated—lastly, these difficulties solved—will be disappointed. Plato is, occasionally, abundant in his affirmations: he has also great negative fertility in starting objections: but the affirmative current does not come into conflict with the negative. His belief is enforced by rhetorical fervour, poetical illustration, and a vivid emotional fancy. These elements stand to him in the place of positive proof; and when his mind is full of them, the unsolved objections, which he himself had stated elsewhere, vanish out of sight. Towards the close of his life (as we shall see in the *Treatise De Legibus*), the love of dialectic, and the taste for enunciating difficulties even when he could not clear them up, died out within him. He becomes

in the *Parmenidean* sense, and not in the sense which he ascribed to it in the *Sophistæ*, and which he recognises in the *Politikus*, p. 284 B. (*Republic*, v. pp. 477 A, 478 C.)

Socher (*Ueber Platon's Schriften*, pp. 260-270) points out the discrepancy between the doctrines of the *Eleate* in the *Sophistæ*, and those maintained by *Sokrates* in other Platonic dialogues; inferring from thence that the *Sophistæ* and *Politikus* are not compositions of Plato. As between the *Theætétus* and

the *Sophistæ*, I think a stronger case of discrepancy might be set forth than he has stated; though the end of the former is tied to the beginning of the latter plainly, directly, and intentionally. But I do not agree in his inference. He concludes that the *Sophistæ* is not Plato's composition: I conclude, that the scope for dissident views and doctrine, within the long philosophical career and numerous dialogues of Plato, is larger than his commentators admit.

ultra-dogmatical, losing even the poetical richness and fervour which had once marked his affirmations, and substituting in their place a strict and compulsory orthodoxy.

The contrast between the philosopher and the man engaged in active life—which is so emphatically set forth in the *Theætétus*¹—falls in with the distinction between Knowledge and Opinion—The Infallible and the Fallible. It helps the purpose of the dialogue, to show what knowledge is *not*: and it presents the distinction between the two on the ethical and emotional side, upon which Plato laid great stress. The

Contrast between the philosopher and the practical statesman—between Knowledge and Opinion.

philosopher (or man of Knowledge, i.e. Knowledge viewed on its subjective side) stands opposed to the men of sensible perception and opinion, not merely in regard to intellect, but in regard to disposition, feeling, character, and appreciation of objects. He neither knows nor cares about particular things or particular persons: all his intellectual force, and all his emotional interests, are engaged in the contemplation of Universals or Real Entia, and of the great pervading cosmical forces. He despises the occupations of those around him, and the actualities of life, like the Platonic Sokrates in the *Gorgias*:² assimilating himself as much as possible to the Gods; who have no other occupation (according to the Aristotelian³ *Ethics*), except that of contemplating and theorising. He pursues these objects not with a view to any ulterior result, but because the pursuit is in itself a life both of virtue and happiness; neither of which are to be found in the region of opinion. Intense interest in speculation is his prominent characteristic. To dwell amidst these contemplations is a self-sufficing life; even without any of the aptitudes or accomplishments admired by the practical men. If the philosopher meddles with their pursuits, he is not merely found incompetent, but also incurs general derision; because his incompetence becomes manifest even to the common-place citizens. But if *they* meddle with his speculations, they fail not less disgracefully; though their failure is not appreciated by the unphilosophical spectator.

¹ Plato, *Theætét.* pp. 173-176. Compare *Republic*, v. pp. 476-477, vii. p. 517.

² See above, chap. xxiv. p. 355.

³ *Ethic. Nikomach.* x. 8, p. 1178, b. 9-25.

The professors of Knowledge are thus divided by the strongest lines from the professors of Opinion. And opinion itself—The Fallible—is, in this dialogue, presented as an inexplicable puzzle. You talk about true and false opinions: but how can false opinions be possible? and if they are not possible, what is the meaning of *true*, as applied to opinions? Not only, therefore, opinion can never be screwed up to the dignity of knowledge—but the world of opinion itself defies philosophical scrutiny. It is a chaos in which there is neither true nor false; in perpetual oscillation (to use the phrase of the Republic) between Ens and Non-Ens.¹

¹ Plato, Republic, v. pp. 478-479.

The Theætétus is more in harmony (in reference to δόξα and γνώμη) with the Republic, than with the Sophistés and Politikus. In the Politikus (p. 308 C) ἀληθὴς δόξα μετὰ βεβαιώσεως is placed very nearly on a par with knowledge: in the Menon also, the difference between the two, though clearly declared, is softened in degree, pp. 97-98.

The Alexandrine physician Herophilus attempted to draw, between πρόρρησις and πρόγνωσις, the same distinction as that which Plato draws between δόξα and γνώμη—The Fallible as contrasted with the Infallible. Galen shows that the distinction is untenable (Prim. Commentat. in Hippokratidis Prorrhetica, Tom. xvi. p. 487, ed. Kühn).

Bonitz, in his Platonische Studien (pp. 41-78), has given an instructive analysis and discussion of the Theætétus. I find more to concur with in his views, than in those of Schleier-

macher or Steinhart. He disputes altogether the assumption of other Platonic critics, that a purely negative result is unworthy of Plato; and that the negative apparatus is an artifice to recommend, and a veil to conceal, some great affirmative truth, which acute expositors can detect and enunciate plainly (Schleiermacher, Einleit. zum Theætét. p. 124 seq.). Bonitz recognises the result of the Theætétus as purely negative, and vindicates the worth of it as such. Moreover, instead of denouncing the opinions which Plato combats, as if they were perverse heresies of dishonest pretenders, he adverts to the great difficulty of those problems which both Plato and Plato's opponents undertook to elucidate: and he remarks that, in those early days, the first attempts to explain psychological phenomena were even more liable to error than the first attempts to explain physical phenomena (pp. 75-77). Such recognition, of the real difficulty of a problem, is rare among the Platonic critics.

CHAPTER XXIX.

SOPHISTES—POLITIKUS.

THESE two dialogues are both of them announced by Plato as forming sequel to the *Theætétus*. The beginning of the *Sophistês* fits on to the end of the *Theætétus*: and the *Politikus* is even presented as a second part or continuation of the *Sophistês*.¹ In all the three, the

Persons
and circum-
stances of
the two
dialogues.

¹ At the beginning of the *Politikus*, Plato makes Sokrates refer both to the *Theætétus* and to the *Sophistês* (p. 258 A). In more than one passage of the *Politikus* (pp. 286 D, 284 B, 286 B), he even refers to the *Sophistês* directly and by name, noticing certain points touched in it—a thing very unusual with him. In the *Sophistês* also (p. 233 B), express reference is made to a passage in the *Theætétus*.

See also the allusion in *Sophistês* (to the appearance of the younger Sokrates as respondent), p. 218 B.

Socher (in his work, *Ueber Platon's Schriften*, pp. 258-294) maintains that neither the *Sophistês*, nor the *Politikus*, nor the *Parmenidês*, are genuine works of Plato. He conceives the two dialogues to be contemporary with the *Theætétus* (which he holds to have been written by Plato), but to have been composed by some acute philosopher of the Megaric school, conversant with the teachings of Sokrates and with the views of Plato, after the visit of the latter to Megara in the period succeeding the death of Sokrates (p. 268).

Even if we grant the exclusion of Plato's authorship, the hypothesis of an author belonging to the Megaric school is highly improbable: the rather, since many critics suppose (I think erroneously) that the Megarici are among those attacked in the dialogue. The suspicion that Plato is not the author

of *Sophistês* and *Politikus* has undoubtedly more appearance of reason than the same suspicion as applied to other dialogues—though I think the reasons altogether insufficient. Socher observes, justly: 1. That the two dialogues are peculiar, distinguished from other Platonic dialogues by the profusion of logical classification, in practice as well as in theory. 2. That both, and especially the *Sophistês*, advance propositions and conclusions discrepant from what we read in other Platonic dialogues.—But these two reasons are not sufficient to make me disallow them. I do not agree with those who require so much uniformity, either of matter or of manner, in the numerous distinct dialogues of Plato. I recognise a much wider area of admissible divergence.

The plain announcement contained in the *Theætétus*, *Sophistês*, and *Politikus* themselves, that the two last are intended as sequel to the first, is in my mind a proof of sameness of authorship, not counterbalanced by Socher's objections. Why should a Megaric author embody in his two dialogues a false pretence and assurance, that they are sequel of the Platonic *Theætétus*? Why should so acute a writer (as Socher admits him to be) go out of his way to suppress his own personality, and merge his fame in that of Plato?

I make the same remark on the views of Suckow (*Form der Plato-*

same interlocutors are partially maintained. Thus Sokrates, Theodórus, and Theætétus are present in all three : and Theætétus makes the responses, not only in the dialogue which bears his name, but also in the *Sophistês*. Both in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, however, Sokrates himself descends from the part of principal speaker to that of listener : it is he, indeed, who by his question elicits the exposition, but he makes no comment either during the progress of it or at the close. In both the dialogues, the leading and expository function is confided to a new personage introduced by Theodórus :—a stranger not named, but announced as coming from Elea—the friend and companion of Parmenides and Zeno. Perhaps (remarks Sokrates) your friend may, without your knowledge, be a God under human shape ; as Homer tells us that the Gods often go about, in the company of virtuous men, to inspect the good and bad behaviour of mankind. Perhaps your friend may be a sort of cross-examining God, coming to test and expose our feebleness in argument. No (replies Theodórus) that is not his character. He is less given to

nischen Schriften, p. 87, seq., Breslau, 1855), who admits the *Sophistês* to be a genuine work of Plato, but declares the *Politikus* to be spurious ; composed by some fraudulent author, who wished to give to his dialogue the false appearance of being a continuation of the *Sophistês* : he admits (p. 93) that it must be a deliberate deceit, if the *Politikus* be really the work of a different author from the *Sophistês* ; for identity of authorship is distinctly affirmed in it.

Suckow gives two reasons for believing that the *Politikus* is not by Plato :—1. That the doctrines respecting government are different from those of the Republic, and the cosmology of the long myths which it includes different from the cosmology of the *Timæus*. These are reasons similar to those advanced by Socher, and (in my judgment) insufficient reasons. 2. That Aristotle, in a passage of the *Politica* (iv. 2, p. 1289, b. 5), alludes to an opinion, which is found in the *Politikus*, in the following terms : ἡ δὲ μὲν οὖν τις ἀνεφύηκε καὶ τὸν πρότερον οὖτος, &c. Suckow maintains that Aristotle could never have alluded to Plato in these terms, and that he must have believed the *Politikus* to be composed by some one else. But I think this inference is not justified by the

premises. It is noway impossible that Aristotle might allude to Plato sometimes in this vague and general way : and I think that he has done so in other passages of the same treatise (vii. 2, 1324, a. 29—vii. 7, p. 1327, b. 37).

Ueberweg (*Äechtheit der Platon. Schrift.* p. 162, seq.) combats with much force the views of Suckow. It would be rash to build so much negative inference upon a loose phrase of Aristotle. That he should have spoken of Plato in this vague manner is much more probable, or much less improbable, than the counter-supposition, that the author of a striking and comprehensive dialogue, such as the *Politikus*, should have committed a fraud for the purpose of fastening his composition on Plato, and thus abnegating all fame for himself.

The explicit affirmation of the *Politikus* itself ought to be believed, in my judgment, unless it can be refuted by greater negative probabilities than any which Socher and Suckow produce.

I do not here repeat, what I have endeavoured to justify in an earlier chapter of this work, the confidence which I feel in the canon of Thrasyllus : a confidence which it requires stronger arguments than those of these two critics to overthrow.

dispute than his companions. He is far from being a God, but he is a divine man: for I call all true philosophers divine.¹

This Eleate performs the whole task of exposition, by putting questions to Theætétus, in the *Sophistês*—to the younger Sokrates in the *Politikus*. Since the true Sokrates is merely listener in both dialogues, Plato provides for him an additional thread of connection with both; by remarking that the youthful Sokrates is his namesake, and that Theætétus resembles him in flat nose and physiognomy.²

Though Plato himself plainly designates the *Sophistês* as an intended sequel to the Theætétus, yet the method of the two is altogether different, and in a certain sense even opposite. In the Theætétus, Sokrates extracts answers from the full and pregnant mind of that youthful respondent: he himself professes to teach nothing, but only to canvass every successive hypothesis elicited from his companion. But the Eleate is presented to us in the most imposing terms, as a thoroughly accomplished philosopher: coming with doctrines established in his mind,³ and already practised in the task of exposition which Sokrates entreats him to undertake. He is, from beginning to end, affirmative and dogmatical: and if he declines to proceed by continuous lecture, this is only because he is somewhat ashamed to appropriate all the talk to himself.⁴ He therefore prefers to accept Theætétus as respondent. But Theætétus is no longer pregnant, as in the preceding dialogue. He can do no more than give answers signifying assent and dissent, which merely serve to break and diversify the exposition. In fact, the dialogue in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus* is assimilated by Plato himself,⁵ not to that in the Theætétus, but to that in the last half of the *Parmenides*; wherein Aristotélès the respondent answers little more than *Ay* or *No*, to leading questions from the interrogator.

¹ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 216 B-C.

² Plato, *Politik.* p. 257 E.

³ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 217 B. *ἔπειτα διακηκόνατο γὰρ φησὶν ἰκανῶς καὶ οὐκ ἀμυμονεῖν.*

⁴ Plato, *Sophist.* pp. 216-217.

⁵ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 217 C. The words of Sokrates show that he alludes to the last half of the *Parmenides*, in

which he is only present as a listener—not to the first half, in which he takes an active part. Compare the *Parmenides*, p. 137 C. In this last-mentioned dialogue, Sokrates (then a youth) and Aristotélès are the parallel of Theætétus and the younger Sokrates in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*. (See p. 135 D.)

In noticing the circumlocutory character, and multiplied negative criticism, of the *Theætétus*, without any ultimate profit realised in the form of positive result—I remarked, that Plato appreciated dialogues not merely as the road to a conclusion, but for the mental discipline and suggestive influence of the tentative and verifying process. It was his purpose to create in his hearers a disposition to prosecute philosophical research of their own, and at the same time to strengthen their ability of doing so with effect. This remark is confirmed by the two dialogues now before us, wherein Plato defends himself against reproaches seemingly made to him at the time.¹ “To what does all this tend? Why do you stray so widely from your professed topic? Could you not have reached this point by a shorter road?” He replies by distinctly proclaiming—That the process, with its improving influence on the mind, stands first in his thoughts—the direct conclusion of the enquiry, only second: That the special topic which is discussed, though in itself important, is nevertheless chosen principally with a view to its effect in communicating general method and dialectic aptitude: just as a schoolmaster, when he goes out to his pupils a word to be spelt, looks mainly, not to their exactness in spelling that particular word, but to their command of good spelling generally.² To form inquisitive, testing minds fond of philosophical debate as a pursuit, and looking at opinions on the negative as well as on the positive side, is the first object in most of Plato’s dialogues: to teach positive truth, is only a secondary object.

Both the *Sophistês* and the *Politikus* are lessons and specimens of that process which the logical manuals recognise under the names—Definition and Division. What is a Sophist? What is a politician or statesman? What is a philosopher? In the first place—Are the three really dis-

¹ Plato, *Politikus*, pp. 283 B, 286-287.

² Plato, *Politikus*, p. 285 D.

Ξεν.—Τί δ' αὖ; ὅν ἡμῖν ἡ περὶ τοῦ πολιτικοῦ ζήτησις ἔρεκα αὐτοῦ τούτου προβέλεται μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ περὶ πάντα διαλεκτικῶς γίνεσθαι;

Νέος Σωκρ.—Καὶ τοῦτο δῆλον ἐστὶ

τοῦ περὶ πάντα.

Again, p. 286 D. π τ αὖ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ προβλεθέντος ζήτησιν αὖ ὥς ῥέοντα καὶ τάχιστα εὐροίμεν, ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλ' οὐ πρότερον ὁ λόγος ἀγαθὸν παραγγέλλει, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ πρὶν τὸν μέθον αὐτὴν τιμῶν, τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν ἰκανῶς εἶναι διαμαρτυρῶν, &c.

tinct characters? for this may seem doubtful: since the true philosopher, in his visits of inspection from city to city, is constantly misconceived by an ignorant public, and confounded with the other two.¹ The Eleate replies that the three are distinct. Then what is the characteristic function of each? How is he distinguished from other persons or other things? To what class or classes does each belong: and what is the specific character belonging to the class, so as to mark its place in the scheme descending by successive logical subdivision from the highest genus down to particulars? What other professions or occupations are there analogous to those of Sophist and Statesman, so as to afford an illustrative comparison? What is there in like manner capable of serving as illustrative contrast?

Such are the problems which it is the direct purpose of the two dialogues before us to solve. But a large proportion of both is occupied by matters bearing only indirectly upon the solution. The process of logical subdivision, or the formation of classes in subordination to each other, can be exhibited just as plainly in application to an ordinary craft or profession, as to one of grave importance. The Eleate Stranger even affirms that the former case will be simpler, and will serve as explanatory introduction to the latter.² He therefore selects the craft of an angler, for which to find a place in logical classification. Does not an angler belong to the general class—men of art or craft? He is not a mere artless, non-professional, private man. This being so, we must distribute the class Arts—Artists, into two subordinate classes: Artists who construct or put together some new substance or compound—Artists who construct nothing new, but are employed in getting, or keeping, or employing, substances already made. Thus the class Artists is bisected into Constructive—Acquisitive. The angler constructs nothing: he belongs to the acquisitive branch. We now bisect this latter branch. Acquirers either obtain by consent, or appropriate without consent. Now the angler is one of the last-mentioned class: which is again bisected into two sub-classes, according as

Sokrates tries the application of this method, first, upon a vulgar subject. To find the logical place and deduction of the Angler. Superior classes above him. Bisecting division.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 216 E.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 218 E.

the appropriation is by force or stratagem—Fighters and Hunters. The angler is a hunter: but many other persons are hunters also, from whom he must be distinguished. Hunters are therefore divided into, Those who hunt inanimate things (such as divers for sponges, &c.), and Those who hunt living things or animals, including of course the angler among them. The hunters of animals are distinguished into hunters of walking animals, and hunters of swimming animals. Of the swimming animals some are in air, others in water:¹ hence we get two classes, Bird-Hunters and Fish-Hunters; to the last of whom the angler belongs. The fish-hunters (or fishermen) again are bisected into two classes, according as they employ nets, or striking instruments of one kind or another, such as tridents, &c. Of the striking fishermen there are two sorts: those who do their work at night by torch-light, and those who work by day. All these day-fishermen, including among them the angler, use instruments with hooks at the end. But we must still make one bisection more. Some of them employ tridents, with which they strike from above downwards at the fishes, upon any part of the body which may present itself: others use hooks, rods, and lines, which they contrive to attach to the jaws of the fish, and thereby draw him from below upward.² This is the special characteristic of the angler. We have now a class comprehending the anglers alone, so that no farther sub-division is required. We have obtained not merely the name of the angler, but also the rational explanation of the function to which the name is attached.³

This is the first specimen which Plato gives of a systematic classification descending, by successive steps of bifurcation, through many subordinations of genera and species, each founded on a real and proclaimed distinction—and ending at last in an *infima species*. He repeats the like process in regard to the Sophist, the Statesman, and other professions to which he compares the one or the other: but it will suffice to have

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 220 B. Νευστικοὺ μὲν τὸ μὲν πτητῶν φύλον ὁρῶμεν, τὸ δὲ ἐνὺδρον.

It deserves notice that Plato here considers the air as a fluid in which birds swim.

² Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 219-221.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 221 A-B. Νῦν ἄρα τῆς ἀσφαλίουτικῆς—οὐ μόνον τοῦ ρομα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν λόγον περὶ αὐτὸ τοῦργον, εἰλήφαμεν ἱκανῶς.

given one specimen of his method. If we transport ourselves back to his time, I think that such a view of the principles of classification implies a new and valuable turn of thought. There existed then no treatises on logic ; no idea of logic as a scheme of mental procedure ; no sciences out of which it was possible to abstract the conception of a regular method more or less diversified. On no subject was there any mass of facts or details collected, large enough to demand some regular system for the purpose of arranging and rendering them intelligible. Classification to a certain extent is of necessity involved, consciously or unconsciously, in the use of general terms. But the process itself had never been made a subject of distinct consciousness or reflection to any one (as far as our knowledge reaches), in the time of Plato. No one had yet looked at it as a process natural indeed to the human intellect, up to a certain point and in a loose manner,—but capable both of great extension and great improvement, and requiring especial study, with an end deliberately set before the mind, in order that it might be employed with advantage to regularise and render intelligible even common and well-known facts. To determine a series of descending classes, with class-names, each connoting some assignable characteristic—to distribute the whole of each class between two correlative sub-classes, to compare the different ways in which this could be done, and to select such *membra dividenda* as were most suitable for the purpose—this was in the time of Plato an important novelty. We know from Xenophon¹ that Sokrates considered Dialectic to be founded, both etymologically and really, upon the distribution of particular things into genera or classes. But we find little or no intentional illustration of this process in any of the conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates : and we are farther struck by the fact that Plato, in the two dialogues which we are here considering, assigns all the remarks on the process of classification, not to Sokrates himself, but to the nameless Eleatic Stranger.

After giving the generic deduction of the angler from the comprehensive idea of Art, distributed into two sections, Plato describes the constructive and acquisitive, Plato proceeds to notice

¹ Xenoph. Memor. iv. 5, 12.

Sophist as analogous to an angler. He traces the Sophist by descending subdivision from the acquisitive genus of art. the analogy between the Sophist and an angler : after which he deduces the Sophist also from the acquisitive section of Art. The Sophist is an angler for rich young men.¹ To find his place in the preceding descending series, we must take our departure from the bisection—hunters of walking animals, hunters of swimming animals. The Sophist is a hunter of walking animals : which may be divided into two classes, wild and tame. The Sophist hunts a species of tame animals—men. Hunters of tame animals are bisected into such as hunt by violent means (robbers, enslavers, despots, &c.),² and such as hunt by persuasive means. Of the hunters by means of persuasion there are two kinds : those who hunt the public, and those who hunt individuals. The latter again may be divided into two classes : those who hunt to their own loss, by means of presents, such as lovers, &c., and those who hunt with a view to their own profit. To this latter class belongs the Sophist : pretending to associate with others for the sake of virtue, but really looking to his own profit.³

The Sophist traced down from the same, by a second and different descending subdivision. Again, we may find the Sophist by descending through a different string of subordinate classes from the genus—*Acquisitive Art*. The professors of this latter may be bisected into two sorts—hunters and exchangers. Exchangers are of two sorts—givers and sellers. Sellers again sell either their own productions, or the productions of others. Those who sell the productions of others are either fixed residents in one city, or hawkers travelling about from city to city. Hawkers again carry about for sale either merchandise for the body, or merchandise for the mind, such as music, poetry, painting, exhibitions of jugglery, learning, and intellectual accomplishments, and so forth. These latter (hawkers for the mind) may be divided into two sorts :

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 222 A.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 222 C.

It illustrates the sentiment of Plato's age respecting classification, when we see the great diversity of particulars which he himself, here as well as elsewhere, ranks under the general name *θήρα*, *hunting*—*θήρα γὰρ παντοῦ τι πράγμα ἐστι, περιελημμένον ὀνόματι τῶν σφῆδον ἐν* (Plato, *Legg.* viii. 832-

823-824, and *Euthyd.* p. 290 B). He includes both *στρατηγική* and *φθειριστική* as varieties of *θηρευτική*, *Sophist*. p. 227 B.

Compare also the interesting conversation about *θήρα ἐνδρώμετα* between Sokrates and Theodotus, *Xenophon*, *Memorab.* iii. 11, 7; and between Sokrates and Kritobulus, ii. 6, 29.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 223 A.

those who go about teaching; for money, arts and literary accomplishments—and those who go about teaching virtue for money. They who go about teaching virtue for money are the Sophists.¹ Or indeed if they sell virtue and knowledge for money, they are not the less Sophists—whether they buy what they sell from others, or prepare it for themselves—whether they remain in one city or become itinerant.

A third series of subordinate classes will also bring us down from the genus—*Acquisitive Art*—down to the *infima* Also, by a *species*—*Sophist*. In determining the class-place of third. the angler, we recognised a bisection of acquisitive art into acquirers by exchange, or mutual consent—and acquirers by appropriation, or without consent.² These latter we divided according as they employed either force or stratagem: contenders and hunters. We then proceeded to bisect the class hunters, leaving the contenders without farther notice. Now let us take up the class contenders. It may be divided into two: competitors for a set prize (pecuniary or honorary), and fighters. The fighters go to work either body against body, violently—or tongue against tongue, as arguers. These arguers again fall into two classes: the pleaders, who make long speeches, about just or unjust, before the public assembly and dikastery: and the dialogists, who meet each other in short question and answer. The dialogists again are divided into two: the private, untrained antagonists, quarrelling with each other about the particular affairs of life (who form a species by themselves, since characteristic attributes may be assigned to them; though these attributes are too petty and too indefinite to have ever received a name in common language, or to deserve a name from us³)—and the trained practitioners or wranglers, who dispute not about particular incidents, but about just and unjust in general, and

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 224 B.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 219 E.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 225 C.

ἕνός.—Τοῦ δὲ ἀντιλογικοῦ, τὸ μὲν ὅσον περὶ τὰ συμβολαία ἀμφισβητεῖται μὲν, εἰς ἣ δὲ καὶ ἀτεχνῶς περὶ αὐτὸ πρᾶττεται, ταῦτα θεῖον μὲν εἶδος, ἐπεισὲρ αὐτὸ διέγνωκεν ὡς ἕτερον ὅν ὁ λόγος· ἀτὰρ ἐκωνυμίας οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμπροσθεν ἐτυχεν, οὔτε νῦν ὑφ' ἡμῶν

τυχεῖν ἄξιον.

Θεαίτητ.—Ἀληθῆ· κατὰ μικρὰ γὰρ λίαν καὶ παντοδαπὰ διεῖρηται.

These words illustrate Plato's view of an εἶδος or species. Any distinguishable attributes, however petty, and however multifarious, might be taken to form a species upon; but if they were petty and multifarious, there was no advantage in bestowing a specific name.

other general matters.¹ Of wranglers again there are two sorts: the proers, who follow the pursuit from spontaneous taste and attachment, not only without hope of gain, but to the detriment of their private affairs, incurring loss themselves, and wearying or bothering their hearers: and those who make money by such private dialogues. This last sort of wrangler is the Sophist.²

There is yet another road of class-distribution which will bring us down to the Sophist. A great number of common arts (carding wool, straining through a sieve, &c.) have, in common, the general attribute of separating matters confounded in a heap. Of separation there are two sorts: you may separate like from like (this has no established name)—or better from worse, which is called *purification*. Purification is of two sorts: either of body or of mind. In regard to body, the purifying agents are very multifarious, comprising not only men and animals, but also inanimate things: and thus including many varieties which in common estimation are mean, trivial, repulsive, or ludicrous. But all these various sentiments (observes Plato) we must disregard. We must follow out a real analogy wherever it leads us, and recognise a logical affinity wherever we find one; whether the circumstances brought together be vile or venerable, or some of them vile and some venerable, in the eyes of mankind. Our sole purpose is to improve our intelligence. With that view, all particulars are of equal value in our eyes, provided only they exhibit that real likeness which legitimates them as members of the same class—purifiers of body: the correlate of that other class which we now proceed to study—purifiers of mind.³

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 225 C. τὸ δὲ γε ἐντεχνον, καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδικῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλων ἀμφισβητοῦν, ἀρ' οὐκ ἐριστικὸν αὐ λέγειν εἰδίσματα;

² Plato, Sophist. p. 225 E.

³ Plato, Sophist. pp. 226-227. 227 A: τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῇ ἢ φαρμακοποιῇ οὐδὲν ἦτον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ, τὸ δὲ μέγαλα ἡμᾶς ὠφελεῖ καθαίρον. Τοῦ κτήσεσθαι γὰρ ἐνεκεν νοῦν περὶ τῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν περὶ

ρωμένη, τιμὴ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἐτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγείται γελιούτερα, σεμνότερον δὲ τι τὸν διὰ στρατημικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς δηλοῦντα θηρευτικῆν οὐδὲν νενομίκεν, ἀλλ' ὥς τὸ πολὺ χαννότερον. Καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν, ὅπερ ἦρον, τί προστεροῦμεν ὄνομα ξυμπάσας δύναμις, ὅσαι σῶμα εἴτε ἐμψυχον εἴτε ἀψυχον εἰλήχασι καθαίρειν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ διοίσει, ποῖόν τι λαχθὲν εὐπρεπέστατον εἶναι δοῖται. μόνον ἐχέτω χωρὶς τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς καθάρσεων πάντα ἐνδύσαντα ὅσα ἄλλο τι καθαίρει. To maintain the

This precept (repeated by Plato also in the *Politikus*) respecting the principles of classification, deserves notice. It protests against, and seeks to modify, one of the ordinary turns in the associating principles of the human mind. With unreflecting men, classification is often emotional rather than intellectual. The groups of objects thrown together in such minds, and conceived in immediate association, are such as suggest the same or kindred emotions: pleasure or pain, love or hatred, hope or fear, admiration, contempt, disgust, jealousy, ridicule. Community of emotion is a stronger bond of association between different objects, than community in any attribute not immediately interesting to the emotions, and appreciable only intellectually. Thus objects which have nothing else in common, except appeal to the same earnest emotion, will often be called by the same general name, and will be constituted members of the same class. To attend to attributes in any other point of view than in reference to the amount and kind of emotion which they excite, is a process uncongenial to ordinary taste: moreover, if any one brings together, in the same wording, objects really similar, but exciting opposite and contradictory emotions, he usually provokes either disgust or ridicule. All generalizations, and all general terms connoting them, are results brought together by association and comparison of particulars somehow resembling. But if we look at the process of association in an unreflecting person, the resemblances which it fastens upon will be often emotional, not intellectual: and the generalizations founded upon such resemblances will be emotional also.

In a logical classification, low and vulgar items deserve as much attention as grand ones. Conflict between emotional and scientific classifications.

It is against this natural propensity that Plato here enters his protest, in the name of intellect and science. For the purpose of obtaining a classification founded on real, intrinsic affinities, we

equal scientific position of στρατηγική and φθειριστική, as two different species under the genus θεραπευτική, is a strong illustration.

Compare also Plato, *Politikus*, p. 286 D.

A similar admonition is addressed (in the *Parmenides*, p. 120 D) by the old Parmenides to the youthful Sokrates, when the latter cannot bring

himself to admit that there exist εἶδη or Forms of vulgar and repulsive objects, such as θρίξ and πῦλος. Νεὸς γὰρ εἰ ἐστὶ, καὶ οὕτως σοὶ ἀντιτίθεται φιλοσοφία ὥς ἐστὶ ἀντιλήφεται κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἀτιμάσει· γὰρ δ' ἐστὶ πρὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀποβλέπειν δόξας διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν.

See above, ch. xxvii. p. 60, in my review of the *Parmenides*.

must exclude all reference to the emotions: we must take no account whether a thing be pleasing or hateful, sublime or mean:¹ we must bring ourselves to rank objects useful or grand in the same logical compartment with objects hurtful or ludicrous. We must examine only whether the resemblance is true and real, justifying itself to the comparing intellect: and whether the class-term chosen be such as to comprise all these resemblances, holding them apart (*μόνον ἐχέτω χάρις*) from the correlative and opposing class.²

¹ Compare *Politikus*, p. 286 D; *Parmenides*, p. 130 E.

We see that Plato has thus both anticipated and replied to the objection of Socher (*Ueber Platon's Schriften*, pp. 260-262), who is displeased with the minuteness of this classification, and with the vulgar objects to which it is applied. Socher contends that this is unworthy of Plato, and that it was peculiar to the subtle Megaric philosophers.

I think, on the contrary, that the purpose of illustrating the process of classification was not unworthy of Plato; that it was not unnatural to do this by allusion to vulgar trades or handicraft, at a time when no scientific survey of physical facts had been attempted; that the allusion to such vulgar trades is quite in the manner of Plato, and of Sokrates before him.

Stallbaum, in his elaborate *Prolegomena* both to the *Sophistes* and to the *Politikus*, rejects the conclusion of Socher, and maintains that both dialogues are the work of Plato. Yet he agrees to a certain extent in Socher's premises. He thinks that minuteness and over-refinement in classification were peculiarities of the Megaric philosophers, and that Plato intentionally pushes the classification into an extreme subtlety and minuteness, in order to parody their proceedings and turn them into ridicule. (*Proleg. ad Sophist.* pp. 32-36, *ad Politik.* pp. 64-66.)

But how do Socher and Stallbaum know that this extreme minuteness of subdivision into classes was a characteristic of the Megaric philosophers? Neither of them produce any proof of it. Indeed Stallbaum himself says, most truly (*Proleg. ad Politik.* p. 66), "*Quæ de Megaricorum arte dialectica accipimus, sanequam sunt paucissima*". He might have added, that the little which we do hear about their dialectic,

is rather adverse to this supposed minuteness of positive classification, than consonant with it. What we hear is, that they were extremely acute and subtle in contentious disputations—able assailants of the position of a logical opponent. But this talent has nothing to do with minuteness of positive classification; and is even indicative of a different turn of mind. Moreover, we hear about Eukleides, the chief of the Megaric school, that he enlarged the signification of the *Summum Genus* of Parmenides—the *Ἐν καὶ Πάν*. Eukleides called it *Unum*, *Bonum*, *Simile et Idem Semper*, *Deus*, &c. But we do not hear that Eukleides acknowledged a series of subordinate Genera or Species, expanding by logical procession below this primary *Unum*. As far as we can judge, this seems to have been wanting in his philosophy. Yet it is exactly these subordinate Genera or Species, which the Platonic *Sophistes* and *Politikus* supply in abundance, and even excess, conformably to the precept laid down by Plato in the *Philébus* (p. 14). The words of the *Sophistes* (p. 216 D) rather indicate that the Eleatic Stranger is declared *not* to possess the character and attributes of Megaric disputation.

² Though the advice here given by Plato about the principles of classification is very judicious, yet he has himself in this same dialogue set an example of repugnance to act upon it. (*Sophist.* p. 231 A-B.) In following out his own descending series of partitions, he finds that the Sophist corresponds with the great mental purifier—the person who applies the *Elenchus*, or cross-examining test, to youthful minds, so as to clear out that false persuasion of knowledge which is the great bar to all improvement. But though brought by his own process to this point, Plato shrinks from ad-

After these just remarks on classification generally, the Eleate pursues the subdivision of his own theme. To purify the mind is to get rid of the evil, and retain or improve the good. Now evil is of two sorts—disease (injustice, intemperance, cowardice, &c.) and ignorance. Disease, which in the body is dealt with by the physician, is in the mind dealt with by the judicial tribunal: ignorance (corresponding to ugliness, awkwardness, disability, in the body, which it is the business of the gymnastic trainer to correct) falls under the treatment of the teacher or instructor.¹ Ignorance again may be distributed into two heads: one, though special, being so grave as to counterbalance all the rest, and requiring to be set apart by itself—that is—ignorance accompanied with the false persuasion of knowledge.²

To meet this special and gravest case of ignorance, we must recognise a special division of the art of instruction or education. Exhortation, which is the common mode of instruction, and which was employed by our forefathers universally, is of no avail against this false persuasion of knowledge: which can only be approached and cured by the Elenchus, or philosophical cross-examination. So long as a man believes himself to be wise, you may lecture for ever without making impression upon him: you do no good by supplying food when the stomach is sick. But the examiner, questioning him upon those subjects which he professes to know, soon entangles him in contradictions with himself, making him feel with shame and humiliation his own

The purifier—a species under the genus discriminator—separates good from evil. Evil is of two sorts; the worst sort is, Ignorance mistaking itself for knowledge.

Exhortation is useless against this worst mode of evil. Cross-examination, the shock of the Elenchus, must be brought to bear upon it. This is the sovereign purifier.

mitting it. His dislike towards the Sophist will not allow him. "The Sophist is indeed" (he says) "very like to this grand educator: but so also a wolf is very like to a dog—the most savage of animals to the most gentle. We must always be extremely careful about these likenesses: the whole body of them are most slippery. Still we cannot help admitting the Sophist to represent this improving process—that is, the high and true bred Sophist."

It will be seen that Plato's remark here about *ἀμολόγητος* contradicts what he had himself said before (p. 227 B).

The reluctance to rank *dog* and *wolf* together, in the same class, is an exact specimen of that very mistake which he had been just pointing out for correction. The scientific resemblance between the two animals is very close; but the antithesis of sentiment, felt by men towards the one and the other, is extreme.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*, pp. 228-229.

² Plat. *Soph.* p. 229 C. Ἀγροίος δ' οὐν μέγα τί μοι δοκῶ καὶ χλευστὸν ἀφωρισμένον ὄρεν εἶδος, πᾶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτῆς ἀντιταθῆναι μέγεσι . . . Το μὴ κατεῖδεναι τι, δοκῶν εἶδέναι.

real ignorance. After having been thus disabused—a painful but indispensable process, not to be accomplished except by the Elenchus—his mind becomes open and teachable, so that positive instruction may be communicated to him with profit. The Elenchus is the grand and sovereign purification: whoever has not been subjected to it, were he even the Great King, is impure, unschooled, and incompetent for genuine happiness.¹

This cross-examining and disabusing process, brought to bear upon the false persuasion of knowledge and forming the only antidote to it, is the business of the Sophist looked at on its best side.² But Plato will not allow the Elenchus, the great Sokratic accomplishment and mission, to be shared by the Sophists: and he finds or makes a subtle distinction to keep them off. The Sophist (so the Eleate proceeds) is a disputant, and teaches all his youthful pupils to dispute about everything as if they knew it—about religion, astronomy, philosophy, arts, laws, politics, and everything else. He teaches them to argue in each department against the men of special science: he creates a belief in the minds of others that he really knows all those different subjects, respecting which he is able to argue and cross-examine successfully: he thus both possesses, and imparts to his pupils, a seeming knowledge, an imitation and pretence of reality.³ He is a sort of juggler: an imitator who palms off

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 230 D-E.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 231 B. τῆς δὲ παιδευτικῆς ὁ περὶ τὴν μάταιον δοξασίαν γυγνώσκων ἐλεγχος ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων παραφανέντι μὲν δὲ ἄλλ' ἡμῖν εἶναι λεγέσθω πλὴν ἢ γένει γερραία σοφιστικῆ.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 232-233 C, 235 A. Sokrates tells us in the *Platonic Apology* (p. 23 A) that this was the exact effect which his own cross-examination produced upon the hearers: they supposed him to be wise on those topics on which he exposed ignorance in others. The *Memorabilia* of Xenophon exhibit the same impression as made by the conversation of Sokrates, even when he talked with artisans on their own arts. Sokrates indeed professed not to teach any one—and he certainly took no fee for teaching. But

we see plainly that this disclaimer imposed upon no one; that he did teach, though gratuitously; and that what he taught was, the art of cross-examination and dispute. We learn this not merely from his enemy, Aristophanes, and from the proceedings of his opponents, Kritias and Charikles (*Xenoph. Memor.* i. 2), but also from his own statement in the *Platonic Apology* (pp. 23 C, 37 E, 39 B), and from the language of Plato and Xenophon throughout. Plato is here puzzled to make out a clear line of distinction between the Elenchus of Sokrates, and the disputatious arguments of those Sophists whom he calls *Eristic*—a name deserved quite as much by Sokrates as by any of them. Plato here accuses the Sophists of talking upon a great many subjects which they did not know, and teaching their pupils

upon persons what appears like reality when seen from a distance, but what is seen to be not like reality when contemplated closely.¹

Here however (continues Plato) we are involved in a difficulty. How can a thing appear to be what it is not? How can a man who opines or affirms, opine or affirm falsely—that is, opine or affirm the thing that is not? To admit this, we must assume the thing that is not (or Non-Ens, Nothing) to have a real existence. Such an assumption involves great and often debated difficulties. It has been pronounced by Parmenides altogether inadmissible.²

Doubt started by the Eleate. How can it be possible either to think or to speak falsely.

We have already seen that Plato discussed this same question in the *Theætétus*, and that after trying and rejecting many successive hypotheses to show how false supposition, or false affirmation, might be explained as possible, by a theory involving no contradiction, he left the question unsolved. He now resumes it at great length. It occupies more than half³ the dialogue. Near the close, but only then, he reverts to the definition of the Sophist.

First, the Eleate states the opinion which perplexes him, and which he is anxious either to refute or to explain away. (Unfortunately, we have no statement of the opinion, nor of the grounds on which it was held, from those who actually held it.) Non-Ens, or Nothing, is not the name of any existing thing, or of any Something. But every one who speaks must speak something: therefore if you try to speak of Non-Ens, you are trying to speak nothing—which is equivalent to not speaking at all.⁴ Moreover,

He pursues the investigation of this problem by a series of questions

to do the same. This is exactly what Sokrates passed his life in doing, and what he did better than any one—on the negative side.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 235-236.

² Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 236 E—237 A. πάντα ταῦτα ἔστι μετὰ ἀπορίας εἰ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ καὶ νῦν. Ὅπως γὰρ εἰπόντα χρὴ ψευδῆ λέγειν ἢ δοξάζειν ὅτιος εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο φεγγόμενον ἀνατιλογία μὴ ἐνέχεσθαι, πάντα καὶ χαλεπὸν. . . . Τετέλεμκεν ὁ λόγος οὗτος ὑποθέσθαι τὸ μὴ ἔν εἶναι· ψεύδος γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἄλλως ἐγγίγγοτο ἔν.

³ From p. 236 D to p. 264 D.

⁴ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 237 E. The Eleate here recites this opinion, not as his own but as entertained by others, and as one which he did not clearly see through: in *Republic* (v. p. 478 B-C) we find Sokrates advancing a similar doctrine as his own. So in the *Kratylus*, where this same topic is brought under discussion (pp. 429 D, 430 A), *Kratylus* is represented as contending that false propositions were impossible; that propositions, improperly called false, were in reality combinations of sounds without any meaning, like the strokes on a bell.

to every Something, you can add something farther: but to Non-Ens, or Nothing, you cannot add any thing. (Non-Entis nulla sunt prædicata.) Now Number is something, or included among the Entia: you cannot therefore apply number, either singular or plural, to Non-Ens: and inasmuch as every thing conceived or described must be either one or many, it is impossible either to conceive or describe Non-Ens. You cannot speak of it without falling into a contradiction.¹

When therefore we characterise the Sophist as one who builds up phantasms for realities—who presents to us what is not, as being like to what *is*, and as a false substitute for what *is*—he will ask us what we mean? If, to illustrate our meaning, we point to images of things in mirrors or clear water, he will pretend to be blind, and will refuse the evidence of sense: he will require us to make out a rational theory explaining Non-Ens or Nothing.² But when we try to do this, we contradict ourselves. A phantasm is that which, not being a true counterpart of reality, is yet so like it as to be mistaken for reality. *Quatenus* phantasm, it is Ens: *quatenus* reality, it is Non-Ens: thus the same thing is both Ens, and Non-Ens: which we declared before to be impossible.³ When therefore we accuse the Sophist of passing off phantasms for realities, we suppose falsely: we suppose matters not existing, or contrary to those which exist: we suppose the existent not to exist, or the non-existent to exist. But this assumes as done what cannot be done: since we have admitted more than once that Non-Ens can neither be described in language by itself, nor joined on in any manner to Ens.⁴

Stating the case in this manner, we find that to suppose falsely, or affirm falsely, is a contradiction. But there is yet another possible way out of the difficulty (the Eleate continues).

Let us turn for a moment (he says) from Non-Ens to Ens.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*, pp. 238-239.

² Plato, *Sophist*, p. 240 B.

³ Plato, *Sophist*, p. 239-240. κατα- γέλαισθαι σου τὸν λόγον, ὅταν ὡς βλέποντι λόγῳ αὐτῷ, προσποιούμενος ὅτι ἀδύνατον ὅτι ὕδατα γενέσκειν, ὅτι τὸ παράπαν ἔστιν· τὸ δ' ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον.

⁴ Plato, *Sophist*, p. 241 B. τῷ γὰρ μὴ ὅτι τὸ ὃν προσέειπεν ἡμεῖς πολ- λάκις ἀναγκάσθαι, διωμολογησάμενους νῦν δὲ πού τοῦτο εἶναι πάντων ἀδυνατό- ταν.

The various physical philosophers tell us a good deal about Ens. They differ greatly among themselves. Some philosophers represent Ens as triple, comprising three distinct elements, sometimes in harmony, sometimes at variance with each other. Others tell us that it is double—wet and dry—or hot and cold.

The Eleate turns from Non-Ens to Ens. Theories of various philosophers about Ens.

A third sect, especially Xenophanes and Parmenides, pronounce it to be essentially One. Herakleitus blends together the different theories, affirming that Ens is both many and one, always in process of disjunction and conjunction : Empedokles adopts a similar view, only dropping the *always*, and declaring the process of disjunction to alternate with that of conjunction, so that Ens is sometimes Many, sometimes One.¹

Now when I look at these various theories (continues the Eleate), I find that I do not follow or understand them ; and that I know nothing more or better about Ens than about Non-Ens. I thought, as a young man, that I understood both : but I now find that I understand neither.² The difficulties about Ens are

Difficulties about Ens are as great as those about Non-Ens.

just as great as those about Non-Ens. What do these philosophers mean by saying that Ens is double or triple ? that there are two distinct existing elements—Hot and Cold—or three ? What do you mean by saying that Hot and Cold *exist* ? Is existence any thing distinct from Hot and Cold ? If so, then there are three elements in all, not two. Do you mean that existence is something belonging to both and affirmed of both ? Then you pronounce both to be One : and Ens, instead of being double, will be at the bottom only One.

Such are the questions which the Eleatic spokesman of Plato puts to those philosophers who affirm Ens to be plural : He turns next to those who affirm Ens to be singular, or Unum. Do you mean that Unum is identical with Ens—and are they only two names for the same One and only thing ? There cannot be two distinct names belonging to one and the same thing : and yet, if this be not so, one of the names must be the name of nothing. At any rate, if there be only one name and one thing, still the name itself is

Whether Ens is Many or One ? If Many, how Many ? Difficulties about One and the Whole. Theorists about Ens cannot solve them.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 242 D-E.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 243 B.

different from the thing—so that duality must still be recognised. Or if you take the name as identical with the One thing, it will either be the name of nothing, or the name of a name.¹

Again, as to the Whole :—is the Whole the same with the Ens Unum, or different from it. We shall be told that it is the same : but according to the description given by Parmenides, the whole is spherical, thus having a centre and circumference, and of course having parts. Now a whole divisible into parts may have unity predicable of it, as an affection or accident in respect to the sum of its parts : but it cannot be the genuine, essential, self-existent, One, which does not admit of parts or division. If Ens be One by accident, it is not identical with One, and we thus have two existent things : and if Ens be not really and essentially the Whole, while nevertheless the Whole exists—Ens must fall short of or be less than itself, and must to this extent be Non-Ens : besides that Ens, and Totum, being by nature distinct, we have more things than One existing. On the other hand, if we assume Totum not to be Ens, the same result will ensue. Ens will still be something less than itself ;—Ens can never have any quantity, for each quantum is necessarily a whole in itself—and Ens can never be generated, since everything generated is also necessarily a whole.²

Such is the examination which the Eleate bestows on the theories of those philosophers who held one, two, or a definite number of self-existent Entia or elements. His purpose is to show, that even on their schemes, Ens is just as unintelligible, and involves as many contradictions, as Non-Ens. And to complete the same demonstration, he proceeds to dissect the theories of those who do not recognise any definite or specific number of elements or Entia.³ Of these he distinguishes two classes ; in direct and strenuous opposition to each other, respecting what constituted Essentia.⁴

First, the Materialist Philosophers, who recognise nothing

Theories of those who do not recognise a definite number of Entia or elements. Two classes thereof.

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 244 D.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 245 A-C.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 245 E.

⁴ Plato, Sophist. p. 246 A. *τοὺς γε ἐν αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἔχοντες μάχην τὴν εἶναι διὰ τὴν ἀμφισβήτησιν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας πρὸς ἀλλήλους.*

as existing except what is tangible ; defining Essence as identical with Body, and denying all incorporeal essence. Plato mentions no names : but he means (according to some commentators) Leukippus and Demokritus — perhaps Aristippus also. Secondly, other philosophers who, diametrically opposed to the Materialists, affirmed that there were no real Entia except certain Forms, Ideas, genera or species, incorporeal and conceivable only by intellect : that true and real essence was not to be found in those bodies wherein the Materialists sought it : that bodies were in constant generation and disappearance, affording nothing more than a transitory semblance of reality, not tenable¹ when sifted by reason. By these last are understood (so Schleiermacher and others think, though in my judgment erroneously) Eukleides and the Megaric school of philosophers.

The Eleate proceeds to comment upon the doctrines held by these opposing schools of thinkers respecting Essence or Reality. It is easier (he says) to deal with the last-mentioned, for they are more gentle. With the Materialists it is difficult, and all but impossible, to deal at all. Indeed, before we can deal with them, we must assume them to be for this occasion better than they show themselves in reality, and ready to answer in a more becoming manner than they actually do.² These Materialists will admit (Plato continues) that man exists—an animated body, or a compound of mind and body : they will farther allow that the mind of one man differs from that of another :—one is just, prudent, &c., another is unjust and imprudent. One man is just, through the habit and presence of justice : another is unjust, through the habit and presence of injustice. But justice must surely be

1. The Materialist Philosophers. 2. The Friends of Forms or Idealists, who recognise such Forms as the only real Entia.

Argument against the Materialists—Justice must be something, since it may be either present or absent, making sensible difference—But Justice is not a body.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 246 B-C. νοητὰ ἄντα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθειᾶν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δὲ καί τινος σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὕπ' αὐτῶν (i. e. the Materialists) ἀλθόμενα κατὰ μικρὰ διασπάρτεται ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, γίνονται ἀντ' οὐσίας φερόμενην τινὰ προσεγορεύουσιν.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 246 C. παρὰ μὲν τῶν ἐν εἰδῶν αὐτῇ (τὴν οὐσίαν) τιθε-

μένων ῥέον· ἡμετέροις γὰρ· παρὰ δὲ τῶν εἰς σῶμα πάντα ἐκέντων βίη, χαλεπώτερον· ἵσως δὲ καὶ σχεδὸν ἀδύνατον. Ἄλλ' ὅδε μοι δοκεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν ὁρᾶν. . . . Μάλιστα μὲν, εἰ πρὸς δύνασιν ἦν, ἔργῳ βελτίους αὐτοὺς ποιεῖν· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ ἔχουσιν, λόγῳ ποιεῖμεν, ὑποτιθέμενοι νομικώτερον αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν ἀπεκρίνασθαι.

something—injustice also must be *something*—if each may be present to, or absent from, any thing; and if their presence or absence makes so sensible a difference.¹ And justice or injustice, prudence or imprudence, as well as the mind in which the one or the other inheres, are neither visible or tangible, nor have they any body: they are all invisible.

Probably (replies Theætétus) these philosophers would contend that the soul or mind had a body; but they would be ashamed either to deny that justice, prudence, &c., existed as realities—or to affirm that justice, prudence, &c., were all bodies.² These philosophers must then have become better (rejoins the Eleate): for the primitive and genuine leaders of them will not concede even so much as that. But let us accept the concession. If they will admit any incorporeal reality at all, however small, our case is made out.

For we shall next call upon them to say, what there is in common between these latter, and those other realities which have bodies connate with and essential to them—to justify the names *real—essence*—bestowed upon both.³ Perhaps they would accept the following definition of Ens or the Real—of Essence or Reality. Every thing which possesses any sort of power, either to act upon any thing else or to be acted upon by any thing else, be it only for once or to the smallest degree—every such thing is true and real Ens. The characteristic mark or definition of Ens or the Real is, power or potentiality.⁴

The Eleate now turns to the philosophers of the opposite school—the Mentalists or Idealists,—whom he terms the friends of Forms, Ideas, or species.⁵ These men

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 247 A. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν τό γε δυνατόν τε παραγίγνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίγνεσθαι, πάντως εἶναι τι φύσιν.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 247 B. 'Ἀποκρίνονται . . . τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν δοκεῖν σφίσι σῶμα τι κεκτῆσθαι, φρόνησιν δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ὡς ἡρώτης, αἰσχύνονται τὸ τοιαῦτον ἢ μηδὲν τῶν ὄντων αὐτὰ ὁμολογεῖν, ἢ πάντ' εἶναι σώματα διωχυρίζεσθαι.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 247 C-D. εἰ γὰρ τι καὶ σμικρὸν ἐθέλουσι τῶν ὄντων συχωρεῖν ἀσώματον, ἔφακεν. τὸ γὰρ ἐπὶ

τε τοῖς αἰμα καὶ ἐν' ἑκείνοις ὅσα ἔχει σῶμα συμφύετα γινώσκει, εἰς δ' ἑλπίσας ἀμφότερα εἶναι λέγουσι, τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ῥητέον.

⁴ Plato, Sophist. p. 247 D-E. λέγω δὲ τὸ καὶ ὁποιαοῦν κεκτῆμένον δύναμιν, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν πεφυκὸς εἶτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ σμικρότερον ὅπῃ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, πᾶν εἰ μόνον εἰσάραξ, πᾶν τοῦτο ὄντως εἶναι· τίθεμαι γὰρ ὅρον ὁρίζων τὰ ὄντα, ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δυνάμιν.

⁵ Plato, Sophist. p. 248 A. τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους.

(he says) distinguish the generated, transitory and changeable—from Ens or the Real, which is eternal, unchanged, always the same: they distinguish generation from essence. With the generated (according to their doctrine) we hold communion through our bodies and our bodily perceptions: with Ens, we hold communion through our mind and our intellectual apprehension. But what do they mean (continues the Eleate) by this “holding of communion”? Is it not an action or a passion produced by a certain power of agent and patient coming into co-operation with each other? and is not this the definition which we just now laid down, of Ens or the Real.

No—these philosophers will reply—we do not admit your definition as a definition of Ens: it applies only to the generated. Generation does involve, or emanate from, a reciprocity of agent and patient: but neither power nor action, nor suffering, have any application to Ens or the Real. But you admit (says the Eleate) that the mind knows Ens:—and that Ens is known by the mind. Now this *knowing*, is it not an action—and is not the *being known*, a passion? If to *know* is an action, then Ens, being known, is acted upon, suffers something, or undergoes some change,—which would be impossible if we assume Ens to be eternally unchanged. These philosophers might reply, that they do not admit to *know* as an action, nor to *be known* as a passion. They affirm Ens to be eternally unchanged, and they hold to their other affirmation that Ens is known by the mind. But (urges the Eleate) can they really believe that Ens is eternally the same and unchanged,—that it has neither life, nor mind, nor intelligence, nor change, nor movement? This is incredible. They must concede that Change, and the Changeable, are to be reckoned as Entia or Realities: for if these be not so reckoned, and if all Entia are unchangeable, no Ens can be an object of knowledge to any mind. But though the changeable belongs to Ens, we must not affirm that *all* Ens is changeable. There cannot be either intellect or knowledge, without something constant and unchangeable. It is equally necessary to recognise

who distinguish Ens from the generated, and say that we hold communion with the former through our minds, with the latter, through our bodies and senses.

Holding communion—What? Implies Relativity. Ens is known by the mind. It therefore suffers—or undergoes change. Ens includes both the unchangeable and the changeable.

something as constant and unchangeable—something else as moving and changeable: Ens or reality includes alike one and the other. The true philosopher therefore cannot agree with those "Friends of Forms" who affirm all Ens or Reality to be at rest and unchangeable, either under one form or under many:—still less can he agree with those opposite reasoners, who maintain all reality to be in perpetual change and movement. He will acknowledge both and each—rest and motion—the constant and the changeable—as making up together total reality or Ens Totum.

Still, however, we have not got over our difficulties. Motion and Rest are contraries; yet we say that each and both are Realities or Entia. In what is it that they both agree? Not in moving, nor in being at rest, but simply in existence or reality. Existence or reality therefore must be a *tertium quid*, apart from motion and rest, not the sum total of those two items. Ens or the Real is not, in its own proper nature, either in motion or at rest, but is distinct from both. Yet how can this be? Surely, whatever is not in motion, must be at rest—whatever is not at rest, must be in motion. How can any thing be neither in motion nor at rest; standing apart from both?¹

Here the Eleate breaks off his enquiry, without solving the problems which he has accumulated. My purpose was (he says²) to show that Ens was just as full of difficulties and embarrassments as Non-Ens. Enough has been said to prove this clearly. When we can once get clear of obscurity about Ens, we may hope to be equally successful with Non-Ens.

Let us try (he proceeds) another path. We know that it is a common practice in our daily speech to apply many different predicates to one and the same subject. We say of the same man, that he is fair, tall, just, brave, &c., and several other epitheta. Some persons deny our right to do this. They say that the predicate ought always to be identical with

Motion and Rest are both of them Entia or Realities. Both agree in Ens. Ens is a *tertium quid*—distinct from both. But how can anything be distinct from both?

Here the Eleate breaks off without solution. He declares his purpose to show, That Ens is as full of puzzle as non-Ens.

Argument against those who admit no predication to be legitimate, except idem.

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 250 C.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 250 D.

the subject: that we can only employ with propriety such propositions as the following—man is man—good is good, &c.: that to apply many predicates to one and the same subject is to make one thing into many things.¹ But in reply to these opponents, as well as to those whom we have before combated, we shall put before them three alternatives, of which they must choose one. 1. Either all Forms admit of intercommunion one with the other. 2. Or no Forms admit of such intercommunion. 3. Or some Forms do admit of it, and others not. Between these three an option must be made.²

If we take the first alternative—that there is no intercommunion of Forms—then the Forms *motion* and *rest* can have no intercommunion with the Forms, *essence* or *reality*. In other words, neither motion nor rest exist: and thus the theory both of those who say that all things are in perpetual movement, and of those who say that all things are in perpetual rest, becomes unfounded and impossible. Besides, these very men, who deny all intercommunion of Forms, are obliged to admit it implicitly and involuntarily in their common forms of speech. They cannot carry on a conversation without it, and they thus serve as a perpetual refutation of their own doctrine.³

No intercommunion between any distinct Forms. Refuted. Common speech is inconsistent with this hypothesis.

The second alternative—that all Forms may enter into communion with each other—is also easily refuted. If this were true, motion and rest might be put together: motion would be at rest, and rest would be in motion—which is absurd. These and other forms are contrary to each other. They reciprocally exclude and repudiate all intercommunion.⁴

Reciprocal intercommunion of all Forms—inadmissible.

Remains only the third alternative—that some forms admit of intercommunion—others not. This is the real truth (says the Eleate). So it stands in regard to letters and words in language: some letters come together in words frequently and conveniently—others rarely and

Some Forms admit of intercommunion, others not. This is

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 251 B. ὡς ἀδύνατον τὰ τε πολλὰ ἐν καὶ τὸ ἐν πολλὰ εἶναι, &c.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 251 E.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 252 D.

⁴ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 252 E.

the only
admissible
doctrine.
Analogy of
letters and
syllables.

awkwardly — others never do nor ever can come together. The same with the combination of sounds to obtain music. It requires skill and art to determine which of these combinations are admissible.

Art and
skill are
required to
distinguish
what Forms
admit of
intercom-
munion, and
what Forms
do not. This
is the special
intelligence of the
Philosopher, who
lives in the
bright
region of
Ens: the
Sophist
lives in the
darkness of
Non-Ens.

So also, in regard to the intercommunion of Forms, skill and art are required to decide which of them will come together, and which will not. In every special art and profession the case is similar: the ignorant man will fail in deciding this question—the man of special skill alone will succeed.—So in regard to the intercommunion of Forms or Genera universally with each other, the comprehensive science of the true philosopher is required to decide.¹ To note and study these Forms, is the purpose of the philosopher in his dialectics or ratiocinative debate. He can trace the one Form or Idea, stretching through a great many separate particulars; he can distinguish it from all different Forms: he knows which Forms are not merely distinct from each other, but incapable of alliance and reciprocally repulsive—which of them

are capable of complete conjunction, the one circumscribing and comprehending the other—and which of them admit conjunction partial and occasional with each other.² The philosopher thus keeps close to the Form of eternal and unchangeable Ens or Reality—a region of such bright light that the eyes of the vulgar cannot clearly see him: while the Sophist on the other hand is also difficult to be seen, but for an opposite reason—from the darkness of that region of Non-Ens or Non-Reality wherein he carries on his routine-work.³

We have still to determine, however (continues Plato), what this Non-Ens or Non-Reality is. For this purpose we will take a survey, not of all the Forms or Genera, but of some few the most important. We will begin with the two before noticed — Motion and Rest

He comes
to enquire
what Non-
Ens is. He
takes for
examina-

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 253 B. ἄρ' οὐ μετ' ἐπιστήμης τινὸς ἀναγκαῖον διὰ τὸν λόγον πορεύεσθαι τὸν ὁρθῶς μέλλοντα διαφέρειν ποῖα ποιοῖς συμφωνεῖν τῶν γενῶν καὶ ποῖα ἄλληλα οὐ δεχεται;

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 253 D-E.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 254 A. ὅ ἔσθ

γὰ φιλόσοφος, τῇ τοῦ ὄντος αἰεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκαίμενος ἰδέει, διὰ τὸ λαμβάνειν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας οὐδεμιᾶς εὐπύτης ἀφ᾽ ὧν· τὰ γὰρ τῆς τῶν πολλῶν ψυχῆς ἁμαρτα καρτερεῖν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ἀφορῶντα εἰδέναι.

(= Change and Permanence), which are confessedly irreconcilable and reciprocally exclusive. Ens however enters into partnership with both: for both of them *are*, or exist.¹ This makes up three Forms or Genera—Motion, Rest, Ens: each of the three being the same with itself, and different from the other two. Here we have pronounced two new words—Same—Different.² Do these words designate two other Forms, over and above the three before-named, yet necessarily always intermingling in partnership with those three, so as to make five Forms in all? Or are these two—Same and Different—essential appendages of the three before-named? This last question must be answered in the negative. Same and Different are not essential appendages, or attached as parts, to Motion, Rest, Ens. Same and Different may be predicated both of Motion and of Rest: and whatever can be predicated alike of two contraries, cannot be an essential portion or appendage of either. Neither Motion nor Rest therefore *are* essentially either Same or Different: though both of them partake of Same or Different—*i.e.*, come into accidental co-partnership with one as well as the other.³ Neither can we say that Ens is identical with either Idem or Diversum. Not with Idem—for we speak of both Motion and Rest as Entia or Existences: but we cannot speak of them as the same. Not with Diversum—for *different* is a name relative to something else from which it is different, but Ens is not thus relative. Motion and Rest *are* or exist, each in itself: but each is *different*, relatively to the other, and to other things generally. Accordingly we have here five Forms or Genera—Ens, Motion, Rest, Idem, Diversum: each distinct from and independent of all the rest.⁴

This Form of Diversum or Different pervades all the others: for each one of them is different from the others, not through any thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form of Difference.⁵ Each of the five is different from others: or, to express the same fact

tion five
principal
Forms—
Motion—
Rest—Ens
—Same—
Different.

Form of
Diversum
—pervades
all the
others.

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 254 D. τὸ δὲ ἐστὶν ὅτι μὴ ἀμφοῖν ἐστὶν γὰρ ἀμφοῖν.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 254 E. τί ποτ' εἶναι οὕτως εἰρήκαμεν τὸ τε ταῦτον καὶ ἄτερον; πότερα δύο γένη τινὲς αὐτῶ, τῶν μὲν τριῶν ἄλλων, &c.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 255 B. μετέχοντων μὴν ἀμφοῖν ταύτου καὶ ἄτερου. Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ' εἶναι ταῦτον ἢ ἄτερον, μὴδ' εἰς ὁσάσιν.

⁴ Plato, Sophist. p. 255 D.

⁵ Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτὴν φήσομεν εἶναι

in other words, each of them *is not* any one of the others. Thus motion is different from rest, or *is not* rest: but nevertheless motion *is* or exists, because it partakes of the Form—Ens. Again, Motion is different from Idem: it *is not* the Same: yet nevertheless it *is* the same, because it partakes of the nature of Idem, or is the same with itself. Thus then both predications are true respecting motion: it *is* the same: it *is not* the same, because it partakes of or enters into partnership with both Idem and Diversum.¹ If motion in any way partook of Rest, we should be able to talk of stationary motion: but this is impossible: for we have already said that some Forms cannot come into intercommunion—that they absolutely exclude each other.

Again, Motion is different not only from Rest, and from Idem, but also from Diversum itself. In other words, it is both Diversum in a certain way, and also not Diversum: different and not different.² As it is different from Rest, from Idem, from Diversum—so also it is different from Ens, the remaining one of the five forms or genera. In other words Motion is not Ens, —or is Non-Ens. It is both Ens, and Non-Ens: Ens, so far as it partakes of Entity or Reality—Non-Ens, so far as it partakes of Difference, and is thus different from Ens as well as from the other Forms.³ The same may be said of the other Forms,—Rest, Idem, Diversum: each of them is Ens, because it partakes of entity or reality: each of them is also Non-Ens, or different from Ens, because it partakes of Difference. Moreover, Ens itself is different from the other four, and so far as these others go, it is Non-Ens.⁴

Now note the consequence (continues the Eleate). When we speak of Non-Ens, we do not mean any thing contrary to Ens, but only something different from Ens. When we call any thing *not great*, we do not affirm it

διακληθέντων (τὴν θατέρου φύσιν) ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων, οὐ δὲ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ιδέας τῆς θατέρου.

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 256 A. τὴν κίνησιν δὲ ταῦτόν τ' εἶναι καὶ μὴ ταῦτόν ὁμολογητέον καὶ οὐ δυσχεραντέον, &c.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 256 C. οὐχ ἕτερον ἂν ἐστὶ πρὶ καὶ ἕτερον κατὰ τὸν

οὐν δὲ λόγον.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 256 D. οὐκοῦν δὲ σαφές ἡ κίνησις ὅπως οὐκ ὂν ἐστὶ καὶ ὂν, ἐπεὶ περ τοῦ ὄντος μετέχει;

⁴ Plato, Sophist. p. 257 A. καὶ τὸ ὂν ἂν ἡμῖν, ὅσα περ ἔστιν τὰ ἄλλα, κατὰ τοσαῦτα οὐκ ἐστὶν· ἐκείνα γὰρ οὐκ ὂν ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ ἐστὶν, ἀπέραιστα δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν τὰ ἄλλα οὐκ ἐστὶν αὐτῷ.

to be the contrary of great, or to be *little*: for it may perhaps be simply equal: we only mean that it is different from great.¹ A negative proposition, generally, does not signify anything contrary to the predicate, but merely something else distinct or different from the predicate.² The Form of Different, though of one and the same general nature throughout, is distributed into many separate parts or specialties, according as it is attached to different things. Thus *not beautiful* is a special mode of the general Form or Genus Different, placed in antithesis with another Form or Genus, *the beautiful*. The antithesis is that of one Ens or Real thing against another Ens or Real thing: *not beautiful, not great, not just*, exist just as much and are quite as real, as *beautiful, great, just*. If the Different be a real Form or Genus, all its varieties must be real also. Accordingly Different from Ens is just as much a real Form as Ens itself:³ and this is what we mean by Non-Ens:—not any thing contrary to Ens.

contrary to Ens—we mean only something different from Ens. Non-Ens is a real Form, as well as Ens.

Here then the Eleate professes to have found what Non-Ens is: that it is a real substantive Form, numerable among the other Forms, and having a separate constant nature of its own, like *not beautiful, not great*:⁴ that it is real and existent, just as much as *Ens, beautiful, great, &c.* Disregarding the prohibition of Parmenides, we have shown (says he) not only that Non-Ens exists, but also what it is. Many Forms or Genera enter into partnership or communion with each other; and Non-Ens is the partnership between Ens and

The Eleate claims to have refuted Parmenides, and to have shown both that Non-Ens is a real Form, and also what it is.

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Ὅποταν τὸ μὴ ἐν λέγῳμεν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἕτερον μόνον. . . . Ὅλον ὅταν εἰπωμέν τι μὴ μέγα, τότε μᾶλλον τί σοι φαίνεται τὸ μικρὸν ἢ τὸ ἴσον ἐπλοῦν τῷ ῥήματι.

Plato here means to imply that τὸ μικρὸν is the real contrary of τὸ μέγα. When we say μὴ μέγα, we do not necessarily mean μικρὸν—we may mean ἴσον. Therefore τὸ μὴ μέγα does not (in his view) imply the contrary of μέγα.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 257 B. Οὐκ ἄρ' ἐναντίον, ὅταν ἀποφασίς λέγῃται, σημαίνειν συγχρησόμεθα, τοσούτου δὲ

μόνον, ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων τι μὴνέει τὸ μὴ καὶ τὸ οὐ προτιθέμενα τῶν ἐπιδόντων ὀνομάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ τῶν πραγμάτων περὶ ἧτ' ἂν κέηται τὰ ἐπιφθεγγόμενα ὑστερον τῆς ἀποφάσεως ὀνόματα.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B. ἡ τῆς θατέρου μορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένην ἀντίθεσιν οὐδὲν ἤττον, εἰ θέμις εἰπεῖν, αὐτοῦ τοῦ ὄντος οὐσία ἐστίν· οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῃ σημαίνουσα, ἀλλὰ τοσούτου μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

⁴ Plato, Sophist. p. 258 B-C. τὸ μὴ ὄν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον . . . ἐνάριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἐστίν.

Diversum. *Diversum*, in partnership with *Ens*, *is* (exists), in consequence of such partnership :—yet *it is not* that with which it is in partnership, but different therefrom—and being thus different from *Ens*, it is clearly and necessarily *Non-Ens* : while *Ens* also, by virtue of its partnership with *Diversum*, is different from all the other *Forms*, or *is not* any one of them, and to this extent therefore *Ens* is *Non-Ens*. We drop altogether the idea of contrariety, without enquiring whether it be reasonably justifiable or not : we attach ourselves entirely to the *Form*—*Different*.¹

Let those refute this explanation, who can do so (continues the Eleate), or let them propose a better of their own, if they can : if not, let them allow the foregoing as possible.² Let them not content themselves with multiplying apparent contradictions, by saying that the same may be in some particular respect different, and that the different may be in some particular respect the same, through this or the other accidental attribute.³ All these sophisms lead but to make us believe—That no one thing can be predicated of any other—

That there is no intercommunion of the distinct *Forms* one with another, no right to predicate of any subject a second name and the possession of a new attribute—That therefore there can be no dialectic debate or philosophy, which is all founded upon such intercommunion of *Forms*.⁴ We have shown that *Forms* do

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 258 E—259 A. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἐναντίον τινὸς αὐτῷ χαίρειν πάσαι λέγομεν, εἰς ἑστὶν εἶτε μὴ λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀλογον, &c. . . .

τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὼν τοῦ ὄντος ἔστι μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεξιν, οὐ μὲν ἕκαστο γὰρ οὐ μέτεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὅν ἐστι σαφίστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν, &c.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 259 A-C. ὁ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, ἢ πεισάτω τις ὡς οὐ καλῶς λέγομεν εἰλέξαι, ἢ μέτρι περ ἂν ἀδυνατῇ, λεκτικόν καὶ ἕκαστον καθάπερ ἡμεῖς λέγομεν . . . τὸ ταῦτα εἰσαγαγεῖν ὡς δυνατόν. . . .

The language of the Eleate here is altogether at variance with the spirit of Plato in his negative or Searching Dialogues. To say, as he does, "Either accept the explanation which I give, or propose a better of your own"—is

a dilemma which the Sokrates of the *Theætetus*, and other dialogues, would have declined altogether. The complaint here made by the Eleate, against disputants who did nothing but propound difficulties—is the same as that which the hearers of Sokrates made against him (see Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 20 A, where the remark is put into the mouth, not of an opponent, but of a respectful young listener); and many a reader of the Platonic *Parmenides* has indulged in the complaint.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 259 D. ἐκείνῳ καὶ κατ' ἕκαστο δὲ φησι τούτων πεποιθέναι πότερον.

⁴ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 259 B, E. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν ὁ λόγος γέγονεν ἡμῖν. 252 B: οἱ μὲν ἴσμεν κοινῶς παθήματος ἕτερον ἕτερον προσαγορεύειν.

really come into conjunction, so as to enable us to conjoin, truly and properly, predicate with subject, and to constitute proposition and judgment as taking place among the true Forms or Genera. Among these true Forms or Genera, Non-Ens is included as one.¹

The Eleate next proceeds to consider, whether these two Genera or Forms—Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, on the one hand, and Non-Ens on the other—are among those which may or do enter into partnership and conjunction with each other. For we have admitted that there are some Forms which cannot come into partnership; and the Sophist against whom we are reasoning, though we have driven him to concede that Non-Ens is a real Form, may still contend that it is one of those which cannot come into partnership with Proposition, Judgment, Opinion—and he may allege that we can neither embody in language, nor in mental judgment, that which is *not*.²

Enquiry, whether the Form of Non-Ens can come into inter-communion with the Forms of Proposition, Opinion, Judgment.

Let us look attentively what Proposition, Judgment, Opinion, are. As we said about Forms and letters, so about words: it is not every combination of words which is possible, so as to make up a significant proposition. A string of nouns alone will not make one, nor a string of verbs alone. To compose the simplest proposition, you must put together at least one noun and one verb, in order to signify something respecting things existing, or events past, present, and future.³ Now every proposition must be a proposition about something, or belonging to a certain subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality.⁴ *Theætétus is sitting down—Theætétus is flying.* Here are two propositions, both belonging to the same subject, but with opposite qualities: the former true, the latter false. The true proposition affirms respecting Theætétus real things as they are; the false proposition affirms respecting him things

Analysis of a Proposition. Every Proposition must have a noun and a verb—it must be proposition of something. False propositions, involve the Form of Non-Ens, in relation to the particular subject.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 260 A. πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῶν τῶν ὄντων ἐν τι γενῶν εἶναι. 268 B: τὸ μὴ ἐν βεβαίως ἐστὶ τῇ αὐτοῦ φύσει ἔχειν.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 260 C-D-E.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 261-262.

⁴ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 262 E. λόγον ἀπαρκέον, ὅταν περὶ τινος εἶναι λόγον· μὴ δὲ τινος ἀδύνατον . . . Οὐκοῦν καὶ ποῖόν τινα αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ;

different from real, or non-real, as being real. The attribute of *flying* is just as real in itself as the attribute of *sitting*: but as respects Theætétus, or as predicated concerning him, it is different from the reality, or non-real.¹ But still Theætétus is the subject of the proposition, though the predicate *flying* does not really belong to him: for there is no other subject than he, and without a subject the proposition would be no proposition at all. When therefore different things are affirmed as the same, or non-realities as realities, respecting you or any given subject, the proposition so affirming is false.²

As propositions may be true or false, so also opinion or judgment or conception, may be true or false: for opinion or judgment is only the concluding result of deliberation or reflection—and reflection is the silent dialogue of the mind with itself: while conception or phantasy is the coalescence or conjunction of opinion with present perception.³ Both opinion and conception are akin to proposition. It has thus been shown that false propositions, and false opinions or judgments, are perfectly real, and involve no contradiction: and that the Form or Genus—Proposition, Judgment, Opinion—comes properly and naturally into partnership with the Form Non-Ens.

This was the point which Plato's Eleate undertook to prove against Parmenides, and against the plea of the Sophist founded on the Parmenidean doctrine.

Here Plato closes his general philosophical discussion, and reverts to the process of logical division from which he had deviated. In descending the predicamental steps, to find the logical place of the Sophist, Plato had reached a point where he assumed Non-Ens, tc-

It thus appears that Falsehood, imitating Truth, is

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 263 B. Ὅτιον δὲ γὰρ ὅτι ἐπεὶ περὶ σοῦ.

That is, ἐπεὶ τὸν ὄντων,—being the explanation given by Plato of τὰ μὴ ὄντα.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 263 D.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 263-264. 264 A-B:

Οὐκοῦν ἐπειπερ λόγος ἀληθὲς ἦν καὶ ψευδὲς, τούτων δ' ἑκάστη διάθεσις μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν ψυχῆς διάλογος, δόξα δὲ διανοίας ἀποτελεστικῆς, φαίνεται δὲ ὁ λόγος (φαντασία) σύμμιζος αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τούτων τῷ λόγῳ συγγενῶν ὄντων ψευδὲς τε αὐτῶν εἶναι καὶ ἐπίστω εἶναι;

gether with false propositions and judgments affirming Non-Ens. To which the Sophist is conceived as replying, that Non-Ens was contradictory and impossible, and that no proposition could be false. On these points Plato has produced an elaborate argument intended to refute him, and to show that there was such a thing as falsehood imitating truth, or passing itself off as truth : accordingly, that there might be an art or profession engaged in producing such falsehood.

Now the imitative profession may be distributed into those who know what they imitate—and those who imitate without knowing.¹ The man who mimics your figure or voice, knows what he imitates : those who imitate the figure of justice and virtue often pass themselves off as knowing it, yet do not really know it, having nothing better than fancy or opinion concerning it. Of these latter again—(i.e. the imitators with mere opinion, but no knowledge, respecting that which they imitate)—there are two classes : one, those who sincerely mistake their own mere opinions for knowledge, and are falsely persuaded that they really know : the other class, those who by their perpetual occupation in talking, lead us to suspect and apprehend that they are conscious of not knowing things, which nevertheless they discuss before others as if they did know.²

Of this latter class, again, we may recognise two sections : those who impose upon a numerous audience by long discourses on public matters : and those who in private, by short question and answer, compel the person conversing with them to contradict himself.³ The man of long discourse is not the true statesman, but the popular orator : the man of short discourse, but without any real knowledge, is not the truly wise

theoretically possible, and that there may be a profession, like that of the Sophist, engaged in producing it.

Logical distribution of Imitators—those who imitate what they know, or what they do not know—of these last, some sincerely believe themselves to know, others are conscious that they do not know, and designedly impose upon others.

Last class divided—Those who impose on numerous auditors by long discourse, the Rhetor—Those who

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 267 A-D.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 268 A. τὸ δὲ θα-
τέρου σχῆμα, διὰ τὴν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
κυλινδρῶσιν, ἔχει πολλὴν ὑποψίαν καὶ
φόβον ὡς ἀγνοεῖ ταῦτα ἃ πρὸς τοῖς
ἄλλοις εἰς εἰδὴς ἰσχυμάσται.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 268 B. τὸν μὲν
δημοσίῃ τε καὶ μακροῖς λόγοις πρὸς πλῆθος
δυνατὸν εἰρωνεῖσθαι καθορᾶ· τὸν
δὲ ἰδίᾳ τε καὶ βραχείῳ λόγοις ἀναγκά-
ζοντα τὸν προσδιαλεγόμενον ἐναντιολο-
γεῖν αὐτὸν αὐτῷ.

impose on select auditors, by short question and answer, making the respondent contradict himself—the Sophist.

Dialogue closed. Remarks upon it. Characteristics ascribed to a Sophist.

man, since he has no real knowledge—but the imitator of the wise man, or Sophist.

We have here the conclusion of this abstruse and complicated dialogue, called *Sophistês*. It ends by setting forth, as the leading characteristics of the Sophist—that he deals in short question and answer so as to make the respondent contradict himself: That he talks with small circles of listeners, upon a large variety of subjects, on which he possesses no real knowledge: That he mystifies or imposes upon his auditors; not giving his own sincere convictions, but talking for the production of a special effect. He is *ἐναντιοποιολογικὸς* and *εἴρων*, to employ the two original Platonic words, neither of which is easy to translate.

I dare say that there were some acute and subtle disputants in Athens to whom these characteristics belonged, though we do not know them by name. But we know one to whom they certainly belonged: and that was, Sokrates himself. They stand manifest and prominent both in the Platonic and in the Xenophontic dialogues. The attribute which Xenophon directly predicates about him, that "in conversation he dealt with his interlocutors just as he pleased,"¹ is amply exemplified by Plato in the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Euthyphron*, *Lachês*, *Charmides*, *Lysias*, *Alkibiadês I. and II.*, *Hippias I. and II.*, &c. That he cross-examined and puzzled every one else without knowing the subjects on which he talked, better than they did—is his own declaration in the *Apology*. That the

¹ Xen. Memor. i. 2, 14, τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρώμενον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ὅπως βούλεται.

Compare, to the same purpose, i. 4, 1, where we are told that Sokrates employed his colloquial *Elenchus* as a means of chastising (κολαστηρίον ἔνεκεν) those who thought that they knew every thing; and the conversation of Sokrates with the youthful *Euthydêmus*, especially what is said by Xenophon at the close of it (iv. 4, 39-40).

The power of Sokrates to vanquish in dialogue the persons called *Sophists*, and to make them contradict themselves in answering—is clearly brought out, and doubtless intentionally brought out, in some of Plato's most consummate dialogues. *Alkibiades* says, in the *Platonic Protagoras* (p. 336), "Sokrates confesses himself no match for *Protagoras* in long speaking. If *Protagoras* on his side confesses himself inferior to Sokrates in dialogue, Sokrates is satisfied."

Athenians regarded him as a clever man mystifying them—talking without sincere persuasion, or in a manner so strange that you could not tell whether he was in jest or in earnest—overthrowing men's established convictions by subtleties which led to no positive truth—is also attested both by what he himself says in the *Apology*, and by other passages of Plato and Xenophon.¹

Moreover, if we examine not merely the special features assigned to the Sophist in the conclusion of the dialogue, but also those indicated in the earlier part of it, we shall find that many of them fit Sokrates as well as they could have fitted any one else. If the Sophists hunted after rich young men,² Sokrates did the same; seeking opportunities for conversation with them by assiduous frequentation of the palæstræ, as well as in other ways. We see this amply attested by Plato and Xenophon:³ we see farther that Sokrates announces

The conditions enumerated in the dialogue (except the taking of a fee) fit Sokrates better than any other known person.

¹ Plato, *Apolog.* p. 37 E. *εἰαν τε γὰρ λέγω, ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν, οὐ πείσεσθέ μοι εἰς εἰρωνομενίην.*

Xen. *Memor.* iv. 4, 9. *ἄρα κὶ γὰρ* (says Hippias to Sokrates), *ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων καταγελάτῃ, ἐρωτῶν καὶ ἐλέγχων πάντας, αὐτὸς δὲ οὐδενὶ θέλων ὑπέχειν λόγον, οὐδὲ γνῶμην ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ οὐδενός.* See also *Memorab.* iii. 5, 24.

Compare a striking passage in Plato's *Menon*, p. 80 A; also *Theæstet.* p. 149; and Plutarch, *Quæst. Platonic.* p. 1000.

The attribute *εἰρωνεία*, which Plato here declares as one of the main characteristics of the Sophists, is applied to Sokrates in a very special manner, not merely in the Platonic dialogues, but also by Timon in the fragments of his *Silli* remaining—*Ἀντὶ ἰακίῃς ἢ εὐθεσίᾳ εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους* (Plato, *Repub.* i. p. 337 A); and again—*προὔλεγον ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἐθέλεις, εἰρωνεύσοιο δὲ καὶ πᾶσι μάλλον ποιήσεις ἢ ἀποκρίνοιο, εἰ τις τί σε ἐρωτῇ.* So also in the *Symposium*, p. 216 E, Alkibiades says about Sokrates *εἰρωνευόμενος δὲ καὶ παῖσιν πάντα τὸν βίον πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους διατελεῖ.* And Gorgias, p. 439 E. In another part of the *Gorgias* (p. 481 B), Kallikles says, "Tell me, Chærophon, does Sokrates mean seriously

what he says, or is he bantering?" *σπουδάζει ταῦτα Σωκράτης ἢ παίζει;* Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias, &c., do not seem to have been *εἰρωνες* at all, as far as our scanty knowledge goes.

The words *εἰρων*, *εἰρωνικός*, *εἰρωνεία*, seem to include more than is implied in our words *irony*, *ironical*. Schleiermacher translates the words *ἀπλοῦν μιμήτην, εἰρωνικὸν μιμήτην*, at the end of the *Sophistês*, by "den ehrlichen, den Schlänen, Nachahmer"; which seems to me near the truth,—meaning one who either speaks what he does not think, or evades speaking what he does think, in order to serve some special purpose.

² Plato, *Sophist.* p. 223. *νῦν πλουν σίων καὶ ἐνδόξων θήρα.*

³ In the opening words of the Platonic *Protagoras*, we read as a question from the friend or companion of Sokrates, *Πρότερον, ὦ Σώκράτης, φαίνεις ἢ ἀπὸ κυνηγεσίου τοῦ περὶ τὴν Ἀλκιβιάδου ὥραν;*

See also the opening of the *Charmides*, *Lysis*, *Alkibiades I.*, and the speech of Alkibiades in the *Symposium*.

Compare also Xenophon, *Memorab.* iv. 2, 1-2-6, with the commencement of the Platonic *Protagoras*; in which the youth Hippiokrates, far from being run after by the Sophist Protagoras, is described as an enthusiastic admirer of

it as a propensity natural to him, and meritorious rather than otherwise. Again, the argumentative dialogue—disputation or eristic reduced to an art, and debating on the general theses of just and unjust, which Plato notes as characterising the Sophists¹—belonged in still higher perfection to Sokrates. It not only formed the business of his life, but is extolled by Plato elsewhere,² as the true walk of virtuous philosophy. But there was undoubtedly this difference between Sokrates and the Sophists, that he conversed and argued gratuitously, delighting in the process itself: while they both asked and received money for it. Upon this point, brought forward by Plato both directly and with his remarkable fertility in multiplying indirect allusions, the peculiarity of the Sophist is made mainly to turn. To ask or receive a fee for communicating knowledge, virtue, aptitude in debate, was in the view of Sokrates and Plato a grave enormity: a kind of simoniacal practice.³

We have seen also that Plato assigns to what he terms "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistic Art" (ἡ γένει γενναία σοφιστικὴ), the employment of the Elenchus, for the purpose of destroying, in the minds of others, that false persuasion of existing knowledge which was the radical impediment to their imbibing acquisitions of real knowledge from the teacher.⁴ Here Plato draws

The art which Plato calls "the thoroughbred and noble Sophistical Art" belongs to

that Sophist from reputation alone, and as eagerly soliciting Sokrates to present him to Protagoras (Protag. pp. 310-311).

¹ Plato, *Sophist*, p. 225 C. τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἐντεχνον καὶ περὶ δικαίων αὐτῶν καὶ ἀδικῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλων ἀμφισβητοῦν.

Spengel says truly—in his *Συναγωγὴ Τεχνῶν*, p. 40—"Quod si sermo et locus hic esset de Sophistarum doctrinā et philosophiā, odium quod nunc vulgo in eos vertunt, majore ex parte sine causā et ratione esse conceptum, eosque laude magis quam vituperatione dignos esse censendos—hand multa cum operā exponi posset. Sic, quo proceduntur convictio, juvenes non nisi magno pretio eruditos esse, levissimum est; immo hoc sophistas suae ipsorum scientiæ satis confisos esse neque eam despexisse, docet: et vitium, si modo vitium dicendum, commune est vel potius ortum optimis

lyricæ poeseos asseclis, Simonide, Pindaro, aliis."

² Plato, *Theætet.* p. 175 C.

³ It is to be remembered, however, that Plato, though doubtless exacting no fee, received presents from rich admirers like Dion and Dionysius; and there were various teachers who found presents more lucrative than fees. "M. Antonius Guipho fuisse dicitur ingeni magni, memoriæ singularis, nec minus Græcæ, quam Latine, doctus: præterea comi faciliusque naturā, nec unquam de mercedibus pactus—eosque plura ex liberalitate discipulorum consecutus." (Sueton. *De Illust. Grammat.* 7.)

⁴ Plato, *Sophist*, p. 230 D. πρὸς τὸν ἐλέγχον τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς ἀσχύναν καταστήσας, τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐπιποδίου δόξας ἐφελών, καθάρων ἀνοψήρη καὶ ταῦτα ἡγούμενον, ἅπερ εἶδεν εἰδέναι μόνον, πλεον δὲ μὴ.

a portrait not only strikingly resembling Sokrates, but resembling no one else. As far as we can make out, Sokrates stood alone in this original conception of the purpose of the Elenchus, and in his no less original manner of working it out. To prove to others that they knew nothing, is what he himself represents to be his mission from the Delphian oracle. Sokrates is a Sophist of the most genuine and noble stamp: others are Sophists, but of a more degenerate variety. Plato admits the analogy with reluctance, and seeks to attenuate it.¹ We may remark, however, that according to the characteristic of the true Sophist here given by Plato, Protagoras and Prodikus were less of Sophists than Sokrates. For though we know little of the two former, yet there is good reason to believe, That the method which they generally employed was, that of continuous and eloquent discourse, lecture, exhortation: that disputation by short question and answer was less usual with them, and was not their strong point: and that the Elenchus, in the Sokratic meaning, can hardly be said to have been used by them at all. Now Plato, in this dialogue, tells us that the true and genuine Sophist renounces the method of exhortation as unprofitable; or at least employs it only subject to the condition of having previously administered the Elenchus with success, as his own patent medicine.² Upon this definition, Sokrates is more truly a Sophist than either Protagoras or Prodikus: neither of whom, so far as we know, made it their business to drive the respondent to contradictions.

Again, Plato tells us that the Sophist is a person who disputes about all matters, and pretends to know all matters: respecting the invisible Gods, respecting the visible Gods, Sun, Moon, Stars, Earth, &c., respecting transcendental philosophy, generation and essence—and respecting all civil, social, and political questions—and respecting special arts. On all these miscellaneous topics, according to Plato, the Sophists pretended to be themselves instructed, and to qualify their disciples for arguing on all of them.

Sokrates and to no one else. The Elenchus was peculiar to him. Protagoras and Prodikus were not Sophists in this sense.

Universal knowledge —was professed at that time by all philosophers—Plato, Aristotle, &c.

¹ Plato, *Sophist* p. 231 C.

² Plato, *Sophist* p. 230 E.

Now it is possible that the Sophists of that day may have pretended to this species of universal knowledge; but most certainly Plato and Aristotle did the same. The dialogues of Plato embrace all that wide range of topics which he tells us that the Sophists argued about, and pretended to teach. In an age when the amount of positive knowledge was so slender, it was natural for a clever talker or writer to fancy that he knew every thing. In reference to every subject then discussed, an ingenious mind could readily supply deductions from both hypotheses—generalities ratiocinative or imaginative—strung together into an apparent order sufficient for the exigencies of hearers. There was no large range of books to be studied; no stock of facts or experience to be mastered. Every philosopher wove his own tissue of theory for himself, without any restraint upon his intellectual impulse, in regard to all the problems then afloat. What the theories of the Sophists were, we do not know: but Plato, author of the *Timæus*, *Republic*, *Leges*, *Kratylus*, *Menon*—who affirmed the pre-existence as well as post-existence of the mind, and the eternal self-existence of Ideas—has no fair ground for reproaching them with blamable rashness in the extent and diversity of topics which they presumed to discuss. They obtained indeed (he says justly) no truth or knowledge, but merely a fanciful semblance of knowledge—an equivocal show or imitation of reality.¹ But Plato himself obtains nothing more in the *Timæus*: and we shall find Aristotle pronouncing the like condemnation on the Platonic self-existent Ideas. If the Sophists professed to be encyclopedists, this was an error natural to the age; and was the character of Grecian philosophy generally, even in its most illustrious manifestations.

Having traced the Sophist down to the character of a man of delusion and imposture, passing off appearance as if it were reality, and falsehood as if it were truth—Plato

¹ Plato, *Sophistês*, p. 233 C. *ἡ σοφιστικὴν ἔρα τὰν περὶ πάντων ἐπιστήμην ὁ σοφιστὴς ἥμιν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀληθείαν ἔχειν ἀναγράφεται.* 234 B: *μυθήματα καὶ φαινόμενα τῶν ὄντων.*

When the Eleate here says about the Sophists (p. 233 B), *δοκοῦσι πρὸς τὰντα ἐπιστημονίως ἔχειν αὐτοὶ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἀντιλέγοντες*, this is exactly what Sokrates, in the Platonic *Apolog.*, tells

us about the impression made by his own dialectics or refutative conversation, Plato, *Apolog.* p. 23 A.

ἐκ ταύτης δὲ τῆς ἐξέτασεως πολλοὶ μὲν ἀνιχνεύει μοι γυγνέσθαι καὶ οὐαὶ χαλεπώτερον καὶ βαρύτερον, ὅσπερ πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἐκ αὐτῶν γυγνέσθαι, ὅσοι μὰ τὸ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι· εἰσὶν γὰρ μοι ἐκαστὸν οἱ παρόντες ταῦτ' εἶναι σοφὸν ἢ ἐν ἄλλων ἐξελέγξαι.

(as we have seen) suddenly turns round upon himself, and asks how such a character is possible. He represents the Sophist as maintaining that no man could speak falsely¹—that a false proposition was self-contradictory, inasmuch as Non-Ens was inconceivable and unutterable. I do not see how the argument which Plato here ascribes to the Sophist, can be reconciled with the character which he had before given of the Sophist—as a man who passed his life in disputation and controversy: which involves the perpetual arraigning of other men's opinions as false. A professed disputant may perhaps be accused of admitting nothing to be true: but he cannot well be charged with maintaining that nothing is false.

Plato's argument in the *Sophistês*. He says that the Sophist is a disputatious man, who challenges every one for speaking falsehood. He says also that the Sophist is one who maintains false propositions to be impossible.

To pass over this inconsistency, however—the reasoning of Plato himself on the subject of Non-Ens is an interesting relic of ancient speculation. He has made for himself an opportunity of canvassing, not only the doctrine of Parmenides, who emphatically denied Non-Ens—but also the opposite doctrine of other schools. He farther comments upon a different opinion, advanced by other philosophers—That no proposition can be admitted, in which the predicate is different from the subject: That no proposition is true or valid, except an identical proposition. You cannot say, Man is good: you can only say, Man is Man, or Good is good. You cannot say—Sokrates is good, brave, old, stout, flat-nosed, &c., because you thereby multiply the one Sokrates into many. One thing cannot be many, nor many things one.²

Reasoning of Plato about Non-Ens—No predications except identical.

This last opinion is said to have been held by Antisthenes, one of the disciples of Sokrates. We do not know how he explained or defended it, nor what reserves he may have admitted to qualify it. Plato takes no pains to inform us on this point. He treats the opinion with derision, as an absurdity. We may conceive it as one of the many errors arising from a misconception of the purpose and function of the copula in predication. Antisthenes

Misconception of the function of the copula in predication.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 240-241. Compare 260 E.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 251 B-C. Compare Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 14 C.

probably considered that the copula implied identity between the predicate and the subject. Now the explanation or definition of *man* is different from the explanation or definition of *good*: accordingly, if you say, *Man is good*, you predicate identity between two different things: as if you were to say *Two is Three*, or *Three is Four*. And if the predicates were multiplied, the contradiction became aggravated, because then you predicated identity not merely between one thing and another different thing, but between one thing and many different things. The opinion of Antisthenes depends upon two assumptions—That each separate word, whether used as subject or as predicate, denotes a Something separate and existent by itself: That the copula implies identity. Now the first of these two assumptions is not unfrequently admitted, even in the reasonings of Plato, Aristotle, and many others: while the latter is not more remarkable than various other erroneous conceptions which have been entertained, as to the function of the copula.

What is most important to observe is—That at the time which we are here discussing, there existed no such sciences as either grammar or formal logic. There was a copious and flexible language—a large body of literature, chiefly poetical—and great facility as well as felicity in the use of speech for the purposes of communication and persuasion. But no attempt had yet been made to analyse or theorise on speech: to distinguish between the different functions of words, and to throw them into suitable classes: to generalise the conditions of good or bad use of speech for proving a conclusion: or to draw up rules for grammar, syntax, and logic. Both Protagoras and Prodikus appear to have contributed something towards this object, and Plato gives various scattered remarks going still farther. But there was no regular body either of grammar or of formal logic: no established rules or principles to appeal to, no recognised teaching, on either topic. It was Aristotle who rendered the important service of filling up this gap. I shall touch hereafter upon the manner in which he proceeded: but the necessity of laying down a good theory of predication, and precepts respecting the employment of propositions in reasoning, is best shown by such misconceptions as this

No formal Grammar or Logic existed at that time. No analysis or classification of propositions before the works of Aristotle.

of Antisthenes ; which naturally arise among argumentative men yet untrained in the generalities of grammar and logic.

Plato announces his intention, in this portion of the *Sophistês*, to confute all these different schools of thinkers, to whom he has made allusion.¹ His first purpose, in reasoning against those who maintained Non-Ens to be an incogitable absurdity, is, to show that there are equal difficulties respecting Ens : that the Existent is just as equivocal and unintelligible as the Non-Existent. Those who recognise two co-ordinate and elementary principles (such as Hot and Cold) maintain that both are really existent, and call them both, *Entia*. Here (argues Plato) they contradict themselves : they call their two elementary principles *one*. What do they mean by existence, if this be not so ?

Plato's declared purpose in the *Sophistês*—To confute the various schools of thinkers—Antisthenes, Parmenides, the Materialists, &c.

Then again, Parmenides—and those who affirm that Ens Totum was essentially Unum, denying all plurality—had difficulties on their side to surmount. Ens could not be identical with Unum, nor was the name *Ens*, identical with the thing named Ens. Moreover, though Ens Unum was *Totum*, yet Totum was not identical with Ens or with Unum. *Totum* necessarily implied *partes* : but the *Unum per se* was indivisible or implied absence of parts. Though it was true therefore that Ens was both Unum and Totum, these two were both of them essentially different from Ens, and belonged to it only by way of adjunct accident. Parmenides was therefore wrong in saying that Unum alone existed.

The reasoning here given from Plato throws some light upon the doctrine just now cited from Antisthenes. You cannot say (argues Plato against the advocates of duality) that *two* elements (Hot and Cold) are both of them *Entia* or Existent, because by so doing you call them *one*. You cannot say (argues Antisthenes) that Sokrates is good, brave, old, &c., because by such speech you call one thing three. Again, in controverting the doctrine of Par-

Plato's refutation throws light upon the doctrine of Antisthenes.

¹ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 251 C.D. "ἵνα καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅσοις ἐμπροσθεν τοῖνυν πρὸς πάντας ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος διεiléγμεθα, τὰ νῦν ὡς ἐν ἐρωτῇσιν ἢ τοὺς πάποτε περὶ οὐσίας καὶ ὁτιοῦν λεχθῆσόμενα. . . . καὶ πρὸς τοὺς . . ."

menides, Plato urges, That Ens cannot be Unum, because it is Totum (Unum having no parts, while Totum has parts): but it may carry with it the accident Unum, or may have Unum applied to it as a predicate by accident. Here again, we have difficulties similar to those which perplexed Antisthenes. For the same reason that Plato will not admit, That Ens is Unum—Antisthenes will not admit, That Man is good. It appeared to him to imply essential identity between the predicate and the subject.

All these difficulties and others to which we shall come presently, noway peculiar to Antisthenes—attest the incomplete formal logic of the time: the want of a good theory respecting predication and the function of the copula.

Pursuing the purpose of establishing his conclusion (*vis.* That Plato's Ens involved as many perplexities as Non-Ens), Plato argument against the comes to the two opposite sects:—1. Those (the Materialists. Materialists) who recognised bodies and nothing else, as the real Entia or Existences. 2. Those (the Friends of Forms, the Idealists) who maintained that incorporeal and intelligible Forms or Species were the only real existences; and that bodies had no existence, but were in perpetual generation and destruction.¹

Respecting the first, Plato says that they must after all be ashamed not to admit, that justice, intelligence, &c., are something real, which may be present or absent in different individual men, and therefore must exist apart from all individuals. Yet justice and intelligence are not bodies. Existence therefore is something common to body and not-body. The characteristic mark of existence is, power or potentiality. Whatever has power to act upon any thing else, or to be acted on by any thing else, is a real Ens or existent something.²

Unfortunately we never know any thing about the opponents of Plato, nor how they would have answered his objection—except so much as he chooses to tell us. But it appears to me that the opponents whom he is here

Reply open
to the Mate-
rialists.

¹ Plato, *Sophist* p. 246 B.

² Plato, *Sophist* p. 247 D-E. λέγω δὴ τὸ καὶ ὁμοιωμένον καταμένον δύναμιν, εἴτ' εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁμοῦν πεφυκὸς εἴτ' εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ συμμέ-

ταρον ὁπὸ τοῦ φαυλοτάτου, καὶ εἰ μόνον εἰσάραξ, καὶ τούτῳ ὅπως εἶπαι· τὴν καὶ γὰρ ἔρον ὁρίξαι τὰ ὅντα, ὥς ἔστιν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν δύναμις.

confuting would have accepted his definition, and employed it for the support of their own opinion. "We recognise (they would say) just men, or hard bodies, as existent, because they conform to your definition: they have power to act and be acted upon. But justice, apart from just men—hardness, apart from hard bodies—has no such power: they neither act upon any thing, nor are acted on by any thing: therefore we do not recognise them as existent." According to their view, objects of perception acted on the mind, and therefore were to be recognised as existent: objects of mere conception did not act on the mind, and therefore had not the same claim to be ranked as existent: or at any rate they acted on the mind in a different way, which constitutes the difference between the real and unreal. Of this difference Plato's definition takes no account.¹

Plato now presents this same definition to the opposite class of philosophers: to the Idealists, or partisans of the incorporeal—or of self-existent and separate Forms. These thinkers drew a marked distinction between the Existent and the Generated—between *Ens* and *Fiens*—*τὸ ὂν* and *τὸ γυγνόμενον*. *Ens* or the Existent was eternal and unchangeable: *Fiens* or the Generated was always in change or transit, coming or going. We hold communion (they said) with the generated or transitory, through our bodies and sensible perceptions: we hold communion with unchangeable *Ens* through our mind and by intellection. They did not admit the definition of existence just given by Plato. They contended that that definition applied only to *Fiens* or to the sensible world—not to *Ens* or the intelligible world.² *Fiens* had power to act and be acted upon, and existed only under the condition of being so: that is, its existence was only temporary, conditional, relative: it had no permanent or absolute existence at all. *Ens* was the real existent, absolute and independent—neither acting upon any thing nor being acted upon. They considered that Plato's definition was not a definition of Existence, or the Absolute: but rather of Non-Existence, or the Relative.

Plato's
argument
against the
Idealists
or Friends
of Forms.
Their point
of view
against him.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 247 E. *τὸ καὶ ὁποῖαν οὖν κεκτῆμένον δύναμιν, &c.*

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 248 C.

But (asks Plato in reply) what do you mean by "the mind holding communion" with the intelligible world? You mean that the mind knows, comprehends, conceives, the intelligible world: or in other words, that the intelligible world (*Ens*) is known, is comprehended, is conceived, by the mind. To be known or conceived, is to be acted on by the mind.¹ *Ens*, or the intelligible world, is thus acted upon by the mind, and has a power to be so acted upon: which power is, in Plato's definition here given, the characteristic mark of existence. Plato thus makes good his definition as applying to *Ens*, the world of intelligible Forms—not less than to *Fiens*, the world of sensible phenomena.

The definition of *existence*, here given by Plato, and the way in which he employs it against the two different sects of philosophers—Materialists and Idealists—deserves some remark.

According to the Idealists or Immaterialists, Plato's definition of existence would be supposed to establish the case of their opponents the Materialists, who recognised nothing as existing except the sensible world: for Plato's definition (as the Idealists thought) fitted the sensible world, but fitted nothing else. Now these Idealists did not recognise the sensible world as existent at all. They considered it merely as *Fiens*, ever appearing and vanishing. The only *Existent*, in their view, was the intelligible world—Form or Forms, absolute, eternal, unchangeable, but neither visible nor perceivable by any of the other senses. This is the opinion against which Plato *here* reasons, though in various other dialogues he gives it as his own opinion, or at least, as the opinion of his representative spokesman.

In this portion of the present dialogue (*Sophistês*) the point which he makes is, to show to the Idealists, or Absolutists, that their Forms are not really absolute, or independent of the mind: that the existence of these forms is relative, just as much as that of the sensible world. The sensible world exists relatively to our senses, really or potentially exercised: the intelligible world

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 248 D. εἰ προσ- γινώσκειν ἢ γινώσκεισθαι φερεῖ ποῖμα ἢ μολογοῦσι τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν γινώσκειν, τὴν δὲ οὐσίαν γινώσκεισθαι . . . τί δέ; τὸ

exists relatively to our intelligence, really or potentially exercised. In both cases alike, we hold communion with the two worlds: the communion cannot be left out of sight, either in the one case or in the other. The communion is the entire and fundamental fact, of which the Subject conceiving and the Object conceived, form the two opposite but inseparable faces—the concave and convex, to employ a favourite illustration of Aristotle. Subject conceiving, in communion with Object conceived, are one and the same indivisible fact, looked at on different sides. This is, in substance, what Plato urges against those philosophers who asserted the absolute and independent existence of intelligible Forms. Such forms (he says) exist only in communion with, or relatively to, an intelligent mind: they are not absolute, not independent: they are Objects of intelligence to an intelligent Subject, but they are nothing without the Subject, just as the Subject is nothing without them or some other Object. Object of intelligence implies an intelligent Subject: Object of sense implies a sentient Subject. Thus Objects of intelligence, and Objects of sense, exist alike relatively to a Subject—not absolutely or independently.

This argument, then, of Plato against the Idealists is an argument against the Absolute—showing that there can be no Object of intelligence or conception without its obverse side, the intelligent or concipient Subject. The Idealists held, that by soaring above the sensible world into the intelligible world, they got out of the region of the Relative into that of the Absolute. But Plato reminds them that this is not the fact. Their intelligible world is relative, not less than the sensible; that is, it exists only in communion with a mind or Subject, but with a Cogitant or intelligent Subject, not a percipient Subject.

The argument of Plato goes to an entire denial of the Absolute, and a full establishment of the Relative.

The argument here urged by Plato coincides in its drift and result with the dictum of Protagoras—Man is the measure of all things. In my remarks on the *Theætétus*,¹ I endeavoured to make it appear that the Protagorean dictum was really a negation of the Absolute, of the Thing in itself, of the Object without a Sub-

Coincidence of his argument with the doctrine of Protagoras in the *Theætétus*.

¹ See my notice of the *Theætétus*, where I have adverted to Plato's reasoning in the *Sophistés*.

ject:—and an affirmation of the Relative, of the Thing in communion with a percipient or concipient mind, of Object implicated with Subject—as two aspects or sides of one and the same conception or cognition. Though Plato in the *Theætétus* argued at length against Protagoras, yet his reasoning here in the *Sophistès* establishes by implication the conclusion of Protagoras. Here Plato impugns the doctrine of those who (like Sokrates in his own *Theætétus*) held that the sensible world alone was relative, but that the intelligible world or Forms were absolute. He shows that the latter were no less relative to a mind than the former; and that mind, either percipient or cogitant, could never be eliminated from “communion” with them.

These same Idealist philosophers also maintained—That Forms, or the intelligible world, were eternally the same and unchangeable. Plato here affirms that this opinion is not true: he contends that the intelligible world includes both change and unchangeableness, motion and rest, difference and sameness, life, mind, intelligence, &c. He argues that the intelligible world, whether assumed as consisting of one Form or of many Forms, could not be regarded either as wholly changeable or wholly unchangeable: it must comprise both constituents alike. If all were changeable, or if all were unchangeable, there could be no Object of knowledge; and, by consequence, no knowledge.¹ But the fact that there is knowledge (cognition, conception), is the fundamental fact from which we must reason; and any conclusion which contradicts this must be untrue. Therefore the intelligible world is not all homogeneous, but contains different and even opposite Forms—change and unchangeableness—motion and rest—different and same.²

Let us now look at Plato's argument, and his definition of existence, as they bear upon the doctrine of the opposing Materialist philosophers, whom he states to have held that bodies alone existed, and that the incorporeal did not exist:—in other words that all real existence was concrete and particular: that the abstract

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 249 B. *ἐνυμναίνει δ' οὐδ' ἀκινήτων τε ὅτιων οὐδὲν κίνησι καὶ κινήσει εἶναι μὴ δυνατόν.*

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 249 C.

(universals, forms, attributes) had no real existence, certainly no separate existence. As I before remarked, it is not quite clear what or how much these philosophers denied. But as far as we can gather from Plato's language, what they denied was, the existence of attributes *apart from* a substance. They did not deny the existence of just and wise men, but the existence of justice and wisdom, apart from men real or supposable.

In the time of Plato, distinction between the two classes of words, Concrete and Abstract, had not become so clearly matter of reflection as to be noted by two appropriate terms: in fact, logical terminology was yet in its first rudiments. It is therefore the less matter of wonder that Plato should not here advert to the relation between the two, or to the different sense in which existence might properly be predicable of both. He agrees with the materialists or friends of the Concrete, in affirming that sensible objects, Man, Horse, Tree, exist (which the Idealists or friends of the Abstract denied): but he differs from them by saying that other Objects, super-sensible and merely intelligible, exist also — namely, Justice, Virtue, Whiteness, Hardness, and other Forms or Attributes. He admits that these last-mentioned objects do not make themselves manifest to the senses; but they do make themselves manifest to the intelligence or the conception: and that is sufficient, in his opinion, to authenticate them as existent. The word *existent*, according to his definition (as given in this dialogue), includes not only all that is or may be perceived, but also all that is or may be known by the mind; i.e., understood, conceived, imagined, talked or reasoned about. Existent, or Ens, is thus made purely relative: having its root in a Subject, but ramifying by its branches in every direction. It bears the widest possible sense, co-extensive with *Object* universally, either of perception or conception. It includes all fictions, as well as all (commonly called) realities. The conceivable and the existent become equivalent.

Now the friends of the Concrete, against whom Plato reasons, used the word *existent* in a narrower sense, as comprising only the concretes of the sensible world. They probably admitted the existence of the abstract,

Difference
between
Concrete
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conspicu-
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meaning
here given
by Plato to
Ens—com-
prehending
not only
Objects of
Perception,
but Objects
of Concep-
tion besides.

Narrower
meaning
given by
Materialists

to Ens—
they in-
cluded only
Objects of
Perception.
Their rea-
soning as
opposed to
Plato.

along with and particularised in the concrete: but they certainly denied the *separate* existence of the Abstract—i.e., of Forms, Attributes, or classes, apart from particulars. They would not deny that many things were conceivable, more or less dissimilar from the realities of the sensible world: but they did not admit that all those conceivable things ought to be termed existent or realities, and put upon the same footing as the sensible world. They used the word *existent* to distinguish between Men, Horses, Trees, on the one hand—and Cyclopes, Centaurs, Τραγέλαφοι, &c., on the other. A Centaur is just as intelligible and conceivable as either a man or a horse; and according to this definition of Plato, would be as much entitled to be called really existent. The attributes of *man* and *horse* are real, because the objects themselves are real and perceivable: the class *man* and the class *horse* is real, for the same reason: but the attributes of a Centaur, and the class Centaurs, are not real, because no individuals possessing the attributes, or belonging to the class, have ever been perceived, or authenticated by induction. Plato's Materialist opponents would here have urged, that if he used the word *existent* or Ens in so wide a sense, comprehending all that is conceivable or nameable, fiction as well as reality—they would require some other words to distinguish fiction from reality—Centaur from Man: which is what most men mean when they speak of one thing as non-existent, another thing as existent. At any rate, here is an equivocal sense of the word Ens—a wider and a narrower sense—which we shall find frequently perplexing us in the ancient metaphysics; and which, when sifted, will often prove, that what appears to be a difference of doctrine, is in reality little more than a difference of phraseology.¹

¹ Plato here aspires to deliver one definition of Ens, applying to all cases. The contrast between him and Aristotle is shown in the more cautious procedure of the latter, who entirely renounces the possibility of giving any one definition fitting all cases. Aristotle declares Ens to be an equivocal word (ἀμύνημον), and discriminates several different significations which it bears: all these significations having nevertheless an analogical affinity,

more or less remote, with each other. See Aristot. *Metaphys.* Δ. 1017, a. 7, seq.; vi. 1028, a. 10.

It is declared by Aristotle to be the question first and most disputed in *Philosophia Prima*, Quid est Ens? καὶ ὅθ' καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τοῦτο ἐστὶν, τίς ἢ οὐσία (p. 1028, b. 2). Compare, B. 1001, a. 6, 31.

This subject is well treated by Brentano, in his Dissertation Ueber

This enquiry respecting Ens is left by Plato professedly unsettled; according to his very frequent practice. He pretends only to have brought it to this point: that Ens or the Existent is shown to present as many difficulties and perplexities as Non-Ens or the non-existent.¹ I do not think that he has shown thus much; for, according to his definition, Non-Ens is an impossibility: the term is absolutely unmeaning: it is equivalent to the Unknowable or Inconceivable—as Parmenides affirmed it to be. But he has undoubtedly shown that Ens is in itself perplexing: which, instead of lightening the difficulties about Non-Ens, aggravates them: for all the difficulties about Ens must be solved, before you can pretend to understand Non-Ens. Plato has shown that Ens is used in three different meanings:—

Different definitions of Ens—by Plato—the Materialists, the Idealists.

1. According to the Materialists, it means only the concrete and particular, including all the attributes thereof, essential and accidental.

2. According to the Idealists or friends of Forms, it means only Universals, Forms, and Attributes.

3. According to Plato's own definition here given, it means both the one and the other: whatever the mind can either perceive or conceive: whatever can act upon the mind in any way, or for any time however short. It is therefore wholly relative to the mind: yet not exclusively to the *perceiving* mind (as the Materialists said), nor exclusively to the *conceiving* mind (as the friends of Forms said): but to both alike.

Here is much confusion, partly real but principally verbal, about Ens. Plato proceeds to affirm, that the difficulty about Non-Ens is no greater, and that it admits of being elucidated. The higher Genera or Forms (he says) are such that some of them will combine or enter into communion with each other, wholly or partially, others will not,

Plato's views about Non-Ens examined.

die Bedeutung des Seienden im Aristoteles. See pp. 49-50 seq., of that work.

Aristotle observes truly, that these most general terms are the most convenient hiding-places for equivocal meaning (Anal. Post. II. 97, b. 29).

The analogical varieties of Ens or

Essence are graduated, according to Aristotle: Complete, Proper, typical, *civis*, stands at the head: there are then other varieties more or less approaching to this proper type: some of them which *μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἔχει τοῦ ἔννομου*. (Metaphys. vi. 1029, b. 9.)

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 250 E.

but are reciprocally exclusive. Motion and Rest will not enter into communion, but mutually exclude each other: neither of them can be predicated of the other. But each or both of them will enter into communion with Existence, which latter may be predicated of both. Here are three Genera or Forms: motion, rest, and existence. Each of them is the *same* with itself, and *different* from the other two. Thus we have two new distinct Forms or Genera—*Same* and *Different*—which enter into communion with the preceding three, but are in themselves distinct from them.¹ Accordingly you may say, motion *partakes* of (or enters into communion with) Diversum, because motion differs from rest: also you may say, motion *partakes* of Idem, as being identical with itself: but you cannot say, motion *is* different, motion *is* the same; because the subject and the predicate are essentially distinct and not identical.²

Some things are always named or spoken of *per se*, others with reference to something else. Thus, Diversum is always different from something else: it is relative, implying a correlate.³ In

¹ In the *Timæus* (pp. 35-36-37), Plato declares these three elements—*ταύτων, θάτερον, οὐσία*—to be the three constituent elements of the cosmical soul, and of the human rational soul.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 255 B.

Μετέχον μὴν ἄμφω (κίνησις καὶ στάσις) ταύτων καὶ θάτερον. . . .

Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν κίνησιν γ' εἶναι ταύτων ἢ θάτερον, μὴδ' αὖ στάσιν. He had before said—*Ἄλλ' οὐ τι μὴ κίνησις γε καὶ στάσις οὐθ' ἕτερον οὔτε ταύτων ἐστίν* (p. 255 A).

Plato here says, It is true that κίνησις μετέχει ταύτων, but it is not true that κίνησις ἐστὶ ταύτων. Again, p. 259 A. τὸ μὲν ἕτερον μετασχὼν τοῦ ὅτιος ἐστὶ μὲν διὰ ταύτην τὴν μέθεσιν, οὐ μὴν ἐκείνῳ γε οὐ μετέσχει ἄλλ' ἕτερον. He understands, therefore, that ἐστὶ, when used as copula, implies identity between the predicate and the subject.

This is the same point of view from which Antisthenes looked, when he denied the propriety of saying ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἀγαθός—ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ κακός: and when he admitted only identical propositions, such as ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος—ἀγαθός ἐστὶν ἀγαθός. He assumed that ἐστὶ, when intervening between the subject and

the predicate, implies identity between them; and the same assumption is made by Plato in the passage now before us. Whether Antisthenes would have allowed the proposition—ἄνθρωπος μετέχει κακίας, or other propositions in which ἐστὶ does not appear as copula, we do not know enough of his opinions to say.

Compare Aristotle. *Physic.* i. 2, 185, b. 27, with the Scholia of Simplicius, p. 390, a. 331, b. 18-23, ed. Brandis.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 256 C-D. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτά, τὰ δὲ πρὸς ἄλλα ἀεὶ λέγεσθαι. . . . Τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον. . . . Νῦν δὲ ἀτεχνῶς ἡμῖν δ, τι περ ἂν ἕτερον ᾗ, συμβέβηκεν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕτερον τοῦτο ὧπερ ἐστὶν εἶναι. These last words partly anticipate Aristotle's explanation of τὰ πρὸς τι (*Categor.* p. 6, a. 38).

Here we have, for the first time so far as I know (certainly anterior to Aristotle), names *relative* and names *non-relative*, distinguished as classes, and contrasted with each other. It is to be observed that Plato here uses λέγεσθαι and εἶναι as equivalent; which is not very consistent with the sense which he assigns to ἐστὶν in predication: see the note immediately preceding.

this, as well as in other points, Diversum (or Different) is a distinct Form, Genus, or Idea, which runs through all other things whatever. Each thing is different from every other thing: but it differs from them, not through any thing in its own nature, but because it partakes of the Form or Idea of Diversum or the Different.¹ So, in like manner, the Form or Idea of Idem (or Same) runs through all other things: since each thing is both different from all others, and is also the same with itself.

Now motion is altogether different from rest. Motion therefore *is not* rest. Yet still motion *is*, because it partakes of existence or Ens. Accordingly, motion both *is*, and *is not*.

His review
of the select
Five Forms.

Again, motion is different from Idem or the Same. It is therefore *not the same*. Yet still motion *is the same*; because every thing partakes of identity, or is the same with itself. Motion therefore both *is* the same and *is not* the same. We must not scruple to advance both these propositions. Each of them stands on its own separate ground.² So also motion is different from Diversum or The Different; in other words, it *is not* different, yet still it *is* different. And, lastly, motion is different from Ens, in other words, *it is not Ens*, or is non-Ens: yet still *it is Ens*, because it partakes of existence. Hence motion is both Ens, and Non-Ens.

Here we arrive at Plato's explanation of Non-Ens, τὸ μὴ ὂν: the main problem which he is now setting to himself. Non-Ens is equivalent to, *different from Ens*. It is the Form or Idea of Diversum, considered in reference to Ens. Every thing is Ens, or partakes of entity, or existence. Every thing also is different from Ens, or partakes of difference in relation to Ens: it is thus Non-Ens. Every thing therefore is at the same time both Ens, and Non-Ens. Nay, Ens itself, inasmuch as it is different from all other things, is Non-Ens in reference to them. It is Ens only as one, in reference to itself: but it is Non-Ens an infinite number of times, in reference to all other things.³

When we say Non-Ens, therefore (continues Plato), we do not

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 255 E. πέμπτον ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λαττόν ἐν τοῖς εἰδοσιν οὖσαν, ἐν οἷς προαιρούμεθα . . . καὶ διὰ πάντων γε αὐτὴν αὐτῶν φήσομεν εἶναι διαληλυθυῖαν· ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ

φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου.

² Plato, Sophist. pp. 255-256.

³ Plato, Sophist. pp. 256-257.

Plato's doctrine—That Non-Ens is nothing more than different from Ens. mean any thing *contrary* to Ens, but merely something *different from* Ens. When we say *Not-great*, we do not mean any thing contrary to Great, but only something different from great. The negative generally, when annexed to any name, does not designate any thing contrary to what is meant by that name, but something different from it. The general nature or Form of difference is disseminated into a multitude of different parts or varieties according to the number of different things with which it is brought into communion: *Not-great*, *Not-just*, &c., are specific varieties of this general nature, and are just as much realities as *great*, *just*. And thus Non-Ens is just as much a reality as Ens being not contrary, but only that variety of the general nature of difference which corresponds to Ens. *Non-Ens*, *Not-great*, *Not-just*, &c., are each of them permanent Forms, among the many other Forms or Entia, having each a true and distinct nature of its own.¹

I say nothing about contrariety (concludes Plato), or about any thing contrary to Ens; nor will I determine whether Non-Ens in this sense be rationally possible or not. What I mean by Non-Ens is a particular case under the general doctrine of the communion or combination of Forms: the combination of Ens with Diversum, composing that which is different from Ens, and which is therefore Non-Ens. Thus Ens itself, being different from all other Forms, is Non-Ens in reference to them all, or an indefinite number of times² (i.e. an indefinite number of negative predications may be made concerning it).

Non-Ens being thus shown to be one among the many other Forms, disseminated among all the others, and entering into communion with Ens among the rest—we have next to enquire whether it enters into communion with the Form of Opinion and Discourse. It is the communion of the two which constitutes false opinion and false proposition: if therefore such communion be possible, false opinion and false proposition are possible, which is the point that Plato is trying to prove.³

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 258 C. ὅτι τὸ μὴ ἐν βεβαιότητι ἐστὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ φύσιν ἔχον . . . οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐν κατὰ ταῦτόν τε καὶ ἐστὶν μὴ ἐν, ἐνέριθμον τῶν πολλῶν ὄντων εἶδος ἐν. ἡμεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν ἑναντίον τινος αὐτῶ (τῷ ὄντι) χαίρουσιν πάσαι λέγοντες, εἴ τι ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ λόγον ἔχον ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἀλογον· ὃ δὲ νῦν εἰρήκαμεν εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἐν, &c.

² Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 258 E—259 A.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 260 B.

Now it has been already stated (continues Plato) that some Forms or Genera admit of communion with each other, others do not. In like manner some words admit of communion with each other—not others. Those alone admit of communion, which, when put together, make up a proposition significant or giving information respecting Essence or Existence. The smallest proposition must have a noun and a verb put together: the noun indicating the agent, the verb indicating the act. Every proposition must be a proposition concerning something, or must have a logical subject: every proposition must also be of a certain quality. Let us take (he proceeds) two simple propositions: *Theætétus is sitting down—Theætétus is flying.*¹ Of both these two, the subject is the same: but the first is true, the second is false. The first gives things existing as they are, respecting the subject: the second gives respecting the subject, things different from those existing, or in other words things non-existent, as if they did exist.² A false proposition is that which gives things different as if they were the same, and things non-existent as if they were existent, respecting the subject.³

Communion of Non-Ens with proposition—possible and explicable.

The foregoing is Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. Before we remark upon it, let us examine his mode of analysing a proposition. He conceives the proposition as consisting of a noun and a verb. The noun marks the logical *subject*, but he has no technical word equivalent to *subject*: his phrase is, that a proposition must be of something or concerning something. Then again, he not only has no word to designate the predicate, but he does not even seem to conceive the predicate as distinct and separable: it stands along with the copula embodied in the verb. The two essentials of a proposition, as he states them, are—That it should have a certain subject—That it should be of a certain quality,

Imperfect analysis of a proposition—Plato does not recognise the predicate.

¹ Plato, Sophist. p. 263 A. Θεαίτητος καθήκει . . . Θεαίτητος πέτεται.

² Plato, Sophist. p. 263 B. λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν (τῶν λόγων of the two propositions) ὁ μὲν ἀληθὲς τὰ ὄντα, ὡς ἐστὶ περὶ σοῦ . . . Ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὲς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων . . . Τὰ μὴ ὄντ' ἀρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει . . . Ὅντων δὲ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ. Πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμεν ὄντα περὶ ἑκάστου εἶναί πον, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 263 D. Περὶ δὲ σοῦ λεγόμενα μέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ, καὶ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα, παντάνασι, ὡς εἴκεν, ἢ τοιαύτη σύνθεσις ἐκ τε ῥημάτων γιγνομένη καὶ ὀνομάτων ὄντως τε καὶ ἀληθῶς γίνεσθαι λόγος ψευδής.

It is plain that this explanation takes no account of negative propositions: it applies only to affirmative propositions.

true or false.¹ This conception is just, as far as it goes : but it does not state all which ought to be known about proposition, and it marks an undeveloped logical analysis. It indicates moreover that Plato, not yet conceiving the predicate as a distinct constituent, had not yet conceived the copula as such : and therefore that the substantive verb *εἶναι* had not yet been understood by him in its function of pure and simple copula. The idea that the substantive verb when used in a proposition must mark *existence* or *essence*, is sufficiently apparent in several of his reasonings.

I shall now say a few words on Plato's explanation of Non-Ens. It is given at considerable length, and was, in the judgment of Schleiermacher, eminently satisfactory to Plato himself. Some of Plato's expressions² lead me to suspect that his satisfaction was not thus unqualified : but whether he was himself satisfied or not, I cannot think that the explanation ought to satisfy others.

Plato here lays down the position—That the word *Not* signifies nothing more than difference, with respect to that other word to which it is attached. It does not signify (he says) what is contrary ; but simply what is different. *Not-great*, *Not-beautiful*—mean what is different from great or beautiful : Non-Ens means, not what is contrary to Ens, but simply what is different from Ens.

First, then, even if we admit that Non-Ens has this latter meaning and nothing beyond—yet when we turn to Plato's own definition of Ens, we shall find it so all-comprehensive, that there can be absolutely nothing different from Ens :—these last words can have no place and no meaning. Plato defines Ens so as to include all that is knowable, conceivable, thinkable.³ One portion of this total differs from another : but there can be nothing which differs from it all. The Form or nature of Diversum (to

¹ Since the time of Aristotle, the quality of a proposition has been understood to designate its being either affirmative or negative : that being formal, or belonging to its form only. Whether affirmative or negative, it may be true or false : and this is doubtless a quality, but belonging to its matter, not

to its form. Plato seems to have taken no account of the formal distinction, negative or affirmative.

² Plato, *Sophistês*, p. 259 A-B. Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Sophistes*, vol. iv. p. 134, of his translation of Plato.

³ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 247-248.

use Plato's phrase) as it is among the knowable or conceivable, is already included in the total of Ens, and comes into communion (according to the Platonic phraseology) with one portion of that total as against another portion. But with Ens as a whole, it cannot come into communion, for there is nothing apart from Ens. Whenever we try to think of any thing apart from Ens, we do by the act of thought include it in Ens, as defined by Plato. *Different from great*—*different from white* (i.e. not great, not white, sensu Platónico) is very intelligible: but *Different from Ens*, is not intelligible: there is nothing except the inconceivable and incomprehensible: the words professing to describe it, are mere unmeaning sound. Now this is just¹ what Parmenides said about Non-Ens. Plato's definition of Ens appears to me to make out the case of Parmenides about Non-Ens; and to render the Platonic explanation—*different from Ens*—open to quite as many difficulties, as those which attach to Non-Ens in the ordinary sense.

Secondly, there is an objection still graver against Plato's explanation. When he resolves negation into an affirmation of something different from what is denied, he effaces or puts out of sight one of the capital distinctions of logic. What he says is indeed perfectly true: *Not-great*, *Not-beautiful*, *Non-Ens*, are respectively different from *great*, *beautiful*, *Ens*. But this, though true, is only a part of the truth; leaving unsaid another portion of the truth which, while equally essential, is at the same time special and characteristic. The negative not only differs from the affirmative, but has such peculiar meaning of its own, as to exclude the affirmative: both cannot be true together. *Not-great* is certainly different from *great*: so also, *white*, *hard*, *rough*, *just*, *valiant*, &c., are all different from *great*. But there is nothing in these latter epithets to exclude the co-existence of *great*. *Theætétus is great*—*Theætétus is white*: in the second of these two propositions I affirm something respecting Theætétus quite different from what I affirm in the first, yet nevertheless noway excluding what is affirmed in the first.² The two propositions may both

¹ Compare Kratylus, 430 A.

² Proklus, in his Commentary on the Parmenidés (p. 281, p. 785, Stallbaum), says, with reference to the doctrine laid down by Plato in the Sophistés, δλως

γὰρ αἱ ἀποφάνσεις ἔργοναί εἰσι τῆς ἐτεροτήτος τῆς νοεράς· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ οὐχ ἴππος, ὅτι ἕτερον—καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὐκ ἄνθρωπος, ὅτι ἄλλο.

Proklus here adopts and repeats

be true. But when I say—*Theættus is dead*—*Theættus is not dead*: here are two propositions which cannot both be true, from the very form of the words. To explain *not-great*, as Plato does, by saying that it means *only* something different from great,¹ is to suppress this peculiar meaning and virtue of the negative, whereby it simply excludes the affirmative, without affirming any thing in its place. Plato is right in saying that *not-great* does not affirm the *contrary* of great, by which he means *little*. The negative does not affirm any thing: it simply denies. Plato seems to consider the negative as a species of affirmative:² only affirming something different from what is affirmed by the term which it accompanies. Not-Great, Not-Beautiful, Not-Just—he declares to be Forms just as real and distinct as Great, Beautiful, Just: only different from these latter. This, in my opinion, is a conception logically erroneous. Negative stands opposed to affirmative, as one of the modes of distributing both terms and propositions. A purely negative term cannot stand alone in the subject of a proposition: *Non-Entis nulla sunt prædicata*—was

Plato's erroneous idea of the negative proposition and its function. When I deny that Caius is just, wise, &c., my denial does not intimate simply that I know him to be something *different* from just, wise; for he may have fifty *different* attributes, co-existent and consistent with justice and wisdom.

To employ the language of Aristotle (see a pertinent example, *Physic.* i. 8, 191, b. 15, where he distinguishes τὸ μὴ ὄν καθ' αὐτὸ from τὸ μὴ ὄν κατὰ συμβεβηκός), we may say that it is not of the essence of the Different to deny or exclude that from which it is different: the Different may deny or exclude, but that is only by *accident*—κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Plato includes, in the essence of the Different, that which belongs to it only by accident.

Aristotle in more than one place distinguishes διαφορά from ἐναντιώσεις—not always in the same language. In *Metaphysic.* I. p. 1065 a. 33, he considers that the root of all ἐναντιώσεις is εἶς; and ὁρμήσεις, understood in the widest sense, i. e. affirmative and negative. See Bonitz, not. ad loc., and Waits, ad *Categor.* p. 12, a. 26. The last portion of the treatise Περὶ Ἑρμηνείας was interpreted by Syrianus with a view to uphold Plato's opinion

here given in the *Sophistes* (Schol. ad Aristot. p. 136, a. 15 Brandis).

¹ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 258 B. οὐκ ἐναντίον ἐκείνῃ σημαίνονσα, ἀλλὰ τὸ σούτων μόνον, ἕτερον ἐκείνου.

If we look to the *Euthydēmus*, we shall see that this confusion between what is different from A, and what is incompatible with or exclusive of A, is one of the fallacies which Plato puts into the mouth of the two Sophists Euthydēmus and Dionysodōrus, whom he exhibits and exposes in that dialogue. "Ἄλλο τι οὖν ἕτερος, ἢ δ' ὅς (Dionysodōrus), ὡς λίθου, οὐ λίθος εἰ; καὶ ἕτερος ὡς χρυσοῦ, οὐ χρυσοῦς εἰ; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ Χαιρέδημος, εἴη, ἕτερος ὡς πατρός, οὐκ ἂν πατὴρ εἴη; (Plat. *Euthydem.* p. 298 A).

² Plato, *Sophist.* p. 257 B.

³ Plato, *Sophist.* pp. 257 E, 258 A.

Ὅντος δὲ πρὸς ἐναντίας, ὡς δοκ', εἶναι ἐμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν. . . .

Ὅμοιος ἄρα τὸ μὴ μέγα, καὶ τὸ μέγα αὐτὸ εἶναι λεκτέον.

Plato distinctly recognises here Forms or Ideas τῶν ἀνοράστων, which the Platonists professed not to do, according to Aristotle, *Metaphys.* A. 990, b. 13—see the instructive *Schol.* of Alexander, p. 665, a. Brandis.

the scholastic maxim. The apparent exceptions to this rule arise only from the fact, that many terms negative in their form have taken on an affirmative signification.

The view which Plato here takes of the negative deserves the greater notice, because, if it were adopted, what is called the maxim of contradiction would be divested of its universality. Given a significant proposition with the same subject and the same predicate, each taken in one and the same signification—its affirmative and its negative cannot both be true. But if by the negative, you mean to make a new affirmation, different from that contained in the affirmative—the maxim just stated cannot be broadly maintained as of universal application: it may or may not be valid, as the case happens to stand. The second affirmation may be, as a matter of fact, incompatible with the first: but this is not to be presumed, from the mere fact that it is different from the first: proof must be given of such incompatibility.

Plato's view of the negative is erroneous. Logical maxim of contradiction.

We may illustrate this remark by looking at the two propositions which Plato gives as examples of true and false. *Theætétus is sitting down—Theætétus is flying.* Both the examples are of affirmative propositions: and it seems clear that Plato, in all this reasoning, took no account of negative propositions: those which simply deny, affirming nothing. The second of these propositions (says Plato) affirms *what is not*, as if it were, respecting the subject. But how do we know this to be so? In the form of the second proposition there is nothing to show it: there is no negation of any thing, but simply affirmation of a different positive attribute. Although it happens, in this particular case, that the two attributes are incompatible, and that the affirmation of the one includes the negation of the other—yet there is nothing in the form of either proposition to deny the other:—no formal incompatibility between them. Both are alike affirmative, with the same subject, but different predicates. These two propositions therefore do not serve to illustrate the real nature of the negative, which consists precisely in this formal incompatibility. The proper negative belonging to the proposition—*Theætétus is sitting down*—would be, *Theætétus is not sitting down*. Plato ought to maintain, if he followed out his previous

Examination of the illustrative propositions chosen by Plato—How do we know that one is true, the other false.

argument, that Not-Sitting down is as good a Form as Sitting-down, and that it meant merely—Different from Sitting down. But instead of doing this Plato gives us a new affirmative proposition, which, besides what it affirms, conceals an implied negation of the first proposition. This does not serve to illustrate the purpose of his reasoning—which was to set up the formal negative as a new substantive attribute, different from its corresponding affirmative. As between the two, the maxim of contradiction applies: both cannot be true. But as between the two propositions given in Plato, that maxim has no application: they are two propositions with the same subject, but different predicates; which happen in this case to be, the one true, the other false—but which are not formally incompatible. The second is not false because it differs from the first; it has no essential connection with the first, and would be equally false, even if the first were false also.

The function of the negative is to deny. Now denial is not a species of affirmation, but the reversal or antithesis of affirmation: it nullifies a belief previously entertained, or excludes one which might otherwise be entertained,—but it affirms nothing. In particular cases, indeed, the denial of one thing may be tantamount to the affirmation of another: for a man may know that there are only two suppositions possible, and that to shut out the one is to admit the other. But this is an inference drawn in virtue of previous knowledge possessed and contributed by himself: another man without such knowledge would not draw the same inference, nor could he learn it from the negative proposition *per se*. Such then is the genuine meaning of the negative; from which Plato departs, when he tells us that the negative is a kind of affirmation, only affirming something different—and when he illustrates it by producing two affirmative propositions respecting the same subject, affirming different attributes, the one as matter of fact incompatible with the other.

But how do we know that the first proposition—*Theætétus is sitting down*—affirms what is:—and that the second proposition—*Theætétus is flying*—affirms what is not? If present, our senses testify to us the truth of the first, and the falsehood of the second: if absent, we have the testimony of a witness, combined with our own past experience

Necessity of
accepting
the evidence
of sense.

attesting the frequency of facts analogous to the one, and the non-occurrence of facts analogous to the other. When we make the distinction, then,—we assume that what is attested by sense or by comparisons and inductions from the facts of sense, is real, or *is*: and that what is merely conceived or imagined, without the attestation of sense (either directly or by way of induction), is not real, or *is not*. Upon this assumption Plato himself must proceed, when he takes it for granted, as a matter of course, that the first proposition is true, and the second false. But he forgets that this assumption contradicts the definition which, in this same dialogue,¹ he had himself given of *Ens*—of the real or *the thing that is*. His definition was so comprehensive, as to include not only all that could be seen or felt, but also all that had capacity to be known or conceived by the mind: and he speaks very harshly of those who admit the reality of things perceived, but refuse to admit equal reality to things only conceived. Proceeding then upon this definition, we can allow no distinction as to truth or falsehood between the two propositions—*Theætétus is sitting down*—*Theætétus is flying*: the predicate of the second affirms *what is*, just as much as the predicate of the first: for it affirms something which, though neither perceived nor perceivable by sense, is distinctly conceivable and conceived by the mind. When Plato takes for granted the distinction between the two, that the first affirms *what is*, and the second *what is not*—he unconsciously slides into that very recognition of the testimony of sense (in other words, of fact and experience), as the certificate of reality, which he had so severely denounced in the opposing materialist philosophers: and upon the ground of which he thought himself entitled, not merely to correct them as mistaken, but to reprove them as wicked and impudent.²

I have thus reviewed a long discussion—terminating in a conclusion which appears to me unsatisfactory—of the meaning and function of the negative. I hardly think that Plato would have given such an explanation of it, if he had had the opportunity of studying the *Organon* of Aristotle. Prior to Aristotle, the principles and distinctions of formal logic were hardly

Errors of Antisthenes—depended partly on the imperfect formal logic of that day.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. pp. 247 D-E, 248 D-E.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 246 D.

at all developed; nor can we wonder that others at that time fell into various errors which Plato scornfully derides, but very imperfectly rectifies. For example, Antisthenes did not admit the propriety of any predication, except identical, or at most essential, predication: the word *ἔστω* appeared to him incompatible with any other. But we perceive in this dialogue, that Plato also did not conceive the substantive verb as performing the simple function of copula in predication: on the contrary he distinguishes *ἔστω*, as marking identity between subject and predicate—from *μετέχει*, as marking accidental communion between the two. Again, there were men in Plato's day who maintained that Non-Ens (*τὸ μὴ ὂν*) was inconceivable and impossible. Plato, in refuting these philosophers, gives a definition of Ens (*τὸ ὂν*), which puts them in the right—fails in stating what the true negative is—and substitutes, in place of simple denial, a second affirmation to overlay and supplant the first.

To complete the examination of this doctrine of the Sophists, respecting Non-Ens, we must compare it with the doctrine on the same subject laid down in other Platonic dialogues. It will be found to contradict, very distinctly, the opinion assigned by Plato to Sokrates both in the *Theætétus* and in the fifth Book of the *Republic*:¹ where Sokrates deals with Non-Ens in its usual

¹ Plato, *Republic*, v. pp. 477-478. *Theætét.* pp. 188-189. *Parmenidés*, pp. 160 C, 163 C. *Euthydémus*, p. 284 B-C.

Aristotle (*De Interpretat.* p. 21, a. 32) briefly expresses his dissent from an opinion, the same as what is given in the Platonic *Sophistés*—that *τὸ μὴ ὂν* is *ὂν τι*. He makes no mention of Plato, but Ammonius in the *Scholias* alludes to Plato (p. 129, b. 20, *Schol. Bekk.*).

We must note that the Eleates in the *Sophistés* states both opinions respecting *τὸ μὴ ὂν*: first that which he refutes—next that which he advances. The *Scholias* may, therefore, refer to both opinions, as stated in the *Sophistés*, though one of them is stated only for the purpose of being refuted.

We may contrast with these views of Plato (in the *Sophistés*) respecting *τὸ μὴ ὂν*, as not being a negation *τῶν ὄντων*, but simply a something *τίποτι* *τῶν ὄντων* the different views of Ari-

stotle about *τὸ μὴ ὂν*, set forth in the instructive Commentary of M. Ravaisson, *Essai sur la Métaphysique d'Aristote*, p. 360.

"Le non-être s'oppose à l'être, comme sa négation: ce n'est donc pas, non plus que l'être, une chose simple; et autant il y a de genres de l'être, autant il faut que le non-être ait de genres. Cependant l'opposition de l'être et du non-être, différente, en réalité, dans chacune des catégories, est la même dans toutes par sa forme. Dans cette forme, le second terme n'exprime pas autre chose que l'absence du premier. Le rapport de l'être et du non-être consiste donc dans une pure contradiction: dernière forme à laquelle toute opposition doit se ramener."

Aristotle seems to allude to the *Sophistés*, though not mentioning it by its title, in three passages of the *Metaphysica*—E. 1026, b. 14; K. 1064, b. 29; N. 1069, a. 6 (see the note of Bonitz on the latter passage)—perhaps

sense as the negation of Ens: laying down the position that Non-Ens can be neither the object of the cognizing Mind, nor the object of the opining (*δοξάζων*) or cogitant Mind: that it is uncognizable and incogitable, correlating only with Non-Cognition or Ignorance. Now we find that this doctrine (of Sokrates, in *Theætétus* and *Republic*) is the very same as that which is affirmed, in the *Sophistês*, to be taken up by the delusive Sophist: the same as that which the Eleate spends much ingenuity in trying to refute, by proving that Non-Ens is not the negation of Ens, but only that which differs from Ens, being itself a particular variety of Ens. It is also the same doctrine as is declared, both by the Eleate in the *Sophistês* and by Sokrates in the *Theætétus*, to imply as an undeniable consequence, that the falsehood of any proposition is impossible. "A false proposition is that which speaks the thing that is not (*τὸ μὴ ὄν*). But this is an impossibility. You can neither know, nor think, nor speak, the thing that is not. You cannot know without knowing something: you cannot speak without speaking something (i. e. something that is)." Of this consequence—which is expressly announced as included in the doctrine, both by the Eleate in the *Sophistês* and by the Platonic Sokrates in the *Theætétus*—no notice is taken in the *Republic*.¹

also elsewhere (see Ueberweg, pp. 153-154). Plato replied in one way, Leukippus and Demokritus in another, to the doctrine of Parmenides, who banished Non-Ens as incogitable. Leukippus maintained that Non-Ens was equivalent to *τὸ κενόν*, and that the two elements of things were *τὸ πᾶν* and *τὸ κενόν*, for which he used the expressions *ὄν* and *οὐδέν*. Plato replied as we read in the *Sophistês*: thus both he and Leukippus tried in different ways to demonstrate a positive nature and existence for Non-Ens. See Aristot. *Metaph.* A. 936, b. 4, with the Scholia, p. 536, Brandis. The Scholiast cites Plato *ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ*, which seems a mistake for *ἐν τῇ Σοφιστικῇ*.

¹ Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 264-265) is upon this point more satisfactory than the other Platonic commentators. He points out—not only without disguise, but even with emphasis—the discrepancies and contradictions between the doctrines

ascribed to the Eleate in the *Sophistês*, and those ascribed to Sokrates in the *Republic*, *Phædon*, and other Platonic dialogues. These are the main premisses upon which Socher rests his inference, that the *Sophistês* is not the composition of Plato. I do not admit his inference: but the premisses, as matters of fact, appear to me undeniable. Stallbaum, in his *Proleg.* to the *Sophistês*, p. 40 seq., attempts to explain away these discrepancies—in my opinion his remarks are obscure and unsatisfactory. Various other commentators, also holding the *Sophistês* to be a genuine work of Plato, overlook or extenuate these premisses, which they consider unfavourable to that conclusion. Thus Alkinous, in his *Eisagōgē*, sets down the explanation of *τὸ μὴ ὄν* which is given in the *Sophistês*, as if it were the true and Platonic explanation, not adverting to what is said in the *Republic* and elsewhere (Alkin. c. 35, p. 129 in the *Appendix Platonica* annexed to the

Again, the doctrine maintained by the Eleate in the *Sophistês* respecting *Ens*, as well as respecting *Ideas* or *Forms*, is in other ways inconsistent with what is laid down in other Platonic dialogues. The Eleate in the *Sophistês* undertakes to refute two different classes of opponents; first, the *Materialists*, of whom he speaks with derision and antipathy—secondly, others of very opposite doctrines, whom he denominates the *Friends of Ideas* or *Forms*, speaking of them in terms of great respect. Now by these *Friends of Forms* or *Ideas*, Schleiermacher conjectures that Plato intends to denote the *Megaric philosophers*. M. Cousin, and most other critics (except Ritter), have taken up this opinion. But to me it seems that Socher is right in declaring the doctrine, ascribed to these *Friends of Ideas*, to be the very same as that which is laid down by Plato himself in other important dialogues—*Republic*, *Timæus*, *Phædon*, *Phædrus*, *Kratylus*, &c.—and which is generally understood as that of the *Platonic Ideas*.¹ In all these dialogues, the capital contrast and antithesis

edition of Plato by K. F. Hermann). The like appears in the *Προλεγόμενα τῆς Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίας*: c. 21, p. 215 of the same edition. Proklus, in his Commentary on the *Parmenidês*, speaks in much the same manner about τὸ μὴ ὂν—considering the doctrine advanced and defended by the Eleate in the *Sophistês*, to represent the opinion of Plato (p. 785 ed. Stallbaum; see also the Commentary of Proklus on the *Timæus*, b. iii. p. 188 E, 448 ed. Schneid.). So likewise Simplicius and the commentators on Aristotle, appear to consider it—see Schol. ad Aristotel. *Physica*, p. 332, a. 8, p. 333, b., 334, a., 343, a. 5. It is plain from these Scholia that the commentators were much embarrassed in explaining τὸ μὴ ὂν. They take the *Sophistês* as if it delivered Plato's decisive opinion upon that point (Porphyry compares what Plato says in the *Timæus*, but not what he says in the *Republic* or in *Theætétus*, p. 333, b. 25); and I think that they accommodate Plato to Aristotle, in such manner as to obscure the real antithesis which Plato insists upon in the *Sophistês*—I mean the antithesis according to which Plato excludes what is *ἐναντίον τοῦ ὄντος*, and admits only what is *ἑτερον τοῦ ὄντος*.

Ritter gives an account (*Gesch. der Philos.* part ii. pp. 288-299) of Plato's

doctrine in the *Sophistês* respecting *Non-Ens*; but by no means an adequate account. K. F. Hermann also omits (*Geschichte und System der Platonischen Philos.* pp. 504-505-507) to notice the discrepancy between the doctrine of the *Sophistês*, and the doctrine of the *Republic*, and *Theætétus*, respecting τὸ μὴ ὂν—though he pronounces elsewhere that the *Republic* is among the most indisputably positive of all Plato's compositions (p. 536).

¹ Socher, p. 266; Schleiermacher, *Einleitung zum Sophistes*, p. 134; Cousin, *Œuvres de Platon*, vol. xi. 517, notes.

Schleiermacher gives this as little more than a conjecture; and distinctly admits that any man may easily suppose the doctrine ascribed to these *Friends of Forms* to be Plato's own doctrine—"Nicht zu verwundern wäre es, wenn Mancher auf den Gedanken käme, Platon meinte hier sich selbst und seine eigene Lehre," &c.

But most of the subsequent critics have taken up Schleiermacher's conjecture (that the *Megarici* are intended), as if it were something proved and indubitable.

It is curious that while Schleiermacher thinks that the opinions of the *Megaric philosophers* are impugned and refuted in the *Sophistês*, Socher fancies that the dialogue was composed by a *Megaric*

is that between Ens or Entia on one side, and Fientia (the transient, ever generated and ever perishing), on the other: between the eternal, unchangeable, archetypal Forms or Ideas—and the ever-changing flux of particulars, wherein approximative likeness of these archetypes is imperfectly manifested. Now it is exactly this antithesis which the Friends of Forms in the Sophistês are represented as upholding, and which the Eleate undertakes to refute.¹ We shall find Aristotle, over and over again, impugning the total separation or demarcation between Ens and Fientia (*εἶδη—γένεσις—χωριστά*), both as the characteristic dogma, and the untenable dogma, of the Platonic philosophy: it is exactly the same issue which the Eleate in the Sophistês takes with the Friends of Forms. He proves that Ens is just as full of perplexity, and just as difficult to understand, as Non-Ens:² whereas, in the other Platonic dialogues, Ens is

philosopher, not by Plato. Ueberweg (*Aechtheit der Platon. Schr.* pp. 275-277) points out as explicitly as Socher, the discrepancy between the Sophistês and several other Platonic dialogues, in respect to what is said about Forms or Ideas. But he draws a different inference: he infers from it a great change in Plato's own opinion, and he considers that the Sophistês is later in its date of composition than those other dialogues which it contradicts. I think this opinion about the late composition of the Sophistês, is not improbable; but the premisses are not sufficient to prove it.

My view of the Platonic Sophistês differs from the elaborate criticism on it given by Steinhart (*Einleitung zum Soph.* p. 417 seq.) Moreover, there is one assertion in that *Einleitung* which I read with great surprise. Steinhart not only holds it for certain that the Sophistês was composed after the Parmenides, but also affirms that it solves the difficulties propounded in the Parmenides—discusses the points of difficulty "in the best possible way" ("in der wünschenswerthesten Weise" (pp. 470-471).

I confess I cannot find that the difficulties started in the Parmenides are even noticed, much less solved, in the Sophistês. And Steinhart himself tells us that the Parmenides places us in a circle both of persons and doctrines entirely different from those of the Sophistês (p. 472). It is plain also

that the other Platonic commentators do not agree with Steinhart in finding the Sophistês a key to the Parmenides: for most of them (Ast, Hermann, Zeller, Stallbaum, Brandis, &c.) consider the Parmenides to have been composed at a later date than the Sophistês (as Steinhart himself intimates; compare his *Einleitung zum Parmenides*, p. 312 seq.). Ueberweg, the most recent enquirer (posterior to Steinhart), regards the Parmenides as the latest of all Plato's compositions—if indeed it be genuine, of which he rather doubts. (*Aechtheit der Platon. Schrift.* pp. 182-183.)

M. Mallet (*Histoire de l'École de Megare*, *Introd.* pp. xl-lviii., Paris, 1845) differs from all the three opinions of Schleiermacher, Ritter, and Socher. He thinks that the philosophers, designated as Friends of Forms, are intended for the Pythagoreans. His reasons do not satisfy me.

¹ Plato, *Sophist.* pp. 246 B, 248 B. The same opinion is advanced by Sokrates in the *Republic*, v. p. 479 B-C. *Phædon*, pp. 78-79. Compare *Sophist.* p. 248 C with *Symposium*, p. 211 B. In the former passage, *τὸ πάσχειν* is affirmed of the Ideas: in the latter passage, *τὸ πάσχειν μηδέν*.

² Plato, *Sophist.* p. 245 E. Yet he afterwards talks of *τὸ λαμπρὸν τοῦ ὄντος* ἀεὶ as contrasted with *τὸ σκοτεινὸν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος*, p. 254 A, which seems not consistent.

constantly spoken of as if it were plain and intelligible. In fact, he breaks down the barrier between Ens and Fientia, by including motion, change, the moving or variable, among the world of Entia.¹ Motion or Change belongs to Fieri; and if it be held to belong to Esse also (by recognising a Form or Idea of Motion or Change, as in the Sophistês), the antithesis between the two, which is so distinctly declared in other Platonic dialogues, disappears.²

If we examine the reasoning of the Eleate, in the Sophistês, against the persons whom he calls the Friends of Forms, we shall see that these latter are not Parmenideans only, but also Plato himself in the Phædon, Republic, and elsewhere. We shall also see that the ground, taken up by the Eleate, is much the same as that which was afterwards taken up by Aristotle against the Platonic Ideas. Plato, in most of his dialogues, declares Ideas, Forms, Entia, to be eternal substances distinct and apart from the flux and movement of particulars: yet he also declares, nevertheless, that particulars have a certain communion or participation with the Ideas, and are discriminated and denominated according to such participation. Aristotle controverts both these doctrines:

The persons whom Plato here attacks as Friends of Forms are those who held the same doctrines as Plato himself espouses, in Phædon, Republic, &c.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 249 B. "Ipse ideas per se simplices sunt et immutabiles: sunt æternæ, ac semper fuerunt ab omni liberæ mutatione," says Stallbaum ad *Platon. Republ.* v. p. 476; see also his *Prolegg.* to the *Parmenidês*, pp. 39-40. This is the way in which the Platonic Ideas are presented in the *Timeus*, *Republic*, *Phædon*, &c., and the way in which they are conceived by the εἰδὼν φίλοι in the *Sophistês*, whom the Eleate seeks to confute.

Zeller's chapter on Plato seems to me to represent not so much what we read in the separate dialogues, as the attempt of an able and ingenious man to bring out something like a consistent and intelligible doctrine which will do credit to Plato, and to soften down all the inconsistencies (see *Philos. der Griech.* vol. ii. pp. 394-415-429 ed. 2nd).

² See a striking passage about the unchangeableness of Forms or Ideas

in the *Kratylus*, p. 439 D-E; also *Philêbus*, p. 15.

In the *Parmenidês* (p. 132 D) the supposition τὰ εἶδη ἐστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει is one of those set up by Sokrates and impugned by Parmenides. Nevertheless in an earlier passage of that dialogue Sokrates is made to include κίνησις and στάσις among the εἶδη (p. 129 E). It will be found, however, that when Parmenides comes to question Sokrates, What εἶδη do you recognise? attributes and subjects only (the latter with hesitation) are included: no such thing as actions, processes, events—τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν (p. 130). In *Republic*. vii. 529 D, we find mention made of τὸ ἐν τάχει and ἡ οὐρα βραδύτης, which implies κίνησις as among the εἶδη. In *Theætêt.* pp. 152 D, 156 A, κίνησις is noted as the constituent and characteristic of Fieri—τὸ γινώμενον—which belongs to the domain of sensible perception, as distinguished from permanent and unchangeable Ens.

first, the essential separation of the two, which he declares to be untrue: next, the participation or coming together of the two separate elements—which he declares to be an unmeaning fiction or poetical metaphor, introduced in order to elude the consequences of the original fallacy.¹ He maintains that the two (Entia and Fientia—Universals and Particulars) have no reality except in conjunction and implication together; though they are separable by reason (λόγῳ χωριστὰ—τῷ εἶναι, χωριστὰ) or abstraction, and though we may reason about them apart, and must often reason about them apart.² Now it is this implication and conjunction of the Universal with its particulars, which is the doctrine of the Sophistēs, and which distinguishes it from other Platonic dialogues, wherein the Universal is transcendentalized—lodged in a separate world from particulars. No science or intelligence is possible (says the Eleate in the Sophistēs) either upon the theory of those who pronounce all Ens to be constant and unchangeable, or upon that of those who declare all Ens to be fluent and variable. We must recognise both together, the constant and the variable, as equally real and as making up the totality of Ens.³ This result, though not stated in the language which Aristotle would have employed, coincides very nearly with the Aristotelian doctrine, in one of the main points on which Aristotle distinguishes his own teaching from that of his master.

That the Eleate in the Sophistēs recedes from the Platonic point of view and approaches towards the Aristotelian, will be seen also if we look at the lesson of logic which he gives to Theætētus. In his analysis of a proposition—and in discriminating such conjunctions of

The Sophistēs recedes from the Platonic point of view, and

¹ Aristot. Metaphys. A. 991-992.

² Aristot. Metaph. vi. 1038, a-b. The Scholion of Alexander here (p. 763, b. 36, Brandis) is clearer than Aristotle himself. Τὸ προκείμενόν ἐστι δειξαι ὡς οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου οὐσία ἐστιν· οὔτε γὰρ ὁ καθόλου ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ καθόλου ἵππος, οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ἀλλ' ἕκαστον αὐτῶν διανοίας ἀπέμαψις ἐστιν ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα καὶ πρώτως καὶ μέγιστα λεγομένων οὐσιῶν καὶ ὁμοιωμάτων.

³ Plato, Sophist. p. 249 C-D. Τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ καὶ ταῦτα μέγιστα τιμῶνται πάσα ἀνάγκη διὰ ταῦτα μήτε τῶν ἐν ἡ

καὶ τὰ πολλὰ εἶδη λεγόντων τὸ πᾶν ἐστῆκός ἀποδέχεσθαι, τῶν τε αὖ πανταχῇ τὸ ὄν κινούντων μηδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τῶν παίδων εὐχὴν, ὅσα ἀκίνητά τε καὶ κεκινημένα, τὸ ὄν τε καὶ τὸ πᾶν, ξυναμφοτέρως λέγειν.

Ritter states the result of this portion of the Sophistēs correctly. "Es bleibt uns als Ergebnis aller dieser Untersuchungen über das Seyn, dass die Wahrheit sowohl des Werdens, als auch des beharrlichen Seyns, anerkannt werden müsse" (Geschichte der Philos. ii. p. 231).

~~some~~ words ~~is~~ are significant, from such ~~is~~ are insignificant ~~the latter~~.—he places himself in the same ground as that which is occupied even by Aristotle in the *Liberation* and the treatise *De Interpretatione*. Thus the handling of the topic by Aristotle is much superior to what we might naturally expect from the fact that he is posterior in time. But there is another difference between the two which is important to notice. Aristotle deals with this topic as he does with every other, in the way of methodical and systematic exposition. To expound it as a whole, to introduce it into subsequent portions each illustrating the others, to furnish suitable examples for the general principles laid down—are announced as his distinct purposes. Now Plato's manner is quite different. Systematic exposition is not his primary purpose: he employs it up to a certain point, but as means towards another and an independent purpose—towards the solution of a particular difficulty, which has presented itself in the course of the dialogue.—“*Nosci maxime dialogorum.*” Aristotle is demonstrative: Plato is dialectical. In our present dialogue (the *Sophist*), the Eleate has been giving a long explanation of Non-Ens; an explanation intended to prove that Non-Ens was a particular sort of Ens, and that there was therefore no absurdity (though Parmenides had said that this was absurdity) in assuming it as a possible object of Cognition, Opinion, Affirmation. He now goes a step farther, and seeks to show that it is, actually and in fact, an object of Opinion and Affirmation.¹ It is for this purpose, and for this purpose only, that he analyses a proposition, specifies the constituent elements requisite to form it, and distinguishes one proposition from another.

Accordingly, the Eleate,—after pointing out that neither a string of nouns repeated one after the other, nor a string of verbs so repeated, would form a significant proposition,—declares that the conjunction of a noun with a verb is required to form one; and that opinion is nothing but that internal mental process which the words of the proposition express. The smallest proposition must combine a noun with a verb:—the former signifying the agent, the latter, the action or thing done.² Moreover,

¹ Plato, *Sophist*. p. 261 D.

² Plato, *Sophist*. p. 262 C.

the proposition must be a proposition of *something*; and it must be of a certain quality. By a proposition of *something*, Plato means, that what is called technically the subject of the proposition (in his time there were no technical terms of logic) must be something positive, and cannot be negative: by the quality of the proposition, he means that it must be either true or false.¹

This early example of rudimentary grammatical or logical analysis, recognising only the two main and principal parts of speech, is interesting as occurring prior to Aristotle; by whom it is repeated in a manner more enlarged, systematic,² and instructive. But Aristotle assumes, without proof and without supposing that any one will dispute the assumption—that there are some propositions true, other propositions false: that a name or noun, taken separately, is neither true nor false:³ that propositions (enunciations) only can be true or false.

Aristotle assumes without proof, that there are some propositions true, others false.

The proceeding of Plato in the *Sophistês* is different. He supposes a Sophist who maintains that no proposition either is false or can be false, and undertakes to prove against him that there are false propositions: he farther supposes this antagonist to reject the evidence of sense and visible analogies, and to acknowledge no proof except what is furnished by reason and philosophical deduction.⁴ Attempting, under these restrictions, to prove his point, Plato's Eleatic disputant rests entirely upon the peculiar meaning which he professes to have shown to attach to Non-Ens. He

Plato in the *Sophistês* has undertaken an impossible task—He could not have proved, against his supposed adversary, that there are false propositions.

¹ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 262 E. ἄλογον ἀπαράλογον, ὅταν περ ἢ, τιθεὶς εἶναι λόγον, μὴ ὅδ' ἐστι λόγος, ἀλόγονον. . . Οὐκ οὐκ καὶ τοῦτον αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ; Compare p. 237 E.

In the words here cited Plato unconsciously slides back into the ordinary acceptation of μὴ τι: that is, to μὴ in the sense of negation. If we adopt that peculiar sense of μὴ, which the Eleate has taken so much pains to prove just before in the case of τὸ μὴ εἶναι (that is, if we take μὴ as signifying not negation but simply difference), the above argument will not hold. If τις signifies one subject (A), and μὴ τις signifies simply another subject (B) different from A (ἕτερον), the predicate

ἀλόγονον cannot be affirmed. But if we take μὴ τις in its proper sense of negation, the ἀλόγονον will be so far true that οὐκ ἀλόγονον, οὐ θεαίητος, cannot be the subject of a proposition. Aristotle says the same in the beginning of the *Treatise De Interpretatione* (p. 16, a. 30).

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applies this to prove that Non-Ens may be predicated as well as Ens : assuming that such predication of Non-Ens constitutes a false proposition. But the proof fails. It serves only to show that the peculiar meaning ascribed by the Eleate to Non-Ens is inadmissible. The Eleate compares two distinct propositions—*Theætétus is sitting down*—*Theætétus is flying*. The first is true : the second is false. Why ? Because (says the Eleate) the first predicates Ens, the second predicates Non-Ens, or (to substitute his definition of Non-Ens) another Ens different from the Ens predicated in the first.¹ But here the reason assigned, why the second proposition is false, is not the real reason. Many propositions may be assigned, which predicate attributes different from the first, but which are nevertheless quite as much true as the first. I have already observed, that the reason why the second proposition is false is, because it contradicts the direct testimony of sense, if the persons debating are spectators : if they are not spectators, then because it contradicts the sum total of their previous sensible experience, remembered, compared, and generalised, which has established in them the conviction that no man does or can fly. If you discard the testimony of sense as unworthy of credit (which Plato assumes the Sophist to do), you cannot prove that the second proposition is false—nor indeed that the first proposition is true. Plato has therefore failed in giving that dialectic proof which he promised. The Eleate is forced to rely (without formally confessing it), on the testimony of sense, which he had forbidden Theætétus to invoke, twenty pages before.² The long intervening piece of dialectic about Ens and Non-Ens is inconclusive for his purpose, and might have been omitted. The proposition—*Theætétus is flying*—does undoubtedly predicate attributes *which are not* as if they were,³ and is thus

to us the Sophist as holding the doctrine *ἐπιστήμη = αἰσθησις*. How these propositions can both be true respecting the Sophists as a class I do not understand. The first may be true respecting some of them ; the second may be true respecting others ; respecting a third class of them, neither may be true. About the Sophists in a body there is hardly a single proposition which can be safely affirmed.

¹ Plato, *Sophist*, p. 263 C.

² Theætétus makes this attempt and

is checked by the Eleate, pp. 239-240. It is in p. 261 A that the Eleate begins his proof in refutation of the supposed Sophist—that *ἄφα* and *λόγος* may be false. The long interval between the two is occupied with the reasoning about Ens and Non-Ens.

³ Plato, *Sophist*, p. 263 E. τὰ μὴ ὄντα ὡς ὄντα λεγόμενα, &c.

The distinction between these two propositions, the first as true, the second as false (*Theætétus is sitting down*, *Theætétus is flying*), is in noway con-

false. But then we must consult and trust the evidence of our perception : we must farther accept *are not* in the ordinary sense of the words, and not in the sense given to them by the Eleate in the Platonic Sophistês. His attempt to banish the specific meaning of the negative particle, and to treat it as signifying nothing more than difference, appears to me fallacious.¹

In all reasoning, nay in all communication by speech, you must assume that your hearer understands the meaning of what is spoken : that he has the feelings of belief and disbelief, and is familiar with those forms of the language whereby such feelings are expressed : that there are certain propositions which he believes—in other words, which he regards as true : that there are certain other propositions which he disbelieves, or regards as false : that he has had experience of the transition from belief to disbelief, and *vice versa*—in other words, of having fallen into error and afterwards come to perceive that it was error. These are the mental facts realised in each man and assumed by him to be also realised in his neighbours, when communication takes place by speech. If a man could be supposed to believe nothing, and to disbelieve nothing ;—if he had no forms of speech to express his belief, disbelief, affirmation, and denial—no information could be given, no discussion would be possible. Every child has to learn this lesson in infancy ; and a tedious lesson it undoubtedly is.² Antisthenes (who composed several dialogues) and the other

What must be assumed in all dialectic discussion.

connected with the distinction which Plato had so much insisted upon before respecting the intercommunion of Forms, Ideas, General Notions, &c., that some Forms will come into communion with each other, while others will not (pp. 252-253).

There is here no question of repugnancy or intercommunion of Forms : the question turns upon the evidence of vision, which informs us that Theætêtus is sitting down and not standing up or flying. If any predicate be affirmed of a subject, contrary to what is included in the definition of that subject, then indeed repugnancy of Forms might be urged.

¹ Plato, *Sophist.* p. 257 B.

² Aristotel. *Metaphys.* vii. 1043, b. 25. *ὥστε ἡ ἀνορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένης*

καὶ οἱ οὗτοι ἀπαίδευτοι ἠρόρου, ἔχει τινὰ κακόν, &c.

Compare respecting this paradox or *θέσις* of Antisthenes, the scholia of Alexander on the passage of Aristotle's *Topica* above cited, p. 259, b. 15, in Schol. Bekk.

If Antisthenes admitted only identical predications, of course *ὁ ἀντίθετος* became impossible. I have endeavoured to show, in a previous note on this dialogue, that a misconception (occasionally shared even by Plato) of the function of the copula, lay at the bottom of the Antisthenian theory respecting identical predication. Compare Aristotel. *Physic.* i. p. 185, b. 23, together with the Scholia of Simplicius, pp. 329-330, ed. Bekk., and Plato, *Sophistês*, p. 245.

disputants of whom we are now speaking, must have learnt the lesson as other men have : but they find or make some general theory which forbids them to trust the lesson when learnt. It was in obedience to some such theory that Antisthenes discarded all predication except essential predication, and discarded also the form suited for expressing disbelief—the negative proposition : maintaining, That to contradict was impossible. I know no mode of refuting him, except by showing that his fundamental theory is erroneous.

Discussion and theorising can only begin when these processes, partly intellectual, partly emotional, have become established and reproducible portions of the train of mental association. As processes, they are common to all men. But though two persons agree in having the feeling of belief, and in expressing that feeling by one form of proposition—also in having the feeling of disbelief, and in expressing it by another form of proposition—yet it does not follow that the propositions which these two believe or disbelieve are the same.

How far such is the case must be ascertained by comparison—by appeal to sense, memory, inference from analogy, induction, feeling, consciousness, &c. The ground is now prepared for fruitful debate : for analysing the meaning, often confused and complicated, of propositions : for discriminating the causes, intellectual and emotional, of belief and disbelief, and for determining how far they harmonise in one mind and another : for setting out general rules as to sequence, or inconsistency, or independence, of one belief as compared with another. To a certain extent, the grounds of belief and disbelief in all men, and the grounds of consistency or inconsistency between some beliefs and others, will be found to harmonise : they can be embodied in methodical forms of language, and general rules can be laid down preventing in many cases inadvertence or erroneous combination. It is at this point that Aristotle takes up rational grammar and logic, with most profitable effect. But he is obliged to postulate (what Antisthenes professed to discard) predication, not merely identical, but also accidental as well as essential—together with names and propositions both negative and affir-

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rising pre-
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mative.¹ He cannot avoid postulating thus much : though he likewise postulates a great deal more, which ought not to be granted.

The long and varied predicamental series, given in the Sophistês, illustrates the process of logical partition, as Plato conceived it, and the definition of a class-name founded thereupon. You take a logical whole, and you subtract from it part after part until you find the *quæsitum* isolated from every thing else.² But you must always divide into two parts (he says) wherever it can be done : dichotomy or bipartition is the true logical partition : should this be impracticable, trichotomy, or division into the smallest attainable number of parts, must be sought for.³ Moreover, the bipartition must be made according to Forms (Ideas, Kinds) : the parts which you recognise must be not merely parts, but Forms : every form is a part, but every part is not a form.⁴ Next, you must draw the line of division as nearly as you can through the middle of the *dividendum*, so that the parts on both sides may be nearly equal : it is in this way that your partition is most likely to coincide with forms on both sides of the line.⁵ This is the longest way of proceeding, but the safest. It is a logical mistake to divide into two parts very unequal : you may find a form on one side of the line, but you obtain none on the other side. Thus, it is bad classification to distribute the human race into Hellênes + Barbari : the *Barbari* are of infinite number and diversity, having no one common form to which the name can apply. It is also improper to distribute Number into the myriad on side, and all other numbers on the other—for a similar reason. You ought to distribute the human

Precepts and examples of logical partition, illustrated in the Sophistês.

¹ See the remarks in Aristotel. *Metaphys.* Γ. 1005, b. 2, 1006, a. 6. He calls it ἀραβευσία—ἀραβευσία τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν—not to be able to distinguish those matters which can be proved and require to be proved, from those matters which are true, but require no proof and are incapable of being proved. But this distinction has been one of the grand subjects of controversy from his day down to the present day ; and between different schools of philosophers, none of whom would allow themselves to deserve the epithet of ἀραβευτοί.

Aristotle calls Antisthenes and his followers ἀραβευτοί, in the passage cited in the preceding note.

² Plato, *Politikus*, p. 263 D. μέρος αἰ μέρος ἀφαιρουμένους ἐπ' ἄκρον ἐφικνίσθαι τὸ ζητούμενον.

Ueberweg thinks that Aristotle, when he talks of αἱ γεγραμμένα διαρίσεις, alludes to these logical distributions in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus* (*Äechtheit der Platon. Schr.* pp. 153-154).

³ *Politik.* p. 237 C.

⁴ *Politik.* p. 263 C.

⁵ *Politik.* pp. 262 B, 265 A. δὲ μεσοτομεῖν ὡς μέλιστα, &c.

race into the two forms, Male—Female : and number into the two, Odd—Even.¹ So also, you must not divide gregarious creatures into human beings on one side, and animals on the other ; because this last term would comprise numerous particulars utterly disparate. Such a classification is suggested only by the personal feeling of man, who prides himself upon his intelligence. But if the classification were framed by any other intelligent species, such as Cranes,² they would distinguish Cranes on the one side from animals on the other, including Man as one among many disparate particulars under *animal*.

The above-mentioned principle — dichotomy or bipartition into two equal or nearly equal halves, each resting upon a characteristic form—is to be applied as far as logical bipartition. it will go. Many different schemes of partition upon this principle may be found, each including forms subordinated one to the other, descending from the more comprehensive to the less comprehensive. It is only when you can find no more parts which are forms, that you must be content to divide into parts which are not forms. Thus after all the characteristic forms, for dividing the human race, have been gone through, they may at last be partitioned into Hellènes and Barbari, Lydians and non-Lydians, Phrygians and non-Phrygians : in which divisions there is no guiding form at all, but only a capricious distribution into fractions with separate names³—meaning by *capricious*, a distribution founded on some feeling or circumstance peculiar to the distributor, or shared by him only with a few others ; such as the fact, that he is himself a Lydian or a Phrygian, &c.

These precepts in the Sophistês and Politikus, respecting the process of classification, are illustrated by an important passage of the Philêbus :⁴ wherein Plato tells us that the constitution of things includes the Determinate and the Indeterminate implicated with each other, and requiring study to disengage them. Between the highest One, Form, or Genus—and the lowest array of indefinite particulars—

¹ Politikus, p. 262 D-E.

² Politikus, p. 263 D. σεμνύνον αὐτὸ εἰσαυτὸ, &c.

³ Politikus, p. 262 E. αὐτοὺς δὲ ἢ Φρύγας ἢ τίνας ἑτέροους πρὸς ἅπαντας τῶντων ἀποσχεῖται τότε, ἥνικα ἀποροὶ γένος ἅμα καὶ μέρος εὐρίσκειν ἐκείνων

τῶν σχισθέντων.

⁴ Plato, Philêbus, pp. 16-17.

The notes of Dr. Badham upon this passage in his edition of the Philêbus, p. 11, should be consulted as a just correction of Stallbaum in regard to πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ τῶν ἐν ἐκείνῳ.

there exist a certain number of intermediate Ones or Forms, each including more or fewer of these particulars. The process of study or acquired cognition is brought to bear upon these intermediate Forms: to learn how many there are, and to discriminate them in themselves as well as in their position relative to each other. But many persons do not recognise this: they apprehend only the Highest One, and the Infinite Many, not looking for any thing between: they take up hastily with some extreme and vague generality, below which they know nothing but particulars. With knowledge thus imperfect, you do not get beyond contentious debate. Real, instructive, dialectic requires an understanding of all the intermediate forms. But in descending from the Highest Form downwards, you must proceed as much as possible in the way of bipartition, or if not, then of tripartition, &c.: looking for the smallest number of forms which can be found to cover the whole field. When no more forms can be found, then and not till then, you must be content with nothing better than the countless indeterminate particulars.

This instructive passage of the Philébus—while it brings to view a widespread tendency of the human mind, to pass from the largest and vaguest generalities at once into the region of particulars, and to omit the distinctive sub-classes which lie between—illustrates usefully the drift of the Sophistês and Politikus. In these two last dialogues it is the method itself of good logical distribution which Plato wishes to impress upon his readers: the formal part of the process.¹ With this view, he not only makes the process intentionally circuitous and diversified, but also selects by preference matters of common sensible experience, though in themselves indifferent, such as the art of weaving,² &c.

The reasons given for this preference deserve attention. In these common matters (he tells us) the resemblances upon which Forms are founded are perceived by sense, and can be exhibited to every one, so that the form is readily understood and easily discriminated. The general terms can there be explained by reference to sense. But in regard to incorporeal matters, the

Importance
of founding
logical
Partition
on resem-
blances
perceived
by sense.

¹ He states this expressly, Politik. p. 286 D.

² Plato, Politik. p. 286 D.

higher and grander topics of discussion, there is no corresponding sensible illustration to consult. These objects can be apprehended only by reason, and described only by general terms. By means of these general terms, we must learn to give and receive rational explanations, and to follow by process of reasoning from one form to another. But this is more difficult, and requires a higher order of mind, where there are no resemblances or illustrations exposed to sense. Accordingly, we select the common sensible objects as an easier preparatory mode of a process substantially the same in both.¹

This explanation given by Plato, in itself just, deserves to be compared with his view of sensible objects as knowable, and of sense as a source of knowledge. I noticed in a preceding chapter the position which Sokrates is made to lay down in the *Theætétus*,²—That (*αἰσθησις*) sensible perception reaches only to the separate impressions of sense, and does not apprehend the likeness and other relations between them. I have also noticed the contrast which he establishes elsewhere between *Esse* and *Fieri*: i.e., between *Ens* which alone (according to him) is knowable, and the perpetual flux of *Fientia* which is not knowable at all, but is only matter of opinion or guess-work. Now in the dialogue before us, the *Politikus*, there is no such marked antithesis between opinion and knowledge. Nor is the province of *αἰσθησις* so strictly confined: on the contrary, Plato here considers sensible perception as dealing with *Entia*, and as appreciating resemblances and other relations between them. It is by an attentive study and comparison of these facts of sense that Forms are detected. "When a man (he says) has first perceived by sense the points of communion between the Many, he must not desist from attentive observation until he has discerned in that communion all the differences which reside in Forms: and when

¹ Plato, *Politik.* pp. 285 E—286 A. τοὺς πλείοντες λάβειν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν τῶν ὄντων ῥηδὶς καταμαθεῖν αἰσθηταὶ τινες ὁμοιωτῆτες πεφύκασιν, ἃς οὐδὲν χελεπὸν δηλοῦν, ὅταν αὐτῶν τις βουλήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ αἰτοῦντι περὶ τοῦ μὴ μετὰ πραγμάτων ἀλλὰ χωρὶς λόγου ῥηδὶς ἐνδείξασθαι· τοῖς δ' εὖ μεγίστοις ὁδοὶ καὶ τιμητά· τοὺς οὐκ ἔστιν εἰδῶλον οὐδὲν πρὸς τοὺς

ἀνθρώπους εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, οὐ δεχθῆναι, &c. About the εἰδῶλον εἰργασμένον ἐναργῶς, which is affirmed in one of these two cases and denied in the other, compare a striking analogy in the *Phædrus*, p. 250 A-E.

² Plato, *Theæt.* pp. 185-186. See above p. 161.

he has looked at the multifarious differences which are visible among these Many, he must not rest contented until he has confined all such as are really cognate within one resemblance, tied together by the essence of one common Form."¹

These passages may be compared with others of similar import in the Phædrus.² Plato here considers the Form, not as an Entity *per se* separate from and independent of the particulars, but as implicated in and with the particulars: as a result reached by the mind through the attentive observation and comparison of particulars: as corresponding to what is termed in modern language abstraction and generalisation. The self-existent Platonic Ideas do not appear in the Politikus:³ which approximates rather to the Aristotelian doctrine:—that is, the doctrine of the universal, logically distinguishable from its particulars, but having no reality apart from them (*χωριστὰ λόγῳ μόνον*). But in other dialogues of Plato, the separation between the two is made as complete as possible, especially in the striking passages of the Republic: wherein we read that the facts of sense are a delusive juggle—that we must turn our back upon them and cease to study them—and that we must face about, away from the sensible world, to contemplate Ideas, the separate and unchangeable furniture of the intelligible world—and that the whole process of acquiring true Cognition, consists in passing from the higher to the lower Forms or Ideas, without any misleading illustrations of sense.⁴ Here, in the Sophistês and Politikus, instead of having the Universal behind our backs when the particulars are before our faces, we see it *in and amidst* particulars: the illustrations of sense, instead of deluding us, being declared to conduce,

Comparison
of the
Sophistês
with the
Phædrus.

¹ Plato, Politikus, p. 285 B. *δίων, ὅταν μὲν τὴν τῶν πολλῶν τις πρότερον αἰσθῆται κοινωρίαν, μὴ προαρίσασθαι πρὶν ἢ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰς διαφορὰς ἰδῆ πάσας ὁπόσαι περ ἐν εἰδεσι κείνται· τὰς δὲ αὖ παντοδαπὰς ἀνομοιωτάτας, ὅταν ἐν πλείθεσιν ὁρῶσιν, μὴ δυνατόν εἶναι δυσωπούμενον παύσθαι, πρὶν ἢ ἐνέμνηναι τὰ οἰκεία ἐντὸς μιᾶς ὁμοιώματος ἕρπας γένους τῆς οὐσίας περιβάλλεται.*

² Plato, Phædrus, pp. 249 C, 265 D-E.

³ This remark is made by Stallbaum in his Prolegg. ad Politicum, p. 81;

and it is just, though I do not at all concur in his general view of the Politikus, wherein he represents the dialogue as intended to deride the Megaric philosophers.

⁴ See the Republic, v. pp. 476-479, vi. pp. 508-510-511, and especially the memorable simile about the cave and the shadows within it, in Book vii. pp. 518-519, together with the περιεργὴ which he there prescribes—*ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου εἰς τὸ εὖ*—and the remarks respecting observations in astronomy and acoustics, p. 529.

wherever they can be had, to the clearness and facility of the process.¹ Here, as well as in the *Phædrus*, we find the process of Dialectic emphatically recommended, but described as consisting mainly in logical classification of particulars, ascending and descending divisions and conjunctions, as Plato calls them²—analysis and synthesis. We are enjoined to divide and analyse the larger genera into their component species until we come to the lowest species which can no longer be divided: also, conversely, to conjoin synthetically the subordinate species until the highest genus is attained, but taking care not to omit any of the intermediate species, in their successive gradations.³ Throughout all this process, as described both in the *Phædrus* and in the *Politikus*, the eye is kept fixed upon the constituent individuals. The Form is studied in and among the particulars which it comprehends: the particulars are looked at in groups put together suitably to each comprehending Form. And in both dialogues, marked stress is laid upon the necessity of making the division dichotomous; as well as according to Forms, and not according to fractions which are not legitimate Forms.⁴ Any other method, we are told, would be like the wandering of a blind man.

What distinguishes the *Sophistês* and *Politikus* from most other dialogues of Plato, is, that the method of logical classification is illustrated by setting the classifier to work upon one or a few given subjects, some in themselves trivial, some important. Though the principles of the method are enunciated in general terms, yet their application to the special example is kept constantly before us; so that we are never permitted, much less required, to divorce the Universal from its Particulars.

As a dialogue illustrative of this method, the *Politikus* (as I

¹ Compare the passage of the *Phædrus* (p. 263 A-C) where Plato distinguishes the sensible particulars on which men mostly agree, from the abstractions (Just and Unjust, &c., corresponding with the *ἀσώματα*, *ἐκάλιστα*, *μέγιστα*, *τιμωτάτα*, *Politikus*, p. 286 A) on which they are perpetually dissenting.

² Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 266 B. *τούτων δὲ ἕνεκα αὐτὸς τε ἐραστὴς τῶν διαίρεσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν . . . τοὺς δυναμῶναι αὐτὸ δοκῶν . . . καλῶ διαλεκτικούς.* The reason which Sokrates gives

in the *Phædrus* for his attachment to dialectics, that he may become competent in discourse and in wisdom (*ὅς οἷός τε ᾗ λέγειν καὶ φρονεῖν*), is the same as that which the Eleate assigns in recommendation of the logical exercises in the *Politikus*.

³ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 271 D, 277 B. *ὁρισμένους τε πάλιν κατ' εἶδη μέχρι τοῦ ἀμύητον γέμειν ἐπιστήθῃ.*

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 265 E, 270 E. *ἴσικαι ἂν ὡσπερ τυφλοῦ πορείαι.*

have already pointed out) may be compared to the Phædrus: in another point of view, we shall find instruction in comparing it to the Parmenidès. This last too is a dialogue illustrative of method, but of a different variety of method.

Comparison
of the Poli-
tikos with
the Parme-
nidès.

What the Sophistès and Politikus are for the enforcement of logical classification, the Parmenidès is for another part of the philosophising process—laborious evolution of all the consequences deducible from the affirmative as well as from the negative of every hypothesis bearing upon the problem. And we note the fact, that both in the Politikus and Parmenidès, Plato manifests the consciousness that readers will complain of him as prolix, tiresome, and wasting ingenuity upon unprofitable matters.¹ In the Parmenidès, he even goes the length of saying that the method ought only to be applied before a small and select audience; to most people it would be repulsive, since they cannot be made to comprehend the necessity for such circuitous preparation in order to reach truth.²

Variety of
method in
dialectic
research—
Diversity
of Plato.

¹ Plato, Politikus, p. 283 B. *πρὸς δὴ τὸ μέγιστον τὸ τοιοῦτον*, and the long series of questions and answers which follows to show that prolixity is unavoidable, pp. 285 C, 286 B-E.

² Plato, Parmenid. p. 136 D-E.

CHAPTER XXX.

POLITIKUS.

I HAVE examined in the preceding sections both that which the Sophistês and Politikus present in common—(*viz.* a lesson, as well as a partial theory, of the logical processes called Definition and Division)—and that which the Sophistês presents apart from the Politikus. I now advert to two matters which we find in the Politikus, but not in the Sophistês. Both of them will be found to illustrate the Platonic mode of philosophising.

The Politikus by itself, apart from the Sophistês.

Views of Plato on mensuration. Objects measured against each other. Objects compared with a common standard. In each Art, the purpose to be attained is the standard.

I. Plato assumes, that there will be critics who blame the two dialogues as too long and circuitous; excessive in respect of prolixity. In replying to those objectors,¹ he enquires, What is meant by long or short—excessive or deficient—great or little? Such expressions denote mensuration or comparison. But there are two varieties of mensuration. We may measure two objects one against the other: the first will be called great or greater, in relation to the second—the second will be called little or less in relation to the first. But we may also proceed in a different way. We may assume some third object as a standard, and then measure both the two against it: declaring the first to be great, greater, excessive, &c., because it exceeds the standard—and the second to be little, less, deficient, &c., because it falls short of the standard. Here then are two judgments or estimations altogether different from each other, and yet both denoted by the same words *great* and *little*: two distinct *essences* (in Pla-

¹ The treatment of this subject intimates that the coming remarks are begins, Politik. p. 283 C, where Plato of wide application.

tonic phrase) of great and little, or of greatness and littleness.¹ The art of mensuration has thus two varieties. One includes arithmetic and geometry, where we simply compare numbers and magnitudes with each other, determining the proportions between them: the other assumes some independent standard; above which is excess, and below which is deficiency. This standard passes by different names according to circumstances: the Moderate, Becoming, Seasonable, Proper, Obligatory, &c.² Such a standard is assumed in every art—in every artistic or scientific course of procedure. Every art has an end to be attained, a result to be produced; which serves as the standard whereby each preparatory step of the artist is measured, and pronounced to be either excessive or deficient, as the case may be.³ Unless such a standard be assumed, you cannot have regular art or science of any kind; neither in grave matters, nor in vulgar matters—neither in the government of society, nor in the weaving of cloth.⁴

Now what is the end to be attained, by this our enquiry into the definition of a Statesman? It is not so much to solve the particular question started, as to create in ourselves dialectic talent and aptitude, applicable to every thing. This is the standard with reference to which our enquiry must be criticised—not by regard to the easy solution of the particular problem, or to the immediate pleasure of the hearer. And if an objector complains, that our exposition is too long or our subject-matters too vulgar—we shall require him to show that the proposed end might have been attained with fewer words and with more solemn illustrations. If he cannot show this, we shall disregard his censure as inapplicable.⁵

Purpose in the Sophistēs and Politikus is—To attain dialectic aptitude. This is the standard of comparison whereby to judge whether the means employed are suitable.

¹ Plato, Politik. p. 283 E. *δίττας ἀρα ταύτας οὐσίας καὶ κρίσεις τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ τοῦ μικροῦ θετόν.*

² Plato, Politik. p. 284 E. *τὸ μέτριον, τὸ πρέπον, τὸν καιρὸν, τὸ δέον, &c.*

The reader will find these two varieties of mensuration, here distinguished by Plato, illustrated in the "two distinct modes of appreciating weight" (the Absolute and the Relative), described and explained by Pro-

fessor Alexander Bain in his work on The Senses and The Intellect, 3rd edition, p. 93. This explanation forms an item in the copious enumeration given by Mr. Bain of the fundamental sensations of our nature.

³ Plato, Politik. p. 283 D. *κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀνεγκλίαν οὐσίαν.—284 A-C. πρὸς τὴν τοῦ μετρίου γένεσιν.*

⁴ Plato, Politik. p. 284 C.

⁵ Plato, Politik. pp. 286 D, 287 A. Compare Plato, Philæbus, p. 36 D.

The above-mentioned distinction between the two varieties of mensuration or comparison, is here given by Plato, simply to serve as a defence against critics who censured the peculiarities of the Politikus. It is not pursued into farther applications. But it deserves notice, not merely as being in itself just and useful, but as illustrating one of the many phases of Plato's philosophy. It is an exhibition of the relative side of Plato's character, as contra-distinguished from the absolute or dogmatical : for both the two, opposed as they are to each other, co-exist in him and manifest themselves alternately. It conveys a valuable lesson as to the apportionment of praise and blame. "When you blame me" (he says to his critics), "you must have in your mind some standard of comparison upon which the blame turns. Declare what that standard is :—what you mean by the Proper, Becoming, Moderate, &c. There is such a standard, and a different one, in every different Art. What is it here? You must choose this standard, explain what it is, and adhere to it when you undertake to praise or blame." Such an enunciation (thoroughly Sokratic¹) of the principle of relativity, brings before critics the fact—which is very apt to be forgotten—that there must exist in the mind of each some standard of comparison, varying or unvarying, well or ill understood : while at the same time it enforces upon them the necessity of determining clearly for themselves, and announcing explicitly to others, what that standard is. Otherwise the propositions, affirming comparison, can have no uniform meaning with any two debaters, nor even with the same man at different times.

To this relative side of Plato's mind belong his frequent commendations of measurement, numbering, computation, comparison, &c. In the Protagoras,² he describes the art of measurement as the main guide and protector of human life : it is there treated as applicable to the correct estimation of pleasures and pains. In the Phædon,³ it is again extolled : though the elements to be calculated are there specified differently. In the Philébus, the

¹ Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 8, 7, iii. 10, 12.

² Plato, Protagoras. p. 357 B.

³ Plato, Phædon, p. 69 B.

antithesis of Πέρας and ἄπειρον (the Determinant or Limit, and the Indeterminate or Infinite) is one of the leading points of the dialogue. We read in it moreover a bipartite division of Mensuration or Arithmetic,¹ which is quite different from the bipartite division just cited out of the Politikus. Plato divides it there (in the Philēbus) into arithmetic for theorists, and arithmetic for practical life : besides which, he distinguishes the various practical arts as being more or less accurate, according as they have more or less of measurement and sensible comparison in them. Thus the art of the carpenter, who employs measuring instruments such as the line and rule—is more accurate than that of the physician, general, pilot, husbandman, &c., who have no similar means of measuring. This is a classification quite different from what we find in the Politikus ; yet tending in like manner to illustrate the relative point of view, and its frequent manifestation in Plato. In the Politikus, he seeks to refer praise and blame to a standard of measurement, instead of suffering them to be mere outbursts of sentiment unsystematic and unanalysed.

II. The second peculiarity to which I call attention in the Politikus, is the definition or description there furnished of the character so-called : that is, the Statesman, the King, Governor, Director, or Manager, of human society. At the outset of the dialogue, this person is declared to belong to the Genus—Men of Science or of Art (the two words are faintly distinguished in Plato). It is possession of the proper amount of scientific competence which constitutes a man a Governor : and which entitles him to be so named, whether he actually governs any society or not.² (This point of departure is purely Sokratic : for in the Memorabilia of Xenophon,³ Sokrates makes the same express declaration.) The King knows, but does not act : yet he is not a simple critic or spectator—he gives orders : and those orders are not suggested

Definition of the Statesman or Governor. Scientific competence. Sokratic point of departure. Procedure of Plato in sub-dividing.

¹ Plato, Philēbus, pp. 25 C, 27 D, 57. δύο ἀριθμητικά καὶ δύο μετρητικά . . . τῆς διδυμότητος ἔχονσαι τὰς αὐτὰς ἐξουσίας ἐκείνων μέτρας.

This same bipartition, however, is

noticed in another passage of the Politikus, p. 258 D-E.

² Plato, Politikus, pp. 258 B, 259 B.

³ Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 10.

to him by any one else (as in the case of the Herald, the *Tristates*, and others); but spring from his own bosom and his own knowledge. From thence Plato carries us through a series of descending logical subdivisions, until we come to define the King as the shepherd and feeder of the flock of human beings.¹ But many other persons, besides the King, are concerned in feeding the human flock, and will therefore be included in this definition: which is thus proved to be too large, and to require farther qualification and restriction.² Moreover the feeding of the human flock belongs to others rather than to the King. He tends and takes care of the flock, but does not feed it: hence the definition is, in this way also, unsuitable.³

Our mistake (says Plato) was of this kind. In describing the King or Governor, we have unconsciously fallen upon the description of the King, such as he was in the Saturnian period or under the presidency of Kronos; and not such as he is in the present period. Under the presidency of Kronos, each human flock was tended and governed by a living King or God, who managed every thing for it, keeping it happy and comfortable by his own unassisted agency: the entire Kosmos too, with its revolutions, was at that time under the immediate guidance of a divine mover. But in the present period this divine superintendence is withdrawn: both the entire Kosmos, and each separate portion of it, is left to its own movement, full of imperfection and irregularity. Each human flock is now tended not by a living King, as it was then; but by a human King, much less perfect, less effective, less exalted above the constituent members. Now the definition which we fell upon (says Plato) suited the King of the Saturnian period; but does not suit the King of the present or human period.⁴ At the first commencement of the present period, the human flock, left to themselves without superintendence from the Gods, suffered great misery: but various presents from some Gods (fire from Prometheus, arts from Hephaestus and Athénâ, plants and seeds from Déméter)⁵

¹ *Plato, Politik. p. 288 C-E. et seq.*
Der Herrscher ist der Herr der Menschen.
— Plato, Politik. p. 287 E, 288 C.

² *Plato, Politik. p. 288.*

³ *Plato, Politik. p. 288 D-E.*

⁴ *Plato, Politik. pp. 274 A—275 B.*

rendered their condition more endurable, though still full of difficulty and hardship.¹

¹ Plato, Politik. p. 274 C.

Plato embodies these last-mentioned comparisons in an elaborate and remarkable myth—theological, cosmical, zoological, social—which occupies six pages of the Politikus (268 D—274 E). Meiners and Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 273-275) point out that the theology of Plato in this fable differs much from what we read in the Phædon, Republic, &c.: and Socher insists upon such discrepancy as one of his arguments against the genuineness of the Politikus. I have already observed that I do not concur in his inference. I do not expect uniformity of doctrine in the various Platonic dialogues: more especially on a subject so much beyond experience, and so completely open to the conjectures of a rich imagination, as theology and cosmogony. In the Sophistês, pp. 242-243, Plato had talked in a sort of contemptuous tone about those who dealt with philosophical doctrine in the way of myth, as a proceeding fit only for boys: (not unlike the manner of Aristotle, when he speaks of οἱ μυθικῶς σοφισόμενοι—τὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, Metaphys. B, 1000, a. 15-18, A. 1071, b. 27): while here, in the Politikus, he dilates upon what he admits to be a boyish myth, partly because a certain portion of it may be made available in illustration of his philosophical purpose, partly because he wishes to enliven the monotony of a long-continued classification. Again, in the Phædrus (p. 229 C), the Platonic Sokrates is made to censure as futile any attempt to find rational explanations for the popular legends (σοφισεσθαι): but here, in the Politikus, the Eleate expressly adapts his theory about the backward and forward rotation of the Kosmos to the explanation of the popular legends—about earthborn men, and about Helios turning back his chariot, in order to escape the shocking spectacle of the Thyestean banquet: which legends, when so explained, Plato declares that people would be wrong to disbelieve (οἱ γὰρ ὑπὸ πολλῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπιστοῦνται, pp. 271 B, 268 A, B, C).

The differences of doctrine and handling, between the various Platonic dialogues, are facts not less worthy to be noted than the similarities. Here, in the myth of the

Politikus, we find a peculiar theological view, and a very remarkable cosmical doctrine—the rotation and counter-rotation of the Kosmos. The Kosmos is here declared (as in the Timæus) to be a living and intelligent Subject; having received these mental gifts from its Demiurgus. But the Kosmos is also Body as well as Mind; so that it is incapable of that constant sameness or uniformity which belongs to the Divine: Body having in itself an incurable principle of disorder (p. 269 D). The Kosmos is perpetually in movement; but its movement is only rotatory or circular in the same place: which is the nearest approximation to uniformity of movement. It does not always revolve by itself: nor is it always made to revolve by the Divine Steersman (κυβερνήτης, p. 272 E), but alternately the one and the other. This Divine Steersman presides over its rotation for a certain time, and along with him many subordinate Deities or Demons; until an epoch fixed by some unassigned destiny has been reached (p. 272 E). Then the Steersman withdraws from the process to his own watch-tower (εἰς τὴν αὐτοῦ περιώπην), and the other Deities along with him. The Kosmos, being left to itself, ceases to revolve in the same direction, and begins its counter rotation; revolving by itself backwards, or in the contrary direction. By such violent revulsion many of the living inhabitants of the Kosmos are destroyed. The past phenomena are successively reproduced, but in an inverse direction—the old men go back to maturity, boyhood, infancy, death: the dead are born again, and pass through their lives backwards from age to infancy. Yet the counter-rotation brings about not simply an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, but new phenomena also: for we are told that the Kosmos, when left to itself, did tolerably well as long as it remembered the Steersman's direction, but after a certain interval became forgetful and went wrong, generating mischief and evil: so that the Steersman was at last forced to put his hand again to the work, and to impart to it a fresh rotation in his own direction (p. 273 B-D). The Kosmos never goes satisfactorily, except when the hand of the Steersman is upon it.

The human King, whom we shall now attempt to define, tends the human flock; but there are other persons also who assist in doing so, and without whose concurrent agency he could not attain his purpose. We may illustrate this by comparing with him the weaver of woollen garments: who requires many subsidiary and preparatory processes, performed by agents different from himself (such as the carder of wool, the spinner, and the manufacturer of the instruments for working the loom) to enable him to finish his work. In all matters, important as well as vulgar, two separate processes or arts, or contributory persons, are to be distinguished: Causes and Co-Causes, i.e., Principal Causes, and Concurrent, Auxiliary, Co-efficient, Subordinate, Causes.¹ The King, like the Weaver, is distinguishable, from other agents helping towards the same end, as a Principal Cause from Auxiliary Causes.² The Causes auxiliary to the King, in so far as they are inanimate, may be distributed roughly under seven heads (bipartition being here

Distinction
of Causes
Principal
and Causes
Auxiliary.
The King is
the only
Principal
Cause, but
his auxilia-
ries pretend
to be prin-
cipal also.

But we are informed that there are varieties of this divine administration: one named the period of Kronos or Saturn; another that of Zeus, &c. The present is the period of Zeus (p. 272 B). The period of Kronos was one of spontaneous and universal abundance, under the immediate superintendence of the Deity. This Divine Ruler was infinitely superior to the subjects whom he ruled, and left nothing to be desired. But now, in the present period of Zeus, men are under human rule, and not divine: there is no such marked superiority of the Ruler to his subjects. The human race has been on the point of becoming extinct; and has only been saved by beneficent presents from various Gods—fire from Prometheus, handicraft from Hephaestus and Athênê (pp. 272 C, 274 C).

All this prodigious bulk of mythical invention (*ὑψηλὰ ὄντα*, p. 277 B) seems to be introduced here for the purpose of illustrating the comparative ratio between the Ruler and his subjects; and the material difference in this respect between King and Shepherd—between the government of mankind by kings, and that of flocks and herds by the herdsman. In attempting to define the True and Genuine Ruler (he lays

it down), we can expect nothing better than a man among other men; but distinguished above his fellows, so far as wisdom, dialectic, and artistic accomplishment, can confer superiority.

There is much in this copious mythos which I cannot clearly understand or put together: nor do I derive much profit from the long exposition of it given by Stallbaum (Proleg. ad Polit. pp. 100-128). We cannot fairly demand either harmonious consistency or profound meaning in the different features of an ingenious fiction. The hypothesis of a counter-rotation of the Kosmos (spinning like a top, *ἐν ἐναντιοτάτῳ βαίοντες ὅδε ἰδμεν*, p. 270 A), with an inverted reproduction of past phenomena, appears to me one of the most singular fancies in the Greek mythology. I cannot tell how far it may have been suggested by any such statement as that of the Egyptian priests (Herodot. ii. 143). I can only repeat the observation made by Phaedrus to the Platonic Sokrates, in the dialogue Phaedrus (p. 276 A): "You, Sokrates, construct easily enough Egyptian tales, or any other tales that you please".

¹ Plato, Politik. p. 281 D-E.

² Plato, Politik. p. 287 D.

impracticable)—Implements, Vessels, Vehicles, Protections surrounding the Body, Recreative Objects, Raw Material of every variety, Nutritive Substances, &c.¹ Other auxiliary Causes are, the domestic cattle, bought slaves, and all descriptions of serving persons; being often freemen who undertake, for hire, servile occupations and low trades. There are moreover ministerial officers of a higher grade: heralds, scribes, interpreters, prophets, priests, Sophists, rhetors; and a great diversity of other functionaries, military, judicial, forensic, dramatic, &c., who manage different departments of public affairs, often changing from one post to another.² But these higher ministerial functionaries differ from the lower in this—That they pretend to be themselves the directors and managers of the government, not recognising the genuine King: whereas the truth is, that they are only ministerial and subordinate to him:—they are Concurrent Causes, while he is the only real or principal Cause.³

Our main object now (says the Eleate) is to distinguish this Real Cause from the subordinate Causes which are mistaken for its partners and equals:—the genuine and intelligent Governor, from those who pretend falsely to be governors, and are supposed often to be such.⁴ We cannot admit the lines of distinction, which are commonly drawn between different governments, as truly logical: at least they are only subordinate to ours. Most men distinguish the government of one, or a few, or the many: government of the poor or of the rich: government according to law, or without law:—by consent, or by force. The different names current, monarchy or despotism, aristocracy, or oligarchy, &c., correspond to these definitions. But we hold that these definitions do not touch the true characteristic: which is to be found in Science, Knowledge, Intelligence, Art or scien-

Plato does not admit the received classification of government. It does not touch the point upon which all true distinction ought to be founded—Scientific or Unscientific.

¹ Plato, *Politik.* pp. 288-289.

² Plato, *Politik.* pp. 290-291 B. Plato describes these men by comparing them to lions, centaurs, satyrs, wild beasts, feeble and crafty. This is not very intelligible, but I presume that it alludes to the variety of functions, and the frequent alternation of functions. I cannot think that such an

obscure jest deserves Stallbaum's compliment:—"Ceterum lepidissima hæc est istorum hominum irrisio, qui cum leonibus, Centauris, Satyris, aliisque monstribus comparantur". Plato repeats it p. 303 C.

³ Plato, *Politik.* p. 291 C

⁴ Plato, *Politik.* p. 292 D.

tific procedure, &c., and in nothing else. The true government of mankind is, the scientific or artistic: whether it be carried on by one, or a few, or many—whether by poor or rich, by force or consent—whether according to law, or without law.¹ This is the right and essential characteristic of genuine government:—it is government conducted according to science or art. All governments not conforming to this type are only spurious counterfeits and approaches to it, more or less defective or objectionable.²

Looking to the characteristic here suggested, the Eleate pronounces that all numerous and popular governments must be counterfeits. There can be no genuine government except by One man, or by a very small number at most. True science or art is not attainable by many persons, whether rich or poor: scarcely even by a few, and probably by One alone; since the science or art of governing men is more difficult than any other science or art.³ But the government of this One is the only true and right government, whether he proclaims laws or governs without law, whether he employs severity or mildness—provided only he adheres to his art, and achieves its purpose, the good and improvement of the governed.⁴ He is like the true physician, who cuts and burns patients, when his art commands, for the purpose of curing them. He will not be disposed to fetter himself by fixed general laws: for the variety of situations and the fluctuation of circumstances, is so perpetual, that no law can possibly fit all cases. He will recognise no other law but his art.⁵ If he lays down any general formula or law, it will only be from necessity, because he cannot be always at hand to watch and direct each individual case: but he will not hesitate to depart from his own formula whenever Art enjoins it.⁶ That alone is base, evil, unjust, which he with his political Science or Art declares to be so. If in any particular case he departs from his

Unscientific governments are counterfeits. Government by any numerous body must be counterfeit. Government by the one scientific man is the true government.

¹ Plato, Politik. pp. 292 C, 293 B.

² Plato, Politik. p. 293 E. τήν τε τέχνην καὶ κατὰ τοὺς τοιοῦτους ὄρους ἡμῖν μόνον ὁρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι ῥητόν, ὅσας δὲ ἄλλας λόγουμεν, οὐ γνησίας οὐδ' ὄρους οὐσας λατρίων.

³ Plato, Politik. pp. 292 D-E, 297 B, 300 E.

⁴ Plato, Politik. p. 293 B-E.

⁵ Plato, Politik. p. 297 A. οὐ γράμματα τιθεῖς ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην νόμον παρεχόμενος.

⁶ Plato, Politik. pp. 300 C, 295 B-C.

own declaration, and orders such a thing to be done—the public have no right to complain that he does injustice. No patient can complain of his physician, if the latter, acting upon the counsels of his art, disregards a therapeutic formula.¹ All the acts of the true Governor are right, whether according or contrary to law, so long as he conducts himself with Art and Intelligence—aiming exclusively to preserve the people, and to render them better instead of worse.²

How mischievous would it be (continues the Eleate) if we prescribed by fixed laws how the physician or the steersman should practise their respective arts: if we held them bound to peremptory rules, punishing them whenever they departed from those rules, and making them accountable before the Dikastery, when any one accused them of doing so: if we consecrated these rules and dogmas, forbidding all criticism or censure upon them, and putting to death the free enquirer as a dreaming, prosy, Sophist, corrupting the youth and inciting lawless discontent!³ How absurd, if we pretended that every citizen did know, or might or ought to know, these two arts; because the matters concerning them were enrolled in the laws, and because no one ought to be wiser than the laws?⁴ Who would think of imposing any such fetters on other arts, such as those of the general, the painter, the husbandman, the carpenter, the prophet, the cattle-dealer? To impose them would be to render life, hard as it is even now, altogether intolerable. Yet these are the trammels under which in actual cities the political Art is exercised.⁵

Such are the mischiefs inseparable, in greater or less degree,

¹ Plato, *Politik.* p. 296 C-D.

² Plato, *Politik.* p. 297 A.

³ Plato, *Politik.* pp. 298-299. 299 B: Καὶ τοῖνυν ἐπὶ δεήσει θίσθαι νόμον ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῦτοις, ἂν τις κυβερνητικὴν καὶ τὸ ναυτικὸν ἢ τὸ ὑγεινὸν καὶ ἰατρικὴν ἀληθείαν . . . ζητῶν φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ συζητῶντες ὅτιον περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, πρῶτον μὲν μήτε ἰατρικὸν αὐτὸν μήτε κυβερνητικὸν ὀνομάζειν, ἀλλὰ μετεωρόλογον ἀβολόσχην τινὰ σοφιστὴν εἶδ' ὥς διαφθεύοντα ἄλλους νεωτέρους καὶ ἀναπειθοντα ἐπιτίθασθαι

κυβερνητικῇ, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Polit.* p. 299 C. ἂν δὲ παρὰ τοὺς νόμους καὶ τὰ γεγραμμένα δόξῃ πείθειν εἴτε νέους εἴτε πρεσβύτας, κολλᾶν τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ δεῖν τῶν νόμων εἶναι σοφώτερον· οὐδένα γὰρ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ τε ἰατρικὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγεινὸν οὐδὲ τὸ κυβερνητικὸν καὶ ναυτικόν· ἐξεῖναι γὰρ τῇ βουλομένῃ μαθάνειν γεγραμμένα καὶ πατρία ἔθνη κείμενα.

⁵ Plato, *Polit.* p. 299 D-E. ὥστε ὁ βίος, ὃν καὶ νῦν χαλεπός, εἰς τὸν χρόνον ἐκείνον ἀβιωτός γίγνοιτ' ἂν τὸ παράπαν.

Government by fixed laws is better than lawless government by unscientific men, but worse than lawless government by scientific men. It is a second-best.

from fixed and peremptory laws. Yet grave as these mischiefs are, there are others yet graver, which such laws tend to obviate. If the magistrate appointed to guard and enforce the laws, ventures to break or contravene them, simulating, but not really possessing, the Art or Science of the genuine Ruler—he will make matters far worse. The laws at any rate are such as the citizens have been accustomed to, and such as give a certain measure of satisfaction. But the arbitrary rule of this violent and unscientific Governor is a tyranny :¹ which is greatly worse than the laws. Fixed laws are thus a second-best :² assuming that you cannot obtain a true scientific, artistic, Governor. If such a man could be obtained, men would be delighted to live under him. But they despair of ever seeing such a character, and they therefore cling to fixed laws, in spite of the numerous concomitant mischiefs.³ These mischiefs are indeed so serious, that when we look at actual cities, we are astonished how they get on under such a system ; and we cannot but feel how firm and deeply rooted a city naturally is.⁴

We see therefore (the Eleate goes on) that there is no true polity—nothing which deserves the name of a genuine political society—except the government of one chief, scientific or artistic. With him laws are superfluous and even inconvenient. All other polities are counterfeits : factions and cabals, rather than governments :⁵ delusions carried on by tricksters and conjurers. But among these other polities or sham polities, there is a material difference as to greater or less badness : and the difference turns upon the presence or absence of good laws. Thus, the single-headed government, called monarchy (assuming the Prince not to be a man of science or art) is the

¹ Plato, Politik. p. 300 A-B, 301 B-C.

² Plato, Politik. p. 300 C. δεύτερος πλοῦς.

³ Plato, Politik. p. 301 D.

⁴ Plato, Politik. p. 302 A. ἡ ἐκείνο ἡμῖν θαυμαστόν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἰσχυρόν τι πόλις ἐστὶ φύσει ;

⁵ Plato, Politik. pp. 302-303 B-C. τοὺς κοινωνοὺς τούτων τῶν πολιτικῶν πασῶν, πλὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμονος, ἀφαιρετόν ὡς οὐκ ὄντας πολιτικοὺς ἀλλὰ στασιαστικούς, καὶ εἰδῶμεν μεγίστων προστάτας ὄντας καὶ αὐτοὺς εἶναι τοιοῦτους, μεγίστους δὲ ὄντας μικρὰς καὶ γόφας μεγίστους γίγνεσθαι τῶν σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς.

best of all the sham-polities, if the Prince rules along with and in observance of known good laws : but it is the worst of them all, if he rules without such laws, as a despot or tyrant. Oligarchy, or the government of a few—if under good laws, is less good than that of the Prince under the same circumstances—if without such laws, is less bad than that of the despot. Lastly, the government of the many is less good under the one supposition—and less bad under the other. It is less effective, either for good or for evil. It is in fact less of a government : the administrative force being lost by dissipation among many hands for short intervals ; and more free play being thus left to individuals. Accordingly, assuming the absence of laws, democracy is the least bad or most tolerable of the six varieties of sham-polity. Assuming the presence of laws, it is the worst of them.¹

We have thus severed the genuine scientific Governor from the unworthy counterfeits by whom his agency is mimicked in actual society. But we have still to sever him from other worthier functionaries, analogous and cognate, with whom he co-operates ; and to show by what characteristic he is distinguished from persons such as the General, the Judge, the Rhetor or Persuader to good and just objects. The distinction is, that all these functions, however honourable functions, are still nevertheless essentially subordinate and ministerial, assuming a sovereign guidance from some other quarter to direct them. Thus the General may, by his strategic art, carry on war effectively ; but he must be directed when, and against whom, war is to be carried on. The Judge may decide quarrels without fear, antipathy, or favour : but the general rules for deciding them must be prescribed to him by a higher authority. So too the Rhetor may apply his art well, to persuade people, or to work upon their emotions, without teaching them : but he must be told by some one else, when and on what occasions persuasion is suitable, and when force must be employed instead of it.² Each of these functionaries must learn, what his own art

The true governor distinguished from the General, the Rhetor, &c. They are all properly his subordinates and auxiliaries.

¹ Plato, *Polit.* p. 302 B. τίς δὲ τῶν οὐκ ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν τούτων ἥκιστα χαλεπή σὺν ἡμῶν, πασῶν χαλεπὴν οὖσαν, καὶ τίς βαρυτάτη; Also p. 303 A-B.

² Plato, *Polit.* pp. 304-305.

will not teach him, the proper seasons, persons, and limitations, among and under which his art is to be applied. To furnish such guidance is the characteristic privilege and duty of the scientific chief, for which he alone is competent. He does not act himself, but he originates, directs, and controls, all the real agents and agencies. Without him, none of them are available or beneficial towards their special ends. He alone can judge of their comparative value, and of the proper reasons for invoking or restraining their interference.¹

The great scientific Governor being thus defined, and logically distinguished from all others liable to be confounded with him, Plato concludes by a brief statement what his principal functions are. He will aim at ensuring among his citizens the most virtuous characters and the best ethical combinations. Like the weaver (to whom he has been already assimilated) he will put together the great political web or tissue of improved citizenship, intertwining the strong and energetic virtues (the warp) with the yielding and gentler virtues (the woof).² Both these dispositions are parts or branches of virtue; but there is a natural variance or repulsion between them.³ Each of them is good, in proper measure and season: each of them is bad, out of measure and season. The combination of both, in due proportion, is indispensable to form the virtuous citizen: and that combination it is the business of the scientific Governor to form and uphold. It is with a view to this end that he must set at work all the agents of teaching and education, and must even interfere to arrange the intermarriages of the citizens; not allowing the strong and courageous families to form alliance with each other, lest the breed should in time become too violent—nor the gentle and quiet families to do the like, lest the offspring should degenerate into stupidity.⁴

All persons, who, unable to take on this conjunction, sin by an

¹ Plato, Polit. p. 305 D. τὴν γὰρ ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράττειν, ἀλλ' ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν, γινώσκουσιν τὴν ἀρχὴν τε καὶ ὅρμην τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαίριος τε πέρη καὶ ἀκαίριος, τὰς δ'

ἄλλας τὰ προστεχθέντα δοῦν.

² Plato, Polit. pp. 306-307. τὴν βασιλικὴν συμπλοκήν.

³ Plato, Polit. pp. 306 A-B, 307 C, 308 B.

⁴ Plato, Polit. pp. 308-309-310.

excess of the strong element, manifesting injustice or irreligion—must be banished or put to death: ¹ all who sin by excess of the feebler element, exhibiting stupidity and meanness, must be degraded into slavery. Above all things, the scientific Governor must himself dictate, and must implant and maintain, in the minds of all his citizens, an authoritative standard of orthodox sentiment respecting what is just, honourable, good—and the contrary.² If this be ensured, and if the virtues naturally discordant be attuned with proper care, he will make sure of a friendly and harmonious community, enjoying as much happiness as human affairs admit.³

If a man sins by excess of the energetic element, he is to be killed or banished; if of the gentle, he is to be made a slave. The Governor must keep up in the minds of the citizens an unanimous standard of ethical orthodoxy

I have thus given a brief abridgment of the main purpose of the *Politikus*, and of the definition which Plato gives of the True Governor and his function. I proceed to make a few remarks upon it.

Remarks—Socratic Ideal—Title to govern mankind derived exclusively from scientific superiority in an individual person

Plato's theory of government is founded upon the supposition of perfect knowledge—scientific or artistic intelligence—in the person of the Governor: a partial approach, through teaching and acquired knowledge, to that immense superiority of the Governor over the Governed, which existed in the Saturnian period. It is this, and this alone, which constitutes, in his estimation, the title to govern mankind. The Governor does not himself act: he directs the agency of others: and the directions are dictated by his knowledge. I have already observed that Sokrates had himself enunciated the doctrine—Superior scientific competence (the special privilege of a professor or an artist) is the only legitimate title to govern.

From Sokrates the idea passed both to Plato and to Xenophon: and the contrast between the two is shown forcibly by the different way in which they deal with it. Xenophon has worked it out on a large

Different ways in which this ideal is

¹ Plato, *Polit.* p. 309 A.

² Plato, *Polit.* pp. 309 C, 310 E.

³ Plato, *Polit.* p. 311 B-C.

worked out by Plato and Xenophon. The man of speculation and the man of action. scale, in the *Cyropædia*—on a small scale, in the *Œconomicus*. Cyrus in the former, Ischomachus in the latter, knows better than any one else what is to be done, and gives orders accordingly. But both the one and the other are also foremost in action, setting example as well as giving orders to others.

Now Plato, while developing the same idea, draws a marked line of distinction between Science and Practice :—between direction and execution.¹ His scientific Governor does not act at all, but he gives orders to all the different men of action, and he is the only person who knows on what occasions and within what limits each agent should put forth his own special aptitude. Herein we discern one of the distinctions between these two *virī Socratici*: Xenophon, the soldier and man of action—Plato, the speculative philosopher. Xenophon conceives the conditions of the True Governor in a larger way than Plato, for he includes among them the forward and energetic qualities requisite for acting on the feelings of the subject Many, and for disposing them to follow orders with cheerfulness and zeal :² whereas Plato makes abstraction of this part of the conditions, and postulates obedience on the part of the many as an item in his fundamental hypothesis. Indeed he perpetually presents us with the comparison of the physician, who cuts and burns for the purpose of ultimate cure. Plato either neglects, or assumes as a matter of course, the sentiments of the persons commanded, or the conditions of *willing* obedience ; while Xenophon dwells upon the maintenance of such sentiments as one of the capital difficulties in the problem of government. And we perceive a marked contrast between the unskilful proceedings of Plato, when he visited Dionysius II. at Syracuse, illustrating his (Plato's) inaptitude for dealing with a real situation—and the judicious management of Xenophon, when acting as one of the leaders of the Cyreian army under circumstances alike unexpected and perilous.

Plato here sets forth the business of governing as a special art,

¹ Plato, *Polit.* pp. 259 C-D, 306 D.

² See the preface to Xenophon's *Cyropædia* ; also *Cyropæd.* I. 6, 20 ; and his *Econ.* c. 21, and c. 13, 4, where we see the difference between the Xenophontic idea, and the Platonic idea, of *ὁ ἀρχὸς ἀνθρώπων, οἱ θεοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἐπιστήμονες ἀρχόντες*.

analogous to the special art of the weaver, the steersman, the physician. Now in each special art, the requisite knowledge and competence is possessed only by the one or few artists who practise them. The knowledge possessed by such one or few, suffices for all the remaining community ; who benefit by it, but are altogether ignorant on the matter, and follow orders blindfold. As this one Artist is the only competent person for the task, so he is assumed *quid* Artist, to be infallible in the performance of the task—never to go wrong, nor to abuse his power, nor to aim at any collateral end.¹ Such is Plato's theory of government in the *Politikus*. But if we turn to the Protagoras, we shall find this very theory of government explicitly denied, and a counter-theory affirmed, in the discourse put into the mouth of Protagoras. That Sophist is made to distinguish the political or social art, upon which the possibility of constituting or keeping up human society depends, from all other arts (manual, useful, linguistic), by this express characteristic : All other arts were distributed among mankind in such manner, that knowledge and skill were confined to an exclusive few, whose knowledge, each in his own special department, sufficed for the service of all the rest, not favoured with the like knowledge—but the political or social art was distributed (by order of Zeus to Hermes) on a principle quite opposite. It was imparted to every member of society without exception. If it had been granted only to a few, and not to all, society could not have held together. Justice and the sense of shame (Temperance or Moderation), which are the bonds of the city and the fruits of the political art, must be instilled into every man. Whoever cannot take on and appropriate them (Zeus proclaims it as his law), must be slain as a nuisance or distemper of the city.²

Such we have seen to be the theory enunciated by the Platonic Protagoras (in the dialogue so-called) respecting the political or social art. It pervades all the members of society, as a common and universal attribute, though each man has his own specialty besides. It was thus distributed at the outset by Zeus. It stands

The theory in the *Politikus* is the contradiction to that theory which is assigned to Protagoras in the Protagoras.

Points of the Protagorean theory—rests upon common sentiment.

¹ Compare Plato, *Republic*, i. pp. 340-341.

² Plato *Protag.* pp. 322, 325 A.

embodied in the laws and in the unwritten customs, so that one man may know it as well as another. Every man makes open profession of knowing and possessing it:—which he cannot do with any special art. Fathers enforce it on their children by rewards and punishments, schoolmasters and musicians impart it by extracts from the poets: the old teach it to the young: nay every man, far from desiring to monopolise it for himself, is forward in teaching it to others: for it is the interest of every one that his neighbour should learn it. Since every one thus teaches it, there are no professed or special teachers: yet there are still some few who can teach it a little better than others—and among those few I (says Protagoras) am one.¹

Whoever compares the doctrine of the Politikus² with the portion of the Protagoras³ to which I have just referred, will see that they stand to each other as theory and counter-theory. The theory in the Politikus sets aside (intentionally or not) that in the Protagoras. The Platonic Protagoras, spokesman of King Nomos, represents common sense, sentiment, sympathies and antipathies, written laws, and traditional customs known to all as well as revered by the majority: the Platonic Politikus repudiates all these, as preposterous fetters to the single Governor who monopolises all political science and art. Let us add too, that the Platonic Protagoras (whom many commentators teach us to regard as a person of exorbitant arrogance and pretensions) is a very modest man compared to the Eleate in the Platonic Politikus. For the former accepts all the written laws and respected customs around him,—admits that most others know them, in the main, as well as he,—and only professes to have acquired a certain amount of superior skill in impressing them upon others: whereas the latter sets them all aside, claims for himself an uncontradicted monopoly of social science and art, and postulates an extent of blind submission from society such as has never yet been yielded in history.

The Eleate here complains of it as a hardship, that amidst a

¹ Plato, Protag. pp. 327-328.

² Plato, Politik. p. 301 E.

The portion of this dialogue, from p. 296 to p. 302, enunciates the doc-

trine of which I have given a brief abstract in the text.

³ Plato, Protag. pp. 321-323.

community actually established and existing, directed by written laws, traditional customs and common sentiment (the Protagorean model),—he, the political artist, is interdicted from adverse criticism and outspoken censure of the legal and consecrated doctrines. If he talks as one wiser than the laws, or impugns them as he thinks that they deserve, or theorises in his own way respecting the doctrines which they sanction—he is either laughed to scorn as a visionary, prosing, Sophist—or hated, and perhaps punished, as a corruptor of youth ; as a person who brings the institutions of society into contempt, and encourages violators of the law.¹

The Fleete complains that under the Protagorean theory no adverse criticism is allowed. The dissenter is either condemned to silence or punished.

The reproach implied in these phrases of Plato is doubtless intended as an allusion to the condemnation of Sokrates. It is a reproach well-founded against that proceeding of the government of Athens:—and would have been still better founded against other contemporary governments. That the Athenians were intolerant, is not to be denied : but they were less intolerant than any of their contemporaries. No-where else except at Athens could Sokrates have gone on until seventy years of age talking freely in the market-place against the received political and religious orthodoxy. There was more free speech (*παρρησία*)² at Athens than in any part of the contemporary world. Plato, Xenophon, and the other companions of Sokrates, proclaimed by lectures and writings that they thought themselves wiser than the laws of Athens : yet though the Gorgias was intended as well as adapted to bring into hatred and contempt both those laws and the persons who administered them, the Athenian Rhetors never indicted Plato for libel. Upon this point, we can

Intolerance at Athens, not so great as elsewhere. Plato complains of the assumption of infallibility in existing societies, but exacts it severely in that which he himself constructs.

¹ Plato, *Politik.* p. 299 B. *ἐν τις . . . ζητῶν φαίνεται παρὰ τὰ γράμματα καὶ σοφιστικῶς διανοῦν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα.*

In the seventh book of *Republic* (p. 520 B), Plato describes the position of the philosopher in an established society, springing up by his own internal force, against the opposition of all the social influences—*αὐτόματοι γὰρ ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἐκάστῃ πόλει πολιτείας, &c.*

² See Euripides, *Ion*, 671.

ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν μ' ἡ τεκοῦσ' εἴη γυνή, ὥς μοι γένοιτο μητρόθεν παρρησία.

Also Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 424, and Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 461 E, where Sokrates says to Polus—*δεινὰ μὲν' ἂν πάθους, εἰ Ἀθήνας ἀφικόμενος, οὐ τῆς Ἑλλάδος πλείστη ἐστὶν ἐξουσία τοῦ λέγειν, ἔπειτα σὺ ἐν ταῦτα τούτου μόνος ἀτυχῆσαις, &c.*

only speak comparatively : for perfect liberty of proclaiming opinions neither does now exist, nor ever has existed, any where. Most men have no genuine respect for the right of another to form and express an opinion dissentient from theirs : if they happen to hate the opinion, they account it a virtue to employ as much ill-usage or menace as will frighten the holder thereof into silence. Plato here points out in emphatic language,¹ the deplorable consequences of assuming infallibility and perfection for the legal and customary orthodoxy of the country, and prohibiting free censure by dissentient individuals. But this is on the supposition that the laws and customs are founded only on common sense and traditional reverence :—and that the scientific Governor is among the dissenters. Plato's judgment is radically different when he supposes the case reversed :—when King Nomos is superseded by the scientific Professor of whom Plato dreams, or by a lawgiver who represents him. We shall observe this when we come to the *Treatise de Legibus*, in which Plato constitutes an orthodoxy of his own, prohibiting free dissent by restrictions and penalties stricter than any which were known to antiquity. He cannot recognise an infallible common sense : but he has no scruple in postulating an infallible scientific dictator, and in enthroning himself as such. Though well aware that reasoned truth presents itself to different philosophers in different versions, he does not hesitate to condemn those philosophers who differ from him, to silence or to something worse.

It will appear then that the Platonic Politikus distinguishes three varieties and gradations of social constitution.

Theory of the Politikus—distinguished three gradations of polity. Gigantic individual force the worst.

1. *Science or Art. Systematic Construction from the beginning, based upon Theory.*—That which is directed by the constant supervision of a scientific or artistic Ruler. This is the only true or legitimate polity. Represented by Plato in *Republic*. Illustrated by the systematic scheme of weights, measures, apportionment of years, months, and days, in calendar—put together on scientific principles by the French Convention in 1793—as contrasted with the various local, incoherent, growths, which had obtained recognition through custom or arbitrary preference of unscientific superiors.

¹ Plato, *Polit.* p. 299 E.

2. *Common Sense. Unsystematic Aggregate of Customs, accepted in an Actual Society.*—That which is directed by written laws and fixed traditional customs, known to every one, approved by the common sense of the community, and communicated as well as upheld by the spontaneous teaching of the majority. King Nomos.

This stands for the second best scheme : the least objectionable form of degeneracy—yet still a degeneracy. It is the scheme set forth by the Platonic Protagoras, in the dialogue so called. Represented with improvements by Plato in Treatise De Legibus.

3. *Gigantic Individual Force.*—That in which some violent individual—not being really scientific or artistic, but perhaps falsely pretending to be so—violates and tramples under foot the established laws and customs, under the stimulus of his own exorbitant ambition and unmeasured desires.

This is put forward as the worst scheme of all : as the greatest depravation of society, and the greatest forfeiture of public as well as private happiness. We have here the proposition which Pólos and Kalliklēs are introduced as defending in the Gorgias, and Thrasymachus in the Republic. In both dialogues, Sokrates undertakes to expose it. The great benefit conferred by King Nomos, is, that he protects society against the maximum of evil.

Another interesting comparison may be made : that between the Politikus and the Republic. We must remember that the Politikus is announced by Plato as having two purposes. 1. To give a lesson in the method of definition and division. 2. To define the characteristic of the person bearing the name of Politikus, distinguishing him from all others, analogous or dis-

Comparison of the Politikus with the Republic. Points of analogy and difference.

parate.—The method is here more prominent than the doctrine.

But in the Republic, no lesson of method is attempted ; the doctrine stands alone and independent of it. We shall find however that the doctrine is essentially the same. That which the Politikus lays down in brief outline, is in the Republic amplified and enlarged ; presented with many variations and under different points of view, yet, still at the bottom, the same doctrine, both as to affirmation and negation. The Republic affirms (as the Politikus does) the exclusive legitimacy of science, art, intelligence, &c., as the initiatory and omnipotent authority over all

the constituent members of society : and farther, that such intelligence can have no place except in one or a few privileged persons. The Republic (like the Politikus) presents to us the march of society with its Principal Cause—its concurrent or Auxiliary Causes—and its inferior governable mass or matter, the human flock, indispensable and co-essential as a part of the whole scheme. In the Republic, the Cause is represented by the small council of philosophical Elders : the concurrent causes, by the Guardians or trained soldiers : the inferior matter, by the remaining society, which is distributed among various trades, providing for the subsistence and wants of all. The explanation of Justice (which is the ostensible purpose of the Republic) is made to consist in the fact—That each one of these several parts does its own special work—nothing more—nothing less. Throughout all the Republic, a constant parallelism is carried on (often indeed overstrained) between the community and the individual man. In the one as well as in the other, Plato recognises the three constituent elements, all essential as co-operators, but each with its own special function : in the individual, he recognises three souls (encephalic, thoracic, and abdominal) as corresponding to Elders, Guardians, and Producers, in the community. Here are the same features as those given in outline in the Politikus : but the two higher features of the three appear greatly expanded in the Republic : the training and conditions proper for the philosophic Artist or Governor, and for his auxiliaries the Guardians, being described and vindicated at great length. Moreover, in the Republic, Plato not only repeats the doctrine¹ that the right of command belongs to every art in its own province and over its own subject-matter (which is the cardinal point in the Politikus)—but he farther proclaims that each individual neither can exercise, nor ought to exercise, more than one art. He allows no double men or triple men²—“*Quam quisque novit artem, in eâ se exerceat*”. He would not have respected the Xenophontic Cyrus or Ischomachus. He carries the principle of specialization to its extreme point. His Republic

¹ Plato, *Republ.* i. p. 342 C. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀρχοῦσι γὰρ αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκείνου οὐκ ἑπὶ εἰσι τέχναι.

² Plato, *Republ.* ii. pp. 370 B, 374

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is an aggregate of special artists and professional aptitudes : among whom the Governor is only one, though the first and rarest. He sets aside the common basis of social endowments essential to every man : upon which each man's specialty is superinduced in the theory of the Platonic Protagoras. The only common quality which Plato admits is,—That each man, and each of the three souls composing each man, shall do his own business and his own business only : this is his definition of Justice, in the Republic.¹

Lastly, I will illustrate the Politikus by comparison with the Kratylus, which will be treated in the next chapter. The conception of dictatorial science or art, which I have stated as the principal point in the Politikus, appears again in the Kratylus applied to a different subject—naming, or the imposition of names. Right and legitimate name-giving is declared to be an affair of science or art, like right and legitimate polity : it can only be performed by the competent scientific or artistic name-giver, or by the lawgiver considered in that special capacity. The second title of the dialogue Kratylus is *Περὶ Ὀνομάτων Ὁρθότητος*—On the Rectitude or legitimacy of names. What constitutes right and legitimate Name-giving? In like manner, we might provide a second title for the Politikus—*Περὶ Πολιτείας Ὁρθότητος*—On the rectitude or legitimacy of polity or sociality. What constitutes right or legitimate sociality?² Plato answers—It is the constant dictation and supervision of art or science—or of the scientific, artistic, dictator, who alone knows both the End and the means. This alone is right and true sociality—or sociality as it ought to be. So, if we read the Kratylus, we find Plato defining in the same way right Name-giving—or name-

Comparison of the Politikus with the Kratylus. Dictatorial constructive, science or art, common to both: applied in the former to social administration—in the latter to the formation and modification of names.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iv. p. 433.

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The *ὁρθή*, *ἐλεθινή*, *γενεσία*, *πολιτεία*, are phrases employed several times—pp. 292 A-C, 293 B-E, 296 E, 297 B-D. 300 D-E: *ὁ ἀληθινός, ὁ ἵππευτος.* 300 E: *τὴν ἀληθεύσαν ἐκείνην, τὴν τοῦ ἐνὸς μετὰ τέχνης ἀρχόντος πολιτείαν.* 302 A-E.

Plato sometimes speaks as if a bad *πολιτεία* were no *πολιτεία* at all—as if a bad *νόμος* were no *νόμος* at all. See above, vol. ii. ch. xiv. pp. 88, where I have touched on this point in reviewing the *Minos*. This is a frequent and perplexing confusion, but purely verbal. Compare *Aristotel. Polit.* iii. 2, p. 1276, a. 1, where he deals with the like confusion—*ἀρ' εἰ μὴ δικαίως πολίτης, οὐ πολίτης;*

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is an aggregate of special artists and professional aptitudes : among whom the Governor is only one, though the first and rarest. He sets aside the common basis of social endowments essential to every man : upon which each man's speciality is superinduced in the theory of the Platonic Protagoras. The only common quality which Plato admits is,—That each man, and each of the three souls composing each man, shall do his own business and his own business only : this is his definition of Justice, in the Republic.¹

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giving as it ought to be. It is when each name is given by an artistic name-constructor, who discerns the Form of the name naturally suitable in each particular case, and can embody it in appropriate letters and syllables.¹ A true or right name signifies by likeness to the thing signified.² The good lawgiver discerns this likeness: but all lawgivers are not good: the bad lawgiver fancies that he discerns it, but is often mistaken.³ It would be the ideal perfection of language, if every name could be made to signify by likeness to the thing named. But this cannot be realised: sufficient likenesses cannot be found to furnish an adequate stock of names. In the absence of such best standard, we are driven to eke out language by appealing to a *second-best*, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating more or less to rectitude—that is, custom and convention.⁴

We see thus that in the *Kratylus* also, as well as in the *Politikus*, the systematic dictation of the Man of Science or Art is pronounced to be the only basis of complete rectitude. Below this, and far short of it, yet still indispensable as a supplement in real life—is, the authority of unsystematic custom or convention; not emanating from any systematic constructive Artist, but actually established (often, no one knows how) among the community, and resting upon their common sentiment, memory, and tradition.

This is the true Platonic point of view, considering human affairs in every department, the highest as well as the lowest, as subjects of Art and Science: specialization of attributes and subdivision of function, so that the business of governing falls to the lot of one or a few highly qualified Governors: while the social edifice is assumed to have been constructed from the beginning by one of these Governors, with a view to consistent, systematic, predetermined ends—instead of that incoherent aggregate⁵ which is consecrated under the empire of law

¹ Plato, *Kratylus*, p. 288 E. Οὐκ ἔστι τὰς οὐσιμῶν ἀπορίας ἀπορία θίγοντες ἑαυτοὺς, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπορίας οὐκ ὄντος ὅτι ἑαυτοὺς, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἡ ἀπορία, ὡς ἂν τὸν ἀπορίας. *Comp. Politik.* p. 292 D.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 420, 421 D, 423 C.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 421 E, 426 B.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 426 B-C.

So in the *Protagoras* (p. 328 A) we find the Platonic Protagoras comparing the self-originated and self-sustaining traditional ethics to the traditional language—*τὸ ἀρχαῖον ἔστι τοῦ ἑλληνικοῦ*.

⁵ The want of coherence, or of reference to any common and distinct

and custom. Here in the *Politikus*, we read that the great purpose of the philosophical Governor is to train all the citizens into virtuous characters : by a proper combination of Courage and Temperance, two endowments naturally discordant, yet each alike essential in its proper season and measure. The interweaving of these two forms the true Regal Web of social life.¹

Such is the concluding declaration of the accomplished Eleatic expositor, to Sokrates and the other auditors. But this suggests to us another question, when we revert to some of the Platonic dialogues handled in the preceding pages. What *are* Virtue, Courage, Temperance? In the *Menon*, the Platonic Sokrates had proclaimed, that he did not himself know what virtue was : that he had never seen any one else who did know : that it was impossible to say how virtue could be communicated, until you knew what virtue was—and impossible to determine any one of the parts of virtue, until virtue had been determined as a whole. In the *Charmidēs*, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what Temperance was ; he then tested several explanations thereof, propounded by Charmides and Kritias : but ending only in universal puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the *Lachēs*, he had done the same with Courage : not without various expressions of regret for his own ignorance, and of surprise at those who talked freely about generalities which they had never probed to the bottom. Perplexed by these doubts and difficulties—which perplexed yet more all his previous hearers, the modest beauty of

End, among the bundle of established *Νόμιμα* is noted by Aristotle, *Polit.* vii. 2, 1324, b. 5 : διὸ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χυθὲν, ὥς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως, εἰ ποῦ τι πρὸς ἐν οἱ νόμοι βλέπουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες· ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντέτακται σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.

Custom and education surround all prohibitions with the like sanctity—both those most essential to the common security, and those which emanate from capricious or local antipathy—in the minds of docile citizens.

¹ Ἰσθὲν τοι ἐνέμους τε φαγεῖν, κεφαλὰς τε τοκήων.

Aristotle dissents from Plato on the point of always vesting the governing functions in the same hands. He con-

siders such a provision dangerous and intolerable to the governed.

Aristot. *Polit.* ii. 5, 1264, b. 6.

¹ Plato, *Polit.* p. 306 A. βασιλικὴ συμπλοκή, &c.

Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the *Politikus* (pp. 254-256) treats this βασιλικὴ συμπλοκή as a poor and insignificant function, for the political Artist determined and installed by so elaborate a method and classification. But the dialogue was already so long that Plato could not well lengthen it by going into fuller details. Socher points out (Ueber Platon's Schrift, p. 274) discrepancies between the *Politikus* on one side, and Protagoras and Gorgias on the other—which I think are really discoverable, though I do not admit the inference which he draws from them.

Charmides and the mature dignity of Nikias and Laches—Sokrates now finds himself in presence of the Eleate, who talks about Virtue, Temperance, Courage, &c., as matters determinate and familiar. Here then would have been the opportunity for Sokrates to reproduce all his unsolved perplexities, and to get them cleared up by the divine Stranger who is travelling on a mission of philosophy. The third dialogue, to be called the *Philosophus*, which Plato promises as sequel to the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, would have been well employed in such a work of elucidation.

This, I say, is what we might have expected, if Plato had corresponded to the picture drawn by admiring commentators: if he had merely tied knots in one dialogue, in order to untie them in another. But we find nothing of the kind, nor is such a picture of Plato correct. The dialogue *Philosophus* does not exist, and probably was never written. Respecting the embarrassments of the *Menon*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Alkibiadês I.*, *Protagoras*, *Euthyphron*—Sokrates says not a word—*οὐδὲ γού*—to urge them upon the attention of the Eleate: who even alludes with displeasure to contentious disputants as unfair enemies. For the right understanding of these mysterious but familiar words—Virtue, Courage, Temperance—we are thrown back upon the common passive, unscientific, unreasoning, consciousness: or upon such measure and variety of it as each of us may have chanced to imbibe from the local atmosphere, unassisted by any special revelation from philosophy. At any rate, the Eleate furnishes no interpretative aid. He employs the words, as if the hearers understood them of course, without the slightest intimation that any difficulty attaches to them. Plato himself ignores all the difficulties, when he is putting positive exposition into the mouth of the Eleate. Puzzles and perplexities belong to the *Dialogues of Search*; in which they serve their purpose, if they provoke the intellect of the hearer to active meditation and effort, for the purpose of obtaining a solution.

Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search—To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions.

CHAPTER XXXI.

KRATYLUS.

THE dialogue entitled *Kratylus* presents numerous difficulties to the commentators: who differ greatly in their manner of explaining. First, What is its main or leading purpose? Next, How much of it is intended as serious reasoning, how much as mere caricature or parody, for the purpose of exposing and reducing to absurdity the doctrines of opponents? Lastly, who, if any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed?

The subject proposed for discussion is, the rectitude or inherent propriety of names. How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? Two disputants are introduced who invoke Sokrates as umpire. Hermogenes asserts the negative of the question; contending that each name is destitute of natural significance, and acquires its meaning only from the mutual agreement and habitual usage of society.¹ *Kratylus* on the contrary maintains the doctrine that each name has a natural rectitude

Persons and subject of the dialogue *Kratylus*—Sokrates has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others.

¹ In the arguments put into the mouth of Hermogenes, he is made to maintain two opinions which are not identical, but opposed. 1. That names are significant by habit and convention, and not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any name which he pleases to any object (pp. 384-385).

The first of these two opinions is that which is really discussed here: impugned in the first half of the dialogue, conceded in the second. It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of mutual communication and information among persons living in

society: which purpose they would not serve if each individual gave a different name to the same object. The second opinion is therefore not a consequence of the first, but an implied contradiction of the first.

He who says that the names Horse and Dog are significant by convention, will admit that at the outset they might have been inverted in point of signification; but he will not say that any individual may invert them at pleasure, now that they are established. The purposes of naming would no longer be answered, if this were done.

or fitness for its own significant function:—that there is an inherent bond of connection, a fundamental analogy or resemblance between each name and the thing signified. Sokrates carries on the first part of the dialogue with Hermogenes, the last part with Kratylus.¹ He declares more than once, that the subject is one on which he is ignorant, and has formed no conclusion: he professes only to prosecute the search for a good conclusion, conjointly with his two companions.²

Sokrates, refuting Hermogenes, lays down the following doctrines.³ If propositions are either true or false, names, which are parts of propositions, must be true or false also.⁴ Every thing has its own fixed and determinate essence, not relative to us nor varying according to our fancy or pleasure, but existing *per se* as nature has arranged.⁵ All agencies either by one thing upon other things, or by other things upon it, are in like manner determined by nature, independent of our will and choice. If we intend to cut or burn any substance, we must go to work, not according to our

Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes—all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws—speaking and naming among the rest.

¹ The question between Hermogenes and Kratylus was much debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout antiquity (Aul. Gell. x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c. 24)—*λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπέρρητος ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων, πότερον, ὡς οἰεῖται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα, ἢ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Σοφίας, φύσει.*

Aristotle assumes the question in favour of *θέσει*, in his treatise De Interpretatione, without any reasoning, against the Platonic Kratylus; but his commentators, Ammonius and Boethius, note the controversy as one upon which eminent men in antiquity were much divided.

Plato connects his opinion, that names have a natural rectitude of signification, with his general doctrine of self-existent, archetypal, Forms or Ideas. The Stoics, and others who defended the same opinion afterwards, seem to have disconnected it from this latter doctrine.

² Plato, Kratyl. pp. 384 C, 391 A.

³ Aristotle. De Interpretat. ii. 1-2: "Ὄνομα μὲν ὅν ἐστι φωνῇ σηματοειρη κατὰ συνθήκην ἀνευ χρόνου . . . τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, &c.

This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of Hermogenes (Kratylus, p. 384 E), and which Sokrates himself, in the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent: that is, he admits that names are significant *κατὰ συνθήκην*, though he does not deny that they are or may be significant *φύσει*.

Τὸ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου (p. 397 A) is another phrase for expressing the opinion opposed to *ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητος*.

⁴ Plato, Kratyl. p. 385.

Here too, Aristotle affirms the contrary: he says (with far more exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false; and that a name taken by itself is neither. (De Interpret. i. 2.)

The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is analogous to that which we read in the Philébus, where Pleasures are distinguished as true and false.

⁵ Plato, Kratyl. p. 386 D. *ἔηλον δὲ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέλαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐλεόμενα αὐτῶ καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗ περ ἔσθαι.*

own pleasure, but in the manner that nature prescribes: by attempting to do it contrary to nature, we shall do it badly or fail altogether.¹ Now *speaking* is one of these agencies, and *naming* is a branch of *speaking*: what is true of other agencies is true of these also—we must name things, not according to our own will and pleasure, but in the way that nature prescribes that they shall be named.² Farther, each agency must be performed by its appropriate instrument: cutting by the axe, boring by the gimlet, weaving by the bodkin. The name is the instrument of naming, whereby we communicate information and distinguish things from each other. It is a didactic instrument: to be employed well, it must be in the hands of a properly qualified person for the purpose of teaching.³ Not every man, but only the professional craftsman, is competent to fabricate the instruments of cutting and weaving. In like manner, not every man is competent to make a name: no one is competent except the lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing artists.⁴

To what does the lawgiver look when he frames a name? Compare the analogy of other instruments. The artisan who constructs a bodkin or shuttle for weaving, has present to his mind as a model, the Idea or Form of the bodkin—the self-existent bodkin of Nature herself. If a broken shuttle is to be replaced, it is this Idea or type, not the actual broken instru-

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¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 389 B-C. αὐτὸ δὲ ἐστὶ κεραῖς . . . πᾶσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κεραίδος ἔχειν εἶδος . . . οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουλήθῃ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπεφύκει.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 389 D, 390 A. τὸ ἐκάστῃ φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὸν νομοθέτην ἔκαινον εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπιστάσθαι τιθεῖναι, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο ὃ ἐστὶν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τιθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κύ-

ριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης. . . .

Οὕτως ἀξιώσεις καὶ τὸν νομοθέτην τὸν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὥς ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῷ τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῃ ἐν ὁποιαῖσιν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χεῖρα νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν ὁπουοῦν ἄλλοθι;

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 424 D-E.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 390 C.

It is the fact then, though many persons may think it ridiculous, that names—or the elementary constituents and letters, of which names are composed—have each an intrinsic and distinctive aptitude, fitting them to signify particular things.¹ Names have thus a standard with reference to which they are correct or incorrect.

Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another.

If they are to be correct, they cannot be given either by the freewill of an ordinary individual, or even by the convention of all society. They can be affixed only by the skilled lawgiver, and appreciated only by the skilled dialectician.

Such is the theory here laid down by Sokrates respecting Names. It is curious as illustrating the Platonic vein of speculation. It enlarges to an extreme point Plato's region of the absolute and objective. Not merely each thing named, but each name also, is in his view an *Ens absolutum*; not dependent upon human choice—not even relative (so he alleges) to human apprehension. Each name has its own self-existent Idea, Form, or Type, the reproduction or copy of which is imperative. The Platonic intelligible world included Ideas of things, and of names correlative to them: just as it included Ideas of master and slave correlative to each other. It contained *Noumena* of names, as well as *Noumena* of things.² The essence of the name was, to be significant of the essence of the thing named: though such significance admitted of diversity, multiplication, or curtailment, in the letters or syllables wherein it was embodied.³ The name became significant, by imitation or resemblance: that name was right, the essence of which imitated the essence of the thing named.⁴ The vocal mimic imitates

Forms of Names, as well as, Forms of things nameable—essence of the *Nomen*, to signify the Essence of its *Nominatum*.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 425-426.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 133 E.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 393 D, 432.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 422 D. τῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ ὁρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἱβούλετο εἶναι, οἷα δηλοῦν ὅλον ἑκάστων ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων.—423 D: οὐ καὶ οὐ σία

δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι ἑκάστην, ὥσπερ καὶ χρώμα καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον ἀντὶ τῶ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἐστὶν οὐσία τις ἑκατέρῃ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πασι, ὅσα ἡξίωται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι; . . . Τί ἐόν; εἰ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μιμῆσθαι δύναται, οὐκ ἄσπον τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασι τε καὶ

συλλαβαῖς, ἄρ' οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἑκάστων ὁ ἐστίν; Compare p. 433.

The story given by Herodotus (ii. 2) about the experiment made by the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying *bread*. Psammetichus

giving as it ought to be. It is when each name is given by an artistic name-constructor, who discerns the Form of the name naturally suitable in each particular case, and can embody it in appropriate letters and syllables.¹ A true or right name signifies by likeness to the thing signified.² The good lawgiver discerns this likeness : but all lawgivers are not good : the bad lawgiver fancies that he discerns it, but is often mistaken.³ It would be the ideal perfection of language, if every name could be made to signify by likeness to the thing named. But this cannot be realised : sufficient likenesses cannot be found to furnish an adequate stock of names. In the absence of such best standard, we are driven to eke out language by appealing to a *second-best*, an inferior and vulgar principle approximating more or less to rectitude—that is, custom and convention.⁴

We see thus that in the *Kratylus* also, as well as in the *Politikus*, the systematic dictation of the Man of Science or Art is pronounced to be the only basis of complete rectitude. Below this, and far short of it, yet still indispensable as a supplement in real life—is, the authority of unsystematic custom or convention ; not emanating from any systematic constructive Artist, but actually established (often, no one knows how) among the community, and resting upon their common sentiment, memory, and tradition.

This is the true Platonic point of view, considering human affairs in every department, the highest as well as the lowest, as subjects of Art and Science : specialization of attributes and subdivision of function, so that the business of governing falls to the lot of one or a few highly qualified Governors : while the social edifice is assumed to have been constructed from the beginning by one of these Governors, with a view to consistent, systematic, predetermined ends—instead of that incoherent aggregate⁵ which is consecrated under the empire of law

¹ Plato, *Kratylus*, p. 388 E. Οὐκ ἄρα παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ὄνομα θέσθαι ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τινος ὀνοματοῦργου· οὗτος δ' ἔστιν, ὡς δοκεῖν, ὁ νομοθέτης, δε δὴ τῶν δημιουργῶν σπουδαιότερος ἐν ἀνθρώποις γίγνεται. Compare *Politik.* p. 292 D.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 430, 431 D, 433 C.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 431 E, 436 B.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 435 B-C.

So in the *Protagoras* (p. 323 A) we find the Platonic Protagoras comparing the self-originated and self-sustaining traditional *ethica*, to the traditional language—*τίς διδάσκαλος ἐστὶ τοῦ Ἑλληνίζειν;*

⁵ The want of coherence, or of reference to any common and distinct

and custom. Here in the *Politikus*, we read that the great purpose of the philosophical Governor is to train all the citizens into virtuous characters : by a proper combination of Courage and Temperance, two endowments naturally discordant, yet each alike essential in its proper season and measure. The interweaving of these two forms the true Regal Web of social life.¹

Such is the concluding declaration of the accomplished Eleatic expositor, to Sokrates and the other auditors. But this suggests to us another question, when we revert to some of the Platonic dialogues handled in the preceding pages. What *are* Virtue, Courage, Temperance? In the *Menon*, the Platonic Sokrates had proclaimed, that he did not himself know what virtue was : that he had never seen any one else who did know : that it was impossible to say how virtue could be communicated, until you knew what virtue was—and impossible to determine any one of the parts of virtue, until virtue had been determined as a whole. In the *Charmidés*, Sokrates had affirmed that he did not know what Temperance was ; he then tested several explanations thereof, propounded by Charmides and Kritias : but ending only in universal puzzle and confessed ignorance. In the *Lachés*, he had done the same with Courage : not without various expressions of regret for his own ignorance, and of surprise at those who talked freely about generalities which they had never probed to the bottom. Perplexed by these doubts and difficulties—which perplexed yet more all his previous hearers, the modest beauty of

End, among the bundle of established Νόμματα is noted by Aristotle, *Polit.* vii. 2, 1324, b. 5 : διὰ καὶ τῶν πλείστων νομίμων χυθὴν, ὡς εἰπεῖν κειμένων παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις, ὅμως, εἰ ποῦ τι πρὸς τὸν οἶ νόμοι βλίσκουσι, τοῦ κρατεῖν στοχάζονται πάντες· ὥσπερ ἐν Λακεδαιμονίᾳ καὶ Κρήτῃ πρὸς τοὺς πολέμους συντίταται σχεδὸν ἢ τε παιδεία καὶ τὸ τῶν νόμων πλῆθος.

Custom and education surround all prohibitions with the like sanctity—both those most essential to the common security, and those which emanate from capricious or local antipathy—in the minds of docile citizens.

¹ Ἰσὸν τοι κνέμους τε φαγεῖν, κεφαλὰς τε τοκήων.

Aristotle dissents from Plato on the point of always vesting the governing functions in the same hands. He con-

siders such a provision dangerous and intolerable to the governed.

Aristot. *Polit.* ii. 5, 1264, b. 6.

¹ Plato, *Polit.* p. 306 A. βασιλικὴ συμπλοκή, &c.

Schleiermacher in his Introduction to the *Politikus* (pp. 254-256) treats this βασιλικὴ συμπλοκή as a poor and insignificant function, for the political Artist determined and installed by so elaborate a method and classification. But the dialogue was already so long that Plato could not well lengthen it by going into fuller details. Socher points out (Ueber Platon's Schrift, p. 274) discrepancies between the *Politikus* on one side, and Protagoras and Gorgias on the other—which I think are really discoverable, though I do not admit the inference which he draws from them.

Charmides and the mature dignity of Nikias and Laches—Sokrates now finds himself in presence of the Eleate, who talks about Virtue, Temperance, Courage, &c., as matters determinate and familiar. Here then would have been the opportunity for Sokrates to reproduce all his unsolved perplexities, and to get them cleared up by the divine Stranger who is travelling on a mission of philosophy. The third dialogue, to be called the *Philosophus*, which Plato promises as sequel to the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*, would have been well employed in such a work of elucidation.

This, I say, is what we might have expected, if Plato had corresponded to the picture drawn by admiring commentators : if he had merely tied knots in one dialogue, in order to untie them in another. But we find nothing of the kind, nor is such a picture of Plato correct. The dialogue *Philosophus* does not exist, and probably was never written. Respecting the embarrassments of the *Menon*, *Lachês*, *Charmidês*, *Alkibiadês I.*, *Protagoras*, *Euthyphron*—Sokrates says not a word—*οὐδὲ γὰρ*—to urge them upon the attention of the Eleate : who even alludes with displeasure to contentious disputants as unfair enemies. For the right understanding of these mysterious but familiar words—Virtue, Courage, Temperance—we are thrown back upon the common passive, unscientific, unreasoning, consciousness : or upon such measure and variety of it as each of us may have chanced to imbibe from the local atmosphere, unassisted by any special revelation from philosophy. At any rate, the Eleate furnishes no interpretative aid. He employs the words, as if the hearers understood them of course, without the slightest intimation that any difficulty attaches to them. Plato himself ignores all the difficulties, when he is putting positive exposition into the mouth of the Eleate. Puzzles and perplexities belong to the *Dialogues of Search* ; in which they serve their purpose, if they provoke the intellect of the hearer to active meditation and effort, for the purpose of obtaining a solution.

Purpose of the difficulties in Plato's Dialogues of Search—To stimulate the intellect of the hearer. His exposition does not give solutions.

CHAPTER XXXI.

KRATYLUS.

THE dialogue entitled *Kratylus* presents numerous difficulties to the commentators: who differ greatly in their manner of explaining. First, What is its main or leading purpose? Next, How much of it is intended as serious reasoning, how much as mere caricature or parody, for the purpose of exposing and reducing to absurdity the doctrines of opponents? Lastly, who, if any, are the opponents thus intended to be ridiculed?

The subject proposed for discussion is, the rectitude or inherent propriety of names. How far is there any natural adaptation, or special fitness, of each name to the thing named? Two disputants are introduced who invoke *Sokrates* as umpire. *Hermogenes* asserts the negative of the question; contending that each name is destitute of natural significance, and acquires its meaning only from the mutual agreement and habitual usage of society.¹ *Kratylus* on the contrary maintains the doctrine that each name has a natural rectitude

Persons and subject of the dialogue *Kratylus*—*Sokrates* has no formed opinion, but is only a Searcher with the others.

¹ In the arguments put into the mouth of *Hermogenes*, he is made to maintain two opinions which are not identical, but opposed. 1. That names are significant by habit and convention, and not by nature. 2. That each man may and can give any name which he pleases to any object (pp. 384-385).

The first of these two opinions is that which is really discussed here: impugned in the first half of the dialogue, conceded in the second. It is implied that names are to serve the purpose of mutual communication and information among persons living in

society: which purpose they would not serve if each individual gave a different name to the same object. The second opinion is therefore not a consequence of the first, but an implied contradiction of the first.

He who says that the names *Horse* and *Dog* are significant by convention, will admit that at the outset they might have been inverted in point of signification; but he will not say that any individual may invert them at pleasure, now that they are established. The purposes of naming would no longer be answered, if this were done.

or fitness for its own significant function:—that there is an inherent bond of connection, a fundamental analogy or resemblance between each name and the thing signified. Sokrates carries on the first part of the dialogue with Hermogenes, the last part with Kratylus.¹ He declares more than once, that the subject is one on which he is ignorant, and has formed no conclusion: he professes only to prosecute the search for a good conclusion, conjointly with his two companions.²

Sokrates, refuting Hermogenes, lays down the following doctrines.³ If propositions are either true or false, names, which are parts of propositions, must be true or false also.⁴ Every thing has its own fixed and determinate essence, not relative to us nor varying according to our fancy or pleasure, but existing *per se* as nature has arranged.⁵ All agencies either by one thing upon other things, or by other things upon it, are in like manner determined by nature, independent of our will and choice. If we intend to cut or burn any substance, we must go to work, not according to our

Argument of Sokrates against Hermogenes—all proceedings of nature are conducted according to fixed laws—speaking and naming among the rest.

¹ The question between Hermogenes and Kratylus was much debated among the philosophers and literary men throughout antiquity (Aul. Gell. x. 4). Origen says (contra Celsum, i. c. 24)—*λόγος βαδύς καὶ ἀπέρρητος ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων, πότερον, ὡς οἰεῖται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα, ἢ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει.*

Aristotle assumes the question in favour of *θέσει*, in his treatise *De Interpretatione*, without any reasoning, against the Platonic Kratylus; but his commentators, Ammonius and Boethius, note the controversy as one upon which eminent men in antiquity were much divided.

Plato connects his opinion, that names have a natural rectitude of signification, with his general doctrine of self-existent, archetypal, Forms or Ideas. The Stoics, and others who defended the same opinion afterwards, seem to have disconnected it from this latter doctrine.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 384 C, 391 A.

³ Aristotle. *De Interpretat.* ii. 1-2: "Ὅνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ φωνῇ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἀνευ χρόνου . . . τὸ δὲ κατὰ συνθήκην, ὅτι φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, &c.

This is the same doctrine which Plato puts into the mouth of Hermogenes (*Kratylus*, p. 384 E), and which Sokrates himself, in the latter half of the dialogue, admits as true to a large extent: that is, he admits that names are significant *κατὰ συνθήκην*, though he does not deny that they are or may be significant *φύσει*.

Τὸ ἀπὸ ταυτομάτου (p. 397 A) is another phrase for expressing the opinion opposed to *ὀνομάτων ὁρθότης*.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 386.

Here too, Aristotle affirms the contrary: he says (with far more exactness than Plato) that propositions alone are true or false; and that a name taken by itself is neither. (*De Interpret.* i. 2.)

The mistake of Plato in affirming Names to be true or false, is analogous to that which we read in the *Philæbus*, where Pleasures are distinguished as true and false.

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 386 D. *ἔηλον δὲ ὅτι αὐτὰ αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντά τινα βέβαιόν ἐστι τὰ πράγματα, οὐ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐδὲ ὑφ' ἡμῶν, ἐλκόμενα ἄνω καὶ κάτω τῷ ἡμετέρῳ φαντάσματι, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ἔχοντα ᾗ περ ἔρρευσεν.*

own pleasure, but in the manner that nature prescribes: by attempting to do it contrary to nature, we shall do it badly or fail altogether.¹ Now *speaking* is one of these agencies, and *naming* is a branch of *speaking*: what is true of other agencies is true of these also—we must name things, not according to our own will and pleasure, but in the way that nature prescribes that they shall be named.² Farther, each agency must be performed by its appropriate instrument: cutting by the axe, boring by the gimlet, weaving by the bodkin. The name is the instrument of naming, whereby we communicate information and distinguish things from each other. It is a didactic instrument: to be employed well, it must be in the hands of a properly qualified person for the purpose of teaching.³ Not every man, but only the professional craftsman, is competent to fabricate the instruments of cutting and weaving. In like manner, not every man is competent to make a name: no one is competent except the lawgiver or the gifted name-maker, the rarest of all existing artists.⁴

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ment, which he seeks to copy. Whatever may be the variety of web for which the shuttle is destined, he modifies the new instrument accordingly: but all of them must embody the Form or Idea of the shuttle. He cannot choose another type according to his own pleasure: he must embody the type, prescribed by nature, in the iron, wood, or other material of which the instrument is made.¹

So about names: the lawgiver, in distributing names, must look to the Idea, Form, or type—the self-existent name of Nature—and must embody this type, as it stands for each different thing, in appropriate syllables. The syllables indeed may admit of great variety, just as the material of which the shuttle is made may be diversified: but each aggregate of syllables, whether Hellenic or barbaric, must embody the essential Name-Idea or Type.² The lawgiver³ ought to know, enumerate, and classify all the sorts of things on the one hand, and all the varieties of letters or elements of language on the other; distinguishing the special significative power belonging to each letter. He ought then to construct his words, and adapt each to signify that with which it is naturally connected. Who is to judge whether this process has been well or ill performed? Upon that point, the judge is, the professional man who uses the instrument. It is for the working weaver to decide whether the shuttle given to him is well or ill made. To have a good ship and rudder, it must be made by a professional builder, and appreciated by a professional pilot or steersman. In like manner, the names constructed by the lawgiver must be appreciated by the man who is qualified by training or study to use names skilfully: that is, by the dialectician or philosopher, competent to ask and answer questions.⁴

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 389 B-C. αὐτὸ δ' ὅστις κεραῖς . . . πᾶσας μὲν δεῖ τὸ τῆς κεραῖδος ἔχειν εἶδος . . . οὐχ οἷον ἂν αὐτὸς βουλήσθῃ, ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπεφύκει.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 389 D, 390 A. τὸ ἐκείνων φύσει πεφυκὸς ὄνομα τὴν νομοθέτην ἐκείνων εἰς τοὺς φθόγγους καὶ τὰς συλλαβὰς δεῖ ἐπιστάσθαι τίθεται, καὶ βλέποντα πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐκείνο δ' ἔστιν ὄνομα, πάντα τὰ ὀνόματα ποιεῖν τε καὶ τίθεσθαι, εἰ μέλλει κτ.

ριος εἶναι ὀνομάτων θέτης. . . .

Οὕτως ἀφύσους καὶ τὴν νομοθέτην τὸν τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὸν ἐν τοῖς βαρβάροις, ὥς ἂν τὸ τοῦ ὀνόματος εἶδος ἀποδιδῇ τὸ προσῆκον ἐκείνων ἐν ὁποιαῖσιν συλλαβαῖς, οὐδὲν χεῖρα νομοθέτην εἶναι τὸν ἐνθάδε ἢ τὸν σπουδὴν ἄλλοθεν;

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 424 D-E.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 390 C.

It is the fact then, though many persons may think it ridiculous, that names—or the elementary constituents and letters, of which names are composed—have each an intrinsic and distinctive aptitude, fitting them to signify particular things.¹ Names have thus a standard with reference to which they are correct or incorrect. If they are to be correct, they cannot be given either by the freewill of an ordinary individual, or even by the convention of all society. They can be affixed only by the skilled lawgiver, and appreciated only by the skilled dialectician.

Names have an intrinsic aptitude for signifying one thing and not another.

Such is the theory here laid down by Sokrates respecting Names. It is curious as illustrating the Platonic vein of speculation. It enlarges to an extreme point Plato's region of the absolute and objective. Not merely each thing named, but each name also, is in his view an *Ens absolutum*; not dependent upon human choice—not even relative (so he alleges) to human apprehension. Each name has its own self-existent Idea, Form, or Type, the reproduction or copy of which is imperative. The Platonic intelligible world included Ideas of things, and of names correlative to them: just as it included Ideas of master and slave correlative to each other. It contained *Noumena* of names, as well as *Noumena* of things.² The essence of the name was, to be significant of the essence of the thing named: though such significance admitted of diversity, multiplication, or curtailment, in the letters or syllables wherein it was embodied.³ The name became significant, by imitation or resemblance: that name was right, the essence of which imitated the essence of the thing named.⁴ The vocal mimic imitates

Forms of Names, as well as Forms of things nameable—essence of the Nomen, to signify the Essence of its Nominatum.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 425-426.

² Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 133 E.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 393 D, 432.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 422 D. τῶν ὀνομάτων ἢ ὁρθότης τοιαύτη τις ἱβούλετο εἶναι, οἷα δηλοῦν οἷον ἑκάστὸν ἐστὶ τῶν ὄντων.— 423 D: οὐ καὶ οὐ σ' ἰα δοκεῖ σὺ εἶναι ἐκάστῳ, ὥσπερ καὶ χρώμα καὶ ἂ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν; πρῶτον αὐτῷ τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ φωνῇ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία τις ἐκατέρῃ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πασιν, ὅσα ἡξιώται ταύτης τῆς προσρήσεως τοῦ εἶναι; . . . Τί ἔδν; εἰ τις αὐτὸ τοῦτο μμῆσθαι δύναται, οὐκαστον τὴν οὐσίαν, γράμμασι τε καὶ

συλλαβαῖς, ἀρ' οὐκ ἂν δηλοῖ ἑκάστον ὁ ἐστίν; Compare p. 433.

The story given by Herodotus (II. 2) about the experiment made by the Egyptian king Psammetichus, is curious. He wished to find out whether the Egyptians or the Phrygians were the oldest or first of mankind: he accordingly caused two children to be brought up without having a word spoken to them, with a view to ascertain what language they would come to by nature. At the age of two years they uttered the Phrygian word signifying *bread*. Psammetichus

sounds, the painter imitates the colours : the name-giver imitates in letters or syllables, the essence of colours, sounds, and every thing else which is nameable.

Another point here is peculiar to Plato. The Name-Giver must provide names such as can be used with effect by the dialectician or philosopher : who is the sole competent judge whether the names have genuine rectitude or not.¹ We see from hence that the aspirations of Plato went towards a philosophical language fit for those who conversed with forms or essences : something like (to use modern illustrations) a technical nomenclature systematically constructed for the expositions of men of science : such as that of Chemistry, Botany, Mineralogy, &c. Assuredly no language actually spoken among men, has ever been found suitable for this purpose without much artificial help.

As this theory of naming is a deduction from Plato's main doctrine of absolute or self-existing Ideas, so it also illustrates (to repeat what was said in the last chapter) his recognition of professional skill and of competence vested exclusively in a gifted One or Few : which he ranks as the sole producing cause of Good or the Best, setting it in contrast with those two causes which he considers as productive of Evil, or at any rate of the Inferior or Second-Best : 1. The One or Few, who are ungifted and unphilosophical : perhaps ambitious pretenders. 2. The spontaneous, unspoken inspirations, conventions, customs, or habits, which grow up without formal mandate among the community. To find the right name of each thing, is no light matter, nor within the competence of any one or many ordinary men. It can only be done by one of the few privileged lawgivers. Plato even glances at the necessity of a superhuman

Exclusive competence of a privileged law-giver, to discern these essences, and to apportion names rightly.

was then satisfied that the Phrygians were the first of mankind.

This story undoubtedly proceeds upon the assumption that there is one name which naturally suggests itself for each object. But when M. Renan says that the assumption is the same "as Plato has developed with so much subtlety in the *Kratylus*," I do not agree with him. The Absolute Name-Form or Essence, discernible only by the technical Lawgiver, is something

very different. See M. Renan, *De l'Origine du Langage*, ch. vi. p. 146, 2nd ed.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 390 D. Respecting the person called ὁ διαλεκτικός, whom Plato describes as grasping Ideas, or Forms, Essences, and employing nothing else in his reasoning—ἀόρον δὲ καὶ λαμβάνων τῆς οὐσίας—see *Republic*, vi. p. 511 B, vii. pp. 533-534-537 C.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 426 A. ὁ τεχνικὸς νομοτάτης τεχνικός, &c.

name-giver : though he deprecates the supposition generally, as a mere evasion or subterfuge, introduced to escape the confession of real ignorance.¹

In laying down the basis of his theory respecting names, Plato states another doctrine as opposed to it : *viz.*, the Protagorean doctrine—Man is the Measure of all things. I have already said something about this doctrine, in reviewing the *Theætétus*, where Plato impugns it : but as he here impugns it again, by arguments in part different—a few words more will not be misplaced.

Counter-Theory, which Sokrates here sets forth and impugns—the Protagorean doctrine—*Homo Mensura*.

The doctrine of Protagoras maintains that all things are relative to the percipient, cogitant, concipient, mind : that all Object is implicated with a Subject : that as things appear to me, so they are to me—as they appear to you, so they are to you. Plato denies this, and says : “All things have a fixed essence of their own, absolutely and in themselves, not relative to any percipient or cogitant—nor dependent upon any one’s appreciative understanding, or emotional susceptibility, or will. Things are so and so, without reference to us as sentient or cogitant beings : and not only the things are thus independent and absolute, but all their agencies are so likewise—agencies either by them or upon them. Cutting, burning, speaking, naming, &c., must be performed in a certain determinate way, whether we prefer it or not. A certain Name belongs, by Nature or absolutely, to a certain thing, whether we choose it or not : it is not relative to any adoption by us, either individually or collectively.”

This Protagorean theory is here set forth by the Platonic Sokrates as the antithesis or counter-theory, to that which he is himself advancing, *viz.*—That Names are significant by nature and not by agreement of men :—That each Nomen is tied to its Nominatum by a natural and indissoluble bond. His remarks imply, that those who do not accept this last-mentioned theory must agree with Protagoras. But such an antithesis is noway necessary : since (not to speak of Hermogenes himself in this very dialogue) we find also that Aristotle—who maintains that Names are significant by convention and not by nature—dis-

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 397, 425, 438.

sents also from the theory of Protagoras : and would have rested his dissent from it on very different grounds.

This will show us—what I have already remarked in commenting on the *Theætétus*—that Plato has not been very careful in appreciating the real bearing of the Protagorean doctrine. He impugns it here by the same argument which we also read in the *Theætétus*. “Every one admits” (he says) “that there are some men wise and good—others foolish and wicked. Now if you admit this, you disallow the Protagorean doctrine. If I contend that as things appear to me, so they truly are to me—as things appear to you or to him, so they truly are to you or to him—I cannot consistently allow that any one man is wiser than any other. Upon such a theory, all men are put upon the same level of knowledge or ignorance.”

But the premisses of Plato here do not sustain his inference.

The Protagorean doctrine is, when stated in its most general terms,—That every man is and must be his own measure of truth or falsehood—That what appears to him true, is *true to him*, however it may appear to others—That he cannot by any effort step out of or beyond his own individual belief, conviction, knowledge—That all his *Cognita*, *Credita*, *Percepta*, *Cogitata*, &c., imply himself as *Cognoscens*, *Credens*, *Percipiens*, *Cogitans*, inseparably and indivisibly—That in affirming an object, he himself is necessarily present as affirming subject, and that Object and Subject are only two sides of the same indivisible fact¹—That though there are some

¹ M. Destutt Tracy observes, *Logique*, ch. ix. p. 347, ed. 1825 :

“En effet, on ne saurait trop le redire, chacun de nous, et même tout être animé quelconque, est pour lui-même le centre de tout. Il ne perçoit par un sentiment direct et une conscience intime, que ce qui affecte et émeut sa sensibilité. Il ne conçoit et ne connaît son existence que par ce qu’il sent, et celle des autres êtres que par ce qu’ils lui font sentir. Il n’y a de réel pour lui que ses perceptions, ses affections, ses idées : et tout ce qu’il peut jamais savoir, n’est toujours que des conséquences et des combinai-

sons de ces premières perceptions ou idées.”

The doctrine of the Sceptical philosophers, is explicitly announced by Sextus Empiricus as his personal belief : that which appears true to him, as far as his enquiry had reached. The passage deserves to be cited.

Sextus Empir. *Pyrrh. Hypotyp.* i. sect. 197-199.

“Ὅταν οὖν εἴη ὁ σκεπτικὸς οὐδὲν δρῶν . . . τούτῳ φησι λέγων τὸ δαυτῷ φαινόμενον περὶ τῶν προκειμένων, οὐκ ἀπαγγελτικῶς μετὰ πεποιθήσεως ἀποφαινόμενος, ἀλλ’ ὁ πάσχει, διηγούμενος. . . . Καὶ ὡς περ

matters which all men agree in believing, there is no criterion at once infallible and universally recognised, in matters where they dissent: moreover, the matters believed are just as much relative where all agree, as where some disagree.

This doctrine is not refuted by the fact, that every man believes others to be wiser than himself on various points. A man is just as much a measure to himself when he acts upon the advice of others, or believes a fact upon the affirmation of others, as when he judges upon his own unassisted sense or reasoning. He is a measure to himself when he agrees with others, as much as when he disagrees with them. Opinions of others, or facts attested by others, may count as materials determining his judgment; but the judgment is and must be his own. The larger portion of every man's knowledge rests upon the testimony of others; nevertheless the facts thus reported become portions of *his* knowledge, generating conclusions *in him* and relatively *to him*. I believe the narrative of travellers, respecting parts of the globe which I have never seen: I adopt the opinion of A a lawyer, and of B a physician, on matters which I have not studied: I understand facts which I did not witness, from the description of those who did witness them. In all these cases the act of adoption is my own, and the grounds of belief are relative to my state of mind. Another man may mistrust completely the authorities which I follow: just as I mistrust the authority of Mahomet or Confucius, or various others, regarded as infallible by a large portion of mankind. The grounds of belief are to a certain extent similar, to a certain extent dissimilar, in different men's minds. Authority is doubtless a frequent ground of belief; but it is essentially variable and essentially relative to the believer. Plato himself, in many passages, insists emphatically upon the dissensions in mankind respecting the question—"Who are the good and wise men?" He tells us that the true philosopher is accounted by the bulk of mankind foolish and worthless.

Each man believes others to be wiser on various points than himself—Belief on authority—not inconsistent with the affirmation of Protagoras.

ὁ λέγων "περιπατῶ," δύναται φησὶν λέγεσθαι τοιοῦτον "ὅσα ἐπ' ἡλθον ἐγὼ περιπατῶ," οὕτως ὁ λέγων "πάντα ἴσθιν ἀόριστα" συσσημαίνει καθ' ἑμᾶς τὸ ὡς πρὸς ἐμὲ ἢ ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται· ὡς εἶναι τὸ κατὰ πίστιν ἢ ἀπιστίαν.

In the *Kratylus*, Sokrates says (and I agree with him) that there are laws of nature respecting the processes of cutting and burning: and that any one who attempts to cut or burn in a way unconformable to those laws, will fail in his purpose. This is true, but it proves nothing against Protagoras. It is an appeal to a generalization from physical facts, resting upon experience and induction—upon sensation and inference which we and others, Protagoras as well as Plato, have had, and which we believe to be common to all. We know this fact, or have a full and certain conviction of it; but we are not brought at all nearer to the Absolute (i.e., to the Object without Subject) which Plato's argument requires. The analogy rather carries us away from the Absolute: for cutting and burning, with their antecedent conditions, are facts of sense: and Plato himself admits, to a great extent, that the facts of sense are relative. All experience and induction, and all belief founded thereupon, are essentially relative. The experience may be one common to all mankind, and upon which all are unanimous:¹ but it is not the less relative to each indi-

¹ Proklus, in his Scholia on the *Kratylus*, p. 32, ed. Boisson. cites the argument used by Aristotle against Plato on this very subject of names—*τὰ μὲν φύσει, παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτὰ· τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα οὐ παρὰ πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά· ὥστε τὰ φύσει ὄντα οὐκ ἔστιν ὀνόματα, καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα οὐκ εἰσι φύσει*. Ammonius ad Aristot. De Interpretat. p. 100, a. 28, Schol. Bekk. Sextus Empiricus adv. Mathematic. i. 145-147, p. 247, Fab.

Plato had assimilated naming to cutting and burning. Aristotle denies the analogy: he says that cutting and burning are the same to all, or are by nature: naming is not the same to all, and is therefore not by nature.

We find here the test pointed out to distinguish what is by nature (that which Plato calls the *οὐρίαν βέβαιον τῶν πραγμάτων*—p. 386 E),—viz. That it is the same to all or among all. What it is to one individual, it is to another also. There are a multitude of different judging subjects, but no dissentient subjects: myself, and in my belief all other subjects, are affected alike. This is the true and real Ob-

jective: a particular fact of sense, where Subject is not eliminated altogether, but becomes a constant quantity, and therefore escapes separate notice. An Objective absolute (i.e., without Subject altogether) is an impossibility.

In the Aristotelian sense of *φύσει*, it would be correct to say that Language, or Naming in *genere*, is natural to man. No human society has yet been found without some language—some names—some speech employed and understood by each individual member. But many different varieties of speech will serve the purpose, not indeed with equal perfection, yet tolerably: enough to enable a society to get on. The uniformity (*τὸ φῦλον*) here ceases. To a certain extent, the objects and agencies which are named, are the same in all societies: to a certain extent different. If we were acquainted with all the past facts respecting the different languages which have existed or do exist on the globe, we should be able to assign the reason which brought each particular *Nomen* into association with its *Nominatum*. But this past history is lost.

vidual of the multitude. What is relative to all, continues to be relative to each : the fact that all sentient individuals are in this respect alike, does not make it cease to be relative, and become absolute. What I see and hear in the theatre is relative to me, though it may at the same time be relative to ten thousand other spectators, who are experiencing like sensations. Where all men think or believe alike, it may not be necessary for common purposes to distinguish the multiplicity of individual thinking subjects : yet the subjects are nevertheless multiple, and the belief, knowledge, or fact, is relative to each of them, whether all agree, or whether beliefs are many and divergent. We cannot suppress ourselves as sentient or cogitant subjects, nor find any *locus standi* for Object pure and simple, apart from the ground of relativity. And the Protagorean dictum brings to view these subjective conditions, as being essential, no less than the objective, to belief and disbelief.

Protagoras would have agreed with Plato as to combustion—that there were certain antecedent conditions under which he fully expected it, and certain other conditions under which he expected with confidence that it would not occur. Only he would have declared this (assuming him to speak conformably to his own theory) to be his own full belief and conviction, derived from certain facts and comparisons of sense, which he also *knew* to be shared by most other persons. He would have pronounced farther, that those who held opposite opinions were in his judgment wrong : but he would have recognised that their opinion was true to themselves, and that their belief must be relative to causes operating upon *their* minds. Furthermore, he would have pointed out, that combustion itself, with its antecedents, were facts of sense, relative to individual sentients and observers, remembering and comparing what they had observed. This would have been the testimony of Protagoras (always assuming him to speak in conformity with his own theory), but it would not have satisfied Plato : who would have required a peremptory, absolute affirmation, discarding all relation to observers or observed facts, and leaving no scope for error or fallibility.

Those who agree with Plato on this question, impugn the

Reply of
Protagoras
to the Pla-
tonic objec-
tions.

Sentiments
of Belief
and Disbe-
lief common
to all men—
Grounds of
belief and
disbelief,
different
with diffe-
rent men
and diffe-
rent ages.

doctrine of Protagoras as effacing all real, intrinsic, distinction between truth and falsehood. Such objectors make it a charge against Protagoras, that he does not erect his own mind into a peremptory and infallible measure for all other minds.¹ He expressly recognises the distinction, so far as his own mind is concerned: he admits that other men recognise it also, each for himself. Nevertheless, to say that all men recognise one and the same objective distinction between truth and falsehood, would be to contradict palpable facts. Each man has a standard, an ideal of truth in his own mind: but different men have different standards. The grounds of belief, though in part similar with all men, are to a great extent dissimilar also: they are dissimilar even with the same man, at different periods of his life and circumstances. What all men have in common is the feeling of belief and the feeling of disbelief: the matters believed or disbelieved, as well as the ideal standard to which any new matter presented for belief or disbelief is referred, differ considerably. By rational discussion—by facts and reasonings set forth on both sides, as in the Platonic dialogues—opinions may be overthrown or modified: dissentients may be brought into agreement, or at least each may be rendered more fully master of the case on both sides. But this dialectic, the Platonic question and answer, is itself an appeal to the free action of the individual mind. The questioner starts from premisses conceded by the respondent. He depends upon the acquiescence of the respondent for every step taken in advance. Such a proceeding is relative, not absolute: coinciding with the Protagorean formula rather than with the Platonic negation of it.² No man ever claimed the right of individual judgment more emphatically than Sokrates: no man was ever more special in adapting his persuasions to the individual persons with whom he conversed.

¹ To illustrate the impossibility of obtaining any standard absolute and purely objective, without reference to any judging Subject, I had transcribed a passage from Steinthal's work on the Classification of Human Languages; but I find it too long for a note.

Steinthal, *Charakteristik der Haupt-*

sächlichen Typen des Sprachbaues, 2nd ed. Berlin, 1860, pp. 313-314-315.

² See the striking passages in the *Gorgias*, pp. 472 B, 474 B, 483 B; *Theætétus*, p. 171 D.

Also in proclaiming the necessity of speciality of adaptation to individual minds—*Plat. Phædr.* pp. 271-272, 277 B.

The grounds of belief, according to Protagoras, relative to the individual, are not the same with all men at all times. But it does not follow (nor does Protagoras appear to have asserted) that they vary according to the *will* or *inclination* of the individual. Plato, in impugning this doctrine, reasons as if these two things were one and the same—as if, according to Protagoras, a man believed whatever he chose.¹ This, however, is not an exact representation of the doctrine “Homo Mensura”: which does not assert the voluntary or the arbitrary, but simply the relative as against the absolute. What a man believes does not depend upon his own will or choice: it depends upon an aggregate of circumstances, partly peculiar to himself, partly common to him with other persons more or fewer in number:² upon his

Protagoras did not affirm, that Belief depended upon the will or inclination of each individual, but that it was relative to the circumstances of each individual mind.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 387-389, where πρὸς ἡμᾶς is considered as equivalent to ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλευόμεθα—ἢ ἂν ἡμεῖς βουλῶμεν—both of them being opposed to οἷον ἐπιφέρει—τὸ κατὰ φύσιν—ἰδίαν αὐτῶν φύσιν ἔχουσαι.

The error here noted is enumerated by Mr. John Stuart Mill, among the specimens of Fallacies of Confusion, in his *System of Logic*, Book v. ch. vii. § 1: “The following is an argument of Descartes to prove, in his *a priori* manner, the being of a God. The conception, says he, of an infinite Being proves the real existence of such a Being. For if there is not really any such Being, I must have made the conception: but if I could make it, I can also unmake it—which evidently is not true: therefore there must be, externally to myself, an archetype from which the conception was derived. In this argument (which, it may be observed, would equally prove the real existence of ghosts and of witches) the ambiguity is in the pronoun *I*; by which, in one place, is to be understood *my will*—in another, the *laws of my nature*. If the conception, existing as it does in my mind, had no original without, the conclusion would unquestionably follow that *I* made it—that is, the laws of my nature must have somehow evolved it: but that *my will* made it, would not follow. Now when Descartes afterwards adds that I cannot unmake the conception, he

means that I cannot get rid of it by an act of my will—which is true, but is not the proposition required. I can as much unmake this conception as I can any other: no conception which I have once had, can I ever dismiss by mere volition: but what some of the laws of my nature have produced, other laws, or those same laws in other circumstances, may, and often do, subsequently efface.”

² To show how constantly this Protagorean dictum is misconceived, as if Protagoras had said that things were to each individual what he was pleased or chose to represent them as being, I transcribe the following passage from Lassalle's elaborate work on Herakleitus (vol. ii. p. 381):—“Des Protagoras Prinzip ist es, dass überhaupt Nichts Objektives ist; dass vielmehr alles Beliebige was Einem scheint, auch für ihn sei. Dies Selbstsetzen des Subjekts ist die einzige Wahrheit der Dinge, welche an sich selbst Nichts Objektives haben, sondern zur gleichgültigen Fläche geworden sind, auf die das Subjekt willkürlich und beliebig seine Charaktere schreibt.”

Protagoras does not (as is here asserted) deny the Objective: he only insists on looking at it in conjunction with, or measured by, some Subject; and that Subject, not simply as desiring or preferring, but clothed in all its attributes.

age, organisation, and temperament—his experience, education, historical and social position—his intellectual powers and acquirements—his passions and sentiments of every kind, &c. These and other ingredients—analogue, yet neither the same nor combined in the same manner, even in different individuals of the same time and country, much less in those of different times and countries—compose the aggregate determining grounds of belief or disbelief in every one. Each man has in his mind an ideal standard of truth and falsehood: but that ideal standard, never exactly the same in any two men, nor in the same man at all times, often varies in different men to a prodigious extent. Now it is to this standard in the man's own mind that those reasoners refer who maintain that belief is relative. They do not maintain that it is relative simply to his wishes, or that he believes and disbelieves what he chooses.

When Plato says that combustibility and secability of objects

Facts of sense—some are the same to all sentient subjects, others are different to different subjects. Grounds of unanimity.

are properties fixed and determinate,¹ this is perfectly true, as meaning that a certain proportion of the facts of sense affect in the same way the sentient and appreciative powers of each individual, determining the like belief in every man who has ever experienced them. Measuring and weighing are sensible facts of this character: seen alike by all, and conclusive proofs to all. But this implies, to a certain point, funda-

¹ When Plato asserts not only that Objects are absolute and not relative to any Subject—but that the agencies or properties of Objects are also absolute—he carries the doctrine farther than modern defenders of the absolute. M. Cousin, in the eighth and ninth Lectures of his Cours d'Hist. de la Philosophie Morale au 18^{me} Siècle, lays down the contrary, maintaining that objects and essences alone are absolute, though unknowable; but that their agencies are relative and knowable.

"Nous savons qu'il existe quelque chose hors de nous, parceque nous ne pouvons expliquer nos perceptions sans les rattacher à des causes distinctes de nous mêmes: nous savons de plus que ces causes, dont nous ne connaissons pas d'ailleurs l'essence, produisent les effets les plus variables, les plus divers, et même les plus contraires, selon qu'elles rencontrent telle nature ou

telle disposition du sujet. Mais savons-nous quelque chose de plus? et même, vu le caractère indéterminé des causes que nous concevons dans les corps, y-a-t-il quelque chose de plus à savoir? Y-a-t-il lieu de nous enquerir si nous percevons les choses telles qu'elles sont? Non, évidemment. . . Je ne dis pas que le problème est insoluble: je dis qu'il est absurde, et renferme une contradiction. Nous ne savons pas ce que ces causes sont en elles-mêmes, et la raison nous défend de chercher à les connaître: mais il est bien évident *a priori* qu'elles ne sont pas en elles-mêmes ce qu'elles sont par rapport à nous, puisque la présence du sujet modifie nécessairement leur action. Supprimez tout sujet sentant, il est certain que ces causes agiraient encore, puisqu'elles continueraient d'exister: mais elles agiraient autrement; elles seraient encore des qualités et des propriétés,

mental uniformity in the individual sentient and judges. Where such condition is wanting—where there is a fundamental difference in the sensible apprehension manifested by different individuals—the unanimity is wanting also. Such is the case in regard to colours and other sensations: witness the peculiar vision of Dalton and many others. The unanimity in the first case, the discrepancy in the second, is alike an aggregate of judgments, each individual, distinct, and relative. You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence or authority which satisfies *his* senses or *his* reason, he remains unconvinced. Your individual opinion stands good to *you*; his opinion stands good to *him*. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel persuaded that he will be brought to that result by future experience, which of course must be relative to him and to his appreciative powers. He entertains the like persuasion in regard to you.

It is thus that Sokrates, in the first half of the *Kratylus*, lays down his general theory that names have a natural and inherent propriety: and that naming is a process which cannot be performed except in one way. He at the same time announces that his theory rests upon a principle opposed to the "*Homo Mensura*" of Protagoras. He then proceeds to illustrate his doctrine by exemplification of many particular names, which are alleged to manifest a propriety of signification in reference to the persons or matters to which they are applied. Many of these are proper names, but some are common names or appellatives. Plato regards the

Sokrates exemplifies his theory of the Absolute Name or the Name-Form. He attempts to show the inherent rectitude of many existing names. His etymological transpositions.

mais qui ne ressembleraient à rien de ce que nous connaissons. Le feu ne manifesterait plus aucune des propriétés que nous lui connaissons: que serait-il? C'est ce que nous ne saurons jamais. C'est d'ailleurs peut-être un problème qui ne répugne pas seulement à la nature de notre esprit mais à l'essence même des choses. Quand même en effet on supprimerait par la pensée tous les sujets sentants, il fau-

drait encore admettre que nul corps ne manifesterait ses propriétés autrement qu'en relation avec un sujet quelconque, et dans ce cas ses propriétés ne seraient encore que relatives: en sorte qu'il me paraît fort raisonnable d'admettre que les propriétés déterminées des corps n'existent pas indépendamment d'un sujet quelconque." (3^e Partie, 8^{me} Leçon, pp. 216-218, ed. Danton et Vacherot Bruxelles, 1841.)

proper names as illustrating, even better than the common, the doctrine of inherent rectitude in naming: especially the names of the Gods, with respect to the use of which Plato was himself timidly scrupulous—and the names reported by Homer as employed by the Gods themselves. We must remember that nearly all Grecian proper names had some meaning: being compounds or derivatives from appellative nouns.

The proper names are mostly names of Gods or Heroes: then follow the names of the celestial bodies (conceived as Gods), of the elements, of virtues and vices, &c. All of them, however, both the proper and the common names, are declared to be compound, or derivative; presupposing other simple and primitive names from which they are formed.¹ Sokrates declares the

¹ See the Introduction to Pape's Wörterbuch der Griechischen Eigennamen.

Thus Proklus observes:—"The recklessness about proper names is shown in the case of the man who gave to his son the name of Athanasius" (Proklus, Schol. ad Kratyl. p. 5, ed. Boiss.). Proklus adopts the distinction between divine and human names, citing the authority of Plato in Kratylus. The words of Proklus are remarkable, ad Timæum, ii. p. 197, Schneid. Οἰκεία γὰρ ἵσταν ὀνόματα πάσῃ τάττει τῶν πραγμάτων, θεῶν μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς, διανοητὰ δὲ τοῖς διανοητοῖς, δοξαστὰ δὲ τοῖς δοξαστοῖς. See Timæus, p. 29 B. Compare also Kratylus, p. 400 E, and Philæbus, p. 12 C.

When Plato (Kratylus, pp. 391-392; compare Phædrus, p. 252 A) cites the lines of Homer mentioning appellations bestowed by the Gods, I do not understand him, as Gräfenhahn and others do, to speak in mockery, but *bonâ fide*. The affirmation of Clemens Alexandrinus (Stromat. i. 104) gives a probable account of Plato's belief:—"Ὁ Πλάτων καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς διαλεκτὸν ἀπονέμει τινά, μάλιστα μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνειράτων τεκμαιρόμενος καὶ τῶν χρησμῶν." See Gräfenhahn, Gesch. der Klassischen Philologie, vol. i. p. 176.

When we read the views of some learned modern philologists, such as Godfrey Hermann, we cannot be surprised that many Greeks in the Platonic age should believe in an ὁρότης νομάτων applicable to their Gods and Heroes:—"Unde intelligitur, ex nominibus naturam et munia esse cog-

noscenda Deorum: Nec Deorum tantum, sed etiam heroum, omninoque rerum omnium, nominibus quæ propria vocantur appellatarum" (De Mythologiâ Græcorum Antiquissima—in Opuscula, vol. ii. p. 167).

"Bei euch, Ihr Herrn, kann man das Wesen Gewöhnlich aus dem Namen lesen," &c.

Goethe, Faust.

See a remarkable passage in Plutarch, adv. Kolōten, c. 22, p. 1119 E, respecting the essential rectitude and indispensable employment of the surnames and appellations of the Gods.

The supposition of a mysterious inherent relation, between Names and the things named, has found acceptance among expositors of many different countries.

M. Jacob Salvador (Histoire des Institutions de Moïse, Liv. x., ch. ii.; vol. iii. p. 136) says respecting the Jewish Cabbala:—"Que dirai-je de leur *Cabale*? mot signifiant aussi tradition. Elle se composait originairement de tous les principes abstraits qui ne se répandent pas chez le vulgaire; elle tomba bientôt dans la folie. Cacher quelques idées métaphysiques sous les figures les plus bizarres, et prendre ensuite une peine infinie pour retrouver ces idées premières: s'imaginer qu'il existe entre les noms et les choses une corrélation inévitable, et que la contexture littérale des livres sacrés, par exemple, doit éclairer sur l'essence même et sur tous les secrets du Dieu qui les a dictés: tourmenter

fundamental theory on which the primitive roots rest; and indicates the transforming processes, whereby many of the names are deduced or combined from their roots. But these processes, though sometimes reasonable enough, are in a far greater number of instances forced, arbitrary, and fanciful. The transitions of meaning imagined, and the structural transformations of words, are alike strange and violent.¹

dès-lors chaque phrase, chaque mot, chaque lettre, avec la même ardeur qu'on en met de nos jours à décomposer et à recomposer tous les corps de la nature: enfin, après avoir établi la corrélation entre les mots et les choses, croire qu'en changeant, disposant, combinant, ces mots, on traverse de prétendus canaux d'influence qui les unissent à ces choses, et qu'on agit sur elles: voilà, ce me semble, les principales prétentions de cette espèce de science occulte, échappée de l'Égypte, qui a dévoré beaucoup de bons esprits, et qui, d'une part, donne la main à la théologie, d'autre part, à l'astrologie et aux combinaisons magiques."

¹ I cite various specimens of the etymologies given by Plato:—

1. *Ἀγαμέμνων*—δ' ἀγαστός κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονήν—in consequence of his patience in remaining (μονή) with his army before Troy (p. 395 A).

2. *Ἀτρεΐς*—κατὰ τὸ ἀτρεΐς, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτρεστον, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἀτηρόν (p. 395 C).

3. *Πέλοψ*—δ' τὸ ἐγγὺς (πέλας) μόνον ὄρων καὶ τὸ παραχρήμα (p. 395 D).

4. *Τάνταλος*—ταλάντατος (p. 395 E).

5. *Ζεύς*—*Δία*—*Ζήνα*—*δι*· ὃν ζῆν αἰ πασι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει—ut proprie unum debuerit esse vocabulum *Διαζήνα*. Stallbaum, ad. p. 396 A. Proklus admired these etymologies (ad Timæum, ii. p. 328, ed. Schneid.).

6. *Οἱ θεοὶ*—Sun, Moon, Earth, Stars, Uranus—ἐπεὶ αὐτὰ δρῶντες πάντα αἰεὶ ἰόντα δρόμῳ καὶ θίοντα, ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς φύσεως τῆς τοῦ θεῶν θεοῦς αὐτοὺς ἐπονομάσαι (p. 397 D).

7. *Δαίμονες*—ἐπεὶ φρόνιμοι καὶ δαΐμονες ἦσαν, δαίμονας αὐτοὺς ὠνόμασεν (Hesiod) (p. 398 B).

8. *Ἦμος*—either from ἔρως, as one sprung from the union of Gods with human females: or from ἐρωτῆν or εἶρεν, from oral or rhetorical attributes, as being ῥήτορες καὶ ἐρωτητικοί (p. 398 D).

9. *Διόφίλος*—Διὶ φίλος (p. 399 B).

10. *Ἀνθρωπος*—δ' ἀναθρών & ὥππων (p. 399 C).

11. *Ψυχὴ*—a double derivation is proposed: first, τὸ ἀνάψυχον, next, a second, i.e. *ψυχὴ* = *φυσέχη*, ἡ φύσιν ὀχεῖ καὶ ἔχει, which second is declared to be ridiculous (pp. 399 E, 400 A-B).

12. *Σῶμα*—τὸ σῆμα τῆς ψυχῆς, because the soul is buried in the body. Or *σῶμα*, that is, preserved or guarded, by the body as by an exterior wall, in order that it may expiate wrongs of a preceding life (p. 400 C).

13. The first imposer of names was a philosopher who followed the theory of Herakleitus—perpetual flux of everything. Pursuant to this theory he gave to various Gods the names Kronos, Rhea, Tethys, &c., all signifying flux (p. 402 A-D).

14. Various derivations of the names Poseidon, Hades or Pluto, Persephon or Pherrephatta, &c., are given (pp. 404-406); also of Apollo, so as to fit on to the four functions of the last-named God, μουσική, μαντική, ιατρική, τοξική (p. 405).

15. *Μούσα*—μουσική, from μῦσθαι (recognised in Liddell and Scott from μάω p. 406 A). *Ἀφροδίτη* from ἀφροῦ γένεσιν, the Hesiodic derivation (p. 406 B-D).

16. *Ἄηρ*—ἐπεὶ αἶρει τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς—ἢ ἐπεὶ αἰεὶ ρεῖ—ἢ ἐπεὶ πνεῦμα ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίγνεται ῥέοντος—quasi ἀπὸ ῥέοντος. *Αἰθήρ*—ἐπεὶ αἰεὶ θεῖ περὶ τὸν αἶρα ῥέων (p. 410 B).

17. *Φρόνησις*—φορὰς καὶ ροῦ νόστις, or, τὸ ὄνησιν ὑπολαβεῖν φορὰς. This and the following are put as derivatives from the Herakleitean theory (p. 411 D-E). *Νόστις* = τοῦ νέου ἔστις. *Σωφροσύνη*—σωτηρία φρονήσεως. This is recognised by Aristotle in the *Nikom. Ethica*, vi. 5.

18. *Ἐπιστήμη* = ἐπιστημένη—ὡς φερομένοις τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐπομένης τῆς ψυχῆς (p. 412 A).

19. *Δικαιοσύνη*—ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ δικαίου συνέσει (p. 412 C).

20. *Κακία* = τὸ κακῶς ἰόν. *Δελία*—τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμός ισχυρός—δ' αἰεὶ λίαν. *Ἀρετὴ* = ἀειρετή—that which has an

Such is the light in which these Platonic etymologies appear to a modern critic. But such was not the light in which they appeared either to the ancient Platonists, or to critics earlier than the last century. The Platonists even thought them full of mysterious and recondite wisdom. Dionysius of Halikarnassus highly commends Plato for his speculations on etymology, especially in the *Kratylus*.¹ Plutarch cites some of the most singular etymologies in the *Kratylus* as serious and instructive. The modesty of the Protagorean formula becomes here especially applicable: for so complete has been the revolution of opinion, that the Platonic etymologies are *now* treated by *most* critics as too absurd to have been seriously intended by Plato, even as conjectures. It is called

These transitions appear violent to a modern reader. They did not appear so to readers of Plato until this century. Modern discovery, that they are intended as caricatures to deride the Sophists.

easy and constant flux, or perhaps αἰσθητή (p. 415 B-D). Αἰσχροὶν = τὸ αἰσχροτέρου—τὸ αἰεὶ ἰσχυρὸν τὸν ῥοὺν (p. 416 B). Σύμφερρον = τὴν ἄρα φερὰν τῆς ψυχῆς μετὰ τῶν πραγμάτων (p. 417 A). Δυσκρίθων = τὸ τῆς φερᾶς ἁλὸς τὸ τίλος (p. 417 C-E). Βλαβερὸν = τὸ βλάπτειν τὸν ῥοὺν.

The names of favourable import are such as designate facility of the universal flux, according to the Heraklitean theory. The names of unfavourable import designate obstruction of the flux.

21. Ζυγόν = ὀνογόν (p. 418 D).

22. Εὐφροσύνη—ἀπὸ τοῦ εὖ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν ξυμφέρεισθαι = εὐφροσύνη (p. 419 D).

23. Θυμὸς—ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς. Ἐπιθυμία—ἡ ἐπὶ τὸν θυμὸν ἰούσα δύναμις (p. 419 E).

24. Τὸ ἐν = τὸ οὐ τυγχάνει ζήτημα, τὸ ὄνομα. Ὀνομαστόν = ἐν, οὐ μάσμα ἰούσιν. (Μάσμα = ζήτημα: μαίεσθαι = ζητεῖν) (p. 421 A).

25. Ἀλυσία—θεία ἐλθ, ὅτ' ἡ θεία τοῦ ὄντος φερὰ. Ψεύδος from εὐδεν, with ψι prefixed, as being the opposite of movement and flux (p. 421 B-C).

26. Several derivations of names are given by Sokrates, as founded upon the theory opposed to Herakleitus—i.e., the theory that things were not in perpetual flux, but stationary:—

Ἐπιστήμη—ὅτι ἰσταιν ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν.

Ἱστορία—ὅτι ἰσταισι τὸν ῥοὺν.

Πιστὸν—ἰστέον παντάπασιν σημαίνει.

Μήνυμα—μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (437 A-C).

27. We found before that some names of good attributes were founded on the Heraklitean theory. But there are also names of bad attributes founded on it.

Ἀμαθία = ἡ τοῦ ἄρα θεῶ ἰόντος πορείᾳ.

Ἀκολασία = ἡ ἀκολουθεῖα τοῖς πράγμασι (p. 437 C).

Sokrates contrasts the two theories of στάσις and κίνησις, and says that he believes the first Name-Givers to have apportioned names in conformity to the theory of κίνησις, but that he thinks they were mistaken in adopting that theory (p. 439 C).

¹ Dionys. Hal. De Comp. Verb. a. 16, p. 196, Schaefer. τὰ κράτιστα δὲ τίμας, ὡς πρῶτον τὸν ὑπὲρ ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγοντι λόγον, Πλάτωνι τῷ Σωκρατικῷ, πολλοῦ μὴν καὶ ἄλλοι, μέλιστα δὲ ἐν τῷ Κρατύλῳ.

About Plato's etymologies, as seriously intended, see Plutarch, De Iside et Osiride, p. 375 C-D-E, with the note of Wyttenbach. Harris, in his *Hermes* (pp. 369-370-407), alludes to the etymologies of Plato in the *Kratylus* as being ingenious, though disputable, but not at all as being derisive caricatures. Indeed the etymology of *Scientia*, which he cites from Scaliger, p. 370, is quite as singular as any in the *Kratylus*. Sydenham (Notes to the translation of Plato's *Philæbus*, p. 35) calls the *Kratylus* "a dialogue, in which is taught the nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient,

"a valuable discovery of modern times" (so Schleiermacher terms it) that Plato meant all or most of them as mere parody

from a supposed etymology of names and words."

I find, in the very instructive comments of Bishop Colenso on the Pentateuch (Part iv. ch. 24, p. 250), a citation from St. Augustine, illustrating the view which I believe Plato to have taken of these etymologies: "Quo loco prorsus non arbitror prætereundum, quod pater Valerius animadvertit admirans, in quorundam rusticorum [i.e., Africans, near Carthage] colloquutione. Cum enim alteri dixisset *Salus*—quesivit ab eo, qui et Latine nosset et Punicè, quid esset *Salus*: responsum est, *Tria*. Tum ille agnoscens cum gaudio, salutem nostram esse Trinitatem, convenientiam linguarum non fortuito sic sonuisse arbitratus est, sed occultissimâ dispensatione divinæ providentiæ—ut cum Latine nominatur *Salus*, à Punicis intelligantur *Tria*—et cum Punicis lingua suâ *Tria* nominant, Latine intelligatur *Salus*. . . . Sed hæc verborum consonantia, sive provenierit sive provisâ sit, non pugnantiter agendum est ut ei quisque consentiat, sed quantum interpretantis elegantiam hilaritas audientis admittit."

So in the etymologies of the *Kratylus*: Plato follows out threads of analogy, which, with indulgent hearers, he reckons will be sufficient for proof: and which, even when not accepted as proof, will be pleasing to the fancy of unbelieving hearers, as they are to his own. There is no intention to caricature: no obvious absurdities piled up with a view to caricature.

¹ Schleiermacher, Introduction to *Kratylus*, vol. iv. p. 6: "Dagegen ist viel gewonnen durch die Entdeckung neuerer Zeiten," &c. To the same purpose, Zeller, *Phil. d. Griech.*, part ii. p. 402, edit. 2nd, and Brandis, *Gesch. d. Gr. Röm. Phil.*, part ii. sect. cvii. p. 225.

Stallbaum, *Prolegg. ad Platon. Cratylum*, p. 4, says: "Quod mirum est non esse ab his animadversum, qui Platonem putaverunt de linguæ et vocabulorum origine hoc libro suam sententiam explicare voluisse. Isti enim adeo nihil senserunt irrisionis, ut omnia atque singula pro philosophi decretis vendidant, ideoque ei absurdissima quæque commenta affinxerint. Ita Menægius. . . . Nec Tiedemannus Argum. Dial. Plat. multo rectius judicat. Irris-

sionem primi senserunt Garnierius et Tennemann." &c. Stallbaum, moreover, is perpetually complaining in his notes, that the *Etymological Lexicons* adopt Plato's derivations as genuine. *Ménage* (ad *Diogen. Laert.* iii. 25) declares most of the etymologies of Plato in the *Kratylus* to be *verderbte*, but never hints at the supposition that they are intended as caricatures. During the centuries between Plato and *Ménage*, men had become more critical on the subject of etymology: in the century after *Ménage*, they had become more critical still, as we may see by the remarks of Turgot on the etymologies of *Ménage* himself.

The following are the remarks of Turgot, in the article 'Etymologie' (*Encycl. Franc.* in Turgot's collected works, vol. iii. p. 33): "*Ménage* est un exemple frappant des absurdités dans lesquelles on tombe, en adoptant sans choix ce que suggère la malheureuse facilité de supposer tout ce qui est possible: car il est très vrai qu'il ne fait aucune supposition dont la possibilité ne soit justifiée par des exemples. Mais nous avons prouvé, qu'en multipliant à volonté les alterations intermédiaires, soit dans le son, soit dans la signification, il est aisé de dériver un mot quelconque de tout autre mot donné: c'est le moyen d'expliquer tout, et dès-lors de ne rien expliquer; c'est le moyen aussi de justifier tous les mépris de l'ignorance."

Steinhart (*Einleitung zum Kratylus*, pp. 551-552) agrees with Stallbaum to a certain extent, that Plato in the *Kratylus* intended to mock and caricature the bad etymologists of his own day; yet also that parts of the *Kratylus* are seriously intended. And he declares it almost impossible to draw a line between the serious matter and the caricature.

It appears to me that the Platonic critics here exculpate Plato from the charge of being a bad etymologist, only by fastening upon him another intellectual defect quite as serious.

Dittrich, in his *Dissertation De Cratylō Platōnis*, Leipzig, 1841, adopts the opinion of Schleiermacher and the other critics, that the etymological examples given in this dialogue, though Sokrates announces them as proving and illustrating his own theory seri-

and caricature. We are now told that it was not Plato who misconceived the analogies, conditions, and limits, of etymological transition, but others; whom Plato has here set himself to expose and ridicule, by mock etymologies intended to parody those which they had proposed as serious. If we ask who the persons thus ridiculed were, we learn that they were the Sophists, Protagoras, or Prodikus, with others; according to Schleiermacher, Antisthenes among them.¹

To me this modern discovery or hypothesis appears inadmissible. It rests upon assumptions at best gratuitous, and in part incorrect: it introduces difficulties greater than those which it removes. We find no proof that the Sophists ever proposed such etymologies as those which are here supposed to be ridiculed—or that they devoted themselves to etymology at all. If they etymologised, they would doubtless do so in the manner (to our judgment loose and fantastic) of their own time and of times long after them. But what ground have we for presuming that Plato's views on the subject were more correct? and that etymologies which to them appeared admissible, would be regarded by him as absurd and ridiculous?

Now if the persons concerned were other than the Sophists, scarcely any critic would have thought himself entitled to fasten upon them a discreditable imputation without some evidence. Of Prodikus we know (and that too chiefly from some sarcasms of Plato) that he took pains to distinguish words apparently, but not really, equivalent: and that such accurate distinction was what he meant by "rectitude of names" (Plato, *Euthydēm.* 277 E.) Of Protagoras we know that he taught, by precept or example, correct speaking or writing: but we have no information that either of them pursued etymological researches,

usually laid down, are really bitter jests and mockery, intended to destroy it—"hanc sententiam facetissimis et irrisione plenius exemplis, dum comprobare videtur, revera infringit" (p. 12). Dittich admits that Kratylus, who holds the theory derided, understands nothing of this *acerbissima irrisio* (p. 18). He thinks that Protagoras, not Prodikus nor Antisthenes, is the person principally caricatured (pp. 32-34-38).

¹ Schleiermacher, *Introd. to Kratyl* pp. 8-16; Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Krat.* p. 17. Winckelmann suspects that Hermogenes in the *Kratylus* is intended to represent Antisthenes (*Antisth. Fragm.* p. 49).

Lobeck (*Aglaophamus*, p. 866) says that the Pythagoreans were among the earliest etymologising philosophers, proposing such etymologies as now appear very absurd.

successfully or unsuccessfully.¹ Moreover this very dialogue (Kratylus) contains strong presumptive evidence that the Platonic etymologies could never have been intended to ridicule Protagoras. For these etymologies are announced by Sokrates as exemplifying and illustrating a theory of his own respecting names: which theory (Sokrates himself expressly tells us) is founded upon the direct negation of the cardinal doctrine of Protagoras.² That Sophist, therefore, could not have been ridiculed by any applications, however extravagant, of a theory directly opposed to him.³

¹ See a good passage of Winckelmann, Prolegg. ad Platon. Euthydemum, p. xlvii., respecting Protagoras and Prodikus, as writers and critics on language.

Stallbaum says, Prolegg. ad Krat. p. 11:—"Quibus verbis *Aud dubis* notantur Sophistæ; qui, neglectis linguis elementis, derivatorum et compositorum verborum originem temerè ad suum arbitrium tractabant". Ibid. p. 4:—"In Cratylō ineptæ etymologię specimina exhibentur, ita quidem ut *audiquam dubitare liceat*, quin ista omnia ad mentem sophistarum maximeque Protagoreorum *joculari imitatione explicata sint*".

In spite of these confident assertions,—first, that the Sophists are the persons intended to be ridiculed, next, that they deserved to be so ridiculed—Stallbaum has another passage, p. 15, wherein he says, "Jam vero quinam fuerint philosophi isti atque etymologi, qui in Cratylō ridentur et exploduntur, *ulgo parum exploratum habetur*". He goes on to say that neither Prodikus nor Antisthenes is meant, but Protagoras and the Protagoreans. To prove this he infers, from a passage in this dialogue (c. 11, p. 391 C), that Protagoras had written a book *περί ὀνόματων* (Heindorf and Schleiermacher, with better reason, infer from the passage nothing more than the circumstance that Protagoras taught *ὀνομαστικὴν* or correct speaking and writing). The passage does not prove this; but if it did, what did Protagoras teach in the book? Stallbaum tells us (p. 16):—"Jam si quæras, quid tantum Protagoras ipse de nominum ortu censuerit, *futores et conjecturæ nitendum esse, ut de hoc re aliquid eruiatur*". He then proceeds to conjecture, from the little which we know respecting

Protagoras, what that Sophist must have laid down upon the origin of names; and he finishes by assuming the very point which he ought to have proved (p. 17):—"ex ipso Cratylō intelligimus et cognoscimus, mox inter Protagoræ amicos exstitisse qui ineptè hæc studia persequentes, non e verbis et nominibus mentis humanæ notiones elicere et illustrare, sed in verba et nomina sua ipsi decreta transferre et sic ea probare et confirmare niterentur. Quid quidem homines à Platone hoc libro *factissimè irrisione exagitantur*," &c. I repeat, that in spite of Stallbaum's confident assertions, he falls in giving the smallest proof that Protagoras or the Sophists proposed etymologies such as to make them a suitable butt for Plato on this occasion. Ast also talks with equal confidence and equal absence of proof about the silly and arbitrary etymological proceedings of the Sophists, which (he says) this dialogue is intended throughout to ridicule (Ast, *Platon's Leben und Schriften*, pp. 253-254-254, &c.).

² Plato, *Kratylus*, c. 4-5, pp. 386-387.

³ Lassalle (*Herakleitos*, vol. ii. pp. 379-384) asserts and shows very truly that Protagoras cannot be the person intended to be represented by Plato under the name of Kratylus, or as holding the opinion of Kratylus about names. Lassalle affirms that Plato intends Kratylus in the dialogue to represent Herakleitus himself (p. 385); moreover he greatly extols the sagacity of Herakleitus for having laid down the principle, that "Names are the essence of things," in which principle Lassalle (so far as I understand him) himself concurs.

Assuming this to be the case, we should naturally suppose that if Plato intends to ridicule any one, by pre-

Suppose it then ascertained that Plato intended to ridicule and humiliate some rash etymologists, there would still be no propriety in singling out the Sophists as his victims—except that they are obnoxious names, against whom every unattested accusation is readily believed. But it is neither ascertained, nor (in my judgment) probable, that Plato here intended to ridicule or humiliate any one. The ridicule, if any was intended, would tell against himself more than against others. For he first begins by laying down a general theory respecting names: a theory unquestionably propounded as serious, and understood to be so by the critics:¹ moreover, involving some of his favourite and peculiar doctrines. It is this theory that his particular etymologies are announced as intended to carry out, in the way of illustration or exemplification. Moreover, he undertakes to prove this theory against Hermogenes, who declares himself strongly opposed to it: and he proves it by a string of arguments which (whether valid or not) are obviously given with a serious and sincere purpose of establishing the conclusion. Immediately after having established that there *was* a *real* rectitude of names, and after announcing that he would proceed to enquire wherein such rectitude consisted,² what sense or consistency would there be in his inventing a string of intentional caricatures announced as real etymologies? By doing this, he would be only discrediting and degrading the very theory which he had taken so much pains to inculcate upon Hermogenes. Instead of ridiculing Protagoras, he would ridicule himself and his own theory for the benefit of opponents generally, one among them being Protagoras:

Plato did not intend to propose mock-etymologies, or to deride any one. Protagoras could not be ridiculed here. Neither Hermogenes nor Kratylus understand the etymologies as caricature.

sending caricatured etymologies as flowing from this principle, the person intended as butt must be Herakleitos himself. Not so Lassalle. He asserts as broadly as Stallbaum that it was Protagoras and the other Sophists who grossly abused the doctrine of Herakleitos, for the purpose of confusing and perverting truth by arbitrary etymologies. His language is even more monstrous and extravagant than that of Stallbaum; yet he does not produce (any more than Stallbaum) the least fragment of proof that the Sophists or

Protagoras did what he imputes to them (pp. 400-401-403-422).

M. Lenormant, in his recent edition of the *Kratylus* (Comm. p. 7-9), maintains also that neither the Sophists nor the Rhetors pretended to etymologise, nor are here ridiculed. But he ascribes to Plato in the *Kratylus* a mystical and theological purpose which I find it difficult to follow.

¹ Schleiermacher, *Introd. to Krat.* pp. 7-10; Lassalle, *Herakleitos* ii. p. 387.

² Plato, *Kratylus*, p. 391 B.

who (if we imagine his life prolonged) would have had the satisfaction of seeing a theory, framed in direct opposition to his doctrine, discredited and parodied by his own advocate. Hermogenes, too (himself an opponent of the theory, though not concurring with Protagoras), if these etymologies were intended as caricatures, ought to be made to receive them as such, and to join in the joke at the expense of the persons derided. But Hermogenes is not made to manifest any sense of their being so intended: he accepts them all as serious, though some as novel and surprising, in the same passive way which is usual with the interlocutors of Sokrates in other dialogues. Farther, there are some among these etymologies plain and plausible enough, accepted as serious by all the critics.¹ Yet these are presented in the series, without being parted off by any definite line, along with those which we are called upon to regard as deliberate specimens of mock-etymology. Again, there are also some, which, looking at their etymological character, are as strange and surprising as any in the whole dialogue: but which yet, from the place which they occupy in the argument, and from the plain language in which they are presented, almost exclude the supposition that they can be intended as jest or caricature.² Lastly,

¹ See, as an example, his derivation of Διφίλος from Διφίλος, p. 399: Μεῦσα, p. 406: δαίμων, from δαίμων, p. 398: for Ἀφροδίτη he takes the Hesiodic etymology, p. 406. Ἄρη; and ἄρρη; (p. 407). His derivation of αἰθέρ—ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰθέρεω (p. 410) is given twice by Aristotle (De Caelo, i. 3, p. 270, b. 22; Meteorol. i. 3, p. 339, b. 25) as well as in the Pseudo-Aristotle, De Mundo, p. 392, a. 8. None of the Platonic etymologies is more strange than that of ψυχή, quasi ψυχή, ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἔχειν καὶ ἔχειν (Kratyl. p. 400). Yet Proklus cites this as serious, Scholia in Kratylum, p. 4, ed. Boissonnade. Plato, in the Treatise De Legibus, derives χάρος from χαρά and νόμος from νόος or νόος (ii. 1, p. 654 A, xii. 8, p. 957 D).

² See Plato, Kratyl. p. 437 A-B.

This occurs in the latter portion of the dialogue carried on by Sokrates with Kratylus, and is admitted by Lassalle to be seriously meant by Plato: though Lassalle maintains that the etymologies in the first part of the dialogue (between Sokrates and Her-

mogenes) are mere mockery and parody. (Lassalle, Herakleitos der Dunkle, vol. ii. pp. 402-406).

I venture to say that none of those Platonic etymologies, which Lassalle regards as caricatures, are more absurd than those which he here accepts as serious. Liddell and Scott in their Lexicon say about θυμός, "probably rightly derived from θύω by Plat. Crat. 419 E, ἀπὸ τῆς θύσεως καὶ ἔσεως τῆς ψυχῆς." The manner in which Schleiermacher and Steinhart also (Kinlelt. zum Kratylus, pp. 552-554), analysing this dialogue, represent Plato as passing backwards and forwards from mockery to earnest and from earnest to mockery, appears to me very singular: as well as the principle which Schleiermacher lays down (Introduc. p. 10), that Plato intended the general doctrines to be seriously understood, and the particular etymological applications to be mere mockery and extravagance (um wer weiss welche Komödie aufzuführen). What other philosopher has ever propounded serious doctrines, and then followed them up by illustrations

Kratylus, whose theory all these etymologies are supposed to be intended to caricature, is so far from being aware of this, that he cordially approves every thing which Sokrates had said.¹

I cannot therefore accept as well-founded this "discovery of modern times," which represents the Platonic etymologies in the *Kratylus* as intentionally extravagant and knowingly caricatured, for the purpose of ridiculing the Sophists or others. In my judgment, Plato did not put them forward as extravagant, nor for the purpose of ridiculing any one, but as genuine illustrations of a theory of his own respecting names. It cannot be said indeed that he advanced them as proof of his theory: for Plato seldom appeals to particulars, except when he has a theory to attack. When he has a theory to lay down, he does not gene-

knowingly and intentionally caricatured so as to disparage the doctrines instead of recommending them?

Is it surely less difficult to believe that Plato conceived as plausible and admissible those etymologies which appear to us absurd.

As a specimen of the view entertained by able men of the seventeenth century respecting the Platonic and Aristotelian etymologies, see the *Institutiones Logice* of Burgersdicius, lib. i. c. 25, not. 1. Lehrsich (*Die Sprachphilosophie der Alten*, Part i. p. 34-35) agrees with the other commentators, that the Platonic etymologies in the *Kratylus* are caricatured to deride the boastful and arbitrary etymologies of the Sophists about language. But he too produces no evidence of such etymologies on the part of the Sophists; nay, what is remarkable, he supposes that both Protagoras and Prodikos agreed in the Platonic doctrine that names were φύσει (see pp. 17-19).

¹ Plato, *Kratylus*, p. 429 C. Steinbart (Einleit. zum *Krat.* pp. 549-550) observes that both *Kratylus* and *Hermogenes* are represented as understanding seriously these etymologies which are now affirmed to be meant as caricatures.

As specimens of Plato's view respecting admissible etymologies, we find him in *Timæus*, p. 43 C, deriving αἰσθησις from αἰσθάνω: again in the same dialogue, p. 62 A, θερμός from

καρμαρίζειν. In *Legg.* iv. 714, we have τὴν τοῦ τοῦ διανομήντος ἐπονομαζούσας νόμον. In *Phædrus*, p. 238 C, we find ἔπος derived from ἐπρωμένους βωσθεῖσα.

Aristotle derives δόξος from ἰσοφύες, *Histor. Animal.* i. 13, p. 498, a. 22: also δίκαιον from δίχα, *Ethic. Nikom.* v. 7, 1132, a. 31; μεθύειν—μετὰ τὸ θύνειν, *Athenæus*, ii. 40. The Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *Περὶ Κόσμου* (p. 401, a. 15) adopts the Platonic etymology of Δία-Ζῆρα as δὲ ἐν Ζῆρῳ.

Plutarch, *De Primo Frigido*, c. 9, p. 948, derives κνέφας from κενὸν φάος.

The Emperor Marcus Antoninus derives ἀκρίς, the ray of the Sun, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰερείνυσθαι, *Meditat.* viii. 57.

The Stoics, who were fond of etymologising, borrowed many etymologies from the Platonic *Kratylus* (Villoison, *de Theologia Physica Stoicorum*, in Osanni's edition of Cornutus, *De Naturâ Deorum*, p. 512). Specimens of the Stoic etymologies are given by the Stoic Balbus in Cicero, *De Nat. Deor.* ii. 25-29 (64-73).

Dähne (in his *Darstellung der Jüdisch-Alexandrinischen Religions-Philosophie*, i. p. 73 seq.) remarks on the numerous etymologies not merely propounded, but assumed as grounds of reasoning by Philo Judæus in commenting upon the Pentateuch, etymologies totally inadmissible and often ridiculous.

rally recognise the necessity of either proving or verifying it by application to particular cases. His proof is usually deductive or derived from some more general principle asserted *a priori*—some internal sentiment enunciated as a self-justifying maxim. Particular examples serve to illustrate what the principle is, but are not required to establish its validity.¹ But I believe that he intended his particular etymologies as *bonâ fide* guesses, more or less probable (like the developments in the *Timæus*, which he² repeatedly designates as *εἰκόρα*, and nothing beyond): some certain, some doubtful, some merely novel and ingenious: such as would naturally spring from the originating *afflatus* of diviners (like Euthyphron, to whom he alludes more than once³) who stepped beyond the ordinary regions of human affirmation. Occasionally he proposes alternative and distinct etymologies:

¹ See some passages in this very dialogue, *Krat.* pp. 436 E, 437 C, 438 C.

Lassalle remarks that neither Heraclitus nor Plato were disposed to rest the proof of a general principle upon an induction of particulars (Heraclitus, p. 406).

² Spengel justly remarks (Art. Scr. p. 52) respecting the hypotheses of the Platonic commentators:—"Platonem quidem liberare gestiunt, falsa, ironia, non ex animi sententiâ omnia in Cratylô prolata esse dicentes. Sed præter alia multa et hoc neglexerunt viri docti, easdem verborum originationes, quas in Cratylô, in cæteris quoque dialogis, ubi nullus est facietis locus, et seria omnia aguntur, recurrere."

This passage is cited by K. F. Hermann, *Gesch. und Syst. d. Platon.* Phil. not. 474, p. 656. Hermann's own remarks on the dialogue (pp. 494-497) are very indistinct, but he seems to agree with Schleiermacher in singling out Antisthenes as the object of attack.

The third portion of Lehrsch's work, *Ueber die Sprachphilosophie der Alten*, cites numerous examples of the etymologies attempted by the ancients, from Homer downwards, many of them collected from the *Etymologicum Magnum*. When we read the etymologies propounded seriously by Greek and Latin philosophers (especially the Stoic Chrysippus), literary men, jurists, and poets, we shall not be astonished at those found in the Platonic *Kratylus*. The etymology of *θεός ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖν*,

given in the *Kratylus* (p. 397 D), as well as in the Pythagorean *Philolaus* (see Boeckh, *Philolaus*, pp. 168-175), and repeated by Clemens Alexandrinus, is not more absurd than that of *θεός ἀπὸ τοῦ θεῖναι*, given by Herodot. ii. 52, and also repeated by Clemens, see Wesseling's note. None of the etymologies of the *Kratylus* is more strange than that of *Ζεὺς Διὰ Ζήνα* (p. 396 B). Yet this is reproduced in the Pseudo-Aristotelian Treatise, *Περὶ Κόσμου* (p. 401, a. 15), as well as by the Stoic Zeno (Diogen. Laert. vii. 147). The treatise of Cornutus, *De Nat. Deor.* with Osann's Commentary, is instructive in enabling us to appreciate the taste of ancient times as to what was probable or admissible in etymology. There are few of the etymologies in the *Kratylus* more singular than that of *ἀνθρωπος* from *ἀναθρώπων ἃ ὄντων*. Yet this is cited by Ammonius as a perfectly good derivation, ad Aristot. *De Interpret.* p. 103, b. 8, Schol. Bekk., and also in the *Etymologicum Magnum*.

³ Compare Plato, *Euthyphron*, p. 6 D. Origination and invention often pass in Plato as the workings of an ordinary mind (sometimes even a feeble mind) worked upon from without by divine inspiration, quite distinct from the internal force, reasoning, judging, testing, which belongs to a powerful mind. See *Phædrus*, pp. 235 C, 238 D, 244 A; *Timæus*, p. 72 A; *Menon*, p. 81 A.

feeling assured that there was some way of making out the conclusion—but not feeling equally certain about his own way of making it out. The sentiment of belief attaches itself in Plato's mind to general views and theorems: when he gives particular consequences as flowing from them, his belief graduates down through all the stages between full certainty and the lowest probability, until in some cases it becomes little more than a fanciful illustration—like the mythes which he so often invents to expand and enliven these same general views.¹

We must remember that Sokrates in the *Kratylus* explicitly announces himself as having no formed opinion on the subject, and as competent only to the prosecution of the enquiry, jointly with the others. What he says must therefore be received as conjectures proposed for discussion. I see no ground for believing that he regarded any of them, even those which appear to us the strangest, as being absurd or extravagant—or that he proposed any of them in mockery and caricature, for the purpose of deriding other Etymologists. Because these etymologies, or many of them at least, appear to us obviously absurd, we are not warranted in believing that they must have appeared so to Plato. They did not appear so (as I have already observed) to Dionysius of Halikarnassus—nor to Diogenes, nor to the Platonists of antiquity nor to any critics earlier than the seventeenth century.² By

¹ I have made some remarks to this effect upon the Platonic mythes in my notice of the *Phædon*, see ch. xxv. p. 415, ad *Phædon*, p. 114.

² Dionys. Hal. *De Comp. Verbor.* c. 16, p. 96, Reiske; Plutarch, *De Isid. et Osir.* c. 60, p. 375.

Proklus advises that those who wish to become dialecticians should begin with the study of the *Kratylus* (Schol. ad *Kratyl.* p. 3, ed. Boiss.).

We read in the *Phædrus* of Plato (p. 244 B), in the second speech ascribed to Sokrates, two etymologies:—1. *μαντική* derived from *μανία* by the insertion of *τ*, which Sokrates declares to be done in bad taste, οὐδὲν ἀπειροσκόπως τὸ ταῦ ἐπαμβάλλοντες *μαντικὴν* ἐκάλεσαν. 2. *οἰονιστική*, quasi *οἰονοιστική*, from *οἶσσις*, *νούς*, *ιστορία*. Compare the etymology

of *Ἔπος*, p. 238 C. That these are real word-changes, which Plato believes to have taken place, is the natural and reasonable interpretation of the passage. Cicero (*Divinat.* i. 1) alludes to the first of the two as Plato's real opinion; and Heindorf as well as Schleiermacher accept it in the same sense, while expressing their surprise at the want of etymological perspicacity in Plato. Ast and Stallbaum, on the contrary, declare that these two etymologies are mere irony and mockery, spoken by Plato, *ex mente Sophistarum*, and intended as a sneer at the perverse and silly Sophists. No reason is produced by Ast and Stallbaum to justify this hypothesis, except that you cannot imagine "*Platonem tam cæcū fuisse*," &c. To me this reason is utterly insufficient; and I contend, moreover,

many of these critics they were deemed not merely serious, but valuable. Nor are they more absurd than many of the etymologies proposed by Aristotle, by the Stoics, by the Alexandrine critics, by Varro, and by the *grammatici* or literary men of antiquity generally; moreover, even by Plato himself in other dialogues occasionally.¹ In determining what etymologies would appear to Plato reasonable or admissible, Dionysius, Plutarch, Proklus, and Alkinous, are more likely to judge rightly than we: partly because they had a larger knowledge of the etymologies proposed by Greek philosophers and *grammatici* than we possess—partly because they had no acquaintance with the enlarged views of modern etymologists—which, on the point here in

that sneers at the Sophists would be quite out of place in a speech, such as the palinode of Sokrates about Eros.

¹ See what Aristotle says about Πλάτων in the first chapter of the treatise *De Cælo*; also about ἀνδρομαχῶν from αὐτὸ μάτην, *Physic.* ii. 5, p. 197, b. 30.

Stallbaum, after having complimented Plato for his talent in caricaturing the etymologies of others, expresses his surprise to find Aristotle reproducing some of these very caricatures as serious, see Stallbaum's note on *Kratyl.* p. 411 E.

Respecting the etymologies proposed by learned and able Romans in and before the Ciceronian and Augustan age, Ælius Stilo, Varro, Labæo, Nigidius, &c., see Aulus Gellius, xiii. 10; Quintilian, *Inst. Or.* i. 5; Varro, *de Lingua Latina*.

Even to Quintilian, the etymologies of Varro appeared preposterous; and he observes, in reference to those proposed by Ælius Stilo and by others afterwards, "Cui non post Varronem sit venia?" (i. 6, 37). This critical remark, alike good tempered and reasonable, might be applied with still greater pertinence to the *Kratylus* of Plato. In regard to etymology, more might have been expected from Varro than from Plato; for in the days of Plato, etymological guesses were almost a novelty; while during the three centuries which elapsed between him and Varro, many such conjectures had been hazarded by various scholars, and more or less of improvement might be hoped from the conflict of opposite opinions and thinkers.

M. Gaston Boissier (In his interesting *Étude sur la vie et les Ouvrages de M. Terentius Varron*, p. 162, Paris, 1861) observes respecting Varro, what is still more applicable to Plato:—"Gardons nous bien d'ailleurs de demander à Varron ce qu'exige la science moderne: pour n'être pas trop sévères, remettons-le dans son époque et jugeons-le avec l'esprit de son temps. Il ne semble pas qu'alors on réclamat, de ceux qui recherchaient les étymologies, beaucoup d'exactitude et de sévérité. On se piquait moins d'arriver à l'origine réelle du mot, que de le décomposer d'une manière ingénieuse et qui en gravait le sens dans la mémoire. Les juriconsultes eux-mêmes, malgré la gravité de leur profession et l'importance pratique de leurs recherches, ne suivaient pas une autre méthode. Trebatius trouvait dans *ocellum* les deux mots *sacra cella*: et Labéon faisait venir *seror* de *serenum*, parce que la jeune fille se sépare de la maison paternelle pour suivre son époux: tout comme Nigidius trouvoit dans *frater* *ferè alter*—c'est à dire, un autre soi-même," &c.

Lobeck has similar remarks in his *Aglaophamus* (pp. 867-868):—"Sané ita J. Capellus veteres juris consultos excusat, mutuum interpretantes quod ex suo truxit *Aut*, testamentum autem testamentum mentis, non quod eam verborum originem esse putarent, sed ut significationem eorum altius in legentium animis defigerent. Similiterque ecclesiastici quidam auctores, quum nomen Pascha a græco verbo πάσχειν repetunt, non per ignorantiam lapsi, sed allusionis quandam gratiam aucupati videntur."

question, are misleading rather than otherwise. Plato held the general theory that names, in so far as they were framed with perfect rectitude, held embodied in words and syllables a likeness or imitation of the essence of things. And if he tried to follow out such a theory into detail, without any knowledge of grammatical systems, without any large and well-chosen collection of analogies within his own language, or any comparison of different languages with each other—he could scarcely fail to lose himself in wonderful and violent transmutations of letters and syllables.¹

Having expressed my opinion that the etymologies propounded by Sokrates in the *Kratylus* are not intended as caricatures, but as *bona fide* specimens of admissible etymological conjecture, or, at the least, of discoverable analogy—I resume the thread of the dialogue.

Continuance
of the dia-
logue—
Sokrates
endeavours
to explain
how it is
that the
Names origi-
nally right
have become
so disguised
and spoiled.

These etymologies are the hypothetical links where-
by Sokrates reconciles his first theory of the essential
rectitude of Names (that is, of Naming, as a process
which can only be performed in one way, and by an
Artist who discerns and uses the Name-Form), with
the names actually received and current. The contrast between
the sameness and perfection postulated in the theory, and the
confusion of actual practice, is not less manifest than the contrast
between the benevolent purposes ascribed to the Demiurgus (in
the *Timæus*) and the realities of man and society:—requiring
intermediate assumptions, more or less ingenious, to explain or
attenuate the glaring inconsistencies. Respecting the Name-
Form, Sokrates intimates that it may often be so disguised by
difference of letters and syllables, as not to be discernible by an

¹ Gräfenhahn (Gesch. d. classischen Philologie, vol. i. sect. 36, pp. 151-164) points out how common was the hypothesis of fanciful derivation of names or supposed etymologies among the Greek poets, and how it passed from them to the prose writers. He declares that the etymologies in Plato not only in the *Kratylus* but in other dialogues are "etymologische monstra," but he professes inability to distinguish which of them are serious (pp. 163-164).

Lobeck remarks that the playing and quibbling with words, widely diffused among the ancient literati generally, was especially likely to belong to those who held the Platonic theory about language:—"Is intelligat necesse est, hoc universum genus antiquitatis ingenio non alienum, ei vero, qui imagines rerum in vocabulis sic ut in cæci expressas putaret, convenientissimum fuisse" (*Aglaophamus*, p. 870).

ordinary man, or by any one except an artist or philosopher. Two names, if compound, may have the same Name-Form, though few or none of the letters in them be the same. A physician may so disguise his complex mixtures, by apparent differences of colour or smell, that they shall be supposed by others to be different, though essentially the same. *Beta* is the name of the letter B: you may substitute, in place of the three last letters, any others which you prefer, and the name will still be appropriate to designate the letter B.¹

To explain the foundations of the onomastic (name-giving or speaking) art,² we must analyse words into their primordial constituent letters. The name-giving Artists have begun from this point, and we must follow in their synthetical track. We must distinguish letters with their essential forms—we must also distinguish things with their essential forms—we must then assign to each essence of things that essence of letters which has a natural aptitude to signify it, either one letter singly or several conjoined. The rectitude of the compound names will depend upon that of the simple and primordial.³ This is the only way in which we can track out the rectitude of names: for it is no account of the matter to say that the Gods bestowed them, and that therefore they are right: such recourse to a *Deus ex machina* is only one among the pretexts for evading the necessity of explanation.⁴

Essential aptitude for signification consists in resemblance between the essence of the letter and that of the thing signified. Thus the letter *Rho*, according to Sokrates, is naturally apt for the signification of rush or vehement motion, because in pronouncing it the tongue is briskly agitated and rolled about. Several words are cited, illustrating this position.⁵ *Iota* natu-

Letters, as well as things, must be distinguished with their essential properties, each must be adapted to each.

Essential significant aptitude consists in resemblance.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 393-394.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 425 A. ἡ δὲ οὐκ ἀποφασίζω, ἀλλὰ λέγω, ὅτι τὸν λόγον ἔχει τὸν ὅτι.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 424 B-E, 426 A, 434 A.

This extreme postulate of analysis and adaptation may be compared with that which Sokrates lays down, in the *Phædrus*, in regard to the art of Rhe-

toric. You must first distinguish all the different forms of mind—then all the different forms of speech; you must assign the sort of speech which is apt for persuading each particular sort of mind. *Phædrus*, pp. 271-272.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 425 E.

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 426 D-E. ῥοῦρον, ῥοῦρον, ῥοῦρον, &c. Leibnitz (*Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement Hu-*

rally designates thin and subtle things, which insinuate themselves everywhere. *Phi*, *Chi*, *Psi*, *Sigma*, the sibilants, imitate blowing. *Delta* and *Tau*, from the compression of the tongue, imitate stoppage of motion, or stationary condition. *Lambda* imitates smooth and slippery things. *Nu* serves, as confining the voice in the mouth, to form the words signifying in-doors and interior. *Alpha* and *Eta* are both of them large letters: the first is assigned to signify size, the last to signify length. *Omicron* is suited to what is round or circular.¹

It is from these fundamental aptitudes, and some others analogous, that the name-giving Artist, or Lawgiver, first put together letters to compound and construct his names. Herein consists their rectitude, according to Sokrates. Though in laying down the position Sokrates gives it only as the best which *he* could discover, and intimates that some persons may turn it into derision—yet he evidently means to be understood seriously.²

In applying this theory—about the fundamental significant aptitudes of the letters of the alphabet—to show the rectitude of the existing words compounded from them—Sokrates assumes that the name-giving Artists were believers in the Herakleitean theory: that is, in the perpetual process of flux, movement, and transition into contraries. He cites a large variety of names, showing by their composition that they were adapted to denote this all-pervading fact, as constituting the essence of things.³ The names given by these theorists to that which is good, virtuous, agreeable, &c., were compounded in such

main, Book iii. ch. 2, p. 300 Erdm.); and Jacob Grimm (in his Dissertation Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache, Berlin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato, respecting the primordial growth of language, and the original significant or symbolising power supposed to be inherent in each letter (Kein Buchstabe, "ursprünglich steht bedeutungslos oder ueberrüssig," pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough—*Lambda*, the Smooth: see also what he says about Alpha, Iota, Hypsilon. Compare, besides, M. Renan, Orig. du Langage, vi. p. 137.

The comparison of the Platonic speculations on the primordial powers of letters, with those of a modern linguistic scholar so illustrious as Grimm (the earliest speculations with the latest) are exceedingly curious—and honourable to Plato. They serve as farther reasons for believing that this dialogue was not intended to caricature Protagoras.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 426-427.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 426 B, 427 D.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 401 C—402 B. 436 E: *ὡς τοῦ παντός ἰσχυρὸς τὴν καὶ φερόμενον καὶ πέποιτος φανερὸν σημαίνει ἡμῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὄντα.* Also p. 439 B.

a manner as to denote what facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards movement.¹

Many names (pursues Sokrates), having been given by artistic lawgivers who believed in the Herakleitean theory, will possess intrinsic rectitude, if we assume that theory to be true. But how if the theory be not true? and if the name-givers were mistaken on this fundamental point? The names will then not be right. Now we must not assume the theory to be true, although the Name-givers believed it to be so. Perhaps they themselves (Sokrates intimates) having become giddy by often turning round to survey the nature of things, mistook this *vertige* of their own for a perpetual revolution and movement of the things which they saw, and gave names accordingly.² A Name-Giver who is real and artistic is rare and hard to find: there are more among them incompetent than competent: and the name originally bestowed represents only the opinion or conviction of him by whom it is bestowed.³ Yet the names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the same theory.

But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent—the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge.

Again, the names originally bestowed differ much from those in use now. Many of them have undergone serious changes: there have been numerous omissions, additions, interpolations, and transpositions of letters, from regard to euphony or other fancies: insomuch that the primitive root becomes hardly traceable, except by great penetration and sagacity.⁴ Then there are some names which have never been issued at all from the mint of the name-giver, but have either been borrowed from foreigners, or perhaps have been suggested by super-human powers.⁵

Changes and transpositions introduced in the name—hard to follow.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 416-416-417, &c.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 420-411 C. *Αἰτιώμεθα δὲ οὐ τὸ ἐνὸν τὸ παρὰ σφίσι τὰς αἰτίας εἶναι ταύτης τῆς διέξεως, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τὰ πράγματα οὕτως πεφυκέναι, &c.*

"He that is giddy thinks the world turns round," &c.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 418 C. *Οἴσθη οὖν ὅτι μόνον τοῦτο ἔχουσιν τὰ ἀρχαῖον ὄνομα τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦ θεμένου; Ἄλλο* p. 419 A.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 394 B, 399 B, 414 C, 418 A.

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 397 B, 409 B.

In this point Sokrates brings the question during his conversation with Herakleitos against whom he maintains—*That there is a natural natural rectitude in Names, or a true Name-Form—that naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way, and by an *ἐπιστήμη* who knows that way. But when, after saying thus the general theory, in the point a certain length in applying it to actual names, he introduces a multitude of qualifications which attenuate and explain it away. Forcing names are bestowed by arbitrary law-givers, not under a belief in the Herakleitean theory—which theory is at best doubtful: moreover the original names have in course of time undergone such multiplied changes, that the original point of significance can hardly be now recognised except by very penetrating intellects.*

It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kratylos: who appears as the unwearied advocate of the same general theory which Sokrates had enforced upon Herakleitos. He admits all the consequences of the theory, taking no account of qualifications. Moreover he announces himself as having already bestowed reflection on the subject, and as exposing the doctrine of Herakleitos.¹

If names are significant by natural rectitude, or by partaking of the Name-Form, it follows that all names must be *right or true*, one as well as another. If a name be not right, it cannot be significant: that is, it is no name at all: it is a mere unmeaning sound. A name, in order to be significant, must imitate the essence of the thing named. If you add any thing to a number, or subtract any thing from it, it becomes thereby a new number: it is not the same number badly rendered. So with a letter: so too with a name. There is no such thing as a bad name. Every name must be either significant, and therefore, right—or else it is not a name. So also there is no such thing as

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 428 B, 440 E. It appears that on this point the opinion of Herakleitos coincided with that of the Pythagoreans, who held that names were *φύσει καὶ οὐ θεῷ*, and maintained as a corollary that there could be only one name for each

thing and only one thing signified by each name (*Simplikios ad Aristot. Categ.* p. 43, b. 32, *Schol. Bekk.*).

In general Herakleitos differed from Pythagoras, and is described as speaking of him with bitter antipathy.

a false proposition : you cannot say the thing that is not : your words in that case have no meaning ; they are only an empty sound. The hypothesis that the law-giver may have distributed names erroneously is therefore not admissible.¹ Moreover, you see that he must have known well, for otherwise he would not have given names so consistent with each other, and with the general Herakleitean theory.² And since the name is by necessity a representation or copy of the thing, whoever knows the name, must also know the thing named. There is in fact no other way of knowing or seeking or finding out things, except through their names.³

These consequences are fairly deduced by Kratylus from the hypothesis, of the natural rectitude of names, as laid down in the beginning of the dialogue, by Sokrates : who had expressly affirmed (in his anti-Protagorean opening of the dialogue) that unless the process of naming was performed according to the peremptory dictates of nature and by one of the few privileged name-givers, it would be a failure and would accomplish nothing ;⁴ in other words, that a

Sokrates
goes still
farther
towards re-
tracting it.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 429 B-C.
Sokr. Πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὀρθῶς
κεῖνται ;

Krat. Ὅσα γε ὀνόματα ἔστι.

Sokr. Τί οὖν ; Ἐρμολόγει τῷδε πότερον
μὴδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φημεν, εἰ μὴ
τι αὐτῷ Ἐρμού γενέσθωσ προσηκεῖ, ἢ
κεῖσθαι μὲν, οὐ μὲντοι ὀρθῶς γε ;

Krat. Οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ,
ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ
ἑτέρου τοῦτο τοῦνομα, οὐπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις
ἢ τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῦσα.

The critics say that these last words
ought to be read ἢν τὸ ὄνομα δηλοῖ, as
Ficinus has translated, and Schleier-
macher after him. They are probably
in the right ; at the same time, reason-
ing upon the theory of Kratylus, we
might say without impropriety, that
"the thing indicates the name".

That which is erroneously called
a bad name is no name at all (so
Kratylus argues), but only seems to be
a name to ignorant persons. Thus
also in the Platonic *Minos* (c. 9, p. 317):
a bad law is no law in reality, but only
seems to be a law to ignorant men, see
above, ch. xiv. p.

Compare the like argument about
νόμος in Xenoph. *Memorab.* i. 2, 42-47,
and Lassalle, *Herakleitos*, vol. ii. p. 392.

² Plato, *Krat.* p. 436 C. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴ
οὐχ οὕτως ἔχῃ, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ, εἰδὸτα
τιθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ
δὲ μὴ, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἂν
ὀνόματα εἴη. Μέγιστον δὲ σοι ἔστω
τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἰσφαλταί τῆς ἀλη-
θείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε οὕτω
ξύμφονα ἦν αὐτῷ πάντα. ἢ οὐκ
ἑνεργεῖς αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα
κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτόν ἐγίγ-
νετο τὰ ὀνόματα ;

These last words allude to the
various particular etymologies which
had been enumerated by Sokrates as
illustrations of the Herakleitean theory.
They confirm the opinion above ex-
pressed, that Plato intended his etymo-
logies seriously, not as mockery or
caricature. That Plato should have
intended them as caricatures of Prota-
goras and Prodikos, and yet that he
should introduce Kratylus as welcom-
ing them in support of his argument,
is a much greater absurdity than the
supposition that Plato mistook them
for admissible guesses.

³ Plato, *Krat.* c. 111, pp. 435-436.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 387 C. ἴδὼν δὲ μὴ,
ἱεμαρτήσεται τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσει.
Compare p. 389 A.

non-natural name would be no name at all. Accordingly, in replying to Kratylus, Sokrates goes yet farther in retracting his own previous reasoning at the beginning of the dialogue—though still without openly professing to do so. He proposes a compromise.¹ He withdraws the pretensions of his theory, as peremptory or exclusive; he acknowledges the theory of Hermogenes as true, and valid in conjunction with it. He admits that non-natural names also, significant only by convention, are available as a make-shift—and that such names are in frequent use. Still however he contends, that natural names, significant by likeness, are the best, so far as they can be obtained: but inasmuch as that principle will not afford sufficiently extensive holding-ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or conventional significance.²

You say (reasons Sokrates with Kratylus) that names must be significant by way of likeness. But there are degrees of likeness. A portrait is more or less like its original, but it is never exactly like: it is never a duplicate, nor does it need to be so. Or a portrait, which really belongs to and resembles one person, may be erroneously assigned to another. The same thing happens with names. There are names more or less like the thing named—good or bad: there are names good with reference to their own object, but erroneously fitted on to objects not their own. The name does not cease to be a name, so long as the type or form of the thing named is preserved in it: but it is worse or better, according as the accompanying features are more or less in harmony with the form.³

If names are like things, the letters which are put together to form names, must have a natural resemblance to things—as we remarked above respecting the letters Rho, Lambda, &c. But the natural, inherent, powers of resemblance and significance,

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 430 A. φέρε δὲ, εἰάν πῃ διαλλαχθῶμεν, ὡς Κράτυλε, &c.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 435 C. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὁμοία εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς γλίσχρὰ ἢ ἢ ἄλκι· αὐτῇ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἢ καὶ

τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσκρῆσθαι, τῇ ξυνηθείᾳ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητα· ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατὰ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο, ὅταν ἡ πᾶσιν ἢ ὡς πλείστοις ὁμοίους λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἰσχίστα δὲ τούναντιον.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 432-434.

which we pronounced to belong to these letters, are not found to pervade all the actual names, in which they are employed. There are words containing the letters *Rho* and *Lambda*, in a sense opposite to that which is natural to them—yet nevertheless at the same time significant; as is evident from the fact, that you and I and others understand them alike. Here then are words significant, without resembling: significant altogether through habit and convention. We must admit the principle of convention as an inferior ground and manner of significance. Resemblance, though the best ground as far as it can be had, is not the only one.¹

All names are not like the things named: some names are bad, others good: the law-giver sometimes gave names under an erroneous belief. Hence you are not warranted in saying that things must be known and investigated through names, and that whoever knows the name, knows also the thing named. You say that the names given are all coherent and grounded upon the Herakleitean theory of perpetual flux. You take this as a proof that that theory is true in itself, and that the law-giver adopted and proceeded upon it as true. I agree with you that the law-giver or name-giver believed in the Herakleitean theory, and adapted many of his names to it: but you cannot infer from hence that the theory is true—for he may have been mistaken.² Moreover, though many of the existing names consist with, and are based upon, that theory, the same cannot be said of all names. Many names can be enumerated which are based on the opposite principle of permanence and stand-still. It is unsafe to strike a balance of mere numbers between the two: besides which, even among the various names founded on the Herakleitean theory, you will find jumbled together the names of virtues and vices, benefits and misfortunes. That theory lends itself to good and evil alike; it cannot therefore

All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 434-435.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 439 B-C. Ἐτι τοῖνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα νόματα ἐς ταῦτον τείνοντα ἐξαπατᾷ, καὶ τῷ ὅτι μὲν οἱ θάμνοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες τε εἴθελτο ὡς ἰόντων ἀπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ρέοντων φαίνονται γὰρ ἔμοιγε

καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δ', εἰ ἐτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, &c.

These words appear to me to imply that Sokrates is perfectly serious, and not ironical, in delivering his opinion, that the original imposers of names were believers in the Herakleitean theory.

be received as true—whether the name-giver believed in it or not.¹

Lastly, even if we granted that things may be known and studied through their names, it is certain that there must be some other way of knowing them; since the first name-givers (as you yourself affirm) knew things, at a time when no names existed.² Things may be known and ought to be studied, not through names, but by themselves and through their own affinities.³

Sokrates then concludes the dialogue by opposing the Platonic ideas to the Herakleitean theory. I often dream of or imagine the Beautiful *per se*, the Good *per se*, and such like existences or Entia.⁴ Are not such existences real? Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? Particular beautiful things—particular good things—are in perpetual change or flux: but The Beautiful, The Good—The Ideas or Forms of these and such like—remain always what they are, always the same.

The Herakleitean theory of constant and universal flux is true respecting particular things, but not true respecting these Ideas or Forms. It is the latter alone which know or are known: it is they alone which admit of being rightly named. For that which is in perpetual flux and change can neither know, nor be known, nor be rightly named.⁵ Being an ever-changing subject, it is never in any determinate condition: and nothing can be

¹ Plato, *Krat.* pp. 437-438 C.

Sokrates here enumerates the particular names illustrating his judgment. However strange the verbal transitions and approximations may appear to us, I think it clear that he intends to be understood seriously.

² Plato, *Krat.* p. 438 A-B. Kratylus here suggests that the first names may perhaps have been imposed by a superhuman power. But Sokrates replies, that upon that supposition all the names must have been imposed upon the same theory: there could not have been any contradiction between one name and another.

³ Plato, *Krat.* pp. 438-439. 438 E:—*ὅτι ἀλλήλων γε, εἰ πῃ ἐγγενῆ ἔστι, καὶ αὐτὰ δὲ αὐτῶν.*

⁴ Plato, *Krat.* p. 439 C-D. *σκέψαι δ' ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω, πότερον φῶμεν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων οὕτως, ἢ μή; . . . μὴ εἰ πρόσθεν τί ἐστι καλὸν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δεκὶ ταῦτα πάντα εἶναι. ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιούτων δεῖ εἶναι οἷόν ἐστιν;*

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 439 D-440 A. *Ἄρ' οὐν οἷόν τε προσεῖπαι αὐτὸ ὁρθῶς, εἰ δεῖ ὑπερέχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἑκαὶ οὐδὲν ἐστιν, ὅτι τοιούτων; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὖθις γίνεσθαι καὶ ὑπερβαίνειν, καὶ μετέχει οὕτως ἕκαστον; . . .*

Ἄλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθεῖν γε ὑπ' οὐδενός. . . .

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ γινώσκον εἶναι φάναι εἰκόες, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει.

known which is not in a determinate condition. The Form of the knowing subject, as well as the Form of the known object, must both remain fixed and eternal, otherwise there can be no knowledge at all.

To admit these permanent and unchangeable Forms is to deny the Herakleitean theory, which proclaims constant and universal flux. This is a debate still open and not easy to decide. But while it is yet undecided, no wise man ought to put such implicit faith in names and in the bestowers of names, as to feel himself warranted in asserting confidently the certainty of the Herakleitean theory.¹ Perhaps that theory is true, perhaps not. Consider the point strenuously, Kratylus. Be not too easy in acquiescence—for you are still young, and have time enough before you. If you find it out, give to me also the benefit of your solution.²

Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names.

Kratylus replies that he will follow the advice given, but that he has already meditated on the matter, and still adheres to Herakleitus. Such is the close of the dialogue.

One of the most learned among the modern Platonic commentators informs us that the purpose of Plato in this dialogue was, "to rub over Protagoras and other Sophists with the bitterest salt of sarcasm".³ I have already expressed my dissent from this theory, which is opposed to all the ancient views of the dialogue, and which has arisen, in my judgment, only from the anxiety of the moderns to exonerate Plato from the reproach of having suggested as admissible, etymologies which now appear to us fantastic. I see no derision of the Sophists, except one or two sneers

Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 440 C. Ταῦτ' οὐδ' ἐπὶ τὸν ποτὶ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ἐκείνους ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτον τε λήγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ βέλδιον ἢ ἐπισκεψασθαι, οὐδὲ πᾶν τοῦν ἐχούτος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα δυνάσιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν θεραπεύειν, πεπιστευκότα ἐκείνους καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, διεσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς τι

εἶδόντα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων καταγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ὑμῖς οὐδενός, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ καρέμια βεῖ, &c.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 440 D.

³ Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Kratyl.* p. 18 — "quos Plato hoc libro acerbissimo sale perficandos statuit". Schliermacher also tells us (*Einführung*, pp. 17-21) that "Plato had much delight

against Protagoras and Prodikus, upon the ever-recurring theme that they took money for their lectures.¹ The argument against Protagoras at the opening of the dialogue—whether conclusive or not—is serious and not derisory. The discourse of Sokrates is neither that of an anti-sophistical caricaturist, on the one hand—nor that of a confirmed dogmatist who has studied the subject and made up his mind on the other (this is the part which he ascribes to Kratylus)²—but the tentative march of an enquirer groping after truth, who follows the suggestive promptings of his own invention, without knowing whither it will conduct him: who, having in his mind different and even opposite points of view, unfolds first arguments on behalf of one, and next those on behalf of the other, without pledging himself either to the one or to the other, or to any definite scheme of compromise between them.³ Those who take no interest in such circuitous gropings and guesses of an inquisitive and yet unsatisfied mind—those who ask for nothing but a conclusion clearly enunciated along with one or two affirmative reasons—may find the dialogue tiresome. However this may be—it is a manner found in many Platonic dialogues.

Sokrates opens his case by declaring the thesis of the Absolute Theory laid down by Sokrates & *a priori*, in the (Object *sine* Subject), against the Protagorean thesis of the Relative (Object *cum* Subject). Things have an absolute essence: names have an absolute essence:⁴

in heaping a full measure of ridicule upon his enemy Antisthenes; and that he at last became tired with the exuberance of his own philological jests". Lassalle shows, with much force, that the persons ridiculed (even if we grant the derisory purpose to be established) in the *Kratylus*, cannot be Protagoras and the Protagoreans (Herakleitos, vol. ii. pp. 376-384).

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 384 B, 391 B.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 423 A, 440 D.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 384 C, 391 A. συζητῶν ἐτοιμός εἰμι καὶ σοὶ καὶ Κρατύλῳ κοινῇ . . . ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην ἀλλὰ σκευδοίμην μετὰ σοῦ.

⁴ One cannot but notice how Plato, shortly after having declared war against the Relativity affirmed by Protagoras, falls himself into that very track of Relativity when he comes to speak about actual language, telling us that names are imposed on grounds

dependant on or relative to the knowledge or belief of the Name-givers. *Kratylus*, pp. 397 B, 399 A, 401 A-B, 411 B, 436 B.

The like doctrine is affirmed in the *Republic*, vi. p. 515 B. ὅλον ὅτι ὁ θεῖμος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἦναι εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα εἴθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα.

Leibnitz conceived an idea of a "Lingua Characterica Universalis, quae simul sit ars inveniendi et iudicandi" (see Leibnitz *Opp.* Erdmann, pp. 162-163), and he alludes to a conception of Jacob Böhme, that there once existed a Lingua Adamica or Natur-Sprache, through which the essences of things might be contemplated and understood. "Lingua Adamica vel certè vis ejus, quam quidam se nomen, et in nominibus ab Adamo imposita essentias rerum intueri posse contendunt—nobis certè ignota est" (*Opp.* p. 93).

each name belongs to its own thing, and to no other : this is its rectitude : none but that rare person, the artistic name-giver, can detect the essence of each thing, and the essence of each name, so as to apply the name rightly. Here we have a theory truly Platonic : impressed upon Plato's mind by a sentiment *a priori*, and not from any survey or comparison of particulars. Accordingly when Sokrates is called upon to apply his theory to existing current words, and to make out how any such rectitude can be shown to belong to them—he finds the greatest divergence and incongruity between the two. His ingenuity is hardly tasked to reconcile them : and he is obliged to have recourse to bold and multiplied hypotheses. That the first Name-Givers were artists proceeding upon system, but incompetent artists proceeding on a bad system—they were Herakleiteans who believed in the universality of movement, and gave names having reference to movement :¹ That the various letters of the alphabet, or rather the different actions of the vocal organism by which they are pronounced, have each an inherent, essential, adaptation, or analogy to the phenomena of movement or arrest of movement :² That the names originally bestowed have become disguised by a variety of metamorphoses, but may be

first part—Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary to bring it into harmony with facts.

Leibnitz seems to have thought that it was possible to construct a philosophical language, based upon an *Alphabetum Cogitationum Humanarum*, through which problems on all subjects might be resolved, by a *calculus* like that which is employed for the solution of arithmetical or geometrical problems (Opp. p. 83 ; compare also p. 266).

This is very analogous to the affirmations of Sokrates, in the first part of the *Kratylus*, about the essentiality of Names discovered and declared by the *νομοθετῆς τοῦ λόγου*.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 436 D.

² Plato, *Krat.* pp. 424-425. Schleiermacher declares this to be among the greatest and most profound truths which have ever been enunciated about language (Introduction to *Kratylus*, p. 11). Stallbaum, on the contrary, regards it as not even seriously meant, but mere derision of others (Prolegg. ad *Krat.* p. 12). Another commentator on Plato calls it "eine Lehre der So-

phistischen Sprachforscher" (August Arnold, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*—durch die Lehre Platons vermittelt—p. 178, Berlin, 1841).

Proklus, in his Commentary, says that the scope of this dialogue is to exhibit the imitative or generative faculty which essentially belongs to the mind, and whereby the mind (aided by the vocal or pronounciative imagination—*λεκτική φαντασία*) constructs names which are natural transcripts of the essences of things (Proklus, Schol. ad *Kratyl.* pp. 1-21 ed. Boissonnade ; Alkinous, *Introd. ad Platon.* c. 6).

Ficinus, too, in his argument to the *Kratylus* (p. 768), speaks much about the mystic sanctity of names, recognised not merely by Pythagoras and Plato, but also by the Jews and Orientals. He treats the etymologies in the *Kratylus* as seriously intended. He says not a word about any intention on the part of Plato to deride the Sophists or any other Etymologists.

So also Sydenham, in his transla-

rally designates thin and subtle things, which insinuate themselves everywhere. *Phi*, *Chi*, *Psi*, *Sigma*, the sibilants, imitate blowing. *Delta* and *Tau*, from the compression of the tongue, imitate stoppage of motion, or stationary condition. *Lambda* imitates smooth and slippery things. *Nu* serves, as confining the voice in the mouth, to form the words signifying in-doors and interior. *Alpha* and *Eta* are both of them large letters: the first is assigned to signify size, the last to signify length. *Omicron* is suited to what is round or circular.¹

It is from these fundamental aptitudes, and some others analogous, that the name-giving Artist, or Lawgiver, first put together letters to compound and construct his names. Herein consists their rectitude, according to Sokrates. Though in laying down the position Sokrates gives it only as the best which *he* could discover, and intimates that some persons may turn it into derision—yet he evidently means to be understood seriously.²

In applying this theory—about the fundamental significant aptitudes of the letters of the alphabet—to show the rectitude of the existing words compounded from them—Sokrates assumes that the name-giving Artists were believers in the Herakleitean theory: that is, in the perpetual process of flux, movement, and transition into contraries. He cites a large variety of names, showing by their composition that they were adapted to denote this all-pervading fact, as constituting the essence of things.³ The names given by these theorists to that which is good, virtuous, agreeable, &c., were compounded in such

main, Book iii. ch. 2, p. 300 Erdm.); and Jacob Grimm (in his Dissertation) Ueber den Ursprung der Sprache, Berlin, 1858, ed. 4) give views very similar to those of Plato, respecting the primordial growth of language, and the original significant or symbolising power supposed to be inherent in each letter (Kein Buchstabe, "ursprünglich steht bedeutungslos oder ueberflüssig," pp. 39-40). Leibnitz and Grimm say (as Plato here also affirms) that Rho designates the Rough—*Lambda*, the Smooth: see also what he says about *Alpha*, *Iota*, *Hypsilon*. Compare, besides, M. Renan, Orig. du Langage, vi. p. 137.

The comparison of the Platonic speculations on the primordial powers of letters, with those of a modern linguistic scholar so illustrious as Grimm (the earliest speculations with the latest) are exceedingly curious—and honourable to Plato. They serve as farther reasons for believing that this dialogue was not intended to caricature Protagoras.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 426-427.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 426 B, 427 D.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 401 C—402 B.

436 E: ἐς τοῦ παρὸς ἰόντος τε καὶ φερόμενου καὶ πάντος φαιδὸν σημαίνειν ἡμῶν τὴν οὐσίαν τὰ ὄνματα. Also p. 439 B.

a manner as to denote what facilitates, or falls in with, the law of universal movement: the names of things bad or hurtful, denote what obstructs or retards movement.¹

Many names (pursues Sokrates), having been given by artistic lawgivers who believed in the Herakleitean theory, will possess intrinsic rectitude, if we assume that theory to be true. But how if the theory be not true? and if the name-givers were mistaken on this fundamental point? The names will then not be right. Now we must not assume the theory to be true, although the Name-givers believed it to be so. Perhaps they themselves (Sokrates intimates) having become giddy by often turning round to survey the nature of things, mistook this *vertige* of their own for a perpetual revolution and movement of the things which they saw, and gave names accordingly.² A Name-Giver who is real and artistic is rare and hard to find: there are more among them incompetent than competent: and the name originally bestowed represents only the opinion or conviction of him by whom it is bestowed.³ Yet the names bestowed will be consistent with themselves, founded on the same theory.

But the Name-Giver may be mistaken or incompetent—the rectitude of the name depends upon his knowledge.

Again, the names originally bestowed differ much from those in use now. Many of them have undergone serious changes: there have been numerous omissions, additions, interpolations, and transpositions of letters, from regard to euphony or other fancies: inasmuch that the primitive root becomes hardly traceable, except by great penetration and sagacity.⁴ Then there are some names which have never been issued at all from the mint of the name-giver, but have either been borrowed from foreigners, or perhaps have been suggested by super-human powers.⁵

Changes and transpositions introduced in the name—hard to follow.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 416-417, &c.
² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 429-431 C.
Αἰτιώμεται δὲ οὐ τὸ ἔνθεν τὸ παρὰ σφίσι.
καὶ οὐκ αἰτίαν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς δόξης, ἀλλ'
ἐπὶ τὰ πράγματα οὕτω νοητέον, &c.

"He that is giddy thinks the world turns round," &c.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 418 C. Οἷός τε
οὐκ ἔστι μόνον τοῦτο ἀρετὴ τὸ ἀρχαίων
ὄνομα τὴν διάρκειαν τοῦ θεμένου; Also
p. 419 A.

⁴ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 394 B, 399 B,
414 C, 418 A.

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 397 B, 400 B.

To this point Sokrates brings the question during his conversation with Hermogenes : against whom he maintains —That there is a natural intrinsic rectitude in Names, or a true Name-Form—that naming is a process which must be performed in the natural way, and by an Artist who knows that way. But when, after laying down this general theory, he has gone a certain length in applying it to actual names, he proceeds to introduce qualifications which attenuate and explain it away. Existing names were bestowed by artistic law-givers, but under a belief in the Herakleitean theory—which theory is at best doubtful : moreover the original names have, in course of time, undergone such multiplied changes, that the original point of significant resemblance can hardly be now recognised except by very penetrating intellects.

It is here that Sokrates comes into conversation with Kratylus : who appears as the unreserved advocate of the same general theory which Sokrates had enforced upon Hermogenes. He admits all the consequences of the theory, taking no account of qualifications. Moreover he announces himself as having already bestowed reflection on the subject, and as espousing the doctrine of Herakleitus.¹

If names are significant by natural rectitude, or by partaking of the Name-Form, it follows that all names must be right or true, one as well as another. If a name be not right, it cannot be significant : that is, it is no name at all : it is a mere unmeaning sound. A name, in order to be significant, must imitate the essence of the thing named. If you add any thing to a number, or subtract any thing from it, it becomes thereby a new number : it is not the same number badly rendered. So with a letter : so too with a name. There is no such thing as a bad name. Every name must be either significant, and therefore, right—or else it is not a name. So also there is no such thing as

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 428 B, 440 E.

It appears that on this point the opinion of Herakleitus coincided with that of the Pythagoreans, who held that names were *φύσει καὶ οὐ θέσει*, and maintained as a corollary that there could be only one name for each

thing and only one thing signified by each name (*Simplikios ad Aristot. Categ.* p. 43, b. 32, *Schol. Bekk.*).

In general Herakleitus differed from Pythagoras, and is described as speaking of him with bitter antipathy.

a false proposition : you cannot say the thing that is not : your words in that case have no meaning ; they are only an empty sound. The hypothesis that the law-giver may have distributed names erroneously is therefore not admissible.¹ Moreover, you see that he must have known well, for otherwise he would not have given names so consistent with each other, and with the general Herakleitean theory.² And since the name is by necessity a representation or copy of the thing, whoever knows the name, must also know the thing named. There is in fact no other way of knowing or seeking or finding out things, except through their names.³

These consequences are fairly deduced by Kratylus from the hypothesis, of the natural rectitude of names, as laid down in the beginning of the dialogue, by Sokrates : who had expressly affirmed (in his anti-Protagorean opening of the dialogue) that unless the process of naming was performed according to the peremptory dictates of nature and by one of the few privileged name-givers, it would be a failure and would accomplish nothing ;⁴ in other words, that a

¹ Plato, Kratyl. p. 429 B-C.

Sokr. Πάντα ἄρα τὰ ὀνόματα ὁρθῶς κεῖται ;

Krat. Ὅσα γε ὀνόματα ἔστι.

Sokr. Τί οὖν ; Ἐρμολόγε τῷδε πότερον μὴδὲ ὄνομα τοῦτο κεῖσθαι φάμεν, εἰ μή τι αὐτῷ Ἐρμού γενέσθαι προσήκει, ἢ κεῖσθαι μὲν, οὐ μόντοι ὁρθῶς γε ;

Krat. Οὐδὲ κεῖσθαι ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖν κεῖσθαι, εἶναι δὲ ἕτερον τοῦτο τοῦτο, οὐπὲρ καὶ ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δηλοῦσα.

The critics say that these last words ought to be read ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος δηλοῦσα, as Ficinus has translated, and Schleiermacher after him. They are probably in the right ; at the same time, reasoning upon the theory of Kratylus, we might say without impropriety, that "the thing indicates the name".

That which is erroneously called a bad name is no name at all (so Kratylus argues), but only seems to be a name to ignorant persons. Thus also in the Platonic *Minos* (c. 9, p. 317) : a bad law is no law in reality, but only seems to be a law to ignorant men, see above, ch. xiv. p.

Compare the like argument about νόμος in Xenoph. *Memorab.* i. 2, 42-47, and Lassalle, *Herakleitos*, vol. ii. p. 392.

² Plato, Krat. p. 436 C. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴ οὕχ οὕτως ἔχη, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον ᾖ, εἰδὸτα τίθεσθαι τὸν τιθέμενον τὰ ὀνόματα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὅπερ πάλαι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, οὐδ' ἂν ὀνόματα εἴη. Μέγιστον δὲ σοι ἔστω τεκμήριον ὅτι οὐκ ἔσφαλται τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ τιθέμενος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε οὕτω ξύμφωνα ἦν αὐτῷ πάντα, ἢ οὐκ ἐνενόεεις αὐτὸς λέγων ὡς πάντα κατ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῦτον ἐγγίγντο τὰ ὀνόματα ;

These last words allude to the various particular etymologies which had been enumerated by Sokrates as illustrations of the Herakleitean theory. They confirm the opinion above expressed, that Plato intended his etymologies seriously, not as mockery or caricature. That Plato should have intended them as caricatures of Protagoras and Prodikos, and yet that he should introduce Kratylus as welcoming them in support of his argument, is a much greater absurdity than the supposition that Plato mistook them for admissible guesses.

³ Plato, Krat. c. 111, pp. 435-436.

⁴ Plato, Kratyl. p. 387 C. εἰν δὲ μὴ, ἱεραρχήσονται τε καὶ οὐδὲν ποιήσιν. Compare p. 389 A.

non-natural name would be no name at all. Accordingly, in replying to Kratylus, Sokrates goes yet farther in retracting his own previous reasoning at the beginning of the dialogue—though still without openly professing to do so. He proposes a compromise.¹ He withdraws the pretensions of his theory, as peremptory or exclusive; he acknowledges the theory of Hermogenes as true, and valid in conjunction with it. He admits that non-natural names also, significant only by convention, are available as a make-shift—and that such names are in frequent use. Still however he contends, that natural names, significant by likeness, are the best, so far as they can be obtained: but inasmuch as that principle will not afford sufficiently extensive holding-ground, recourse must be had by way of supplement to the less perfect rectitude (of names) presented by customary or conventional significance.²

You say (reasons Sokrates with Kratylus) that names must be significant by way of likeness. But there are degrees of likeness. A portrait is more or less like its original, but it is never exactly like: it is never a duplicate, nor does it need to be so. Or a portrait, which really belongs to and resembles one person, may be erroneously assigned to another. The same thing happens with names. There are names more or less like the thing named—good or bad: there are names good with reference to their own object, but erroneously fitted on to objects not their own. The name does not cease to be a name, so long as the type or form of the thing named is preserved in it: but it is worse or better, according as the accompanying features are more or less in harmony with the form.³

If names are like things, the letters which are put together to form names, must have a natural resemblance to things—as we remarked above respecting the letters Rho, Lambda, &c. But the natural, inherent, powers of resemblance and significance,

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 430 A. φέρε δὲ, εἰς τὴν διαλλαχθεῖσαν, ὡς Κράτυλος, &c.

² Plato, *Krat.* p. 435 C. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκει μὲν κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν ὅμοια εἶναι τὰ ὀνόματα τοῖς πράγμασιν· ἀλλὰ μὴ ὥς ἀληθὲς γλίσχρῃ ἢ ἢ ὁλῶς αὐτῇ τῆς ὁμοιότητος, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ ἢ καὶ

τῷ φορτικῷ τούτῳ προσχρησθαι, τῇ ξυμβολῇ, εἰς ὀνομάτων ὁρθότητα· ἐπεὶ ἴσως κατὰ γὰρ τὸ δυνατόν κάλλιστ' ἂν λέγοιτο, ὅταν ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ ὥς πλείστοις ὁμοίους λέγηται, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ προσήκουσιν, αἰσχίστα δὲ τοῖναντιον.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 432-434.

which we pronounced to belong to these letters, are not found to pervade all the actual names, in which they are employed. There are words containing the letters *Rho* and *Lambda*, in a sense opposite to that which is natural to them—yet nevertheless at the same time significant; as is evident from the fact, that you and I and others understand them alike. Here then are words significant, without resembling: significant altogether through habit and convention. We must admit the principle of convention as an inferior ground and manner of significance. Resemblance, though the best ground as far as it can be had, is not the only one.¹

All names are not like the things named: some names are bad, others good: the law-giver sometimes gave names under an erroneous belief. Hence you are not warranted in saying that things must be known and investigated through names, and that whoever knows the name, knows also the thing named. You say that the names given are all coherent and grounded upon the Herakleitean theory of perpetual flux. You take this as a proof that that theory is true in itself, and that the law-giver adopted and proceeded upon it as true. I agree with you that the law-giver or name-giver believed in the Herakleitean theory, and adapted many of his names to it: but you cannot infer from hence that the theory is true—for he may have been mistaken.² Moreover, though many of the existing names consist with, and are based upon, that theory, the same cannot be said of all names. Many names can be enumerated which are based on the opposite principle of permanence and stand-still. It is unsafe to strike a balance of mere numbers between the two: besides which, even among the various names founded on the Herakleitean theory, you will find jumbled together the names of virtues and vices, benefits and misfortunes. That theory lends itself to good and evil alike; it cannot therefore

All names are not consistent with the theory of Herakleitus: some are opposed to it.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 434-435.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 439 B-C. "Ἐτι τοίνυν τόδε σκεψώμεθα, ὅπως μὴ ἡμᾶς τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ὀνόματα ἐς ταυτὸν τεύοντα ἔξαπατᾷ, καὶ τῷ ὄντι μὲν οἱ θέμενοι αὐτὰ διανοηθέντες τε ἴδεντο ὡς ἰόντων ἀπάντων ἀεὶ καὶ ρέοντων—φαίνονται γὰρ ἑμοί γε

καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι—τὸ δ', εἰ ἐτυχεν, οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, &c.

These words appear to me to imply that Sokrates is perfectly serious, and not ironical, in delivering his opinion, that the original imposers of names were believers in the Herakleitean theory.

be received as true—whether the name-giver believed in it or not.¹

Lastly, even if we granted that things may be known and studied through their names, it is certain that there must be some other way of knowing them; since the first name-givers (as you yourself affirm) knew things, at a time when no names existed.² Things may be known and ought to be studied, not through names, but by themselves and through their own affinities.³

Sokrates then concludes the dialogue by opposing the Platonic ideas to the Herakleitean theory. I often dream of or imagine the Beautiful *per se*, the Good *per se*, and such like existences or Entia.⁴ Are not such existences real? Are they not eternal, unchangeable and stationary? Particular beautiful things—particular good things—are in perpetual change or flux: but The Beautiful, The Good—The Ideas or Forms of these and such like—remain always what they are, always the same.

The Herakleitean theory of constant and universal flux is true respecting particular things, but not true respecting these Ideas or Forms. It is the latter alone which know or are known: it is they alone which admit of being rightly named. For that which is in perpetual flux and change can neither know, nor be known, nor be rightly named.⁵ Being an ever-changing subject, it is never in any determinate condition: and nothing can be

¹ Plato, *Krat.* pp. 437-438 C.

Sokrates here enumerates the particular names illustrating his judgment. However strange the verbal transitions and approximations may appear to us, I think it clear that he intends to be understood seriously.

² Plato, *Krat.* p. 438 A-B. *Kratylus* here suggests that the first names may perhaps have been imposed by a superhuman power. But Sokrates replies, that upon that supposition all the names must have been imposed upon the same theory: there could not have been any contradiction between one name and another.

³ Plato, *Krat.* pp. 438-439. 438 E:—*δι' ἄλλῳ γὰρ, εἰ πῶς ἐγγιγνῆ ἔστι, καὶ αὐτὰ δι' αὐτῶν.*

⁴ Plato, *Krat.* p. 439 C-D. *σκέψαι δ' ἔγωγε πολλάκις ὀνειρώττω, πότερον φῶμεν τι εἶναι αὐτὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐν ἑκάστων τῶν ὄντων οὕτως, ἢ μή; . . . μὴ εἰ πρόσθεν τί ἐστι καλὸν ἢ τι τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ δοκεῖ ταῦτα πάντα εἶναι· ἀλλ' αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν οὐ τοιούτων δεῖ εἶναι ὅλον εἶναι;*

⁵ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 439 D-440 A. *Ἀρ' οὐκ ὅλον τε προσείπειν αὐτὸ δρθῶς, εἰ δεῖ ὑπερέχεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιούτων; ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόμενον ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξίναί, καὶ μετέπειτα οὕτως ἔχειν; . . . Ἄλλὰ μὲν οὐδ' ἂν γνωσθεῖν γε ὑπ' οὐδενός. . . .*

Ἄλλ' οὐδὲ γινώσκον εἶναι φάναι εἰσὶν, εἰ μεταπίπτει πάντα χρήματα καὶ μηδὲν μένει.

known which is not in a determinate condition. The Form of the knowing subject, as well as the Form of the known object, must both remain fixed and eternal, otherwise there can be no knowledge at all.

To admit these permanent and unchangeable Forms is to deny the Herakleitean theory, which proclaims constant and universal flux. This is a debate still open and not easy to decide. But while it is yet undecided, no wise man ought to put such implicit faith in names and in the bestowers of names, as to feel himself warranted in asserting confidently the certainty of the Herakleitean theory.¹ Perhaps that theory is true, perhaps not. Consider the point strenuously, Kratylus. Be not too easy in acquiescence—for you are still young, and have time enough before you. If you find it out, give to me also the benefit of your solution.²

Herakleitean theory must not be assumed as certain. We must not put implicit faith in names.

Kratylus replies that he will follow the advice given, but that he has already meditated on the matter, and still adheres to Herakleitus. Such is the close of the dialogue.

One of the most learned among the modern Platonic commentators informs us that the purpose of Plato in this dialogue was, "to rub over Protagoras and other Sophists with the bitterest salt of sarcasm".³ I have already expressed my dissent from this theory, which is opposed to all the ancient views of the dialogue, and which has arisen, in my judgment, only from the anxiety of the moderns to exonerate Plato from the reproach of having suggested as admissible, etymologies which now appear to us fantastic. I see no derision of the Sophists, except one or two sneers

Remarks upon the dialogue. Dissent from the opinion of Stallbaum and others, that it is intended to deride Protagoras and other Sophists.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 440 C. Ταῦτ' οὐκ ἰσχυρόν ποτε οὕτως ἔχει, ἢ ἑκάστωι ὡς οἱ περὶ Ἡράκλειτον τε λέγουσι καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοί, μὴ οὐ βῆδιον ἢ ἐπισκέψασθαι, οὐδὲ πάνυ νούν ἔχοντος ἀνθρώπου ἐπιτρέψαντα ὀνόμασιν αὐτὸν καὶ τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν θεράπευειν, πεπιστευκότα ἑκαίνοισι καὶ τοῖς θεμένοις αὐτά, δύσχυρίζεσθαι ὡς τι

εἰδότα, καὶ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ὄντων κατὰ γινώσκειν, ὡς οὐδὲν ἡμέτερος οὐδένα, ἀλλὰ πάντα ὥσπερ κεράμια ρεῖ, &c.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 440 D.

³ Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Kratyl.* p. 18 —"quos Plato hoc libro acerbissimo sape perficandos statuit". Schleiermacher also tells us (*Einführung*, pp. 17-21) that "Plato had much delight

against Protagoras and Prodikus, upon the ever-recurring theme that they took money for their lectures.¹ The argument against Protagoras at the opening of the dialogue—whether conclusive or not—is serious and not derisory. The discourse of Sokrates is neither that of an anti-sophistical caricaturist, on the one hand—nor that of a confirmed dogmatist who has studied the subject and made up his mind on the other (this is the part which he ascribes to Kratylus)²—but the tentative march of an enquirer groping after truth, who follows the suggestive promptings of his own invention, without knowing whither it will conduct him: who, having in his mind different and even opposite points of view, unfolds first arguments on behalf of one, and next those on behalf of the other, without pledging himself either to the one or to the other, or to any definite scheme of compromise between them.³ Those who take no interest in such circuitous gropings and guesses of an inquisitive and yet unsatisfied mind—those who ask for nothing but a conclusion clearly enunciated along with one or two affirmative reasons—may find the dialogue tiresome. However this may be—it is a manner found in many Platonic dialogues.

Sokrates opens his case by declaring the thesis of the Absolute Theory laid down by Sokrates *a priori*, in the (Object *sine* Subject), against the Protagorean thesis of the Relative (Object *cum* Subject). Things have an absolute essence: names have an absolute essence:⁴

in heaping a full measure of ridicule upon his enemy Antisthenes; and that he at last became tired with the exuberance of his own philological jests". Lassalle shows, with much force, that the persons ridiculed (even if we grant the derisory purpose to be established) in the *Kratylus*, cannot be Protagoras and the Protagoreans (Heraclitus, vol. ii. pp. 376-384).

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 384 B, 391 B.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 428 A, 440 D.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 384 C, 391 A. *συνήγειν τροπὰς εἰμι καὶ σοὶ καὶ Κρατύλῳ κοινῇ . . . ὅτι οὐκ εἰδείην ἄλλὰ σκεψοίμην μετὰ σοῦ.*

⁴ One cannot but notice how Plato, shortly after having declared war against the Relativity affirmed by Protagoras, falls himself into that very track of Relativity when he comes to speak about actual language, telling us that names are imposed on grounds

dependant on or relative to the knowledge or belief of the Name-givers. *Kratylus*, pp. 397 B, 399 A, 401 A-B, 411 B, 436 B.

The like doctrine is affirmed in the *Republic*, vi. p. 515 B. *ἔφαλον ὅτι ὁ θεῖμος πρῶτος τὰ ὀνόματα, οἷα ἦγετο εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, τοιαῦτα ἐτίθετο καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα.*

Leibnitz conceived an idea of a "Lingua Characterica Universalis, quae simul sit ars inveniendi et iudicandi" (see Leibnitz *Opp.* Erdmann, pp. 163-168), and he alludes to a conception of Jacob Böhme, that there once existed a *Lingua Adamica* or *Natur-Sprache*, through which the essences of things might be contemplated and understood. "*Lingua Adamica vel certè vis ejus, quam quidam se noceat, et in nominibus ab Adamo impositis essentias rerum intueri posse contendunt—nobis certè ignota est*" (*Opp.* p. 93).

each name belongs to its own thing, and to no other : this is its rectitude : none but that rare person, the artistic name-giver, can detect the essence of each thing, and the essence of each name, so as to apply the name rightly. Here we have a theory truly Platonic : impressed upon Plato's mind by a sentiment *a priori*, and not from any survey or comparison of particulars. Accordingly when Sokrates is called upon to apply his theory to existing current words, and to make out how any such rectitude can be shown to belong to them—he finds the greatest divergence and incongruity between the two. His ingenuity is hardly tasked to reconcile them : and he is obliged to have recourse to bold and multiplied hypotheses. That the first Name-Givers were artists proceeding upon system, but incompetent artists proceeding on a bad system—they were Herakleiteans who believed in the universality of movement, and gave names having reference to movement :¹ That the various letters of the alphabet, or rather the different actions of the vocal organism by which they are pronounced, have each an inherent, essential, adaptation, or analogy to the phenomena of movement or arrest of movement :² That the names originally bestowed have become disguised by a variety of metamorphoses, but may be

first part—Great difficulty, and ingenuity necessary to bring it into harmony with facts.

Leibnitz seems to have thought that it was possible to construct a philosophical language, based upon an *Alphabetum Cogitationum Humanarum*, through which problems on all subjects might be resolved, by a calculus like that which is employed for the solution of arithmetical or geometrical problems (Opp. p. 83 ; compare also p. 356).

This is very analogous to the affirmations of Sokrates, in the first part of the *Kratylus*, about the essentiality of Names discovered and declared by the *νομοθέτης τεχνικός*.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 438 D.

² Plato, *Krat.* pp. 424-425. Schleiermacher declares this to be among the greatest and most profound truths which have ever been enunciated about language (Introduction to *Kratylus*, p. 11). Stallbaum, on the contrary, regards it as not even seriously meant, but mere derision of others (Prolegg. ad *Krat.* p. 12). Another commentator on Plato calls it "eine Lehre der So-

phistischen Sprachforscher" (August Arnold, *Einleitung in die Philosophie*—durch die Lehre Platons vermittelt—p. 178, Berlin, 1841).

Proklos, in his Commentary, says that the scope of this dialogue is to exhibit the imitative or generative faculty which essentially belongs to the mind, and whereby the mind (aided by the vocal or pronunciative imagination—*λεκτική φαντασία*) constructs names which are natural transcripts of the essences of things (Proklos, Schol. ad *Kratyl.* pp. 1-21 ed. Boissonnade ; Alkinous, *Introd. ad Platon.* c. 6).

Ficinus, too, in his argument to the *Kratylus* (p. 768), speaks much about the mystic sanctity of names, recognised not merely by Pythagoras and Plato, but also by the Jews and Orientals. He treats the etymologies in the *Kratylus* as seriously intended. He says not a word about any intention on the part of Plato to deride the Sophists or any other Etymologists.

So also Sydenham, in his transla-

brought back to their original by probable suppositions, and shown to possess the rectitude sought. All these hypotheses are only violent efforts to reconcile the Platonic *a priori* theory, in some way or other, with existing facts of language. To regard them as intentional caricatures, would be to suppose that Plato is seeking intentionally to discredit and deride his own theory of the Absolute: for the discredit could fall nowhere else. We see that Plato considered many of his own guesses as strange and novel, some even as laying him open to ridicule.¹ But they were indispensable to bring his theory into something like coherence, however inadequate, with real language.

In the second part of the dialogue, where Kratylus is introduced as uncompromising champion of this same theory, Sokrates changes his line of argument, and impugns the peremptory or exclusive pretensions of the theory: first denying some legitimate corollaries from it—next establishing by the side of it the counter-theory of Hermogenes, as being an inferior though indispensable auxiliary—yet still continuing to uphold it as an ideal of what is Best. He concludes by disconnecting the theory pointedly from the doctrine of Herakleitus, with which Kratylus connected it, and by maintaining that there can be no right naming, and no sound knowledge, if that doctrine be admitted.² The Platonic Ideas, eternal and unchangeable, are finally opposed to Kratylus as the only objects truly knowable and nameable—and therefore as the only conditions under which right naming can be realised. The Name-givers of actual society have failed in their task by proceeding on a wrong doctrine: neither they nor the names which they have given can be trusted.³ The doctrine of per-

Opposite tendencies of Sokrates in the last half of the dialogue—he disconnects his theory of Naming from the Herakleitean doctrine.

tion of Plato's *Philæbus* (p. 83), designates the *Kratylus* as "a dialogue in which is taught the nature of things, as well the permanent as the transient, by a supposed etymology of Names and Words".

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 425 D, 426 B. Because Sokrates says that these etymologies may appear ridiculous, we are not to infer that he proposed them as caricatures; see what Plato says in the *Republic*, v. p. 452, about his own propositions respecting the training of

women, which others (he says) will think ludicrous, but which he proposes with the most thorough and serious conviction.

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 439 D. Ἀρ' οὐν οἷόν τε προσετιθεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθόν, εἰ δέ τι ἄλλο φησὶν;

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 440 C. Compare pp. 436 D, 439 B.

Lassalle contends that Herakleitus and his followers considered the knowledge of names to be not only indispensable to the knowledge of things,

petual change or movement is true respecting the sensible world and particulars, but it is false respecting the intelligible world or universals—Ideas and Forms. These latter are the only things knowable: but we cannot know them through names: we must study them by themselves and by their own affinities.

How this is to be done, Sokrates professes himself unable to say. We may presume him to mean, that a true Artistic Name-giver must set the example, knowing these Forms or essences beforehand, and providing for each its appropriate Name, or Name-Form, significant by essential analogy.

Herein, so far as I can understand, consists the amount of positive inference which Plato enables us to draw from the *Kratylus*. Sokrates began by saying that names having natural rectitude were the only materials out of which a language could be formed: he ends by affirming merely that this is the best and most perfect mode of formation: he admits that names may become significant, though loosely and imperfectly, by convention alone—yet the best scheme would be, that in which they are significant by inherent resemblance to the thing named. But this cannot be done until the Name-giver, instead of proceeding upon the false theory of Herakleitus, starts from the true theory recognising the reality of eternal, unchangeable, Ideas or Forms. He will distinguish, and embody in appropriate syllables, those Forms of Names which truly resemble, and have natural connection with, the Forms of Things.

Ideal of the best system of naming—the Name-Giver ought to be familiar with the Platonic Ideas or Essences, and apportion his names according to resemblances among them.

Such is the ideal of perfect or philosophical Naming, as Plato conceives it—disengaged from those divinations of the origin and metamorphoses of existing names, which occupy so much of the dialogue.¹ He does not indeed attempt to construct a body

but equivalent to and essentially embodying that knowledge. (Herakleitos, vol. II. pp. 363-368-387.) See also a passage of Proklus, in his Commentary on the Platonic *Parmenides*, p. 476, ed. Stallbaum.

The remarkable passage in the first book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, wherein he speaks of Plato and Plato's early familiarity with *Kratylus* and

the Herakleitean opinions, coincides very much with the course of the Platonic dialogue *Kratylus*, from its beginning to its end (Aristot. *Metaphys. A.* p. 987 a-b).

¹ Deuschle (*Die Platonische Sprachphilosophie*, p. 57) tells us that in this dialogue "Plato intentionally presented many of his thoughts in a covert or contradictory and unintelligible man-

of true names *a priori*, but he sets forth the real nameable permanent essences, to which these names might be assimilated :

ner". (Viele absichtlich verhüllt oder widersprechend und missverständlich dargestellt wird.)

I see no probability in such an hypothesis.

Respecting the origin and primordial signification of language, a great variety of different opinions have been started.

William von Humboldt (Werke, vi. 80) assumes that there must have been some primitive and natural bond between each sound and its meaning (i.e. that names were originally significant φύσει), though there are very few particular cases in which such connexion can be brought to evidence or even divined. (Here we see that the larger knowledge of etymology possessed at present detours the modern philologist from that which Plato undertakes in the *Kratylus*.) He distinguishes a threefold relation between the name and the thing signified. 1. Directly imitative. 2. Indirectly imitative or symbolical. 3. Imitative by one remove, or analogical; where a name becomes transferred from one object to another, by virtue of likeness between the two objects. (Ueber die Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechtes, p. 78, Berlin, 1836.)

Mr. Hensleigh Wedgwood, in his *Etymology of the English Language* (see Prelim. Disc. p. 10 seq.), recognises the same imitative origin, and tries to apply the principle to particular English words. Mr. F. W. Farrar, in his recent interesting work (*Chapters on Language*) has explained and enforced copiously the like thesis—onomatopœic origin for language generally. He has combated the objections of Professor Max Müller, who considers the principle to be of little applicability or avail. But M. Renan assigns to it not less importance than Mr. Wedgwood and Mr. Farrar. (See sixth chapter of his ingenious dissertation *De l'Origine du Langage*, pp. 135-146-148.)

"L'imitation, ou l'onomatopée, paraît avoir été le procédé ordinaire d'après lequel les premiers nomenclateurs formèrent les appellations. . . D'ailleurs, comme le choix de l'appellation n'est point arbitraire, et que jamais l'homme ne se décide à assembler des sons au hasard pour en faire les signes de la

pensée, on peut affirmer que de tous les mots actuellement usités, il n'en est pas un seul qui n'ait eu sa raison suffisante, et ne se rattache, à travers mille transformations, à une élection primitive. Or, le motif déterminant pour le choix des mots a dû être, dans la plupart des cas, le désir d'imiter l'objet qu'on voulait exprimer. L'instinct de certains animaux suffit pour les porter à ce genre d'imitation, qui, faute de principes rationnels, reste chez eux infécond. . .

"En résumé, le caprice n'a eu aucune part dans la formation du langage. Sans doute, on ne peut admettre qu'il y ait une relation intrinsèque entre le nom et la chose. Le système que Platon a si subtilement développé dans le *Kratylus*—cette thèse qu'il y a des dénominations naturelles, et que la propriété des mots se reconnaît à l'imitation plus ou moins exacte de l'objet,—pourrait tout au plus s'appliquer aux noms formés par onomatopée, et pour ceux-ci mêmes, la loi dont nous parlons n'établit qu'une convenance. Les appellations n'ont pas uniquement leur cause dans l'objet appelé (sans quoi, elles seraient les mêmes dans toutes les langues), mais dans l'objet appelé, vu à travers les dispositions personnelles du sujet appelant. . . La raison qui a déterminé le choix des premiers hommes peut nous échapper; mais elle a existé. La liaison du sens et du mot n'est jamais nécessaire, jamais arbitraire; toujours elle est motivée."

When M. Renan maintains the Protagorean doctrine, that it is not the Object which is cause of the denomination given, but the Object seen through the personal dispositions of the denominating Subject—he contradicts the reasoning of the Platonic Sokrates in the conversation with Hermogenes (pp. 386-387; compare 424 A). But he adopts the reasoning of the same in the subsequent conversation with Kratylus; wherein the relative point of view is introduced for the first time (pp. 429 A-B, 431 E), and brought more and more into the foreground (pp. 436 B-D—437 C—439 C).

The distinction drawn by M. Renan between *l'arbitraire* and *le motivé* appears to me unfounded: at least, it requires a peculiar explanation of the two words—for if by *le caprice* and

the principles upon which the construction ought to be founded, by the philosophic lawgiver following out a good theory :¹ and he contrasts this process with two rival processes, each defective in its own way. This same contrast, pervading Plato's views on other subjects, deserves a few words of illustration.

Respecting social institutions and government, there is one well-known theory to which Sir James Mackintosh gave expression in the phrase—"Governments are not made, but grow". The like phrase has been applied by an eminent modern author on Logic, to language—"Languages are not made, but grow".² One might suppose, in reading the second and third books of the Republic of Plato, that Plato also had adopted this theory: for the growth of a society, without any initiative or predetermined construction by a special individual, is there strikingly depicted.³ But in truth it is this theory which stands in most of the Platonic works, as the antithesis depreciated and discredited by Plato. The view most satisfactory to him contemplates the analogy of a human artist or professional man; which he enlarges into the idea of an originating, intelligent, artistic, Constructor, as the source of all good. This view is exhibited to us in the *Timæus*, where we find the Demiurgus, building up by his own fiat all that is good in the Kosmos: in the *Politikus*, where we find the individual dictator producing by his uncontrolled ordinance all that is really good in the social system:—lastly, here also in the *Kratylus*, where we have the scientific or artistic

Comparison of Plato's views about naming with those upon social institutions. Artistic systematic construction—contrasted with unpremeditated, unsystematic growth.

l'arbitraire he meant the exclusion of all motive, such a state of mind could not be a preliminary to any proceeding at all. M. Renan can only mean that the motive which led to the original choice of the name, was peculiar to the occasion, and has since been forgotten. And this is what he himself says in a note to his Preface (pp. 18-19), replying to M. Littré: "L'Arien primitif a eu un motif pour appeler le frère *bratër* ou *fratr*, et le Sémite pour l'appeler *ak*: peut-on dire que cette différence résulte ou des aptitudes différentes de leur esprit, ou du spectacle extérieur? Chaque objet, les circonstances restant les mêmes, a été susceptible d'une foule de dénominations: le choix qui a été

fait de l'une d'elles tient à des causes impossibles à saisir."

¹ Plato (in *Timæus*, p. 29 B) recognises an essential affinity between the eternal Forms and the words or propositions in which they become subjects of discourse.

² See Mr. John Stuart Mill's *Logic*, Book i. ch. viii.

³ Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 369 seq., where the *genesis* of a social community, out of common necessity and desire acting upon all and each of the individual citizens, is depicted in a striking way. The *genesis* of the City (p. 369 B) as Plato there presents it, is Aristotelian rather than Platonic.

Name-giver, and him alone, set forth as competent to construct an assemblage of names, each possessing full and perfect rectitude. To this theory there is presented a counter-theory, which Plato disapproves—a Kosmos which grows by itself and keeps up its own agencies, without any extra-kosmic constructor or superintendent: in like manner, an aggregate of social customs, and an aggregate of names, which have grown up no one knows how; and which sustain and perpetuate themselves by traditional force—by movement already acquired in a given direction. The idea of growth, by regular assignable steps and by regularising tendencies instinctive and inherent in Nature, belongs rather to Aristotle; Plato conceives Nature as herself irregular, and as persuaded or constrained into some sort of regularity by a supernatural or extranatural artist.¹

Looking back to the *Politikus* (reviewed in the last chapter),

¹ M. Destutt de Tracy insists upon the emotional initiative force, as deeper and more efficacious than the intellectual, in the first formation of language.

"Dans l'origine du langage d'action, un seul geste dit—je veux cela, ou je vous montre cela, ou je vous demande secours; un seul cri dit, je vous appelle, ou je souffre, ou je suis content, &c.; mais sans distinguer aucune des idées qui composent ses propositions. Ce n'est point par le détail, mais par les masses, que commencent toutes nos expressions, ainsi que toutes nos connaissances. Si quelques langages possèdent des signes propres à exprimer des idées isolées, ce n'est donc que par l'effet de la décomposition qui s'est opérée dans ces langages; et ces signes, ou noms propres d'idées, ne sont, pour ainsi dire, que des débris, des fragments, ou du moins des émanations de ceux qui d'abord exprimaient, bien ou mal, les propositions tout entières." (Destutt de Tracy, *Grammaire*, ch. i. p. 23, ed. 1825; see also the *Idéologie* of the same author, ch. xvi. p. 215.)

M. Renan enunciates in the most explicit terms this comparison of the formation of language to the growth and development of a germ:—"Les langues doivent étre comparées, non au cristal qui se forme par agglomération autour d'un noyau, mais au germe qui se développe par sa force intime, et par l'appel nécessaire de ses parties".

(*De l'Origine du Langage*, ch. iii. p. 101; also ch. iv. pp. 115-117.)

The theory of M. Renan, in this ingenious treatise, is, that language is the product of "la raison spontanée, la raison populaire," without reflexion. "La reflexion n'y peut rien: les langues sont sorties toutes faites du moule même de l'esprit humain, comme Minerve du cerveau de Jupiter." "Maintenant que la raison réfléchie a remplacé l'instinct créateur, à peine le génie suffit-il pour analyser ce que l'esprit des premiers hommes enfanta de toutes pièces, et sans y songer" (pp. 98-99). This theory appears to me very doubtful; as much as there is proved in it, is stated in a good passage cited by M. Renan from Will. von Humboldt (pp. 106-107). But there are two remarks to be made, in comparing it with the *Kratylus* of Plato. 1. That the hypothesis of a philosopher "qui compose un langage de sang-froid," which appears absurd to Turgot and M. Renan (p. 92), did not appear absurd to Plato, but on the contrary as the only sure source of what is good and right in language. 2. That Plato, in the *Kratylus*, takes account only of naming, and not of the grammatical structure of language, which M. Renan considers the essential part (p. 106; compare also pp. 208-209). Grammar, with its established analogies, does not seem to have been present to Plato's mind as an object of reflexion; there existed none in his day.

we find Plato declaring to us wherein consists the rectitude of a social Form : it resides in the presiding and uncontrolled authority of a scientific or artistic Ruler, always present and directing every one : or of a few such Rulers, if there be a few—though this is more than can be hoped. But such rectitude is seldom or never realised. Existing social systems are bad copies of this type, degenerating more or less widely from its perfection. One or a Few persons arrogate to themselves uncontrolled power, without possessing that science or art which justifies the exercise of it in the Right Ruler. These are, or may become, extreme depravations. The least bad, among all the imperfect systems, is an aggregate of fixed laws and magistrates with known functions, agreed to by convention of all and faithfully obeyed by all. But such a system of fixed laws, though second-best, falls greatly short of rectitude. It is much inferior in every way to the uncontrolled authority of the scientific Ruler.¹

That which Plato does for social systems in the *Politikus*, he does for names in the *Kratylus*. The full rectitude of names is when they are bestowed by the scientific Ruler, considered in the capacity of Name-giver. He it is who discerns, and embodies in syllables, the true Name-Form in each particular case. But such an artist is seldom realised : and there are others who, attempting to do his work without his knowledge, perform it ignorantly or under false theories.² The names thus given are imperfect names : moreover, after being given, they become corrupted and transformed in passing from man to man. Lastly, the mere fact of convention among the individuals composing the society, without any deliberate authorship or origination from any Ruler, bad or good—suffices to impart to Names a sort of significance, vulgar and imperfect, yet adequate to a certain extent.³ The Name-giving Artist or Lawgiver is here superseded by King *Nomos*.

It will be seen that in both these cases the Platonic point of

¹ See Plato, *Politik.* pp. 300-301

² Plato, *Kratyl.* p. 432 E.

³ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 434 E, 435 A-B.

This unsystematic, spontaneous, origin and growth of language is set

forth by Lucretius, who declares himself opposed to the theory of an originating Name-giver (v. pp. 1021-1060). Jacob Grimm and M. Renan espouse a theory, in the main, similar.

Ideal of Plato—Postulate of the One Wise Man—Badness of all reality. view comes out—deliberate authorship from the scientific or artistic individual mind, as the only source of rectitude and perfection. But when Plato looks at the reality of life, either in social system or in names, he finds no such perfection anywhere: he discovers a divine agency originating what is good; but there is an independent agency necessary in the way of co-operation, though it sometimes counteracts and always debases the good.¹ We find either an incompetent dictator who badly imitates the true Artist—or else we have fixed, peremptory, laws; depending on the unsystematic, unauthorised, convention among individuals, which has grown up no one knows how—which is transmitted by tradition, being taught by every one and learnt by every one without any privileged caste of teachers—and which in the Platonic Protagoras is illustrated in the mythe and discourse ascribed to that Sophist;² being in truth, common sense, as contrasted with professional speciality. In regard to social systems, Plato pronounces fixed laws to be the second-best—enjoining strict obedience to them, wherever the first-best cannot be obtained. In the Republic he enumerates what are the conditions of rectitude in a city: but he admits at the same time that this Right Civic Constitution is an ideal, nowhere to be found existing: and he points out the successive stages of corruption by which it degenerates more and more into conformity with the realities of human society. As with Right Civic Constitution, so with Right Naming: Plato shows what constitutes rectitude of Names, but he admits that this is an ideal seen nowhere, and he notes the various causes which deprave the Right Names into that imperfect and semi-significant condition, which is the best that existing languages present.³

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 68 E.

² See my remarks on the *Politikus*, in the last chapter: also Protagoras, p. 320 seq.

Compare Plato, *Kriton*, p. 48 A. ὁ ἑταῖρος περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὁ εἷς.

In the *Menon* also the same question is broached as in the Protagoras, whether virtue is teachable or not? and how any virtue can exist, when there are no special teachers, and no special learners of virtue? Here we

have, though differently handled, the same antithesis between the ethical sentiment which grows and propagates itself unconsciously, without special initiative—and that which is deliberately prescribed and imparted by the wise individual: common sense versus professional speciality.

³ See the conditions of the *πολιτεία*, and its gradual deprivation and degeneracy into the state of actual governments, in *Republic*, v. init. p. 440 B, viii. 544 A-B.

One more remark, in reference to the general spirit and reciprocal bearing of Plato's dialogues. In three distinct dialogues—Kratylus, Theætétus, Sophistês—one and the same question is introduced into the discussion: a question keenly debated among the contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle. How is a false proposition possible? Many held that a false proposition and a false name were impossible: that you could not speak the thing that is *not*, or Non-Ens ($\tau\acute{o} \mu\grave{\eta} \delta\upsilon$): that such a proposition would be an empty sound, without meaning or signification: that speech may be significant or insignificant, but could not be false, except in the sense of being unmeaning.¹

Comparison of Kratylus, Theætétus, and Sophistês, in treatment of the question respecting Non-Ens, and the possibility of false propositions.

Now this doctrine is dealt with in the Theætétus, Sophistês, and Kratylus. In the Theætétus,² Sokrates examines it at great length, and proposes several different hypotheses to explain how a false proposition might be possible: but ends in pronouncing them all inadmissible. He declares himself incompetent, and passes on to something else. Again, in the Sophistês, the same point is taken up, and discussed there also very copiously.³ The Eleate in that dialogue ends by finding a solution which satisfies him (*viz.*: that $\tau\acute{o} \mu\grave{\eta} \delta\upsilon = \tau\acute{o} \epsilon\tau\epsilon\rho\omicron\nu \tau\omicron\upsilon \delta\upsilon\tau\omicron\varsigma$). But what is remarkable is, that the solution does not meet any of the difficulties propounded in the Theætétus; nor are those difficulties at all adverted to in the Sophistês. Finally, in the Kratylus, we have the very same doctrine, that false affirmations are impossible—which both in the Theætétus and in the Sophistês is enunciated, not as the decided opinion of the speaker, but as a problem which embarrasses him—we have this same doctrine averred unequivocally by Kratylus as his own full

¹ Plato, Kratyl. p. 429.

Ammonius, Scholia eis tās Kat’ hōrōlas of Aristotle (Schol. Brandis, p. 60, a. 10).

Τινὲς φασὶ μὴδὲν εἶναι τῶν πρὸς τὴ φύσει, ἀλλὰ ἀνάπλασμα εἶναι ταῦτα τῆς ἡμετέρας διανοίας, λέγοντες ὅτι οὕτως οὐκ ἐστὶ φύσει τὰ πρὸς τὴ ἀλλὰ θέσει. . . . Τινὲς δὲ, ἐκ διαμέτρου τούτοις ἔχοντες, πάντα τὰ ὄντα πρὸς τὴ ἔλεγον. Ὅν ἐστι τῶ Πρωταγόρας ὁ σοφιστής. . . . διὸ καὶ ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ τινὰ ψευδὴ λέγειν. ἕκαστος γὰρ κατὰ τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ

καὶ δοκοῦν ἀποφαίνεσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, οὐκ ἔχόντων ἀρισμένην φύσιν ἀλλ’ ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς σχέσει τὸ εἶναι ἔχόντων.

² Plato, Theætét. pp. 187 D to 201 D. The discussion of the point is continued through thirteen pages of Stephan. edit.

³ Plato, Sophistês, pp. 237 A, 264 B, through twenty-seven pages of Steph. edit.—though there are some digressions included herein.

conviction. And Sokrates finds that a very short argument, and a very simple comparison, suffice to refute him.¹ The supposed "aggressive cross-examiner," who presses Sokrates so hard in the *Theætétus*, is not allowed to put his puzzling questions in the *Kratylus*.²

How are we to explain these three different modes of handling the same question by the same philosopher? If the question about Non-Ens can be disposed of in the summary way which we read in the *Kratylus*, what is gained by the string of unsolved puzzles in the *Theætétus*—or by the long discursive argument in the *Sophistês*, ushering in a new solution noway satisfactory? If, on the contrary, the difficulties which are unsolved in the *Theætétus*, and imperfectly solved in the *Sophistês*, are real and pertinent—how are we to explain the proceeding of Plato in the *Kratylus*, when he puts into the mouth of Kratylus a distinct averment of the opinion about Non-Ens, yet without allowing him, when it is impugned by Sokrates, to urge any of these pertinent arguments in defence of it? If the peculiar solution given in the *Sophistês* be the really genuine and triumphant solution, why is it left unnoticed both in the *Kratylus* and the *Theætétus*, and why is it contradicted in other dialogues? Which of the three dialogues represents Plato's real opinion on the question?

To these questions, and to many others of like bearing, connected with the Platonic writings, I see no satisfactory reply, if we are to consider Plato as a positive philosopher, with a scheme and edifice of methodised opinions in his mind: and as composing all his dialogues with a set purpose, either of inculcating these opinions on the reader, or of refuting the opinions opposed to them. This supposition is what most Platonic critics have in their minds, even when professedly modifying it. Their admiration for Plato is not satisfied unless they conceive him in the professorial chair as a teacher, surrounded by a crowd of learners, all under the obligation (incumbent on learners generally) to believe what

Discrepancies and inconsistencies of Plato, in his manner of handling the same subject.

No common didactic purpose pervading the Dialogues—each is a distinct composition, working out its own peculiar argument.

¹ Plato, *Kratyl.* pp. 430-431 A-B.

² Plato, *Theætét.* p. 200 A. ὁ γὰρ ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος γελᾶσας φήσκει.

they hear. Reasoning upon such a basis, the Platonic dialogues present themselves to me as a mystery. They exhibit neither identity of the teacher, nor identity of the matter taught: the composer (to use various Platonic comparisons) is Many, and not One—he is more complex than Typhos.¹

If we are to find any common purpose pervading and binding together all the dialogues, it must not be a didactic purpose, in the sense above defined. The value of them consists, not in the result, but in the discussion—not in the conclusion, but in the premisses for and against it. In this sense all the dialogues have value, and all the same sort of value—though not all equal in amount. In different dialogues, the same subject is set before you in different ways: with remarks and illustrations sometimes tending towards one theory, sometimes towards another. It is for you to compare and balance them, and to elicit such result as your reason approves. The Platonic dialogues require, in order to produce their effect, a supplementary responsive force, and a strong effective reaction, from the individual reason of the reader: they require moreover that he shall have a genuine interest in the process of dialectic scrutiny (τὸ φιλομαθές, φιλόλογον)² which will enable him to perceive beauties in what would appear tiresome to others.

Such manner of proceeding may be judicious or not, according to the sentiment of the critic. But it is at any rate Platonic. And we have to recall this point of view when dismissing the *Kratylus*, which presents much interest in the premisses and conflicting theories, with little or no result. It embodies the oldest speculations known to us respecting the origin, the mode of signification, and the functions of words as an instrument: and not the least interesting part of it, in my judgment, consists in its etymological conjectures, affording evidence of a rude etymological sense which has now passed away.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 230 A.

pare *Phædon*, pp. 89-90. *Phædrus*,

² Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 475; com-

p. 230 E.

CHAPTER XXXII

PHILEBUS.

THE *Philëbus*, which we are now about to examine, is not merely a Dialogue of Search, but a Dialogue of Exposition, accompanied with more or less of search made subservient to the exposition. It represents Sokrates from the first as advancing an affirmative opinion—maintaining it against *Philëbus* and *Protarchus*—and closing with a result assumed to be positively established.¹

The question is, Wherein consists the Good—The Supreme Good—*Summum Bonum*. Three persons stand before us: the youthful *Philëbus*: *Protarchus*, somewhat older, yet still a young man: and Sokrates.

Philëbus declares that The Good consists in pleasure or enjoyment; and *Protarchus* his friend advocates the same thesis, though in a less peremptory manner. On the contrary, Sokrates begins by proclaiming that it consists in wisdom or intelligence. He presently however recedes from this doctrine, so far as to admit that wisdom, alone and *per se*, is not sufficient to constitute the Supreme Good: and that a certain combination of pleasure along with it is required. Though the compound total thus formed is superior both to wisdom and to pleasure taken separately, yet comparing the two elements of which it is compounded, wisdom (*Sokrates* contends) is the most important of the two, and pleasure the least important. Neither wisdom nor pleasure can pretend to claim the first prize; but wisdom is fully entitled to the second, as being far more cognate than pleasure is, with the nature of Good.

¹ *Schleiermacher* says, about the *Philëbus* (Einleit. p. 136)—“Das Ganze liegt fertig in dem Haupte des Sokrates, und tritt mit der ganzen Persönlichkeit und Willkür einer zusammenhängenden Rede heraus,” &c.

Such is the general purpose of the dialogue. As to the method of enquiry, Plato not only assigns to Sokrates a distinct affirmative opinion from the beginning, instead of that profession of ignorance which is his more usual characteristic—but he also places in the mouth of Protarchus an explicit protest against the negative cross-examination and Elenchus. “We shall not let you off” (says Protarchus to Sokrates) “until the two sides of this question shall have been so discriminated as to elicit a sufficient conclusion. In meeting us on the present question, pray desist from that ordinary manner of yours—desist from throwing us into embarrassment, and putting interrogations to which we cannot at the moment give suitable answers. We must not be content to close the discussion by finding ourselves in one common puzzle and confusion. If ~~we~~ cannot solve the difficulty, *you* must solve it for us.”¹

Protest against the Sokratic Elenchus, and the purely negative procedure.

Conformably to this requisition, Sokrates, while applying his cross-examining negative test to the doctrine of Philébus, sets against it a counter-doctrine of his own, and prescribes, farther, a positive method of enquiry. “You and I” (he says) “will each try to assign what permanent habit of mind, and what particular mental condition, is calculated to ensure to all men a happy life.”² Good and Happiness are used in this dialogue as correlative and co-extensive terms. Happiness is that which a man feels when he possesses Good: Good is that which a man must possess in order to feel Happiness. The same fact or condition, looked at objectively, is denominated Good: looked at subjectively, is denominated Happiness.

Enquiry—What mental condition will ensure to all men a happy life? Good and Happiness—correlative and co-extensive. Philébus declares for Pleasure, Sokrates for Intelligence.

Is Good identical with pleasure, or with intelligence, or is it a Tertium Quid, distinct from both? Good, or The Good—object of

¹ Plato, Philébus, pp. 19 E—20 A. παύσαι δὲ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα . . . εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλον καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ἃν μὴ δυνάμειμ' ἂν ἰκανῇ ἀποκρίσιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοί. μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλ' εἰ ὅρῳ τοῦθ' ἡμῖς ἀδυνατούμεν, σοὶ δραστέον.

There is a remarkable contrast between the method here proclaimed and that followed in the Theætétus, though some eminent commentators have represented the Philébus as a sequel of the Theætétus.

² Plato, Philébus, p. 11 D.

universal
choice and
attachment
by men, ani-
mals, and
plants—all
sufficient—
satisfies all
desires.

object of desire, aspiration, choice, and attachment, by all men, and even by all animals and plants, who are capable of attaining it. Every man who has it, is satisfied, desiring nothing else. If he neglects it, and chooses any thing else, this is contrary to nature : he does so involuntarily, either from ignorance or some other untoward constraint.¹ Thus, the characteristic mark of Good or Happiness is, That it is desired, loved, and sought by all, and that, if attained, it satisfies all the wishes and aspirations of human nature.

Sokrates then remarks that pleasure is very multifarious and diverse : and that under that same word, different pleasures are unlike to each other, and even opposite cognitions are so likewise. Thus the intemperate man has his pleasures, while the temperate man enjoys his pleasures also, attached to his own mode of life : so too the simpleton has pleasure in his foolish dreams and hopes, the intelligent man in the exercise of intellectual force. These and many others are varieties of pleasure not resembling, but highly dissimilar, even opposite.—Protarchus replies—That they proceed from dissimilar and opposite circumstances, but that in themselves they are not dissimilar or opposite. Pleasure must be completely similar to pleasure—itself to itself.—So too (rejoins Sokrates) colour is like to colour : in that respect there is no difference between them. But black colour is different from, and even opposite to, white colour.² You will go wrong if you make things altogether opposite, into one. You may call all pleasures by the name *pleasures* : but you must not affirm between them any other point of resemblance, nor call them all *good*. I maintain that some are bad,

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 11 C. 20 C-D : Τὴν τάχαθ' οὐ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλειον ἢ μὴ τέλειον εἶναι ; Πάντων δὲ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τὸ τέλος. Τί δέ ; ἰκανὸν τάχαθ' ; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ; καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων. Τότε γε μὴν, ὡς οἴμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γινώσκον αὐτὸ θηρεῖν καὶ ἐφίεται βουλούμενον εἶλιν καὶ περὶ αὐτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν.

² 22 B : ἰκανὸς καὶ τέλος καὶ πᾶσι

φυτοῖς καὶ ζώοις αἰρετός, ὥστερ' δυνατόν ἦν οὕτως αἰετὶ διὰ βίον ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ἤρειθ' ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς αἰρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἢ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.

60 C, 61 A. 61 E : τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον. 64 C : τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονότα προσφιλέτην τοιαύτην διέδοξεν. 67 A. "Omnibus naturæ humanæ desideria prorsus satisfacere" (Stallbaum ad Philébus, p. 18 D-E, page 120).

³ Plat. Philébus, p. 12 D-E.

others good. What common property in all of them, is it, that you signify by the name *good*? As different pleasures are unlike to each other, so also different cognitions (or modes of intelligence) are unlike to each other; though all of them agree in being *cognitions*. To this Protarchus accedes.¹—We must enter upon our enquiry after The Good with this mutual concession: That Pleasure, which you affirm to be The Good—and Intelligence, which I declare to be so—is at once both Unum, and Multa et Diversa.²

In determining between the two competing doctrines—pleasure on one side and intelligence on the other—Sokrates makes appeal to individual choice. “Would you be satisfied (he asks Protarchus) to live your life through in the enjoyment of the greatest pleasures? Would *any one of us* be satisfied to live, possessing the fullest measure and variety of intelligence, reason, knowledge, and memory—but having no sense, great or small, either of pleasure or pain?” And Protarchus replies, in reference to the joint life of intelligence and pleasure combined, “Every man will choose this joint life in preference to either of them separately. It is not one man who will choose it, and another who will reject it: but every man will choose it alike.”³

Whether Pleasure, or Wisdom, corresponds to this description? Appeal to individual choice.

¹ Plat. Philéb. pp. 13 D-E, 14 A.

² Plat. Philéb. p. 14 B.

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 21 A. δέξαι' αὖ σὺ, Πρωταρχε, σὺν τῶν βίον ἀγαθὰ ἡδέμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας; 21 D-E: εἰ τις δέξαι' αὖ αἶς σὺν ἡμῶν, &c. 22 A: Πᾶς ὁφείτω τοῦτόν γε αἰσθεσθῆναι πρότερον ἢ ἀκρίβειαν ὁμοτροποῦναι, καὶ πρὸς τοῦτοίς γε οὐχ ὁ μὲν, ὁ δ' οὐ. 60 D: εἰ τις ἀνὴρ τοῦτον δέξαι' αὖ, &c.

Here again in appealing to the individual choice and judgment, the Platonic Sokrates indirectly recognises what, in the Theætétus and other dialogues, we have seen him formally rejecting and endeavouring to confute—the Protagorean canon or measure. Protarchus is the measure of truth or falsehood, of belief or disbelief, to Protarchus himself: every other man is so to himself. Sokrates may be a wiser man, in the estimation of the public, than Protarchus; and if Pro-

tarchus believes him to be such, that very belief may amount to an authority, determining Protarchus to accept or reject various opinions propounded by Sokrates: but the ultimate verdict must emanate from the bosom of the acceptor or rejector. I have already observed elsewhere, that a large part of the conversation which the Platonic dialogues put into the mouth of Sokrates, is addressed to individuals and specialties of the other interlocutors: that this very power of discriminating between one mind and another, forms the great superiority of dialectic colloquy as compared with written treatise or rhetorical discourse—both of which address the same terms to a multitude of hearers or readers differing among themselves, without possibility of separate adaptation to each. (See above, ch. xxvi. pp. 50-54, on the Phædrus.)

The point, which Sokrates submits to the individual judgment of Protarchus, is—"Would *you* be satisfied to pass your life in the enjoyment of the most intense pleasures, and would you desire nothing farther?" The reply is in the affirmative. "But recollect (adds Sokrates) that you are to have nothing else. The question assumes that you are to be without thought, intelligence, reason, sight, and memory: you are neither to have opinion of present enjoyment, nor remembrance of past, nor anticipation of future: you are to live the life of an oyster, with great present pleasure?" The question being put with these additions, Protarchus alters his view, and replies in the negative: at the same time expressing his surprise at the strangeness of the hypothesis.¹

First Question submitted to Protarchus—Intense Pleasure, without any intelligence—He declines to accept it.

Sokrates now proceeds to ask Protarchus, whether he will accept a life of full and all-comprehensive intelligence purely and simply, without any taste either of pleasure or pain. To which Protarchus answers, that neither he nor any one else would accept such a life.²

Second Question—Whether he will accept a life of Intelligence

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 21.
Such an hypothesis does indeed depart so totally from the conditions of human life, that it cannot be considered as a fair test of any doctrine. A perpetuity of delicious sensations cannot be enjoyed, consistent with the conditions of animal organization. A man cannot realise to himself that which the hypothesis promises; much less can he realise it without those accompaniments which it assumes him to renounce. The loss stands out far more palpably than the gain. It is no refutation of the theory of *Philébus*; who, announcing pleasure as the *Summum Bonum*, is entitled to call for pleasure in all its varieties, and for exemption from all pains. Sokrates himself had previously insisted on the great variety as well as on the great dissimilarity of the modes of pleasure and pain. To each variety of pleasure there corresponds a desire: to each variety of pain, an aversion.

If the *Summum Bonum* is to fulfil the conditions postulated—that is, if it be such as to satisfy all human desires, it ought to comprise all these varieties of pleasure. It ought, e.g., to comprise the pleasures of self-esteem, and

conscious self-protecting power, affording security for the future: it ought to comprise exemption from the pains of self-reproach, self-contempt, and conscious helplessness. These are among the greatest pleasures and pains of the mature man, though they are aggregates formed by association. Now the alternative tendered by Sokrates neither includes these pleasures nor eliminates these pains. It includes only the pleasures of sense; and it is tendered to one who has rooted in his mind desires for other pleasures, and aversions for other pains, besides those of sense. It does not therefore come up to the requirements fairly implied in the theory of *Philébus*.

² Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 21-22.

It is to be remarked, however, that there was more than one Grecian philosopher who described the *Summum Bonum* as consisting in absence of pain (*ἀλγία*); even without the large measure of intelligence which Sokrates here promises, and without any positive pleasure. These men would of course have accepted the second alternative put by Sokrates, which Protarchus here refuses. They took their

Both of them agree that the *Summum Bonum* ought to be sought neither in pleasure singly, nor in intelligence singly, but in both combined.

Sokrates then undertakes to show, that of these two elements, intelligence is the most efficacious and the most contributory to the *Summum Bonum*—pleasure the least so. But as a preparation for this enquiry, he adverts to that which has just been agreed between them respecting both Pleasure and Intelligence—That each of them is *Unum*, and each of them at the same time *Multa et Diversa*. Here (argues Sokrates) we find opened before us the embarrassing question respecting the One and the Many. Enquirers often ask—"How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? How can the same thing be both One and Many?" They find it difficult to understand how you, Protarchus, being One person, are called by different names—tall, heavy, white, just, &c. : or how you are affirmed to consist of many different parts and members. To this difficulty, however (says Sokrates), the reply is easy. You, and other particular men, belong to the generated and the perishable. You partake of many different Ideas or Essences, and your partaking of one among them does not exclude you from partaking also of another distinct and even opposite. You partake of the Idea or Essence of Unity—also of Multitude—of tallness, heaviness, whiteness, humanity, greatness, littleness, &c. You are both great and little, heavy and light, &c. In regard to generated and perishable things, we may understand this. But in regard to the ungenerated, imperishable, absolute

purely without any pleasure or pain? Answer—No.

It is agreed on both sides, That the Good must be a *Tertium Quid*. But Sokrates undertakes to show, That Intelligence is more cognate with it than Pleasure.

Difficulties about *Unum et Multa*. How can the One be Many? How can the Many be One? The difficulties are greatest about Generic Unity—how it is distributed among species and individuals.

standard of comparison from the actualities of human life around them, which exhibited pain and suffering universal, frequent, and unavoidable. They conceived that if painlessness could be obtained, it was as much as could reasonably be demanded, and that pleasure might be dispensed with. In laying down any theory about the *Summum Bonum*, the preliminary question ought always to be settled—What are the conditions of human life

which are to be assumed as peremptory and unalterable? What circumstances are we at liberty to suppose to be suppressed, modified, or reversed? According as these fundamental postulates are given in a larger or narrower sense, the ideal *Summum Bonum* will be shaped differently. This preliminary requisite to the investigation was little considered by the ancient philosophers.

Essences, the difficulty is more serious. The Self-existent or Universal Man, Bull, Animal—the Self-existent Beautiful, Good—in regard to these Unities or Monads there is room for great controversy. First, Do such unities or monads really and truly exist? Next, assuming that they do exist, how do they come into communion with generated and perishable particulars, infinite in number? Is each of them dispersed and parcelled out among countless individuals? or is it found, whole and entire, in each individual, maintaining itself as one and the same, and yet being parted from itself? Is the Universal Man distributed among all individual men, or is he one and entire in each of them? How is the Universal Beautiful (The Self-Beautiful—Beauty) in all and each beautiful thing? How does this one monad, unchangeable and imperishable, become embodied in a multitude of transitory individuals, each successively generated and perishing? How does this One become Many, or how do these Many become One? ¹

These (says Sokrates) are the really grave difficulties respecting the identity of the One and the Many: difficulties which have occasioned numerous controversies, and are likely to occasion many more. Youthful speculators, especially, are fond of trying their first efforts of dialectical ingenuity in arguing upon this paradox—How the One can be Many, and the Many One. ²

It is a primæval inspiration (he says) granted by the Gods to man along with the fire of Prometheus, and handed down to us as a tradition from that heroic race who were in nearer kindred with the Gods—That all things said to exist are composed of Unity and Multiplicity, and include in them a natural coalescence of

Active dis-
putes upon
this ques-
tion at the
time.

Order of
Nature—
Coalescence
of the
Finite with
the Infinite.
The One—

¹ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 15 B.

² Plato, *Philæbus*, pp. 15-16.

In reading the difficulties thus started by Sokrates, we perceive them to be the same as those which we have seen set forth in the dialogue called *Parmenides*, where they are put into the mouth of the philosopher so-called; as objections requiring to be removed by Sokrates, before the Platonic theory of self-existent Ideas, universal, eternal and unchangeable, can be admitted. We

might expect that Plato having so emphatically and repeatedly announced his own sense of the difficulty, would proceed to suggest some mode of replying to it. But this he never does. In the *Parmenides*, he does not even promise any explanation; in the *Philæbus*, he seems to promise one, but all the explanation which he gives ignores or jumps over the difficulty, enjoining us to proceed as if no such difficulty existed.

Finiteness and Infinity.¹ This is the fundamental order of Nature, which we must assume and proceed upon in our investigations. We shall find everywhere the Form of Unity conjoined with the Form of Infinity. But we must not be satisfied simply to find these two forms. We must look farther for those intermediate Forms which lie between the two. Having found the Form of One, we must next search for the Form of Two, Three, Four, or some definite number: and we must not permit ourselves to acquiesce in the Form of Infinite, until no farther definite number can be detected. In other words, we must not be satisfied with knowing only one comprehensive Genus, and individuals comprised under it. We must distribute the Genus into two, three, or more Species: and each of those Species again into two or more sub-Species, each characterised by some specific mark: until no more characteristic marks can be discovered upon which to found the establishment of a distinct species. When we reach this limit, and when we have determined the number of subordinate species which the case presents, nothing remains except the indefinite mass and variety of individuals.² The whole scheme will thus comprise—The One, the Summum Genus, or Highest Form: The Many, a definite number of Species or sub-Species or subordinate Forms: The Infinite, a countless heap of Individuals.

The mistake commonly made (continues Sokrates) by clever men of the present day, is, that they look for nothing beyond the One and the Infinite Many: one comprehensive class, and countless individuals included in it. They take up carelessly any class which strikes them,³ and are satisfied to have got an indefinite num-

The Finite Many—The Infinite many.

Mistake commonly made—To look only for the One, and the Infinite

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 16 C. ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν αἰετιζομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐμφύτῳ ἔχοντων.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 16 D. δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς, τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων, αἰετὴν μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἀκρότατε θεμένους ζητεῖν· εὐρῆσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν· ἴαν οὖν μεταλλάξωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἰ πως εἰσὶ, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἢ τινα ἄλλαν ἀριθμὸν, καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτῶν ἑκάστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχρι περ ἂν τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν μὴ ὅτι ἐν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἀπειρά

ἴσται μόνον ἰδῆ τις ἄλλα καὶ ὅσους· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸν πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν, πρὶν ἂν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατὰ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός· τότε δ' ἤδη τὸ ἐν ἑκάστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἀπειρον μεθέτα χαιρεῖν ἔδν.

Plato here recognises a Form of the Infinite, ἀπείρου ἰδέαν; again, p. 18 A, ἀπείρου φύσιν.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 17 A. οἱ δὲ τῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τύχῃσι, καὶ πολλὰ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιοῦσι τοῦ δεινός,

Many, without looking for the intermediate sub-divisions. ber of individuals under one name. But they never seek for intermediate sub-divisions between the two, so as to be able to discriminate one portion of the class from other by some definite mark, and thus to constitute a sub-class. They do not feel the want of such intermediate sub-divisions, nor the necessity of distinguishing one portion of this immense group of individuals from another. Yet it is exactly upon these discriminating marks that the difference turns, between genuine dialectical argument and controversy without result.¹

This general doctrine is illustrated by two particular cases—
 Illustration from Speech and Music. Speech and Music. The voice (or Vocal Utterance) is One—the voice is also Infinite: to know only thus much is to know very little. Even when you know, in addition to this, the general distinction of sounds into acute and grave, you are still far short of the knowledge of music. You must learn farthermore to distinguish all the intermediate gradations, and specific varieties of sound, into which the infinity of separate sounds admits of being distributed: what and how many these gradations are? what are the numerical ratios upon which they depend—the rhythmical and harmonic systems? When you have learnt to know the One Genus, the infinite diversity of individual sounds, and the number of subordinate specific varieties by which these two extremes are connected with each other—then you know the science of music. So too, in speech: when you can distinguish the infinite diversity of articulate utterance into vowels, semi-vowels, and consonants, each in definite number and with known properties—you are master of grammatical science. You must neither descend at once from the One to the Infinite Multitude, nor ascend at once from the Infinite Multitude to the One: you must pass through the intermediate stages of subordinate Forms, in determinate number. All three together make up scientific knowledge. You cannot know one portion separately, without knowing the re-

μετὰ δὲ τὸ εἶναι ἀπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέγα αὐτοὺς ἀφ' ἑνός, &c.

Stallbaum conjectures that the words καὶ πολλά after τῶντοι ought not to be in the text. He proposes to expunge them. The meaning of the

passage certainly seems clearer without them.

¹ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 17 A. οἱ διακεχωρισται τὸ τε διαλεκτικῶς τέλει καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

mainder: all of them being connected into one by the common bond of the highest Genus.¹

Such is the explanation which Plato gives as to the identity of One and Many. Considered as a reply to his own previous doubts and difficulties, it is altogether insufficient. It leaves all those doubts unsolved. The first point of enquiry which he had started, was, Whether any Universal or Generic Monads really existed: the second point was, assuming that they did exist, how each of them, being essentially eternal and unchangeable, could so multiply itself or divide itself as to be at the same time in an infinite variety of particulars.² Both points are left untouched by the explanation. No proof is furnished that Universal Monads exist—still less that they multiply or divide their one and unchangeable essence among infinite particulars—least of all is it shown, how such multiplication or division can take place, consistently with the fundamental and eternal sameness of the Universal Monad. The explanation assumes these difficulties to be eliminated, but does not suggest the means of eliminating them. The Philébus, like the Parmenidès, recognises the difficulties as existing, but leaves them unsolved, though the dogmas to which they attach are the cardinal and peculiar tenets of Platonic speculation. Plato shows that he is aware of the embarrassments: yet he is content to theorize as if they did not exist. In a remarkable passage of this very dialogue, he intimates pretty clearly that he considered the difficulty of these questions to be insuperable, and never likely to be set at rest. This identification of the One with the Many, in verbal propositions (he says) has begun with the beginning of dialectic debate, and will continue to the end of it, as a stimulating puzzle which especially captivates the imagination of youth.³

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 18 C-D. καθορὰν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδ' ἂν ἐν αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτὸ ἀνεν πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν θεωρῶν εἰς λογισμένους ὡς ὄντα ἵνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἐν πως ποιούonta, μίαν ἐπ' αὐτοῖς ὡς οὐραν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπιφθέγγετο προσεσιπών.

² Plato, Philébus, p. 16 B-C.

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 16 D. φαμὲν περ ταῦτον ἐν καὶ πολλὰ πρὸς λόγων γυνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθ' ἑκάστον

τῶν λεγομένων αἱ καὶ πάσαι καὶ νῦν. καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσεται ποτε οὔτε ἤρξεται νῦν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατον τι καὶ ἀγίρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν.

The sequel (too long to transcribe) of this passage (setting forth the manner in which this apparent paradox worked upon the imagination of youthful students) is very interesting to read, and shows (in my opinion) that Stall-

But though the difficulties started by Plato remain unexplained, still his manner of stating them is in itself valuable and instructive. It proclaims—1. The necessity of a systematic classification, or subordinate scale of species and sub-species, between the highest Genus and the group of individuals beneath. 2. That each of these subordinate grades in the scale must be founded upon some characteristic mark. 3. That the number of sub-divisions is definite and assignable, there being a limit beyond which it cannot be carried. 4. That full knowledge is not attainable until we know all three—The highest Genus—The intermediate species and sub-species; both what they are, how many there are, and how each is characterised—The infinite group of individuals. These three elements must all be known in conjunction: we are not to pass either from the first to the third, or from the third to the first, except through the second.

The general necessity of systematic classification—of generalisation and specification, or subordination of species and sub-species, as a condition of knowing any extensive group of individuals—requires no advocate at the present day. But it was otherwise in the time of Plato. There existed then no body of knowledge, distributed and classified, to which he could appeal as an example. The illustrations to which he himself refers here, of language and music as systematic arrangements of vocal sounds, were both of them the product of empirical analogy and unconscious growth, involving little of predetermined principle or theory. All the classification then employed was merely that which is included in the structure of language: in the framing of general names, each designating a multitude of individuals. All that men knew of classification was, that which is involved in calling many individuals by the same common name. This is the defect pointed out by Plato, when he remarks that

At that time little thought had been bestowed upon classification as a logical process.

baum's interpretation of it in his note is not the right one. Plato is here talking (in my judgment) about the puzzle and paradox itself: Stallbaum represents Plato as talking about his pretended solution of it, which has not as yet been at all alluded to.

Plato seems to give his own ex-

planation without full certainty or confidence: see p. 16 B. And when we turn to pp. 18-19, we shall see that he forgets the original difficulty which had been proposed (compare p. 15 B), introducing in place of it another totally distinct difficulty, as if that had been in contemplation.

the clever men of his time took no heed except of the One and the Infinite (Genus and Individuals): neglecting all the intermediate distinctions. Upon the knowledge of these *media* (he says) rests the difference between true dialectic debate, and mere polemic.¹ That is—when you have only an infinite multitude of individuals, called by the same generic name, it is not even certain that they have a single property in common: and even if they have, it is not safe to reason from one to another as to the possession of any other property beyond the one generic property—so that the debate ends in mere perplexity. All pleasures agree in being pleasures (Sokrates had before observed to Protarchus), and all cognitions agree in being cognitions. But you cannot from hence infer that there is any other property belonging in common to all.² That is a point which you cannot determine without farther observation of individuals, and discrimination of the great multitude into appropriate subdivisions. You will thus bring the whole under that triple point of view which Plato requires:—the highest Genus,—the definite number of species and sub-species,—the undefined number of individuals.

Here we have set before us one important branch of logical method—the necessity of classification, not simply arising as an incidental and unconscious effect of the transitive employment of a common name, but undertaken consciously and intentionally as a deliberate process, and framed upon principles predetermined as essential to the accomplishment of a scientific end. This was a conception new in the Sokratic age. Plato seized upon it with ardour. He has not only emphatically insisted upon it in the *Philêbus* and elsewhere, but he has also given (in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*) elaborate examples of systematic logical subdivision applied to given subjects.

Classifica-
tion—un-
conscious
and con-
scious.

We may here remark that Plato's views as to the necessity of systematic classification, or of connecting the Sum-
mum Genus with individuals by intermediate stages
of gradually decreasing generality—are not necessarily

Plato's doc-
trine about
classifica-
tion is not

¹ Plato, *Philêbus*, p. 17 A. οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σοφοὶ ἐν μὲν, ὅπως ἂν τέχῃσι, καὶ πολλὰ θάττον καὶ βραδύτερον ποιῶσι τοῦ δόντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀπειρᾷ εἶδος, τὰ δὲ μῖσα αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει, οἷς διατεχέρισται τὸ τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐριστικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τοὺς λόγους.

² Plato, *Philêbus*, pp. 13 B, 14 A.

necessarily
connected
with his
Theory of
Ideas.

connected with his peculiar theory of Ideas as Self-existent objects, eternal and unchangeable. The two are indeed blended together in his own mind and language: but the one is quite separable from the other; and his remarks on classification are more perspicuous without his theory of Ideas than with it. Classification does not depend upon his hypothesis—That Ideas are not simply Concepts of the Reason, but absolute existences apart from the Reason (*Entia Rationis* apart from the *Ratio*)—and that these Ideas correspond to the words *Unum*, *Multa definitè*, *Multa indefinitè*, which are put together to compose the totality of what we see and feel in the *Kosmos*.

Applying this general doctrine (about the necessity of establishing subordinate classes as intermediate between the Genus and Individuals) to the particular subject debated between Sokrates and Protarchus—the next step in the procedure would naturally be, to distinguish the subordinate classes comprised first under the Genus *Pleasure*—next, under the Genus *Intelligence* (or *Cognition*). And so indeed the dialogue seems to promise¹ in tolerably explicit terms.

But such promise is not realised. The dialogue takes a different turn, and recurs to the general distinction already brought to view between the *Finient* (*Determinans*) and the *Infinite* (*Indeterminatum*). We have it laid down that all existences in the universe are divided into four Genera: 1. The *Infinite* or *Indeterminate*. 2. The *Finient* or the *Determinans*. 3. The product of these two, mixed or compounded together *Determinatum*. 4. The *Cause* or *Agency* whereby they become mixed together.—Of these four, the first is a Genus, or is both *One* and *Many*, having numerous varieties, all agreeing in the possession of a perpetual *More* and *Less* (without any limit or positive quantity): that which is perpetually increasing or diminishing, more or less hot, cold, moist, great, &c., than any given positive standard. The second, or the *Determinans*, is also a Genus, or *One* and *Many*: including equal, double, triple, and all fixed ratios.²

Quadruple
distribution
of Exist-
ences. 1. The In-
finite. 2. The
Finient. 3.
Product of
the two
former.
4. Combin-
ing Cause
or Agency.

¹ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 19 B, p. 20 A.

² Plato, *Philebus*, pp. 24-25.

The third Genus is laid down by Plato as generated by a mixture or combination of these two first—the Infinite and the Determinans. The varieties of this third or compound Genus comprise all that is good and desirable in nature—health, strength, beauty, virtue, fine weather, good temperature :¹ all agreeing, each in its respective sphere, in presenting a right measure or proportion as opposed to excess or deficiency.

Fourthly, Plato assumes a distinct element of causal agency which operates such mixture of the Determinans with the Infinite, or banishment and supersession of the latter by the former.

We now approach the application of these generalities to the question in hand—the comparative estimate of pleasure and intelligence in reference to Good. It has been granted that neither of them separately is sufficient, and that both must be combined to compose the result Good : but the question remains, which of the two elements is the most important in the compound? To which of the four above-mentioned Genera (says Sokrates) does Pleasure belong? It belongs to the Infinite or Indeterminate : so also does Pain. To which of the four does Intelligence or Cognition belong? It belongs to the fourth, or to the nature of Cause, the productive agency whereby definite combinations are brought about.²

Pleasure and Pain belong to the first of these four Classes—Cognition or Intelligence belongs to the fourth.

Hence we see (Sokrates argues) that pleasure is a less important element than Intelligence, in the compound called Good. For pleasure belongs to the Infinite : but pain belongs to the Infinite also : the Infinite therefore, being common to both, cannot be the circumstance which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good : they must derive that affinity from some one of the other elements.³ It is Intelligence which imparts to pleasures their affinity with Good : for Intelligence belongs to the more efficacious Genus called Cause. In the combination of Intelligence with Pleasure, indispensable to constitute Good, Intelligence is the primary

In the combination, essential to Good, of Intelligence with Pleasure, Intelligence is the more important of the two constituents.

¹ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 26 A-B.

² Plato, *Philæbus*, pp. 27-28, p. 31 A.

³ Plato, *Philæbus*, pp. 27-28.

The argument of Plato is here very

obscure and difficult to follow. Stallbaum in his note even intimates that Plato uses the word *αἴτιον* in a sense different from that in which he had used it before : which I think doubtful.

element, Pleasure only the secondary element. Intelligence or Reason is the ruling cause which pervades and directs both the smaller body called Man, and the greater body called the Kosmos. The body of man consists of a combination of the four elements, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire : deriving its supply of all these elements from the vast stock of them which constitutes the Kosmos. So too the mind of man, with its limited reason and intelligence, is derived from the vast stock of mind, reason, and intelligence, diffused throughout the Kosmos, and governing its great elemental body. The Kosmos is animated and intelligent, having body and mind like man, but in far higher measure and perfection. It is from this source alone that man can derive his supply of mind and intelligence.¹

Sokrates thus arrives at the conclusion, that in the combination constituting Good, Reason or Intelligence is the regulating principle : and that Pleasure is the Infinite or Indeterminate which requires regulation from without, having no fixed measure or regulating power in itself.² He now proceeds to investigate pleasure and intelligence as phenomena : to enquire in what each of them resides, and through what affection they are generated.³

We cannot investigate pleasure (Sokrates continues) apart from pain : both must be studied together. Both pleasure and pain reside in the third out of the four above-mentioned Genera : ⁴ that is, in the compound Genus formed out of that union (of the Infinite with the Determinans or Finient) which includes all animated bodies. Health and Harmony reside in these animated bodies : and pleasure as well as pain proceed from modifications of such fundamental harmony. When the fundamental harmony is disturbed or dissolved, pain is the consequence : when the disturbance is rectified and the harmony restored, pleasure

Pleasure and Pain must be explained together—Pain arises from the disturbance of the fundamental harmony of the system—Pleasure from the restoration of it.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 29 C. 30 A : Τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν σῶμα ἀρ' οὐ φύσιν φήσομεν ἔχειν ; . . . Πόθεν λαβόν, εἴπερ μὴ τὸ γε τοῦ παντὸς σῶμα ἑμψυχον ὄν ἐντέλῃ, ταῦτά γε ἔχον ταύτῃ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντῃ καλλίονα ;

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 31 A.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 31 B. δεῖ δὲ τὸ

μετὰ τοῦτο, ἐν ᾧ τί ἐστιν ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν καὶ διὰ τί πάθος γίγνεται, οὕτως γίγνεται, ἴδωμεν ἡμᾶς.

⁴ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 31 C. ἐν τῷ κοινῷ μοι γένοιτο ἅμα φαίνεσθαι λύπῃ τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι κατὰ φύσιν . . . κοινὸν τοίνυν ὑπακούμεν ὅδ' ἑῶν τεττάρων τρίτον ἔλεγμα. Com-

ensuea.¹ Thus hunger, thirst, extreme heat and cold, are painful, because they break up the fundamental harmony of animal nature: while eating, drinking, cooling under extreme heat, or warming under extreme cold, are pleasurable, because they restore the disturbed harmony.

This is the primary conception, or original class, of pleasures and pains, embracing body and mind in one and the same fact. Pleasure cannot be had without antecedent pain: it is in fact a mere reaction against pain, or a restoration from pain.

Pleasure
pre-sup-
poses Pain.

But there is another class of pleasures, secondary and derivative from these, and belonging to the mind alone without the body. The expectation of future pleasures is itself pleasurable,² the expectation of future pains is itself painful. In this secondary class we find pleasure without pain, and pain without pleasure: so that we shall be better able to study pleasure by itself, and to decide whether the whole class, in all its varieties, be good, welcome and desirable,—or whether pleasure and pain be not, like heat and cold, desirable or undesirable according to circumstances—i.e. not good in their own nature, but sometimes good and sometimes not.³

Derivative
pleasures of
memory and
expectation
belonging to
mind alone.
Here you
may find
pleasure
without
pain.

In the definition above given of the conditions of pleasure, as a re-action from antecedent pain, it is implied that if there be no pain, there can be no pleasure: and that a state of life is therefore conceivable which shall be without both—without pain and without pleasure. The man who embraces wisdom may prefer this third mode of life. It would be the most divine and the most akin to the nature of the Gods, who cannot be supposed without indecency to feel either joy or sorrow.⁴ At any rate, if not the best life of all, it will be the second-best.

A life of in-
telligence
alone, with-
out pain and
without
pleasure, is
conceivable.
Some may
prefer it: at
any rate it is
second-best.

pare p. 32 A-B: τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἐμφυχὸν γεγονὸς εἶδος.

Plato had before said that ἡδονὴ belonged to the Infinite (compare p. 41 D), or to the first of the four above-mentioned genera, not to the third.

¹ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 31 D.

² Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 32 C. ἡδονὴς

καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.

³ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 32 D.

⁴ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 33 B. Οὐκοῦν εἰκὸς γε οὐτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὐτε τὸ ἑναντίον; Πάνν μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἀσχημὸν γοῦν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν εἶναι.

Those pleasures, which reside in the mind alone without the body, arise through memory and by means of reminiscence. When the body receives a shock which does not go through to the mind, we call the fact insensibility. In sensation, the body and mind are both affected :¹ such sensation is treasured up in the memory, and the mental part of it is recalled (without the bodily part) by reminiscence.² Memory and reminiscence are the foundations of desire or appetite. When the body suffers the pain of hunger or thirst, the mind recollects previous moments of satisfaction, and desires a repetition of that satisfaction by means of food or drink. Here the body and the mind are not moved in the same way, but in two opposite ways: the desire belongs to the mind alone, and is turned towards something directly opposed to the affection of the body. That which the body feels is emptiness: that which the mind feels is desire of replenishment, or of the condition opposed to emptiness. But it is only after experience of replenishment that the mind will feel such desire. On the first occasion of emptiness, it will not desire replenishment, because it will have nothing, neither sensation nor memory, through which to touch replenishment: it can only do so after replenishment has been previously enjoyed, and through the memory. Desire therefore is a state of the mind apart from the body, resting upon memory.³ Here then the man is in a double state: the pain of emptiness, which affects the mind through the body, and the memory of past replenishment, or expectation of future replenishment, which resides in the mind. Such expectation, if certain and immediate, will be a state of pleasure: if doubtful and distant, it will be a state of pain. The state of emptiness and consequent appetite must be, at the very best, a state of mixed pain and pleasure: and it may

¹ Plato, *Philæbus*, pp. 33 E—34 A. ἀναίσθησιν ἐπονόμασον . . . τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δ' αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἰσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φησὶν αὖ.

² Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 34 A-B. σωτηρίαν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην.

Μνήμην καὶ ἀναμνήσεις are pronounced to be different.

³ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 35 C. τὴν ψυχὴν ἅρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ ὅλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἐν ἐν' ἑλλερ ἐφάψαιτο;

35 D. τὴν ἐρ' ἐπιδύουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην, ὃ λόγος ψυχῆς ἐύμασσαν τὴν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῶον παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.

perhaps be a state of pain only, under two distinct forms.¹ Life composed of a succession of these states can afford no true or pure pleasure.

What do you mean (asks Protarchus) by true pleasures or pains? How can pleasures or pains be either true or false? Opinions and expectations may be true or false; but not pleasures, nor pains.

Can pleasures be true or false? Sokrates maintains that they are so.

That is an important question (replies Sokrates), which we must carefully examine. If opinions may be false or true, surely pleasures may be so likewise. When a man holds an opinion, there is always some Object of his opinion, whether he thinks truly or falsely: so also when a man takes delight, there must always be some Object in which he takes delight, truly or falsely. Pleasure and pain, as well as opinion, are susceptible of various attributes; vehement or moderate, right or wrong, bad or good. Delight sometimes comes to us along with a false opinion, sometimes along with a true one.

Yes (replies Protarchus), but we then call *the opinion* true or false—not *the pleasure*.²

You will not deny (says Sokrates) that there is a difference between the pleasure accompanying a true opinion, and that which accompanies a false opinion. Wherein does the difference consist? Our opinions, and our comparisons of opinion, arise from sensation and memory:³ which write words and impress images upon our mind (as upon a book or canvas), sometimes truly, sometimes falsely,⁴ not only respecting

Reasons given by Sokrates. Pleasures attached to true opinions, are true pleasures. The just man is

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 86 A-B.

This analysis of desire is in the main just: antecedent to all gratification, it is simple uneasiness: gratification having been supplied, the memory thereof remains, and goes along with the uneasiness to form the complex mental state called *desire*.

But there is another case of desire. While tasting a pleasure, we desire the continuance of it: and if the expectation of its continuance be assured, this is an additional pleasure: two sources of pleasure instead of one. In this last case, there is no such conjunction of opposite states, pain and

pleasure, as Plato pointed out in the former case.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 37.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 38 C. Οὐκ οὖν ἐκ μνήμης τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως δόξα ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ διαδοξάζειν ἐγχεῖρειν γίγνεται ἡμῖν;

⁴ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 88 E, 89. δοκεῖ μοι τότε ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ βιβλίῳ τινὶ προσοικεῖναι . . . ἡ μνήμη ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι συμπίπτουσα εἰς ταῦτόν, ἀκρίβεια δὲ περὶ ταῦτά ἐστι τὰ παθήματα, φαίνονται μοι σχεδὸν ὅσον γράφειν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τότε λόγους.

⁵ Ἀποδέχου δὲ καὶ ἕτερον δημιουργὸν ἡμῶν ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ

favoured by the Gods, and will have true visions sent to him. the past and present, but also respecting the future. To these opinions respecting the future are attached the pleasures and pains of expectation, which we have already recognised as belonging to the mind alone,—anticipations of bodily pleasures or pains to come—hopes and fears. As our opinions respecting the future are sometimes true, sometimes false, so also are our hopes and fears : but throughout our lives we are always full of hopes and fears.¹ Now the just and good man, being a favourite of the Gods, will have these visions or anticipations of the future presented to him truly and accurately : the bad man on the contrary will have them presented to him falsely. The pleasures of anticipation will be true to the former, and false to the latter :² his false pleasures will be a ludicrous parody on the true ones.³ Good or bad opinions are identical with true or false opinions : so also are good or bad pleasures, identical with true or false pleasures : there is no other ground for their being good or bad.

I admit this identity (remarks Protarchus) in regard to opinions, but not in regard to pleasures. I think there are other grounds, and stronger grounds, for pronouncing pleasures to be bad—independently of their being false. We will reserve that question (says Sokrates) for the present—whether there are or are not pleasures bad on other grounds.⁴ I am now endeavouring to show that there are some pleasures which are *false* : and I proceed to another way of viewing the subject.

We agreed before that the state, called Appetite or Desire,

γγράμμενον . . . Ζωγράφον, δε μετὰ τὸν γραμματιστὴν τῶν λεγόμενων εἰκόνας ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦτον γράφει.

It seems odd that Plato here puts the painter after the scribe, and not before him. The images or phantasms of sense must be painted on the mind before any words are written upon it (if we are to adopt both these metaphors).

The comparison of the mind to a sheet of paper or a book begins with the poets (Æschyl. Prometh. 790), and passes into philosophy with Plato.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 39 E. ἡμᾶς δ' αὖ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου αἰετὶ γίγμενον ἐλπίζων. 40 E. οὐκ οὖν δ' αὐτὸς λόγος

αὖ εἰς περὶ φόβου τε καὶ θυμῶν, &c. Also 40 D.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 40 A-B. Prophets and prophecies, inspired by the Gods, were phenomena received as frequently occurring in the days of Plato.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 40 C. μὲν μὲν μὲν μὲν τὰς ἀληθείας ἐπὶ τὰ γελοῖα τετα.

⁴ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 40 E—41 A. Σοκρ. ὅδ' ἔδρας γ', οἶμαι, καταρτίζμεν ὥς ἄλλον τινα τρόπον εἰσι ποιεῖναι πλὴν τῷ ψευδεὶς εἶναι. Protarch. Πάνου μὲν οὖν τούτωντιον εἰρηκαί, &c.

was a mixed state comprehending body and mind : the state of body affecting the mind with a pain of emptiness,—the state of mind apart from body being either a pleasure of expected replenishment, or a pain arising from our regarding replenishment as distant or unattainable. Appetite or Desire, therefore, is sometimes mixed pleasure and pain ; both, of the genus Infinite, Indeterminate. We desire to compare these pleasures and pains, and to value their magnitude in relation to each other, but we have no means of performing the process. We not only cannot perform it well, but we are sure to perform it wrongly. For future pleasure or pain counts for more or less in our comparison, according to its proximity or distance. Here then is a constant source of false computation : pleasures and pains counted as greater or less than they really are : in other words, false pleasures and pains. We thus see that pleasures may be true or false, no less than opinions.¹

We have also other ways of proving the point that much of what is called pleasure is false and unreal²—either no pleasure at all, or pleasure mingled and alloyed with pain and relief from pain. According to our previous definition of pain and pleasure—that pain arises from derangement of the harmony of our nature, and pleasure from the correction of such derangement, or from the re-establishment of harmony—there may be and are states which are neither painful nor pleasurable. Doubtless the body never remains the same : it is always undergoing change : but the gentle and gradual changes (such as growth, &c.) escape our consciousness, producing neither pain nor pleasure : none but the marked, sudden changes force themselves upon our consciousness, thus producing pain and pleasure.³ A life of gentle changes would be a life without pain as well as

No means of truly estimating pleasures and pains—False estimate habitual—These are the false pleasures.

Much of what is called pleasure is false. Gentle and gradual changes do not force themselves upon our notice either as pleasure or pain. Absence of pain not the same as pleasure.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 41-42.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 42 C. Τούτων τοίνυν εἴησι δύο μέρη, ἃν τῆς ἀπαντήμεν ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ψευδεῖς εἴη μάλλον ἢ τὰς αἰσθητέας τε καὶ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς σώματι.

This argument is continued, though in a manner desultory and difficult to

follow, down to p. 51 A : πρὸς τὸ τίνας ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὐκ ἔστι οὐδὲν καὶ μεγάλης ἑτέρας τίνας ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθεῖσας, εἶναι δ' αὐτὰς συμπεφυμένους ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὁδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περὶ τὴν σωματικὴν καὶ ψυχικὴν ἀπορίαν.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 42-43.

without pleasure. There are thus three states of life¹—painful—pleasurable—neither painful nor pleasurable. But *no pain* (absence of pain) is not identical with pleasure: it is a third and distinct state.²

Now there are some philosophers who confound this distinction:³ Philosophers respectable, but stern, who hate the very name of pleasure, deny its existence as a separate state *per se*, and maintain it to be nothing more than relief from pain: implying therefore, perpetually and inevitably, the conjunction or antecedence of pain. They consider the seduction of pleasure in prospect to be a mere juggle—a promise never realised. Often the expected moment brings no pleasure at all: and even when it does, there are constant accompaniments of pain, which always greatly impair, often countervail, sometimes far more than countervail, its effect. Pain is regarded by them as the evil—removal or mitigation of pain as the good—of human life.

These philosophers (continues Sokrates) are like prophets who speak truth from the stimulus of internal temperament, without any rational comprehension of it. Their theory is partially true, but not universally.⁴ It is true of a large portion of what are called pleasures, but it is not true of all pleasures. Most pleasures (indeed all the more vehement and coveted pleasures), correspond to the description given in the theory. The moment when the supposed intense pleasure arrives, is a disappointment of the antecedent hopes, either by not bringing the pleasure promised, or by bringing it along with a preponderant dose of pain. But there are some pleasures of which this cannot be said—which are really true and unmixed with pain. Which these are (continues Sokrates), I will presently explain: but I shall first state the case of the pleasure-hating philosophers, so far as I go along with it.

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 43 D. τρι- μάλα δεινός λεγόμενος τὰ περὶ φύσιν, τοὺς βίους, ἔνα μὲν ἥδύ, τὸν δ' ἀπὸ οἷ τοῦ παράπαν ἥδονας οὐ φασὶν εἶναι. . . . λυπηρόν, τὸν δ' ἑνα μᾶλλον.

² Plato, Philébus, p. 45 D. οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι ποτε ταῦτον τῷ χαίρειν. ἅς τὴν οἱ περὶ Φίληβον ἥδονας ἱκανομένους.

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 44 B-C. καὶ πάντες προσχρησθῆναι τισι, μαρτυρομένοις

⁴ Plato, Philébus, p. 44 C. ὥστε

When we are studying any property (they say), we ought to examine especially those cases in which it appears most fully and prominently developed: thus, if we are enquiring into hardness, we must take for our first objects of investigation the hardest things, in preference to those which are less hard or scarcely hard at all.¹ So in enquiring into pleasure generally, we must investigate first the pleasures of extreme intensity and vehemence. Now the most intense pleasures are enjoyed not in a healthy state of body, but on the contrary under circumstances of distemper and disorder: because they are then preceded by the most violent wants and desires. The sick man under fever suffers greater thirst and cold than when he is in health, but in the satisfaction of those wants, his pleasure is proportionally more intense. Again when he suffers from the itch or an inflamed state of body, the pleasure of rubbing or scratching is more intense than if he had no such disorder.² The most vehement bodily pleasures can only be enjoyed under condition of being preceded or attended by pains greater or less as the case may be. The condition is not one of pure pleasure, but mixed between pain and pleasure. Sometimes the pain preponderates, sometimes the pleasure: if the latter, then most men, forgetting the accompanying pain, look upon these transient moments as the summit of happiness.³ In like manner the violent and insane man, under the stimulus of furious passions and desires, experiences more intense gratifications than persons of sober disposition: his condition is a mixed one, of great pains and great pleasures. The like is true of all the vehement passions—love, hatred, revenge, anger, jealousy, envy, fear, sorrow, &c.: all of them embody pleasures mixed with pain, and the magnitude of the pleasure is proportioned to that of the accompanying pain.⁴

Theory of the pleasure-haters — We must learn what pleasure is by looking at the intense pleasures—These are connected with distempered body and mind.

οὐ τέχνη, ἀλλὰ τινι δυσχερεῖ φύσεως οὐκ ἀγνοοῦς, &c. Also p. 51 A.

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 44 E. ὥς εἰ βουλόμεν ὁτιοῦν εἶδους τὴν φύσιν ἰδεῖν, ὅλον τὴν τοῦ σκληροῦ, πότερον εἰς τὰ σκληρότατα ἀποβλέποντες οὕτως ἢ μᾶλλον συννοήσομεν ἢ πρὸς τὰ πολλοστὰ σκληρότητα; Answer: πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μεγέθει.

² Plato, Philébus, pp. 45-46.

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 47 A.

⁴ Plato, Philébus, pp. 49-50 D. Plato here introduces, at some length, an analysis of the mixed sentiment of pleasure and pain with which we regard scenic representations, tragedy and comedy—especially the latter. The explanation which he gives of the sentiment of the ludicrous is curious, and is intended to elucidate an obscure

Recollect (observes Sokrates) that the question here is not whether *more pleasure* is enjoyed, *on the whole*, in a state of health than in a state of sickness—by violent rather than by sober men. The question is, about the intense modes of pleasure. Respecting these, I have endeavoured to show that they belong to a distempered, rather than to a healthy, state both of body and mind:—and that they cannot be enjoyed pure, without a countervailing or preponderant accompaniment of pain.¹ This is equally true, whether they be pleasures of body alone, of mind alone, or of body and mind together. They are false and delusive pleasures: in fact, they are pleasures only in seeming, but not in truth and reality. To-morrow I will give you fuller proofs on the subject.²

Thus far (continues Sokrates) I have set forth the case on behalf of the pleasure-haters. Though I deny their full doctrine,—that there is no pleasure except cessation from pain—I nevertheless agree with them and cite them as witnesses on my behalf, to the extent of affirming that a large proportion of our so-called pleasures, and those precisely the most intense are false and unreal: being poisoned and drenched in accompaniments of pain.³ But there are some pleasures, true, genuine, and untainted. Such are those produced by beautiful colours and figures—by many

psychological phenomenon (ὡς σκοτεινότερον ἐστίν, p. 48 B). But his explanation is not clear, and the sense which he gives to the word *φθόνος* is a forced one. He states truly that the natural object (at least one among the objects) which a man laughs at, is the intellectual and moral infirmities of persons with whom he is in friendly intercourse, when such persons are not placed in a situation of power, so as to make their defects or displeasure pregnant with dangerous consequences. The laughter is amused with exaggerated self-estimation or foolish vanity displayed by friends, *δοξοσοφία*, *δοξοκαλία*, &c. (49 E). But how the laughter can be said to experience a mixture of pain and pleasure here, or how he can be said to feel *φθόνος*, I do not clearly see. At least *φθόνος* is here used in

the very unusual sense (to use Stallbaum's words, note p. 48 B, page 278) of "injusta lætitia de malis eorum, quibus bene cupere debemus"; a sense altogether contrary to that which the word bears in Xen. Memor. iii. 9, 8; which Stallbaum himself cites, as if the definition of *φθόνος* were the same in both.

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 45 C-E. *μή με ἡγῆ διανοούμενον ἰσχυρὴν σε, εἰ πλεῖον χαίρουσιν οἱ σφόδρα ποσούτῃς τὰν ὑγιαίνοντων, ἀλλ' οἷον μέγας θός με ζῆταίν ἡδονῆς, καὶ τὸ σφόδρα περὶ τοῦ τοιοῦτου ποῦ ποτὶ γίγνεται ἀκάστοτε, &c.*

² Plato, Philébus, p. 50 E. *τούτων γὰρ ἀπάντων αὐριον ἐδελέξω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, &c.*

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 51 A

odours—by various sounds : none of which are preceded by any painful want requiring to be satisfied. The sensation when it comes is therefore one of pure and unmixed pleasure. The figures here meant are the perfect triangle, cube, circle, &c. : the colours and sounds are such as are clear and simple. All these are beautiful and pleasurable absolutely and in themselves—not simply in relation to (or relatively to) some special antecedent condition. Smells too, though less divine than the others, are in common with them unalloyed by accompanying pain.¹ To these must be added the pleasure of acquiring knowledge, which supposes neither any painful want before it, nor any subsequent pain even if the knowledge acquired be lost. This too is one of the unmixed or pure pleasures ; though it is not attainable by most men, but only by a select few.²

Having thus distinguished the pure and moderate class of pleasures, from the mixed and vehement—we may remark that the former class admit of measure and proportion, while the latter belong to the immeasurable and the infinite. Moreover, look where we will, we shall find truth on the side of the select, small, unmixed specimens—rather than among the large and mixed masses. A small patch of white colour, free from all trace of any other colour, is truer, purer, and more beautiful, than a large mass of clouded and troubled white. In like manner, gentle pleasure, free from all pain, is more pleasurable, truer, and more beautiful, than intense pleasure coupled with pain.³

There are yet other arguments remaining (continues Sokrates) which show that pleasure cannot be the Summum Bonum. If it be so, it must be an End, not a Means : it must be something for the sake of which other things exist or are done—not something which itself exists or is done for the sake of something else. But pleasure is not an End : it is essentially a means, as we may infer from the reasonings of its own advocates.

Pleasure is generation, not substance or essence ; it cannot therefore be an End, because all generation is only a

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 51 E. τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὁσμὰς ἦντο μὲν τοῦτων θείων γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμίχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαῖον λύπας, &c.

² Plato, Philébus, p. 52 B. ταύτας

τοῖνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμίκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον, καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ἐλίγων.

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 53 B-C.

means towards substance—Pleasure therefore cannot be the good.

They themselves tell us that it is generation, not substance:—essentially a process of transition or change, never attaining essence or permanence.¹ But generation or transition is always for the sake of the thing to be generated, or for Substance—not substance for the sake of generation: the transitory serves as a road to the permanent, not *vice versa*. Pleasure is thus a means, not an End. It cannot therefore partake of the essential nature and dignity of Good: it belongs to a subordinate and imperfect category.²

Indeed we cannot reasonably admit that there is no Good in bodies and in the universe generally, nor anywhere except in the mind:—nor that, within the mind, pleasure alone is good, while courage, temperance, &c., are not good:—nor that a man is good only while he is enjoying pleasure, and bad while suffering pain, whatever may be his character and merits.³

Having thus (continues Sokrates) gone through the analysis of pleasures, distinguishing such as are true and pure, from such as are false and troubled—we must apply the like distinctive analysis to the various modes of knowledge and intelligence. Which varieties of knowledge, science, or art, are the purest from heterogeneous elements, and bear most closely upon truth? Some sciences and arts (we know) are intended for special professional practice: others are taught as subjects for improving the intellect of youth. As specimens of the former variety, we may notice music, medicine, husbandry, navigation, generalship, joinery, ship-building, &c. Now in all these, the guiding and directing elements are computation, mensuration, and statics—the sciences or arts of computing, measuring, weighing. Take away these three—and little would be left worth having, in any

¹ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 53 C. ἀρα περὶ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ἀκρόαμεν ὡς αἰ γένεσις ἐστίν, οὐσία δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἡδονῆς· κομφοὶ γὰρ δὴ τινας ἀπὸ τούτων τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μνησέειν ἡμῖν, οἳ δὲ γάρην ἔχουσιν. . . .

² D: ἐστὶν δὲ τινα δύο, τὸ μὲν αὐτὸ κατ' αὐτὸ, τὸ δὲ αἰ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἄλλου . . .

τὸ μὲν σεμνότερον αἰ πεφυκόσ, τὸ δὲ ἑλλειπὲς ἐκείνου.

³ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 54 D. ἡδονὴ εἴπερ γένεσις ἐστίν, εἰς ἄλλαν ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν αὐτὴν τιθέντες ὁρθῶς θήσομεν.

⁴ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 55 B.

of the sciences or arts before named. There would be no exact assignable rules, no definite proportions: everything would be left to vague conjecture, depending upon each artisan's knack and practice which some erroneously call Art. In proportion as each of these professional occupations has in it more or less of computation and mensuration, in the same proportion is it exact and true. There is little of computation or mensuration in music, medicine, husbandry, &c.: there is more of them in joinery and ship-building, which employ the line, plummet, and other instruments: accordingly these latter are more true and exact, less dependent upon knack and conjecture, than the three former.¹ They approach nearer to the purity of science, and include less of the non-scientific, variable, conjectural, elements.

But a farther distinction must here be taken (Sokrates goes on). Even in such practical arts as ship-building, which include most of computation and mensuration—these two latter do not appear pure, but diversified and embodied in a multitude of variable particulars. Arithmetic and geometry, as applied by the ship-builder and other practical men, are very different from arithmetic and geometry as studied and taught by the philosopher.² Though called by the same name, they are very different; and the latter alone are pure and true. The philosopher assumes in his arithmetic the exact equality of all units, and in his geometry the exact ratios of lines and spaces: the practical man adds together units very unlike each other—two armies, two bulls, things little or great as the case may be: his measurement too, always falls short of accuracy.³ There are in short two arithmetics and two geometries—very different from each other, though bearing a common name.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 55-56.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 56 D-E. 'Αριθμητικὴν πρῶτον ἄρ' οὐκ ἄλλην μὲν τινα τῆν των πολλῶν φασίν, ἄλλην δ' αὖ τὴν των φιλοσοφούντων; . . . λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἢ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατ' ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένη—πότερον ὡς μία ἑκάτερον λεκτέον, ἢ δύο τιθῆναι;

Compare Aristotel. *Ethic. Nikom.* i.

7, p. 1098, a. 30.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 56 D-E. οἱ μὲν γὰρ που μονάδας ἀνίστους καταριθμοῦνται των περι ἀριθμῶν, οἷον στρατόπεδα δύο καὶ βούι δύο καὶ δύο τὰ σμικρότατα ἢ καὶ τὰ πάντων μέγιστα· οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μονάδα μονάδος ἐκάστης των μυρίων μηδεμίαν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις θήσει.

⁴ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 57 D.

We thus make out (continues Sokrates) that there is a difference between one variety and another variety of science or knowledge, analogous to that which we have traced between the varieties of pleasure. One pleasure is true and pure ; another is not so, or is inseparably connected with pain and non-pleasurable elements—there being in each case a difference in degree. So too one variety of science, cognition, or art, is more true and pure than another : that is, it is less intermingled with fluctuating particulars and indefinite accompaniments. A science, bearing one and the same name, is different according as it is handled by the practical man or by the philosopher. Only as handled by the philosopher, does science attain purity : dealing with eternal and invariable essences. Among all sciences, Dialectic is the truest and purest, because it takes comprehensive cognizance of the eternal and invariable—*Eus semper Idem*—presiding over those subordinate sciences which bear upon the like matter in partial and separate departments.¹

Your opinion (remarks Protarchus) does not agree with that of Gorgias. He affirms, that the power of persuasion (Rhetoric) is the greatest and best of all arts : inasmuch as it enables us to carry all our points, not by force, but with the free will and consent of others. I should be glad to avoid contradicting either him or you.

There is no real contradiction between us (replies Sokrates). You may concede to Gorgias that his art or cognition is the greatest and best of all—the most in repute, as well as the most useful to mankind. I do not claim any superiority of *that* kind, on behalf of my cognition.² I claim for it superiority in truth and purity. I remarked before, that a small patch of unmixed white colour was superior in truth and purity to a large mass of white tarnished with other colours—a gentle and

Dialectic is the truest and purest of all Cognitions. Analogy between Cognition and Pleasure: in each, there are gradations of truth and purity.

Difference with Gorgias, who claims superiority for Rhetoric. Sokrates admits that Rhetoric is superior, in usefulness and celebrity: but he claims superiority for Dialectic, as satisfying the lover of truth.

¹ Plato, *Philebus*, pp. 57-58.

² Plato, *Philebus*, p. 58 B. Οὐ τοῦτ' ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐξήτουν πῶς, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστῳ καὶ ἀρίστῳ καὶ πλείστῳ ὠφελούσῃ ἡμᾶς.

ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφέστερον καὶ τὰ καθαυτά καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, καὶ ἢ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ δυνάσασθαι. Τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ νῦν ἐγὼ ζητοῦμεν.

unmixed pleasure, in like manner, to one that is more intense but alloyed with pains. It is this superiority that I assert for Dialectic and the other sister cognitions. They are of little positive advantage to mankind: yet they, and only they, will satisfy both the demands of intelligence, and the impulse within us, in so far as we have an impulse to love and strain after truth.¹

As far as straining after truth is concerned (says Protarchus), Dialectic and the kindred sciences have an incontestable superiority.

You must see (rejoins Sokrates) that Rhetoric, and most other arts or sciences, employ all their study, and seek all their standard, in opinions alone: while of those who study Nature, the greater number confine their investigations to this Kosmos, to its generation and its phenomenal operations—its manifestations past, present, and future.² Now all these manifestations are in perpetual flux, admitting of no true or certain cognition. Pure truth, corresponding to those highest mental endowments, Reason and Intelligence—can be found only in essences, eternal and unchangeable, or in matters most akin to them.³

We have now (continues Sokrates) examined pleasure separately and intelligence separately. We have agreed that neither of them, apart and by itself, comes up to the conception of Good; the attribute of which is, to be all sufficient, and to give plenary satisfaction, so that any animal possessing it desires nothing besides.⁴ We must therefore seek Good in a certain mixture or combination of the two—Pleasure and Intelligence: and we must determine, what sort of combination of these two contains the Good which we seek. Now, to mix all pleasures, with all cogni-

Most men look to opinions only, or study the phenomenal manifestations of the Kosmos. They neglect the unchangeable essences, respecting which alone pure truth can be obtained.

Application. Neither Intelligence nor Pleasure separately is the Good, but a mixture of the two—Intelligence being the most important. How are they to be mixed?

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 58 D. ἀλλ' εἰ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἔρην τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἰσάμεν, &c.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 58. εἰ δὲ καὶ περὶ φύσεως ἡγείται τις ζητεῖν, οἷσθ' ὅτι τὰ περὶ τὸν κόσμον τόνδε, ὅπη τε γέγονε καὶ ὅπη πάσχει τι καὶ ὅπη ποιεῖ, ταῦτα

ζητεῖ διὰ βίον;

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 59.

⁴ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 60 C. τὴν τάχα τοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τρεῖς τῶν ἀλ-
λων . . . ἢ παρὲν τούτ' αἰ τῶν ζῶων διὰ
τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντη, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου
ποτὲ ἐπὶ προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελειώ-
τατον ἔχειν.

tions, at once and indiscriminately, will hardly be safe. We will first mix the truest and purest pleasures (those which include pleasure in its purest form), with the truest or purest cognitions (those which deal altogether with eternal and unchangeable essence, not with fluctuating particulars). Will such a combination suffice to constitute Good, or an all-sufficient and all-satisfactory existence? Or do we want anything more besides?¹ Suppose a man cognizant of the Form or Idea of Justice, and of all other essential Ideas: and able to render account of his cognition, in proper words: Will this be sufficient?² Suppose him to be cognizant of the divine Ideas of Circle, Sphere, and other figures; and to employ them in architecture, not knowing anything of human circles and figures as they exist in practical life?³

That would be a ludicrous position indeed (remarks Protarchus), to have his mind full of the divine Ideas or cognitions only.

We must include all Cognitions, not merely the truest, but the others also. Life cannot be carried on without both.

What! (replies Sokrates) must he have cognition not only of the true line and circle, but also of the false, the variable, the uncertain?

Certainly (says Protarchus), we all must have this farther cognition, if we are to find our way from hence to our own homes.⁴

Must we then admit (says Sokrates) those cognitions also in music, which we declared to be full of conjecture and imitation, without any pure truth or certainty?

We must admit them (says Protarchus), if life is to be worth anything at all. No harm can come from admitting all the other cognitions, provided a man possesses the first and most perfect.

Well then (continues Sokrates), we will admit them all. We have now to consider whether we can in like manner admit all pleasures without distinction. The true and pure must first be let in: next, such as are

¹ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 61 E.

² Plato, *Philebus*, p. 62 A. Ἔστιν δὲ τις ἡμῖν φρονὴν ἄνθρωπος αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὅ, τι ἐστὶ, καὶ λόγον ἔχων ἐπόμενον τῇ νοεῖ, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων τῶν ὄντων ὡσαύτως διανοούμενος;

³ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 62 A. Ἄρ' οὐν

οὗτος ἱκανῶς ἐπιστήμης ἔξει κύκλον μὲν καὶ σφαῖρας αὐτῆς τῆς θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχων, τὴν δὲ ἀνθρωπίνην ταύτην σφαῖραν καὶ τοὺς κύκλους τούτους ἀγνοῶν, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 62 B. Ἀγαθαῖον γάρ, εἰ μᾶλλον τις ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ὁδὸν ἐκάστοτε ἐξευρήσκειν οἰκεῖν.

necessary and indispensable: and all the rest also, if any one can show that there is advantage without mischief in our enjoying every variety of pleasure.¹ We must put the question first to pleasures, next to cognitions—whether they can consent respectively to live in company with each other. Now pleasures will readily consent to the companionship of cognitions: but cognitions (or Reason, upon whom they depend) will not tolerate the companionship of all pleasures indiscriminately. Reason will welcome the true and pure pleasures: she will also accept such as are indispensable, and such as consist with health, and with a sober and virtuous disposition. But Reason will not tolerate those most intense, violent, insane, pleasures, which extinguish correct memory, disturb sound reflection, and consist only with folly and bad conduct. Excluding these violent pleasures, but retaining the others in company with Reason and Truth—we shall secure that perfect and harmonious mixture which makes the nearest approximation to Good.²

This mixture as Good (continues Sokrates) will be acceptable to all.³ But what is the cause that it is so? and is that cause more akin to Reason or to Pleasure? The answer is, that this mixture and combination, like every other that is excellent, derives its excellence from Measure and Proportion. Thus the Good becomes merged in the Beautiful: for measure and proportion (Moderation and Symmetry) constitute in every case beauty and excellence.⁴ In this case, Truth has been recognised as a third element of the mixture: the three together coalesce into Good, forming a Quasi-Unum, which serves instead of a Real Unum or Idea of Good.⁵ We

true, pure, and necessary. The others are not compatible with Cognition or Intelligence—especially the intense sexual pleasures.

What causes the excellence of this mixture? It is Measure, Proportion, Symmetry. To these, Reason is more akin than Pleasure.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 63 A. εἴπερ πάσας ἡδονὰς ἡδεσθαι διὰ βίου συμφέρον τε ἡμῖν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀβλαβὲς ἅπασιν, πάσας ἐνυκρατίον.

² Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 63-64.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 64 C. τί δὲτα ἐν τῇ ἁρμύνῃ τιμωτάτων ἅμα καὶ μέλιστα αἰτιῶν εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν, τοῦ πᾶσι γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διαθεσιν;

⁴ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 64 E. νῦν δὲ

καταπέφηνεν ἡμῖν ἡ τἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν· μετρίότης γὰρ καὶ ἑνμετρία κάλλος δέηται καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ ἐνμβαίνει γίνεσθαι.

⁵ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 64 E—65 A. Οὐκ οὐν εἰ μὴ μὴ δυναμένα ἰδέε τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεύσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλος καὶ ἑνμετρίαν καὶ ἀληθείαν, λέγεμεν ὡς τοῦτο ὅλον ἐν ὁρότατ' ἂν αἰτιασάμεθα· ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ ἁρμύνῃ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ἐν τοιαύτῃ αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.

must examine these three elements separately—Truth—Moderation—Symmetry (Measure—Proportion) to find whether each of them is most akin to Reason or to Pleasure. There can be no doubt that to all the three, Reason is more akin than Pleasure : and that the intense pleasures are in strong repugnance and antipathy to all the three.¹

We thus see (says Sokrates in conclusion), in reference to the debate with Philêbus, that Pleasure stands neither first nor second in the scale of approximation to Good. First comes Measure—the Moderate—the Seasonable—and all those eternal Forms and Ideas which are analogous to these.² Secondly, come the Symmetrical—the Beautiful—the Perfect—the Sufficient—and other such like Forms and Ideas.³ Thirdly, come Reason and Intelligence. Fourthly, the various sciences, cognitions, arts, and right opinions—acquirements embodied in the mind itself. Fifthly, those pleasures which we have discriminated as pure pleasures without admixture of pain ; belonging to the mind itself, but consequent on the sensations of sight, hearing, smell.⁴

It is not necessary to trace the descending scale farther. It has been shown, against Philêbus—That though neither Intelligence separately, nor Pleasure separately, is an adequate embodiment of Good, which requires both of them conjointly—yet Intelligence is more akin to Good, and stands nearer to it in nature, than Pleasure.

Dionysius of Halikarnassus, while blaming the highflown metaphor and poetry of the Phædrus and other Platonic dialogues, speaks with great admiration of Plato in his appropriate walk of the Sokratic dialogues ; and selects specially the Philêbus, as his example of these latter. I confess that this selection

¹ Plato, Philêbus, p. 65 C.

² Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 A. *ὡς ἦδον ἡ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδ' αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μὲν πρὸς τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὅποσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν τὴν εἰδὸν ἡρήσθαι*

φύσιν.

³ Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 B. *δεύτερον μὲν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλειον καὶ ἱκανὸν, καὶ πάνθ' ὅποσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὐτῆς ἐστίν.*

⁴ Plato, Philêbus, p. 66 C.

surprises me: for the Philébus, while it explicitly renounces the peculiar Sokratic vein, and becomes didactic—cannot be said to possess high merit as a didactic composition. It is neither clear, nor orderly, nor comparable in animation to the expository books of the Republic.¹ Every commentator of Plato, from Galen downwards, has complained of the obscurity of the Philébus.

Sokrates concludes his task, in the debate with Protarchus, by describing Bonum or the Supreme Good as a complex aggregate of five distinct elements, in a graduated scale of affinity to it and contributing to its composition in a greater or less degree according to the order in which they are placed. Plato does not intimate that these five complete the catalogue; but that after the fifth degree, the affinity becomes too feeble to deserve notice.² According to this view, no Idea of Good, in the strict Platonic sense, is affirmed. Good has not the complete unity of an Idea, but only the quasi-unity of analogy between its diverse elements; which are attached by different threads to the same root, with an order of priority and posteriority.³

Remarks.
Sokrates does not claim for Good the unity of an Idea, but a quasi-unity of analogy.

In the discussions about Bonum, there existed among the contemporaries of Plato a great divergence of opinions. Eukleides of Megara represents the extreme absolute, ontological, or objective view: Sokrates (I mean the historical Sokrates, as reported by Xenophon) enunciated very distinctly the relative or subjective view. "Good (said Eukleides) is the One: the only real, eternal, omnipresent Ens—always the same or like

Discussions
of the time
about Bo-
num. Ex-
treme abso-
lute view,
maintained
by Euklei-
des: ex-
treme rela-
tive by the

¹ Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. ap. Demosth. p. 1025.

Schleiermacher (Einleit. p. 136) admits the comparatively tiresome character and negligent execution of the Philébus.

Galen had composed a special treatise, *Περὶ τῶν ἐν Φιλήβῳ μετὰ βίοντων*, now lost (Galen, De Libris Propriis, 13, vol. xix. 46, ed. Kühn).

We have the advantage of two recent editions of the Philébus by excellent English scholars, Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste; both are valuable, and that of Dr. Badham is distinguished by sagacious critical remarks and con-

jectures, but the obscurity of the original remains incorrigible.

² Plato, Philébus, p. 66 C.

³ Plato, Philébus, p. 66 A. The passage is cited in note 5, p. 363.

About the difference, recognised partly by Plato but still more insisted on by Aristotle, between τὰ λεγόμενα καθ' ἐν (κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν) and τὰ λεγόμενα πρὸς ἐν (πρὸς μίαν τινὰ φύσιν), see my note towards the close of the Lysis, vol. ii. ch. xx.

Aristotle says about Plato (Eth. Nikom. i. 6): Οἱ δὲ κομισαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην, οὐκ ἐποιοῦν ἰδέαν ἐν ᾗ οἱ τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ὕστερον ἕλκον, &c.

Xenophon-
tic So-
krates.
Plato here
blends the
two in
part; an
Eclectic
doctrine.

itself—called sometimes Good, sometimes Intelligence, and by various other names: the opposite of Good has no real existence, but only a temporary, phenomenal, relative, existence." On the other hand, the Xenophontic Sokrates affirmed—"The Good and The Beautiful have no objective unity at all; they include a variety of items altogether dissimilar to each other, yet each having reference to some human want or desire; sometimes relieving or preventing pain, sometimes conferring pleasure. That which neither contributes to relieve any pain or want, nor to confer pleasure, is not Good at all."¹ In the *Philebus*, Plato borrows in part from both of these points of view, though inclining much more to the first than to the last. He produces a new eclectic doctrine, comprising something from both, and intended to harmonise both; announced as applying at once to Man, to Animals, to Plants, and to the Universe.²

Unfortunately, the result has not corresponded to his intentions. If we turn to the close of the dialogue, we find that the principal elements which he assigns as explanatory of Good, and the relation in which they stand to each other, stand as much in need of explanation as Good itself. If we follow the course of the dialogue, we are frequently embarrassed by the language, because he is seeking for phrases applicable at once to the *Kosmos* and to Man: or because he passes from one to the other, under the assumption of real analogy between them. The extreme generalities of Logic or Ontology, upon which Sokrates here dwells—the Determinant and Indeterminate, the Cause, &c.—do not conduct us to the attainment of Good as he himself defines it—That which is desired by, and will give full satisfaction to, all men, animals, and plants. The fault appears to me to lie in the very scheme of the dialogue. Attempts to discuss Ontology and

¹ Diogen. Laert. ii. 106; Cicero, *Academic.* ii. 42; Xenophon, *Memorab.* iii. 8, 3-5.

² Plato, *Philebus*, p. 64 A. *ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν περὶ πάντων, τί ποτε ἐν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντί πέφυκεν ἀγαθόν, καὶ τίνα ἴδιον αὐτῷ εἶναι ποτε παντὶν.*

Schleiermacher observes about the

Philebus:—"Dieses also lag ihm (Plato) am Herzen, das Gute zu bestimmen nicht nur für das Leben des Menschen, sondern auch zumal für das ganze Gebiet des gewordenen Seins," &c.

The partial affinity between the *Kosmos* and the human soul is set forth in the *Timæus*, pp. 37-43-44.

Ethics in one and the same piece of reasoning, instead of elucidating both, only serve to darken both. Aristotle has already made a similar remark : and it is after reading the Philēbus that we feel most distinctly the value of his comments on Plato in the first book of the *Nikomachean Ethics*. Aristotle has discussed Ontology in the *Metaphysica* and in other treatises : but he proclaims explicitly the necessity of discussing Ethics upon their own principles : looking at what is good for man, and what is attainable by man.¹ We find in the *Philēbus* many just reflections upon pleasure and its varieties : but these might have been better and more clearly established, without any appeal to the cosmical dogmas. The parallelism between Man and the *Kosmos* is overstrained and inconclusive, like the parallelism in the *Republic* between the collective commonwealth and the individual citizen.

Moreover, when Plato, to prove the conclusion that Intelligence and Reason are the governing attributes of man's mind, enunciates as his premiss that Intelligence and Reason are the governing attributes in the *Kosmos*²—the premiss introduced is more debatable than the conclusion ; and would (as he himself intimates) be contested by those against whose opposition he was arguing. In fact, the same proposition (That Reason and Intelligence are the dominant and controlling attributes of man, Passion and Appetite the subordinate) is assumed without any proof by Sokrates, both in the *Protagoras* and in the *Republic*. The *Kosmos* (in Plato's view) has reason and intelligence, but experiences no emotion either painful or pleasurable : the rational nature of man is thus common to him with the

Comparison of Man to the *Kosmos*, which has reason, but no emotion, is unnecessary and confusing.

¹ See especially *Ethic. Nikom.* i. 4, 1096-1097. Aristotle reasons there directly against the Platonic *idea* *ἀγαθού*, but his arguments have full application to the exposition in the *Philēbus*. He distinguishes pointedly the ethical from the physical point of view. In his discussion of friendship, after touching upon various comparisons of the physiological poets, and of Plato himself repeating them, he says :—*τὰ μὲν οὖν φυσικά των ἀπορημάτων παραφείσθω· οὐ γὰρ οἰκεία τῆς παρούσης σκέψεως· ὅσα δ' ἴσθιν ἀνθρωπικά καὶ*

ἀνήκει εἰς τὰ θῆν καὶ τὰ πάθη, ταῦτ' ἐπισκεψώμεθα, *Ethic. Nikom.* viii. 1, 1155, b. 10.

The like contrast is brought out (though less clearly) in the *Eudemian Ethics*, viii. 1, 1225, a. 30.

He animadvertes upon Plato on the same ground in the *Ethica Magna*, i. 1, 1152, a. 23-30. *ὑπὲρ γὰρ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀληθείας λέγοντα, οὐκ ἔδει ὑπὲρ ἀρετῆς φράζειν· οὐδὲν γὰρ τοῦτ' ἀκρίβη κοινόν.*

² Plato, *Philēbus*, pp. 20-30.

Kosmos, his emotional nature is not so. That the mind of each individual man was an emanation from the all-pervading mind of the Kosmos or universe, and his body a fragmentary portion of the four elements composing the cosmical body—these are propositions which had been laid down by Sokrates, as well as by Philolaus and other Pythagoreans (perhaps by Pythagoras himself) before the time of Plato.¹ Not only that doctrine, but also the analysis of the Kosmos into certain abstract constituent *principia*—(the Finient or Determinant—and the Infinite or Indeterminate)—this too seems to have been borrowed by Plato from Philolaus.²

But here in the Philēbus, that analysis appears expanded into a larger scheme going beyond Philolaus or the Pythagoreans: *via* the recognition of a graduated scale of limits, or a definite number of species and sub-species—intermediate between the One or Highest Genus, and the Infinite Many or Individuals—and descending by successive stages of limitation from the Highest to the Lowest. What is thus described, is the general framework of systematic logical classification, deliberately contrived, and founded upon known attributes, common as well as differential. It is prescribed as essential to all real cognition; if we conceive only the highest Genus or generic name as comprehending an infinity of diverse particulars, we have no real cognition, until we can assign the intermediate stages of specification by which we descend from one to the other.³ The step here made by Plato,

¹ Cicero, De Nat. Deor. i. 11, 27: De Senectute, 21, 78; Xenophon, Memor. i. 4, 7-8; Cicero, Nat. Deor. ii. 6, 18; Plato, Timæus, pp. 37-38, &c.

In the Xenophonic dialogue here referred to, Sokrates inverts the premises and the conclusion: he infers that Mind and Reason govern the Kosmos, because the mind and reason of man govern the body of man.

² See Stallbaum, Prolegg. in Philēb. pp. 41-42.

³ Ueberweg (Ächtheit und Zeitf. Platon. Schriften, pp. 204-207) considers the Philēbus, as well as the Sophistēs and Timæus, to be compositions of Plato's very late age—partly on the ground of their didac-

tic and expository style, the dialogue serving only as form to the exponent Sokrates—partly because he thinks that the nearest approach is made in them to that manner of conceiving the doctrine of Ideas which Aristotle ascribes to Plato in his old age—that is, the two *συνεχέα* or factors of the Ideas. 1. Τὸ ἐν. 2. Τὸ μέγα καὶ μικρόν. This last argument seems to me far-fetched. I see no real and sensible approach in the Philēbus to this Platonic doctrine of the *συνεχέα* of the Ideas: at least, the approach is so vague, that one can hardly make it a basis of reasoning. But the didactic tone is undoubtedly a characteristic of the Philēbus, and seems to indicate

under the stimulus of the Sokratic dialectic, from the Pythagorean doctrine of Finient and Infinite to the idea of gradual, systematic, logical division and subdivision, is one very important in the history of science. He lays as much stress upon the searching out of the intermediate species, as Bacon does upon the *Axiomata Media* of scientific enquiry.¹

Though there are several other passages of the Platonic dialogues in which the method of logical division is inculcated, there is none (I think) in which it is prescribed so formally, or enunciated with such comprehensive generality, as this before us in the *Philébus*. Yet the method, after being emphatically announced, is but feebly and partially applied, in the distinction of different species, both of pleasure and of cognition.² The announcement would come more suitably, as a preface to the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*: wherein the process is applied to given subjects in great detail, and at a length which some critics consider excessive: and wherein moreover the particular enquiry is expressly proclaimed as intended to teach as well as to exemplify the general method.³

Classification broadly enunciated, and strongly recommended—yet feebly applied—in this dialogue.

that the dialogue was composed after Plato had been so long established in his school, as to have acquired a pedagogic ostentation.

¹ Bacon, *Augment. Scient.* v. 2. Nov. Organ. Aph. 106. "At Plato non semel inuit particularia infinita esse maximè: rursus generalia minus certa documenta exhibere. Medullam igitur scientiarum, quæ artifex ab imperito distinguitur, in mediis propositionibus consistere, quas per singulas scientias tradidit et docuit experientia."

² The purpose of discriminating the different sorts of pleasure is intimated, yet seemingly not considered as indispensable, by Sokrates; and it is executed certainly in a very unsystematic and perfunctory manner, compared with what we read in the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*. (*Philébus*, pp. 19 B, 20 C, 32 B-C.)

Mr. Poste, in his note on p. 55 A, expresses surprise at this point; and notices it as one among other grounds for suspecting that the *Philébus* is a composition of two distinct fragments, rather carelessly soldered together:—"Again after Division and Generalization have been propounded as the only

satisfactory method, it is somewhat strange that both the original problems are solved by ordinary Dialectic without any recourse to classification. All this becomes intelligible if we assume the *Philébus* to have arisen from a boldly executed junction of two originally separate dialogues."

Acknowledging the want of coherence in the dialogue, I have difficulty in conceiving what the two fragments could have been, out of which it was compounded. Schleiermacher (*Einleit.* pp. 136-137) also points out the negligent execution and heavy march of the dialogue.

³ See *Politikus*, pp. 285-286; *Phædrus*, p. 265; *Xenoph. Memor.* iv. 5, 12.

I have already observed that Socher (*Ueber Platon*, pp. 260-270) and Stallbaum (*Proleg. ad Politik.* pp. 52-54, 65-67, &c.) agree in condemning the extreme minuteness, the tiresome monotony, the useless and petty comparisons, which Plato brings together in the multiplied bifurcate divisions of the *Sophistês* and *Politikus*. Socher adduces this as one among his reasons for rejecting the dialogue as spurious.

The same question as that which is here discussed in the Philébus, is also started in the sixth book of the Republic. It is worth while to compare the different handling, here and there. "Whatever else we possess (says Sokrates in the Republic), and whatever else we may know, is all of no value, unless we also possess and know Good. In the opinion of most persons, Pleasure is The Good: in the opinion of accomplished and philosophical men, intelligence (*φρόνησις*) is the Good. But when we ask Intelligence, of *what?* these philosophers cannot inform us: they end by telling us, ridiculously enough, Intelligence of *The Good*. Thus, while blaming us for not knowing what The Good is, they make an answer which implies that we do already know it: in saying, Intelligence of the Good, they of course presume that we know what they mean by the word. Then again, those who pronounce Pleasure to be the Good, are not less involved in error; since they are forced to admit that some Pleasures are Evil; thus making Good and Evil to be the same. It is plain therefore that there are many and grave disputes what The Good is."¹

In this passage of the Republic Plato points out that Intelligence cannot be understood, except as determined by or referring to some Object or End: and that those who tendered Intelligence *per se* for an explanation of The Good (as Sokrates does in the Philébus), assumed as known the very point in dispute which they professed to explain. This is an important remark in regard to ethical discussions: and it were to be wished that Plato had himself avoided the mistake which he here blames in others. The Platonic Sokrates frequently tells us that he does not know what Good is.

Mistake of talking about Bonum confidently, as if it were known, while it is subject of constant dispute. Plato himself wavers about it; gives differ-

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 B-C. οἱ τοῦτο ᾗρουμένοι οὐκ ἔχουσι δαίψαι ἢ τῆς φρόνησις, ἀλλ' ἀναγκάζονται τελευτῶντες τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φάναι . . . οὐκ εἰδόντες γὰρ οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδότες· φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτοῖς φασι εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ὡς αὖ συνέδωκεν ἡμῶν δ, τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὴν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φέρεται ὄνομα.

In the Symposium, there is a like tenor of questions about Eros or Love.

Love must be Love of something: the term is relative. You confound Love with the object loved. See Plato, Symposium, pp. 199 C, 204 C.

When we read the objection here advanced by Plato (in the above passage of the Republic) as conclusive against the appeal to *φρόνησις* absolutely (without specifying *φρόνησις* of *what?*), we are surprised to see that it is not even mentioned in the Philébus.

In the sixth Book of the Republic, having come to a point where his argument required him to furnish a positive explanation of it, he expressly declines the obligation and makes his escape amidst the clouds of metaphor.¹ In the Protagoras, he pronounces Good to be identical with pleasure and avoidance of pain, in the largest sense and under the supervision of calculating Intelligence.² In the second Book of the Republic, we find what is substantially the same explanation as that of the Protagoras, given (though in a more enlarged and analytical manner) by Glaukon and assented to by Sokrates; to the effect that Good is tripartite,³ viz.: 1. That which we desire for itself, without any reference to consequences—*e. g.*, enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. That which we desire on a double account, both for itself and by reason of its consequences—*e. g.*, good health, eyesight, intelligence, &c. 3. That which we do not desire, perhaps even shun, for itself: but which we desire, or at least accept, by reason of its consequences—such as gymnastics, medical treatment, discipline, &c. Again, in the Gorgias and elsewhere, Plato seems to confine the definition of Good to the two last of these three heads, rejecting the first: for he distinguishes pointedly the Good from the Pleasurable. Yet while thus wavering in his conception of the term, Plato often admits it into the discussions as if it were not merely familiar, but clear and well-understood by every one.

In the present dialogue, Plato lays down certain characteristic marks whereby The Supreme Good may be known. These marks are subjective—relative to the feelings and appreciation of sentient beings—to all mankind, and even to animals and plants. Good is explicitly defined by the property of conferring happiness. The Good is declared to be "that habit and disposition of mind which has power to confer on all men a happy life":⁴ it is perfect and all sufficient: every creature that knows Good, desires and hunts after it, demanding

rent explanations, and sometimes professes ignorance, sometimes talks about it confidently.

Plato lays down tests by which Bonum may be determined: but the answer in the Philébus does not satisfy these tests.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 E.
Compare also Republic, vii. p. 583 C. *ὅ γὰρ ἀρχὴ μὲν ὁ μὴ οἶδε, τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ τὰ μεταξὺ ἐξ οὗ μὴ οἶδε συμπέλεκται, τίς μηχανὴ τὴν*

τοιαύτην ὁμολογίαν ποτὲ ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι;

² Plato, Protagoras, pp. 356-7.

³ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357 B.

⁴ Plato, Philébus, p. 11 E.

nothing farther when it is attained, and caring for nothing else except what is attained along with it:¹ it is the object of choice for all plants and animals, and if any one prefers any thing else, he only does so through ignorance or from some untoward necessity:² it is most delightful and agreeable to all.³ This is what Plato tells us as to the characteristic attributes of Good. And the test which Sokrates applies, to determine whether Pleasure does or does not correspond with these attributes, is an appeal to individual choice or judgment. "Would you choose? Would *any one* be satisfied?" Though this appeal ought by the conditions of the problem to be made to mankind generally, and is actually made to Protarchus as one specimen of them—yet Sokrates says at the end of the dialogue that all except philosophers choose wrong, being too ignorant or misguided to choose aright. Now it is certain that what these philosophers choose, will not satisfy the aspirations of all other persons besides. It may be Good, in reference to the philosophers themselves: but it will fail to answer those larger conditions which Plato has just laid down.

In submitting the question to individual choice, Plato does not keep clear either of confusion or of contradiction. If this *Summum Bonum* be understood as the End comprising the full satisfaction of human wishes and imaginations, without limitation by certain given actualities—and if the option be tendered to a man already furnished with his share of the various desires generated in actual life—such a man will naturally demand entire absence of all pains, with pleasures such as to satisfy all his various desires: not merely the most pleasant pleasures (which Plato intends to prove, not to be pleasures at all), but other pleasures also. He will wish (if you thus

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 20 D-E, 61 C, 67 A. *ἀνταρξεία*, &c.

Sydenham, Translation of *Philébus*, note, p. 48, observes—"Whether Happiness be to be found in Speculative Wisdom or in Pleasure, or in some other possession or enjoyment, it can be seated nowhere but in the soul. For Happiness has no existence anywhere but where it is felt and known. Now, it is no less certain, that only the soul is sensible of pain and plea-

sure, than it is, that only the soul is capable of knowledge, and of thinking either foolishly or wisely."

² Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 22 B, 61 A.

³ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 61 E, 64 C. *τὸν ἀγαθώτατον βίον καὶ πρὸς σπουδῇ*. Aristotle, *Ethic. Nikomach.* I. iiii. *ῥαγὰν δὲ, ὅτι πάντα ἐπείρα.*

Seneca, *Epistol.* 118. "Bonum est quod ad se impetum animi secundum naturam movet."

suppose him master of Fortunatus's wishing-cap) to include in his enjoyments pleasures which do not usually go together, and which may even, in the real conditions of life, exclude one another: no boundary being prescribed to his wishing power. He will wish for the pleasures of knowledge or intelligence, of self-esteem, esteem from others, sympathy, &c., as well as for those of sense. He will put in his claim for pleasures, without any of those antecedent means and conditions which, in real life, are necessary to procure them. Such being the state of the question, the alternative tendered by Plato—Pleasure, versus Intelligence or Knowledge—has no fair application. Plato himself expressly states that pleasure, though generically One, is specifically multiform, and has many varieties different from, even opposite to, each other: among which varieties one is, the pleasure of knowledge or intelligence itself.¹ The person to whom the question is submitted, has a right to claim these pleasures of knowledge among the rest, as portions of his Summum Bonum. And when Plato proceeds to ask—Will you be satisfied to possess pleasure only, without the least spark of intelligence, without memory, without eyesight?—he departs from the import of his previous question, and withdraws from the sum total of pleasure many of its most important items: since we must of course understand that the pleasures of intelligence will disappear along with intelligence itself,² and that the pains of conscious want of intelligence will be felt instead of them.

That the antithesis here enunciated by Plato is not legitimate or logical, we may see on other grounds also. Pleasure and Intelligence cannot be placed in competition with each other for recognition as Summum Bonum: which, as described by Plato himself, is of the nature of an End, while Intelligence is of the nature of a means or agency—indispensable indeed, yet of no value unless it be exercised, and rightly exercised towards its appropriate end, which end must be separately declared.³ Intelligence is a durable acquisition stored up, like the good health, moral character, or established habits, of each individual person: it is a

Intelligence and Pleasure cannot be fairly compared—Pleasure is an End, Intelligence a Means. Nothing can be compared with Pleasure, except some other End.

¹ Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 12 D.

² Plato, *Philæbus*, p. 21 C.

³ Compare Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 505 D (referred to in a previous note);

capital engaged in the production of interest, and its value is measured by the interest produced. You cannot with propriety put the means—the Capital—in one scale, and the End—the Interest—in the other, so as to ascertain which of the two weighs most. A prudent man will refrain from any present enjoyment which trenches on his capital: but this is because the maintenance of the capital is essential to all future acquisitions and even future maintenance. So too, Intelligence is essential as a means or condition to the attainment of pleasure in its largest sense—that is, including avoidance or alleviation of pain or suffering: if therefore you choose to understand pleasure in a narrower sense, not including therein avoidance of pain (as Plato understands it in this portion of the *Philëbus*), the comprehensive end to which Intelligence corresponds may be compared with Pleasure and declared more valuable—but Intelligence itself cannot with propriety be so compared. Such a comparison can only be properly instituted when you consider the exercise of Intelligence as involving (which it undoubtedly does¹) pleasures of its own; which pleasures form part of the End, and may fairly be measured against other pleasures and pains. But nothing can be properly compared with Pleasure, except some other supposed End: and those theorists who reject Pleasure must specify some other *Terminus ad quem*—otherwise intelligence has no clear meaning.

Now the Hedonists in Plato's age, when they declared Pleasure to be the supreme Good, understood Pleasure in its widest sense, as including not merely all varieties of pleasure, mental and bodily alike, but also avoidance of pain (in fact Epikurus dwelt especially upon this last point). Moreover, they did not intend to depreciate Intelligence, but on the contrary postulated it

The Hedonists, while they laid down attainment of pleasure and diminution of pain, postulated

also Aristotel. *Ethic. Nikom.* i. 3, 1095, b. 30; i. 8, 1099, a. 1. Respecting the value of Intelligence or Cognition, when the end towards which it is to be exercised is undetermined, see the dialogue between Sokrates and Kleinias—Plato, *Euthydém.* pp. 289-292 B-E.

Aristotle, in the *Nikomach. Ethic.* (i. 4, 1096, b. 10), makes a distinction between—1. τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διακόμενα και ἀγαπώμενα—2. τὰ ποιητικά τούτων

ἢ φυλακτικά ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων καλυπτικά: and Plato himself makes the same distinction at the beginning of the second book of the *Republic*. But though it is convenient to draw attention to this distinction, for the clear understanding of the subject, you cannot ask with propriety which of the two lots is most valuable. The value of the two is equal: the one cannot be had without the other.

¹ Plato, *Philëb.* p. 13 D.

as a governing agency, indispensable to right choice and comparative estimation between different pleasures and pains. That Eudoxus,¹ the geometer and astronomer, did this, we may be sure: but besides, this is the way in which the Hedonistic doctrine is expounded by Plato himself. In his Protagoras, Sokrates advocates that doctrine, against the Sophist who is unwilling to admit it. In the exposition there given by Sokrates, Pleasure is announced as The Good to be sought, Pain as The Evil to be avoided or reduced to a minimum. But precisely because the End, to be pursued through constant diversity of complicated situations, is thus defined—for that very reason he declares that the dominant or sovereign element in man must be, the measuring and calculating Intelligence; since such is the sole condition under which the End can be attained or approached. In the theory of the Hedonists, there was no antithesis, but indispensable conjunction and implication, between Pleasure and Intelligence.² And if it be said, that by declaring Pleasure (and avoidance of Pain) to be the End, Intelligence the means,—they lowered the dignity of the latter as compared with the former:—we may reply that the dignity of Intelligence is exalted to the maximum when it is enthroned as the ruling and controuling agent over the human mind.

In a scheme of mental philosophy, Emotion and Intellect are properly treated as distinct phenomena requiring to be explained separately, though perpetually co-existent and interfering with each other. But in an ethical discourse about Summum Bonum, the antithesis between Pleasure and Intelligence, on which the Philèbus turns, is from the outset illogical. What gives to it an apparent plausibility, is, That the exercise of Intelligence has pleasures and pains of its

Intelligence
as the
governing
agency.

Pleasures of
Intelligence
may be
compared,
and are
compared
by Plato,
with other
pleasures,
and declared
to be of
more value.
This is

¹ Eudoxus is cited by Aristotle (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2) as the great champion of the Hedonistic theory. He is characterised by Aristotle as διαφερόντως σώφρων.

² The implication of the intelligent and emotional is well stated by Aristotle (Eth. Nikom. x. 8, 1178, a. 16). συνίσχεται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ θύους ἀρετῇ, καὶ αὐτῇ τῇ φρόνησι,

εἴπω αἱ μὲν τῆς φρονήσεως ἀρεταὶ κατὰ τὰς θύκας εἰσιν ἀρεταί, τὸ δ' ὁρθὸν τῶν θύκων κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. συναρτημέναι δ' αὐταὶ καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι περὶ τὸ σύνθετον ἐν εἶναι· αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρώπιναί. καὶ ὁ βίος δὲ ὁ κατ' αὐτὰς καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία. ἡ δὲ τοῦ τοῦ περὶ αὐτὰς ἀρετῆς, &c. Compare also the first two or three sentences of the tenth Book of Eth. Nik.

arguing upon the Hedonistic basis own, and includes therefore in itself a part of the End, besides being the constant and indispensable directing force or Means. Now, though pleasure in *genere* cannot be weighed in the scale against Intelligence, yet the pleasures and pains of Intelligence may be fairly and instructively compared with other pleasures and pains. You may contend that the pleasures of Intelligence are superior in quality, as well as less alloyed by accompanying pains. This comparison is really instituted by Plato in other dialogues;¹ and we find the two questions apparently running together in his mind as if they were one and the same. Yet the fact is, that those who affirm the pleasures attending the exercise of Intelligence to be better and greater, and the pains less, than those which attend other occupations, are really arguing upon the Hedonistic basis.² Far from establishing any antithesis between

¹ See Republic, ix. pp. 581-582, where he compares the pleasures of the three different lives. 1. 'Ο φιλόσοφος or φιλομαθής. 2. 'Ο φιλότιμος. 3. 'Ο φιλοκερδής.

Again in the Phædon, he tells us that we are not to weigh pleasures against pleasures, or pains against pains, but all of them against φρόνησις or Intelligence (p. 69 A-B). This appears distinctly to contradict what Sokrates affirms in the Protagoras. But when we turn to another passage of the Phædon (p. 114 E), we find Sokrates recognising a class of pleasures attached to the exercise of Intelligence, and declaring them to be more valuable than the pleasures of sense, or any others. This is a very different proposition: but in both passages Plato had probably the same comparison in his mind.

Sydenham, in a note to his translation of the Philebus (pp. 42-43), observes—"If Protarchus, when he took on himself to be an advocate for pleasure, had included, in his meaning of the word, all such pleasures as are purely mental, his opinion, fairly and rightly understood, could not have been different in the main, from what Sokrates here professes—That in every particular case, to discern what is best in action, and to perceive what is true in speculation, is the chief good of man; unless, indeed, it should afterwards come into question which of the two kinds of pleasure, the sensual or the mental, was to be preferred. For

if it should appear that in this point they were both of the same mind, the controversy between them would be found a mere logomachy, or contention about words (as between Epicureans and Stoics), of the same kind as that would be between two persons, one of whom asserted that to a musical ear the proper and true good was Harmony, while the other contended that the good lay not in the Harmony itself, but in the pleasure which the musical ear felt from hearing it: or like a controversy among three persons, one of whom having asserted that to all animals living under the northern frigid zone, the Sun in Cancer was the greatest blessing; and another having asserted that not the Sun was that chief blessing to those northern animals, but the warmth which he afforded them; the third should imagine that he corrected or amended the two former by saying—That those animals were thus highly blest neither by the Sun, nor by the warmth which his rays afforded them, but by the joy or pleasure which they felt from the return of the Sun and warmth."

² Plato, in Philebus, p. 63 C-D, denounces and discards the vehement pleasures because they disturb the right exercise of Reason and Intelligence. Aristotle, after alluding to this doctrine, presents the same fact under a different point of view, as one case of a general law. Each variety of pleasure belongs to, and is consequent

Pleasure and Intelligence, they bring the two into closer conjunction than was done by Epikurus himself.

Another remark may be made on the way in which Plato argues the question in the *Philēbus* against the Hedonists. He draws a marked line of separation between Pleasure—and avoidance, relief, or mitigation, of Pain. He does not merely distinguish the two, but sets them in opposing antithesis. Wherever there is pain to be relieved, he will not allow the title of *pleasurable* to be bestowed on the situation. That is not *true* pleasure: in other words, it is no pleasure at all. He does not go quite so far as some contemporary theorists, the Fastidious Pleasure-Haters, who repudiated all pleasures without exception.¹ He allows a few rare exceptions; the sensual pleasures of sight, hearing, and smell—and the pleasures of exercising Intelligence, which (these latter most erroneously) he affirms to be not dis-entitled by any accompanying pains. His catalogue of pleasures is thus reduced to a chosen few, and these too enjoyable only by a chosen few among mankind.

Marked antithesis in the *Philēbus* between Pleasure and Avoidance of pain.

Now this very restricted sense of the word Pleasure is peculiar to Plato, and peculiar even to some of the Platonic dialogues. Those who affirmed Pleasure to be the Good, did not understand the word in the same restricted sense. When Sokrates in the *Protagoras* affirms, and when Sokrates in the *Philēbus* denies, that Pleasure is identical with Good,—the affirmation and the denial do not bear upon the same substantial meaning.²

The Hedonists did not recognise this distinction—They included both in their acknowledged End.

on, a certain *ἐνέργεια* of the system. Each variety of pleasure promotes and consummates its own *ἐνέργεια*, but impedes or arrests other different *ἐνέργειαι*. Thus the pleasures of hunting, of gymnastic contest, of hearing or playing music—cause each of these *ἐνέργειαι*, upon which each pleasure respectively depends, to be more completely developed; but are unfavourable to different *ἐνέργειαι*, such as learning by heart, or solving a geometrical problem. The pleasure belonging to these latter, again, is unfavourable to the performance of the former *ἐνέργειαι*. Study often hurts

health or good management of property; but if a man has pleasure in study, he will perform that work with better fruit and result.

This is a juster view of *ἡδονή* than what we read in the *Philēbus*. The illogical antithesis of Pleasure *in genere*, against Intelligence, finds no countenance from Aristotle.

See *Ethic. Nikom.* vii. 13, 1153, a. 20; x. 5, p. 1175; also *Ethic. Magna*, ii. p. 1206, a. 8.

¹ Plato, *Philēbus*, p. 44 B.

² Among the arguments employed by Sokrates in the *Philēbus* to disprove the identity between *ἡδονή* and *ἀγαθόν*,

Again, in the arguments of Sokrates against pleasure *in genere*, we find him also singling out as examples the intense pleasures, which he takes much pains to discredit. The remarks which he makes here upon the intense pleasures, considered as elements of happiness, have much truth taken generally. Though he exaggerates the matter when he says that many persons would rejoice to have itch and irritation, in order that they might have the pleasure of scratching¹—and that persons in a fever have greater pleasure as well as greater pain than persons in health—yet he is correct to this extent, that the disposition to hanker after intense pleasures, to forget their painful sequel in many cases, and to pay for them a greater price than they are worth, is widely disseminated among mankind. But this is no valid objection against the Hedonistic theory, as it was enunciated and defended by its principal advocates—by the

Arguments of Plato against the intense pleasures—The Hedonists enforced the same reasonable view.

one is, that *ψόρος* is a *γένησις*, and is therefore essentially a process of imperfection or transition into some ulterior *οὐσία*, for the sake of which alone it existed (Philébus, pp. 63-55); whereas Good is essentially an *οὐσία*—perfect, complete, all-sufficient—and must not be confounded with the process whereby it is brought about. He illustrates this by telling us that the species of *γένησις* called ship-building exists only for the sake of the ship—the *οὐσία* in which it terminates; but that the fabricating process, and the result in which it ends, are not to be confounded together.

The doctrine that pleasure is a *γένησις*, Plato cites as laid down by others: certain *κομφοί*, whom he does not name, but whom the critics suppose to be Aristippus and the Kyrenaici. Aristotle (in the seventh and tenth books of *Ethic. Nik.*) also criticises and impugns the doctrine that pleasure is a *γένησις*; but he too omits to name the persons by whom it was propounded.

Possibly Aristippus may have been the author of it: but we can hardly tell what he meant, or how he defended it. Plato derides him for his inconsistency in calling pleasure a *γένησις*, while he at the same time maintained it to be the Good: but the derision is founded upon an assumption which Aristippus would have denied. Aristippus would not have admitted that

all *γένησις* existed only for the sake of *οὐσία*: and he would have replied to Plato's argument, illustrated by the example of ship-building, by saying that the *οὐσία* called a ship existed only for the sake of the services which it was destined to render in transporting persons and goods: that if *γένησις* existed for the sake of *οὐσία*, it was no less true that *οὐσία* existed for the sake of *γένησις*. Plato therefore had no good foundation for the sarcasm which he throws out against Aristippus.

The reasoning of Aristotle (*E. N.* x. 2-4; compare *Eth. Magn.* ii. 1204-1205) against the doctrine, that pleasure is *γένησις* or *κίνησις*, is drawn from a different point of view, and is quite as unfavourable to the opinions of Plato as to those of Aristippus. His language however in the *Rhetoric* is somewhat different (i. p. 1270, b. 32).

Aristippus is said to have defined pleasure as *ἡδὴ κίνησις*, and pain as *τραγικὴ κίνησις* (*Diog. L.* ii. 86-89). The word *κίνησις* is so vague, that one can hardly say what it means, without some words of context: but I doubt whether he meant anything more than "a marked change of consciousness". The word *γένησις* is also very obscure: and we are not sure that Aristippus employed it.

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 47 B.

Platonic Sokrates (in the Protagoras), by Aristippus, Eudoxus,¹ Epikurus. All of them took account of this frequent wrong tendency, and arranged their warnings accordingly. All of them discouraged, not less than Plato, such intense enjoyments as produced greater mischief in the way of future pain and disappointment, or as obstructed the exercise of calm reason.² All of them, when they talked of pleasure as the Supreme Good, understood thereby a rational estimate and comparison of pleasures and pains, present and future, so as to ensure the maximum of the former and the minimum of the latter. All of them postulated a calculating and governing Reason. Epikurus undoubtedly, and I believe the other two also, recommended a life of moderation, tranquillity, and meditative reason: they deprecated the violent emotions, whether sensual, ambitious, or money-getting.³ The objections therefore here stated by Sokrates, in so far as they are derived from the mischievous consequences of indulgence in the intense pleasures, do not avail against the Hedonistic theory, as explained either by Plato himself (Protagoras) or by any theorists of the Platonic century.

We find Plato in his various dialogues working out different points of view, partly harmonious, partly conflicting, upon ethical theory. Thus in the Gorgias, Sokrates

Different points of

¹ I have already remarked that Eudoxus is characterised by Aristotle as being *διαφερόντως σάφρων* (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2). The strong interest which he felt in scientific pursuits is marked by a story in Plutarch (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi; see Epicur. p. 1094 A).

² The equivocal sense of the word Pleasure is the same as that which Plato notes in the Symposium to attach to Eros or Love (p. 205). When employed in philosophical discussion, it sometimes is used (and always ought to be used) in its full extent of generic comprehension: sometimes in a narrower sense, so as to include only a few of the more intense pleasures, chiefly the physical, and especially the sexual; sometimes in a sense still more peculiar, partly as opposed to duty, partly as opposed to *business, work, utility, &c.* Opponents of the Hedonists took advantage of the unfavourable associations attached to the word in these narrower and special senses, to make objections tell against the theory

which employed the word in its widest generic sense.

³ See the beautiful lines of Lucretius, Book ii. init. When we read the three acrimonious treatises in which Plutarch attacks the Epikureans (Non Posse Suaviter Vivi, adv. Koloten, De Latenter Vivendo), we find him complaining, not that Epikurus thought too much about pleasures, or that he thought too much about the intense pleasures, but quite the reverse. Epikurus (he says) made out too poor a catalogue of pleasures: he was too easily satisfied with a small amount and variety of pleasures: he dwelt too much upon the absence of pain, as being, when combined with a very little pleasure, as much as man ought to look for: he renounced all the most vehement and delicious pleasures, those of political activity and contemplative study, which constitute the great charms of life (1097 F—1098 E—1092 E—1093-1094). Plutarch attacks Epikurus upon grounds really Hedonistic.

view worked out by Plato in different dialogues—Gorgias, Protagoras, Philébus—True and False Pleasures.

insists eloquently upon the antithesis between the Immediate and Transient on the one hand, which he calls Pleasure or Pain—and the Distant and Permanent on the other, which he calls Good or Profit, Hurt or Evil. In the Protagoras, Sokrates acknowledges the same antithesis : but he points out that the Good or Profit, Hurt or Evil, resolve themselves into elements generically the same as those of the Immediate and Transient—Pleasure and Pain : so that all which we require is, a calculating Intelligence to assess and balance correctly the pleasures and pains in every given case. In the Philébus, Sokrates takes a third line, distinct from both the other two dialogues : he insists upon a new antithesis, between True Pleasures—and False Pleasures. If a Pleasure be associated with any proportion, however small, of Pain or Uneasiness—or with any false belief or impression—he denounces it as false and impostrous, and strikes it out of the list of pleasures. The small residue which is left after such deduction, consists of pleasures recommended altogether by what Plato calls their truth, and addressing themselves to the love of truth in a few chosen minds. The attainment of Good—the object of the practical aspirations—is presented as a secondary appendage of the attainment of Truth—the object of the speculative or intellectual energies.

How much the Philébus differs in its point of view from the Gorgias,¹ is indicated by Plato himself in a remarkable passage. "I have often heard Gorgias affirm" (says Protarchus) "that among all arts, the art of persuasion stands greatly pre-eminent : since it ensures subservience from all, not by force, but with their own free consent." To which Sokrates replies—"I was not then enquiring what art or science stands pre-eminent as the greatest, or as the best, or as conferring most benefit upon us—but what art or science investigates clear, exact, and full truth, though it be in itself small, and may afford small benefit. You

¹ Sokrates in the Gorgias insists upon the constant intermixture of pleasure with pain, as an argument to prove that pleasure cannot be identical with good : pleasure and pain (he says) go together but good and evil cannot go together : therefore pleasure cannot

be good, pain cannot be evil (Gorgias, pp. 496-497). But he distinguishes pleasures into the good and the bad ; not into the true and the false, as they are distinguished in the Philébus and the Republic (ix. pp. 583-585).

need not quarrel with Gorgias, for you may admit to him the superiority of his art in respect of usefulness to mankind, while my art (dialectic philosophy) is superior in respect of accuracy. I observed just now, that a small piece of white colour which is pure, surpasses in truth a large area which is not pure. We must not look to the comparative profitable consequences or good repute of the various sciences or arts, but to any natural aspiration which may exist in our minds to love truth, and to do every thing for the sake of truth. It will then appear that no other science or art strives after truth so earnestly as Dialectic."¹

If we turn to the Gorgias, we find the very same claim advanced by Gorgias on behalf of his own art, as that which Protarchus here advances: but while Sokrates here admits it, in the Gorgias he repudiates it with emphasis, and even with contumely: ranking rhetoric among those employments which minister only to present pleasure, but which are neither intended to yield, nor ever do yield, any profitable result. Here in the Philébus, the antithesis between immediate pleasure and distant profit is scarcely noticed. Sokrates resigns to Gorgias and to others of the like stamp, a superiority not merely in the art of flattering and tricking the immediate sensibilities of mankind, but in that of contributing to their permanent profit and advantage. It is in a spirit contrary to the Gorgias, and contrary also to the Republic (in which latter we read the memorable declaration—That the miseries of society will have no respite until government is in the hands of philosophers²), that Sokrates here abnegates on behalf of philosophy all efficacious pretension of conferring profit or happiness on mankind generally, and claims for it only the pure delight of satisfying

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 58 B-D-E. Οὐ τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐξήτουν πῶς, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστῃ καὶ ἀρίστῃ καὶ πλείστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφές καὶ τάκριβες καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ δύνῃσιν. . . . Ἄλλ' ὅρα· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθῆσκει Γοργίας, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπερέχειν τέχνῃ διδούς πρὸς χρεῖαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, πρὸς ἀκριβείαν δὲ ἥ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματεῖα. . . . μήτ' εἰς τινας ὠφελείας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινας εὐδοκίας, ἀλλ' εἰ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἔρῃν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν.

Here, as elsewhere, I translate the substance of the passage, adopting the amendments of Dr. Badham and Mr. Poste (see Mr. Poste's note), which appear to me valuable improvements of a confused text.

It seems probable enough that what is here said, conceding so large a measure of credit to Gorgias and his art, may be intended expressly as a mitigation of the bitter polemic assigned to Sokrates in the Gorgias. This is, however, altogether conjecture.

² Plato, Republ. v. 473 D.

the truth-seeking aspirations. Now these aspirations have little force except in a few chosen minds; in the bulk of mankind the love of truth is feeble, and the active search for truth almost unknown. We thus see that in the *Philēbus* it is the speculative few who are present to the imagination of Plato, more than the ordinary working, suffering, enjoying Many.

Aristotle, in the commencement of his *Metaphysica*, recommends *Metaphysics* or *First Philosophy* to the reader, by affirming that, though other studies are more useful or more necessary to man, none is equal to it in respect of truth and exactness,¹ because it teaches us to understand *First Causes* and *Principles*. The like pretension is put forward by Plato in the *Philēbus*² on behalf of *Dialectic*; which he designates as the science of all real, permanent, unchangeable,

Entia. Taking *Dialectic* as the maximum or *Verissimum*, Plato classifies other sciences or cognitions according as they approach closer to it in truth or exactness—according as they contain more of precise measurement and less of conjecture. Sciences or cognitions are thus classified according as they are more or less true and pure. But because this principle of classification is fairly applicable to cognitions, Plato conceives that it may be made applicable to Pleasures also. One characteristic feature of the *Philēbus* is the attempt to apply the predicates, *true* or *false*, to pleasures and pains, as they are applicable to cognitions or opinions: an attempt against which Protarchus is made to protest, and which Sokrates altogether fails in justifying,³ though he employs a train of argument both long and diversified.

In this train of argument we find a good deal of just and

¹ Aristotel. *Metaphys.* A. p. 983, a. 25, b. 10.

² Plato, *Philēb.* pp. 57-58. Compare *Republic*, vii. pp. 531-532.

³ Plato, *Philēbus*, pp. 36 C, 38 A.

The various arguments, intended to prove this conclusion, are continued from p. 36 to p. 51. The same doctrine is advocated by Sokrates in the *Republic*, ix. pp. 583-584.

The doctrine is briefly stated by the Platonist Nemesius, *De Natur. Hominis*, p. 223. καὶ γὰρ κατὰ Ἱπλάτωνα τῶν

ἡδονῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι ψευδεῖς, αἱ δὲ ἀληθεῖς. ψευδεῖς μὲν, ὅσαι μετ' αἰσθήσεως γίνονται καὶ δόξης οὐκ ἀληθεῖς, καὶ λύπας ἔχουσι συνεπλεγμέναι· ἀληθεῖς δὲ, ὅσαι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰσι μόνες αὐτῆς καθ' ἑαυτὴν μετ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνεπίμικτοι λύπης, αἳ οὐδεμίᾳ μετάνοιᾳ παρακλονθεὶ ποτὶ.

A brief but clear abstract of the argument will be found in Dr. Badham's *Preface to the Philēbus* (pp. viii.-xi.). Compare also Stallbaum's *Prolegg.* ch. v. p. 50, seq.

instructive psychological remark : but nothing at all which proves the conclusion that there are or can be *false pleasures* or *false pains*. We have (as Sokrates shows) false remembrances of past pleasures and pains—false expectations, hopes, and fears of future : we have pleasures alloyed by accompanying pains, and pains qualified by accompanying pleasures : we have pleasures and pains dependent upon false beliefs : but false pleasures we neither have nor can have. The predicate is altogether inapplicable to the subject. It is applicable to the intellectual side of our nature, not to the emotional. A pleasure (or a pain) is what it seems, neither more nor less ; its essence consists in being felt.¹ There are false beliefs, disbeliefs, judgments, opinions—but not false pleasures or pains. The pleasure of the dreamer or madman is not false, though it may be founded on illusory belief : the joy of a man informed that he has just been appointed to a lucrative and honourable post, the grief of a father on hearing that his son has been killed in battle, are neither of them false, though the news which both persons are made to believe may be totally false, and though the feelings will thus be of short duration. Plato observes that the state which he calls neutrality or indifference appears pleasurable when it follows pain, and painful when it results from an interruption of pleasure : here is a state which appears alternately to be both, though it is in reality neither : the pleasure or pain, therefore, whichever it be, he infers to be *false*.² But there is no falsehood in the case : the state described

Distinction
of true and
false—not
applicable
to pleasures.

¹ This is what Aristotle means when he says :—*τῆς ψυχῆς δ' ἐν ὁρμῶν χρόνῳ τρέχουσιν τὸ εἶδος . . . τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ τελείων ἡ ψυχῆς* (Eth. Nik. x. 3, 1174, b. 4).

² Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 43-44 ; *Republic*, ix. p. 583.

I copy the following passage from Professor Bain's work on "The Emotions and the Will," the fullest and most philosophical account of the emotions that I know (pp. 615-616 ; 3rd ed., pp. 650 seq.) :—

"It is a general law of the mental constitution, more or less recognised by inquirers into the human mind, that change of impression is essential to consciousness in every form. . . There are notable examples to show, that one

unvarying action upon the senses fails to give any perception whatever. Take the motion of the earth about its axis and through space, whereby we are whirled with immense velocity, but at a uniform pace, being utterly insensible of the circumstance. . . It is the change from rest to motion that wakens our sensibility, and, conversely, from motion to rest. A uniform condition, as respects either state, is devoid of any quickening influence on the mind. . . . We have repeatedly seen pleasures depending for their existence on previous pains, and pains on pleasures experienced or conceived. Such are the contrasting states of Liberty and Restraint, Power and Impotence. Many pleasures owe their effect as such to

is what it appears to be—pleasurable or painful: Plato describes it erroneously when he calls it the same state, or one of neutrality. Pleasure and Pain are both of them phenomena of present consciousness. They are what they seem: none of them can be properly called (as Plato calls them) “apparent pleasures which have no reality”.¹

mere cessation. For example, the pleasures of exercise do not need to be preceded by pain: it is enough that there has been a certain intermission, coupled with the nourishment of the exhausted parts. These are of course our best pleasures. By means of this class, we might have a life of enjoyment without pain: although, in fact, the other is more or less mixed up in every one's experience. Exercise, Repose, the pleasures of the different Senses and Emotions, might be made to alternate, so as to give a constant succession of pleasure: each being sufficiently dormant during the exercise of the others, to reanimate the consciousness when its turn comes. It also happens that some of those modes of delight are increased, by being preceded by a certain amount of a painful opposite. Thus, confinement adds to the pleasure of exercise, and protracted exertion to that of repose. Fasting increases the enjoyment of meals; and being much chilled prepares us for a higher zest in the accession of warmth. It is not necessary, however, in those cases, that the privation should amount to positive pain, in order to the existence of the pleasure. The enjoyment of food may be experienced, although the previous hunger may not be in any way painful: at all events, with no more pain than the certainty of the coming meal can effectually appease. There is still another class of our delights depending entirely upon previous suffering, as in the sudden cessation of acute pains, or the sudden relief from great depression. Here the rebound from one nervous condition to another is a stimulant of positive pleasure: constituting a small, but altogether inadequate, compensation for the prior misery. The pleasurable sensation of good health presupposes the opposite experience in a still larger measure. Uninterrupted health, though an instrumentality for working out many enjoyments, of itself gives no sensation.”

It appears to me that this passage of Mr. Bain's work discriminates and sets out what there is of truth in Plato's doctrine about the pure and painless pleasures. In his first volume (*The Senses and the Intellect*) Mr. Bain has laid down and explained the great fundamental fact of the system, that it includes spontaneous sources of activity; which, after repose and nourishment, require to be exerted, and afford a certain pleasure in the course of being exerted. There is no antecedent pain to be relieved: but privation (which is only a grade and variety of pain, and sometimes considerable pain) is felt if the exertion be hindered. This doctrine of spontaneous activity, employed by Mr. Bain successfully to explain a large variety of mental phenomena, is an important and valuable extension of that which Aristotle lays down in the *Ethics*, that pleasure is an accessory or adjunct of *ἐνέργεια ἀνεμπόδιτος* (*ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἡρώς*, *Eth. N. vii. 13, 1163, a. 15*), without any view to obtain any separate extraneous pleasure or to relieve any separate extraneous pain (*καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἰσραὶ, ἀφ' ὧν μὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν*, *E. N. x. 6, 1176, b. 6*).

¹ Plato, *Philebus*, p. 51 A. “ὅτι τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὐσας δ' οὐδανῶς, &c. τὸ φαινόμενον ἀλλ' οὐκ ὄν, p. 42 C, which last sentence is better explained (I think) in the note of Dr. Badham than in that of Mr. Poste.

Mr. Poste observes justly, in his note on p. 40 C:—“The falsely anticipated pleasure in mistaken Hope may be called, as it is here called, False Pleasure. This is, however, an inaccurate expression. It is not the Pleasure, but the Imagination of it (i.e. the Imagination or Opinion) that is false. Sokrates therefore does not dwell upon this point, though Protarchus allows the expression to pass.” The last phrase of the passage which I have thus transcribed (“Sokrates therefore

What seems present to the mind of Plato in this doctrine is the antithesis between the absolute and the relative. He will allow reality only to the absolute: the relative he considers (herein agreeing with the Eleates) to be all seeming and illusion. Thus when he comes to describe the character of those few pleasures which he admits to be true, we find him dwelling upon their absolute nature. 1. The pleasures derived from perfect geometrical figures: the exact straight line, square, cube, circle, &c.: which figures are always beautiful *per se*, not by comparison or in relation with anything else:¹ and "which have pleasures of their own, noway analogous to those of scratching" (i. e., not requiring to be preceded by the discomfort of an itching surface). 2. The pleasures derived from certain colours beautiful in themselves: which are beautiful always, not merely when seen in contrast with some other colours. 3. The pleasures of hearing simple sounds, beautiful in and by themselves, with whatever other sounds they may be connected. 4. The pleasures of sweet smells, which are pleasurable though not preceded by uneasiness. 5. The pleasures of mathematical studies: these studies do not derive their pleasurable character from satisfying any previous uneasy appetite, nor do they leave behind them any pain if they happen to be forgotten.²

Plato acknowledges no truth and reality except in the Absolute—Pleasures which he admits to be true—and why.

does not dwell upon this point") is less accurate than that which precedes: for it seems to imply that the Sokrates of *Philēbus* admits the inaccuracy of the expression, which seems to me not borne out by the text of the dialogue. Both here and elsewhere in the dialogue, the doctrine, that many pleasures are false, is maintained by Sokrates distinctly—*τὸ ἡδεσθαι* is put upon the same footing as *τὸ δοξάζειν*, which may be either *ἀληθές* or *ψευδές*.

When Sokrates (p. 37 B) puts the question, "You admit that *δόξα* may be either *ἀληθής* or *ψευδής*: how then can you argue that *ἡδονή* must be always *ἀληθής*?" the answer is, that pleasure is not, if we speak correctly, either true or false: neither one predicate nor the other is properly applicable to it: we can only so apply them by a metaphor, altogether misleading in philosophical reasoning. When Sokrates further argues (37 D), "You admit that some qualifying predicates

may be applied to pleasures and pain, great or small, durable or transient, &c. You admit that an opinion may be correct or mistaken in its object, and when it is the latter you call it *false*: why is not the pleasure which accompanies a false opinion to be called false also?" Protarchus refuses distinctly to admit this, saying, "I have already affirmed that on that supposition the opinion is false: but no man will call the pleasure false" (p. 38 A).

¹ Plato, *Philēbus*, p. 51 C. *ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρὸς τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ καλὰ καθ' αὐτὰ πεφυκέναι, καὶ τινὰς ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κινήσεων προσφύειν.*

² 51 D: *τὰς τῶν φωνῶν τὰς λεῖπας καὶ λεπυράς, τὰς ἐν τι καθαρὸν ἰσίσαι μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλ' αὐτὰς καθ' αὐτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων ἐμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἐπομένους.*

³ Plato, *Philēbus*, p. 52 B.

We may illustrate the doctrine of

These few are all the varieties of pleasure which Plato admits as true: they are alleged as cases of the absolutely pleasurable (*Aὐτὸ-ἡδύ*)—that which is pleasurable *per se*, and always, without relation to any thing else, without dependence on occasion or circumstance, and without any antecedent or concomitant pain. All other pleasures are pleasurable relatively to some antecedent pain, or to some contrasting condition, with which they are com-

the *Philebus* about pleasures and pains, by reference to a dictum of Sokrates quoted in the *Xenophontic Memorabilia* (iii. 13).

Some person complained to Sokrates that he had lost his appetite—that he no longer ate with any pleasure (*ἐν ἀπείρῳ ἐσθίει*). "The physician Akumenus (so replied Sokrates) teaches us a good remedy in such a case. Leave off eating: after you have left off, you will come back into a more pleasurable, easy, and healthful condition."

Now let us suppose the like complaint to be addressed to the Platonic Sokrates. What would have been his answer?

The Sokrates of the Protagoras would have regarded the complainant as suffering under a misfortune, and would have tried to suggest some remedy: either the prescription of Akumenus, or any other more promising that he could think of. The Sokrates of the Phædon, on the contrary, would have congratulated him on the improvement in his condition, inasmuch as the misguiding and degrading ascendency, exercised by his body over his mind, was suppressed in one of its most influential channels: just as Kephalus, in the *Republic* (i. 329), is made to announce it as one of the blessings of old age, that the sexual appetite has left him. The Sokrates of the *Philebus*, also, would have treated the case as one for congratulation, but he would have assigned a different reason. He would have replied: "The pleasures of eating are altogether false. You never really had any pleasure in eating. If you believed yourself to have any, you were under an illusion. You have reason to rejoice that this illusion has now passed away: and to rejoice the more, because you have come a step nearer to the most divine scheme of life."

Speusippus (the nephew and successor of Plato), if he had been present, would have re-assured the complainant in a manner equally decided. He would

have said nothing, however, about the difference between true and false pleasures: he would have acknowledged them all as true, and denounced them all as mischievous. He would have said (see *Aul. Gell.* ix. 5): "The condition which you describe is one which I greatly envy. Pleasure and Pain are both, alike and equally, forms of Evil. I eat, to relieve the pain of hunger: but unfortunately, I cannot do so without experiencing some pleasure; and I thus incur evil in the other and opposite form. I am ashamed of this, because I am still kept far off from Good, or the point of neutrality: but I cannot help myself. You are more fortunate: you avert one evil, pain, without the least alloy of the other evil, pleasure: what you attain is thus pure Good. I hope your condition may long continue, and I should be glad to come into it myself."

Not only the sincere pleasure-haters, but also other theorists indicated by Aristotle, would have warmly applauded this pure ethical doctrine of Speusippus; not from real agreement with it, but in order to edify the audience. They would say to one another aside: "This is not true; but we must do all we can to make people believe it. Since every one is too fond of pleasures, and suffers himself to be enlured by them, we must pull in the contrary direction, in order that we may thereby bring people into the middle line." (*Aristot. Eth. Nikom.* x. 1, 1172, a. 30.)

It deserves to be remarked that Aristotle, in alluding to these last theorists, disapproves their scheme of Ethical Fictions, or of falsifying theory in order to work upon men's minds by edifying imposture; while Plato approves and employs this scheme in the *Republic*. Aristotle even recognises it as a fault in various persons, that they take too little delight in bodily pleasures—that a man is τοιοῦτος οἷος ἴσθαι ἢ δεῖ τοῖς σωματικαῖς χαίρειν (*Eth. Nikom.* vii. 11, 1151, b. 24).

pared: accordingly Plato considers them as false, unreal, illusory: pleasures and not pleasures at once, and not more one than the other.¹ Herein he conforms to the Eleatic or Parmenidean view, according to which the relative is altogether falsehood and illusion: an intermediate stage between Ens and Non-Ens, belonging as much to the first as to the last.

The catalogue of pleasures recognised by Plato being so narrow (and much of them attainable only by a few persons), the amount of difference is really very small between him and his pleasure-hating opponents, who disallowed pleasure altogether. But small as the catalogue is, he could not consistently have defended it against them, upon his own principles. His opponents could have shown him that a considerable portion of it must be discarded, if we are to disallow all pleasures which are preceded by or intermingled with pain—or which are sometimes stronger, sometimes feebler, according to the relations of contrast or similarity with other concomitant sensations. Mathematical study certainly, far from being all pleasure and no pain, demands an irksome preparatory training (which is numbered among the

Plato could not have defended this small list of Pleasures, upon his own admission, against his opponents—the Pleasure-haters, who disallowed pleasures altogether.

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¹ Compare, respecting this Platonic view, Republic, v. pp. 478-479, and ix. pp. 583-586, where Plato contrasts the *παραλήθη* or *γρηγορία* *ἡδονή*, which arises from the acquisition of knowledge (when the mind nourishes itself with real essence), with the *νόθη* (p. 587 B) or *ἐσκιαιογραφία* *ἡδονή*, *εἰδωλον* *τῆς ἀληθείας ἡδονῆς*, arising from the pursuits of wealth, power, and other objects of desire.

The comic poet Alexis adverts to this Platonic doctrine of the absolutely pleasurable, here, there, and everywhere, —*τὸ δ' ἡδὺ πάντως ἡδὺ, κακὴ κἀνθάδε*, Athens. viii. 364; Meineke, Com. Frag. p. 453.

In the Phædrus (268 E), we find this same class of pleasures, those which cannot be enjoyed unless preceded by some pain, asserted to be called *for that reason stasik* (*ἀνταποδοδόντες*), and depreciated as worthless. Nearly all the pleasures connected with the body are said to belong to this class; but those of rhetoric and dialectic are exempted

from it, and declared to be of superior order.

The pleasure of gaining a victory in the stadium at Olympia was ranked by Greeks generally as the maximum of pleasure: and we find the Platonic Sokrates (Republ. v. 465 D) speaks in concurrence with this opinion. But this pleasure ought in Plato's view to pass for a false pleasure; since it was invariably preceded by the most painful, long-continued training.

The reasoning of Sokrates in the Philēbus (see especially pp. 46-47) against the intense and extatic pleasures, as being never pure, but always adulterated by accompanying pain, misfortune, disappointment, &c., is much the same as that of Epikurus and his followers afterwards. The case is nowhere more forcibly put than in the fourth book of Lucretius (1074 seq.): where that poet deprecates passionate love, and points out that pure or unmingled pleasure belongs only to the man of sound and healthy reason.

miseries of life in the Axiochus¹), succeeded by long laborious application, together with a fair share of vexatious puzzle and disappointment. The love of knowledge grows up by association (like the thirst for money or power), and includes an uncomfortable consciousness of ignorance: nay, it is precisely this painful consciousness which the Sokratic method was expressly intended to plant forcibly in the student's mind, as an indispensable antecedent condition. Requital doubtless comes in time; but the outlay is not the less real, and is quite sufficient to disentitle the study from being counted as a *true* pleasure, in the Platonic sense. Nor could Plato, upon his own principles, defend the pleasures of sight, sound, and smell. For though he might justly contend that there were some objects originally agreeable to these senses, yet all these objects will appear more or less agreeable, according to the accompanying contrasts under which they are presented, while, in particular states of the organ, they will not appear agreeable at all. Now such variability of estimate is among the grounds alleged by Plato for declaring pleasures to be false.²

¹ See the pseudo-Platonic dialogue Axiochus, pp. 366-367. Compare Republic, vii. 528 C, vi. 504 C.

The Sokratic method, in creating consciousness of ignorance, is exhibited not less in the Xenophontic Memorabilia (iv. 2, 40) than in various Platonic dialogues, Alkibiades I., Theætétus, &c. We read it formally proclaimed by Sokrates in the Platonic Apology.

Aristotle repeats the assertion contained in the Philébus about the list of painless pleasures—*ἀναισθητοὶ γὰρ εἰσὶν αἱ τῆς μαθηματικῆς, &c.* (Ethic. Nikom. x. 2, 1173, b. 16; 7, 1177, a. 25.) He himself says in another place (vii. 13, 1163, a. 20) that τὸ θεωρεῖν sometimes hurts the health, and if he had examined the lives of mathematicians, especially that of Kepler, he would hardly have imagined that mathematical investigations have no pains attached to them. He probably means that they are not preceded by painful appetites such as hunger and thirst. But they are preceded by acquired impulses or desires, which in reference to the present question are upon the same footing as the natural appetites. A healthy and temperate man, leading a regular life and in easy circumstances,

knows little of hunger and thirst as pains: he knows them only as appetites which give relish to his periodical meals. It is only when this periodical satisfaction is withheld that his appetite grows to a painful and distressing height. So too the φιλομαθής; his appetite for study, when regularly gratified to an extent consistent with health and other considerations, is not painful; but it will rise to the height of a most distressing privation if he be debarred from gratifying it, excluded from books and papers, disturbed by noises and intrusions. Kepler, if interdicted from pursuing his calculations, would have been miserable. Jason of Phereæ was heard to say that he felt hungry so long as he was not in possession of supreme power—*πεινῶν, ὅτε μὴ τυραννῶν*; Aristot. Politic. iii. 4, 1277, a. 24; thus intimating that the acquired appetite of ambition had in his mind reached the same intensity as the natural appetite of hunger.

² Plato, Philébus, pp. 41-42. In the Phædon (p. 60 B) Sokrates makes a striking remark on the inseparable conjunction of pleasure with pain generally.

How little the Sokrates of this dialogue differs, at the bottom, from the fastidious pleasure-haters, may be seen by the passage in which he proclaims that the life of intelligence alone, without the smallest intermixture of pleasure or pain, is the really perfect life : that the Gods and the divine Kosmos have no enjoyment and no suffering.¹ The emotional department of human nature is here regarded as a degenerate and obstructive appendage : so that it was an inauspicious act of the sons of the Demiurgus (in the *Timæus* *) when they attached the spherical head (the miniature parallel of the Kosmos, with the rotatory movements of the immortal soul in the brain within) at the summit of a bodily trunk and limbs, containing the thoracic and abdominal cavities : the thoracic cavity embodying a second and inferior soul with the energetic emotions and passions—the abdominal region serving as lodgment to a third yet baser soul with the appetites. From this conjunction sprang the corrupting influence of emotional impulse, depriving man of his close parallelism with the Kosmos, and poisoning the life of pure exclusive Intelligence—regular, unfeeling, undisturbed. The Pleasure-haters, together with Speusippus and others, declared that pleasure and pain were both alike enemies to be repelled, and that neutrality was the condition to be aimed at.³ And such appears to me to be the drift of

Sokrates in this dialogue differs little from these Pleasure-haters.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 33 B.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 43 A, 44 D, 69 D, 70-71. The same fundamental idea though embodied in a different illustration, appears also in the *Phædon* ; where Sokrates depicts life as a period of imprisonment, to which the immortal rational soul is condemned, in a corrupt and defective body, with perpetual stream of disturbing sensations and emotions (*Phædon*, pp. 64-65).

Aristotle observes, *De Animâ*, i. p. 407, b. 2 :—ἐπίτονον δὲ καὶ τὸ μεμίσθαι τῷ σώματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, καὶ προσέτι φευκτόν, εἴπερ βέλτιον τῷ νῷ μὴ μετὰ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἰσθετέ λέγεσθαι καὶ πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ.

We find in one of the Fragments of Cicero, quoted by Augustin from the lost work *Hortensius* (p. 485, ed. Orelli):—"An vero, inquit, voluptates corporis expetendæ, quæ verè et graviter dictæ sunt à Platone illecebræ et escæ malorum? Quis autem bonâ

mente præditus, non mallet nullas omnino nobis à naturâ voluptates esse datas?" This is the same doctrine as what is ascribed to Speusippus.

³ Aristot. *Ethic. Nikom.* vii. 14, p. 1153, b. 5; x. 2, p. 1173, a. 8; Aulus Gellius, ix. 5. "Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter se : bonum autem esse quod utriusque medium foret."

Compare Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 43 D-E, 33 B.

To whom does Plato here make allusion, under the general title of the Fastidious (οἱ θυγαχεῖς) Pleasure-haters? Schleiermacher (note to his translation, p. 487), Stallbaum, and most critics down to Dr. Badham inclusive, are of opinion, that he alludes to Antisthenes—among whose *dicta* we certainly read declarations expressing positive aversion to pleasure—μακίστην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖαν Diog. L. vi. 3 :

Plato's reasonings in the *Philébus*: though he relaxes somewhat the severity of his requirements in favour of a few pleasures, towards which he feels the same indulgence as towards Homer in

compare ix. 101, and Winckelmann, *Frag. Antisthen.* xii. Mr. Poste, on the contrary, thinks it improbable that Antisthenes is alluded to (see p. 80 of his *Philébus*). I confess that I think so too. Mr. Poste points out that these *δυσχερεῖς* are characterised by Plato (p. 44 B), as *μᾶλα δεινοὺς λεγόμενος περὶ φύσιν*:—whereas we are informed that speculations on *φύσιν* were neglected by Antisthenes, who confined his attention to τὰ ἡθικά. This is a strong reason for believing that Antisthenes cannot be here meant; and there are some other reasons also.

First, in describing the *δυσχερεῖς*, Plato notes it as one among their attributes, that they hold in *thorough detestation the indecorous pleasures* (τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων ἡδονάς, ἃς οὐκ εἰπομεν *δυσχερεῖς* μισοῦσι πανταλῶς, p. 46 A). Now this is surely not likely to have been affirmed about Antisthenes. It was the conspicuous characteristic of the Cynic sect, begun by Antisthenes, and carried still farther by his pupil Diogenes, that they reduced to its minimum the distinction between the decorous and the indecorous.

Next, we may observe that these *δυσχερεῖς*, whoever they were, are spoken of with much respect by Plato, even while he combats their doctrine (p. 44 C). I think it not likely that he would have spoken thus of Antisthenes. We are told that there prevailed between the two a great and reciprocal acrimony. And this sentiment is manifested in the *Sophistés* (p. 251 B), where the opponents whom Plato is refuting are described with the most contemptuous bitterness—and where Schleiermacher, and the critics generally, declare that he alludes to Antisthenes. The passage in the *Sophistés* represents, in my judgment, the probable sentiment of Plato towards Antisthenes: the passage in the *Philébus* is at variance with it.

I imagine that the *δυσχερεῖς* to whom Plato makes allusion in the *Philébus*, are the persons from whom his nephew and successor Speusippus derived the doctrine declared in the first portion of this note. The "*vetus omnis Academia*" of Aulus Gellius is

an exaggerated phrase; but many of the old Academy, or companions of Plato, probably held the theory that pleasure was only one form of evil,—especially the pythagorising *Platonici*, adopting the tendencies of Plato himself in his old age. That Speusippus was among the borrowers from the Pythagoreans, we know from Aristotle (*Eth. Nikom.* i. 4, 1096, b. 8).

Now the Pythagorean canon of life, like the Orphic (both of them supposed by Herodotus to be derived in great part from Egypt—ii. 81), was distinguished by a multiplicity of abstinences, disgusts, antipathies, in respect to aliment and other physical circumstances of life—which were held to be of the most imperative force and necessity; so that offences against them were of all others the most intolerable. A remarkable fragment of the *Κοῆρες* of Euripides (ed. Dind., vol. ii. p. 912) describes a variety of this *purism* analogous to the Orphic and Pythagorean:—*Πάλλευκα δ' ἔχον εἶματα, φεύγοντες γένεσιν τε βρώσιν, καὶ νεκροθήκης οὐ χρημπτέμενοι· τὴν τ' ἐμψύχων βρώσιν ἰδεσθαι πεφύλαγμαi.* Compare Eurip. *Hippol.* 987; Alexis *Comicus*, ap. Athenae. iv. p. 161. See the work of M. Alfred Maury, *Histoire des Religions de la Grèce Antique*, vol. iii. pp. 368-384.

It appears to me that the *δυσχερεῖς*, to whom Plato alludes in the *Philébus*, were most probably pythagorising friends of his own; who, adopting a ritual of extreme rigour, distinguished themselves by the violence of their antipathies towards τὰς ἡδονάς τὰς τῶν ἀσχημόνων. Plato speaks of them with respect; partly because ethical theorists, who denounce *pleasure*, are usually characterised in reverential terms, as persons of exalted principle, even by those who think their reasonings inconclusive; partly because these men only pushed the consequences of Plato's own reasonings, rather farther than Plato himself did. In fact they were more consistent than Plato was: for the principles laid down in the *Philébus*, if carried out strictly, would go to the exclusion of all pleasures—not less of the few which he tolerates, than of the many which he banishes.

the Republic.¹ When Ethics are discussed, not upon principles of their own (*οἰκείαι ἀρχαί*), but upon principles of Kosmology or Ontology, no emotion of any kind can find consistent place.

In my judgment, this is one main defect pervading the Platonic Philēbus—the forced conjunction between Kosmology and Ethics—the violent pressure employed to force Pleasures and Pains into the same classifying framework as cognitive Beliefs—the true and the false. In respect to the various pleasures, the dialogue contains many excellent remarks, the value of which is diminished by the purpose to which they are turned.² One of Plato's main batteries is directed against the intense, extatic, momentary enjoyments, which he sets in contrast against the gentle, serene, often renewable.³ That the former are often purchaseable only at the cost of a distempered condition of body and mind, which ought to render them objects shunned rather than desired by a reasonable man—this is a doctrine important to inculcate : but nothing is gained by applying the metaphorical predicate *false*, either to them, or to the other classes of mixed pleasures, &c., which Plato discountenances under the same epithet. By thus condemning pleasures in wholesale and in large groups, we not only set aside the innocuous as well as others, but we also leave unapplied, or only half applied, that principle of Measure or Calculation which Plato so often extols as the main item in Summum Bonum.

In this dialogue as well as others, Measure is thus exalted, and exalted with emphasis, at the final conclusion : but it is far less clearly and systematically applied, as far as human beings are concerned, than in the Protagoras.

Forced conjunction of Kosmology and Ethics—defect of the Philēbus.
Directive sovereignty of Measure—how ex-

These pythagorising *Platonici* might well be termed *δεινοὶ περὶ φύσιν*. They paid much attention to the interpretation of nature, though they did so according to a numerical and geometrical symbolism.

¹ Plato, Republic, x. p. 607.

² We read in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric (Book i. ch. 7, pp. 168-170) some very good remarks on the erroneous and equivocal assertions which identify Truth and Good—a thesis on which various Platonists have ex-

pended much eloquence. Dr. Campbell maintains the just distinction between the Emotions and Will on one side, and the Understanding on the other.

"Passion" (he says) "is the mover to action, Reason is the guide. Good is the object of the Will; Truth the object of the Understanding."

³ Plato, Philēbus, p. 46 D. *ἐν ὑβρὶ μείζους ἡδονάς, οὐ πλείους λόγῳ, &c.* So in the Republic, also, *ἡδονῇ υπερβάλλουσα* is declared to be inconsistent with *σωφροσύνη* (iii. 402 E).

plained and applied in the Protagoras. The Sokrates of the Protagoras does not recognise any pleasures as false—nor any class of pleasures as absolutely unmixed with pain: he does not set pleasure in pointed opposition to the avoidance of pain, nor the intense momentary pleasures to the gentle and more durable. He considers that the whole course of life is a perpetual intermixture of pleasures and pains, in proportions variable and to a certain extent modifiable: that each item in both lists has its proper value, commensurable with the others; that the purpose of a well-ordered life consists, in rendering the total sum of pleasure as great, and the total sum of pain as small, as each man's case admits: that avoidance of pain and attainment of pleasure are co-ordinate branches of this one comprehensive End. He farther declares that men are constantly liable to err by false remembrances, estimates, and comparisons, of pleasures and pains past—by false expectations of pleasures and pains to come: that the whole security of life lies in keeping clear of such error—in right comparison of these items and right choice between them: that therefore the full sovereign controul of each man's life must be vested in the Measuring Science or Calculating Intelligence.¹ Not only all comprehensive sovereignty, but also ever-active guidance, is postulated for this Measuring Science: while at the same time its special function, and the items to which it applies, are more clearly defined than in any other Platonic dialogue. If a man be so absorbed by the idea of an intense momentary pleasure or pain, as to forget or disregard

¹ This argument is carried on by Sokrates from p. 351 until the close of the Protagoras, p. 357 A. *ἔπειδ' ὁ δὲ ἡδονῆς τε καὶ λύπης ἐν ὁρθῇ τῇ αἰρέσει ἐφάνη ἡμῖν ἡ σωτηρία τοῦ βίου οὐδ' αὖτε τοῦ τε πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττωτος καὶ μείζονος καὶ σμικροτεροῦ καὶ πορρωτέρου καὶ ἑγγυτέρου, ὅρα πρῶτον μὲν οὐ μετρητικὴ φαίνεται, ὑπερβολῆς τε καὶ ἐνδείας οὐσα καὶ ἰσότητος πρὸς ἀλλήλας σκέψις; . . . Ἐπεὶ δὲ μετρητικὴ, ἀνάγκη δὴ πῶς τέχνη καὶ ἐπιστήμη.*

Yet Plato in the Philébus, imputing to the Hedonistic theory that it sets aside all idea of measure, regulation, limit, advances as an argument in the case, that Pleasure and Pain in their own nature have no limit (Philébus,

pp. 25-26 B, 27 E. Compare Dr. Badham's note, p. 30 of his edition).

The imputation is unfounded, and the argument without application, in regard to the same theory as expounded by Sokrates in the Protagoras.

At the end of the Philébus (p. 67 B) Plato makes Sokrates exclaim, "We cannot put Pleasure first among the items of Good, even though all oxen, horses, and other beasts affirm it". This rhetorical flourish is altogether misplaced in the Philébus: for Plato had already specified it as one of the conditions of the Good, That it must be acceptable and must give satisfaction to all animals, and even to all plants (pp. 22 B, 60 C), as well as to men.

accompaniments or consequences of an opposite nature, greatly overbalancing it—this is an error committed from default of the Measuring Science : but it is only one among many errors arising from the like deficiency. Nothing is required but the Measuring Science or Intelligence, to enable a man to make the best of those circumstances in which he may be placed : this is true of all men, under every variety of place and circumstances. Measure is not the Good, but the one condition which is constant as well as indispensable to any tolerable approach towards Good.

In the *Philēbus*, too, Measure—The Exact Quantum—The Exact Moment—are proclaimed as the chief item in the complex called—The Good.¹ But to what Items does Sokrates intend the measure to be applied ? Not certainly to pleasures : the comparison of quantity between one pleasure and another is discarded as useless or misleading, and the comparison of quality alone is admitted—i. e., true and false : the large majority of human pleasures being repudiated in the lump as false, and a small remnant only being tolerated, on the allegation that they are true. Nor, again, is the measure applied to pains : for though Plato affirms that a life altogether without pains (as without pleasures) would be the truly divine Ideal, yet he never tells us that the Measuring Intelligence is to be made available in the comparison and choice of pains, and in avoidance of the greater by submitting to the less. Lastly, when we look at the concession made in this dialogue to Gorgias and his art, we find that Plato no longer claims for his Good or Measure any directive function, or any paramount influence, as to utility, profit, reputation, or the greater ends which men usually pursue in life :² he claims for it only the privilege of satisfying the aspiration for truth, in minds wherein such aspiration is preponderant over all others.

Comparing the *Philēbus* with the *Protagoras*, therefore, we see that though, in both, Measuring Science or Intelligence is proclaimed as supreme, the province assigned to it in the *Philēbus* is comparatively narrow. Moreover the practical side or activities of life (which are prominent in the *Protagoras*) appear in

¹ Plato, *Philēbus*, p. 66 A. μέτρον—τὸ μέτρον—τὸ καίριον

² Plato, *Philēbus*, p. 68 B-D.

the Philébus thrust into a corner ; where scanty room is found for them on ground nearly covered by the speculative, or theorising, truth-seeking, pursuits. Practical reason is forced into the same categories as theoretical.

The classification of *true* and *false* is (as I have already remarked) unsuitable for pleasures and pains. We have now to see how Plato applies it to cognitions, to which it really belongs.

The highest of these Cognitions is set apart as Dialectic or Ontology : the Object of which is, Ens or Entia, eternal, ever the same and unchangeable, ever unmixed with each other : while the corresponding Subject is, Reason, Intelligence, Wisdom, by which it is apprehended and felt. In this Science alone reside perfect Truth and Purity. Where the Objects are shifting, variable, mixed or confounded together, there Reason cannot apply herself ; no pure or exact truth can be attained.¹ These unchangeable Entities are what in other dialogues Plato terms Ideas or Forms—a term scarcely used in the Philébus.

Though pure truth belongs exclusively to Dialectic and to the Objects thereof, there are other Sciences which, having more or less of affinity to Dialectic, may thus be classified according to the degree of such affinity. Mathematics approach most nearly to Dialectic. Under Mathematics are included the Sciences or Arts of numbering, measuring, weighing—Arithmetic, Metrêtic, Static—which are applied to various subordinate arts, and impart to these latter all the scientific guidance and certainty which is found in them. Without Arithmetic, the subordinate arts would be little better than vague guesswork or knack. But Plato distinguishes two varieties of Arithmetic and Metrêtic : one purely theoretical, prosecuted by philosophers, and adapted to satisfy the love of abstract truth—the other applied to some department of practice, and employed by the artist as a guide to the execution of his work. Theoretical Arithmetic is characterised by this feature, that it assumes each unit to be equal, like,

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 59 C. ὡς ἡ περὶ
ἐκεῖνα ἐσθ' ἡμῖν τό τε βέβαιον καὶ τὸ
καθαρὸν καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ὃ δὲ λέγεται
εἰληρικόν, περὶ τὰ αἰετὰ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ
ᾧσαντως ἀμικτότατα ἔχοντα—ἡ δευτέ-
ρος ἐκείνων ὃ τι μάλιστα ἐστὶ συγγενές.

τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα δευτέρᾳ τε καὶ ὕστερα
λακτίον. 62 A : φρονῶν ἄνθρωπος
αὐτῆς περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ὃ, τι
ἐστὶ, καὶ λόγον ἔχειν ἐπόμενον τῷ νοεῖν
. . . κύκλον μὲν καὶ σφαῖρας αὐτῆς τῆς
θείας τὸν λόγον ἔχειν.

and interchangeable with every other unit: while practical Arithmetic adds together concrete realities, whether like and equal to each other or not.¹

It is thus that the theoretical geometer and arithmetician, though not coming up to the full and pure truth of Dialectic, is nevertheless nearer to it than the carpenter or the ship-builder, who apply the measure to material objects. But the carpenter, ship-builder, architect, &c., do really apply measure, line, rule, &c.: they are therefore nearer to truth than other artists, who apply no measure at all. To this last category belong the musical composer, the physician, the husbandman, the pilot, the military commander, neither of whom can apply to their processes either numeration or measurement: all of them are forced to be contented with vague estimate, conjecture, a practised eye and ear.²

The foregoing classification of Sciences and Arts is among the most interesting points in the *Philébus*. It coincides to a great degree with that which we read in the sixth and seventh books of the *Republic*, though it is also partially different: it differs too in some respects from doctrines advanced in other dialogues. Thus we find here (in the *Philébus*) that the science or art of the physician, the pilot, the general, &c., is treated as destitute of measure and as an aggregate of unscientific guesses: whereas in the *Gorgias*³ and elsewhere, these are extolled as genuine arts, and are employed to discredit Rhetoric by contrast. Again, all these arts are here placed lower in the scientific scale than the occupations of the carpenter or the ship-builder, who possess and use some material measures. But these latter, in the *Republic*,⁴ are dismissed with the disparaging epithet of *snobbish* (*βαρυσκοί*) and deemed unworthy of consideration.

Dialectic appears here exalted to the same pre-eminence which is assigned to it in the *Republic*—as the energy of the pure Intellect, dealing with those permanent real Essences which are the objects of Intellect alone, intelligible only and not visible. The distinction here drawn by Plato between the theoretical and

Valuable principles of this classification—difference with other dialogues.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 56 E.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 56 A-B.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 501 A, 518 A.

Compare *Republic*, i. pp. 341-342.

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, vii. p. 522 B.

practical arithmetic and geometry, compared with numeration or mensuration of actual objects of sense—is also remarkable in two ways : first, as it marks his departure from the historical Sokrates, who recognised the difference between the two, but discountenanced the theoretical as worthless :¹ next as it brings clearly to view, the fundamental assumption or hypothesis upon which abstract arithmetic proceeds—the concept of units all perfectly like and equal. That this is an assumption (always departing more or less from the facts of sense)—and that upon its being conceded depends the peculiar certainty and accuracy of arithmetical calculation—was an observation probably then made for the first time ; and not unnecessary to be made even now, since it is apt to escape attention. It is enunciated clearly both here and in the Republic.²

The long preliminary discussion of the Philébus thus brings us to the conclusion—That a descending scale of value, relatively to truth and falsehood, must be recognised in cognitions as well as in pleasures : many cognitions are not entirely true, but tainted in different degrees by error and falsehood : most pleasures also, instead of being true and pure, are alloyed by concomitant pains or delusions or both : moreover, all the intense

¹ Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 7, 2-8. The contrast drawn in this chapter of the Memorabilia appears to me to coincide pretty exactly with that which is taken in the Philébus, though the preference is reversed. Dr. Badham (p. 78) and Mr. Poste (pp. 106-113) consider Plato as pointing to a contrast between pure and applied Mathematics : which I do not understand to be his meaning. The distinction taken by Aristotle in the passage cited by Mr. Poste is different, and does really designate Pure and Applied Mathematics. Mr. Poste would have found a better comparison in Ethic. Nikom. I. 7, 1098, a. 29.

² Plato, Philébus, p. 56 E. οἱ δ' οὐκ ἂν ποτε αὐτοῖς συνακολουθήσειαν, εἰ μὴ μόνον μόνος ἐκάστης τῶν μυρίων μετέμεινεν ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρουσάν τις ἔχουσι—where it is formally proclaimed as an assumption or postulate. See Republic, vii. pp. 525-526, vi. p. 610 C.

Mr. John Stuart Mill thus calls attention to the same remark in his instructive chapters on Demonstration

and Necessary Truth (System of Logic, Book ii. ch. vi. sect. 3).

"The inductions of Arithmetic are of two sorts : first, those that we have just expounded, such as One and One are Two, Two and One are Three, &c., which may be called the definitions of the various numbers, in the improper or geometrical sense of the word Definition ; and, secondly, the two following Axioms. The sums of Equals are equal, the differences of Equals are equal.

"These axioms, and likewise the so-called Definitions, are (as already shown) results of induction : true of all objects whatsoever, and as it may seem, exactly true, without the hypothetical assumption of unqualified truth where an approximation to it is all that exists. On more accurate investigation, however, it will be found that even in this case, there is one hypothetical element in the ratiocination. In all propositions concerning numbers a condition is implied without which none of them would be

pleasures are incompatible with Measure, or a fixed standard,¹ and must therefore be excluded from the category of Good.

In arranging the quintuple scale of elements or conditions of the Good, Plato adopts the following descending order: I report them as well as I can, for I confess that I understand them very imperfectly.

Close of the
Philébus—
Graduated
elements
of Good.

1. Measure; that which conforms to Measure and to proper season: with everything else analogous, which we can believe to be of eternal nature.—These seem to be unchangeable Forms or Ideas, which are here considered objectively, apart from any percipient Subject affected by them.²

2. The Symmetrical, Beautiful, Perfect, Sufficient, &c.—These words seem to denote the successive manifestations of the same afore-mentioned attributes; but considered both objectively and subjectively, as affecting and appreciated by some percipient.

3. Intelligent or Rational Mind.—Here the Subject is brought in by itself.

4. Sciences, Cognitions, Arts, Right Opinions, &c.—Here we

true, and that condition is an assumption which may be false. The condition is that $1=1$: that all the numbers are numbers of the same or of equal units. Let this be doubtful, and not one of the propositions in arithmetic will hold true. How can we know that one pound and one pound make two pounds, if one of the pounds may be troy and the other avoirdupois? They may not make two pounds of either or of any weight. How can we know that a forty-horse power is always equal to itself, unless we assume that all horses are of equal strength? One actual pound weight is not exactly equal to another, nor one mile's length to another; a nicer balance or more exact measuring instruments would always detect some difference."

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, pp. 52 D—57 B.

² Plato, *Philébus*, p. 66 A.

The Appendix B, subjoined by Mr. Poste to his edition of the *Philébus* (pp. 149-166), is a very valuable Dissertation, comparing and explaining the abstract theories of Plato and Aristotle. He remarks, justly contrasting the *Philébus* with the *Timæus*, as to the doctrine of Limit: "In the *Philébus* the limit is always

quantitative. Quality, including all the elementary forces, is the substratum that has to receive the quantitative determination. Just, however, as Quality underlies quantity, we can conceive a substratum underlying quality. This Plato in the *Timæus* calls the Vehicle or Receptacle (*τὸ δεκτικόν*), and Aristotle in his writings the primary Matter (*πρώτη ὕλη*). The *Philébus*, however, does not carry the analysis so far. It regards quality as the ultimate matter, the substratum to be moulded and measured out in due quantity by the quantitative limit" (p. 160).

I doubt whether the Platonic idea of *τὸ μέτρον* is rightly expressed by Mr. Poste's translation—a mean (p. 168). It rather implies, even in *Politikus*, p. 306, to which he refers, something adjusted according to a positive standard or conformable to an assumed measure or perfection: there being undoubtedly error in excess above it and error in defect below it—but the standard being not necessarily midway between the two. The Pythagoreans used *καυχή* in a very large sense, describing it as the First Cause of Good. Proklus ad *Plat. Alkib. i.* p. 270-272, Cousin.

7 (5)

have the intellectual manifestations of the Subject, but of a character inferior to No. 3, descending in the scale of value relatively to truth.

5. Lastly come the small list of true and painless pleasures.—These, being not intellectual at all, but merely emotional (some as accompaniments of intellectual, others of sensible, processes), are farther removed from Good and Measure than even No. 4—the opining or uncertain phases of the intellect.¹

The four first elements belong to the Kosmos as well as to man: for the Kosmos has an intelligent soul. The fifth marks the emotional nature of man.

I see no sufficient ground for the hypothesis of Stallbaum and some other critics, who, considering the last result abrupt and unsatisfactory, suspect that Plato either intended to add more, or did add more which has not come down to us.² Certainly the result (as in many other Platonic dialogues) is inconsiderable, and the instruction derivable from the dialogue must be picked out by the reader himself from the long train of antecedent reasoning. The special point emphatically brought out at the end is the discredit thrown upon the intense pleasures, and the exclusion of them from the list of constituents of Good. If among Plato's contemporaries who advocated the Hedonistic doctrine, there were any who laid their main stress upon these intense pleasures, he may be considered to have replied to them under the name of Philēbus. But certainly this result might have been attained with a smaller array of preliminaries.

Moreover, in regard to these same intense emotions we have to remark that Plato in other dialogues holds a very different opinion respecting them—or at least respecting some of them. We have seen that at the close of the Philēbus he connects Bonum and Pulchrum principally, and almost exclusively, with the Reason; but we find him, in the Phædrus and Symposium, taking

¹ Neither the Introduction of Schleiermacher (p. 134 seq.), nor the elucidation of Trandelenburg (*De Philēbi Consilio*, pp. 16-23), nor the Prolegomena of Stallbaum (pp. 76-77 seq.), succeed in making this obscure close of the Philēbus clearly intelligible. Stallbaum, after indicating many com-

mentators who have preceded him, observes respecting the explanations which they have given: "Ea sunt adeo varia atque inter se diversa, ut tanquam adversâ fronte inter ipsa pugnare dicenda sint" (p. 72).

² Stallbaum, *Proleg.* p. 10.

a different, indeed an opposite, view of the matter ; ^{intense} and presenting Bonum and Pulchrum as objects, not ^{Emotions} generally. of the unimpassioned and calculating Reason, but of ardent aspiration and even of extatic love. Reason is pronounced to be insufficient for attaining them, and a peculiar vein of inspiration—a species of madness, *eo nomine*—is postulated in its place. The life of the philosophical aspirant is compared to that of the passionate lover, beginning at first with attachment to some beautiful youth, and rising by a gradual process of association, so as to transfer the same fervent attachment to his mental companionship, as a stimulus for generating intellectual sympathies and recollections of the world of Ideas. He is represented as experiencing in the fullest measure those intense excitements and disturbances which Eros alone can provoke.¹ It is true that Plato here repudiates sensual excitements. In this respect the Phædrus and Symposium agree with the Philēbus. But as between Reason and Emotion, they disagree with it altogether : for they dwell upon ideal excitements of the most vehement character. They describe the highest perfection of human nature as growing out of the better variety of madness—out of the glowing inspirations of Eros : a state replete with the most intense alternating emotions of pain and pleasure. How opposite is the tone of Sokrates in the Philēbus, where he denounces all the intense pleasures as belonging to a distempered condition—as adulterated with pain, and as impeding the tranquil process of Reason—and where he tolerates only such gentle pleasures as are at once un-

¹ See in the Symposium the doctrines of the prophetess Diotima, as recited by Sokrates, pp. 204-212 : also the Phædrus, the second *ἐγκώμιον* delivered by Sokrates upon Eros, pp. 26-30, repeated briefly and confirmed by Sokrates, pp. 77-78.

Compare these with the latter portion of the Philēbus ; the difference of spirit and doctrine will appear very manifest.

To illustrate the contrast between the Phædrus and the Philēbus, we may observe that the former compares the excitement and irritation of the inspired soul when its wings are growing to ascend to Bonum and Pulchrum, with the *κνήσις* or irritation of the gums when a child is cutting teeth—*ζεῖ οὐν ἐν τούτῳ ἄλγος καὶ ἀνάγκη*, καὶ

ὅπερ τὸ τῶν ὀδοντοφυόντων πάθος περὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας γίγνεται ὅταν ἀρτίφωσσι κνήσις τε καὶ ἀγανάκτησις περὶ τὰ ὄντα, ταῦτόν δὲ πέποιθεν ἡ τοῦ πτεροφύειν ἀρχομένου ψυχῆ· ζεῖ τε καὶ ἀγανακτεῖ καὶ γαργαλίζεται φύσις αὐτῆς πτερά (Phædrus, p. 251 C). These are specimens of the strong metaphors used by Plato to describe the emotional condition of the mind during its fervour of aspiration towards Bonum and Pulchrum. On the other hand, in the Philēbus, *κνήσις* and *γαργαλισμός* are noted as manifestations of that distempered condition which produces indeed moments of intense pleasure, but is quite inconsistent with Reason and the attainment of Good. See Philēbus, pp. 46 E, 51 D, and Gorgias, p. 494.

mixed with pain and easily controuled by Reason! In the Phædrus and Symposium, we are told that Bonum and Pulchrum are attainable only under the stimulus of Eros, through a process of emotion, feverish and extatic, with mingled pleasure and pain : and that they crown such aspirations, if successfully prosecuted, with an emotional recompense, or with pleasure so intense as to surpass all other pleasures. In the Philébus, Bonum and Pulchrum come before us as measure, proportion, seasonableness : as approachable only through tranquil Reason—addressing their ultimate recompense to Reason alone—excluding both vehement agitations and intense pleasures—and leaving only a corner of the mind for gentle and unmixed pleasures.¹

The comparison, here made, of the Philébus with the Phædrus and Symposium, is one among many proofs of the different points of view with which Plato, in his different dialogues,² handled the same topics of ethical and psychological discussion. And upon this point of dissent, Eudoxus and Epikurus, would have agreed with the Sokrates of the Philébus, in deprecating that extatic vein of emotion which is so greatly extolled in the Phædrus and Symposium.

¹ Plato, Philébus, p. 66.

² Maximus Tyrus remarks this difference (between the erotic dialogues of Plato and many of the others) in one of his discourses about

the ἐρωτικὴ of Sokrates. Οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ ὁμοίος ὁ Σωκράτης ἐραὶ τῷ σωφροσυνῇ, καὶ ὁ ἐκπληττόμενος τοὺς καλοὺς τῷ ἐλέγχοντι τοὺς ἀφρονάς, &c. (Diss. xxiv. 5, p. 466 ed. Reiske).

CHAPTER XXXIII.

MENEXENUS.

IN this dialogue the only personages are, Sokrates as an elderly man, and Menexenus, a young Athenian of noble family, whom we have already seen as the intimate friend of Lysis, in the dialogue known under the name of Lysis.

Persons and situation of the dialogue.

Sokr.—What have you been doing at the Senate-house, Menexenus? You probably think that your course of education and philosophy is finished, and that you are qualified for high political functions. Young as you are, you aim at exercising command over us elders, as your family have always done before you.¹ *Menex.*—I shall do so, if you advise and allow me, Sokrates: but not otherwise. Now, however, I came to learn who was the person chosen by the Senate to deliver the customary oration at the approaching public funeral of the citizens who have fallen in battle. The Senate, however, have adjourned the election until to-morrow: but I think either Archinus or Dion will be chosen. *Sokr.*—To die in battle is a fine thing in many ways.² He who dies thus may be poor, but he receives a splendid funeral: he may be of little worth, yet he is still praised in prepared speeches by able orators, who decorate his name with brilliant encomiums, whether deserved or not, fascinating all the hearers: extolling us all—not merely the slain warrior, but the city collectively, our ancestors, and us the living—so admirably that I stand bewitched when I hear them, and fancy myself a

Funeral harangue at Athens—Choice of a public orator—Sokrates declares the task of the public orator to be easy—Comic exaggeration of the effects of the harangue.

¹ Plat. Menex. p. 224 B-C.

² Plat. Menex. p. 235 A-B.

greater, nobler, and finer man than I was before. I am usually accompanied by some strangers, who admire as much as I do, and who conceive a lofty estimation both of me and of the city. The voice of the orator resounds in my ear, and the feeling of pride dwells in my mind, for more than three days; during which interval I fancy myself almost in the islands of the blest. I hardly come to myself, or recollect where I am, until the fourth or fifth day. Such is the force of these orators.

Menex.—You are always deriding the orators, Sokrates.¹

Sokrates
professes
to have
learnt a
funeral
harangue
from Aspa-
sia, and to
be compe-
tent to re-
cite it him-
self. Me-
nexenus
entreats
him to
do so.

However, on this occasion I think the orator chosen will have little chance of success: he will have no time for preparation, and will be obliged to speak *impromptu*. *Sokr.*—Never fear: each of these orators has harangues ready prepared. Besides, there is no difficulty here in speaking *impromptu*. If indeed the purpose were to praise the Athenians in Peloponnesus, or the Peloponnesians at Athens, an excellent orator would be required to persuade or to give satisfaction. But when he exhibits before the very hearers whom he praises, there is no great difficulty

in appearing to be a good speaker.² *Menex.*—Indeed! What! do you think you would be competent to deliver the harangue yourself, if the Senate were to elect you? *Sokr.*—Certainly: and it is no wonder that I should be competent to speak, because I have learnt rhetoric from Aspasia (an excellent mistress, who has taught many eminent speakers, and among them Perikles, the most illustrious of all), and the harp from Konnus. But any one else, even less well-trained than me—instructed in music by Lamprus, and in rhetoric by Antiphon—would still be fully competent to succeed in praising Athenians among Athenians. *Menex.*—What would you have to say, if the duty were imposed upon you?³ *Sokr.*—Probably little or nothing of my own. But it was only yesterday that I heard Aspasia going through a funeral harangue for this very occasion: partly suggestions of the present moment, partly recollections of past matters which had

¹ Plat. *Menex.* p. 235 C. 'Αὐτὸν οὖν ἀπορναιῖς, ὡς ἑκείνους, τοὺς πέποιτας.

² Plat. *Menex.* p. 235 D.

Aristotle refers twice to this dictum

as being a true remark made by Σοκράτης ἐν τῇ Ἐπιδείξει, *Rhetoric*, i. 9, p. 1367, b. 8, iii. 14, p. 1415, b. 30.

³ Plat. *Menex.* p. 235 A.

occurred to her when she composed the funeral harangue delivered by Perikles. *Menex.*—Could you recollect what Aspasia said? *Sokr.*—I should be much to blame if I could not. I learnt it from herself, and was near being beaten because I partly forgot it. *Menex.*—Why do you not proceed with it then? *Sokr.*—I fear that my instructress would be displeased, if I were to publish her discourse. *Menex.*—Do not fear that, but proceed to speak. You will confer the greatest pleasure upon me, whether what you say comes from Aspasia or from any one else. Only proceed. *Sokr.*—But perhaps you will laugh me to scorn, if I, an elderly man, continue still such work of pastime.¹ *Menex.*—Not at all: I beseech you to speak. *Sokr.*—Well, I cannot refuse you. Indeed, I could hardly refuse, if you requested me to strip naked and dance—since we are here alone.²

Sokrates then proceeds to recite a funeral harangue of some length which continues almost to the end.³ When he concludes—repeating his declaration that the harangue comes from Aspasia—Menexenus observes, By Zeus, Sokrates, Aspasia is truly enviable, if she, a woman, is competent to compose such discourses as that.

Harangue
recited by
Sokrates.

Sokr.—If you do not believe me, come along with me, and you will hear it from her own lips. *Menex.*—I have often been in company with Aspasia, and I know what sort of person she is. *Sokr.*—Well then, don't you admire her? and are you not grateful to her for the harangue? *Menex.*—I am truly grateful for the harangue, to her, or to him, whoever it was that prompted you: and most of all, I am grateful to you for having recited it. *Sokr.*—Very good. Take care then that you do not betray me. I may perhaps be able, on future occasions, to recite to you many other fine political harangues from her. *Menex.*—Be assured that I will not betray you. Only let me hear them. *Sokr.*—I certainly will.

Compliments of
Menexenus
after Sokrates has
finished
both to the
harangue
itself and
to Aspasia.

The interval between these two fragments of dialogue is filled up by the recitation of Sokrates: a long funeral harangue in honour of deceased warriors, whom the

Supposed
period—

¹ Plato, *Menex.* p. 236 C. 'Αλλ' ἵσως μου καταγέλασαι, ἂν σοι δέξω πρὸς βύτης ἂν ἐνι παῖζειν.

² Plat. *Menex.* pp. 234 C, 236 C.

³ Plat. *Menex.* pp. 236 C, 249 C.

shortly
after the
peace of
Antalkidas

city directs to be thus commemorated. The period is supposed to be not long after the peace concluded by Antalkidas in 387 B.C. That peace was imposed upon Sparta, Athens, and the other Grecian cities, by the imperative rescript of the Persian king: the condition of it being an enforcement of universal autonomy, or free separate government to each city, small as well as great.¹

Custom of
Athens
about
funeral
harangues.
Many such
harangues
existed at
Athens,
composed
by distin-
guished
orators or
logogra-
phers—Es-
tablished
type of the
harangue.

It had been long the received practice among the Athenians to honour their fallen warriors from time to time by this sort of public funeral, celebrated with every demonstration of mournful respect: and to appoint one of the ablest and most dignified citizens as public orator on the occasion.² The discourse delivered by Perikles, as appointed orator, at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian war, has been immortalised by Thucydides, and stands as one of the most impressive remnants of Hellenic antiquity. Since the occasion recurred pretty often, and since the orator chosen was always a man already conspicuous,³ we may be sure that there existed in the time of Plato many funeral harangues which are now lost: indeed he himself says in this dialogue, that distinguished politicians prepared such harangues beforehand, in case the choice of the citizens should fall upon them. And we may farther be sure, amidst the active cultivation of rhetoric at Athens—that the rhetorical teachers as well as their pupils, and the logographers or paid composers of speeches, were practised in this variety of oratorical compositions not less than in others. We have one of them among the remaining discourses of the logographer Lysias: who could not actually have delivered it himself (since he was not even a citizen)—nor could ever probably have been called upon to prepare one for delivery (since the citizens chosen were always eminent speakers and politicians themselves, not requiring the aid of a logographer)—but who composed it as a rhetorical exercise to extend his own celebrity. In like manner we find

¹ See respecting the character of the peace of Antalkidas, and the manner in which its conditions were executed, my *History of Greece*, chap. 76.

² Thucyd. ii. 34.

³ Thucyd. ii. 34. ὅς ἐν γρόῳ τοῖς δούρσι μὴ ἀφύμετος εἶναι, καὶ ἀφίσταται πρὸς αὐτόν.

one among the discourses of Demosthenes, though of very doubtful authenticity. The funeral discourse had thus come to acquire an established type. Rhetorical teachers had collected and generalised, out of the published harangues before them, certain *loci communes*, religious, patriotic, social, historical or pseudo-historical, &c., suitable to be employed by any new orator.¹ All such *loci* were of course framed upon the actual sentiments prevalent among the majority of Athenians; furnishing eloquent expression for sympathies and antipathies deeply lodged in every one's bosom.

The funeral discourse which we read in the Menexenus is framed upon this classical model. It dwells, with emphasis and elegance, upon the patriotic commonplaces which formed the theme of rhetors generally. Plato begins by extolling the indigenous character of the Athenian population; not immigrants from abroad (like the Peloponnesians), but born from the very soil of Attica:² which, at a time when other parts of the earth produced nothing but strange animals and plants, gave birth to an admirable breed of men, as well as to wheat and barley for their nourishment, and to the olive for assisting their bodily exercises.³ Attica was from the beginning favoured by the Gods; and the acropolis had been an object of competition between Athênê and Poseidon.⁴ She was the common and equal mother of all the citizens, who, from such community of birth and purity of Hellenic origin, had derived the attributes which they had ever since manifested—attachment to equal laws among themselves, Panhellenic patriotism, and hatred of barbarians.⁵ The free and equal political constitution of Athens—called an aristocracy, or presidency of the best men, under the choice and

Plato in this harangue conforms to the established type—Topics on which he insists.

¹ Aristotel. Rhetoric. l. 5, p. 1360, b. 81, l. 9, p. 1367. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhetoric. c. 6, pp. 260-267.

"Nec enim artibus inventis factum est, ut argumenta inveniremus; sed dicta sunt omnia, antequam præciperentur: mox ea scriptores observata et collecta ediderunt" (Quintilian, Inst. Or. v. 10).

² Plat. Menex. pp. 237-245. 245 D: οὐ γὰρ Πάριος οὐδὲ Κῶμιος οὐδὲ Διγενεὶς τε καὶ Λακωνοὶ οὐδὲ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ φύσει μὲν βάρβαροι ὄντες, νόμῳ δὲ Ἑλ-

ληνες, συνοικοῦσιν ἡμῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ Ἑλ-ληνες, οὐ μισοβάρβαροι οἰκοῦμεν, &c.

³ Plat. Menex. pp. 237 D, 238 A.

⁴ Plat. Menex. p. 237 C.

⁵ Plat. Menex. pp. 238 D, 239 A, 245 C-D. 239 A: ἡ ἰσογονία ἡμᾶς ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσονομίαν ἀναγκάζει, ζῆσθαι κατὰ νόμον, καὶ μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ὑπεῖσθαι ἐλ-λήσιν ἢ ἀρετῆς δόξῃ καὶ φρονήσεως. 245 D: ὅθεν καθαρὸν τὸ μῖσος ἐπὶ τῇ τῇ πόλει τῆς ἀλλοτρίας φύσεως (i.e. of the βάρβαροι).

approval of the multitude—as it was and as it always had been, is here extolled by Plato, as a result of the common origin.

Alluding briefly to the victories over Eumolpus and the Amazons, the orator passes on to the battles of Marathon, Salamis, and Plataea, which he celebrates with the warmth of an Hellenic patriot.¹ He eulogizes the generous behaviour of Athens towards the Greeks, during the interval between the Persian and the Peloponnesian wars, contrasting it with the unworthy requital which she received from Sparta and others. He then glances at the events of the Peloponnesian wars, though colouring them in a manner so fanciful and delusive, that any one familiar with Thucydides can scarcely recognise their identity—especially in regard to the Athenian expedition against Syracuse.² He protests against the faithlessness of Sparta, towards the close of the Peloponnesian war, in allying herself with the common anti-Hellenic enemy—the Great King—against Athens: and he ascribes mainly to this unholy alliance the conquest of Athens at the end of the war.³ The moderation of political parties in Athens, when the Thirty were put down and the democracy restored, receives its due meed of praise: but the peculiar merit claimed for Athens, in reference to the public events between 403 B.C. and 387 B.C., is—That she stood alone among Greeks in refusing to fraternise with the Persian King, or to betray to him the Asiatic Greeks. Athens had always been prompted by generous feeling, even in spite of political interests, to compassionate and befriend the weak.⁴ The orator dwells with satisfaction on the years preceding the peace concluded by Antalkidas; during which years Athens had recovered her walls and her ships—had put down the Spartan superiority at sea—and had rescued even the Great King from Spartan force.⁵ He laments the disasters of Athenian soldiers at Corinth, through

¹ Plat. Menex. pp. 240-241.

² Plat. Menex. pp. 242-243.

³ Plat. Menex. pp. 243-244.

⁴ Plat. Menex. pp. 244-245. 244 E: εἰ τις βούλοιτο τῇ πόλει κατηγορεῖναι δικαίως, τοῦτ' αὖ μόνον λέγων ὀρθῶς αὖ κατηγοροῖν, ὅς αἱ λίαν φιλοκτιρῶν ἐστί, καὶ τοῦ ἥττονος θρασύς. Isokrates also, in the *Oratio Panegyrica* (Or. iv.), dwells upon this point, as well as on the pronounced hatred

towards *βάρβαροι*, as standing features in the Athenian character (sect. 50-184). The points touched upon in reference to Athens by Isokrates are in the main the same as those brought out by Plato in the *Menekleus*, only that Isokrates makes them subservient to a special purpose, that of bringing about an expedition against Persia under the joint leadership of Sparta and Athens.

⁵ Plat. Menex. p. 245.

difficulties of the ground—and at Lechæum, through treachery. These are the latest political events to which he alludes.¹

Having thus touched upon the political history of Athens, he turns to the surviving relatives—fathers, mothers, children, &c.—of the fallen warriors: addressing to them words of mingled consolation and exhortation. He adopts the fiction of supposing these exhortations to have been suggested to him by the warriors themselves, immediately before entering upon their last battle.² This is the most eloquent and impressive portion of the harangue. The orator concludes by a few words from himself, inculcating on the elders the duty of resignation, and on the youth that of forward and devoted patriotism.³

Consolation and exhortation to surviving relatives.

That this oration was much admired, not merely during the lifetime of Plato, but also long after his death, we know from the testimony of Cicero; who informs us that it was publicly recited every year on the day when the annual funeral rites were celebrated, in honour of those citizens collectively who had been slain in the service of their country.⁴ The rhetor Dionysius⁵ recognises the fact of such warm admiration, and concurs generally therein, yet not without reserves. He points out what he considers defects of thought and expression—ostentatious contrasts and balancing of antithetical clauses, after the manner of Gorgias. Yet we may easily believe that the harangue found much favour, and greatly extended the reputation of its author. It would please many readers who took little interest in the Sokratic dialectics.

Admiration felt for this harangue, both at the time and afterwards.

When Plato first established himself at Athens as a lecturer (about 386 B.C., shortly after the peace made by Antalkidas), he was probably known only by Sokratic dialogues, properly so called: which Diony-

Probable motives of Plato in composing

¹ Plat. Menex. pp. 245 E, 246 A.

² Plat. Menex. pp. 247-248.

³ Plat. Menex. p. 249 A-C.

⁴ Cicero, Orator. c. 44, 151. "At non Thucydides: ne ille quidem, haud paullo major scriptor, Plato: nec solum in his sermonibus, qui dialogi dicuntur, ubi etiam de industria id faciendum fuit, sed in populari oratione, quæ mos

est Athenis laudari in concione eos, qui sint in præliis interfecti: quæ sic probata est, ut eam quotannis, ut scis, illo die recitari necesse sit."

See Plato, Menex. p. 249 B, about these yearly funeral rites, and Lysias, Epitaph. s. 80.

⁵ Dionys. Hal. De Adm. Vi Dic. in Demosth. p. 1027, compared with Ars Rhetoricæ. c. 6, pp. 280-287.

it, shortly after he established himself at Athens as a teacher—His competition with Lysias—Desire for celebrity both as rhetor and as dialectician.

sus specifies both as his earliest works and as his proper department, wherein he stood unrivalled.¹ In these, his opposition to the Rhetors and Sophists was proclaimed: and if, as is probable, the Gorgias had been published before that time, he had already declared war, openly as well as bitterly, against the whole art of Rhetoric. But it would be a double triumph for his genius, if, after standing forward as the representative of Dialectic, and in that character heaping scornful derision on the rival art of Rhetoric, as being nothing better than a mere knack of juggling and flattery²—he were able to show that this did not proceed from want of rhetorical competence, but that he could rival or surpass the Rhetors in their own department. Herein lies the purpose of the Menexenus. I agree with Schleiermacher, Stallbaum, and some other critics,³ in thinking that it was probably composed not long after the peace of Antalkidas, in competition with the harangue of Lysias now remaining on the same subject. Though the name of Lysias is not mentioned in the Menexenus, yet the rivalry between him and Plato is clearly proclaimed in the Platonic Phædrus: and the two funeral harangues go so completely over the same ground, that intentional competition

¹ Dionys. Hal. ad Cn. Pomp. De Platon. p. 762. *γραφείας μὲν ἐν τοῖς Σωκρατικοῖς διαλόγοις ἰσχυροτάτοις οὖσι καὶ ἀριβεστάτοις, οὐ μάλιστα δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τῆς Γοργίου καὶ Θουκυλίδου κατωκυρίας ἔρασαντο.* Compare p. 761, the passage immediately preceding, and De Adm. VI Dicendi in Demosthene, pp. 1025-1031.

To many critics Plato appeared successful in the figurative and metaphorical style—*δεινὸς περὶ τὸ τροπικόν*. But Dionysius thinks him very inferior to Demosthenes even on this point, though it was not the strongest point of Demosthenes, whose main purpose was ἐ ἀληθείας ἀγών (Dionys. *ibid.* p. 1057).

² Isocrates, in his last composition (Panathen. Or. xii.), written in very old age, shows how keenly he felt the aspersions of jealous rivals—Sophists less successful than himself—who publicly complained that he despised the lessons of the poets, and thought no teaching worth having except his

own—*ἀποβεβαμένον δὲ τῶν περιεστώτων τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτῶν, ἵνα τὸν τολμωρότερον ἐπιχειρήσαι ἐμὲ διαβάλλειν, λέγονθ' ὅτι ἐγὼ πάντων καταφρονῶ τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ τὰς τε φιλοσοφίας τὰς τῶν ἄλλων καὶ τὰς τῆς παιδείας ἀνάσσει ἀναιρῶ, καὶ φημι πάντας λαρεῖν ἄλλῃ τούτῳ μετισχημάτας τῆς ἐμῆς διατριβῆς* (sect. 23). That which Isocrates complains of these teachers for saying in their talk with each other, the rhetorical teachers would vehemently complain of in Plato, when he expressed forcibly his contempt for rhetoric in the Gorgias and the Phædrus. One way of expressing their resentment would be to affirm that Plato could not compose a regular rhetorical discourse; which affirmation Plato would best contradict by composing one in the received manner.

³ See the *Einleitung* of Schleiermacher to his translation of the Menexenus; also Stallbaum, *Proleg. ad Menex.* p. 10, and Westermann, *Gesch. der Beredsamkeit*, sect. 66, p. 124.

on the part of the latest, is the most natural of all hypotheses.

Here then we have Plato exchanging philosophy for "the knack of flattery"—to use the phrase of the *Gorgias*. Stallbaum is so unwilling to admit this as possible, that he represents the Platonic harangue as a mere caricature, intended to make the rhetorical process ridiculous. I dissent from this supposition; as I have already dissented from the like supposition of the same critic, in regard to the etymologies of the *Kratylus*. That Plato might in one dialogue scornfully denounce Rhetoric—and in another, compose an elaborate discourse upon the received rhetorical type—is noway inconsistent with the general theory which I frame to myself, about the intellectual character and distinct occasional manifestations of Plato.' The funeral harangue in the *Menexenus* proves that, whatever he thought about Rhetoric generally, he was anxious to establish his title as a competent rhetorical composer: it proves farther that he was equal to Lysias in the epideiktic department, though inferior to Perikles. It affords a valuable illustration of that general doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates lays down in the *Gorgias*—That no man can succeed as a rhetor, unless he is in full harmony of spirit and cast of mind with his auditors; or unless he dwells upon and enforces sympathies, antipathies, and convictions, already established in their minds.¹ A first-rate orator like Perikles, touching the chords of cherished national sentiment, might hope, by such a discourse as that which we read in Thucydides, "adjecisse aliquid receptæ religioni".² No public orator ever appointed

Menexenus compared with the view of rhetoric presented in the *Gorgias*—Necessity for an orator to conform to established sentiments.

¹ Compare also the majestic picture which Plato presents of the ancient character and exploits of the early Athenians, in the myth he commenced in the *Timæus* (pp. 23-24), prosecuted in the *Kritias* (pp. 113-114 seq.), but left by the author incomplete.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 510 C; see above, ch. xxiv. p. 378.

This appears to me the real truth, subject to very rare exceptions. But I do not think it true to say, as the Platonic Sokrates is made to declare in the *Menexenus*, that it is an easy matter to obtain admiration when

you praise Athens among Athenians—though Aristotle commends the observation. Assuredly Perikles did not think so (*Thucyd.* ii. 35). You have a popular theme, but unless you have oratorical talent to do justice to it, you are likely to disappoint and offend, especially among auditors like the Athenians, accustomed to good speaking. Compare *Plat. Kritias*, p. 107 K.

³ To employ the striking expression of Quintilian (xii. 10) respecting the great statue of Zeus at Olympia by Pheidias.

by the Senate to pronounce the funeral harangue, could have expatiated more warmly than Plato has here done, upon the excellence of the Athenian constitution, and upon the admirable spirit which had animated Athenian politics, both foreign and domestic. Plato falls far short, indeed, of the weight and grandeur, the impressive distinctness of specification, the large sympathies, intellectual as well as popular—with which these topics are handled by Perikles in Thucydides: but his eulogy is quite as highflown and unreserved.

In understanding fully the Menexenus, however, we have to take account, not merely of the harangue which forms the bulk of it, but also of the conversation whereby it is commenced and concluded. Plato, speaking always through the mouth of Sokrates, has to invent some fiction excusing the employment of his master in the unprecedented capacity of public orator. What Stallbaum says (in my judgment, erroneously) about the harangue—appears to me perfectly true about the conversation before and after it. The introductory observations, interchanged between Sokrates and Menexenus, certainly tend to caricature (as Aristophanes¹ does in the *Acharneis* and the *Equites*) the strong effects produced by this panegyric oratory on the feelings of hearers; and to depreciate the task of the orator as nothing better than an easy and amusing pastime. To praise Athens among Athenian auditors (we are told) is a matter in which few speakers can fail to succeed, however poor their abilities. Moreover, the great funeral harangue of Perikles is represented as having been composed for him by Aspasia²—a

¹ Aristoph. *Acharn.* 615, *Equit.* 640-887.

The comic exaggeration of Sokrates, in the colloquial portion of the Menexenus (235 B-C), goes as far as that of Aristophanes.

² By the language of Plato here, he seems plainly to bring his own harangue into competition not merely with that of Lysias but also with that of Perikles. But we must not suppose, for that reason, that he necessarily has in view the Periklean harangue which we now read in Thucydides, il-

35-43: which is the real speech, reported and dressed up by Thucydides in his own language and manner. Probably the Periklean harangue was preserved separately and in other reports, so that Plato may have known it without knowing the history of Thucydides. When I see the extreme liberty which Plato takes throughout his harangue in regard to the history of the past, I can hardly believe that he ever read Thucydides; if he ever read the history, he certainly disregarded it altogether, and threw him-

female, though remarkable among her sex—who is extolled as holding the highest place among rhetorical teachers, and is introduced here, as Aristophanes introduces her in the *Acharneis*, when he is putting a construction of discreditable ridicule on the origin of the Peloponnesian war.¹ To make a good funeral harangue (Sokrates says) requires little or no preliminary preparation: besides, the Rhetors have harangues ready prepared at home. All this *persiflage*, in harmony with the polemics of the *Gorgias*, derides and degrades the Rhetors collectively. But when Plato takes the field against them as a competitor, in his own rhetorical discourse, he drops the ironical vein, and takes pains to deliver one really good and excellent in its kind. His triumph is thus doubled. He tells the Rhetors that their business is a trifling and despicable one: at the same time showing them that, despicable as it is, he can surpass them in it, as he professes to surpass Lysias in the *Phædrus*.²

Such I conceive to be the scope of the dialogue, looked at from Plato's point of view. In order to find a person suitable in point of age to be described as the teacher of Sokrates, he is forced to go back to the past generation—that of Perikles and Aspasia. But though he avoids anachronism on this point, he cannot avoid the anachronism of making Sokrates allude to events long posterior to his own death. This anachronism is real, though it has been magnified by some critics into a graver defect than it is in truth. Plato was resolved not to speak in his own person, but through that of Sokrates. But he is not always

Anachronism of the Menexenus —Plato careless on this point.

self ἐν τῷ προσωνυμιώτερον τῇ ἀκροασίᾳ ἢ ἀλγέστερον: like the *λογογράφοι* of whom Thucydides speaks, i. 21, Lysias among them, though in a less degree than Plato. *Æschines* Sokraticus had composed among his dialogues one entitled *Ἀσπασία*. See Xenophon, *Œconom.* i. 14; Cicero de *Inventione*, i. 31; Plutarch, *Perikles*, c. 24-32; also Bergk, *De Reliquiis Comœd. Attic. Antig.* p. 237.

¹ Aristoph. *Acharn.* 501.

² The remarks of Dionysius of Halikarnassus (in the *Epistle to Cn. Pompey* about Plato, pp. 754-758) are well

deserving of attention: especially as he had before him many writers now lost, either contemporary with Plato or of the succeeding generation. He notices not only Plato's asperity in ridiculing most of his distinguished contemporaries, but also his marked feeling of rivalry against Lysias.

ἦν γὰρ, ἦν μὲν τῇ Πλάτωνος φύσει πολλάς ἀρετὰς ἔχουσα τὸ φιλότιμον, &c. (p. 756).

See this subject well handled in an instructive Dissertation by M. Lebeau (Stuttgart, 1863, *Lysias' Epitaphios als ächt erwiesen*, pp. 42-46 seq.).

careful to keep within the limits which consistent adherence to such a plan imposes.¹

¹Groen van Prinsterer (*Prosopographia Platonica*, p. 211 seq.) adverts to the carelessness of Plato about exact chronology.

Most of the Platonic critics recognise the *Menexenus* as a genuine Platonic dialogue. Ast, however, includes it among the numerous dialogues which he disallows as spurious; and Suckow, Steinhart, and Ueberweg, are also inclined to disallow it. See Ueberweg,

Die Aechtheit der Platonischen Schriften, pp. 143-148. These critics make light of the allusion of Aristotle in the *Rhetoric* — *Συμπάρεστιν τῷ Ἐπιδραμῆτι* — which appears to me, I confess, of more weight than all the grounds of suspicion adduced by them to prove the dialogue spurious. The presumption in favour of the catalogue of Thrasylus counts with them, here as elsewhere, for nothing.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

KLEITOPHON.

THE Kleitophon is an unfinished fragment, beginning with a short introductory conversation between Sokrates and Kleitophon, and finishing with a discourse of some length, a sort of remonstrance or appeal, addressed by Kleitophon to Sokrates ; who makes no reply.

Persons
and circum-
stances of
Kleitophon.

Some one was lately telling me (says Sokrates) that Kleitophon, in conversation with Lysias, depreciated the conversation of Sokrates, and extolled prodigiously that of Thrasymachos.

Whoever told you so (replies Kleitophon), did not report accurately what I said. On some points, indeed, I did not praise you ; but on other points I did praise you. Since, however, you are evidently displeased with me, though you affect indifference—and since we are here alone—I should be glad to repeat the same observations to yourself, in order that you may not believe me to think meanly of you. These incorrect reports seem to have made you displeased with me, more than is reasonable. I am anxious to speak to you with full freedom, if you will allow it.¹

Conversa-
tion of
Sokrates
with Kleito-
phon alone :
he alludes to
observa-
tions of an
unfavour-
able char-
acter re-
cently made
by Kleito-
phon, who
asks permis-
sion to
explain.

It would be a shame indeed (rejoined Sokrates), if, when you were anxious to do me good, I could not endure to receive it. When I have learnt which are my worst and which are my best points, I shall evidently be in a condition to cultivate and pursue the latter and resolutely to avoid the former.

¹ Plato, Kleitoph. p. 406.

Hear me then (says Kleitophon).

As your frequent companion, Sokrates, I have often listened to you with profound admiration. I thought you superior to all other speakers when you proclaimed your usual strain of reproof, like the God from a dramatic machine, against mankind.¹ You asked them, "Whither are you drifting, my friends? You do not seem aware that you are doing wrong when you place all your affections on the gain of money, and neglect to teach your sons and heirs the right use of money. You do not provide for them teachers of justice, if justice be teachable; nor trainers of it, if it be acquirable by training and habit; nor indeed have you studied the acquisition of it, even for yourselves. Since the fact is obvious that, while you, as well as your sons, have learnt what passes for a finished education in virtue (letters, music, gymnastic), you nevertheless yield to the corruptions of gain—how comes it that you do not despise your actual education, and look out for teachers to correct such disorder? It is this disorder, not the want of accomplishment in the use of the lyre, which occasions such terrible discord, and such calamitous war, between brother and brother—between city and city.² You affirm that men do wrong wilfully, not from ignorance or want of training: yet nevertheless you are bold enough to say, that wrongdoing is dishonourable and offensive to the Gods. How can any one, then, choose such an evil willingly? You tell us it is because he is overcome by pleasures: well then, that again comes to unwillingness—if victory be the thing which every man wishes: so that, whichever way you turn it, reason shows you that wrong-doing is taken up unwillingly, and that greater precautions ought to be taken upon the subject, both by individuals and by cities."³

Such, Sokrates (continues Kleitophon), is the language which

¹ Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 A. ὅγῳ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ συγγενόμενος, πολλάκις ὑπεληττόμενον ἀκούων· καὶ μοι ἐδόκει παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους κάλλιστα λέγειν, ὅποτε ἐπιτιμῶν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός, ὑμεῖς, λέγων, ποῖ φερεσθε, ἀνθρώποι; &c.

² Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 B-C.

³ Plato, Kleitoph. p. 407 D-E.

ὥστε ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ἀκούσιον ὁ λόγος αἶρει, καὶ δεῖν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς νῦν πλείω ποιεῖσθαι πάντ' ἀνδρα ἰδίᾳ θ' ἅμα καὶ δημοσίᾳ συμμάσας τὰς πόλεις.

I often hear from you ; and which I always hear with the strongest and most respectful admiration. You follow it up by observing, that those who train their bodies and neglect their minds, commit the mistake of busying themselves about the subordinate and neglecting the superior. You farther remark, that if a man does not know how to use any object rightly, he had better abstain from using it altogether: if he does not know how to use his eyes, his ears, or his body—it will be better for him neither to see, nor to hear, nor to use his body at all: the like with any instrument or article of property—for whoever cannot use his own lyre well, cannot use his neighbour's lyre better. Out of these premisses you bring out forcibly the conclusion—That if a man does not know how to use his mind rightly, it is better for him to make no use of it:—better for him not to live, than to live under his own direction. If he must live, he had better live as a slave than a freeman, surrendering the guidance of his understanding to some one else who knows the art of piloting men: which art you, Sokrates, denominate often the political art, sometimes the judicial art or justice.¹

The observations made by Sokrates have been most salutary and stimulating in awakening ardour for virtue. Arguments and analogies commonly used by Sokrates.

These discourses of yours, alike numerous and admirable—showing that virtue is teachable, and that a man should attend to himself before he attends to other objects—I never have contradicted, and never shall contradict. I account them most profitable and stimulating, calculated to wake men as it were out of sleep. I expected anxiously what was to come afterwards. I began by copying your style and asking, not yourself, but those among your companions whom you esteemed the most²—How are we now to understand this stimulus imparted by Sokrates towards virtue? Is this to be all? Cannot we make advance towards virtue and get full possession of it? Are we to pass

But Sokrates does not explain what virtue is, nor how it is to be attained. Kleitophon has had enough of stimulus, and now wants information how he is to act.

¹ Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 B. ἦν δὲ πολυτελέην, ἃ Σώκρατες, δομάζεις πολλάκις, τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ ταύτην δικαστικήν τε καὶ δικαιοσύνην ὡς ἐστὶ λόγων.

² Plato, Kleitoph. p. 408 C. τούτων

γὰρ τοὺς τι μάλιστα εἶναι δοξαζομένους ὑπὸ σοῦ πρώτους ἐπανηρώτων, πυνθανόμενος τίς ὁ μετὰ ταῦτ' εἰς λόγος, καὶ κατὰ σὲ τρόπον τινὰ ὑποτελεῖν αὐτοῖς, &c.

our whole lives in stimulating those who have not yet been stimulated, in order that they in their turn may stimulate others? Is it not rather incumbent upon us, now that we have agreed thus far, to entreat both from Sokrates and from each other, an answer to the ulterior question, What next? How are we to set to work in regard to the learning of justice? If any trainer, seeing us careless of our bodily condition, should exhort us strenuously to take care of it, and convince us that we ought to do so—we should next ask him, which were the arts prescribing how we should proceed? He would reply—The gymnastic and medical arts. How will Sokrates or his friends answer the corresponding question in their case?

The ablest of your companions answered me (continues Kleitophon), that the art to which you were wont to allude was no other than Justice itself. I told him in reply—Do not give me the mere name, but tell me what Justice is.¹ In the medical art there are two distinct results contemplated and achieved: one, that of keeping up the succession of competent physicians—another that of conferring or preserving health: this last, *Health*, is not the art itself, but the work accomplished by the art. Just so, the builder's art, has for its object the *house*, which is its work—and the keeping up the continuity of builders, which is its teaching. Tell me in the same manner respecting the art called Justice. Its teaching province is plain enough—to maintain the succession of just men: but what is its working province? what is the work which the just man does for us?

To this question your friend replied (explaining Justice)—it is The Advantageous. Another man near him said, The Proper: a third said, The Profitable: a fourth, The Gainful.² I pursued the inquiry by observing, that these were general names equally applicable in

¹ Plato, Kleitophon, p. 408 D-E. ἢ δὲ τὸν Σωκράτην καὶ ἀλλήλους ἡμᾶς τὸ μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπανερωτῶν, ἀμολογῆσαι τὰς τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἀνθρώπων πρακτέων εἶναι: τί τοῦντεῦθεν; πῶς ἀρχεσθαι δεῖν φημὲν δικαιοσύνης περὶ καθήσεως;

² Plato, Kleitophon, p. 409 A. εἰπόντος

δὲ μου, Μὴ μοι τὸ ὄνομα μόνον εἰσθε, ἀλλὰ ὅδε—ἱατρικὴ ποῦ τις λέγεται τέχνη, &c.

³ Plato, Kleitophon, p. 409 B. τὸ δ' ἕτερον, ὃ δύνανται ποιεῖν ἡμῖν ἔργον ὃ δίκαιον, τί τοῦτό φημεν; εἰπε. Ὅστος μὲν, ὡς οἶμαι, τὸ συμφέρον εὐκρινάτο· ἄλλος δὲ, τὸ δέον· ἕτερος

other arts, and to something different in each. Every art aims at what is proper, advantageous, profitable, gainful, in its own separate department: but each can farther describe to you what that department is. Thus the art of the carpenter is, to perform well, properly, advantageously, profitably, &c., in the construction of wooden implements, &c. That is the special work of the carpenter's art: now tell me, what is the special work, corresponding thereunto, of the art called Justice?

At length one of your most accomplished companions, Sokrates, answered me—That the special work peculiar to Justice was, to bring about friendship in the community.¹ Being farther interrogated, he said—That friendship was always a good, never an evil: That the so-called friendships between children, and between animals, mischievous rather than otherwise, were not real friendships, and ought not to bear the name: That the only genuine friendship was, sameness of reason and intelligence: not sameness of opinion, which was often hurtful—but knowledge and reason agreeing, in different persons.²

None of them could explain what the special work of justice or virtue was.

At this stage of our conversation the hearers themselves felt perplexed, and interfered to remonstrate with him; observing, that the debate had come round to the same point again. They declared that the medical art also was harmony of reason and intelligence: that the like was true besides of every other art: that each of them could define the special end to which it tended: but that as to that art, or that harmony of reason and intelligence, which had been called Justice, no one could see to what purpose it tended, nor what was its special work.³

After all this debate (continues Kleitophon) I addressed the same question to yourself, Sokrates—What is Justice? You answered—To do good to friends, hurt to enemies

Kleitophon at length asked he

δέ, τὸ ἀφ' ἑλπίου· ὁ δὲ, τὸ λυσιτελεῖν. ἔπαυθ' οὖν διὰ τῶν λόγων ὅτι κακείνῃ γε ὀνόματα ταύτ' ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστῃ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὁρθῶς πράττειν, λυσιστελοῦντα, ἀφ' ἑλπίου, καὶ τὰλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα· ἀλλὰ πρὸς δ, τι ταῦτα πάντα τείνει, ἔρει τὸ ἴδιον ἐκάστῃ τέχνῃ, &c.

¹ Plato, Kleitoph. p. 400 D. Τελονίων ἀπεκρίνατό τις, ὁ Σόκράτης, μοι τῶν σὺν ὁμαίρων, δεῖ διὰ κομψότατα ἰδοῦν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τοῦτ' εἴη τὸ τῆς δικαιοσύνης

ἴδιον ἔργον, ὁ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεμιᾶς, φιλίαν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι ποιεῖν.

² Plato, Kleitophon, p. 400 E.

³ Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 A. καὶ ἔλεγον (i.e. the hearers said) ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἱατρικὴ ὁμόνοιά τις ἐστὶ, καὶ ἀπασαὶ αἱ τέχναι, καὶ περὶ τούτων εἰσὶν, ἔχουσι λέγειν· τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ σοῦ λεγομένην δικαιοσύνην ἢ ὁμόνοιαν, ὅποι τείνουσά ἐστι, διακρίψεναι, καὶ ἀθλον αὐτῆς δ, τι πῶς ἐστὶ τὸ ἔργον.

question from Sokrates himself. But Sokrates did not answer clearly. Kleitophon believes that Sokrates knows, but will not tell.

But presently it appeared, that the just man would never, on any occasion, do hurt to any one :—that he would act towards every one with a view to good. It is not once, nor twice, but often and often, that I have endured these perplexities, and have importuned you to clear them up.¹ At last I am wearied out, and have come to the conviction that you are doubtless a consummate proficient in the art of stimulating men to seek virtue ; but that as to the ulterior question, how they are to find it—you either do not know, or you will not tell. In regard to any art (such as steersmanship or others), there may be persons who can extol and recommend the art to esteem, but cannot direct the hearers how to acquire it : and in like manner a man might remark about you, that you do not know any better what Justice is, because you are a proficient in commending it. For my part, such is not my opinion. I think that you know, but have declined to tell me. I am resolved, in my present embarrassment, to go to Thrasymachus, or any one else that I can find to help me ; unless you will consent to give me something more than these merely stimulating discourses.² Consider me as one upon whom your stimulus has already told. If the question were about gymnastic, as soon as I had become fully stimulated to attend to my bodily condition, you would have given me, as a sequel to your stimulating discourse, some positive direction, what my body was by nature, and what treatment it required. Deal in like manner with the case before us : reckon Kleitophon as one fully agreeing with you, that it is contemptible to spend so much energy upon other objects, and to neglect our minds, with a view to which all other objects are treasured up. Put me down as having already given my adhesion to all these views of yours.

Proceed, Sokrates—I supplicate you—to deal with me as I have described ; in order that I may never more have occasion, when I talk with Lysias, to blame you on some points while praising you on others. I will

Kleitophon is on the point of leaving So-

¹ Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 B. Ταῦτα δὲ οὐχ ἀπεξέτι οὐδὲ τις ἀλλὰ πάλιν δὴ ὑπομείνας χρόνον καὶ λιπαρῶν ἀπεισμενα, &c.

² Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 C. καὶ

ταῦτα δὲ καὶ πρὸς Θρασύμαχον, εἰμαι, πορεύσομαι, καὶ ἄλλοτε ὅποι δόξαμαι, ἀγορῶν—ἵνατι εἰ γ' ὀφείλοις σὺ ταῦτα μὲν ἤδη παύσασθαι πρὸς ἐμὲ τῶν λόγων τῶν προσηντικῶν, &c.

repeat, that to one who has not yet received the necessary stimulus, your conversation is of inestimable value : but to one who has already been stimulated, it is rather a hindrance than a help, to his realising the full acquisition of virtue, and thus becoming happy.¹

krates and going to Thrasymachus. But before leaving he addresses one last entreaty, that Sokrates will speak out clearly and explicitly.

The fragment called Kleitophon (of which I have given an abstract comparatively long), is in several ways remarkable. The Thrasyllan catalogue places it first in the eighth Tetralogy ; the three other members of the same Tetralogy being, Republic, Timæus, Kritias.² Though it is both short, and abrupt in its close, we know that it was so likewise in antiquity : the ancient Platonic commentators observing, that Sokrates disdained to make any reply to the appeal of Kleitophon.³ There were therefore in this Tetralogy two fragments, unfinished works from the beginning—Kleitophon and Kritias.

Remarks on the Kleitophon. Why Thrasyllus placed it in the eighth Tetralogy immediately before the Republic, and along with Kritias, the other fragment.

We may explain why Thrasyllus placed the Kleitophon in immediate antecedence to the Republic : because 1. It complains

¹ Plato, Kleitophon, p. 410 E. μὲν γὰρ προτετραμμένην σὺ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὃ Σώκρατες, ἄξιον εἶναι τοῦ παντὸς φήσας, προτετραμμένην δέ, σχεδὸν καὶ ἐμποδῖον τοῦ πρὸς τέλος ἀρετῆς ἀλθόντα εὐδαίμονα γινώσκει.

² Diog. L. iii. 59. The Kleitophon also was one of the dialogues selected by some students of Plato as proper to be studied first of all (Diog. L. iii. 61).

³ M. Boeckh observes (ad Platonis Minoem, p. 11) :—"Nec minus falsum est, quod spurium Kleitophontem plerique omnes mutilatum putant; quem ex auctoritis manibus truncum excidisse inde intelligitur, quod ne vetusti quidem Platonici philosophi, quibus antiquissima exemplaria ad manum erant, habuerunt integriorem. Proclus in Timæo, i. p. 7. Πτολεμαῖος δὲ ὁ Πλατωνικὸς Kleitophῶντα αὐτὸν οἶεται εἶναι. τοῦτον γὰρ ἐν τῷ ὁμωνύμῳ διαλόγῳ μὴ ἀποκρίσας ἠρώσθαι παρὰ Σωκράτους. Plané ut in Critiâ, quem ab ipso Platone non absolutum docet

Plutarchus in Solone."

M. Boeckh here characterises the Kleitophon as *spurious*, in which opinion I do not concur.

Yxem, in his Dissertation, Ueber Platon's Kleitophon, Berlin, 1846, has vindicated the genuineness of this dialogue, though many of his arguments are such as I cannot subscribe to.

He shows farther, that the first idea of distrusting the genuineness of the Kleitophon arose from the fact that the dialogue was printed in the Aldine edition of 1513, along with the spurious dialogues; although in that very Aldine edition the editors expressly announce that this was a mistake, and that the dialogue ought to have been printed as first of the eighth tetralogy. See Yxem, pp. 82-83. Subsequent editors followed the Aldine in printing the dialogue among the spurious, though still declaring that they did not consider it spurious.

bitterly of the want of a good explanation of Justice, which Sokrates in the latter books of the Republic professes to furnish. 2. It brings before us Kleitophon, who announces an inclination to consult Thrasymachus : now both these personages appear in the first book of the Republic, in which too Thrasymachus is introduced as disputing in a brutal and insulting way, and as humiliated by Sokrates : so that the Republic might be considered both as an answer to the challenge of the Kleitophon, and as a reproof to Kleitophon himself for having threatened to quit Sokrates and go to Thrasymachus.

Like so many other pieces in the Thrasyllean catalogue, the Kleitophon has been declared to be spurious by Schleiermacher and other critics of the present century. I see no ground for this opinion, and I believe the dialogue to be genuine. If it be asked, how can we imagine Plato to have composed a polemic argument, both powerful and unanswered, against Sokrates,—I reply, that this is not so surprising as the Parmenides : in which Plato has introduced the veteran so named as the successful assailant not only of Sokrates, but of the Platonic theory of Ideas defended by Sokrates.

I have already declared, that the character of Plato is, in my judgment, essentially many-sided. It comprehends the whole process of searching for truth, and testing all that is propounded as such : it does not shrink from broaching and developing speculative views not merely various and distinct, but sometimes even opposite.

Yet though the Kleitophon is Plato's work, it is a sketch or fragment never worked out. In its present condition, it can hardly have been published (any more than the Kritias) either by his direction or during his life. I conceive it to have remained among his papers, to have been made known by his school after his death, and to have passed from thence among the other Platonic manuscripts into the Alexandrian library at its first foundation. Possibly it may have been originally intended as a preparation for the solution of that problem, which Sokrates afterwards undertakes in the Republic : for it is a challenge to Sokrates to explain what he means by Justice. It may have been intended

It could not have been published until after Plato's death.

as such, but never prosecuted (—the preparation for that solution being provided in another way, such as we now read in the first and second books of the Republic. That the great works of Plato—Republic, Protagoras, Symposium, &c.—could not have been completed without preliminary sketches and tentatives—we may regard as certain. That some of these sketches, though never worked up, and never published by Plato himself, should have been good enough to be preserved by him and published by those who succeeded him—is at the very least highly probable. One such is the Kleitophon.

When I read the Kleitophon, I am not at all surprised that Plato never brought it to a conclusion, nor ever provided Sokrates with an answer to the respectful, yet emphatic, requisition of Kleitophon. The case against Sokrates has been made so strong, that I doubt whether Plato himself could have answered it to his own satisfaction. It resembles the objections which he advances in the Parmenidēs against the theory of Ideas: objections which he has nowhere answered, and which I do not believe that he could answer.

Reasons why the Kleitophon was never finished. It points out the defects of Sokrates, just as he himself confesses them in the Apology

The characteristic attribute of which Kleitophon complains in Sokrates is, that of a one-sided and incomplete efficiency—(*φύσις μονόκαλος*)—"You are perpetually stirring us up and instigating us: you do this most admirably: but when we have become full of fervour, you do not teach us how we are to act, nor point out the goal towards which we are to move".¹ Now this is precisely the description which Sokrates gives of his own efficiency, in the Platonic Apology addressed to the Dikasts. He lays especial stress on the mission imposed upon him by the Gods, to apply his Elenchus in testing and convicting the false persuasion of knowledge universally prevalent:—to make sure by repeated cross-examination, whether the citizens pursued money and worldly advancement more energetically than virtue:—and to worry the Athenians with perpetual stimulus, like the gadfly exciting a high-bred but lethargic horse. Sokrates describes this

¹ I have in an earlier chapter (ch. viii. vol. i. p. 406) cited the passage—"Philosophiam multis locis inchoasti: ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum

parum". This is the language addressed by Cicero to Varro, and coinciding substantially with that of Kleitophon here.

not only as the mission of his life, but as a signal benefit and privilege conferred upon Athens by the Gods.¹ But here his services end. He declares explicitly that he shares in the universal ignorance, and that he is no wiser than any one else, except in being aware of his own ignorance. He disclaims all power of teaching :² and he deprecates the supposition,—that he himself knew what he convicted others of not knowing,—as a mistake which had brought upon him alike unmerited reputation and great unpopularity.³ We find thus that the description given by Sokrates of himself in the Apology, and the reproach addressed to Sokrates by Kleitophon, fully coincide. "My mission from the Gods" (says Sokrates), "is to dispel the false persuasion of knowledge, to cross-examine men into a painful conviction of their own ignorance, and to create in them a lively impulse towards knowledge and virtue : but I am no wiser than they : I can teach them nothing, nor can I direct them what to do."—That is exactly what I complain of (remarks Kleitophon) : I have gone through your course,—have been electrified by your Elenchus,—and am full of the impulse which you so admirably communicate. In this condition, what I require is, to find out how, or in which direction I am to employ that impulse. If you cannot tell me, I must ask Thrasymachus or some one else.

Moreover, it is not merely in the declarations of Sokrates himself before the Athenian Dikasts, but also in the Platonic Sokrates as exhibited by Plato in very many of his dialogues, that the same efficiency, and the same deficiency, stand conspicuous. The hearer is convicted of ignorance, on some familiar subject which he believed himself to know : the protreptic stimulus is powerful, stinging his mind into uneasiness which he cannot appease except by finding some tenable result : but the didactic supplement is not forthcoming. Sokrates ends by creating a painful feeling of perplexity in the hearers, but he himself shares

¹ Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 23 E, 29 D-E, 30 A-E. 30 E : προσκειμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὡς κτηρ ἰσχυρὸν μεγάλῃ μὲν καὶ γενναίῃ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθευτέρῃ καὶ δορυμνῇ ἐγγίρεισθαι ὑπὸ μόνος τινα· οὐκ ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ δὲ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι τοιούτων τινα, ὅς ἢ μᾶς ἐγγίρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ἀντιδίδων ἕνα

ἕκαστον οὐδὲν παύομαι τὴν ἡμέραν ὅλην πανταχοῦ προσκαλίσκων. Also pp. 36 D, 41 E.

² Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 21 D—22 D 33 A : ἐγὼ δὲ διδασκαλὸς οὐδένος πάποτε ἱγνύμεν.

³ Plat. Apol. Sokr. pp. 23 A, 28 A.

the feeling along with them. It is this which the youth Protarchus deprecates, at the beginning of the Platonic *Philébus*; ¹ and with which Hippias taunts Sokrates, in one of the Xenophontic conversations ²—insomuch that Sokrates replies to the taunt by giving a definition of the Just (τὸ δίκαιον), upon which Hippias comments. But if the observations ascribed by Xenophon to Hippias are a report of what that Sophist really said, we only see how inferior he was to Sokrates in the art of cross-questioning: for the definition given by Sokrates would have been found altogether untenable, if there had been any second Sokrates to apply the Elenchus to it. ³ Lastly, Xenophon expressly tells us, that there were others also, who, both in speech and writing, imputed to Sokrates the same deficiency on the affirmative side. ⁴

The Platonic Kleitophon corresponds, in a great degree, to these complaints of Protarchus and others, as well as to the taunt of Hippias. The case is put, however, with much greater force and emphasis: as looked at, not by an opponent and outsider, like Hippias—nor by a mere novice, unarmed though eager, like Protarchus—but by a companion of long standing, who has gone through the full course of negative gymnastic, is grateful for the benefit derived, and feels that it is time to pass from the lesser mysteries to the greater. He is sick of perpetual negation and stimulus: he demands doctrines and explanations, which will hold good against the negative Elenchus of Sokrates himself. But this is exactly what Sokrates cannot give. His mission from the Delphian God finishes with the negative: inspiration fails him when he deals with the affirmative. He is like the gadfly (his own simile) in stimulating

Forcible, yet respectful, manner in which these defects are set forth in the Kleitophon. Impossible to answer them in such a way as to hold out against the negative Elenchus of a Socratic pupil.

¹ Plato, *Philébus*, p. 20 A.

² Xenoph. *Memor.* iv. 4, 9-11.

³ We need only compare the observations made by Hippias in that dialogue, to the objections raised by Sokrates himself in his conversation with Euthydémus, *Xen. Memor.* iv. 4, 2, and to the dialogue of the youthful Alkibiades (evidently borrowed from Sokrates) with Perikles, *ib.* i. 2, 40-47.

⁴ Xenoph. *Memor.* i. 4, 1. εἰ δὲ τινες Σωκράτην νομίζουσιν, ὡς ἔνιοι

γράφουσι τε καὶ λέγουσι περὶ αὐτοῦ τεκμαιρόμενοι, προτρέψασθαι μὲν διδω-
πους ἐκ ἀρετῆς κράτιστον γεγενῆσθαι,
προσγυγίει δὲ ἐκ αὐτῆς οὐχ ἱκανόν—
σκαφάμενοι μὴ μόνον, &c.

See also Cicero, *De Oratore*, i. 47, 204, in which Sokrates is represented as saying that *conciatio* (προτροπή) was all that people required: they did not need guidance: they would find out the way for themselves: and Yxem, *Ueber Platon's Kleitophon*, pp. 8-12.

the horse—and also in furnishing no direction how the stimulus is to be expended. His affirmative dicta,—as given in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, are for the most part plain, home-bred, good sense,—in which all the philosophical questions are slurred over, and the undefined words, Justice, Temperance, Holiness, Courage, Law, &c., are assumed to have a settled meaning agreed to by every one: while as given by Plato, in the Republic and elsewhere, they are more speculative, high-flown, and poetical,¹ but not the less exposed to certain demolition, if the batteries of the Sokratic Elenchus were brought to bear upon them. The challenge of Kleitophon is thus unanswerable. It brings out in the most forcible, yet respectful, manner the contrast between the two attributes of the Sokratic mind: in the negative, irresistible force and originality: in the affirmative, confessed barrenness alternating with honest, acute, practical sense, but not philosophy. Instead of this, Plato gives us transcendental hypotheses, and a religious and poetical ideal; impressive indeed to the feelings, but equally inadmissible to a mind trained in the use of the Sokratic tests.

We may thus see sufficient reason why Plato, after having drawn up the Kleitophon as preparatory basis for a dialogue, became unwilling to work it out, and left it as an unfinished sketch. He had, probably without intending it, made out too strong a case against Sokrates and against himself. If he continued it, he would have been obliged to put some sufficient reason into the mouth of Sokrates, why Kleitophon should abandon his intention of frequenting some other teacher: and this was a hard task. He would have been obliged to lay before Kleitophon, a pupil thoroughly inoculated with his own negative *astrus*, affirmative solutions proof against such subtle cross-examination: and this, we may fairly assume, was not merely a hard task, but impossible. Hence it is that we possess the Kleitophon only as a fragment.

Yet I think it a very ingenious and instructive fragment:

¹ The explanation of Justice given by Plato in the Republic deserves to be described much in the same words as Sokrates employs (Repub. i. p. 352 C) in characterising the definition of

Justice furnished by (or ascribed to) the poet Simonides:

ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιεῖται τὸ δίκαιον ὅτι εἶναι.

setting forth powerfully, in respect to the negative philosophy of Sokrates and Plato, a point of view which must have been held by many intelligent contemporaries. Among all the objections urged against Sokrates and Plato, probably none was more frequent than this protest against the continued negative procedure. This same point of view—that Sokrates puzzled every one, but taught no one any thing—is reproduced by Thrasymachus against Sokrates in the first book of the Republic: ¹ in which first book there are various other marks of analogy with the Kleitophon.² It might seem as if Plato had in the first instance projected a dialogue in which Sokrates was to discuss the subject of justice, and had drawn up the Kleitophon as the sketch of a sort of forcing process to be applied to Sokrates: then, finding that he placed Sokrates under too severe pressure, had abandoned the project, and taken up the same subject anew, in the manner which we now read in the Republic. The task which he assigns to Sokrates, in this last-mentioned dialogue, is far easier. Instead of the appeal made to Sokrates by Kleitophon, with truly Sokratic point—we have an assault made upon him by Thrasymachus, alike angry, impudent and feeble; which just elicits the peculiar aptitude of Sokrates for humbling the boastful affirmer. Again in the second book, Glaukon and Adeimantus are introduced as stating the difficulties which they feel in respect to the theory of Justice: but in a manner totally different from Kleitophon, and without any reference to previous Sokratic requirements. Each of them delivers an eloquent and forcible pleading, in the manner of an Aristotelian or Ciceronian dialogue: and to this Sokrates makes his reply. In that reply, Sokrates explains what he means by Justice: and though his exposition is given in the form of short questions, each followed by an answer of acquiescence, yet no

The Kleitophon was originally intended as a first book of the Republic, but was found too hard to answer. Reasons why the existing first book was substituted.

¹ Plat. Repub. pp. 336 D, 337 A, 338 A.

² For example, That it is not the province of the just man to hurt any one, either friend or foe, Repub. p. 335 D.

Thrasymachus derides any such definitions of τὸ δίκαιον as the follow-

ing—τὸ δίκαιον—τὸ ὠφέλιμον—τὸ λυσιτελοῦν—τὸ συμφέρον—τὸ κερδαλέον, Repub. i. p. 336, C-D.

These are exactly the unsatisfactory definitions which Kleitophon describes himself (p. 409 C) as having received from the partisans of Sokrates.

real or serious objections are made to him throughout the whole. The case must have been very different if Plato had continued the dialogue Kleitophon; so as to make Sokrates explain the theory of Justice, in the face of all the objections raised by a Sokratic cross-examiner.¹

¹ Schleiermacher (Einleitung, v. pp. 453-456) considers the Kleitophon not to be the work of Plato. But this only shows that he, like many other critics, attaches scarcely the smallest importance to the presumption arising from the Canon of Thrasyllus. For the grounds by which he justifies his disallowance of the dialogue are to the last degree trivial.

I note with surprise one of his assertions: "How" (he asks) "or from what motive can Plato have introduced an attack upon Sokrates, which is thoroughly repelled, both seriously and ironically, in almost all the Platonic dialogues?"

As I read Plato, on the contrary:

the Truth is, That it is repelled in none, confirmed in many, and thoroughly ratified by Sokrates himself in the Platonic Apology.

Schleiermacher thinks that the Kleitophon is an attack upon Sokrates and the Sokratic men, Plato included, made by some opponent out of the best rhetorical schools. He calls it "a parody and caricature" of the Sokratic manner. To me it seems no caricature at all. It is a very fair application of the Sokratic or Platonic manner. Nor is it conceived by any means in the spirit of an enemy, but in that of an established companion, respectful and grateful, yet dissatisfied at finding that he makes no progress.

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
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GEORGE GROTE

AUTHOR OF THE 'HISTORY OF GREECE'.

A NEW EDITION.

IN FOUR VOLUMES.

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PLATO.

CHAPTER XXXV.

PLATONIC REPUBLIC—ABSTRACT.

THE Republic is the longest of all the Platonic dialogues, except the dialogue *De Legibus*. It consists of ten books, each of them as long as any one of the dialogues which we have passed in review. Partly from its length—partly from its lofty pretensions as the great constructive work of Plato—I shall give little more than an abstract of it in the present chapter, and shall reserve remark and comment for the succeeding.

The professed subject is—What is Justice? Is the just man happy in or by reason of his justice, whatever consequences may befall him? Is the unjust man unhappy by reason of his injustice? But the ground actually travelled over by Sokrates, from whose mouth the exposition proceeds, is far more extensive than could have been anticipated from this announced problem.

Declared theme of the Republic—Expansion and multiplication of the topics connected with it.

An immense variety of topics, belonging to man and society, is adverted to more or less fully. A theory of psychology or phrenology generally, is laid down and advocated: likewise a theory of the Intellect, distributed into its two branches: 1. Science, with the Platonic Forms or Ideas as Realities corresponding to it; 2. Opinion, with the fluctuating semi-realities or pseudo-realities, which form its object. A sovereign rule, exercised by philosophy, is asserted as indispensable to human happiness. The fundamental conditions of a good society, as Plato conceived it, are set forth at considerable length, and contrasted with the social

corruptions of various existing forms of government. The outline of a perfect education, intellectual and emotional, is drawn up and prescribed for the ruling class: with many accompanying remarks on the objectionable tendencies of the popular and consecrated poems. The post-existence, as well as the pre-existence of the soul, is affirmed in the concluding books. As the result of the whole, Plato emphatically proclaims his conviction, that the just man is happy in and through his justice, quite apart from all consideration of consequences—yet that the consequences also will be such as to add to his happiness, both during life as well as after death: and the unjust man unhappy in and through his injustice.

The dramatic introduction of the dialogue (which is described as held during the summer, immediately after the festival of the Bendideia in Peiræus), with the picture of the aged Kephalus and his views upon old age, is among the richest and most spirited in the Platonic works: but the discussion does not properly begin until Kephalus retires, leaving it to be carried on by Sokrates with Polemarchus, Glaukon, Adeimantus, and Thrasymachus.

“Old age has its advantages to reasonable men (says Kephalus). If I have lost the pleasures of youth, I have at the same time lost the violent desires which then overmastered me. I now enjoy tranquillity and peace. Without doubt, this is in part owing to my wealth. But the best that wealth does for me is, that it enables me to make compensation for deceptions and injustice, practised on other men in my younger days—and to fulfil all vows made to the Gods. An old man who is too poor to render such atonement for past falsehood and injustice, becomes uneasy in his mind as death approaches; he begins to fear that the stories about Hades, which he has heard and ridiculed in his youth, may perhaps prove true.”¹

“Is that your explanation of justice (asks Sokrates): that it consists in telling truth, and rendering to every one what you have had from him?” The old man

¹ Plat. Repub. i. pp. 328 A, 350 D, 354 A.

² Plato, Repub. i. pp. 330-331.

Compare the language of Cato, more rhetorical and exaggerated than that of Kephalus, in Cic. De Senect. c. 13-14.

Kephalus here withdraws ; Polemarchus and the others prosecute the discussion. "The poet Simonides (says Polemarchus) gives an explanation like to that which you have stated—when he affirms, That just dealing consists in rendering to every man what is owing to him."

by Simonides—It consists in rendering to every man what is owing to him.

"I do not know what Simonides means," replies Sokrates. "He cannot mean that it is always right to tell the truth, or always right to give back a deposit. If my friend, having deposited arms with me, afterwards goes mad, and in that state demands them back, it would not be right in me either to restore the arms, or to tell the truth, to a man in that condition. Therefore to say that justice consists in speaking truth and in giving back what we have received, cannot be a good definition."¹

Objections to it by Sokrates—There are cases in which it is not right to restore what is owing, or to tell the truth.

Polemarchus here gives a peculiar meaning to the phrase of Simonides : a man owes good to his friends—evil to his enemies : and he ought to pay back both. Upon this Sokrates comments.²

Plato, *Repub.* i. p. 331 C-D.

The historical Sokrates argues in the same manner (in the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon. See his conversation with Euthydemus, iv. 2 ; and Cicero, *De Offic.* iii. 25, 94-95).

² Sokrates here remarks that the precepts—Speak truth ; Restore what has been confided to you—ought not to be considered as universally binding. Sometimes justice, or those higher grounds upon which the rules of justice are founded, prescribe that we should disobey the precepts. Sokrates takes this for granted, as a matter which no one will dispute ; and it is evident that what Plato had here in his mind was, the obvious consideration that to tell the truth or restore a weapon deposited, to one who had gone mad, would do no good to any one, and might do immense mischief : thus showing that general utility is both the foundation and the limiting principle of all precepts respecting just and unjust. That this is present to the mind of Plato appears evident from his assuming the position as a matter of course ; it is moreover Sokratic, as

we see by the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon.

But Plato, in another passage of the *Republic*, clothes this Sokratic doctrine in a language and hypothesis of his own. He sets up Forms or Ideas, *per se*. The Just, — The Unjust, — The Honorable, — The Base, &c. He distinguishes each of these from the many separate manifestations in which it is specialised. The Form, though one reality in itself, appears manifold when embodied and disguised in these diversified accompaniments. It remains One and Unchanged, the object of Science and universal infallible truth ; but each of its separate manifestations is peculiar to itself, appears differently to different minds, and admits of no higher certainty than fallible opinion. Though the Form of Justice always remains the same, yet its subordinate embodiments ever fluctuate ; there is no given act nor assemblage of acts which is always just. Every just act (see *Republic*, v. pp. 476 A—479 A) is liable under certain circumstances to become unjust ; or to be invaded and overclouded by

S.—Simonides meant to say (you tell me) that Justice consists in rendering benefits to your friends, evil to your enemies : that is, in rendering to each what is proper and suitable. But we must ask him farther—Proper and suitable—how? in what cases? to whom? The medical art is that which renders what is proper and suitable, of nourishment and medicaments for the health of the body : the art of cookery is that which renders what is proper and suitable, of savoury ingredients for the satisfaction of the palate. In like manner, the cases must be specified in which justice renders what is proper and suitable—to whom, how, or what?¹ P.—Justice consists in doing good to friends, evil to enemies. S.—Who is it that is most efficient in benefiting his friends and injuring his enemies, as to health or disease? P.—It is the physician. S.—Who, in reference to the dangers in navigation by sea? P.—The steersman. S.—In what matters is it that the just man shows his special efficiency, to benefit friends and hurt enemies?² P.—In war : as a combatant for the one and against the other. S.—To men who are not sick, the physician is of no use—nor the steersman, to men on

the Form of Injustice. The genuine philosopher will detect the Form of Justice wherever it is to be found, in the midst of accompaniments however discrepant and confused, over all which he will ascend to the region of universal truth and reality. The unphilosophical mind cannot accomplish this ascent, nor detect the pure Form, nor even recognise its real existence : but sees nothing beyond the multiplicity of diverse particular cases in which it is or appears to be embodied. Respecting these particular cases there is no constant or universal truth, no full science. They cannot be thrown into classes to which the superior Form constantly and unconditionally adheres. They are midway between reality and non-reality : they are matters of opinion more or less reasonable, but not of certain science or unconditional affirmation. Among mankind generally, who see nothing of true and absolute Form, the received rules and dogmas respecting the Just, the Beautiful, &c., are of this intermediate

and ambiguous kind : they can neither be affirmed universally, nor denied universally ; they are partly true, partly false, determinable only by opinion in each separate case. Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 479 C-D : οὐτ' εἶναι οὐτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατόν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὐτε ἀμφοτέρω οὐτε οὐδέτερον . . . Τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα, καλοῦ τε πέρη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, μεταξὺ που κυλινδρεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς.

Of the distinction here drawn in general terms by Plato, between the pure unchangeable Form, and the subordinate classes of particulars in which that Form is or appears to be embodied, the reasoning above cited respecting truth-telling and giving back a deposit is an example.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* i. p. 332 D. ἡ οὖν δὴ τίς τι ἀποδοῖσα τέχνη δικαιοσύνη ἂν καλοῖτο ;

² Plato, *Repub.* i. p. 332 E. ὁ δίκαιος ἐν τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατότατος φίλους ὠφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροὺς βλάπτειν ;

dry land : Do you mean in like manner, that the just man is useless to those who are not at war? *P.*—No : I do not mean that. Justice is useful in peace also. *S.*—So also is husbandry, for raising food—shoemaking, for providing shoes. Tell me for what want or acquisition justice is useful during peace? *P.*—It is useful for the common dealings and joint transactions between man and man. *S.*—When we are engaged in playing at draughts, the good player is our useful co-operator : when in laying bricks and stones, the skilful mason : much more than the just man. Can you specify in what particular transactions the just man has any superior usefulness as a co-operator? *P.*—In affairs of money, I think. *S.*—Surely not in the employment of money. When you want to buy a horse, you must take for your assistant, not the just man, but one who knows horses : so also, if you are purchasing a ship. What are those modes of jointly employing money, in which the just man is more useful than others? *P.*—He is useful when you wish to have your money safely kept. *S.*—That is, when your money is not to be employed, but to lie idle : so that when your money is useless, then is the time when justice is useful for it. *P.*—So it seems. *S.*—In regard to other things also, a sickle, a shield, a lyre—when you want to use them, the pruner, the hoplite, the musician, must be invoked as co-operators : justice is useful only when you are to keep them unused. In a word, justice is useless for the use of any thing, and useful merely for things not in use. Upon this showing, it is at least a matter of no great worth.¹

But let us pursue the investigation (continues Sokrates). In boxing or in battle, is not he who is best in striking, best also in defending himself? In regard to disease, is not he who can best guard himself against it, the most formidable for imparting it to others? Is not the general who watches best over his own camp, also the most effective in surprising and over-reaching the enemy? In a word, whenever a man is effective as a guard of any thing, is he not also effective as a thief of it? *P.*—Such seems the course of the discussion. *S.*—Well then, the just man turns out to be a sort of thief, like the

The just man, being good for keeping property guarded, must also be good for stealing property—Analogies cited.

¹ Plat. *Repub.* i. pp. 332-333. 333 E : δικαιοσύνη, εἰ πρὸς τὰ ἀχρηστά χρήσιμον. Οὐκ ἂν οὖν πᾶν γέ τι σπουδαῖον εἴη ἢ ὃν τυγχάνει ;

Homeric Autolykus. According to the explanation of Simonides, justice is a mode of thieving, for the profit of friends and damage of enemies.¹ *P.*—It cannot be so. I am in utter confusion. Yet I think still that justice is profitable to friends, and hurtful to enemies.

S.—Whom do you call friends : those whom a man believes to be good,—or those who really are good, whether he believes them to be so or not : and the like, in reference to enemies? *P.*—I mean those whom he believes to be good. It is natural that he should love *them* and that he should hate those whom he believes to be evil. *S.*—But is not a man often mistaken in this belief? *P.*—Yes : often. *S.*—In so far as a man is mistaken, the good men are his enemies, and the evil men his friends. Justice, therefore, on your showing, consists in doing good to the evil men, and evil to the good men. *P.*—So it appears. *S.*—Now good men are just, and do no wrong to any one. It is therefore just, on your explanation, to hurt those who do no wrong. *P.*—Impossible! that is a monstrous doctrine. *S.*—You mean, then, that it is just to hurt unjust men, and to benefit just men? *P.*—Yes ; that is something better. *S.*—It will often happen, therefore, when a man misjudges about others, that justice will consist in hurting his friends, since they are in his estimation the evil men : and in benefiting his enemies, since they are in his estimation the good men. Now this is the direct contrary of what Simonides defined to be justice.²

“We have misconceived the meaning of Simonides (replies Polemarchus). He must have meant that justice consists in benefiting your friend, assuming him to be a good man : and in hurting your enemy, assuming him to be an evil man.” Sokrates proceeds to impugn the definition in this new sense. He shows that justice does not admit of our hurting any man, either evil or good. By hurting the evil man, we only make him more evil than he was before. To do this belongs not

¹ Plat. Repub. i. p. 334 B. ἔσκεν οὖν ὠφελεία μέντοι τῶν φίλων, καὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ ἢ δικαιούσῃ . . . κλεπτικὴ τις εἶναι, ἐπ' τῶν ἐχθρῶν.

² Plato, Republic, i. p. 334 D.

to justice, but to injustice.¹ The definition of justice—That it consists in rendering benefit to friends and hurt to enemies—is not suitable to a wise man like Simonides, but to some rich potentate like Periander or Xerxes, who thinks his own power irresistible.²

man will do no hurt to any one. Definition of Simonides rejected.

At this turn of the dialogue, when the definition given by Simonides has just been refuted, Thrasymachus breaks in, and takes up the conversation with Sokrates. He is depicted as angry, self-confident to excess, and coarse in his manners even to the length of insult. The portrait given of him is memorable for its dramatic vivacity, and is calculated to present in an odious point of view the doctrines which he advances: like the personal deformities which Homer heaps upon Thersites in the *Iliad*.³ But how far it is a copy of the real man, we have no evidence to inform us.

Thrasymachus takes up the dialogue—Repulsive portrait drawn of him.

In the contrast between Sokrates and Thrasymachus, Plato gives valuable hints as to the conditions of instructive colloquy. "What nonsense is all this!" (exclaims Thrasymachus). "Do not content yourself with asking questions, Sokrates, which you know is much easier than answering: but tell us yourself what Justice is: give us a plain answer: do not tell us that it is what is right—or profitable—or for our interest—or gainful—or advantageous: for I will not listen to any trash like this." "Be not so harsh with us, Thrasymachus" (replies Sokrates, in a subdued tone). "If we have taken the wrong course of inquiry, it is against our own will. You ought to feel pity for us rather than anger." "I thought" (rejoined Thrasymachus, with a scornful laugh) "that you would have recourse to your usual pretence of ignorance, and would decline answering." S.—How can I possibly answer, when you prescribe beforehand what I am to say or not to say? If you ask men—How much is twelve? and at the same time say—

Violence of Thrasymachus—Subdued manner of Sokrates—Conditions of useful colloquy.

¹ Plato, *Republic*, I. pp. 335-336.

² Here is a characteristic specimen of searching cross-examination in the Platonic or Sokratic style: citing multiplied analogies, and requiring the generalities of a definition to be clothed with particulars, that its suffi-

ciency may be proved in each of many successive as well as different cases.

³ Homer, *Iliad* B 216. Respecting Thrasymachus the reader should compare Spengel—*Zusatz* ΤΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ—pp. 94-98: which abates the odium inspired by this picture in the *Republic*.

Don't tell me that it is twice six, or three times four, or four times three—how can any man answer your question? *T.*—As if the two cases were similar! *S.*—Why not similar? But even though they be not similar, yet if the respondent thinks them so, how can he help answering according as the matter appears to him, whether we forbid him or not? *T.*—Is that what you intend to do? Are you going to give me one of those answers which I forbade? *S.*—Very likely I may, if on consideration it appears to me the proper answer.¹ *T.*—What will you say if I show you another answer better than all of them? What penalty will you then impose upon yourself? *S.*—What penalty?—why, that which properly falls upon the ignorant. It is their proper fate to learn from men wiser than themselves: that is the penalty which I am prepared for.²

After a few more words, in the same offensive and insolent tone ascribed to him from the beginning, Thrasymachus produces his definition of Justice:—"Justice is that which is advantageous to the more powerful". Some comments from Sokrates bring out a fuller explanation, whereby the definition stands amended:—"Justice is that which is advantageous to the constituted authority, or to that which holds power, in each different community: monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, as the case may be. Each of these authorities makes laws and ordinances for its own interest: declares what is just and unjust: and punishes all citizens who infringe its commands.

Justice consists in obeying these commands. In this sense, justice is everywhere that which is for the interest or advantage of the more powerful."³ "I too believe" (says Sokrates)

¹ Plato, *Repub.* i. p. 337 C. Εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μὴ ἐστὶν ὁμοίον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἀπαγγέλλοντι τοιοῦτον, ἥττον τι αὐτὸν οἷσι ἀποκριεῖσθαι τὸ φαινόμενον αὐτῷ, ἢν τε ἡμῖς ἀπαγορεύομεν, ἢν τε μή· Ἄλλο τι οὖν, εἴη, καὶ σὺ οὕτω τοιήσεις; ἢν ἐγὼ ἀπέμην, τοῦτον τι ἀποκριεῖ; Οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμ, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, εἰ μοι σκεψάμενθ' οὕτω δόξειεν.

This passage deserves notice, inasmuch as Plato here affirms, in very plain language, the Protagorean doctrine, which we have seen him trying

to refute in the *Theætétus* and *Kratylus*,—"Homo Mensura,—Every man is a measure to himself. That is true or false to every man which appears to him so."

Most of Plato's dialogues indeed imply this truth; for no man makes more constant appeal to the internal assent or dissent of the individual interlocutor. But it is seldom that he declares it in such express terms.

² Plato, *Republic*, i. p. 337 D.

³ Plato, *Republic*, i. pp. 338-339.

"that justice is something advantageous, in a certain sense. But whether you are right in adding these words—'to the more powerful'—is a point for investigation.¹ Assuming that the authorities in each state make ordinances for their own advantage, you will admit that they sometimes mistake, and enact ordinances tending to their own disadvantage. In so far as they do this, justice is not that which is advantageous, but that which is disadvantageous, to the more powerful.² Your definition therefore will not hold."

Thrasymachus might have replied to this objection by saying, that he meant what the superior power conceived to be for its own advantage, and enacted accordingly, whether such conception was correct or erroneous. This interpretation, though indicated by a remark put into the mouth of Kleitophon, is not farther pursued.³ But in the reply really ascribed to Thrasymachus, he is made to retract what he had just before admitted—that the superior authority sometimes commits mistakes. In so far as a superior or a ruler makes mistakes (Thrasymachus says), he is not a superior. We say, indeed, speaking loosely, that the ruler falls into error, just as we say that the physician or the steersman falls into error. The physician does not err *quod* physician, nor the steersman *quod* steersman. No craftsman errs *quod* craftsman. If he errs, it is not from his craft, but from want of knowledge: that is, from want of craft.⁴ What the ruler, as such, declares to be best for himself, and therefore enacts, is always really best for himself: this is justice for the persons under his rule.

To this subtle distinction, Sokrates replies by saying (in substance), "If you take the craftsman in this strict meaning, as representing the abstraction Craft, it is not true that his proceedings are directed towards his own interest or advantage. What he studies is,

Correction
by Thrasymachus—If
the Ruler
mistakes, he
is *pro tanto*
no Ruler—
The Ruler,
quod Ruler,
—*quod*
Craftsman
—is infal-
lible.

Reply by
Sokrates—
The Ruler,
quod infal-
lible Crafts-

¹ Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 B. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἐμφέρον γέ τι εἶναι καὶ ἐγὼ ὁμολογῶ τὸ δίκαιον, σὺ δὲ προστίθης καὶ αὐτὸ φῆς εἶναι τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος, ἐγὼ δὲ ἀγνοῶ, σκεπτόμενος δὲ.

² Plato, Republic, i. p. 339 E.

³ Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 B.

⁴ Plato, Republic, i. p. 340 E. ἐπιλιπύσσης γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός· ὥστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἀρχὼν οὐδέ τις ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἀρχῶν ᾖ.

man studies
the interest
of those
whom he
governs, and
not his own
interest.

the advantage of his subjects or clients, not his own. The physician, as such, has it in view to cure his patients: the steersman, to bring his passengers safely to harbour: the ruler, so far forth as craftsman, makes laws for the benefit of his subjects, and not for his own. If obedience to these laws constitutes justice, therefore, it is not true that justice consists in what is advantageous to the superior or governing power. It would rather consist in what is advantageous to the governed."¹

Thrasymachus is now represented as renouncing the abstraction above noted,² and reverting to the actualities of life. "Such talk is childish!" (he exclaims, with the coarseness imputed to him in this dialogue). "Shepherds and herdsmen tend and fatten their flocks and herds, not for the benefit of the sheep and oxen, but for the profit of themselves and the proprietors. So too the genuine ruler in a city: he regards his subjects as so many sheep, looking only to the amount of profit which he can draw from them."³ Justice is, in real truth, the good of another; it is the profit of him who is more powerful and rules—the loss of those who are weaker and must obey. It is the unjust man who rules over the multitude of just and well-meaning men. They serve him because he is the stronger: they build up his happiness at the cost of their own. Everywhere, both in private dealing and in public function, the just man is worse off than the unjust. I mean by the unjust, one who has the power to commit wrongful seizure on a large scale. You may see this if you look at the greatest injustice of all—the case of the despot, who makes himself happy while the juster men over whom he rules are miserable. One who is detected in the commission of petty crimes is punished, and gets a bad name: but if a man has force enough to commit crime on the grand scale, to enslave the persons of the citizens, and to appropriate their goods—instead of being called by a bad name, he is envied and regarded as happy, not only by the citizens themselves, but by all who

¹ Plato, Republic, i. p. 342.

² Plato, Republic, p. 345 B-C.

³ Plato, Republic, p. 343 B.

A similar comparison is put into the mouth of Sokrates himself by Plato in the *Thæætétus*, p. 174 D.

hear him named. Those who blame injustice, do so from the fear of suffering it, not from the fear of doing it. Thus then injustice, in its successful efficiency, is strong, free, and overruling, as compared with justice. Injustice is profitable to a man's self: justice (as I said before) is what is profitable to some other man stronger than he."¹

Thrasymachus is described as laying down this position in very peremptory language, and as anxious to depart immediately after it, if he had not been detained by the other persons present. His position forms the pivot of the subsequent conversation. The two opinions included in it—(That justice consists in obedience yielded by the weak to the orders of the strong, for the advantage of the strong—That injustice, if successful, is profitable and confers happiness: justice the contrary)—are disputed, both of them, by Sokrates as well as by Glaukon.²

Sokrates is represented as confuting and humiliating Thrasymachus by various arguments, of which the two first at least are more subtle than cogent.³ He next proceeds to argue that injustice, far from being a source of strength, is a source of weakness—That any community of men, among whom injustice prevails, must be in continual dispute; and therefore incapable of combined action against others—That a camp of mercenary soldiers or robbers, who plunder every one else, must at least observe justice among themselves—That if they have force, this is because they are unjust only by halves: that if they were thoroughly unjust, they would also be thoroughly impotent—That the like is true also of an individual separately taken, who, so far as he is unjust, is in a perpetual state of hatred and conflict with himself, as well as with just men and with the Gods: and would thus be divested of all power to accomplish any purpose.⁴

Having thus shown that justice is stronger than injustice, Sokrates next offers an argument to prove that it is happier or confers more happiness than injustice.

Position laid for the subsequent debate and exposition.

Arguments of Sokrates —Injustice is a source of weakness —Every multitude must observe justice among themselves, in order to avoid perpetual quarrels. The same about any single individual: if he is unjust, he will be at war with himself, and perpetually weak.

Farther argument of

¹ Plato, Republic, i. pp. 343-344.

² Plato, Republic, i. pp. 345 A—348 A.

³ Plato, Republic, i. pp. 346-350.

⁴ Plato, Republic, i. pp. 351-352 D.

Sokrates—
The just
man is
happy, the
unjust man
miserable—
Thrasymachus
is confuted
and silenced.
Sokrates
complains
that he does
not yet know
what Justice
is.

Glaukon
intimates
that he is
not satisfied
with the
proof, though
he agrees in
the opinion
expressed
by Sokrates.
Tripartite
distribution
of Good—
To which
of the three
heads does
Justice
belong?

The conclusion of this argument is—That the just man is happy, and the unjust miserable.¹ Thrasymachus is confuted, and retires humiliated from the debate. Yet Sokrates himself is represented as dissatisfied with the result. "At the close of our debate" (he says) "I find that I know nothing about the matter. For as I do not know what justice is, I can hardly expect to know whether it is a virtue or not; nor whether the man who possesses it is happy or not happy."²

Here Glaukon enters the lists, intimating that he too is dissatisfied with the proof given by Sokrates, that justice is every way better than injustice: though he adopts the conclusion, and desires much to hear it fully demonstrated. "You know" (he says), "Sokrates, that there are three varieties of Good:—
1. Good, *per se*, and for its own sake (apart from any regard to ulterior consequences): such as enjoyment and the innocuous pleasures. 2. Good both in itself, and by reason of its ulterior consequences: such as full health, perfect vision, intelligence, &c. 3. Good, not in itself, but altogether by reason of its consequences: such as gymnastic training, medical treatment, professional business, &c. Now in which of these branches do you rank Justice?" S.—I rank it in the noblest—that is—in the second branch: which is good both in itself, and by reason of its consequences. G.—Most persons put it in the third branch: as being in itself difficult and laborious, but deserving to be cultivated in consequence of the reward and good name which attaches to the man who is reputed just.³ S.—I know that this is the view taken by Thrasymachus and many others: but it is not mine. G.—Neither is it mine.

Yet still I think that you have not made out your case against Glaukon Thrasymachus, and that he has given up the game undertakes too readily. I will therefore re-state his argument, to set forth

¹ Plato, Republic, i. pp. 353-354 A.

² Plato, Republic, i. fin. p. 354 C. ὥστε μοι γέγονεν ἐκ τοῦ διαλόγου μὴδὲν εἶδέναι ὅποτε γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον μὴ οἷός ἐστι, σχολῇ εἰσσομαι εἰτε ἀρετῇ

τις οὐσα τυγχάνει εἰτε, καὶ οὐ, καὶ πότερον ὁ ἔχων αὐτὸ οὐκ εὐδαίμων ἴσθιν ἢ εὐδαίμων.

³ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 357.

not at all adopting his opinion as my own, but simply in order to provoke a full refutation of it from you, such as I have never yet heard from any one. First, I shall show what his partisans say as to the nature and origin of justice. Next, I shall show that all who practise justice, practise it unwillingly; not as good *per se*, but as a necessity. Lastly, I shall prove that such conduct on their part is reasonable. If these points can be made out, it will follow that the life of the unjust man is much better than that of the just.¹

the case
against
Sokrates,
though pro-
fessing not
to agree
with it.

The case, as set forth first by Glaukon, next by Adeimantus, making themselves advocates of Thrasymachus—is as follows. “To do injustice, is by nature good: to suffer injustice is by nature evil: but the last is greater as an evil, than the first as a good: so that when men have tasted of both, they find it advantageous to agree with each other, that none shall either do or suffer injustice. These agreements are embodied in laws; and what is prescribed by the law is called lawful and just. Here you have the generation and essence of justice, which is intermediate between what is best and what is worst: that is, between the power of committing injustice with impunity, and the liability to suffer injustice without protection or redress. Men acquiesce in such compromise, not as in itself good, but because they are too weak to commit injustice safely. For if any man were strong enough to do so, and had the dispositions of a man, he would not make such a compromise with any one: it would be madness in him to do so.”

Pleading of
Glaukon.
Justice is in
the nature
of a com-
promise for
all—a me-
dium be-
tween what
is best and
what is
worst.

“That men are just, only because they are too weak to be unjust, will appear if we imagine any of them, either the just or the unjust, armed with full power and impunity, such as would be conferred by the ring of Gyges, which rendered the wearer invisible at pleasure. If the just man could become thus privileged, he would act in the same manner as the unjust: his temper would never be adamantine enough to resist the temptations which naturally prompt every man to unlimited

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 358.

² Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 358-359.

satisfaction of his desires. Such temptations are now counter-acted by the force of law and opinion ; but if these sanctions were nullified, every man, just or unjust, would seize every thing that he desired, without regard to others. When he is just, he is so not willingly, but by compulsion. He chooses that course not as being the best for him absolutely, but as the best which his circumstances will permit.

“To determine which of the two is happiest, the just man or the unjust, let us assume each to be perfect in his part, and then compare them. The unjust man must be assumed to have at his command all means of force and fraud, so as to procure for himself the maximum of success ; i.e., the reputation of being a just man, along with all the profitable enormities of injustice. Against him we will set the just man, perfect in his own simplicity and righteousness ; a man who cares only for being just in reality, and not for seeming to be so. We shall suppose him, though really just, to be accounted by every one else thoroughly unjust. It is only thus that we can test the true value of his justice : for if he be esteemed just by others, he will be honoured and recompensed, so that we cannot be sure that his justice is not dictated by regard to these adventitious consequences. He must be assumed as just through life, yet accounted by every one else unjust, and treated accordingly : while the unjust man, with whom we compare him, is considered and esteemed by others as if he were perfectly just. Which of the two will have the happiest life ? Unquestionably the unjust man. He will have all the advantages derived from his unscrupulous use of means, together with all that extrinsic favour and support which proceeds from good estimation on the part of others : he will acquire superior wealth, which will enable him both to purchase partisans, and to offer costly sacrifices ensuring to him the patronage of the Gods. The just man, on the contrary, will not only be destitute of all these advantages, but will be exposed to a life of extreme suffering and torture. He will learn by painful experience that his happiness depends, not upon being really just, but upon being accounted just by others.”¹

Comparison of the happiness of the just man derived from his justice alone, when others are unjust to him, with that of the unjust man under parallel circumstances.

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 361-362.

Here Glaukon concludes. Adeimantus now steps in as second counsel on the same side, to the following effect:¹ "Much yet remains to be added to the argument. To make it clearer, we must advert to the topics insisted on by those who oppose Glaukon—those who panegyrisse justice and denounce injustice. A father, who exhorts his sons to be just, says nothing about the intrinsic advantages of justice *per se*: he dwells upon the beneficial consequences which will accrue to them from being just. Through such reputation they will obtain from men favours, honours, commands, prosperous alliances—from the Gods, recompenses yet more varied and abundant. If, on the contrary, they commit injustice, they will be disgraced and ill-treated among men, severely punished by the Gods. Such are the arguments whereby a father recommends justice, and dissuades injustice, he talks about opinions and after consequences only, he says nothing about justice or injustice in themselves. Such are the allegations even of those who wish to praise and enforce justice. But there are others, and many among them, who hold an opposite language, proclaiming unreservedly that temperance and justice are difficult to practise—injustice and intemperance easy and agreeable, though law and opinion brand them as disgraceful. These men affirm that the unjust life is for the most part more profitable than the just. They are full of panegyrics towards the wealthy and powerful, however unprincipled; despising the poor and weak, whom nevertheless they admit to be better men.² They even say that the Gods themselves entail misery upon many good men, and confer prosperity on the wicked. Then there come the prophets and jugglers, who profess to instruct rich men, out of many books, composed by Orpheus and Musæus, how they may by appropriate presents and sacrifices atone for all their crimes and die happy.³

"When we find that the case is thus stated respecting justice, both by its panegyrists and by its enemies—that the former extol it only from the reputation which it procures, and that

Pleading of Adeimantus on the same side. He cites advice given by fathers to their sons, recommending just behaviour by reason of its consequences.

¹ Plato, Republic, II. pp. 362-367.

² Plato, Republic, II. p. 364 A-B.

³ Plato, Republic, p. 364 C-E.

the latter promise to the unjust man, if clever and energetic, a higher recompense than any such reputation can obtain for him—what effect can we expect to be produced on the minds of young men of ability, station, and ambition? What course of life are they likely to choose? Surely they will thus reason: A just life is admitted to be burdensome—and it will serve no purpose, unless I acquire, besides, the reputation of justice in the esteem of others. Now the unjust man, who can establish such reputation, enjoys the perfection of existence. My happiness turns not upon the reality, but upon the seeming: upon my reputation with others.¹ Such reputation then it must be my aim to acquire. I must combine the real profit of injustice with the outside show and reputation of justice. Such combination is difficult: but all considerable enterprises are difficult: I must confederate with partisans to carry my point by force or fraud. If I succeed, I attain the greatest prize to which man can aspire. I may be told that the Gods will punish me; but the same poets, who declare the existence of the Gods, assure me also that they are placable by prayer and sacrifice: and the poets are as good authority on the one point as on the other.² Such” (continues Adeimantus) “will be the natural reasoning of a powerful, energetic, aspiring, man. How can we expect that such a man should prefer justice, when the rewards of injustice on its largest scale are within his reach?³ Unless he be averse to injustice, from some divine peculiarity of disposition—or unless he has been taught to abstain from it by the acquisition of knowledge,—he will treat the current encomiums on justice as ridiculous. No man is just by his own impulse. Weak men or old men censure injustice, because they have not force enough to commit it with success: which is proved by the fact than any one of them who acquires power, immediately becomes unjust as far as his power reaches.

“The case as I set it forth” (pursues Adeimantus) “admits of Nobody recommends Justice *per se*, but only no answer on the ground commonly taken by those who extol justice and blame injustice, from the earliest poets down to the present day.⁴ What they

¹ Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 365 E, 366 A.

² Plat. Rep. ii. p. 365 B-D.

³ Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 B-D

⁴ Plat. Rep. ii. p. 366 D-E. πάντες ἡμῶν, ὅσοι ἱκανοίται περὶ δικαιοσύνης εἶναι, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἄρ᾽ ἄρ᾽.

praise is not justice *per se*, but the reputation which by reason of the just man obtains, and the consequences flowing from it. What they blame is not injustice *per se*, but its results. They never commend, nor even mention, justice as it exists in and moulds the internal mind and character of the just man; even though he be unknown, misconceived and detested, by Gods as well as by men. Nor do they ever talk of the internal and intrinsic effects of injustice upon the mind of the unjust man, but merely of his ulterior prospects. They never attempt to show that injustice itself, in the mind of the unjust man, is the gravest intrinsic evil: and justice in the mind of the just man, the highest intrinsic good: apart from consequences on either side. If you had all held this language from the beginning, and had impressed upon us such persuasion from our childhood, there would have been no necessity for our keeping watch upon each other to prevent injustice. Every man would have been the best watch upon himself, through fear lest by becoming unjust he might take into his own bosom the gravest evil.¹

"Here therefore is a deficiency in the argument on behalf of justice, which I call upon you,² Sokrates, who have employed all your life in these meditations, to supply. You have declared justice to be good indeed for its consequences, but still more of a good from its own intrinsic nature. Explain how it is good, and how injustice is evil, in its own intrinsic nature: what effect each produces on the mind, so as to deserve such an appellation. Omit all notice of consequences accruing to the just or unjust man, from the opinion, favourable or otherwise, entertained towards him by others. You must even go farther: you must suppose that both

Adeimantus calls upon Sokrates to recommend and enforce Justice on its own grounds, and to explain how Justice in itself benefits the mind of the just man.

μενοι, ὅσων λόγῳ λελειμμένοι, μέχρι τῶν νῦν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδεὶς πώποτε ἐψέξεν ἀδικίαν οὐδ' ἐπῆνεσε δικαιοσύνην ἄλλως ἢ ὁφέως τε καὶ τιμᾶς καὶ δωρεᾶς τὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γιγνομένης· αὐτὸ δ' ἐκότερον τῇ αὐτοῦ δυνάμει ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐχόντος ψυχῇ ἔσθ' ἐνδὸν καὶ λατάνων θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὐτ' ἐν ποιήσει οὐτ' ἐν ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἐπεξέλαθεν ἱκανῶς τῷ λόγῳ, &c. Compare p. 363 E.

Whoever reads this, will see that Plato does not intend (as most of his commentators assert) that the arguments which Sokrates combats in the

Republic were the invention of Protagoras, Prodikus, and other Sophists of the Platonic century.

¹ Plato, Republic, II. p. 367 A. εἰ γὰρ οὕτως ἐλέγγοτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ὅμων, καὶ ἐκ νῦν ἡμᾶς ἐπιθετο, οὐκ ἂν ἀλλήλους ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς αὐτοῦ ἦν ἕκαστος φύλαξ, δεδιώς μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ ἐννοκεῖν ἢ.

² Plat. Rep. II. p. 367 E. διότι πάντα τὸν βίον οὐδὲν ἄλλο σκοπεῖν διεκλήλυθας ἢ τοῦτε (you, Sokrates).

of them are misconceived, and that the just man is disgraced and punished as if he were unjust—the unjust man honoured and rewarded as if he were just. This is the only way of testing the real intrinsic value of justice and injustice, considered in their effects upon the mind. If you expatiate on the consequences—if you regard justice as in itself indifferent, but valuable on account of the profitable reputation which it procures, and injustice as in itself profitable, but dangerous to the unjust man from the hostile sentiment and damage which it brings upon him—the real drift of your exhortation will be, to make us aspire to be unjust in reality, but to aim at maintaining a reputation of justice along with it. In that line of argument you will concede substantially the opinion of Thrasymachus—That justice is another man's good, the advantage of the more powerful : and injustice the good or profit of the agent, but detrimental to the weaker."¹

With the invocation here addressed to Sokrates, Adeimantus concludes his discourse. Like Glaukon, he disclaims participation in the sentiments which the speech embodies. Both of them, professing to be dissatisfied with the previous refutation of Thrasymachus by Sokrates, call for a deeper exposition of the subject. Both of them then enunciate a doctrine, resembling partially, though not entirely, that of Thrasymachus—but without his offensive manner, and with superior force of argument. They propose it as a difficult problem, which none but Sokrates can adequately solve. He accepts the challenge, though with apparent diffidence : and we now enter upon his solution, which occupies the remaining eight books and a half of the Republic. All these last books are in fact expository, though in the broken form of dialogue. The other speakers advance scarce any opinions for Sokrates to confute, but simply intervene with expressions of assent, or doubt, or demand for farther information.

I here repeat the precise state of the question, which is very apt to be lost amidst the mæanderings of a Platonic dialogue.

Statement of the question as it stands First, What is Justice? Sokrates had declared at

¹ Plat. Republic, II. p. 367 C-D.

the close of the first book, that he did not know what Justice was ; and that therefore he could not possibly decide, whether it was a virtue or not :—nor whether the possessor of it was happy or not.

after the speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. What Sokrates undertakes to prove.

Secondly, To which of the three classes of good things does Justice belong ? To the second class—i. e. things good *per se*, and good also in their consequences ? Or to the third class—i. e. things not good *per se*, but good only in their consequences ? Sokrates replies (in the beginning of the second book) that it belongs to the second class.

Evidently, these two questions cannot stand together. In answering the second, Sokrates presupposes a certain determination of the first ; inconsistent with that unqualified ignorance, of which he had just made profession. Sokrates now professes to know, not merely that Justice is a good, but to what class of good things it belongs. The first question has thus been tacitly dropped without express solution, and has given place to the second. Yet Sokrates, in providing his answer to the second, includes implicitly an answer to the first, so far as to assume that Justice is a good thing, and proceeds to show in what way it is good.

Some say that Justice is good (i. e. that it ensures, or at least contributes to, the happiness of the agent), but not *per se* : only in its ulterior consequences. Taken *per se*, it imposes privation, loss, self-denial ; diminishing instead of augmenting the agent's happiness. But taken along with its results, this preliminary advance is more than adequately repaid ; since without it the agent would not obtain from others that reciprocity of justice, forbearance, and good treatment without which his life would be intolerable.

If this last opinion be granted, Glaukon argues that Justice would indeed be good for weak and middling agents, but not for men of power and energy, who had a good chance of extorting the benefit without paying the antecedent price. And Thrasymachus, carrying this view still farther, assumes that there are in every society men of power who despotise over the rest ; and maintains that Justice consists, for the society generally, in obeying the orders of these despots. It is all gain to the strong, all loss to the weak. These latter profit by it in no other way

than by saving themselves from farther punishment or ill usage on the part of the strong.

Sokrates undertakes to maintain the opposite—That Justice is a good *per se*, ensuring the happiness of the agent by its direct and intrinsic effects on the mind :—whatever its ulterior consequences may be. He maintains indeed that these ulterior consequences are also good : but that they do not constitute the paramount benefit, or the main recommendation of Justice : that the good of Justice *per se* is much greater. In this point of view, Justice is not less valuable and necessary to the strong than to the weak. He proceeds to show, what Justice is, and how it is beneficial *per se* to the agent, apart from consequences : also, what Injustice is, and how it is injurious to the agent *per se*, apart from consequences.¹

He begins by affirming the analogy between an entire city or community, and each individual man or agent. There is justice (he says) in the entire city—and justice in each individual man. In the city, the characteristics of Justice are stamped in larger letters or magnified, so as to be more easily legible. We will therefore first read them in the city, and then apply the lesson to explain what appears in smaller type in the individual man.² We will trace the steps by which a city is generated, in order that we may see how justice and injustice spring up in it.

It is in this way that Plato first conducts us to the formation of a political community. A parallel is assumed between the entire city and each individual man : the city is a man on a great scale—the man is a city on a small scale. Justice belongs both to one and to the other. The city is described and analysed, not merely as a problem for its own sake, but in order that the relation between its constituent parts may throw light on the analogous constituent parts, which are assumed to exist in each individual man.³

The fundamental principle (Sokrates affirms) to which cities

¹ Plato, Republic, li. pp. 368 seq.

² Plato, Republic, li. pp. 368-369.

³ Plato, Republic, li. p. 369 A. τὴν τοῦ μείζοντος ὁμοιότητα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐλάττονος ἰδέᾳ ἐπισκοποῦντες.

or communities owe their origin, is, existence of wants and necessities in all men. No single man is sufficient for himself: every one is in want of many things, and is therefore compelled to seek communion or partnership with neighbours and auxiliaries. Reciprocal dealings begin: each man gives to others, and receives from others, under the persuasion that it is better for him to do so.¹ Common needs, helplessness of individuals apart, reciprocity of service when they are brought together—are the generating causes of this nascent association. The simplest association, comprising the mere necessities of life, will consist only of four or five men: the husbandman, builder, weaver, shoemaker, &c. It is soon found advantageous to all, that each of these should confine himself to his own proper business: that the husbandman should not attempt to build his own house or make his own shoes, but should produce corn enough for all, and exchange his surplus for that of the rest in their respective departments. Each man has his own distinct aptitudes and dispositions; so that he executes both more work and better work, by employing himself exclusively in the avocation for which he is suited. The division of labour thus becomes established, as reciprocally advantageous to all. This principle soon extends itself: new wants arise: the number of different employments is multiplied. Smiths, carpenters, and other artisans, find a place: also shepherds and herdsmen, to provide oxen for the farmer, wool and hides for the weaver and the shoemaker. Presently a farther sub-division of labour is introduced for carrying on exchange and distribution: markets are established: money is coined: foreign merchants will import and export commodities: dealers, men of weak body, and fit for sedentary work, will establish themselves to purchase wholesale the produce brought by the husbandman, and to sell it again by retail in quantities suitable for distribution. Lastly, the complement of the city will be made up by a section of labouring men who do jobs for hire: men of great bodily strength, though not adding much to the intelligence of the community.²

Fundamental principle, to which communities of mankind owe their origin—Reciprocity of want and service between individuals—No individual can suffice to himself.

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369.

² Plato, Republic, ii. p. 371.

It is remarkable that in this first outline of the city Plato recognises only free labour, not slave labour.

Moderate equipment of a sound and healthy city—Few wants.

Such is the full equipment of the sound and healthy city, confined to what is simple and necessary. Those who compose it will have sufficient provision of wheat and barley, for loaves and cakes—of wine to drink—of clothing and shoes—of houses for shelter, and of myrtle and yew twigs for beds. They will enjoy their cheerful social festivals, with wine, garlands, and hymns to the Gods. They will take care not to beget children in numbers greater than their means, knowing that the consequence thereof must be poverty or war.¹ They will have, as condiment, salt and cheese, olives, figs, and chestnuts, peas, beans, and onions. They will pass their lives in peace, and will die in a healthy old age, bequeathing a similar lot to their children. Justice and injustice, which we are seeking for, will be founded on a certain mode of mutual want and dealing with each other.²

You feed your citizens, Sokrates (observes Glaukon), as if you were feeding pigs. You must at least supply them with as many sweets and condiments as are common at Athens: and with beds and tables besidea.

Enlarge-ment of the city—Multiplied wants and services. First origin of war and strife with neighbours—It arises out of these multiplied wants.

I understand you (replies Sokrates): you are not satisfied with a city of genuine simplicity: you want a city luxurious and inflated. Well then—we will suppose it enlarged until it comprehends all the varieties of elegant and costly enjoyment: gold, silver, and ivory: musicians and painters in their various branches: physicians: and all the crowd of attendants required for a society thus enlarged. Such extension of consumption will carry with it a numerous population, who cannot be maintained from the lands belonging to the city. We shall be obliged to make war upon our neighbours and seize some of their lands. They too will do the same by us, if they have acquired luxurious habits. Here we see the first genesis of war, with all its consequent evils: springing from the acquisition of wealth, beyond the limit of necessity.³ Having war upon our hands, we need

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 372 B-C. οὐχ ὅπερ τὴν οὐσίαν ποιοῦμενοι τοὺς παῖδας, ἐκλαβόμενοι πενίαν ἢ πόλεμον.

² Plato, Republ. ii. p. 372 A. ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεῖα τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

³ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 373.

soldiers, and a considerable camp of them. Now war is essentially a separate craft and function, requiring to be carried on by persons devoted to it, who have nothing else to do. We laid down from the beginning, that every citizen ought to confine himself exclusively to that business for which he was naturally fit; and that no one could be allowed to engage in two distinct occupations. This rule is above all things essential for the business of war. The soldier must perform the duties of a soldier, and undertake no others.¹

The functions of these soldiers are more important than those of any one else. Upon them the security of the whole community depends. They are the Guardians of the city: or rather, those few seniors among them, who are selected from superior merit and experience, and from a more perfect education to exercise command, are the proper Guardians: while the remaining soldiers are their Auxiliaries.² These Guardians, or Guardians and their Auxiliaries, must be first chosen with the greatest care, to ensure that they have appropriate natural dispositions: next, their training and education must be continued as well as systematic. Appropriate natural dispositions are difficult to find: for we require the coincidence of qualities which are rarely found together. The Auxiliaries must be mild and gentle towards their fellow citizens, passionate and fierce towards enemies. They must be like generous dogs, full of kindness towards those whom they know, angrily disposed towards those whom they do not know.³

Assuming children of these dispositions to be found, we must provide for them the best training and education. The training must be twofold: musical, addressed to the mind: gymnastical, addressed to the body—pursuant to the distribution dating from ancient times.⁴ Music includes all training by means of words or

Separate class of soldiers or Guardians. One man cannot do well more than one business. Character required in the Guardians—Mildness at home with pugnacity against enemies.

Peculiar education necessary, musical as well as gymnastical.

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 374.

² Plato, Republic, ii. p. 414 B.

³ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376.

⁴ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E. *Τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; ἡ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βελτίον*

τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου εὐρημένης ἔστι δὲ που ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική.

This appeal of Plato to antiquity and established custom deserves notice.

sounds: speech and song, recital and repetition, reading and writing, &c.

The earliest training of every child begins from the stories or fables which he hears recounted: most of which are false, though some among them are true. We must train the child partly by means of falsehood, partly by means of truth: and we must begin first with the falsehood. The tenor of these fictions, which the child first hears, has a powerful effect in determining his future temper and character. But such fictions as are now currently repeated, will tend to corrupt his mind, and to form in him sentiments and opinions adverse to those which we wish him to entertain in after life. We must not allow the invention and circulation of stories at the pleasure of the authors: we must establish a censorship over all authors; licensing only such of their productions as we approve, and excluding all the rest, together with most of those now in circulation.¹ The fables told by Homer, Hesiod, and other poets, respecting the Gods and Heroes, are in very many cases pernicious, and ought to be suppressed. They are not true; and even were they true, ought not to be mentioned before children. Stories about battles between the Gods and the Giants, or quarrels among the Gods themselves, are mischievous, whether intended as allegories or not: for young hearers cannot discriminate the allegorical from the literal.²

I am no poet (continues the Platonic Sokrates), nor can I pretend to compose legends myself: but I shall lay down a type of theological orthodoxy, to which all the divine legends in our city must conform. Every poet must proclaim that the Gods are good, and therefore cannot be the cause of anything except good. No poet can be allowed to describe the Gods (according to what we now read in Homer and elsewhere) as dispensing both good and evil to mankind.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 377 C. *ὅτι καὶ οἱ θεοὶ λέγουσι τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκβαλτέον.*
Compare the animadversions in Sextus Empiricus about the mischie-

vous doctrines to be found in the poets, *adv. Mathematicos*, i. s. 276-293.

² Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 378 D.

The Gods must be announced as causes of all the good which exists, but other causes must be found for all the evil: the Gods therefore are causes of comparatively few things, since bad things are far more abundant among us than good.¹ No poetical tale can be tolerated which represents the Gods as assuming the forms of different persons, and going about to deceive men into false beliefs.² Falsehood is odious both to Gods and to men: though there are some cases in which it is necessary as a precaution against harm, towards enemies, or even towards friends during seasons of folly or derangement.³ But none of these exceptional circumstances can apply to the Gods.

fore they are causes of few things. Great preponderance of actual evil.

It is indispensable to inspire these youthful minds with courage, and to make them fear death as little as possible. But the terrific descriptions, given by the poets, of Hades and the underworld, are above all things likely to aggravate the fear of death. Such descriptions must therefore be interdicted, as neither true nor useful. Even if poetically striking, they are all the more pernicious to be listened to by youths whom we wish to train up as spirited free-men, fearing enslavement more than death.⁴ We must also prohibit the representations of intense grief and distress, imputed by Homer to Heroes or Gods, to Achilles, Priam, or Zeus, for the death of friends and relatives. A perfectly reasonable man will account death no great evil, either for himself or for his friend: he will be, in a peculiar degree, sufficient to himself for his own happiness, and will therefore endure with comparative equanimity the loss of friends, relatives, or fortune.⁵ We must teach youth to be ashamed of indulging in immoderate grief or in violent laughter.⁶ We must teach them also veracity and tem-

The Guardians must not fear death. No terrible descriptions of Hades must be presented to them: no intense sorrow, nor violent nor sensual passion, must be recounted either of Gods or Heroes.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 379 C. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἰτίας, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίας, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τάχα θάνατον κακῶς ἦναι. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδὲνα ἄλλον αἰτιατόν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἅλλ' ἔργα θεῶν ὄντων τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

² Plato, *Republic*, ii. pp. 380-381.

Dacier blames Plato for this as an

error, saying, that God may appear, and has appeared to men, under the form of an Angel or of some man whom he has created after his own image (*Traduction de Platon*, tom. i. p. 172).

³ Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 382 C.

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, iii. pp. 386-387.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 387 D-E.

⁶ Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 388 E-E.

perance, striking out all those passages in Homer which represent the Gods or Heroes as incontinent, sensual, furiously vindictive, reckless of obligation, or money-loving.¹ The poets must either not recount such proceedings at all, or must not ascribe them to Gods and Heroes.

We have thus prescribed the model to which all poets must accommodate their narratives respecting Gods and Heroes. We ought now to set out a similar model for their narratives respecting men. But this is impossible, until our present investigation is brought to a close: because one of the worst misrepresentations which the poets give of human affairs, is, when they say that there are many men unjust, yet happy—just, yet still miserable:—that successful injustice is profitable, and that justice is a benefit to other persons, but a loss to the agent. We affirm that this is a misrepresentation; but we cannot assume it as such at present, since the present enquiry is intended to prove that it is so.²

From the substance of these stories we pass to the style and manner. The poet will recount either in his own person, by simple narrative: or he will assume the characters and speak in the names of others, thus making his composition imitative. He will imitate every diversity of character, good and bad, wise and foolish. This however cannot be tolerated in our city. We can permit no imitation except that of the reasonable and virtuous man. Every man in our city exercises one simple function: we have no double-faced or many-faced citizens. We shall respectfully dismiss the poet who captivates us by variety of characters, and shall be satisfied with the dry recital of simple stories useful in their tendency, expressing the feeling of the reasonable man and no other.³

We must farther regulate the style of the Odes and Songs, consistent with what has been already laid down. Having prescribed what the sense of the words must be, we must now give directions about melody and rhythm. We shall permit nothing but simple music,

Style of narratives. The poet must not practise variety of imitation: he must not speak in the name of bad characters.

Rhythm and Melody regulated. None but simple and grave music

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 390-391.

² Plato, Republic, iii. p. 392 G.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 396-398.

calculated less to please the ear, than to inspire grave, dignified, and resolute sentiment. We shall not allow either the wailing Lydian, or the soft and convivial Ionic mood: but only the Phrygian and Dorian moods. Nor shall we tolerate either the fife, or complicated stringed instruments: nothing except the lyre and harp, with the panspipe for rural abodes.¹ The rhythm or measure must also be simple, suitable to the movements of a calm and moderate man. Both good rhythm, graceful and elegant speaking, and excellence of sense, flow from good and virtuous dispositions, tending to inspire the same dispositions in others: ² just as bad rhythm, ungraceful and indecorous demeanour, defective proportion, &c., are companions of bad speech and bad dispositions. Contrasts of this kind pervade not only speech and song, but also every branch of visible art: painting, architecture, weaving, embroidery, pottery, and even the natural bodies of animals and plants. In all of them we distinguish grace and beauty, the accompaniments of a good and sober disposition—from ungracefulness and deformity, visible signs of the contrary disposition. Now our youthful Guardians, if they are ever to become qualified for their functions, must be trained to recognise and copy such grace and beauty.³ For this purpose our poets, painters, architects, and artisans, must be prohibited from embodying in their works any ungraceful or unseemly type. None will be tolerated as artists, except such as can detect and embody the type of the beautiful. Our youth will thus insensibly contract exclusive familiarity, both through the eye and through the ear, with beauty in its various manifestations: so that their minds will be brought into harmonious preparation for the subsequent influence of beautiful discourse.⁴

This indeed (continues Sokrates) is the principal benefit arising from musical tuition, that the internal mind of a youth becomes imbued with rhythm and harmony. Hence he learns to commend and be delighted with the beautiful, and to hate and blame what is ugly; before he is able to render any reason for his sentiments: so that when mature age arrives, his

allowed:
only the
Dorian and
Phrygian
moods,
with the
lyre and
harp.

Effect of
musical
training of
the mind
—makes
youth love
the Beautiful
and hate
the Ugly.

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 398-399.

² Plato, Republic, iii. p. 400 A.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 400-401.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 401 C-D.

sentiments are found in unison with what reason enjoins, and already predisposed to welcome it.¹ He becomes qualified to recognise the Forms of Temperance, Courage, Liberality, Magnanimity, and their embodiments in particular persons. To a man brought up in such sentiments, no spectacle can be so lovely as that of youths combining beauty of mental disposition with beauty of exterior form. He may indeed tolerate some defects in the body, but none in the mind.² His love, being genuine and growing out of musical and regulated contemplations, will attach itself to what is tempered and beautiful; not to the intense pleasures of sense, which are inconsistent with all temperance. Such will be the attachments subsisting in our city, and such is the final purpose of musical training—To generate love of the Beautiful.³

We next proceed to gymnastic training, which must be simple, for the body—just as our musical training was simple for the mind. We cannot admit luxuries and refinements either in the one or in the other. Our gymnastics must impart health and strength to the body, as our music imparts sobriety to the mind.⁴ We shall require few courts of justice and few physicians. Where many of either are needed, this is a proof that ill-regulated minds and diseased bodies abound. It would be a disgrace to our Guardians if they could not agree on what is right and proper among themselves, without appealing to the decision of others. Physicians too are only needed for wounds or other temporary and special diseases. We cannot admit those refinements of the medical art, and that elaborate nomenclature and classification of diseases, which the clever sons of Æsculapius have invented, in times more recent than Æsculapius himself.⁵ He knew, but despised, such artifices; which, having been devised chiefly by Herodikus, serve only to keep alive sickly and suffering men—who are disqualified for all active duty through the necessity of perpetual

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 A.
 Plato, Republic, iii. p. 402 D-E.
 Plato, Republic, iii. p. 403 C. δεῖ
 δὲ πον τελευτῆς τὰ μουσικὰ εἰς τὰ τοῦ
 καλοῦ ἐρωτικά.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 404 B.

Plato, Republic, iii. p. 406 D. φύσας C.

τε καὶ κατάρρους νοσημάτων ὀνόματα
 τίθεσθαι ἀναγκάζειν τοὺς κομψοὺς Ἀσ-
 κλητίδας, οὐκ εἰσχυρὸν δοκεῖ; Καὶ
 μάλ', εἶπῃ, ὡς ἀληθῶς κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ
 εἶτοτα νοσημάτων ὀνόματα. Οἷα, ὡς
 οἶμαι, οὐκ ἔν' Ἀσκληπιού. Also 406

attention to health,—and whose lives are worthless both to themselves and to the city. In our city, every man has his distinct and special function, which he is required to discharge. If he be disqualified by some temporary ailment, the medical art will be well employed in relieving and restoring him to activity: but he has no leisure to pass his life as a patient under cure, and if he be permanently unfit to fill his place in the established cycle of duties, his life ought not to be prolonged by art, since it is useless to himself and useless to the city also.¹ Our medical treatment for evils of the body, and our judicial treatment for evils of the mind, must be governed by analogous principles. Where body and mind are sound at bottom, we must do our best to heal temporary derangements: but if a man has a body radically unsound, he must be suffered to die—and if he has a mind unsound and incurable, he must be put to death by ourselves.²

Gymnastic training does some good in strengthening the body, but it is still more serviceable in imparting force and courage to the mind. As regards the mind, gymnastic and music form the indispensable supplement one to the other. Gymnastic by itself makes a man's nature too savage and violent: he acquires no relish for knowledge, comes to hate discourse, and disdains verbal persuasion.³ On the other hand, music by itself makes him soft, cowardly, and sensitive, unfit for danger or hardship. The judicious combination of the two is the only way to form a well-balanced mind and character.⁴

Such must be the training, from childhood upwards, of these Guardians and Auxiliaries of our city. We must now select from among these men themselves, a few to be Governors or chief Guardians; the rest serving as auxiliaries. The oldest and best of them must be chosen for this purpose, those who possess in the

Value of
Gymnastic
in impart-
ing courage
to the mind
—Gymnas-
tic and
Music ne-
cessary to
correct each
other.

Out of the
Guardians
a few of the
very best
must be
chosen as
Elders or
Rulers—

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 406 C. οὐδὲν σχολὴν διὰ βίου κάμνειν ἰατρονομόν.
406 D: οὐ σχολὴν κάμνειν οὐδὲ λυσίτελει οὕτω ζῆν, νοσήματι τὸν νοῦν προσέχοντα, τῆς δὲ προκειμένης ἐργασίας ἀμελοῦντα.
407 D-E: ἀλλὰ τὸν μὴ δυνάμενον ἐν τῇ καθυσταμένη περιόδῳ ζῆν, μὴ οἰσθαι δεῖν θεραπεύειν, ὥς οὔτε αὐτὸς οὔτε πόλει λυσι-

τελῇ. P. 408 A.

² Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 400-410.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 411 D. Μουσὴ δὲ ὁ τοιοῦτος γίγνεται καὶ ἄμουνος, καὶ πειθεῖ μὲν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἐτι χρῆται, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 410-411.

highly educated and severely tested.

greatest perfection the qualities requisite for Guardians. They must be intelligent, capable, and solicitous for the welfare of the city. Now a man is solicitous for the welfare of that which he loves. He loves those whose interests he believes to be the same as his own; those whose well-being he believes to coincide with his own well-being¹—the contrary, with the contrary. The Guardians chosen for Chiefs must be those who are most thoroughly penetrated with such sympathy; who have preserved most tenaciously throughout all their lives the resolution to do every thing which they think best for the city, and nothing which they do not think to be best for it. They must be watched and tested in temptations pleasurable as well as painful, to see whether they depart from this resolution. The elders who have best stood such trial, must be named Governors.² These few will be the chief Guardians or Rulers: the remaining Guardians will be their auxiliaries or soldiers, acting under their orders.

Fundamental creed required to be planted in the minds of all the citizens, respecting their breed and relationship.

Here then our city will take its start; the body of Guardians marching in arms under the orders of their Chiefs, and encamping in a convenient acropolis, from whence they may best be able to keep order in the interior and to repel foreign attack.³ But it is indispensable that both they and the remaining citizens should be made to believe a certain tale,—which yet is altogether fictitious and of our own invention. They must be told that they are all earthborn, sprung from the very soil which they inhabit: all therefore brethren, from the same mother Earth: the auxiliaries or soldiers, born with their arms and equipments. But there was this difference (we shall tell them) between the different brethren. Those fit for Chiefs or Rulers, were born with a certain mixture of gold in their constitution: those fit for soldiers or Guardians simply, with a like mixture of silver: the remainder, with brass or iron.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 412 C. Οὐκ οὖν φρονίμους τε εἰς τοῦτο δεῖ ὑπάρχειν καὶ δυνατοὺς καὶ ἐπὶ κηδεμόνας τῆς πόλεως; Ἔστι ταῦτα. Κηδεῖν δὲ γ' ἂν τις μάλιστα τοῦτον ὃ τυγχάνοι φίλων. Ἀνάγκη. Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φίλοι, ὃ ζυμφέρειν ἡγοῖτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτῶ καὶ

ὅταν μάλιστα ἐκείνου μὲν εὖ πράττοντος οἴοιτο συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτῶ εὖ πράττειν, μὴ δέ, τούναντίον.

² Plato, *Republic*, iii. pp. 412-414.

³ Refer to *De Leg.* (I. p. 633-636-637) about resisting pleasure as well as pain.

³ Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 416 D.

In most individual cases, each of these classes will beget an offspring like themselves. But exceptions will sometimes happen, in which the golden man will have a child of silver, or brass,—or the brazen or iron man, a child of nobler metal than his own. Now it is of the last importance that the Rulers should keep watch to preserve the purity of these breeds. If any one of their own children should turn out to be of brass or iron, they must place him out among the husbandmen or artisans: if any of the brazen or iron men should chance to produce a child of gold, they must receive him among themselves, since he belongs to them by his natural constitution. Upon the maintenance of these distinct breeds, each in its appropriate function, depends the entire fate of the city: for an oracle has declared that it will perish, if ever iron or brazen men shall become its Guardians.¹

It is indispensable (continues Sokrates) that this fiction should be circulated and accredited, as the fundamental, consecrated, unquestioned, creed of the whole city, from which the feeling of harmony and brotherhood among the citizens springs. But how can we implant such unanimous and unshaken belief, in a story altogether untrue? Similar fables have often obtained implicit credence in past times: but no such case has happened of late, and I question whether it could happen now.² The postulate seems extravagant: do you see by what means it could be realised? —I see no means (replies Glaukon) by which the fiction could be first passed off and accredited, among these men themselves: but if it were once firmly implanted, in any one generation, I do not doubt that their children and descendants would inherit and perpetuate it.³ We must be satisfied with thus much (replies Sokrates): assuming the thing to be done, and leaving the process of implanting it to spontaneous and

How is such a fiction to be accredited in the first instance? Difficulty, extreme of first beginning: but if once accredited, it will easily transmit itself by tradition.

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 414-415.

² Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414 B. Τίς ἂν οὖν τῶν μηχανῶν γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δόξῃ γιγνομένων, ὧν δὴ νῦν ἀλλοίμεθα, γενναῖον τι ἐν ψευδομένοις πείσαι μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν; . . . Μερὶν καινόν, ἀλλὰ φοινικικόν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἦν πολλοῦ γένος, ὥς φασιν

οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πεινέουσιν, ἐφ' ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ γιγνόντες οὐδ' οἷδα εἰ γινόμενον ἂν, πείσαι δὲ συχνὴς πεισούς.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 C-D. Τοῦτον οὖν τὸν μῦθον ὅπως ἂν πείσθωμεν, ἔχεις τινὰ μηχανήν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη, ὅπως γ' ἂν αὐτοὶ οὕτοι ὅπως μὲντ' ἂν οἱ τούτων νικῶσι καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα, οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὕστερον.

oracular inspiration.¹ I now proceed with the description of the city.

The Rulers and their auxiliaries the body of Guardians must be lodged in residences, sufficient for shelter and comfort, yet suitable for military men, and not for tradesmen. Every arrangement must be made for rendering them faithful guardians of the remaining citizens. It would be awful indeed, if they were to employ their superior strength in oppressing instead of protecting the flock entrusted to them. To ensure their gentleness and fidelity, the most essential guarantee is to be found in the good musical and gymnastic training which they will have received. But this alone will not suffice. All the conditions of their lives must be so determined, that they shall have the least possible motive for committing injustice towards the other citizens. None of them must have any separate property of his own, unless in special case of proved necessity: nor any house or store cupboard from which others are excluded. They must receive, from the contributions of the remaining citizens, sufficient subsistence for the health and comfort of military men, but nothing beyond. They must live together in their camp or barrack, and dine together at a public mess-table. They must not be allowed either to possess gold and silver, or to drink in cups of those metals, or to wear them as appendages to clothing, or even to have them under the same roof. They must be told, that these metals, though not forbidden to the other citizens, are forbidden to them, because they have permanently inherent in their mental constitution the divine gold and silver, which would be corrupted by intermixture with human.²

If these precautions be maintained, the Guardians may be secure themselves, and may uphold in security the entire city. But if the precautions be relinquished—if the Guardians or Soldiers acquire separate property in lands, houses, and money—they will then become householders and husbandmen instead of

Guardians to reside in barracks and mess together; to have no private property or home; to be maintained by contribution from the people.

If the Guardians fall in these precautions, and acquire private interests, the

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 415 D. Kai τοῦτο μὲν δὴ ἔχει ὅτι ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ φύσις ἀγάρη.

² Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 416-417.

Guardians or Soldiers: hostile masters, instead of allies and protectors to their fellow-citizens. They will hate their fellow-citizens, and be hated by them in return: they will conspire against them, and will be themselves conspired against. In this manner they will pass their lives, dreading their enemies within far more than their enemies without. They, and the whole city along with them, will be perpetually on the brink of destruction.¹

But surely (remarks Adeimantus), according to this picture, your Guardians or Soldiers, though masters of all the city, will be worse off than any of the other citizens. They will be deprived of those means of happiness which the others are allowed to enjoy. Perhaps they will (replies Sokrates): yet I should not be surprised if they were to be the happiest of all. Be that as it may, however, my purpose is, not to make *them* especially happy, but to make the whole city happy. The Guardians can enjoy only such happiness as consists with the due performance of their functions as Guardians. Every man in our city must perform his appropriate function, and must be content with such happiness as his disposition will admit, subject to this condition.² In regard to all the citizens without exception, it must be the duty of the Guardians to keep out both riches and poverty, both of which spoil the character of every one. No one must be rich, and no one must be poor.³ In case of war, the constant discipline of our soldiers will be of more avail than money, in making them efficient combatants against other cities.⁴ Moreover, other cities are divided against themselves: each is many cities, and not one: poor and rich are at variance with each other, and various fractions of each of these classes against other fractions. Our city alone, constituted as I propose, will be really and truly One. It will thus be the greatest of all cities, even though it have only one thousand fighting men. It may be permitted to increase, so long as it will preserve its complete unity, but no farther.⁵ Farthermore, each of our citizens is one and not many: confined to that special function for which he is qualified by his nature.

Complete unity of the city, every man performing his own special function.

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 417 A-B.

² Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 420-421.

³ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 E.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 422 B.

⁵ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 423 A.

It will devolve upon our Guardians to keep up this form of communion unimpaired; and they will have no difficulty in doing so, as long as they maintain their own education and training unimpaired. No change must be allowed either in the musical or gymnastic training: especially not in the former, where changes are apt to creep in, with pernicious effect.¹ Upon this education depends the character and competence of the Guardians. They will provide legislation in detail, which will be good, if their general character is good—bad, on the contrary supposition. If their character and the constitution of the city be defective at the bottom, it is useless for us to prescribe regulations of detail, as we would do for sick men. The laws in detail cannot be good, while the general constitution of the city is bad. Those teachers are mistaken who exhort us to correct the former, but to leave the latter untouched.²

In regard to religious legislation—the raising of temples, arrangement of sacrifices, &c.—we must consult Apollo at Delphi, and obey what he directs. We know nothing ourselves about these matters, nor is there any other authority equally trustworthy.³

Our city is now constituted and peopled (continues Sokrates). We must examine it, and see where we can find Justice and Injustice—reverting to our original problem, which was, to know what each of them was, and which of the two conferred happiness. Now assuming our city to be rightly constituted, it will be perfectly good: that is, it will be wise, courageous, temperate, and just. These four constituents cover the whole: accordingly, if we can discover and set out Wisdom, Courage, and Temperance—that which remains afterwards will be Justice.⁴

First, we can easily see where Wisdom resides. The city includes in itself a great variety of cognitions, corresponding to all the different functions in which its citizens are employed. But it is not called *wise*, from

The maintenance of the city depends upon that of the habits, character, and education of the Guardians.

Religious legislation—Consult the Delphian Apollo.

The city is now constituted as a good city—that is, wise, courageous, temperate, just. Where is its Justice?

First, where is the wisdom of the city? It

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 421 A.

² Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 425-426.

³ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 427 B. τὰ

γὰρ δὴ τοιαῦτα οὐτ' ἐπιστάμεθα ἡμεῖς, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 427-428.

its knowledge of husbandry, or of brazier's and carpenter's craft : since these are specialties which cover only a small fraction of its total proceedings. It is called *wisdom*, or well-advised, from that variety of intelligence or cognition which directs it as a whole, in its entire affairs : that is, the intelligence possessed by the chief Guardians or Rulers. Now the number of persons possessing this variety of intelligence is smaller than the number of those who possess any other variety. The wisdom of the entire city resides in this very small presiding fraction, and in them alone.¹

resides in
the few
elder
Rulers.

Next, we can also discern without difficulty in what fraction of the city Courage resides. The city is called courageous from the valour of those Guardians or Soldiers upon whom its defence rests. These men will have learnt, in the course of their training, what are really legitimate objects of fear, and what are not legitimate objects of fear. To such convictions they will resolutely adhere, through the force of mind implanted by their training, in defiance of all disturbing impulses. It is these right convictions, respecting the legitimate objects of fear, which I (says Sokrates) call true political courage, when they are designedly inculcated and worked in by regular educational authority : when they spring up without any rational foundation, as in animals or slaves, I do not call them Courage. The Courage of the entire city thus resides in its Guardians or Soldiers.²

Where is the
Courage?
In the body
of Guardians
or Soldiers.

Thirdly, wherein resides the Temperance of the city ? Temperance implies a due relation, proportion, or accord, between different elements. The temperate man is called superior to himself : but this expression, on first hearing, seems unmeaning, since the man must also be inferior to himself. But the expression acquires a definite meaning, when we recognise it as implying that there are in the same man's mind better and worse elements : and that when the better rules over the worse, he is called superior to himself, or temperate—when the worse rules over the better, he is called inferior to himself, or intemperate. Our city will be temperate, because

Where is
the Temperance?
It resides in
all and each,
Rulers,
Guardians,
and People.
Superiors
rule and
Inferiors
obey.

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 422-429.

² Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 429-430.

the better part of it, though smaller in number, rules over the worse and inferior part, numerically greater. The pleasures, pains, and desires of our few Rulers, which are moderate and reasonable, are preponderant : controuling those of the Many, which are miscellaneous, irregular, and violent. And this command is exercised with the perfect consent and good-will of the subordinates. The Many are not less willing to obey than the Few to command. There is perfect unanimity between them as to the point—Who ought to command, and who ought to obey ? It is this unanimity which constitutes the temperance of the city : which thus resides, not in any one section of the city, like Courage and Wisdom, but in all sections alike : each recognising and discharging its legitimate function.¹

There remains only Justice for us to discover. Wherein does the Justice of the city reside ? Not far off. Its justice consists in that which we pointed out at first as the fundamental characteristic of the city, when we required each citizen to discharge one function, and one alone—that for which he was best fitted by nature. That each citizen shall do his own work, and not meddle with others in their work—that each shall enjoy his own property, as well as do his own work—this is true Justice.² It is the fundamental condition without which neither temperance, nor courage, nor wisdom could exist ; and it fills up the good remaining after we have allowed for the effects of the preceding three.³ All the four are alike indispensable to make up the entire Good of the city : Justice, or each person (man, woman, freeman, slave, craftsman, guardian) doing his or her own work—Temperance, or unanimity as to command and obedience between Chiefs, Guardians, and the remaining citizens—Courage, or the adherence of the Guardians to right reason, respecting what is terrible and not terrible—Wisdom, or the tutelary superintendence of the Chiefs,

Where is the Justice ? In all and each of them also. It consists in each performing his own special function, and not meddling with the function of the others.

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 431-432.
² Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 432-433.
 433 A : Καὶ μὴν οὐτι γὰρ τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλως τε πολλῶν ἀπεκτάμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν.

433 E. ἡ τοῦ οἰκείου τε καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις τε καὶ πρᾶξις δικαιοσύνη ἐν ὁμολο-

γοῖο.

³ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 B. δοκεῖ μοι τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὡς ἐσκεμμένα, συμφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ φρονήσεως, τοῦτο εἶναι δὲ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχειν ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γὰρ σωτηρίαν παρέχειν, ὥς περ ἂν ἐντῇ.

who protect each person in the enjoyment of his own property.¹

As justice consists in each person doing his own work, and not meddling with that of another—so injustice occurs, when a person undertakes the work of another instead of his own, or in addition to his own. The mischief is not great, when such interference takes place only in the subordinate functions: when, for example, the carpenter pretends to do the work of the shoemaker, or *vice versa*; or when either of them undertake both. But the mischief becomes grave and deplorable, when a man from the subordinate functions meddles with the higher—when a craftsman, availing himself of some collateral support, wealth or party or strength, thrusts himself into the functions of a soldier or auxiliary—or when the Guardian, by similar artifice, usurps the functions of a Chief—or when any one person combines these several functions all at once in himself. Herein consists the true injustice, ruinous to the city: when the line of demarcation is confounded between these three classes—men of business, Guardians, Chiefs. That each of these classes should do its own work, is Justice: that either of them should meddle with the work of the rest, and especially that the subordinate should meddle with the business of the superior, is Injustice, with ruin following in its train.² It is from these opposite characteristics that the titles Just or Unjust will be rightfully bestowed upon our city.

Injustice arises when any one part of the city interferes with the functions of the other part, or undertakes double functions.

We must now apply, as we undertook to do, the analogy of the city to the individual. The just man, so far forth as justice is concerned, cannot differ from the just city. He must therefore have in his own individual mind three distinct parts, elements, or classes, corresponding to the three classes above distinguished in the city. But is it the fact that there are in each man three such mental constituents—three different classes, sorts, or varieties, of mind?

Analogy of the city to the individual—Each man is tripartite, having in his mind Reason, Energy, Appetite. These three

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 433 D.

² Plato, Republic, iv. p. 434 B-C. ἡ τριῶν ἀρα ὄντων γένων πολυπραγμοσύνη καὶ μεταβολὴ εἰς ἄλλα, μεγίστη τε βλάβη τῇ πόλει καὶ ὁρθότατ' ἀν' προσαγο-

ρεύονται μάλιστα κακουργία . . . Κακουργίαν δὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῆς ἰαυτοῦ πόλεως οὐκ ἀδικίαν φήσους εἶναι; . . . χροματιστικῷ, ἐπικουρικῷ, φυλακικῷ, γίνουσι οἰκισπραγία, . . . δικαιο-

elements
are distinct,
and often
conflicting.

To settle this point as it ought to be settled, would require a stricter investigation than our present dialogue will permit : but we may contribute something towards it.¹ It is manifest that there exist different individuals in whom reason, energy (courage or passion), and appetite, are separately and unequally developed : thus in the Thracians there is a predominance of energy or courage—in the Phœnicians, of appetite—in the Athenians, of intellect or reason. The question is, whether we employ one and the same mind for all the three—reason, energy, and appetite ; or whether we do not employ a different mind or portion of mind, when we exercise reason—another, when we are under the influence of energy—and a third, when we follow appetite.²

To determine this question, we must consider that the same thing cannot at the same time do or suffer opposites, in the same respect and with reference to the same thing. The same thing or person cannot at the same time, and in the same respect, both stand still and move. This may be laid down as an universal truth : but since some may not admit it to be so, we will at any rate assume it as an hypothesis.³ Now in reference to the mind, we experience at the same time various movements or affections contrary to each other : assent and dissent—desire and aversion—the attracting any thing to ourselves, and the repelling it from ourselves : each of these is different from and contrary to the other. As a specimen of desires, we will take thirst. When a man is in this condition, his mind desires nothing else but to drink ; and strains entirely towards that object. If there be any thing which drags back his mind when in this condition, it must be something different from that which pulls him forward and attracts him to drink. That which attracts him, and that which repels him, cannot be the same : just as when the archer at the same time pulls his bow towards him and pushes it away from him, it is one of his hands that pulls and another that pushes.⁴

*οὐκ ἔστιν ἂν εἷς, καὶ τὴν πόλιν δικαίαν
πάρεχαι.*

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 435 C.

Schleiermacher (in the Introduction to his translation of the Republic, p. 71) considers that this passage of the Republic is intended to note as a desideratum the exposition in the

Timæus ; wherein the constituent elements of mind or soul are more fully laid down, and its connection with the fundamental elements of the Kosmos.

² Plato, Republic, iv. p. 436 A.

³ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 437 A.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 A-B.

Now it often happens that a man athirst refuses to drink : there is something within him that prompts him to drink, and something still more powerful that forbids him. These two cannot be the same : one of them is different from the other : that which prompts is appetite, that which forbids is reason. The rational element of the mind is in like manner something different or distinguishable from all the appetites, which tend towards repletion and pleasure.

Here then we have two distinct species, forms, or kinds, existing in the mind.¹ Besides these two, however, there is a third, distinct from both: Energy, Passion, Courage, which neither belongs to Appetite nor to Reason. Each of these three acts apart from, and sometimes in contrariety to, each of the others.² There are thus three distinct elements or varieties of mind in the individual—Reason, Energy, Appetite: corresponding to the three constituent portions of the city—The Chiefs or Rulers—The Guardians or Soldiers—The Craftsmen, or the remaining Community.³ The Wisdom of the city resides in its Elders: that of the individual in his Reason. The Courage of the city resides in its Guardians or Soldiers: that of the individual in his Energy. But in the city as well as in the individual, it is the right and privilege of the rational element to exercise command, because it alone looks to the welfare and advantage of the whole compound:⁴ it is the duty of the two other elements—the energetic and the appetitive—to obey. It is moreover the special function of the Guardians in the city to second the Chiefs in enforcing obedience upon the Craftsmen: so also in the individual, it is the special function of Energy or Courage to second Reason in controuling Appetite.

These special functions of the separate parts being laid down,

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 439 E. Ταῦτα μὲν τοῖσιν δύο ἡμῖν ὁρισθῶν εἶδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἰδέσθαι, &c.

² Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 440-441.

³ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 C. τὰ αὐτὰ μὲν ἐν πόλει, τὰ αὐτὰ δ' ἐν ἑνὶ ἀνθρώπῳ τῇ ψυχῇ γίνεσθαι εἰσὶναι, καὶ ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν. 443 D: τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γίγναι, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 441 E, 442 C. τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἀρχεῖν προσήκει, σοφὸς ὅντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἀνάσσει τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν Σοφὸν δὲ γε (ἵνα ἑκάστον καλοῦμεν) ἕκαστον τῷ σμικροῦ μίμνει, τῷ δ' ἄρχῃ τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ταῦτα παρῆγγελλεν, ἔχον αὐτὸν κάκεινο ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὐτῷ τὴν τοῦ ἐμφέροντος ἑκάστην τε καὶ ὅλην τῇ κοινῇ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων.

A man is just when these different parts of his mind exercise their appropriate functions without hindrance.

Justice as well as Temperance will appear analogous in the individual and in the city. Both Justice and Temperance reside in all the parts equally: not in one of them exclusively, as Wisdom and Courage reside. Justice and Temperance belong to the subordinate as well as to the dominant parts. Justice exists when each of the parts performs its own function, without encroaching on the function of the others: Temperance exists when all the parts are of one opinion as to the title of the higher or rational element to exercise command.¹

A man as well as a city is just, when each of his three sorts or varieties of mind confines itself to its own legitimate function: when Reason reigns over and controuls the other two, and when Energy seconds Reason in controuling Appetite. Such a man will not commit fraud, theft, treachery, perjury, or any like proceedings.² On the contrary, injustice exists when the parts are in conflict with each other: when either of them encroaches on the function of the other: or when those parts which ought to be subordinate rise in insurrection against that which ought to be superior.

Justice is in the mind what health is in the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be controuled pursuant to the dictates of nature. Injustice is in the mind what disease is in the body, when the parts are so arranged as to controul and be controuled contrary to the dictates of nature. Virtue is thus the health, beauty, good condition of the mind: Vice is the disease, ugliness, weakness, of the mind.³

Having thus ascertained the nature of justice and injustice, we are now in a condition (continues Sokrates) to reply to the question proposed for investigation—Is it profitable to a man to be just and to do justice *per se*, even though he be not known as just either by Gods or men, and may thus be debarred from the consequences which would ensue if he were known? Or is it profitable to him to be unjust, if

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442 C, 443 B.

² Plato, Republic, iv. pp. 442-443.

³ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 444 B-C.

he can contrive to escape detection and punishment? We are enabled to answer the first question in the affirmative, and the second question in the negative.

from all consequences?
Answer—
Yes.

As health is the greatest good, and sickness the greatest evil, of body: so Justice is the greatest good, and injustice the greatest evil, of mind. No measure of luxury, wealth, or power, could render life tolerable, if we lost our bodily health: no amount of prosperity could make life tolerable, without mental health or justice. As bodily health is good *per se*, and sickness evil *per se*, even apart from its consequences: so justice also is good in itself, and injustice evil in itself, apart from its consequences.¹

Sokrates now assumes the special question of the dialogue to be answered, and the picture of the just or perfect city, as well as of the just or perfect individual, to be completed. He is next proceeding to set forth the contrasts to this picture—that is, the varieties of injustice, or the various modes of depravation and corruption—when he is arrested by Polemarchus and Adeimantus: who call upon him to explain more at large the position of the body of Guardians or Soldiers in the city, in regard to women, children, and the family.²

Glaucón requires farther explanation about the condition of the Guardians in regard to sexual and family ties.

In reply, Sokrates announces his intention to make such provision as will exclude separate family ties, as well as separate property, among these Guardians. The Guardians will consist both of men and women. The women will receive the same training, both musical and gymnastical, as the men.³ They will take part both in the bodily exercises of the palaestra, in the military drill, and in the combats of war. Those who deride these naked exercises as preposterous for the female sex, should be reminded (Sokrates says) that not long ago it was considered unseemly among the Greeks (as it still is among many of the *barbari*) for men to expose their naked bodies in the palaestra: but such repugnance has been overpowered by the marked usefulness of the practice: the Kretans first setting the example, next the Lace-

Men and women will live together and perform the duties of Guardians alike.—They will receive the same gymnastic and musical training.

¹ Plato, Republic, iv. p. 445 A.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 449 C.

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 A.

dæmonians; lastly all other Greeks doing the same.¹ We maintain the principle which we laid down in the beginning, that one person should perform only one duty—that for which he is best qualified. But there is no one function, or class of functions, for which women as such are peculiarly qualified, or peculiarly disqualified. Between women generally, and men generally, in reference to the discharge of duties, there is no other difference, except that men are superior to women in every thing:² the best women will be on a level only with the second-best men, but they will be superior to all men lower than the second best. But among women, as among men, there are great individual differences: one woman is fit for one duty, another for another: and in our city, each must be employed for the duty suitable to her individual disposition. Those who are best qualified by nature for the office of Guardians, must be allotted to that office: they must discharge it along with the men, and must be trained for it by the same education as the men, musical and gymnastical.

If an objector accuses us of proposing arrangements contrary to nature, we not only deny the force of the objection, but we retort the charge. We affirm that the arrangements now existing in society, which restrict all women to a limited number of domestic and family functions, are contrary to nature—and that ours are founded upon the genuine and real dictates of nature.³ The only difference admissible between men and women, in the joint discharge of the functions of Guardians, is, that the easier portion of such functions must in general be assigned to women, and the more difficult to men, in consequence of the inferiority of the feminine nature.⁴

These intermingled male and female Guardians, in the discharge of their joint functions, will live together all in common barracks and at common mess-tables. There must be no separate houses or separate family-

Nature does not prescribe any distribution of functions between men and women. Women are inferior to men in every thing. The best women are equal to second-best men.

Community of life and relations between the

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 452 D.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 455 C-D.

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. κατὰ

φύσιν ἐτίθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ οὖν κατὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα κατὰ φύσιν μάλιστα, ὥς εἶπες, γίγνεται.

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. p. 457 B.

relations between them. All are wives or husbands of all: no youth must know his own father, no mature man must know his own son: all the mature men and women are fathers or mothers of all the younger: all of the same age are brothers and sisters.¹ We do not intend, however, that the copulation between them shall take place in a promiscuous and arbitrary manner: we shall establish laws to regulate the inter-marriages and breeding.² We must copy the example of those who regulate the copulation of horses, dogs, and other animals: we must bring together those who will give existence to the best offspring.³ We must couple, as often as we can, the men who are best, with the women who are best, both in mind and body; and the men who are least good, with the women who are least good. We must bring up the offspring of the former couples—we must refuse to bring up the offspring of the latter.⁴ And such results must be accomplished by underhand arrangements of the Elder Chiefs; so as to be unknown to every one else, in order to prevent discontent and quarrel among the body of the Guardians. These Elders will celebrate periodical festivals, in which they will bring together the fitting brides and bridegrooms, under solemn hymns and sacrifices. They must regulate the number of marriages in such manner as to keep the total list of Guardians as much as possible without increase as well as without diminution.⁵ The Elders must make an artful use of the lot, so that these couplings shall appear to every one else the effect of chance. Distinguished warriors must be rewarded with a larger licence of copulation with different women, which will produce the farther advantage of having as many children as possible born from their procreation.⁶ All the children as soon as born must be consigned to the Chiefs or Elders, male and female, who will conceal in some convenient manner those who are born either from the worst couples or with any

male and female Guardians.

Temporary marriages arranged by contrivance of the Elders. No separate families.

¹ Plato, Republic, v. pp. 457-458.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 458 E.

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 A.

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. p. 459 D-E. δὲ μὲν ἐκ τῶν ὑπολογημένων τοὺς ἀρίστους ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειοτά-
κας, τοὺς δὲ φαυλοτάτους ταῖς φαυλοτά-

ταις τοῖναντίον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἔκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ μάλ' αὖ τὸ ποίμνιον δ, τι ἀρότερον εἶναι· καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γιγνόμενα λαμβάνει πλὴν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀρχοντας, εἰ εὖ ἢ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων δ, τι μάλιστα ἀστασίastos ὅσων.

⁵ Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 A.

⁶ Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 B.

bodily imperfection : while they place the offspring of the best couples in special outbuildings under the charge of nurses. Those mothers who are full of milk will be brought here to give suck, but every precaution will be taken that none of them shall know her own child : wet-nurses will also be provided in addition, to ensure a full supply : but all the care of the children will devolve on the public nurses, not on the mothers.¹

The age for such intermarriages, destined to be procreative for the benefit of the city, must be from thirty to fifty-five, for men—from twenty to forty, for women. No man or woman, above or below these limits of age, will be allowed to meddle with the function of intermarriage and procreation for the public ; which function must always be conducted under superintendence of the authorities, with proper sacrifice and prayers to the Gods. Nor will any man, even within the licensed age, be allowed to approach any woman except by assignment from the authorities. If any infringement of this law should occur, the offspring arising from it will be pronounced spurious and outcast.² But when the above limits of age are passed, both men and women may have intercourse with whomsoever they please, except fathers with daughters or sons with mothers : under condition, however, that no offspring shall be born from such intercourse, or that if any offspring be born, it shall be exposed.³

How is the father to know his own daughter (it is asked), or the son his own mother ? They cannot know (replies Sokrates) : but each couple will consider every child born in the seventh month or tenth month after their marriage, as their child, and will address him or her by the appellation of son or daughter. The fathers and mothers will be fathers and mothers of all the children born at that time : the sons and daughters will be in filial relation to all the couples brought together at the given antecedent period.⁴

The main purpose of such regulations, in respect to family as in respect to property, is to establish the fullest communion between all the Guardians, male and

Regulations
about age,
for procrea-
tion—
Children
brought up
under pub-
lic autho-
rity.

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 460 C-D.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 A-B.

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 C.

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. p. 461 D.

female—and to eliminate as much as possible the feeling of separate interest in any fraction of them. The greatest evil to any city is, that which pulls it to pieces and makes it many instead of one: the greatest good to it is that which binds it together and makes it one. Now what is most efficacious in binding it together, is, community of the causes of pleasure and pain: when each individual feels pleasure from the same causes and on the same occasions as all the rest, and pain in like manner. On the other hand, when the causes of pleasure and pain are distinct, this tends to dissolution; and becomes fatal if the opposition is marked, so that some individuals are much delighted, and others much distressed, under the same circumstances. That city is the best arranged, wherein all the citizens pronounce the words *Mine* and *Not Mine*, with reference to the same things: when they coalesce into an unity like the organism of a single individual. To him a blow in the finger is a blow to the whole man: so also in the city, pleasure or pain to any one citizen ought to communicate itself by sympathy as pleasure and pain to all.¹

Now the Guardians under our regulations will present as much as possible this community of *Mine* and *Not Mine*, as well as of pleasures and pains—and this exclusion of the separate individual *Mine* and *Not Mine*, as well as of separate pleasures and pains. No individual among them will have either separate property or separate family relationship: each will have both one and the other in common with the rest.² No one will have property of his own to be increased, nor a family of his own to be benefited, apart from the rest: all will be as much as possible common recipients of pleasure and pain.³ All the ordinary causes of dispute and litigation will thus be excluded. If two Guardians of the same age happen to quarrel, they must fight it out: this will discharge their wrath and prevent worse consequences—while at the same time it will encourage attention to gymnastic excellence.⁴ But no younger

ment and interest among the Guardians—Causes of pleasure and pain the same to all, like parts of the same organism.

Harmony—absence of conflicting interest—assured scale of equal comfort—consequent happiness—among the Guardians.

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 462 D.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 B.

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 D.

πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατόν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς εἶναι.

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. p. 464 E.

Guardian will raise his hand against an older Guardian, whom he is taught to reverence as his father, and whom every one else would protect if attacked. If the Guardians maintain harmony among themselves, they will easily ensure it among the remaining inhabitants. Assured of sufficient but modest comforts, the Guardians will be relieved from all struggles for the maintenance of a family, from the arts of trade, and from subservience to the rich.¹ They will escape all these troubles, and will live a life happier than the envied Olympic victor: for they will gain the victory in an enterprise more illustrious than he undertakes, and they will receive from their fellow-citizens fuller maintenance and higher privilege than what is awarded to him, as well as honours after death.² Their lives are not to be put in comparison with those of the farmer or the shoemaker. They must not indeed aspire to any happiness incompatible with their condition and duty as Guardians. But that condition will itself involve the highest happiness. And if any silly ambition prompts them to depart from it, they will assuredly change for the worse.³

Such is the communion of sexes which must be kept up for the duties of Guardians, and for the exigencies of military defence. As in other races of animals, males and females must go out to fight, and each will inspire the other with bravery. The children must be taken out on horseback to see the encounters from a distance, so that they may be kept clear of danger, yet may nevertheless be gradually accustomed to the sight of it.⁴ If any one runs away from the field, he must be degraded from the rank of Guardian to that of husbandman or craftsman. If any man suffers himself to be taken prisoner, he is no loss: the enemy may do what they choose with him. When any one distinguishes himself in battle, he shall be received on his return by garlands and by an affectionate welcome from the youth.⁵ Should he be slain

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C. τῶν κακῶν . . . ὡς ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀληθείας, &c.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 D. Πάντων τε δὲ τούτων ἀπαλλάσσονται, ζήσουσι

τε τοῦ μακαριστοῦ βίου, ὃν οἱ Ὀλυμπιονίκαι ζῶσι, μακαριώτερον.

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 466 A-C.

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. pp. 466-467.

⁵ Plato, Republic, v. p. 468 B.

in battle, he shall be recognised as having become a Dæmon or Demigod (according to the Hesiodic doctrine), and his sepulchre shall be honoured by appropriate solemnities.

In carrying on war, our Guardians will observe a marked difference in their manner of treating Hellenic enemies and barbaric enemies. They will never enslave any Hellenic city, nor hold any Hellenic person in slavery. They will never even strip the body of an Hellenic enemy, except so far as to take his arms. They will never pile up in their temples the arms, nor burn the houses and lands, of Hellenic enemies. They will always keep in mind the members of the Hellenic race as naturally kindred with each other, and bound to aid each other in mutual defence, against Barbaric aliens who are the natural enemies of all of them.¹ They will not think themselves authorised to carry on war as Hellenes now do against each other, except when their enemies are Barbaric.

War against Hellenic enemies to be carried on mildly—Hellenes are all by nature kinsmen.

Enough of this, Sokrates, replies Glaukon. I admit that your city will have all the excellencies and advantages of which you boast. But you have yet to show me that it is practicable, and how.²

The task which you impose (says Sokrates) is one of great difficulty: even if you grant me, what must be granted, that every reality must fall short of its ideal type.³ One condition, and one only, is essential to render it practicable: a condition which you may ridicule as preposterous, but which, though not probable, is certainly supposable. Either philosophers must acquire the ruling power, or else the present rulers of mankind must themselves become genuine philosophers. In one or other of these two ways philosophy and political power must come into the same hands. Unless such condition be fulfilled, our city can never be made a reality, nor can there ever be any respite of suffering to the human race.⁴

Question—How is the scheme practicable? It is difficult, yet practicable on one condition—That philosophy and political power should come into the same hands.

The supremacy which you claim for philosophers (replies

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 469 B.

² Plato, Republic, v. pp. 470-471.

³ Plato, Republic, v. pp. 471-472.

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. pp. 472-473.

⁵ Plato, Republic, v. p. 473 D.

Glaukon), will be listened to with repugnance and scorn. But at least you must show who the philosophers are, on whose behalf you invoke such supremacy. You must show that it belongs to them by nature both to pursue philosophy, and to rule in the various cities: and that by nature also, other men ought to obey them as well as to abstain from philosophy.¹

The first requisite for a philosopher (replies Sokrates) is, that he shall love and pursue eagerly every sort of knowledge or wisdom, without shrinking from labour for such purpose. But it is not sufficient that he should be eager about hearing tragedies or learning the minor arts. Other men, accomplished and curious, are fond of hearing beautiful sounds and discourses, or of seeing beautiful forms and colours. But the philosopher alone can see or distinguish truth.² It is only he who can distinguish the genuine Form or Idea, in which truth consists, from the particular embodiments in which it occurs. These Forms or Ideas exist, eternal and unchangeable. Since Pulchrum is the opposite of Turpe, they must be two, and each of them must be One: the same about Just and Unjust, Good and Evil; each of these is a distinct Form or Idea, existing as One and Unchangeable by itself, but exhibiting itself in appearance as manifold, diverse, and frequently changing, through communion with different objects and events, and through communion of each Form with others.³ Now the accomplished, but unphilosophical, man cannot see or recognise this Form in itself. He can see only the different particular cases and complications in which it appears embodied.⁴ None but the philosopher can contemplate each Form by itself, and discriminate it from the various particulars in conjunction with which it appears. Such philosophers are few in number, but they are the only persons who can be said truly to live. Ordinary and even accomplished men

Character-
istic marks
of the philo-
sopher—He
contem-
plates and
knows
Entia or
unchange-
able Forms
as distin-
guished
from fluctu-
ating
particulars
or Phenita.

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 A-B.

² Plato, Republic, v. pp. 474-475.
τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας φιλοθεάμενας (p. 475 B).

³ Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 A.
Ἐπειδὴ ἔστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχροῦ,
δύο αὐτῶ εἶναι . . . Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ δύο,

καὶ ἐν ἑκάτερον; . . . Καὶ περὶ δικαίου
καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάν-
των τῶν εἶδων περὶ, ὃ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ
μὲν ἓν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων
καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ παν-
ταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι
ἕκαστον;

⁴ Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.

—who recognise beautiful things, but cannot recognise Beauty in itself, nor even follow an instructor who points it out to them—pass their lives in a sort of dream or reverie: for the dreamer, whether asleep or awake, is one who believes what is similar to another thing to be not merely similar, but to be the actual thing itself.¹ The philosopher alone, who embraces in his mind the one and unchangeable Form or Idea, along with, yet distinguished from, its particular embodiments, possesses knowledge or science. The unphilosophical man, whose mind embraces nothing higher than variable particulars, does not know—but only opines, or has opinions.²

This latter, the unphilosophical man, will not admit what we say. Accordingly, we must prove it to him. You cannot know without knowing Something: that is, Some Ens: for Non-Ens cannot be known. That which is completely and absolutely Ens, is completely and absolutely cognizable: that which is Non-Ens and nowhere, is in every way uncognizable. If then there be anything which is at once Ens and Non-Ens, it will lie midway between these two: it will be something neither absolutely and completely cognizable, nor absolutely and completely uncognizable: it belongs to something between ignorance and science. Now science or knowledge is one thing, its object is, complete Ens. Opinion is another thing, its object also is different. Knowing and Opining belong, like Sight and Hearing, to the class of Entia called Powers or Faculties, which we and others possess, and by means of which—that is, by means of one or other of them—we accomplish everything that we do accomplish. Now no one of these powers or faculties has either colour or figure, whereby it may be recognised or distinguished from others. Each is known and distinguished, not by what it is in itself, but by what it accomplishes, and by the object to which it has special relation. That which has the same object and accomplishes the same result, I call the same power or faculty: that which has a different object, and accomplishes a different

Ens alone
can be
known—
Non-Ens is
unknow-
able. That
which is
midway
between
Ens and
Non-Ens
(particu-
lars) is mat-
ter only of
opinion.
Ordinary
men attain
nothing
beyond
opinion.

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 B.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 476 D. Οὐκ ἔσμεν εἶναι, τοῦ δὲ δόξαν, ὡς δοξάζον τούτων μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὡς γινώσκοντες.

result, I call a different power or faculty. Now Knowing, Cognition, Science, is one of our faculties or powers, and the strongest of all: Opining is another, and a different one. A marked distinction between the two is, that Knowing or Cognition is infallible—Opining is fallible. Since Cognition is one power or faculty, and Opining another—the object of one must be different from the object of the other. But the object of Cognition is, the complete Ens: the object of Opining must therefore be, not the Complete Ens, but something different from it. What then is the object of Opining? It is not Complete Ens, but it is still Something. It is not Non-Ens, or Nothing; for Non-Ens or Nothing is not thinkable or opinable: you cannot think or opine, and yet think or opine nothing. Whoever opines or thinks, must think or opine something. Ens is the object of Cognition, Non-Ens is the object of Non-Cognition or Ignorance: Opination or Opinion is midway between Cognition and Ignorance, darker than the former, but clearer than the latter. The object of opination is therefore something midway between Ens and Non-Ens.

But what is this Something, midway between Ens and Non-Ens, and partaking of both—which is the object of Opination? To make out this, we must revert to the case of the unphilosophical man. We have described him, as not believing in the existence of the Form or Idea of Beauty, or Justice *per se*; not enduring to hear it spoken of as a real Ens and Unum; not knowing anything except of the many diverse particulars, beautiful and just. We must remind him that every one of these particular beautiful things will appear repulsive also: every one of these just and holy particulars, will appear unjust and unholy also. He cannot refuse to admit that each of them will appear under certain circumstances beautiful and ugly, just and unjust, holy and unholy. In like manner, every particular double, will appear also a half: every light thing will appear heavy: every little thing great. Of each among these many particulars, if you can truly predicate any one quality about it, you may with equal truth predicate the opposite quality also. Each of them both is, and is not, the substratum of all these different and opposite qualities. You cannot pro-

Particulars
fluctuate:
they are
sometimes
just or beau-
tiful, some-
times unjust
or ugly.
Forms or
Entia alone
remain con-
stant.

nounce them to be either one or the other, with fixity and permanence: they are at once both and neither.

Here then we find the appropriate object of Opinion: that which is neither Ens nor Non-Ens, but something between both. Particulars are the object of Opinion, as distinguished from universal Entities, Forms, or Ideas, which are the object of Cognition. The many, who disbelieve or ignore the existence of these Forms, and whose minds dwell exclusively among particulars—cannot know, but only opine.

The Many cannot discern or admit the reality of Forms—Their minds are always fluctuating among particulars.

Their usages and creeds, as to beautiful, just, honourable, float between positive Ens and Non-Ens. It is these intermediate fluctuations which are caught up by their opining faculty, intermediate as it is between Cognition and Ignorance. It is these also, the objects of Opinion, which they love and delight in: they neither recognise nor love the objects of Cognition or Knowledge. They are lovers of opinion and its objects, not lovers of Knowledge. The philosopher alone recognises and loves Knowledge and the objects of Knowledge. His mind dwells, not amidst the fluctuating, diverse, and numerous particulars, but in contemplation of the One, Universal, permanent, unchangeable, Form or Idea.

Here is the characteristic difference (continues Sokrates) which you required me to point out, between the philosopher and the unphilosophical man, however accomplished. The philosopher sees, knows, and contemplates, the One, Real, unchangeable, Form or Idea: the unphilosophical man knows nothing of this Form *per se*, and sees only its multifarious manifestations, each perpetually variable and different from all the rest. The philosopher, having present to his mind this type—and approximating to it, as far as may be, the real institutions and practices—will be the person most competent to rule our city: especially as his education will give him farthermore—besides such familiarity with the Form or Type—as large a measure of experience, and as much virtue, as can fall to the lot of the unphilosophical man.¹ The nature

The philosopher will be ardent for all varieties of knowledge—His excellent moral attributes—He will be trained to capacity for active life.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 484.

and disposition of the true philosopher, if improved by education, will include all the virtue and competence of the practical man. The philosopher is bent on learning everything which can make him familiar with Universal Forms and Essences in their pure state, not floating amidst the confusion of generated and destroyed realities: and with Forms and Essences little as well as great, mean as well as sublime.¹ Devoted to knowledge and truth—hating falsehood—he has little room in his mind for the ordinary desires: he is temperate, indifferent to money, free from all meanness or shabbiness. A man like him, whose contemplations stretch over all time and all essence, thinks human life a small affair, and has no fear of death. He will be just, mild in his demeanour, quick in apprehension, retentive in memory, elegant in his tastes and movements. All these excellences will be united in the philosophers to whom we confide the rule of our city.²

It is impossible, Sokrates (remarks Adeimantus), to answer in the negative to your questions. Nevertheless we who hear and answer, are not convinced of the truth of your conclusion. Unskilled as we are in the interrogatory process, we feel ourselves led astray little by little at each successive question; until at length, through the accumulated effect of such small deviations, we are driven up into a corner without the power of moving, like a bad player at draughts defeated by one superior to himself.³ Here in this particular case your conclusion has been reached by steps to which we cannot refuse assent. Yet if we look at the facts, we see something quite the reverse as to the actual position of philosophers. Those who study philosophy, not simply as a branch of juvenile education but

Adeimantus does not dispute the conclusion, but remarks that it is at variance with actual facts—Existing philosophers are either worthless pretenders, or when they are good, useless.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 485 A.

² Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 485-486.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 B.
 Πρὸς μὲν ταῦτα σοὶ οὐδεὶς ἂν οἶός τ' εἴη ἀντεπεῖν· ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοιόνδε τι πάσχουσιν οἱ ἀκούοντες ἐκάστοτε ἃ νῦν λέγεις· ἡγοῦνται δ' ἀπειρίαν τοῦ ἐρωτῆν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι ὑπο τοῦ λόγου παρ' ἑαυτὸν τὸ ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, ἀδροσθέντων τῶν σμικρῶν ἐπὶ τελευτῇ τῶν λόγων, μέγα τὸ σφάλμα καὶ

ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις ἀναφαίνεσθαι, &c.

This is an interesting remark on the effect produced upon many hearers by the Sokratic and Platonic dialogues,—puzzling, silencing, and ultimately stimulating the mind, but not satisfying or convincing,—rather raising suspicions as to the trustworthiness of the process, which suspicions have to be turned over and scrutinised by subsequent meditation.

as a continued occupation throughout life, are in most cases strange creatures, not to say thoroughly unprincipled: while the few of them who are most reasonable, derive nothing from this pursuit which you so much extol, except that they become useless in their respective cities.¹

Yes (replies Sokrates), your picture is a correct one. The position of true and reasonable philosophers, in their respective cities, is difficult and uncomfortable. Conceive a ship on her voyage, under the management of a steersman distinguished for force of body as well as for skill in his craft, but not clever in dealing with, or acting upon other men. Conceive the seamen all quarrelling with each other to get possession of the rudder; each man thinking himself qualified to steer, though he has never learnt it—nor had any master in it—nor even believes it to be teachable, but is ready to massacre all who affirm that it is teachable.² Imagine, besides, these seamen importuning the qualified steersman to commit the rudder to them, each being ready to expel or kill any others whom he may prefer to them: and at last proceeding to stupify with wine or drugs the qualified steersman, and then to navigate the vessel themselves according to their own views; feasting plentifully on the stores. These men know nothing of what constitutes true and able steersmanship. They extol, as a perfect steersman, that leader who is most efficacious, either by persuasion or force, in seizing the rudder for them to manage: they despise as useless any one who does not possess this talent. They never reflect that the genuine steersman has enough to do in surmounting the dangers of his own especial art, and in watching the stars and the winds: and that if he is to acquire technical skill and practice adequate to such a purpose, he cannot at the same time possess skill and practice in keeping his hold of the rudder whether the crew are pleased with him or not. Such being the condition of the ship and the crew, you see plainly that they will despise and set aside the true steersman as an useless proser and star-gazer.³

Sokrates admits the fact to be so—His simile of the able steersman on ship-board, among a disobedient crew.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 487 D.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 488 D-E

Now the crew of this ship represent the citizens and leaders of our actual cities : the steersman represents the true philosopher. He is, and must be, useless in the ship : but his uselessness is the fault of the crew and not his own. It is not for the true steersman to entreat permission from the seamen, that they will allow him to command ; nor for the wise man to solicit employment at the doors of the rich. It is for the sick man, whether he be poor or rich, to ask for the aid of the physician ; and for every one who needs to be commanded, to invoke the authority of the person qualified to command. No man really qualified will submit to ask command as a favour.¹

The uselessness of the true philosopher is the fault of the citizens, who will not invoke his guidance.

Thus, Adeimantus (continues Sokrates), I have dealt with the first part of your remark, that the true philosopher is an useless man in cities as now constituted : I have shown you this is not his fault—that it could not be otherwise,—and that a man even of the highest aptitude, cannot enjoy reputation among those whose turn of mind is altogether at variance with his own.²

I shall now deal with your second observation—That while even the best philosophers are useless, the majority of those who cultivate philosophy are worthless men, who bring upon her merited discredit. I admit that this also is correct ; but I shall prove that philosophy is not to be blamed for it.³

You will remember the great combination of excellent dispositions, intellectual as well as moral, which I laid down as indispensable to form the fundamental character of the true philosopher. Such a combination is always rare. Even under the best circumstances philosophers must be very few. But these few stand exposed, in our existing cities, to such powerful causes of corruption, that they are prevented from reaching maturity, except by some happy accident. First, each one of those very qualities, which, when

The great qualities required to form a philosopher, become sources of perversion, under a misguiding public opinion.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E. τῆς μίτης ἀχρηστίας τοὺς μὴ χρωμένους κέλευε αἰτιάσθαι, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς ἐπικεικίς. Οὐ γὰρ ἔχει φύσιν κυβερνήτην ναυτῶν δέσσειν ἀρχέσθαι ὑφ' αὐτοῦ, &c.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 D. ἔκ

τε τοῖνυν τούτων καὶ ἐν τούτοις οὐ ῥάδιον εὐδοκίμειν τὸ βέλτιστον ἐπιτήδευμα ὑπὸ τῶν ταρατῶν ἐπιτηδεύοντων.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 489 E. ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦτου φιλοσοφία αἰτία, πειραθῶμεν δεῖξαι.

combined, constitute the true philosopher,—serves as a cause of corruption, if it exists by itself and apart from the rest. Next, what are called good things, or external advantages, act in the same manner—such as beauty, strength, wealth, powerful connections, &c. Again, the stronger a man's natural aptitudes and the greater his external advantages,—the better will he become under favourable circumstances, the worse will he become, if circumstances are unfavourable. Heinous iniquity always springs from a powerful nature perverted by bad training: not from a feeble nature, which will produce no great effects either for good or evil. Thus the eminent predispositions,—which, if properly improved, would raise a man to the highest rank in virtue,—will, if planted in an unfavourable soil, produce a master-mind in deeds of iniquity, unless counteracted by some providential interposition.

The multitude treat these latter as men corrupted by the Sophists. But this is a mistake. Neither Sophists nor other private individuals produce mischief worth mentioning. It is the multitude themselves, utterers of these complaints, who are the most active Sophists and teachers: it is they who educate and mould every individual, man and woman, young and old, into such a character as they please.¹ When they are assembled in the public assembly or the dikastery, in the theatre or the camp—when they praise some things and blame others, with vociferation and vehemence echoed from the rocks around—how irresistible will be the impression produced upon the mind of a youth who hears them! No private training which he may have previously received can hold out against it. All will be washed away by this impetuous current of multitudinous praise or blame, which carries him along with it. He will declare honourable or base the same things as they declare to be so: he will adopt the character, and follow the pursuits, which they enjoin. Moreover, if he resists such persuasive influence, these multitudinous

Mistake of supposing that such perversion arises from the Sophists. Irresistible effect of the public opinion generally, in tempting or forcing a dissenter into orthodoxy.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 A. ἡ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ταῦτα λέγοντας μεγίστους καὶ σὺ ἔχει, ὥστε οἱ πολλοί, διαφθειρόμενους τινες εἶναι ὑπὸ σοφιστῶν νόον, διαφθείροντες δὲ τινες σοφιστὰς ἰδιωτικούς, ὃ, τι καὶ ἄξιον λόγον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας;

teachers and Sophists have stronger pressure in store for him.¹ They punish the disobedient with disgrace, fine, and even death. What other Sophist, or what private exhortation, can contend successfully against teachers such as these? Surely none. The attempt to do so is insane. There neither is, nor has been, nor will be, any individual human disposition educated to virtue in opposition to the training of the multitude:² I say *human*, as distinguished from *divine*, of which I make exception: for in the existing state of society, any individual who is preserved from these ascendant influences to acquire philosophical excellence, owes his preservation to the divine favour.

Moreover, though the multitude complain of these professional teachers as rivals, and decry them as Sophists—yet we must recollect that such teachers inculcate only the opinions received among the multitude themselves, and extol these same opinions as wisdom.³ The teachers know nothing of what is really honourable and base,—good and evil,—just and unjust. They distribute all these names only with reference to the opinions of the multitude:—pronouncing those things which please the multitude to be good, and those which displease to be evil,—without furnishing any other rational account. They call things necessary by the name of just and honourable; not knowing the material difference between what is good and what is necessary, nor being able to point out that difference to others. Thus preposterous are the teachers, who count it wisdom to suit the taste and feelings of the multitude, whether in painting or in music or in social affairs. For whoever lives among them, publicly exhibiting either poetry or other performances private or official, thus making the multitude his masters beyond the strict limits of necessity—the consequence is infallible, that he must adapt his works to that which they praise. But whether the works which he executes are really

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 C.D. Καὶ φήσιν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖσι καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτιθεύουσιν ἄνερ ἂν ὅντοι, καὶ ἴσθαι τοιοῦτον . . . Καὶ μὴν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμεῖς ἀνάγκη εἰρήκαμεν. Ποῖαν; Ἢν ἔργῳ προστιθείας, λόγῳ μὴ πείθοντες, οὗτοι οἱ παιδεύονται τε καὶ σοφισταί. Ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν μὴ

πειθόμενον ἀτιμίαις τε καὶ χρήμασι καὶ θανάτοις κολάζουσιν; Καὶ μάλα, ἔφη, σφόδρα.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 492 D.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 A. ἕκαστον τῶν μισθαρνούμενων ἰδιωτῶν, ὅτι δὴ οὗτοι σοφιστὰς καλοῦσι καὶ ἀντιπύχοντες ἡγούνται, μὴ ἄλλα παιδεύειν ἢ ταῦτα

good and honourable, he will be unable to render any tolerable account.¹

It is therefore the multitude, or the general voice of society—not the Sophists or private teachers, mere echoes of that general voice—which works upon and moulds individuals. Now the multitude cannot tolerate or believe in the existence of those Universals or Forms which the philosopher contemplates. They know only the many particulars, not the One Universal. Incapable of becoming philosophers themselves, they look upon the philosopher with hatred: and this sentiment is adopted by all those so-called philosophers who seek to please them.² Under these circumstances, what chance is there that those eminent predispositions, which we pointed out as the foundation of the future philosopher, can ever be matured to their proper result? A youth of such promise, especially if his body be on a par with his mind, will be at once foremost among all his fellows. His relatives and fellow-citizens, eager to make use of him for their own purposes, and anxious to appropriate to themselves his growing force, will besiege him betimes with solicitations and flatteries.³ Under these influences, if we assume him to be rich, well born, and in a powerful city, he will naturally become intoxicated with unlimited hopes and ambition; fancying himself competent to manage the affairs of all governments, and giving himself the empty airs of a lofty potentate.⁴ If there be any one to give him a quiet hint that he has not yet acquired intelligence, nor *can* acquire it without labour—he will turn a deaf ear. But suppose that such advice should by chance prevail, in one out of many cases, so that the youth alters his tendencies and devotes himself to philosophy—what will be the conduct of those who see, that they will thereby be deprived of his usefulness and party-service towards their own views? They will leave no means untried to

The people generally hate philosophy—A youth who aspires to it will be hated by the people, and persecuted even by his own relatives.

τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἃ δοξάζουσιν ὅτι ἀδριστεύουσιν, καὶ σοφίαν ταύτην καλεῖν.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 493 C-D.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 A. φιλόσοφον μὲν ἄρα πλεῖστος ἀδύνατον εἶναι . . . Καὶ τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη φέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν . . . καὶ ὑπὸ

τούτων δὲ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν, ὅσοι προσομιλοῦντες ἄλλῃ ἀρέσκειν αὐτῷ ἐπιθυμοῦσιν.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 B.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 C. πληρωθῆσεσθαι ἀμυγᾶναι ἐπιδοῦναι, ἡγούμενον καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων ἱκανὸν εἶναι πρᾶττεν.

prevent him from following the advice, and even to ruin the adviser, by private conspiracy and judicial prosecution.¹ It is impossible that the young man can really turn to philosophy, against obstructions thus powerful. You see that those very excellences and advantages, which form the initial point of the growing philosopher, become means and temptations for corrupting him. The best natures, rare as they always are, become thus not only ruined, but turned into instruments of evil. For the same men (as I have already said) who, under favourable training, would have done the greatest good, become perpetrators of the greatest evil, if they are badly placed. Small men will do nothing important, either in the one way or the other.²

It is thus that the path of philosophy is deserted by those who ought to have trodden it, and who pervert their exalted powers to unworthy objects. That path—being left vacant, yet still full of imposing titles and pretensions, and carrying a show of superior dignity as compared with the vulgar professions—becomes invaded by interlopers of inferior worth and ability, who quit their own small craft, and set up as philosophers.³ Such men, poorly endowed by nature, and debased by habits of trade, exhibit themselves, in their self-assumed exaltation as philosophers, like a slave recently manumitted, who has put on new clothes and married his master's daughter.⁴ Having intruded themselves into a career for which they are unfit, they cannot produce any grand or genuine philosophical thoughts, or any thing better than mere neat sophisms, pleasing to the ear.⁵ Through them arises the discredit which is now attached to philosophers.

Amidst such general degradation of philosophy, some few

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 494 D-E.
 ἐάν δ' οὖν, διὰ τὸ τὸ πεφυκέναι καὶ τὸ
 ἐγγυέναι τῶν λόγων, εἰς αἰσθάνηται τὴν
 πρὸς καὶ κάμπτηται καὶ ἔλκεται πρὸς
 φιλοσοφίαν, τί οἰόμεθα θράσσειν ἐκείνους
 τοὺς ἡγουμένους ἀπολλύναι αὐτοῦ τὴν
 χρείαν τε καὶ ἡμετέραν; οὐ πᾶν μὲν ἔργον,
 πᾶν δ' ἔπος, λόγοντας τε καὶ πράττοντας
 καὶ περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅπως ἂν μὴ πεισθῇ, καὶ
 περὶ τῶν πείθοντα, ὅπως ἂν μὴ οἷός τ'
 ᾖ, καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἐπιβουλεύοντας καὶ δημοσίᾳ

εἰς ἀγῶνας καθίστασθαι;

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 A-B.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 C-D.
 καθορώμεντες γὰρ ἄλλοι ἀνθρωπείους κενὴν
 τὴν χώραν ταύτην γεγεμένην, καλῶν δὲ
 ὀνομάτων καὶ προσχημάτων μαστῆν, ὥς-
 περ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἰργμάτων εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδι-
 ράσκοντες, ἄσματος καὶ οὐτοί. ἐκ τῶν τεχ-
 νῶν ἐκτρέφουσιν εἰς τὴν φιλοσοφίαν.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 495 E.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 A.

and rare cases are left, in which the pre-eminent natures qualified for philosophy remain by some favourable accident uncorrupted. One of these is Theagès, who would have been long ago drawn away from philosophy to active politics, had he not been disqualified by bad health. The restraining Dæmon, peculiar to myself (says Sokrates), is another case.¹ Such an exceptional man, having once tasted the sweetness and happiness of philosophy, embraces it as an exclusive profession. He sees that the mass of society are wrongheaded—that scarce any one takes wholesome views on social matters—that he can find no partisans to aid him in upholding justice²—that while he will not take part in injustice, he is too weak to contend single-handed against the violence of all, and would only become a victim to it without doing any good either to the city or to his friends—like a man who has fallen among wild beasts. On these grounds he stands aloof in his own separate pursuit, like one sheltering himself under a wall against a hurricane of wind and dust. Witnessing the injustice committed by all around, he is content if he can keep himself clear and pure from it during his life here, so as to die with satisfaction and good hopes.

He will perform no small achievement (remarks Adeimantus) if he keeps clear to the end.³

True (replies Sokrates)—yet nevertheless he can perform no great achievement, unless he meets with a community suited to him. Amidst such a community he will himself rise to greatness, and will preserve the public happiness as well as his own. But there exists no such community anywhere, at the present moment. Not one of those now existing is worthy of a philosophical disposition : ⁴ which accordingly becomes perverted, and degenerates

Rare cases in which a highly qualified philosopher remains—Being at variance with public opinion, he can achieve nothing, and is lucky if he can obtain safety by silence.

The philosopher must have a community suitable to him, and worthy of him.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 D.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 496 C-D.
καὶ τούτων δὲ τῶν δλίγων οἱ γινόμενοι καὶ γινόμενοι ὡς ἡδὺ καὶ μακάριον τὸ κτῆμα, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν αἰὶν κακῶς ἰδόντες τὴν μάστιγαν, καὶ οἷτι οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ὄνεις, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράττει, οὐδ' ἔστι ξύμμαχος μεθ' ὅτου τις ἰὼν ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν δικαίων βοήθειαν σύζοιτ' ἄν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰς θηρία ἀνθρώπος ἔμπεσάν, οὕτω ξυμβαλεῖν

ἰθέλων οὐτε ἰκανὸς ὢν εἰς πᾶσιν ἀγρίοις ἀντέχειν, πρὶν τι τὴν πόλιν ἢ φίλους διῆσαι προσπαλούμενος ἀνοφελὲς αὐτῷ τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν γένοιτο—ταῦτα πάντα λογισμῷ λαβάν, ἡσυχίαν δὲ καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων . . . ὅρα τὸν ἄλ-
λους καταπληκτικῶν ἀνομίας, ἀγαπῇ εἰ πᾶς αὐτὸς καθαρὸς ἐδικίας, &c.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 A.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 497 B-C.

into a different type adapted to its actual abode, like exotic seed transported to a foreign soil. But if this philosophical disposition were planted in a worthy community, so as to be able to assert its own superior excellence, it would then prove itself truly divine, leaving other dispositions and pursuits behind as merely human.

You mean by a worthy community (observes Adeimantus), such an one as that of which you have been drawing the outline?—I do (replies Sokrates): with this addition, already hinted but not explained, that there must always be maintained in it a perpetual supervising authority representing the scheme and purpose of the primitive lawgiver. This authority must consist of philosophers: and the question now arises—difficult but indispensable—how such philosophers are to be trained up and made efficient for the good of the city.

It must be such a community as Sokrates has been describing —But means must be taken to keep up a perpetual succession of philosophers as Rulers.

The plan now pursued for imparting philosophy is bad. Some do not learn it at all: and even to those who learn it best, the most difficult part (that which relates to debate and discourse) is taught when they are youths just emerging from boyhood, in the intervals of practical business and money-getting.¹ After that period, in their mature age, they abandon it altogether; they will scarcely so much as go to hear an occasional lecture on the subject, without any effort of their own: accordingly it has all died out within them, when they become mature in years. This manner of teaching philosophy ought to be reversed. In childhood and youth, instruction of an easy character and suitable to that age ought to be imparted; while the greatest care is taken to improve and strengthen the body during its period of growth, as a minister and instrument to philosophy. As age proceeds, and the mind advances to perfection, the mental exercises ought to become more difficult and

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 498 A. Νῦν μὲν οἱ καὶ ἀπτόμενοι μισράκια ὄντα ἄρτι ἐκ παιδῶν τὸ μεταξὺ οἰκονομίας καὶ χρηματισμοῦ πλησιάσαντες αὐτοῦ τῷ χαλεπωτάτῳ ἀπαλλάττονται, οἱ φιλοσοφώτατοι ποιοίμενοι· λέγου δὲ χαλεπώ-

τατον τὸ περὶ τοὺς λόγους· ἐν δὲ τῇ ἔπειτα, δὲν καὶ ἄλλων τοῦτο πραττόντων παρακαλοῦμενοι ἐθέλωσιν ἄκροαται γίγνεσθαι, μέγιστα ἡγούνται, παρέργον οἰόμενοι αὐτὸ εἶναι πράττειν.

absorbing. Lastly, when the age of bodily effort passes away, philosophy ought to become the main and principal pursuit.¹

Most people will hear all this (continues Sokrates) with mingled incredulity and repugnance. We cannot wonder that they do so: for they have had no experience of one or a few virtuously trained men ruling in a city suitably prepared.² Such combination of philosophical rulers within a community adapted to them, we must assume to be realised.³ Though difficult, it is noway impracticable: and even the multitude will become reconciled to it, if you explain to them mildly what sort of persons we mean by philosophers. We do not mean such persons as the multitude now call by that name; interlopers in the pursuit, violent in dispute and quarrel with each other, and perpetually talking personal scandal.⁴ The multitude cannot hate a philosophical temper such as we depict, when they once come to know it—a man who, indifferent to all party disputes, dwells in contemplation of the Universal Forms, and tries to mould himself and others into harmony with them.⁵ Such a philosopher will not pretend to make regulations, either for a city or for an individual, until he has purified it thoroughly. He will then make regulations framed upon the type of the Eternal Forms—Justice, Temperance, Beauty—adapting them as well as he can to human exigencies.⁶ The multitude, when they know what is really meant, will become perfectly reconciled to it. One single prince, if he rises so as to become a philosopher, and has a consenting community, will suffice to introduce the system which we have been describing. So fortunate an accident can undoubtedly occur but seldom; yet it is not impossible, and one day or other it will really occur.⁷

If the multitude could once see a real, perfect, philosopher, they could not fail to love him: but this never happens.

I must now (continues Sokrates) explain more in detail the studies and training through which these preservers and Rulers of our city, the complete philosophers, must be created. The most perfect among the Guar-

Course of training in the Platonic city, for

¹ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 498 C.

² Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 498 E.

³ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 499 B-C.

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, vi. pp. 499-500.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 500 C-D.

⁶ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 501 A.

⁷ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 502.

imparting philosophy to the Rulers. They must be taught to ascend to the Idea of Good. But what is Good?

studies.¹ But what are the highest studies? What is the supreme object of knowledge? It is the Idea of Good—the Form of Good: to the acquisition of which our philosophers must be trained to ascend, however laborious and difficult the process may be.² Neither justice nor any thing else can be useful or profitable, unless we superadd to them a knowledge of the Idea of Good: without this, it would profit us nothing to possess all other knowledge.³

Now as to the question, What Good is? there are great and long-standing disputes. Every mind pursues Good, and does every thing for the sake of it—yet without either knowledge or firm assurance what Good is, and consequently with perpetual failure in deriving benefit from other acquisitions.⁴ Most people say that Pleasure is the Good: an ingenious few identify Intelligence with the Good. But neither of these explanations is satisfactory. For when a man says that Intelligence is the Good, our next question to him must be, What sort of Intelligence do you mean?—Intelligence of what? To this he must reply, Intelligence of the Good: which is absurd, since it presumes us to know already what the Good is—the very point which he is pretending to elucidate. Again, he who contends that Pleasure is the Good, is forced in discussion to admit that there are such things as bad pleasures: in other words, that pleasure is sometimes good, sometimes bad.⁵ From these doubts and disputes about the real

Ancient disputes upon this point, though every one yearns after Good. Some say Intelligence; some say Pleasure. Neither is satisfactory.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 503.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 504.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 A. οἱ γε ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα μεγιστον μάθημα πολλάκις ἀπήκοας, ἢ δίκαια καὶ τάλλα προσχρησάμενα χροσима καὶ ὠφέλιμα γίνονται, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 E. Ὁ

δὲ διώκει μὲν ἅπαντα ψυχῇ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαρτυρομένη τι εἶναι, ἀπορούσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστίν, οὐδὲ πιστεύει χρῆσασθαι μονίμῃ, οἷς καὶ περὶ τάλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τι ὄφελος ἦν, &c.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 505 C.

nature of good, we shall require our philosophical Guardians to have emancipated themselves, and to have attained a clear vision. They will be unfit for their post if they do not well know what the Good is, and in what manner just or honourable things come to be good.¹ Our city will have received its final consummation, when it is placed under the superintendence of one who knows what the Good is.

But tell me, Sokrates (asks Adeimantus), what do you conceive the Good to be—Intelligence or Pleasure, or any other thing different from these? I do not profess to know (replies Sokrates), and cannot tell you. We must decline the problem, What Good itself is? as more arduous than our present impetus will enable us to reach.² Nevertheless I will partially supply the deficiency by describing to you the offspring of Good, very like its parent. You will recollect that we have distinguished the Many from the One: the many just particulars, beautiful particulars, from the One Universal Idea or Form, Just *per se*, Beautiful *per se*. The many particulars are seen but not conceived: the one Idea is conceived, but not seen.³ We see the many particulars through the auxiliary agency of light, which emanates from the Sun, the God of the visible world. Our organ and sense of vision are not the Sun itself, but they are akin to the Sun in a greater degree than any of our other senses. They imbibe their peculiar faculty from the influence of the Sun.⁴ The Sun furnishes to objects the power of being seen, and to our eyes the power of seeing: we can see no colour unless we turn to objects enlightened by its rays. Moreover it is the Sun which also brings about the generation, the growth, and the nourishment, of these objects, though it is itself out of the limits of generation: it generates and keeps them in existence, besides rendering them

Adeimantus asks what Sokrates says. Sokrates says that he cannot answer: but he compares it by a metaphor to the Sun.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A. δίκαιά τε καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅσην ποτὶ ἀγαθὸν ὄντι, οὐ πολλοὺς τινὲς ἔξουσι φάλακα περὶσθαι ἢν ἑαυτῶν τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 B-E. Ἀπὸ μὲν τί ποτ' ὄντι τὰγαθὸν ἰδόμεν τὰ νῦν εἶναι· πλεον γὰρ μοι φαίνεται ἢ κατὰ τὴν παρουσίαν ὅρων ἰδμενθαί τοι γε δοκούσας ἡμεῖς τὰ νῦν· οἱ δὲ ἀγαθούς

τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φαίνεται καὶ ἐμοῦστάτος ἐκείνῃ, λέγειν ἐθέλω (p. 506 E).

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 507 B-C. Καὶ τὰ μὲν (πολλὰ) δὴ ὁρᾶσθαι φεμὲν, νοεῖσθαι δὲ οὐ· τὰς δ' αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι μὲν, ὁρᾶσθαι δὲ οὐ.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 A. ἢ ὅφισι—ἡλιοειδέστατον τῶν περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐργάζων.

visible.¹ Now the Sun is the offspring and representative of the Idea of Good: what the Sun is in the sensible and visible world, the Idea of Good is in the intelligible or conceivable world.² As the Sun not only brings into being the objects of sense, but imparts to them the power of being seen—so the Idea of Good brings into being the objects of conception or cognition, imparts to them the power of being known, and to the mind the power of knowing them.³ It is from the Idea of Good that all knowledge, all truth, and all real essence spring. Yet the Idea of Good is itself extra-essential; out of or beyond the limits of essence, and superior in beauty and dignity both to knowledge and to truth; which are not Good itself, but akin to Good, as vision is akin to the Sun.⁴

Here then we have two distinct regions or genera; one, the conceivable or intelligible, ruled by the Idea of Good —the other the visible, ruled by the Sun, which is the offspring of Good. Now let us subdivide each of these regions or genera, into two portions. The two portions of the visible will be—first, real objects, such as animals, plants, works of art, &c.—second, the images or representations of these, such as shadows, reflexions in water or in mirrors, &c. The first of these two subdivisions will be greatly superior in clearness to the second: it will be distinguished from the second as truth is distinguished from not-truth.⁵ Matter of knowledge is in the same relation to matter of opinion, as an original to its copy. Next, the conceivable or intelligible region must be subdivided into two portions, similarly related one to the other: the first of these

The Idea of Good rules the ideal or intelligible world, as the Sun rules the sensible or visible world.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. Τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὁραμένοις οὐ μόνον τὴν τοῦ ὁρᾶσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φέροι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αἰεθρὴν καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γίνεσθαι αὐτὸν ὄντα.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 B-C. Τοῦτον (τὸν ἥλιον) τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἔκγονον, ὃν τάχαθεν ἐγέννησεν ἀνάλογον ἑαυτῷ, ὃ, τι περ αὐτὸ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ πρὸς τὸ νοῦν καὶ τὰ νοούμενα, τοῦτο τοῦτον ἐν τῷ ὁρατῷ πρὸς τὸ ὄψιν καὶ τὰ ὁρώμενα.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 508 E. Τοῦτο τοῖνυν τὸ τὴν ἀληθείαν παρέχον τοῖς γινωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γινώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδίδον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδίαν φάει εἶναι, αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὐ-

σαν καὶ ἀληθείας ὡς γινωσκομένης, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 509 B. Καὶ τοῖς γινωσκομένοις τοῖνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γινώσκεισθαι φέροι, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παύεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὅπ' ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖται, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρᾶσιβει καὶ δύναμει ὑπερέχοντος. Καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκος μέλα γελῶν, Ἀπολλων, εἶπεν, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς! Σὲ γάρ, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, αἰτίας, ἀναγκάζων τὰ μοι δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν.—Also p. 509 A.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 509-510. 510 A: διηγήσθαι ἀληθείαν τε καὶ μὴ, ὥς τὸ δοξαστὸν πρὸς τὸ γνωστὸν, οὕτω τὸ ὁμοιωδὸν πρὸς τὸ ὁμοιωδῶν.

portions will be analogous to the real objects of vision, the second to the images or representations of these objects: the first will thus be the Forms, Ideas, or Realities of Conception or Intellect—the second will be particular images or embodiments thereof.¹

Now in regard to these two portions of the conceivable or intelligible region, two different procedures of the mind are employed: the pure Dialectic, and the Geometrical, procedure. The Geometer or the Arithmetician begins with certain visible images, lines, figures, or numbered objects, of sense: he takes his departure from certain hypotheses or assumptions, such as given numbers, odd and even—given figures and angles, of three different sorts.² He assumes these as data without rendering account of them, or allowing them to be called in

To the intelligible world there are applicable two distinct modes of procedure—the Geometrical—the Dialectic. Geometrical procedure assumes diagrams.

question, as if they were self-evident to every one. From these premisses he deduces his conclusions, carrying them down by uncontradicted steps to the solution of the problem which he is examining.³ But though he has before his eyes the visible parallelogram inscribed on the sand, with its visible diagonal, and though all his propositions are affirmed respecting these—yet what he has really in his mind is something quite different—the Parallelogram *per se*, or the Form of a Parallelogram—the Form of a Diagonal, &c. The visible figure before him is used only as an image or representative of this self-existent form; which last he can contemplate only in conception, though all his propositions are intended to apply to it.⁴ He

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 B. *ἢ το μὲν αὐτοῦ (τμήμα) τοῖς τότε τμηθεῖσιν ὡς εἰκόσι χρωμένη (this is farther illustrated by p. 511 A—εἰκόσι χρωμένην αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσι) ψυχῇ ζητεῖν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχῇ πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτῇ, &c.*

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 C-D. *οἱ περὶ τὰς γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πραγματευόμενοι, ὑποθέμηναι τὸ τε περὶ τὸν καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ γυνῶν τριττὰ εἶδη καὶ ἄλλα τούτων ἀεὶ ἀφ' ἑκάστην μέθοδον, ταῦτα μὲν ὡς εἰδότες, ποιησά-*

μενοι ὑποθέσεις αὐτά, οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἵτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν δίδοναι, ὡς παρὰ φανεράν· ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ πῶς διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὁμολογουμένως ἐπὶ τούτῳ, οὐ ἂν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὀρήσασιν.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 510 D-E. *τοῖς ὀρμμένοις εἶδει προσχρῶνται, καὶ τοὺς λόγους περὶ αὐτῶν ποιοῦνται, οὐ περὶ τούτων διανοούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἐκείνων περὶ οἷς ταῦτα εἶδικα, τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα τοὺς λόγους ποιοῦμενοι καὶ διαμέτρου αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' οὐ ταύτης ἦν γράφουσι, καὶ τάλλα οὕτως· αὐτὰ μὲν ταῦτα ἀπλάττουσι τε καὶ γράφουσιν, ὧν καὶ σκιαὶ καὶ ἐν ὕδασι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ.*

is unable to take his departure directly from this Form, as from a first principle: he is forced to assume the visible figure as his point of departure, and cannot ascend above it: he treats it as something privileged and self-evident.¹

From the geometrical procedure thus described, we must now distinguish the other section—the pure Dialectic. Here the Intellect ascends to the absolute Form, and grasps it directly. Particular assumptions or hypotheses are indeed employed, but only as intervening stepping-stones, by which the Intellect is to ascend to the Form: they are afterwards to be discarded: they are not used here for first principles of reasoning, as they are by the Geometer.² The Dialectician uses for his first principle the highest absolute Form; he descends from this to the next highest, and so lower and lower through the orderly gradation of Forms, until he comes to the end or lowest: never employing throughout the whole descent any hypothesis or assumption, nor any illustrative aid from sense. He contemplates and reasons upon the pure intelligible essence, directly and immediately: whereas the Geometer can only contemplate it indirectly and mediately, through the intervening aid of particular assumptions.³

The distinction here indicated—between the two different sections of the Intelligible Region, and the two different sections of the Region of Sense—we shall mark (continues Sokrates) by appropriate terms. The Dialectician alone has *Noûs* or Intellect, direct or the highest cognition: he alone grasps and comprehends directly the pure intelligible essence or absolute Form.

Two distinct grades of Cognition—
—Direct or Superior—*Noûs*—
—Indirect or Inferior—*Dianoia*.

τούτοις μὲν ὡς εἰκόσιν αὐτὸν χρώμενοι, ζήτουντες τε αὐτὰ ἐκείνα ἰδεῖν, ἀ οὐκ ἀν' ἄλλων ἰδοὶ τις ἢ τῇ διανοίᾳ.

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 A. οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἰοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν, εἰκόσι δι' ἡμετέρας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ὑπὸ τῶν κάτω ἀπεικασθεῖσιν, καὶ ἐκείνους πρὸς ἐκείνα ὡς ἐναργεῖς δεδοσμένοις τε καὶ τετιμμημένοις.

² Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 B. τὸ ἔτερον γὰρ τμήμα τοῦ νοητοῦ . . . οὐδ' αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος ἀπέεται τῇ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δυνάμει, τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιοῦμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς

ἀλλὰ τῇ ὄντι ὑποθέσει, ὅλον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὁρμάς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου, ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντός ἀρχὴν ἴω, ἀφ' ἧς αὐτῆς, πάλιν αὐτὸν ἐχόμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἐχομένων, οὕτως ἐπὶ τελευταίᾳ καταβαίῃ, αἰσθητῇ παντάσῃ οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ' εἰδεῖσιν αὐτοῖς δι' αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτὰ, καὶ τελευτῇ εἰς εἶδη.

³ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 511 C. σαφέστερον εἶναι τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιστήμης τοῦ ὄντος τε καὶ νοητοῦ θεωρούμενον ἢ τὸ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν καλουμένων, αἷς αἱ ὑποθέσεις ἀρχαί, &c.

The Geometer does not ascend to this direct contemplation or intuition of the Form : he knows it only through the medium of particular assumptions, by indirect Cognition or *Dianoia* ; which is a lower faculty than *Noûs* or Intellect, yet nevertheless higher than Opinion.

As we assign two distinct grades of Cognition to the Intelligible Region, so we also assign two distinct grades of Opinion to the Region of Sense, and its two sections. To the first of these two sections, or to real objects of sense, we assign the highest grade of Opinion, viz. : Faith or Belief. To the second of the two, or to the images of real objects of sense, we assign the lower grade, viz. : Conjecture.

Two distinct grades of Opinion also in the Sensible World—Faith or Belief—Conjecture.

Here then are the four grades. Two grades of Cognition—1. *Noûs*, or Direct Cognition. 2. *Dianoia*, or Indirect Cognition : both of them belonging to the Intelligible Region, and both of them higher than Opinion. Next follow the two grades of Opinion. 3. The higher grade, Faith or Belief. 4. The lower grade, Conjecture. Both the two last belong to the sensible world ; the first to real objects, the last to images of those objects.¹

Sokrates now proceeds to illustrate the contrast between the philosopher and the unphilosophical or ordinary man, by the memorable simile of the cave and its shadows. Mankind live in a cave, with its aperture directed towards the light of the sun ; but they are so chained, that their backs are constantly turned towards this aperture, so that they cannot see the sun and sunlight. What they do see is by means of a fire which is always burning behind them. Between them and this fire there is a wall ; along the wall are posted men who carry backwards and forwards representations or images of all sorts of objects ; so that the shadows of these objects by the firelight are projected from behind these chained men upon the ground in front of them, and pass to and fro before their vision. All the experience which such chained men acquire, consists in what they observe of the appearance and disappearance, the

Distinction between the philosopher and the unphilosophical public, illustrated by the simile of the Cave, and the captives imprisoned therein.

¹ Plato, Republic, p. 511 D-E.

transition, sequences, and co-existences, of these shadows, which they mistake for truth and realities, having no acquaintance with any other phenomena.¹ If now we suppose any one of them to be liberated from his chains, turned round, and brought up to the light of the sun and to real objects—his eyesight would be at first altogether dazzled, confounded, and distressed. Distinguishing as yet nothing clearly, he would believe that the shadows which he had seen in his former state were true and distinct objects, and that the new mode of vision to which he had been suddenly introduced was illusory and unprofitable. He would require a long time to accustom him to daylight: at first his eye would bear nothing but shadows—next images in the water—then the stars at night—lastly, the full brightness of the Sun. He would learn that it was the Sun which not only gave light, but was the cause of varying seasons, growth, and all the productions of the visible world. And when his mind had been thus opened, he would consider himself much to be envied for the change, looking back with pity on his companions still in the cave.² He would think them all miserably ignorant, as being conversant not with realities, but only with the shadows which passed before their eyes. He would have no esteem even for the chosen few in the cave, who were honoured by their fellows as having best observed the co-existences and sequences among these shadows, so as to predict most exactly how the shadows would appear in future.³ Moreover if, after having become fully accustomed to daylight and the contemplation of realities, he were to descend again into the cave, his eyesight would be dim and confused in that comparative darkness; so that he would not well recognise the shadows, and would get into disputes about them with his companions. They on their side would deride him as having spoilt his sight as well as his judgment, and would point him out as an example to deter others from emerging out of the cave into daylight.⁴ Far from wishing to emerge them-

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 514-515.

² Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 515-516.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 516 C. Τιμὰὶ δὲ καὶ ἱκανοὶ εἰ τινας αὐτοῖς ᾔσων τότε παρ' ἀλλήλων καὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁρώμενων ἀπορώμενοι τὰ παρόντα, καὶ μνημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα αὐτῶν καὶ ὅσπερ αἰσῶνται καὶ ἅμα πορεύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ

τούτων δὲ δυνατότατα ἀπομαντευόμενοι τὸ μέλλον ἕξαι, δοκοῦσι ἂν αὐτὸν ἐπιθυμητικῶς αὐτῶν, ἔχειν καὶ ζηλοῦν τοὺς παρ' ἑκείνοις τιμωμένους τε καὶ ἐνδυναστεύοντας;

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. ἂν οὐ γίγνεται ἂν παρέσχωι καὶ λέγῃται ἂν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀναβὰς ἄνω διεφθαρ-

selves, they would kill, if they could, any one who tried to unchain them and assist them in escaping.¹

By this simile (continues Sokrates) I intend to illustrate, as far as I can, yet without speaking confidently,² the relations of the sensible world to the intelligible world : the world of transitory shadows, dimly seen and admitting only opinion, contrasted with that of unchangeable realities steadily contemplated and known, illuminated by the Idea of Good, which is itself visible in the background, being the cause both of truth in speculation and of rectitude in action.³ No wonder that the few who can ascend into the intelligible region, amidst the clear contemplations of Truth and Justice *per se*, are averse to meddle again with the miseries of human affairs, and to contend with the opinions formed by ordinary men respecting the shadows of Justice, the reality of which these ordinary men have never seen. There are two causes of temporary confused vision : one, when a man moves out of darkness into light—the other when he moves out of light into darkness. It is from the latter cause that the philosopher suffers when he redescends into the obscure cave.⁴

Daylight of philosophy contrasted with the firelight and shadows of the Cave.

The great purpose of education is to turn a man round from his natural position at the bottom of this dark cave, where he sees nothing but shadows : to fix his eyes in the other direction, and to induce him to ascend into clear daylight. Education does not, as some suppose, either pour knowledge into an empty mind, or impart visual power to blind persons. Men have good eyes, but these eyes are turned in the wrong direction. The clever among them see sharply enough what is before them ; but they have nothing before them except shadows, and the sharper their vision the more mischief they do.⁵ What is required is, to turn them

Purpose of a philosophical training, to turn a man round from facing the bad light of the Cave to face the daylight of philosophy, and to see the eternal Forms.

μήτοις ἔχει τὰ δῶματα, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲ περιῶσθαι ἄνω ἵδναι ;

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 A. καὶ τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν, εἰ πως ἐν ταῖς χερσὶ δύναται λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποκατεῖναι, ἀποκτινύνει αὖν ;

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517. τῆς γ' ἑμῆς ἐλπίδος, ἐπειδὴ ταύτης ἐπιθυμίας ἀκούειν· ὁ δὲ οὐκ οἶδεν εἰ

ἀληθὲς ὁδὸς εὐτυχέει.

This tone of uncertainty in Plato deserves notice. It forms a striking contrast with the dogmatism of many among his commentators.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 517 C.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 517-518.

⁵ Plato, Republic, p. 519 A-B.

round and draw them up so as to face the real objects of daylight. Their natural eyesight would then suffice to enable them to see these objects well.¹ The task of our education must be, to turn round the men of superior natural aptitude, and to draw them up into the daylight of realities. Next, when they shall have become sufficiently initiated in truth and philosophy, we must not allow them to bury themselves permanently in such studies—as they will themselves be but too eager to do. We must compel them to come down again into the cave and exercise ascendancy among their companions, for whose benefit their superior mental condition will thus become available.²

Coming as they do from the better light, they will, after a little temporary perplexity, be able to see the dim shadows better than those who have never looked at anything else. Having contemplated the true and real Forms of the Just, Beautiful, Good—they will better appreciate the images of these Forms which come and go, pass by and reappear in the cave.³ They will indeed be very reluctant to undertake the duties or exercise the powers of government: their genuine delight is in philosophy; and if left to themselves, they would cultivate nothing else. But such reluctance is in itself one proof that they are the fittest persons to govern. If government be placed in the hands of men eager to possess it, there will be others eager to dispossess them, so that competition and factions will arise. Those who come forward to govern, having no good of their own, and seeking to extract their own good from the exercise of power, are both unworthy of trust and sure to be resisted by opponents of the like disposition. The philosopher alone has his own good in himself. He enjoys a life better than that of a ruler; which life he is compelled to forego when he accepts power and becomes a ruler.⁴

The main purpose of education, I have said (continues Socrates), is, to turn round the faces of the superior men, and to invite them upwards from darkness to

¹ Plato, Republic, p. 519 B. ὅν τι & τὴν τέτραται.
ἀπαλλαγὴν περιστρέφεται εἰς τὴν ἡμέραν,
καὶ ἴκονται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτο τῶν αὐτῶν
ἀνθρώπων δεύματα ἑώρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐφ'

² Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 519-520.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 520 C.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 520-521.

light—from the region of perishable shadows to that of imperishable realities.¹ Now what cognitions, calculated to aid such a purpose, can we find to teach? Gymnastic, music, the vulgar arts, are all useful to be taught: but they do not tend to that which we are here seeking. Arithmetic does so to a certain extent, if properly taught—which at present it is not.² It furnishes a stimulus to awaken the dormant intellectual and reflective capacity. Among the variety of sensible phenomena, there are some in which the senses yield a clear and satisfactory judgment, leaving no demand in the mind for anything beyond: there are others in which the senses land us in apparent equivocation, puzzle, and contradiction—so that the mind is stung by this apparent perplexity, and instigated to find a solution by some intellectual effort.³ Thus, if we see or feel the fingers of our hand, they always appear to the sense, fingers: in whatever order or manner they may be looked at, there is no contradiction or discrepancy in the judgment of sense. But if we see or feel them as great or small, thick or thin, hard or soft, &c., they then appear differently according as they are seen or felt in different order or under different circumstances. The same object which now appears great, will at another time appear small: it will seem to the sense hard or soft, light or heavy, according as it is seen under different comparisons and relations.⁴ Here then, sense is involved in an apparent contradiction, declaring the same object to be both hard and soft, great and small, light and heavy, &c. The mind, painfully confounded by such a contradiction, is obliged to invoke intellectual reflection to clear it up. Great and small are presented by the sense as inhering in the same object. Are they one thing, or two separate things? Intellectual reflection informs us that they are two: enabling us to conceive separately two things, which to our sense appeared confounded together. Intellectual (or abstract) conception is thus developed in our mind, as distinguished from sense, and as

tion to philosophy—Arithmetic, its awakening power—shock to the mind by felt contradiction.

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C. *φύχτες περιπατηγῆ, ἀπὸ νεκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθειῶν τοῦ δοτοῦ ἰούσης ἐπιδόσαν, ἢν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν ἀληθὴ φήσονται εἶναι.*

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 521 C.

τί δὲ οὐκ εἰς μάθημα φύχτες ἀλλὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ γεγονότος ἐπὶ τὸ ἐν;

³ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 522-523 A.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 523 C.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 522-524.

a refuge from the confusion and difficulties of sense, which furnish the stimulus whereby it is awakened.¹

Now arithmetic, besides its practical usefulness for arrangements of war, includes difficulties and furnishes a stimulus of this nature. We see the same thing both as One and as infinite in multitude: as definite and indefinite in number.² We can emerge from these difficulties only by intellectual and abstract reflection. It is for this purpose, and not for purposes of traffic, that our intended philosophers must learn Arithmetic.

Their minds must be raised from the confusion of the sensible world to the clear daylight of the intelligible.³ In teaching Arithmetic, the master sets before his pupils numbers in the concrete, that is, embodied in visible and tangible objects—so many balls or pebbles.⁴ Each of these balls he enumerates as One, though they be unequal in magnitude, and whatever be the magnitude of each. If you remark that the balls are unequal—and that each of them is Many as well as One, being divisible into as many parts as you please—he will laugh at the objection as irrelevant. He will tell you that the units to which his numeration refers are each *Unum per se*, indivisible and without parts; and all equal among themselves without the least shade of difference. He will add that such units cannot be exhibited to the senses, but can only be conceived by the intellect: that the balls before you are not such units in reality, but serve to suggest and facilitate the effort of abstract conception.⁵ In this manner arithmetical teaching conducts us to numbers in the abstract—to the real, intelligible, indivisible unit—the *Unum per se*.

Geometrical teaching conducts the mind to the same order of Geometry contemplations; leading it away from variable particulars to unchangeable universal Essence. Some

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 524 B-C.

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 A. εἰ τις ᾔροιτο αὐτοὺς, ὅτι θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων δριμύτων διαλέγεσθαι, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ ἡμῖς ἀειοῦντι ἴσται, ἴσον τε ἑκάστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρει, μᾶλλον τε ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν οἷε αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Τούτῳ ἔργῳ, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ἐν διανομήναι μόνον ἐγχερεῖ, ἄλλως δ' οὐδ' αὐτοὺς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 B. διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπείρου εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαρᾶντι, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 D. ὁρατὰ ἢ ἀπὸ σώματα ἔχοντες δριμύτους, &c.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 525 A. εἰ τις ᾔροιτο αὐτοὺς, ὅτι θαυμάσιοι, περὶ ποίων δριμύτων διαλέγεσθαι, ἐν οἷς τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ ἡμῖς ἀειοῦντι ἴσται, ἴσον τε ἑκάστον πᾶν παντὶ καὶ οὐδὲ σμικρὸν διαφέρει, μᾶλλον τε ἔχον ἐν αὐτῷ οὐδέν; τί ἂν οἷε αὐτοὺς ἀποκρίνασθαι; Τούτῳ ἔργῳ, ὅτι περὶ τούτων λέγουσιν ἐν διανομήναι μόνον ἐγχερεῖ, ἄλλως δ' οὐδ' αὐτοὺς μεταχειρίζεσθαι δυνατόν.

persons extol Geometry chiefly on the ground of its usefulness in applications to practice. But this is a mistake: its real value is in conducting to knowledge, and to elevated contemplations of the mind. It does, however like Arithmetic, yield useful results in practice and both of them are farther valuable as auxiliaries to other studies.¹

After Geometry—the measurement of lines and superficial areas—the proper immediate sequel is Stereometry, the measurement of solids. But this latter is nowhere properly honoured and cultivated: though from its intrinsic excellence, it forces its way partially even against public neglect and discouragement.² Most persons omit it, and treat Astronomy as if it were the immediate sequel to Geometry: which is a mistake, for Astronomy relates to solid bodies in a state of rotatory movement, and ought to be preceded by the treatment of solid bodies generally.³ Assuming Stereometry, therefore, as if it existed, we proceed to Astronomy.

towards
Universal
Ena.

Astronomy
—how use-
ful—not
useful as
now taught
—must be
studied
by ideal
figures, not
by observa-
tion.

Certainly (remarks Glaukon) Astronomy, besides its usefulness in regard to the calendar, and the seasons, must be admitted by every one to carry the mind upwards, to the contemplation of things not below but on high. I do not admit this at all (replies Sokrates), as Astronomy is now cultivated: at least in my sense of the words, *looking upwards and looking downwards*. If a man lies on his back, contemplating the ornaments of the ceiling, he may carry his eyes upward, but not his mind.⁴ To look upwards, as I understand it, is to carry the mind away from the contemplation of sensible things, whereof no science is attainable—to the contemplation of intelligible things, entities invisible and unchangeable, which alone are the objects of science. Observation of the stars, such as astronomers now teach, does not fulfil any such condition. The heavenly bodies are the most beautiful of all visible bodies and the most regular of all visible movements, approximating most nearly, though still with a long interval of inferiority, to the ideal figures and movements of genuine and self-existent Forms—quickness, slowness, number, figure, &c., as

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 526-527.

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-C.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 528 A-B.

ἐν περιφορῇ ἐν ᾗδ' στροβίλῳ λαβόντες, πρὶν αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ λαβεῖν. Also 528 E.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 B.

they are in themselves, not visible to the eye, but conceivable only by reason and intellect.¹ The movements of the heavenly bodies are exemplifications, approaching nearest to the perfection of these ideal movements, but still falling greatly short of them. They are like visible circles or triangles drawn by some very exact artist; which, however beautiful as works of art, are far from answering to the conditions of the idea and its definition, and from exhibiting exact equality and proportion.² So about the movements of the sun and stars: they are comparatively regular, but they are yet bodily and visible, never attaining the perfect sameness and unchangeableness of the intelligible world and its forms. We cannot learn truth by observation of phenomena constantly fluctuating and varying. We must study astronomy, as we do geometry, not by observation, but by mathematical theorems and hypotheses: which is a far more arduous task than astronomy as taught at present. Only in this way can it be made available to improve and strengthen the intellectual organ of the mind.³

In like manner (continues Sokrates), Acoustics or Harmonics must be studied, not by the ear, listening to and comparing various sounds, but by the contemplative intellect, applying arithmetical relations and theories.⁴ After going through all these different studies, the student will have his mind elevated so as to perceive the affinity of method⁵ and principle which pervades them all. In this state he will be prepared for entering on Dialectic, which is the final consummation of his intellectual career. He will then have ascended from the cave into daylight. He will have learnt to see real objects, and ultimately the Sun itself, instead of the dim and transitory shadows below. He will become qualified to grasp the pure Intelligible Form with his pure Intellect alone, without either aid or disturbance from sense. He will acquire that dialectical discursive power which deals exclusively with these Intelligible Forms, carrying on ratiocination by means of

Acoustics,
in like man-
ner—The
student will
be thus con-
ducted to
the highest
of all studies
—Dialectic:
and to the
region of
pure intelli-
gible Forms.

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 529 D.

² Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 529-530.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 530 B.
Προβλήμασιν ἀπὸ χράμενοι ὡς περ γινώ-

μετρίαν, οὕτω καὶ ἀστρονομίαν μετρίαν·
τὰ δ' ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ ἰδόμενα, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 531 D.

them only, with no reference to sensible objects. He will attain at length the last goal of the Dialectician—the contemplation of Bonum *per se* (the highest perfection and elevation of the Intel-ligible)¹ with Intellect *per se* in its full purity: the best part of his mind will have been raised to the contemplation and know-ledge of the best and purest entity.²

I know not whether I ought to admit your doctrine, Sokrates (observes Glaukon). There are difficulties both in admitting and denying it. However, let us assume it for the present. Your next step must be to tell us what is the characteristic function of this Dialectic power—what are its different varieties and ways of proceeding? I would willingly do so (replies Sokrates), but you would not be able to follow me.³ I would lay before you not merely an image of the truth but the very truth itself; as it appears to me at least, whether I am correct or not—for I ought not to be sure of my own correctness.

Question by Glaukon—What is the Dialectic Power? Sokrates declares that he cannot answer with certainty, and that Glaukon could not follow him if he did.

But I am sure that the dialectic power is something of the nature which I have described. It is the only force which can make plain the full truth to students who have gone through the preliminary studies that we have described. It is the only study which investi-gates rationally real forms and essences⁴—what each thing is, truly in itself. Other branches of study are directed either towards the opinions and preferences of men—or towards generation and combination of particular results—or towards upholding of combina-tions already produced or naturally springing up: while even as to geometry and the other kindred studies, we have seen that as to real essence, they have nothing better than dreams⁵—and that they cannot see it as it is, so long

He answers partially—It is the con-summation of all the sciences, raising the student to the con-templation of pure Forms, and especially to that of the highest Form—Good.

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 A. οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῇ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπι-χειρῇ, ἔστιν πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ' αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἑκάστον ὁρᾷ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ τῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ' αὐτῇ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ ἴδιαι, &c.

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 532 D.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 A.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 B. ὡς αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου περὶ, ὃ ἐστὶν ἑκά-στον, οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἐπιχειρεῖ μέθοδος ὁδὸς περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν, &c.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 C. ὡς ἀνιερῶνται μὲν περὶ τὸ ὄν, ὑπάρ δὲ ἀδύνατον αὐταῖς ἰδεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἂν ὑποθέσει-χωμέναι ταύτας ἀεινήτους ἰᾶσιν, &c.

as they take for their principle or point of departure certain assumptions or hypotheses of which they can render no account. The principle being thus unknown, and the conclusion as well as the intermediate items being spun together out of that unknown, how can such a convention deserve the name of Science? ¹ Pursuant to custom, indeed, we call these by the name of Sciences. But they deserve no higher title than that of Intellectual Cognitions, lower than Science, yet higher than mere Opinion. It is the Dialectician alone who discards all assumptions, ascending at once to real essence as his principle and point of departure : ² defining, and discriminating by appropriate words, each variety of real essence—rendering account of it to others—and carrying it safely through the cross-examining process of question and answer. ³ Whoever cannot discriminate in this way the Idea or Form of Good from every thing else, will have no proper cognition of Good itself, but only, at best, opinions respecting the various shadows of Good. Dialectic—the capacity of discriminating real Forms and maintaining them in cross-examining dialogue is thus the coping-stone, completion, or consummation, of all the other sciences. ⁴

The preliminary sciences must be imparted to our Guardians during the earlier years of life, together with such bodily and mental training as may test their energy and perseverance of character. ⁵ After the age of twenty, those who have distinguished themselves in the juvenile studies and gymnastics, must be placed in a select class of honour above the rest, and must be initiated in a synoptic view of the affinity pervading all the separate cognitions which have been imparted to them. They must also be introduced to the view of Real Essence and its nature. This is the test of aptitude for Dialectics : it is the synoptic view only, which constitutes the Dialectician. ⁶

In these new studies they will continue until thirty years of

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 D.

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 533 E.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 B.
ἢ καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάσ-
του λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας ;

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 534 C-E.
ὥσπερ θριγκὸς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἡ διαλεκ-

τικὴ ἡμῖν ἐπάνω κεῖσθαι, &c.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 535-536 D.

⁶ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 536-537 C.
καὶ μεγίστη πείρα διαλεκτικῆς φύσεως καὶ
μή· ὁ μὲν γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικὸς, ὁ
δὲ μή, οὐ.

age : after which a farther selection must be made, of those who have most distinguished themselves. The men selected will be enrolled in a class of yet higher honour, and will be tested by dialectic cross-examination : so that we may discover who among them are competent to apprehend true, pure, and real Essence, renouncing all visual and sensible perceptions.¹ It is important that such Dialectic exercises should be deferred until this advanced age—and not imparted, as they are among us at present, to immature youths : who abuse the license of interrogation, find all their homegrown opinions uncertain, and end by losing all positive convictions.² Our students will remain under such dialectic tuition for five years, until they are thirty-five years of age : after which they must be brought again down into the cave, and constrained to acquire practical experience by undertaking military and administrative functions. In such employments they will spend fifteen years : during which they will undergo still farther scrutiny, to ascertain whether they can act up to their previous training, in spite of all provocations and temptations.³ Those who well sustain all these trials will become, at fifty years of age, the finished Elders or Chiefs of the Republic. They will pass their remaining years partly in philosophical contemplations, partly in application of philosophy to the regulation of the city. It is these Elders whose mental eye will have been so trained as to contemplate the Real Essence of Good, and to copy it as an archetype in all their ordinances and administration. They will be the Moderators of the city : but they will perform this function as a matter of duty and necessity—not being at all ambitious of it as a matter of honour.⁴

What has here been said about the male guardians and philosophers must be understood to apply equally to the female. We recognise no difference in this respect between the two sexes. Those females who have gone through the same education and have shown themselves capable of enduring the same trials as males, will participate, after fifty years of age, in the like philosophical contemplations, and in superintendence of the city.⁵

All these studies, and this education, are common to females as well as males.

¹ Plato, Republic, p. 537 D.

² Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 538-539.

³ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 539 D-E.

⁴ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 539-540.

⁵ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 C.

I have thus shown (Sokrates pursues) how the fundamental postulate for our city may be brought about.—That philosophers, a single man or a few, shall become possessed of supreme rule : being sufficiently exalted in character to despise the vulgar gratifications of ambition, and to carry out systematically the dictates of rectitude and justice. The postulate is indeed hard to be realised—yet not impossible.¹ Such philosophical rulers, as a means for first introducing their system into a new city, will send all the inhabitants above ten years old away into the country, reserving only the children, whom they will train up in their own peculiar manners and principles. In this way the city, according to our scheme, will be first formed : when formed, it will itself be happy, and will confer inestimable benefit on the nation to which it belongs.²

Plato thus assumes his city, and the individual man forming a parallel to his city, to be perfectly well constituted. Reason, the higher element, exercises steady controul : the lower elements, Energy and Appetite, both acquiesce contentedly in her right to controul, and obey her orders—the former constantly and forwardly—the latter sometimes requiring constraint by the strength of the former.

But even under the best possible administration, the city, though it will last long, will not last for ever. Eternal continuance belongs only to Ens ; every thing generated must one day or other be destroyed.³ The fatal period will at length arrive, when the breed of Guardians will degenerate. A series of changes for the worse will then commence, whereby the Platonic city will pass successively into timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. The first change will be, that the love of individual wealth and landed property will get possession of the Guardians : who, having in themselves the force of the city, will divide the territory among themselves, and reduce the other citizens to dependence and slavery.⁴ They will at the same time retain a part of their former mental training.

The city thus formed will last long, but not for ever. After a certain time, it will begin to degenerate. Stages of its degeneracy.

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. p. 540 E.

² Plato, Republic, vii. p. 541 A.

³ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 546 A.

γεννησιν παρρη δόξα δαίμων, &c.

⁴ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 547.

They will continue their warlike habits and drill : they will be ashamed of their wealth, and will enjoy it only in secret : they will repudiate money-getting occupations as disgraceful. They will devote themselves to the contests of war and political ambition—the rational soul becoming subordinate to the energetic and courageous.¹ The system which thus obtains footing will be analogous to the Spartan and Kretan, which have many admirers.² The change in individual character will correspond to this change in the city. Reason partially losing its ascendancy, while energy and appetite both gain ground—an intermediate character is formed in which energy or courage predominates. We have the haughty, domineering, contentious, man.³

Out of this timocracy, or timarchy, the city will next pass into an oligarchy, or government of wealth. The rich will here govern, to the exclusion of the poor. Reason, in the timocracy, was under the dominion of energy or courage : in the oligarchy, it will be under the dominion of appetite. The love of wealth will become predominant, instead of the love of force and aggrandisement. Now the love of wealth is distinctly opposed to the love of virtue : virtue and wealth are like weights in opposite scales.⁴ The oligarchical city will lose all its unity, and will consist of a few rich with a multitude of discontented poor ready to rise against them.⁵ The character of the individual citizen will undergo a modification similar to that of the collective city. He will be under the rule of appetite : his reason will be only invoked as the servant of appetite, to teach him how he may best enrich himself.⁶ He will be frugal,—will abstain from all unnecessary expenditure, even for generous and liberal purposes—and will keep up a fair show of honesty, from the fear of losing what he has already got.⁷

1. Timocracy and the timocratical individual.
2. Oligarchy, and the oligarchical individual.

¹ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 547-548 D. διαφανέστατον δ' ἐν αὐτῇ ἵστίῃ ἐν τι μόνον ἐπὶ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς κρατοῦντος—φιλονεικίαι καὶ φιλοτίμια.

² Plato, Republic, viii. p. 544 C.

³ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 549-550.

⁴ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 550 D-E-551 A. 550 E : προϊόντες εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν τοῦ χροματίζεσθαι, ὅσην ἂν τούτῳ τιμώ-

τερον ᾔδωνται, τοσούτῃ ἀρετῇ ἀτιμοτίραν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτω πλοῦτον ἀρετῇ διδόντεκεν, ὥστερ ἐν πλάστιγγι ζυγοῦ καίμενον ἑκατέρου ἀεὶ τὸν ἄριστον βέποντες ; Also p. 555 D.

⁵ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 552 D-E.

⁶ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 553 C.

⁷ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 554 D.

The oligarchical city will presently be transformed into a democracy, mainly through the abuse and exaggeration of its own ruling impulse—the love of wealth. The rulers, anxious to enrich themselves, rather encourage than check the extravagance of young spend-thrifts, to whom they lend money at high interest, or whose property they buy on advantageous terms. In this manner there arises a class of energetic men, with ruined fortunes and habits of indulgence. Such are the adventurers who put themselves at the head of the discontented poor, and overthrow the oligarchy.¹ The ruling few being expelled or put down, a democracy is established with equal franchise, and generally with officers chosen by lot.²

The characteristic of the democracy is equal freedom and open speech to all, with liberty to each man to shape his own life as he chooses. Hence there arises a great diversity of individual taste and character. Uniformity of pursuit or conduct is scarcely enforced: there is little restraint upon any one. A man offers himself for office whenever he chooses and not unless he chooses. He is at war or at peace, not by obedience to any public authority, but according to his own individual preference. If he be even condemned by a court of justice, he remains in the city careless of the sentence, which is never enforced against him. This democracy is an equal, agreeable, diversified, society, with little or no government: equal in regard to all—to the good, bad, and indifferent.³

So too the democratical individual. The son of one among these frugal and money-getting oligarchs, departing from the habits and disregarding the advice of his father, contracts a taste for expensive and varied indulgences. He loses sight of the distinction between what is necessary, and what is not necessary, in respect to desires and pleasures. If he be of a quiet temperament, not quite out of the reach of advice, he keeps clear of ruinous excess in any one direction; but he gives himself up to a great diversity of successive occupations and amusements, passing from one to the other without discrimination of good

¹ Plato, *Republic*, viii. pp. 556-558.

² Plato, *Republic*, viii. p. 557 A.

³ Plato, *Republic*, viii. pp. 557-558.

from bad, necessary from unnecessary.¹ His life and character thus becomes an agreeable, unconstrained, changeful, comprehensive, miscellany, like the society to which he belongs.²

Democracy, like oligarchy, becomes ultimately subverted by an abuse of its own characteristic principle. Freedom is gradually pushed into extravagance and excess, while all other considerations are neglected. No obedience is practised : no authority is recognised. The son feels himself equal to his father, the disciple to his teacher, the metic to the citizen, the wife to her husband, the slave to his master. Nay, even horses, asses, and dogs, go free about, so that they run against you in the road, if you do not make way for them.³ The laws are not obeyed : every man is his own master.

4. Passage from democracy to despotism. Character of the despotic city.

The subversion of such a democracy arises from the men who rise to be popular leaders in it : violent, ambitious, extravagant, men, who gain the favour of the people by distributing among them confiscations from the property of the rich. The rich, resisting these injustices, become enemies to the constitution : the people, in order to put them down, range themselves under the banners of the most energetic popular leader, who takes advantage of such a position to render himself a despot.⁴ He begins his rule by some acceptable measures, such as abolition of debts, and assignment of lands to the poorer citizens, until he has expelled or destroyed the parties opposed to him. He seeks pretences for foreign war, in order that the people may stand in need of a leader, and may be kept poor by the contributions necessary to sustain war. But presently he finds, or suspects, dissatisfaction among the more liberal spirits. He kills or banishes them as enemies : and to ensure the continuance of his rule, he is under the necessity of dispatching in like manner every citizen prominent either for magnanimity, intelligence, or wealth.⁵ Becoming thus odious to all the better citizens, he

¹ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 560-561 B. εἰς ἴσον ὅτ' τι καταστήσας τὰς ἡβονὰς διδύγει, τῇ παραπιπτοῦσιν αἰεὶ ὥστερ λαχούσῃ τὴν δαντοῦ ἀρχὴν παραδίδούς, ὥς ἂν πληρωθῇ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄλλη, οὐδὲμίαν ἀτιμάζων, ἀλλ' εἰς ἴσον τρέφων.

² Plato, Republic, viii. p. 561 D-E. παντοδαπὸν τε καὶ πλείστον ἡβῶν

μεστόν, καὶ τὸν καλὸν τε καὶ ποικίλον, ὥστερ ἡκείνην τὴν πόλιν, τοῦτον τὸν ἀνδρα εἶναι.

³ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 562-563 C.

⁴ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 565-566.

⁵ Plato, Republic, viii. p. 567 B.

is obliged to seek support by enlisting a guard of mercenary foreigners and manumitted slaves. He cannot pay his guards, without plundering the temples, extorting perpetual contributions from the people, and grinding them down by severe oppression and suffering.¹ Such is the government of the despot, which Euripides and other poets employ their genius in extolling.²

We have now to describe the despotic individual, the parallel of the despotised city. As the democratic individual arises from the son of an oligarchical citizen departing from the frugality of his father and contracting habits of costly indulgence: so the son of this democrat will contract desires still more immoderate and extravagant than his father, and will thus be put into training for the despotic character. He becomes intoxicated by insane appetites, which serve as seconds and auxiliaries to one despotic passion or mania, swaying his whole soul.³ To gratify such desires, he spends all his possessions, and then begins to borrow money wherever he can. That resource being exhausted, he procures additional funds by fraud or extortion; he cheats and ruins his father and mother; he resorts to plunder and violence. If such men are only a small minority, amidst citizens of better character, they live by committing crimes on the smaller scale. But if they are more numerous, they set up as a despot the most unprincipled and energetic of their number, and become his agents for the enslavement of their fellow-citizens.⁴ The despotic man passes his life always in the company of masters, or instruments, or flatterers: he knows neither freedom nor true friendship—nothing but the relation of master and slave. The despot is the worst and most unjust of mankind: the longer he continues despot, the worse he becomes.⁵

We have thus gone through the four successive depravations which our perfect city will undergo—timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, despotism. Step by step we have passed, thus passed, by four stages, from have passed from the best to the worst—from one

¹ Plato, Republic, viii. pp. 568-569.

² Plato, Republic, viii. p. 568 B.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 572-573 D.

⁴ Ἐπειὶς τυράννος ἔνθ' οὐκ οἶκον διακυβερεῖ
τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀντα. 574 E—575 A:

τυράννευσις ὑπὸ Ἐπειρος—Ἐπειρὶς μόνος
χος, &c.

⁵ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 574-575.

⁶ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 575-576.

extreme to the other. As is the city, so is the individual citizen—good or bad: the despotic city is like the despotic individual,—and so about the rest. Now it remains to decide whether in each case happiness and misery is proportioned to good and evil: whether the best is the happiest, the worst the most miserable,—and so proportionally about the intermediate.¹ On this point there is much difference of opinion.²

If we look at the condition of the despotised city, it plainly exhibits the extreme of misery; while our model city presents the extreme of happiness. Every one in the despotised city is miserable, according to universal admission, except the despot himself with his immediate favourites and guards. To be sure, in the eyes of superficial observers, the despots with these few favourites will appear perfectly happy and enviable. But if we penetrate beyond this false exterior show, and follow him into his interior, we shall find him too not less miserable than those over whom he tyrannises.³

What is true of the despotised city, is true also of the despotising individual.⁴ The best parts of his mind are under subjection to the worst: the rational mind is trampled down by the appetitive mind, with its insane and unsatisfied cravings. He is full of perpetual perturbation, anxiety, and fear; grief when he fails, repentance even after he has succeeded. Speaking of his mind as a whole, he never does what he really wishes; for the rational element, which alone can ensure satisfaction to the whole mind, and guide to the attainment of his real wishes, is enslaved by furious momentary impulses.⁵ The man of despotical mind is thus miserable; and most of all miserable, the more completely he succeeds in subjugating his fellow-citizens and becoming a despot in reality. Knowing himself

best to worst.
Question—
How are
Happiness
and Misery
apportioned
among
them.

Misery of
the despo-
tised city.

Supreme
Misery of
the despot-
ising indi-
vidual.

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 D.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 576 C. τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πολλά καὶ δοκεῖ.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 A.

⁴ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 577 C-D. τὴν ὁμοιότητα ἀναμνησκόμενος τῆς τε πόλεως καὶ τοῦ ἀνδρός . . . εἰ οὖν ὁμοίως ἀνὴρ τῇ πόλει, οὐ καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἀνάγκη

τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν εἶναι; &c. Also 579 E.

⁵ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 577-578. Καὶ ἡ τυραννομένη ἀρα ψυχὴ ἥκιστα ποιήσει ἃ ἐν βουλήσῃ ὡς περὶ ἄλλης εἴπῃν ψυχῆς· ὑπὸ δὲ οἰστροῦ ἀεὶ ἐλακόμενῃ βίᾳ ταραχῆς καὶ μεταμελείας μεστή ἐσται (577 E).

to be hated by everyone, he lives in constant fear of enemies within as well as enemies without, against whom he can obtain support only by courting the vilest of men as partisans.¹ Though greedy of all sorts of enjoyment, he cannot venture to leave his city, or visit any of the frequented public festivals. He lives indoors like a woman, envying those who can go abroad and enjoy these spectacles.² He is in reality the poorest and most destitute of men, having the most vehement desires, which he can never satisfy.³ Such is the despot who, not being master even of himself, becomes master of others: in reality, the most wretched of men, though he may appear happy to superficial judges who look only at external show.⁴

Thus then (concludes Sokrates) we may affirm with confidence, having reference to the five distinct cities above described—(1. The Model-City, regal or aristocratical. 2. Timocracy. 3. Oligarchy. 4. Democracy. 5. Despotism)—that the first of these is happy, and the last miserable: the three intermediate cities being more or less happy in the order which they occupy from the first to the last.

Conclusion
—The Model city and the individual corresponding to it, are the happiest of all—That which is farthest removed from it, is the most miserable of all.

The Just Man is happy in and through his Justice, however he may be treated by others. The Unjust Man, miserable.

Each of these cities has its parallel in an individual citizen. The individual citizen corresponding to the first is happy—he who corresponds to the last is miserable: and so proportionally for the individual corresponding to the three intermediate cities. He is happy or miserable, in and through himself, or essentially; whether he be known to Gods and men or not—whatever may be the sentiment entertained of him by others.⁵

There are two other lines of argument (continues Sokrates) establishing the same conclusion.

1. We have seen that both the collective city and the individual mind are distributed into three portions: Reason, Energy, Appetite. Each of these portions has its own peculiar pleasures and pains, desires

Other arguments proving the same conclusion

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 578-579.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 579 C.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 579 E.

⁴ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 579-580.

⁵ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 580 D. εἰν τε λαμβάνουσι τοιοῦτοι ὄντες εἰν τε μὴ πάντας ἀνθρώπους τε καὶ θεούς.

and aversions, beginnings or principles of action : —Pleasures of Intelligence are the best of all pleasures.
 Love of Knowledge : Love of Honour : Love of Gain.
 If you question men in whom these three varieties of temper respectively preponderate, each of them will extol the pleasures of his own department above those belonging to the other two. The lover of wealth will declare the pleasures of acquisition and appetite to be far greater than those of honour or of knowledge: each of the other two will say the same for himself, and for the pleasures of his own department. Here then the question is opened, Which of the three is in the right? Which of the three varieties of pleasure and modes of life is the more honourable or base, the better or worse, the more pleasurable or painful?¹ By what criterion, or by whose judgment, is this question to be decided? It must be decided by experience, intelligence and rational discourse.² Now it is certain that the lover of knowledge, or the philosopher, has greater experience of all the three varieties of pleasure than is possessed by either of the other two men. He must in his younger days have tasted and tried the pleasures of both ; but the other two have never tasted his.³ Moreover, each of the three acquires more or less of honour, if he succeeds in his own pursuits : accordingly the pleasures belonging to the love of honour are shared, and may be appreciated, by the philosopher ; while the lover of honour as such, has no sense for the pleasures of philosophy. In the range of personal experience, therefore, the philosopher surpasses the other two : he surpasses them no less in exercised intelligence, and in rational discourse, which is his own principal instrument.⁴ If wealth and profit furnished the proper means of judgment, the money-lover would have been the best judge of the three : if honour and victory furnished the proper means, we should consult the lover of honour : but experience, intelligence, and rational discourse, have been shown to be the means—and therefore it is plain that the philosopher is a better authority than either of the other two. His verdict must be considered as final. He will assuredly tell us, that the pleasures belong-

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581.² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 A. *ἡμετέρις τε καὶ φρονήσουσι καὶ λόγῳ.*³ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 B.⁴ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C-D. *λόγοι δὲ τούτου μάλιστα ὄργανον.*

ing to the love of knowledge are the greatest : those belonging to the love of honour and power, the next : those belonging to the love of money and to appetite, the least.¹

2. The second argument, establishing the same conclusion, is as follows :—No pleasures, except those belonging to philosophy or the love of wisdom, are completely true and pure. All the other pleasures are mere shadowy outlines, looking like pleasure at a distance, but not really pleasures when you contemplate them closely.² Pleasure and pain are two conditions opposite to each other. Between them both is another state, neither one nor the other, called neutrality or indifference. Now a man who has been sick and is convalescent, will tell you that nothing is more pleasurable than being in health, but that he did not know what the pleasure of it was, until he became sick. So too men in pain affirm that nothing is more pleasurable than relief from pain. When a man is grieving, it is exemption or indifference, not enjoyment, which he extols as the greatest pleasure. Again, when a man has been in a state of enjoyment, and the enjoyment ceases, this cessation is painful. We thus see that the intermediate state—cessation, neutrality, indifference—will be sometimes pain, sometimes pleasure, according to circumstances. Now that which is neither pleasure nor pain cannot possibly be both.³ Pleasure is a positive movement or mutation of the mind : so also is pain. Neutrality or indifference is a negative condition, intermediate between the two : no movement, but absence of movement : non-pain, non-pleasure. But non-pain is not really pleasure : non-pleasure is not really pain. When therefore neutrality or non-pain, succeeding immediately after

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-588.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B. οὐδὲ παναληθὲς ὅστις ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἡδονῇ πλεονεκτήσει τοῦ φρονήμονος, οὐδὲ καθαρὰ, ἀλλ' ἐσκιαγραφημένη τις, ὡς ἐγὼ δοκῶ μοι τῶν σοφῶν τινος ἀπικοῖναι.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 583 E—584 A.

* Ο μεταξὺ ἀρα νῦν δὴ ἀμφοτέρων ἐφαιμένη εἶναι, τὴν ἡσυχίαν, τοῦτο ποτε ἀμφοτέρω ἐστίν, λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή . . .

* Ἡ καὶ δυνατόν τὸ μᾶλλον ὅν ἀμφοτέρω γίγνεσθαι : Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ. Καὶ μὴν τὸ

γε ἡδὺ ἐν ψυχῇ γιγνόμενον καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κίνησις τις ἀμφοτέρω ἔστω ; ἢ οὐ ; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ μῆτε ἡδὺ μῆτε λυπηρὸν οὐκ ἡσυχία μέντοι καὶ ἐν μέσῳ τούτων ἐφάνη ἄρτι ; Ἐφάνη γάρ. Πῶς οὖν ὁρθῶς ἐστὶ τὸ μὴ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ ἡγεῖσθαι, ἢ τὸ μὴ χαίρειν ἀναιρόν ; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀρα τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ φαίνεται, παρὰ τὸ ἀλγεῖν ἡδὺ καὶ παρὰ τὸ ἡδὺ ἀλγεῖν τότε ἢ ἡσυχία, καὶ οὐδὲν ὅστις τούτων τῶν φαντασμάτων πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀλθίσαι, ἀλλὰ γοητεία τις.

pain, appears to be a pleasure—this is a mere appearance or illusion, not a reality. When neutrality or non-pleasure, succeeding immediately after pleasure, appears to be pain—this also is a mere appearance or illusion, not a reality. There is nothing sound or trustworthy in such appearances. Pleasure is not cessation of pain, but something essentially different: pain is not cessation of pleasure, but something essentially different.

Take, for example, the pleasures of smell, which are true and genuine pleasures, of great intensity: they spring up instantaneously without presupposing any anterior pain—they depart without leaving any subsequent pain.¹ These are true and pure pleasures, radically different from cessation of pain: so also true and pure pains are different from cessation of pleasure. Most of the so-called pleasures, especially the more intense, which reach the mind through the body, are in reality not pleasures at all, but only cessations or reliefs from pain. The same may be said about the pleasures and pains of anticipation belonging to these so-called bodily pleasures.² They may be represented by the following simile:—There is in nature a real Absolute Up and uppermost point—a real Absolute Down and lowest point—and a centre between them.³ A man borne from the lowest point to the centre will think himself moving upwards, and will be moving upwards relatively. If his course be stopped in the centre, he will think himself at the absolute summit—on looking to the point from which he came, and ignorant as he is of any thing higher. If he be forced to return from the centre to the point from whence he came, he will think himself moving downwards, and will be really moving downwards, absolutely as well as relatively. Such misapprehension arises from his not knowing the portion of the Kosmos above the centre—the true and absolute Up or summit. Now the case of pleasure and pain is analogous to this. Pain is the absolute lowest—Pleasure the absolute highest—non-pleasure, non-pain, the centre intermediate between them. But most men know

Most men know nothing of true and pure pleasure. Simile of the Kosmos—Absolute height and depth.

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 B.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 584 C. No-
μίσεις τι ἐν τῇ φύσει εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄνω,
τὸ δὲ κάτω, τὸ δὲ μέσον; Ἐγώ γε.

nothing of the region above the centre, or the absolute highest—the region of true and pure pleasure: they know only the centre and what is below it, or the region of pain. When they fall from the centre to the point of pain, they conceive the situation truly, and they really are pained: but when they rise from the lowest point to the centre, they misconceive the change, and imagine themselves to be in a process of replenishment and acquisition of pleasure. They mistake the painless condition for pleasure, not knowing what true pleasure is: just as a man who has seen only black and not white, will fancy, if dun be shown to him, that he is looking on white.

Hunger and thirst are states of emptiness in the body: ignorance and folly are states of emptiness in the mind. A hungry man in eating or drinking obtains replenishment: an ignorant man becoming instructed obtains replenishment also. Now replenishment derived from that which exists more fully and perfectly, is truer and more real than replenishment from that which exists less fully and perfectly.² Let us then compare the food which serves for replenishment of the body, with that which serves for replenishment of the mind. Which of the two is most existent? Which of the two partakes most of pure essence? Meat and drink—or true opinions, knowledge, intelligence, and virtue? Which of the two exists most perfectly? That which embraces the true, eternal, and unchangeable—and which is itself of similar nature? Or that which embraces the mortal, the transient, and the ever variable—being itself of kindred nature? Assuredly the former. It is clear that what is necessary for the sustenance of the body partakes less of truth and real essence, than what is necessary for the sustenance of the

Nourishment of the mind partakes more of real essence than nourishment of the body—Replenishment of the mind imparts fuller pleasure than replenishment of the body.

¹ Plato, Republic, pp. 584 E—585 A. Οὐκ οὖν ταῦτα πάσχειν ἀν πάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔμπειρος εἶναι τοῦ ἀληθινῶς ἄνω τε ὄντος καὶ ἐν μέσῳ καὶ κάτω; . . . ὅταν μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν φέρονται, ἀληθῆ τε οἰοῦνται καὶ τὴν ὄντι λυποῦνται, ὅταν δὲ ἀπὸ λύπης ἐπὶ τὸ μεταξὺ, σφόδρα μὲν οἰοῦνται πρὸς πληρώσει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ γίγνεσθαι, ὥσπερ δὲ πρὸς μέλαν φαῖον ἀποσκοποῦντες ἀπειρία λευκοῦ, καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἀλυστον οὗτος λυτὴν ἀφορῶντες ἀπειρία

ἡδονῆς ἀπαρῶνται;

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 585 B. Πλήρωσις δὲ ἀληθεύστερα τοῦ ἔττον ἢ τοῦ μᾶλλον ὄντος; Ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦ μᾶλλον. Πότερα οὖν ἔχει τὰ γένη μᾶλλον καθαρὰς οὐσίας μετέχειν, τὰ οἷον σίτον καὶ ποτὸν καὶ ὄψον καὶ ξυμπάσεις τροφῆς, ἢ τὰ δόξης τε ἀληθεύς εἶδος καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ νοῦ καὶ ἐυλλήβδην ξυμπάσης ἀρετῆς;

mind. The mind is replenished with nourishment more real and essential: the body with nourishment less so: the mind itself is also more real and essential than the body. The mind therefore is more, and more thoroughly, replenished than the body. Accordingly, if pleasure consists in being replenished with what suits its peculiar nature, the mind will enjoy more pleasure and truer pleasure than the body.¹ Those who are destitute of intelligence and virtue, passing their lives in sensual pursuits, have never tasted any pure or lasting pleasure, nor ever carried their looks upwards to the higher region in which alone it resides. Their pleasures, though seeming intense, and raising vehement desires in their uninstructed minds, are yet only phantoms deriving a semblance of pleasure from contrast with pains:² they are like the phantom of Helen, for which (as Stesichorus says) the Greeks and Trojans fought so many battles, knowing nothing about the true Helen, who was never in Troy.

The pleasures belonging to the Love of Honour (Energy or Passion) are no better than those belonging to the Love of Money (Appetite). In so far as the desires belonging to both these departments of mind are under the controul of the third or best department (Love of Wisdom, or Reason), the nearest approach to true pleasure, which it is in the nature of either of them to bestow, will be realised. But in so far as either of them throws off the controul of Reason, it will neither obtain its own truest pleasures, nor allow the other departments of mind to obtain theirs.³ The desires connected with love, and with despotic power, stand out more than the others, as recusant to Reason, Law, and Regulation. The kingly and moderate desires are most obedient to this authority. The lover and the despot, therefore, will enjoy the least pleasure: the kingly-minded man will enjoy the most. Of the three sorts of pleasure, one true and legitimate, two bastard, the despot goes most away from the legitimate, and to the farthest limit of the bastard. His condition is the most miserable, that of the kingly-minded man is the happiest: between the two come the oligar-

Comparative worthlessness of the pleasures of Appetite and Ambition, when measured against those of Intelligence.

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586 E.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 586.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.

chical and the democratical man. The difference between the two extreme is as 1 : 729.¹

I have thus refuted (continues Sokrates) the case of those who contend—That the unjust man is a gainer by his injustice, provided he could carry it on successfully, and with the reputation of being just. I have shown that injustice is the greatest possible mischief, intrinsically and in itself, apart from consequences and apart from public reputation: inasmuch as it enslaves the better part of the mind to the worse. Justice, on the other hand, is the greatest possible good, intrinsically and in itself, apart from consequences and reputation, because it keeps the worse parts of the mind under due controul and subordination to the better.² Vice and infirmity of every kind is pernicious, because it puts the best parts of the mind under subjection to the worst.³ No success in the acquisition of wealth, aggrandisement, or any other undue object, can compensate a man for the internal disorder which he introduces into his own mind by becoming unjust. A well-ordered mind, just and temperate, with the better part governing the worse, is the first of all objects: greater even than a healthy, strong, and beautiful body.⁴ To put his mind into this condition, and to acquire all the knowledge thereunto conducing, will be the purpose of a wise man's life. Even in the management of his body, he will look not so much to the health and strength of his body, as to the harmony and fit regulation of his mind. In the acquisition of money, he will keep the same end in view: he will not be tempted by the admiration and envy of people around him to seek great wealth, which will disturb the mental polity within him:⁵ he will, on the other hand, avoid depressing poverty, which might produce the same effect. He will take as little part as possible in public life, and will aspire to no political honours, in cities as at present con-

The Just Man will be happy from his justice—He will look only to the good order of his own mind—He will stand aloof from public affairs, in cities as now constituted.

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 587 E.

² Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 588-589.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 580 B-C.

⁴ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B.

⁵ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 D-E.

καὶ τὸν ὄγκον τοῦ πλείους οὐκ, ἐκπλητ-
τέμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ τῶν πολλῶν μακαρισμοῦ,

ἁπείρον αὐξήσει, ἀνέραντα κατὰ ἔχον
... Ἄλλ' ἀποβλέπων γὰρ, πρὸς τὴν ἐν
αὐτῇ πολιτείᾳ, καὶ φυλάττων μὴ τι
παρακινήσῃ αὐτοῦ τῶν ἐκεῖ διὰ πλείους
οὐσίας ἢ δι' ὀλιγότιστα, οὕτω κυβερνήσας
προσθήσει καὶ ἀναλίσσει τῆς οὐσίας, καθ'
ὅσον ἐν οἷός τ' ἦ.

stituted—nor in any other than the model-city which we have described.¹

The tenth and last book of the Republic commences with an argument of considerable length, repeating and confirming by farther reasons the sentence of expulsion which Plato had already pronounced against the poets in his second and third books.² The Platonic Sokrates here not only animadverts upon poetry, but extends his disapprobation to other imitative arts, such as painting. He attacks the process of imitation generally, as false and deceptive; pleasing to ignorant people, but perverting their minds by phantasms which they mistake for realities. The work of the imitator is not merely not reality, but is removed from it by two degrees. What is real is the Form or Idea: the one conceived object denoted by each appellative name common to many particulars. There is one Form or Idea, and only one, known by the name of Bed; another by the name of Table.³ When the carpenter constructs a bed or a table, he fixes his contemplation on this Form or Idea, and tries to copy it. What he constructs, however, is not the true, real, existent, table, which alone exists in nature, and may be presumed to be made by the Gods⁴—but a something like the real existent table: not true Ens, but only quasi-Ens:⁵ dim and indistinct, as compared with the truth, and standing far off from the truth. Next to the carpenter comes the painter, who copies not the real existent table, but the copy of that table made by the carpenter. The painter fixes his contemplation upon it, not as it really exists, but simply as it appears: he copies an appearance or phantasm, not a reality. Thus the table will have a different appearance, according as you look at it from near or far—from one side or the other: yet in reality it never

Tenth Book
—Censure
of the poets
is renewed
—Mischiefs
of imitation
generally, as
deceptive—
Imitation
from imita-
tion.

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 592.

² Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. The language here used by Plato seems to imply that his opinions adverse to poetry had been attacked and required defence.

³ Plato, Republic, x. p. 606 A-B. Βούλει οὖν ἰδεῖν τε ἀρξάμεθα ἑπισκοπεύοντες, ἐκ τῆς εἰσθητικῆς μεθόδου, εἶδος γὰρ πού τι ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἰσθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἑκάστα τὰ πολλὰ, οἷς ταύτῳ ὄνομα

ἐπιφέρομεν . . . θώμεν δὲ καὶ νῦν ὅτι βούλει τῶν πολλῶν ὅλον, εἰ θέλεις πολ-
λαὶ πού εἰσι κλῖναι καὶ τράπεζαι . . .
'Αλλ' ἰδὲαι γέ που περὶ ταῦτα τὰ σκότη
δύο, μία μὲν ἀλλήως, μία δὲ τραπέζης.

⁴ Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B-D. 607 B: μία μὲν ἣ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὖσα, ἣν φαίμεν ἄν, ὥς ἐγώ μαι, θεὸν ἡγρόμεσθα.

⁵ Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 A. οὐκ ἂν τὸ ἐν τοιοῖς, ἀλλὰ τι τοιοῦτον ὅλον τὸ ἐν, ἐν δὲ οὐ.

differs from itself. It is one of these appearances that the painter copies, not the reality itself. He can in like manner paint any thing and every thing, since he hardly touches any thing at all—and nothing whatever except in appearance. He can paint all sorts of craftsmen and their works—carpenters, shoemakers, &c.—without knowledge of any one of their arts.¹

The like is true also of the poets. Homer and the tragedians give us talk and affirmations about everything : government, legislation, war, medicine, husbandry, the character and proceedings of the Gods, the habits and training of men, &c. Some persons even extol Homer as the great educator of the Hellenic world, whose poems we ought to learn by heart as guides for education and administration.² But Homer, Hesiod, and the other poets, had no real knowledge

of the multifarious matters which they profess to describe. These poets know nothing except about appearances, and will describe only appearances, to the satisfaction of the ignorant multitude.³ The representations of the painter, reproducing only the appearances to sense, will be constantly fallacious and deceptive, requiring to be corrected by measuring, weighing, counting—which are processes belonging to Reason.⁴ The lower and the higher parts of the mind are here at variance ; and the painter addresses himself to the lower, supplying falsehood as if it were truth. The painter does this through the eye, the poet through the ear.⁵

In the various acts and situations of life a man is full of contradictions. He is swayed by manifold impulses, often directly contradicting each other. Hence we have affirmed that there are in his mind two distinct principles, one contradicting the other : the emotional and the rational.⁶ When a man suffers misfortune, emotion prompts him to indulge in extreme grief,

The poet chiefly appeals to emotions—Mischief of such eloquent appeals, as disturbing

¹ Plato, Republic, x. p. 598 B-C.

² Plato, Republic, p. 606 E.

³ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 600-601 C. 601 B : τοῦ μὲν ὄντος οὐδὲν ἔπαλει, τοῦ δὲ φαινομένου. 602 B : ὅλον φαίνεται καλὸν εἶναι τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ μηδὲν εἰδῶσι, τοῦτο μίμησται.

⁴ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 602-603.

⁵ Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 B.

⁶ Plato, Republic, x. p. 603 D.

μυρίων τοιούτων ἐναντιωμάτων ἅμα γιγνομένων ἢ ψυχὴ γέμει ἡμῶν . . . 604 B : ἐναντίας δὲ ἀγωγῇ γιγνομένης ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα δύο τινα φανερὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι.

and to abandon himself like a child to the momentary tide. Reason, on the contrary, exhorts him to resist, and to exert himself immediately in counsel to rectify or alleviate what has happened, adapting his conduct as well as he can to the actual throw of the dice which has befallen him.¹ Now it is these vehement bursts of emotion which lend themselves most effectively to the genius of the poet, and which he must work up to please the multitude in the theatre: the state of rational self-command can hardly be described so as to touch their feelings. We see thus that the poet, like the painter, addresses himself to the lower department of the mind, exalting the emotional into preponderance over the rational—the foolish over the wise—the false over the true.² He introduces bad government into the mind, giving to pleasure and pain the sceptre over reason. Hence we cannot tolerate the poet, in spite of all his sweets and captivations. We can only permit him to compose hymns for the Gods and encomiums for good men.³

This quarrel between philosophy and poetry (continues the Platonic Sokrates) is of ancient date.⁴ I myself am very sensible to the charms of poetry, especially that of Homer. I should be delighted if a case could be made out to justify me in admitting it into our city. But I cannot betray the cause of what seems to me truth. We must resist our sympathies and preferences, when they are incompatible with the right government of the mind.⁵

To maintain the right government and good condition of the soul or mind, is the first of all considerations: and will be seen yet farther to be such, when we consider that it is immortal and imperishable. Of this Plato proceeds to give a proof,⁶ concluding with a mythical argument—

¹ Plato, Republic, x. p. 604 C. Τῷ βουλευέσθαι περὶ τὸ γεγονός καὶ ὥσπερ ἐν πτώσει κύβων πρὸς τὰ πεπτωκότα τίθεσθαι τὰ αὐτοῦ πράγματα, ὅσην ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ βέλτιστον ἂν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ προσπατάσαντας, καθάπερ παῖδας, ἐχομένους τοῦ πληγέντος ἐν τῷ βῶσιν διατρίβειν, &c.

² Plato, Republic, x. p. 605.

³ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 605-606-607.

⁴ 605 B: τὸν μιμητικὸν ποιητὴν φήσομεν κακὴν πολιτείαν ἰδίᾳ ἐκάστου τῇ ψυχῇ

ἐμποεῖν, τῷ ἀνοήτῳ αὐτῆς χαρίζομενον . . . 607 A: εἰ δὲ τὴν ἡδονομήνην μοῦσαν παραβίβει ἐν μέλεσιν ἢ ἐπισειν, ἡδονὴ σοὶ καὶ λύπη βασιλεύουσιν ἀντι νόμου τε καὶ τοῦ κοινῇ ἀεὶ δόξαντος εἶναι βελτίστου λόγου.

⁴ Plato, Republic, x. p. 607 B. παλαιὰ τις διαφορὰ φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ.

⁵ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 607-608.

⁶ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 609-610.

Ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry—Plato fights for philosophy, though his feelings are strongly enlisted for poetry.

Immortality of the soul affirmed and sustained by argument—

Total number of souls always the same.

sketch of the destiny of the soul after death. The soul being immortal (he says), the total number of souls is and always has been the same—neither increasing nor diminishing.¹

Recapitulation—The Just Man will be happy, both from his justice and from its consequences, both here and hereafter.

I have proved (the Platonic Sokrates concludes) in the preceding discourse, that Justice is better, in itself and intrinsically, than Injustice, quite apart from consequences in the way of reward and honour; that a man for the sake of his own happiness ought to be just, whatever may be thought of him by Gods or men—even though he possessed the magic ring of Gyges. Having proved this, and having made out the intrinsic superiority of justice to injustice, we may now take in the natural consequences and collateral bearings of both. We have hitherto reasoned upon the hypothesis that the just man was mistaken for unjust, and treated accordingly—that the unjust man found means to pass himself off for just, and to attract to himself the esteem and the rewards of justice. But this hypothesis concedes too much, and we must now take back the concession. The just man will be happier than the unjust, not simply from the intrinsic working of justice on his own mind, but also from the exterior consequences of justice.² He will be favoured and rewarded both by Gods and men. Though he may be in poverty, sickness, or any other apparent state of evil, he may be assured that the Gods will compensate him for it by happiness either in life or after death.³ And men too, though they may for a time be mistaken about the just and the unjust character, will at last come to a right estimation of both. The just man will finally receive honour, reward, and power, from his fellow-citizens: the unjust man will be finally degraded and punished by them.⁴ And after death, the reward of the just man, as well as the punishment of the unjust, will be far greater than even during life.

This latter position is illustrated at some length by the mythe with which the Republic concludes, describing the realm of Hades, with the posthumous condition and treatment of the departed souls.

¹ Plato, Republic, x. p. 611 A.

² Plato, Republic, x. p. 612 B-C.

³ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.

⁴ Plato, Republic, x. p. 613 C-D.

CHAPTER XXXVI

REPUBLIC—REMARKS ON ITS MAIN THESIS.

THE preceding Chapter has described, in concise abstract, that splendid monument of Plato's genius, which passes under the name of the Πολιτεία or Republic. It is undoubtedly the grandest of all his compositions; including in itself all his different points of excellence. In the first Book, we have a subtle specimen of negative Dialectic,—of the Sokratic cross-examination or Elenchus. In the second Book, we find two examples of continuous or Ciceronian pleading (like that ascribed to Protagoras in the dialogue called by his name), which are surpassed by nothing in ancient literature, for acuteness and ability in the statement of a case. Next, we are introduced to Plato's most sublime effort of constructive ingenuity, in putting together both the individual man and the collective City: together with more information (imperfect as it is even here) about his Dialectic or Philosophy, than any other dialogue furnishes. The ninth Book exhibits his attempts to make good his own thesis against the case set forth in his own antecedent counter-pleadings. The last Book concludes with a highly poetical mythe, embodying a Νεκρία shaped after his own fancy,—and the outline of cosmical agencies afterwards developed, though with many differences, in the Timæus. The brilliancy of the Republic will appear all the more conspicuous, when we come to compare it with Plato's two posterior compositions: with the Pythagorean mysticism and theology of the Timæus—or with the severe and dictatorial solemnity of the Treatise De Legibus.

The title borne by this dialogue—the Republic or Polity—

Title of the Republic, of ancient date, but only a partial indication of its contents.

whether affixed by Plato himself or not, dates at least from his immediate disciples, Aristotle among them.¹

This title hardly presents a clear idea either of its proclaimed purpose or of its total contents.

The larger portion of the treatise is doubtless employed in expounding the generation of a commonwealth generally : from whence the author passes insensibly to the delineation of a Model-Commonwealth—enumerating the conditions of aptitude for its governors and guardian-soldiers, estimating the obstacles which prevent it from appearing in the full type of goodness—and pointing out the steps whereby, even if fully realised, it is likely to be brought to perversion and degeneracy. Nevertheless the avowed purpose of the treatise is, not to depict the ideal of a commonwealth, but to solve the questions, What is Justice? What is Injustice? Does Justice, in itself and by its own intrinsic working, make the just man happy, apart from all consequences, even though he is not known to be just, and is even treated as unjust, either by Gods or men? Does Injustice, under the like hypothesis, (i.e. leaving out all consideration of consequences either from Gods or from men), make the unjust man miserable? The reasonings respecting the best polity, are means to this end—intermediate steps to the settlement of this problem. We must recollect that Plato insists strongly on the parallelism between the individual and the state: he talks of “the polity” or Republic in each man’s mind, as of that in the entire city.²

The Republic, or Commonwealth, is introduced by Plato as being the individual man “writ large,” and therefore more clearly discernible and legible to an observer.³ To illustrate the individual man, he begins by describing (to use Hobbes’s language) the great Leviathan than called a “Commonwealth or State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence

¹ See Schleiermacher, Einl. zum Staat, p. 63 seq.; Stallbaum, Proleg. p. lviii. seq.

² Plato, *Repub.* ix. p. 501 E. ἀπο-βλέπων πρὸς τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείαν.

x. p. 608 B: περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας ὁμοιότητι, &c.

³ Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 368 D.

⁴ “New presbyter is but old priest writ large.”—(Milton.)

it was intended".¹ He pursues in much detail this parallel between the individual and the commonwealth, as well as between the component parts and forces of the one, and those of the other. The perfection of the commonwealth (he represents) consists in its being One :² an integer or unit, of which the constituent individuals are merely functions, each having only a fractional, dependent, relative existence. As the commonwealth is an individual on a large scale, so the individual is a commonwealth on a small scale ; in which the constituent fractions, Reason,—Energy or Courage,—and many-headed Appetite,—act each for itself and oppose each other. It is the tendency of Plato's imagination to bestow vivid reality on abstractions, and to reason upon metaphorical analogy as if it were close parallelism. His language exaggerates both the unity of the commonwealth, and the partibility of the individual, in illustrating the one by comparison with the other. The commonwealth is treated as capable of happiness or misery as an entire Person, apart from its component individuals :³ while on the other hand, Reason, Energy, Appetite, are described as distinct and conflicting Persons, packed up in the same wrapper and therefore looking like One from the outside, yet really distinct, each acting and suffering by and for itself : like the charioteer and his two horses, which form the conspicuous metaphor in the *Phædrus*.⁴ We are thus told, that though the man is apparently One, he is in reality Many or multipartite : though the perfect Commonwealth is apparently Many, it is in reality One.

Of the parts composing a man, as well as of the parts composing a commonwealth, some are better, others worse. Each of them a whole, com-
A few are good and excellent ; the greater number whole, com-

¹ This is the language of Hobbes. Preface to the *Leviathan*. In the same treatise (Part II. ch. 17, pp. 157-158, Molesworth's edition) Hobbes says :—"The only way to erect such a common power as may be able to defend men from the invasion of foreigners and the injury of one another, is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices to one will : which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person. This is more than consent or

concord : it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man. This done, the multitude so united in one person, is called a Commonwealth, in Latin *Civitas*. This is the generation of that great Leviathan," &c.

² Plato, *Republic*, iv. p. 423.

³ Plato, *Republic*, iv. pp. 430-431.

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, ix. p. 588, x. p. 604, iv. pp. 436-441. ix. p. 588 E: ὅσπερ τῆς μὴ δυναμένης τὰ ἐντὸς ὁρᾶν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔξω μόνον ἵκναιτο ὁρᾶν, ἐν ζῳον φαίνεται, ἀνθρώπων.

posed of
parts dis-
tinct in
function,
and unequal
in merit.

are low and bad ; while there are intermediate gradations between the two. The perfection of a commonwealth, and the perfection of an individual man, is attained when each part performs its own appropriate function and no more,—not interfering with the rest.

In the commonwealth there are a small number of wise Elders or philosophers, whose appropriate function it is to look out for the good or happiness of the whole ; and to controul the ordinary commonplace multitude, with a view to that end. Each of the multitude has his own special duty or aptitude, to which he confines himself, and which he executes in subordination to the wise or governing Few. And to ensure such subordination, there are an intermediate number of trained, or disciplined Guardians ; who employ their force under the orders of the ruling Few, to controul the multitude within, as well as to repel enemies without. So too in the perfect man, Reason is the small but excellent organ whose appropriate function is, to controul the multitude of desires and to watch over the good of the whole : the function of Energy or Courage is, while itself obeying the Reason, to assist Reason in maintaining this controul over the Desires : the function of each several desire is to obey, pursuing its own special end in due harmony with the rest.

The End to be accomplished, and with reference to which Plato tests the perfection of the means, is, the happiness of the entire commonwealth,—the happiness of the entire individual man. In order to be happy, a commonwealth or an individual man must be at once wise, brave, temperate, just. There is however this difference between the four qualities. Though all four are essential, yet wisdom and bravery belong only to separate fractions of the

End proposed by Plato.
Happiness of the commonwealth.
Happiness of the individual.
Conditions of happiness.

commonwealth and separate fractions of the individual: while justice and temperance belong equally to all the fractions of the commonwealth and all the fractions of the individual. In the perfect commonwealth, Wisdom or Reason is found only in the One or Few Ruling Elders:—Energy or Courage only in the Soldiers or Guardians: but Elders, Guardians, and the working multitude, alike exhibit Justice and Temperance. All are just, inasmuch as each performs his

appropriate business: all are temperate, inasmuch as all agree in recognising what is the appropriate business of each fraction—that of the Elders is, to rule—that of the others is, to obey. So too the individual: he is wise only in his Reason, brave only in his Energy or Courage: but he is just and temperate in his Reason, Courage, and Appetites alike—each of these fractions acting in its own sphere under proper relations to the rest. In fact, according to the definitions given by Plato in the Republic, justice and temperance are scarce at all distinguishable from each other—and must at any rate be inseparable.

Now in regard to the definition here given by Plato of Justice, which is the avowed object of his Treatise, we may first remark that it is altogether peculiar to Plato; and that if we reason about Justice in the Platonic sense, we must take care not to affirm of it predicates which might be true in a more usual acceptance of the word. Next, that even adopting Plato's own meaning of Justice, it does not answer the purpose for which he produces it—*vis.*: to provide reply to the objections, and solution for the difficulties, which he had himself placed in the mouths of Glaukon and Adeimantus.

Peculiar
view of Jus-
tice taken
by Plato.

These two speakers (in the second Book) have advanced the position (which they affirm to be held by every one, past and present)—That justice is a good thing or a cause of happiness to the just agent—not in itself or separately, since the performance of just acts is more or less onerous and sometimes painful, presenting itself in the aspect of an obligation, but—because of its consequences, as being indispensable to procure for him some ulterior good, such as esteem and just treatment from others. Sokrates on the other hand declares justice to be good, or a cause of happiness, to the just agent, most of all in itself—but also, additionally, in its consequences: and injustice to be bad, or a cause of misery to the unjust agent, on both grounds also.

Pleadings of
Glaukon
and Adei-
mantus.

Suppose (we have seen it urged by Glaukon and Adeimantus) that a man is just, but is mis-esteemed by the society among whom he lives, and believed to be unjust. He will certainly be hated and ill-used by others, and may be ill-used

to the greatest possible extent—impoverishment, scourging, torture, crucifixion. Again, suppose a man to be unjust, but to be in like manner misconceived, and treated as if he were just. He will receive from others golden opinions, just dealing, and goodwill, producing to him comfortable consequences: and he will obtain, besides, the profits of injustice. Evidently, under these supposed circumstances, the just man will be miserable, in spite of his justice: the unjust man will, to say the least, be the happier of the two.

Moreover (so argues Glaukon), all fathers exhort their sons to be just, and forbid them to be unjust, admitting that justice is a troublesome obligation, but insisting upon it as indispensable to avert evil consequences and procure good. So also poets and teachers. All of them assume that justice is not inviting for itself, but only by reason of its consequences: and that injustice is in itself easy and inviting, were it not for mischievous consequences and penalties more than countervailing the temptation. All of them either anticipate, or seek to provide, penalties to be inflicted in case the agent commits injustice, and not to be inflicted if he continues just: so that the treatment which he receives afterwards shall be favourable, or severe, conditional upon his own conduct. Such treatment may emanate either from Gods or from men: but in either case, it is assumed that the agent shall be known, or shall seem, to be what he really is: that the unjust agent shall seem, or be known, to be unjust—and that the just shall seem also to be what he is.

It is against this doctrine that the Platonic Sokrates in the Republic professes to contend. To refute it, he sets forth his own explanation, wherein justice consists. How far, or with what qualifications, the Sophists inculcated the doctrine (as various commentators tell us) we do not know. But Plato himself informs us that it was current and received in society, before Protagoras and Prodikus were born: taught by parents to their children, and by poets in their compositions generally circulated.¹ Moreover, Sokrates himself (in the Platonic Apology) recommends

The arguments which they enforce were not invented by the Sophists, but were the received views anterior to Plato.

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 363-364.

virtue on the ground of its remunerative consequences to the agent, in the shape of wealth and other good things.¹ Again, the Xenophontic Sokrates, as well as Xenophon himself, agree in the same general doctrine: presenting virtue as laborious and troublesome in itself, but as being fully requited by its remunerative consequences in the form of esteem and honour, to the attainment of which it is indispensable. In the memorable Choice of Heraklès, that youth is represented as choosing a life of toil and painful self-denial, crowned ultimately by the attainment of honourable and beneficial results—in preference to a life of easy and inactive enjoyment.²

We see thus that the doctrine which the Platonic Sokrates impugns in the Republic, is countenanced elsewhere by Sokratic authority. It is, in my judgment, more true than that which he opposes to it. The exhortations and orders of parents to their children, which he condemns—were founded upon views of fact and reality more correct than those which the Sokrates of the Republic would substitute in place of them.

Let us note the sentiment in which Plato's creed here originates. He desires, above every thing, to stand forward as the champion and panegyrist of justice —as the enemy and denouncer of injustice. To praise justice, not in itself, but for its consequences

Argument of Sokrates to refute them. Sentiments in

¹ Plato, *Apolog. Sokrat.* p. 30 B. λέγων ότι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅπαντα καὶ ἰδία καὶ δημοσία.

Xenophon in the *Cyropædia* puts the following language into the mouth of the hero Cyrus, in addressing his officers (*Cyrop.* i. 5, 9). Καίτοι ἐγὼ γε οἶμαι, οὐδεμίαν ἀρετὴν ἀσκαίεσθαι ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων, ὥς μᾶλλον πλείον ἔχωσιν οἱ ἰσθλοὶ γενόμενοι τῶν πονηρῶν· ἀλλ' εἴ τε τινες παραντίκα ἡδονῶν ἀνεχόμενοι, οὐχ ἵνα μᾶλλον εὐφρανθῶσι, τοῦτο πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐγκράτειαν πολλαπλάσια εἰς τὸν ἑαυτοῦ χρόνον εὐφρανόμενοι, οὕτω παρασκευάζονται, &c.

The love of praise is represented as the prominent motive of Cyrus to the practice of virtue (i. 5, 12, i. 2, 1).

Compare also Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* ii. 2, 6-15, vii. 6, 82, and Xenophon, *Economic.* xiv. 8-9; Xenophon, *De Venatione*, xii. 15-19.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. 1, 19-20, &c. We read in the 'Works and Days' of Hesiod, 287 :—

Τὴν μὲν τοὶ κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλίσσθαι
Ῥηϊδίας· λείη μὲν ὁδοί, μέλα δ' ἐγγυθὶ
ναίει.
Τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἰδρώτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν
ἵστανται.
Ἀθάνατοι· μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὄρθιος οἶμος ἐν
αὐτῇ,
καὶ τρήχνη τοπῶρον· ἐπὶν δ' εἰς ἄκρον
ἵκηται,
Ῥηϊδίῳ δ' ἔπειτα πέλει, χαλεπῇ περ
ἰούσῃ.

It is remarkable that while the Xenophontic Sokrates cites these verses from Hesiod as illustrating and enforcing the drift of his exhortation, the Platonic Sokrates cites them as misleading, and as a specimen of the hurtful errors instilled by the poets (*Republic*, ii. p. 364 D).

which it originates. Panegyric on Justice. —and to blame injustice in like manner—appears to him disparaging and insulting to justice.¹ He is not satisfied with showing that the just man benefits others by his justice, and that the unjust man hurts others by his injustice: he admits nothing into his calculation, except happiness or misery to the agent himself: and happiness, moreover, inherent in the process of just behaviour—misery inherent in the process of unjust behaviour—whatever be the treatment which the agent may receive from either Gods or men. Justice per se (affirms Plato) is the cause of happiness to the just agent, absolutely and unconditionally: injustice, in like manner, of misery to the unjust—quand même—whatever the consequences may be either from men or Gods. This is the extreme strain of panegyric suggested by Plato's feeling, and announced as a conclusion substantiated by his reasons. Nothing more thoroughgoing can be advanced in eulogy of justice. "Neither the eastern star nor the western star is so admirable"—to borrow a phrase from Aristotle.²

Plato is here the first proclaimer of the doctrine afterwards so much insisted on by the Stoics—the all-sufficiency of virtue to the happiness of the virtuous agent, whatever may be his fate in other respects—without requiring any farther conditions or adjuncts. It will be seen that Plato maintains this thesis with reference to the terms *justice* and its opposite *injustice*; sometimes (though not often) using the general term *virtue* or wisdom, which was the ordinary term with the Stoics afterwards.

The ambiguous meaning of the word *justice* is known to Plato himself (as it is also to Aristotle). One professed purpose of the dialogue called the Republic is to remove such ambiguity. Apart from the many other differences of meaning (arising from dissentient sentiments of different men and different ages), there is one duplicity of meaning which Aristotle particularly dwells upon.³ In the stricter and narrower sense, justice comprehends

¹ Plato, Republic, II. p. 368 B-C. *δίδωκα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσον ἢ παραγινόμενον δικαιοσύνη κακηγορούμενη ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πρῶτον καὶ μὴ βοηθ. iv. 42C.*

² Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. v. 2 (1), 1129,

b. 23. οὐδ' ἑσπερος οὐδ' ἑως οὗτος θαυμάσιος.

³ Aristot. Eth. Nikom. v. 2 (1), 1129,

a. 25. δοκεῖ δὲ πλεοναχῶς λέγεσθαι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία.

only those obligations which each individual agent owes to others, and for the omission of which he becomes punishable as unjust—though the performance of them, under ordinary circumstances, carries little positive merit: in another and a larger sense, justice comprehends these and a great deal more, becoming co-extensive with wise, virtuous, and meritorious character generally. The narrower sense is that which is in more common use; and it is that which Plato assumes provisionally when he puts forward the case of opponents in the speeches of Glaukon and Adeimantus. But when he comes to set forth his own explanation, and to draw up his own case, we see that he uses the term justice in its larger sense, as the condition of a mind perfectly well-balanced and well-regulated: as if a man could not be just, without being at the same time wise, courageous, and temperate. The just man described in the counter-pleadings of Glaukon and Adeimantus, would be a person like the Athenian Aristides: the unjust man whom they contrast with him, would be one who maltreats, plunders, or deceives others, or usurps power over them. But the just man, when Sokrates replies to them and unfolds his own thesis, is made to include a great deal more: he is a person in whose mind each of the three constituent elements is in proper relation of controul or obedience to the others, so that the whole mind is perfect: a person whose Reason, being illuminated by contemplation of the Universals or self-existent Ideas of Goodness, Justice, Virtue, has become qualified to exercise controul over the two inferior elements: one of which (Energy) is its willing subordinate and auxiliary—while the lowest of the three (Appetite) is kept in regulation by the joint action of the two. The just man, so described, becomes identical with the true philosopher: no man who is not a philosopher

Also v. 3 (1), 1120, a. 3. διὰ δὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη, μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἔστιν· ἄλλαι γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἀρχοῦσι ἢ κοινῶς.

This proposition—that justice is ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν—is the very proposition which Thrasymachus is introduced as affirming and Sokrates as combating, in the first book of the Republic.

Compare also Aristotle's *Ethica Magna*, I. 34, p. 1193, b. 19, where the

same explanation of justice is given: also p. 1194, a. 7, where the Republic of Plato is cited, and the principle of reciprocity, as laid down at the end of the second book of the Republic, is repeated. We read in a fragment of the lost treatise of Cicero, *De Republica* (iii. 6, 7):—"Justitia foras spectat, et projecta tota est atque eminent. Quæ virtus, præter ceteras, tota se ad alienas porrigit utilitates atque explicat."

can be just.¹ Aristideides would not at all correspond to the Platonic ideal of justice. He would be a stranger to the pleasure extolled by Plato as the exclusive privilege of the just and virtuous—the pleasure of contemplating universal Ideas and acquiring extended knowledge.²

The Platonic conception of Justice or Virtue on the one side, and of Injustice or Vice on the other, is self-regarding and prudential. Justice is in the mind a condition analogous to good health and strength in the body—*(mens sana in corpore sano)*—Injustice is a condition analogous to sickness, corruption, impotence, in the body.³ The body is healthy, when each of its constituent parts performs its appropriate function: it is unhealthy, when there is failure in this respect, either defective working of any part, or interference of one part with the rest. So too in the just mind, each of its tripartite constituents performs its appropriate function—the rational mind directing and controuling, the energetic and appetitive minds obeying such controul. In the unjust mind, the case is opposite: Reason exercises no supremacy: Passion and Appetite, acting each for itself, are disorderly, reckless, exorbitant. To possess a healthy body is desirable for its consequences as a means towards other constituents of happiness; but it is still more desirable in itself, as an essential element of happiness *per se*, i.e., the negation of sickness, which would of itself make us miserable. On the other hand, an unhealthy or corrupt body is miserable by reason of its consequences, but still more miserable *per se*, even apart from consequences. In like manner, the just mind blesses the possessor twice: first and chiefly, as bringing to him happiness in itself—next also, as it leads to ulterior happy results:⁴ the unjust mind is a curse to its possessor in itself, and apart from results—though

¹ This is the same distinction as that drawn by Epiktetus between the φιλόσοφος and the ἰδιώτης (Arrian, Epiktet. iii. 19). An ἰδιώτης may be just in the ordinary meaning of the word. Aristideides was an ἰδιώτης. The Greek word ἰδιώτης, designating the ordinary average citizen, as distinguished from any special or professional training, is highly convenient.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 582 C. τῆς

δὲ τοῦ δικτοῦ θέας, οἷαν ἡδονὴν ἔχει, ἀδύνατον ἄλλω γεγεῖσθαι πλὴν τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. p. 591 B, iv. p. 444 E.

⁴ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἀκολόγησας τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι δικαιοσύνην, ἃ τῶν τε ἀποβαινόντων ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔσται ἐφέα κεκτῆσθαι, πολλὸν δὲ μάλλον αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, &c.

it also leads to ulterior results which render it still more a curse to him.

This theory respecting justice and injustice was first introduced into ethical speculation by Plato. He tells us himself (throughout the speeches ascribed to Glaukon and Adeimantus), that no one before him had announced it: that all with one accord¹—both the poets in addressing an audience, and private citizens in exhorting their children—inculcated a different doctrine, enforcing justice as an onerous duty, and not as a self-recommending process: that he was the first who extolled justice in itself, as conferring happiness on the just agent, apart from all reciprocity or recognition either by men or Gods—and the first who condemned injustice in itself, as inflicting misery on the unjust agent, independent of any recognition by others. Here then we have the first introduction of this theory into ethical speculation. Injustice is an internal taint, corruption of mind, which (like bad bodily health) is in itself misery to the agent, however he may be judged or treated by men or Gods; and justice is (like good bodily health) a state of internal happiness to the agent, independent of all recognition and responsive treatment from others.

The Platonic theory, or something substantially equivalent to it under various forms of words, has been ever since upheld by various ethical theorists, from the time of Plato downward.² Every one would be glad if it could be made out as true: Glaukon and Adeimantus are already enlisted in its favour, and only demand from Sokrates a decent justification for their belief. Moreover, those who deny its truth incur the reproach of being deficient in love of virtue or in hatred of vice. What is still more remarkable—Plato has been complimented as if his theory had been the first antithesis to what is called the

He represents the motives to it, as arising from the internal happiness of the just agents.

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 364 A. *πάντες δὲ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐμμένοντες*, &c. Also p. 366 D.

² It will be found maintained by Shaftesbury and Hutcheson and impugned by Rutherford in his *Essay on Virtue*: also advocated by Sir James Mackintosh in his *Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy*, prefixed to the *Encyclopædia Britannica*; and

controverted, or rather reduced to its proper limits, by Mr. James Mill, in his very acute and philosophical volume, *Fragment on Mackintosh*, published in 1836, see pp. 174-188 seq. Sir James indeed uses the word Benevolence where Plato uses that of Justice: he speaks of "the inherent delights and intrinsic happiness of Benevolence," &c.

"selfish theory of morals"—a compliment which is certainly noway merited: for Plato's theory is essentially self-regarding.¹ He does not indeed lay his main stress on the retribution and punishments which follow injustice, because he represents injustice as being itself a state of misery to the unjust agent: nor upon the rewards attached to justice, because he represents justice itself as a state of intrinsic happiness to the just agent. Nevertheless the motive to performance of justice, and to avoidance of injustice, is derived in his theory (as it is in what is called the selfish theory) entirely from the happiness or misery of the agent himself. The just man is not called upon for any self-denial or self-sacrifice, since by the mere fact of being just, he acquires a large amount of happiness: it is the unjust man who, from ignorance or perversion, sacrifices that happiness which just behaviour would have ensured to him. Thus the Platonic theory is entirely self-regarding; looking to the conduct of each separate agent as it affects his own happiness, not as it affects the happiness of others.

So much to explain what the Platonic theory is. But when

His theory
departs
more widely
from the
truth than
that which
he opposes.
Argument
of Adei-
mantus dis-
cussed.

we ask whether it consists with the main facts of society, or with the ordinary feelings of men living in society, the reply must be in the negative.

"If" (says Plato, putting the words into the counter-pleading of Adeimantus)—"If the Platonic theory were preached by all of you, and impressed upon our belief from childhood, we should not have watched each other to prevent injustice; since each man

would have been the best watch upon himself, from fear lest by committing injustice he should take to his bosom the maximum of evil."²

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Plat. Rep. p. lvi. "Quo facto deinceps ad gravissimam totius sermonis partem ita transiit, ut inter colloquentes conveniat, justitiae vim et naturam eo modo esse investigandam, ut emolumentorum atque commodorum ex ea redundantium nulla plane ratio habeatur."

This is not strictly exact, for Plato claims on behalf of justice not only that the performance of it is happy in itself, but also that it entails an independent result of ulterior happiness.

But he dwells much less upon the second point; which indeed would be superfluous if the first could be thoroughly established. Compare Cicero, Tusc. Disput. v. 12-24, and the notes on Mr. James Harris's Three Treatises, p. 351 seq., wherein the Stoical doctrine—*πάντα αὐτοῦ ἰσχυα πράττειν*—is explained.

² Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 A. *εἰ γὰρ οὗτος ἐλάττω δὲ ἀρχῆς ὑπὸ πάντων ἡμῶν καὶ ἐκ νόου ἡμᾶς ἐκείθεν, οὐκ ἔν ἀλλήλων ἐφυλάττομεν μὴ ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ'*

These words are remarkable. They admit of two constructions:—1. If the Platonic theory were true. 2. If the Platonic theory, though not true, were constantly preached and impressed upon every one's belief from childhood.

Understanding the words in the first of these two constructions, the hypothetical proposition put into the mouth of Adeimantus is a valid argument against the theory afterwards maintained by Sokrates. (If the theory were conformable to facts, no precautions would need to be taken by men against the injustice of each other. But such precautions have been universally recognised as indispensable, and universally adopted. Therefore the Sokratic theory is not conformable to facts. It is not true that the performance of duty (considered apart from consequences) is self-inviting and self-remunerative—the contrary path self-detering and self-punitory—to each individual agent. Plato might perhaps argue that it would be true, if men were properly educated; and that the elaborate education which he provides for his Guardians in the Republic would suffice for this purpose. But even if this were granted, we must recollect that the producing Many of his Republic would receive no such peculiar education.

Understanding the words in the second construction, they would then mean that the doctrine, though not true, ought to be preached and accredited by the lawgiver as an useful fiction: that if every one were told so from his childhood, without ever hearing either doubt or contradiction, it would become an established creed which each man would believe, and each agent would act upon: that the effect in reference to society would therefore be the same as if the doctrine were true. This is in fact expressly affirmed by Plato in another place.¹ Now undoubtedly the effect of preaching and teaching, assuming it to be constant and unanimous, is very great in accrediting all kinds of dogmas. Plato believed it to be capable of almost unlimited extension—as we may see by the prescriptions which he gives for the training of the Guardians in his Republic. But to persuade every one that the path of duty and justice was in itself inviting, would be a task overpassing the eloquence even of Plato, since

αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἢ ἕκαστος ἀριστος φύλαξ, ξύνουκος ἢ.
 δοκίμῳ μὴ ἀδικῶν τῷ μεγίστῳ κακῷ

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ii. pp. 663-664.

every man's internal sentiment would refute it. You might just as well expect to convince a child, through the declarations and encouragements of his nurse, that the medicine prescribed to him during sickness was very nice. Every child has to learn obedience as a necessity, under the authority and sanction of his parents. You may assure him that what is at first repulsive will become by habit comparatively easy: and that the self-reproach, connected with evasion of duty, will by association become a greater pain than that which is experienced in performing duty. This is to a great degree true, but it is by no means true to the full extent: still less can it be made to appear true before it has been actually realised. You cannot cause a fiction like this to be universally accredited. A child is compelled to practise justice by the fear of displeasure and other painful consequences from those in authority over him: the reason for bringing this artificial motive to bear upon him, is, that it is essential in the first instance for the comfort and security of others: in the second instance for his own. In Plato's theory, the first consideration is omitted, while not only the whole stress is laid upon the second, but more is promised in regard to the second than the reality warrants. ✓

✓ The opponents whom the Platonic Sokrates here seeks to confute held—That Justice is an obligation in itself onerous to the agent, but indispensable in order to ensure to him just dealing and estimation from others—That injustice is a path in itself easy and inviting to the agent, but necessary to be avoided, because he forfeits his chance of receiving justice from others, and draws upon himself hatred and other evil consequences. This doctrine (argues Plato) represents the advantages of justice to the just agent as arising, not from his actually being just, but from his seeming to be so, and being reputed by others to be so: in like manner, it represents the misery of injustice to the unjust agent as arising not from his actually being unjust, but from his being reputed to be so by others. The inference which a man will naturally draw from hence (adds Plato) is, That he must aim only at seeming to be just, not at being just in reality: that he must seek to avoid the reputation of injustice, not injustice in reality: that the mode of life most enviable is, to be unjust in reality, but just in seeming—to study the means either

of deceiving others into a belief that you are just, or of coercing others into submission to your injustice.¹ This indeed cannot be done unless you are strong or artful: if you are weak or simple-minded, the best thing which you can do is to be just. The weak alone are gainers by justice: the strong are losers by it, and gainers by injustice.²

These are legitimate corollaries (so Glaukon and Adeimantus are here made to argue) from the doctrine preached by most fathers to their children, that the obligations of justice are in themselves onerous to the just agent, and remunerative only so far as they determine just conduct on the part of others towards him. Plato means, not that fathers, in exhorting their children, actually drew these corollaries: but that if they followed out their own doctrine consistently, they would have drawn them: and that there is no way of escaping them, except by adopting the doctrine of the Platonic Sokrates—That justice is in itself a source of happiness to the just agent, and injustice a source of misery to the unjust agent—however each of them may be esteemed or treated by others.

Now upon this we may observe, that Plato, from anxiety to escape corollaries which are only partially true, and which, in so far as they are true, may be obviated by precautions—has endeavoured to accredit a fiction misrepresenting the constant phenomena and standing conditions of social life. Among those conditions, reciprocity of services is one of the most fundamental. The difference of feeling which attaches to the services which a man renders, called duties or obligations—and the services which he receives from others, called his rights—is alike obvious and undeniable. Each individual has both duties and rights: each is both an agent towards others, and a patient or sentient from others. He is required to be just towards others, they are required to be just towards him: he in his actions must have regard, within certain limits, to their comfort and security—they in their actions must have regard to his. If he has obligations towards them, he has also rights against them; or (which is the same thing) they have

Reciprocity
of rights
and duties
between
men in
social life—
different
feelings to-
wards one
and towards
the other.

¹ Plato, *Republic*, ii. pp. 362-367.

² Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 366 C.

obligations towards him. If punishment is requisite to deter him from doing wrong to them, it is equally requisite to deter them from doing wrong to him. Whoever theorises upon society, contemplating it as a connected scheme or system including different individual agents, must accept this reciprocity as a fundamental condition. The rights and obligations, of each towards the rest, must form inseparable and correlative parts of the theory. Each agent must be dealt with by others according to his works, and must be able to reckon beforehand on being so dealt with:—on escaping injury or hurt, and receiving justice, from others, if he behaves justly towards them. The theory supposes, that whether just or unjust, he will appear to others what he really is, and will be appreciated accordingly.¹

The fathers of families, whose doctrine Plato censures, adopted this doctrine of reciprocity, and built upon it their exhortations to their children. "Be just to others: without that condition, you cannot expect that they will be just to you." Plato objects to their doctrine, on the ground, that it assumed justice to be onerous to the agent, and therefore indirectly encouraged the evading of the onerous preliminary condition, for the purpose of extorting or stealing the valuable consequent without earning it fairly. Persons acting thus unjustly would efface reciprocity by taking away the antecedent. Now Plato, in correcting them, sets up a counter-doctrine which effaces reciprocity by removing the consequent. His counter-doctrine promises me that if I am just towards others, I shall be happy in and through that single circumstance; and that I ought not to care whether they behave justly or unjustly towards me. Reciprocity thus disappears. The authoritative terms *right* and *obligation* lose all their specific meaning.

¹ Euripid. Herakleid. 425.

Οὐ γὰρ τυραννίς, ὥστε βαρβάρων, ἔχω,
Ἄλλ', ἣν δίκαια δρῶ, δίκαια πείσομαι.

In a remarkable passage of the Laws, Plato sets a far higher value upon correct estimation from others, which in the Republic he depicts under the contemptuous appellation of show or seeming.

Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950 B. Χρὴ δὲ οὐποτε περὶ μικροῦ ποιέσθαι τὸ δοκεῖν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἢ μὴ δοκεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ὅσον οὐσίας ἀρετῆς ἀπεσφαλμένοι

τυγχάνουσιν οἱ πολλοί, τοσούτων καὶ τοῦ κρίνειν τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ πονηροὶ καὶ ἄχρηστοι, θεῖον δὲ τι καὶ εὐστοχόν ἐστι καὶ τοῖς κακοῖς. ὥστε πᾶς πολλοὶ καὶ τὸν σφόδρα κακῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ ταῖς δόξαις διαιροῦνται τοὺς ἀμείνων τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ τοὺς χείρους. Διὸ καλὸν ταῖς πολλαῖς πόλεσι τὸ παρακλέουσθαι ἑστί, προτιμῆν τὴν εὐδοξίαν πρὸς τὸν πολλῶν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὁρθότατον καὶ μέγιστον, ὅττα ἀγαθὸν ἀληθῶς οὕτω τὸν εὐδοξόν βίον θηρεύειν—χωρὶς δὲ μῆδαις, τὸν γε τέλειον ἀνδρὰ εἰσάμενον.

In thus eliminating reciprocity—in affirming that the performance of justice is not an onerous duty, but in itself happiness-giving, to the just agent—Plato contradicts his own theory respecting the genesis and foundation of society. What is the explanation which he himself gives (in this very Republic) of the primary origin of a city? It arises (he says) from the fact, that each individual among us is not self-sufficing, but full of wants. All having many wants, each takes to himself others as partners and auxiliaries to supply them: thus grows up the aggregation called a city.¹ Each man gives to another, and receives from another, in the belief that it will be better for him to do so. It is found most advantageous to all, that each man shall devote himself exclusively to one mode of production, and shall exchange his produce with that of others. Such interchange of productions and services is the generating motive which brings about civic communion.² Justice and injustice will be found in certain modes of carrying on this useful interchange between each man and the rest.³

Plato's own theory, respecting the genesis of society, is based on reciprocity.

Here Plato expressly declares the principle of reciprocity to be the fundamental cause which generates and sustains the communion called the city. No man suffices to himself: every man has wants which require supply from others: every man can contribute something to supply the wants of others. Justice or injustice have place, according as this reciprocal service is carried out in one manner or another. Each man labours to supply the wants of others as well as his own.

This is the primitive, constant, indispensable, bond whereby society is brought and held together. Doubtless it is not the only bond, nor does Plato say that it is. There are other auxiliary social principles besides, of great value and importance: but they presuppose and are built upon the fundamental

¹ Plato, Republic, II. p. 369 B. C. γίγνεται πόλις, ἐπειδὴ τυχάνει ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἰσχύος . . . μεταδίδωσι δὲ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ, εἰ τι μεταδίδωσιν, ἢ μεταλαμβάνει, οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἄμεινον εἶναι . . . ποιήσει δὲ αὐτῇ (τῇ πόλει), ὥς ἔοικεν, ἢ ἡμετέρα χρεῖα.

² Plato, Republic, II. p. 371 B. Τί δὲ δέ; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις

μεταδόνουσιν ἕν ἄν ἕκαστος ἰργίζονται; ἕν δὲ ἔνεκα καὶ κοινωνίαν ποιήσάμενοι πόλιν ψικίσταμεν.

³ Plato, Republ. II. pp. 371 E—372 A. Πού οὐδ' ἂν ποτε ἐν αὐτῇ (τῇ πόλει) εἴη ἢ τε δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀδικία; . . . Ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔννοῶ, εἰ μὴ πού ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρεῖε τι τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

principle—reciprocity of need and service—which remains when we reduce society to its lowest terms; and which is not the less real as underlying groundwork, though it is seldom enunciated separately, but appears overlaid, disguised, and adorned, by numerous additions and refinements. Plato correctly announces the reciprocity of need and service as one indivisible, though complex fact, when looked at with reference to the social communion. Neither of the two parts of that fact, without the other part, would serve as adequate groundwork. Each man must act, not for himself alone, but for others also: he must keep in view the requirements of others, to a certain extent, as well as his own. In his purposes and scheme of life, the two must be steadily combined.

It is clear that Plato—in thus laying down the principle of reciprocity, or interchange of service, as the groundwork of the social union—recognises the antithesis, and at the same time the correlation, between obligation and right. The service which each man renders to supply the wants of others is in the nature of an onerous duty; the requital for which is furnished to him in the services rendered by others to supply his wants. It is payment against receipt, and is expressly so stated by Plato—which every man conforms to, “believing that he will be better off thereby”. Taking the two together, every man is better off; but no man would be so by the payment alone; nor could any one continue paying out, if he received nothing in return. Justice consists in the proper carrying on of this interchange in its two correlative parts.¹

We see therefore that Plato contradicts his own fundamental principle, when he denies the doing of justice to be an onerous

¹ We may remark that Plato, though he states the principle of reciprocity very justly, does not state it completely. He brings out the reciprocity of need and service; he does not mention the reciprocal liability of injury. Each man can do hurt to others: each man may receive hurt from others. Abstinence on the part of each from hurting others, and security to each that he shall not be hurt by others, are neces-

sities quite as fundamental as that of production and interchange.

The reciprocal feeling of security, or absence of all fear of ill-usage from others (*τὸ κατ' ἑμῶν ἀσέως καὶ ἀντιβούλευτον πρὸς ἀλλήλους*, to use the phrase of Thucydides iii. 37), is no less essential to social sentiment, than the reciprocal confidence that each man may obtain from others a supply of his wants, on condition of supplying theirs.

duty, and when he maintains that it is in itself happiness-giving to the just agent, whether other men account him just and do justice to him in return—or not. By this latter doctrine he sets aside that reciprocity of want and service, upon which he had affirmed the social union to rest. The fathers, whom he blames, gave advice in full conformity with his own principle of reciprocity—when they exhorted their sons to the practice of justice, not as self-inviting, but as an onerous service towards others, to be requited by corresponding services and goodwill from others towards them. If (as he urges) such advice operates as an encouragement to crime, because it admits that the successful tyrant or impostor, who gets the services of others for nothing, is better off than the just man who gets them only in exchange for an onerous equivalent—this inference equally flows from that proclaimed reciprocity of need and service, which he himself affirms to be the generating cause of human society. If it be true (as Plato states) that each individual is full of wants, and stands in need of the services of others—then it cannot be true, that payment without receipt, as a systematic practice, is self-inviting and self-satisfying. That there are temptations for strong or cunning men to evade obligation and to usurp wrongful power, is an undeniable fact. We may wish that it were not a fact: but we gain nothing by denying or ignoring it. The more clearly the fact is stated, the better; in order that society may take precaution against such dangers—a task which has always been found necessary and often difficult. In reviewing the Gorgias,¹ we found Sokrates declaring, that Archelaus, the energetic and powerful king of Macedonia, who had usurped the throne by means of crime and bloodshed, was thoroughly miserable: far more miserable than he would have been, had he been defeated in his enterprise and suffered cruel punishment. Such a declaration represents the genuine sentiment of Sokrates as to what he *himself* would feel, and what ought to be (in his conviction) the feeling of every one, after having perpetrated such nefarious acts. But it does not represent the feeling of Archelaus himself, nor that of the large majority

¹ See above, ch. xxiv., vol. II., pp. 325-29.

of bystanders: both to these latter, and to himself, Archelaus appears an object of envy and admiration.¹ And it would be a fatal mistake, if the peculiar sentiment of Sokrates were accepted as common to others besides, and as forming a sound presumption to act upon: that is, if, under the belief that no ambitious man will voluntarily bring upon himself so much misery, it were supposed that precautions against his designs were unnecessary. The rational and tutelary purpose of punishment is, to make the proposition true and obvious to all—That the wrong-doer will draw upon himself a large preponderance of mischief by his wrong-doing. But to proclaim the proposition by voice of herald (which Plato here proposes) as if it were already an established fact of human nature, independent of all such precautions—would be only an unhappy delusion.²

The characteristic feature of the Platonic commonwealth is to specialize the service of each individual in that function for which he is most fit. It is assumed, that each will render due service to the rest, and will receive from them due service in requital. Upon this assumption, Plato pronounces that the community will be happy.

Let us grant for the present that this conclusion follows from his premisses. He proceeds forthwith to apply it by analogy to another and a different

¹ Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* iii. 3, 52-53. Cyrus says:—

Ἄρ' οὐκ, εἰ μέλλουσι τοιαῦτα διάνοιαι ἐγγενήσασθαι ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἔμμενοι ἵσσεσθαι, πρῶτον μὲν νόμους ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τοιούτους, δι' ὧν τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῖς ἐντιμος καὶ ἐλευθέριος ὁ βίος παρασκευασθήσεται, τοῖς δὲ κακοῖς ταπεινός τε καὶ ἀλγεινός καὶ ἀβίαντος ὁ αἰὼν ἐπανακίσεται; Ἐπειτα δὲ διδασκάλους, οἷμαι, δεῖ καὶ ἔρχονται ἐπὶ τοῖς γενέσθαι, οἷντες δεῖξουσιν τε ὁρθῶς καὶ διδάξουσιν καὶ ἰδίσσουσι ταῦτα ὄραν, ἵστ' ἂν ἐγγίγηται αὐτοῖς, τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ εὐκλείεις εὐδαιμονεστάτους τῷ ὄντι νομίζειν, τοὺς δὲ κακοὺς καὶ δυσκλείεις ἀθλιωτάτους πάντων ἡγεῖσθαι.

Xenophon here uses language at variance with that of Plato, and con-

sonant to that of the fathers of families whom Plato censures. To create habits of just action, and to repress habits of unjust action, society must meet both the one and the other by a suitable response. Assuming such conditional reciprocity to be realised, you may then persuade each agent that the unjust man, whom society brands with dishonour, is miserable (οἱ κακοὶ καὶ δυσκλείεις).

² Xenophon, *Œconomia*. xiii. 11. Ischomachus there declares:—

Πάνν γάρ μοι δοκεῖ, ὁ Σάκρατες, ἀθμία ἐγγίγνεσθαι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, ὅταν ὀρώσι τὰ μὲν ἔργα δι' αὐτῶν καταπραγμάτων, τῶν δὲ ὁμοίων τυγχάνοντες αὐτοῖς τοὺς μῆτε ποιεῖν μῆτε κινδυνεύειν ἐθέλοντας, ὅταν δέη.—Also xiv. 9-10.

case—the case of the individual man. He presumes ^{apply to one individual separately.} complete analogy between the community and an individual.¹ To a certain extent, the analogy is real: but it fails on the main point which Plato's inference requires as a basis. The community, composed of various and differently endowed members, suffices to itself and its own happiness: "the individual is not sufficient to himself, but stands in need of much aid from others"²—a grave fact which Plato himself proclaims as the generating cause and basis of society. Though we should admit, therefore, that Plato's commonwealth is perfectly well-constituted, and that a well-constituted commonwealth will be happy—we cannot from thence infer that an individual, however well-constituted, will be happy. His happiness depends upon others as well as upon himself. He may have in him the three different mental varieties of souls, or three different persons—Reason, Energy, Appetite—well tempered and adjusted; so as to produce a full disposition to just behaviour on his part: but constant injustice on the part of others will nevertheless be effectual in rendering him miserable. From the happiness of a community, all composed of just men—you cannot draw any fair inference to that of one just man in an unjust community.

Thus much to show that the parallel between the community and the individual, which Plato pursues through the larger portion of the Republic, is fallacious. His affirmation—That the just man is happy in his justice, *quand même*—in his own mental perfection, whatever supposition may be made as to the community among whom he lives—implies that the just man is self-sufficing: and Plato himself expressly declares that no individual is self-sufficing. Indeed, no author can set forth more powerfully than Plato himself in this very dialogue—the uncomfortable and perilous position of a philosophical individual, when standing singly as a dissenter among a community with fixed habits and sentiments—unphilosophical and anti-philosophical. Such a person (Plato says) is like a man who has fallen into a den of wild beasts: he may think him-

¹ The parallel between the Commonwealth and the individual is perpetually reproduced in Plato's reasoning. Republic, ii. pp. 368-369, vii. p. 541 B, ix. pp. 577 C-D, 579 E, &c.

² Plato, Republic, ii. p. 369 B.

self fortunate, if by careful retirement and abstinence from public manifestation, he can preserve himself secure and uncorrupted: but his characteristic and superior qualities can obtain no manifestation. The philosopher requires a community suited to his character. Nowhere does any such community (so Plato says) exist at present.¹

I cannot think, therefore, that the main thesis which Sokrates professes to have established, against the difficulties raised by Glaukon, is either proved or provable. Plato has fallen into error, partly by exaggerating the parallelism between the individual man and the commonwealth: partly by attempting to reason on justice and injustice in abstract isolation, without regard to the natural consequences of either—while yet those consequences cannot be really excluded from consideration, when we come to apply to these terms, predicates either favourable or unfavourable. That justice, taken along with its ordinary and natural consequences, tends materially to the happiness of the just agent—that injustice, looked at in the same manner, tends to destroy or impair the happiness of the unjust—these are propositions true and valuable to be inculcated. But this was the very case embodied in the exhortations of the ordinary moralists and counsellors, whom Plato intends to refute. He is not satisfied to hear them praise justice taken along with its natural consequences: he stands forward to panegyrisé justice abstractedly, and without its natural consequences: nay, even if followed by consequences the very reverse of those which are ordinary and natural.² He insists that justice is eligible and pleasing *per se*, self-recommending: that among the three varieties of *Bona* (1. That which we choose for itself and from its own immediate attractions. 2. That which is in itself indifferent or even painful, but which we choose from regard to its ulterior consequences. 3. That which we choose on both grounds,

¹ Plato, *Repub.* vi. pp. 494 E, 496 D, 497 B. ὥστερ εἰς θρηψά ἀνθρώπος ἐμπεσών, &c. Compare also ix. p. 592 A.

² Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 367 B. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἀφαιρήσεις ἐκατέρωθεν (i.e. both from justice and from injustice) τὰς

ἀληθείας, τὰς δὲ ψευδεῖς προσθήσεις, οὐ τὸ δίκαιον φήσομεν ἐπαινεῖν σε, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀδίκον εἶναι ψέγειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ δοκεῖν, καὶ παρακλεινέσθαι ἀδίκον ὄντα λαμβάνειν, &c.

both as immediately attractive and as ultimately beneficial), it belongs to the last variety: whereas the opponents whom he impugns referred it to the second.

Here the point at issue between the two sides is expressly set forth. Both admit that Justice is a Bonum—both of them looking at the case with reference only to the agent himself. But the opponents contend, that it is Bonum (with reference to the agent) only through its secondary effects, and noway Bonum or attractive in its primary working: being thus analogous to medical treatment or gymnastic discipline, which men submit to only for the sake of ulterior benefits. On the contrary, Plato maintained that it is good both in its primary and secondary effects: good by reason of the ulterior benefits which it confers, but still better and more attractive in its direct and primary effect: thus combining the pleasurable and the useful, like a healthy constitution and perfect senses. Both parties agree in recognising justice as a good: but they differ in respect of the grounds on which, and the mode in which, it is good.

Statement
of the real
issue be-
tween him
and his
opponents.

Such is the issue as here announced by Plato himself: and the announcement deserves particular notice because the Platonic Sokrates afterwards, in the course of his argument, widens and misrepresents the issue: ascribing to his opponents the invidious post of enemies who defamed justice and recommended injustice, while he himself undertakes to counterwork the advocates of injustice, and to preserve justice from unfair calumny¹—thus professing to be counsel for Justice *versus* Injustice. Now this is not a fair statement of the argument against which Sokrates is contending. In that argument, justice was admitted to be a Good, but was declared to be a Good of that sort which is laborious and irksome to the agent in the primary proceedings required from him—though highly beneficial and indispensable to him by reason of its ulterior results: like medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry,² &c. Whether this doctrine be correct or not, those who hold it cannot be fairly

He himself
misrepresents
this issue—he
describes
his oppo-
nents as
enemies of
justice.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* ii. p. 368 B-C. ἔ- και μὴ βοηθεῖν, ἐν ἀμείνοισι καὶ δυνά-
μουκα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅσον ἢ παραγενόμενον μιν φέγγεσθαι.
δικαιοσύνη κακῶτον μὲν ἀπαγορεύει

² Plato, *Republic*, ii. pp. 357-368.

described as advocates of injustice and enemies of Justice :¹ any more than they are enemies of medicine, gymnastic discipline, industry, &c., which they recommend as good and indispensable, on the same grounds as they recommend justice.

It may suit Plato's purpose, when drawing up an argument which he intends to refute, to give to it the colour of being a panegyric upon injustice : but this is no real or necessary part of the opponent's case. Nevertheless the commentators on Plato bring it prominently forward. The usual programme affixed to the Republic is—Plato, the defender of Justice, against Thrasymachus and the Sophists, advocates and panegyrists of Injustice. How far the real Thrasymachus may have argued in the slashing and offensive style described in the first book of the Republic, we have no means of deciding. But the Sophists are here brought in as assumed preachers of injustice, without any authority either from Plato or elsewhere : not to mention the impropriety of treating the Sophists as one school with common dogmas. Glaukon (as I have already observed) announces the doctrine against which Sokrates contends, not as a recent corruption broached by the Sophists, but as the generally received view of Justice : held by most persons, repeated by the poets from ancient times downwards, and embodied by fathers in lessons to their children : Sokrates farther declares the doctrine which he himself propounds to be propounded for the first time.²

Over and above the analogy between the just commonwealth and the just individual, we find two additional and independent arguments, to confirm the proof of the Platonic thesis, respecting the happiness of the just man. Plato distributes mankind into three varieties.

Farther arguments of Plato in support of his thesis. Comparison

¹ In the lost treatise *De Republica* of Cicero, Philus, one of the disputants, was introduced as spokesman of the memorable discourse delivered by Carneades at Rome, said to have been against Justice, and in favour of Injustice—"patrocinium injustitiæ". Lælius replied to him, as "*Justitiæ defensor*". The few fragments preserved do not enable us to appreciate the line of argument taken by Carneades : but as far as we can judge, it seems to have been very different from that which is assigned to Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Platonic Republic. See the

Fragments of the third book *De Republica* in Orelli's edition of Cicero, pp. 460-467.

² Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 358 A. Οὐ τοῖνυν δοκεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἶδους, &c. 358 C-D : ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων. τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγον οὐδένος περ ἀκήκοα ὡς βοῦλαμαι. 363 E—364 : λέγονται δὲ πῶς καὶ παρακλειόμεναι παρὰ τὴν νόμιμον καὶ πάντες οἱ τιμῶν κτήτορες, &c.—τούτοις δὲ πᾶσι τοῖς λόγοις μάρτυρας ποιῶντας ἐπάγονται (p. 364 C). Also p. 366 D.

1. He in whom Reason is preponderant—the philosopher. 2. He in whom Energy or Courage is preponderant—the lover of dominion and superiority—the ambitious man. 3. He in whom Appetite is preponderant—the lover of money. Plato considers the two last as unjust men, contrasting them with the first, who alone is to be regarded as just.

of three different characters of men.

The language of Plato in arguing this point is vague, and requires to be distinguished before we can appreciate the extent to which he has made out his point. At one time, he states his conclusion to the effect—That the man who pursues and enjoys the pleasures of ambition or enrichment, but only under the conditions and limits which reason prescribes, is happier than he who pursues them without any such controul, and who is the slave of violent and ungovernable impulses.¹ This is undoubtedly true.

But elsewhere Plato puts his thesis in another way. He compares the pleasures of the philosopher, arising from intellectual contemplation and the acquisition of knowledge—with the pleasures of the ambitious man and the money-lover, in compassing their respective ends, the attainment of power and wealth. If you ask (says Plato) each of these three persons which is the best and most pleasurable mode of life, each will commend his own: each will tell you that the pleasures of his own mode of life are the greatest, and that those of the other two are comparatively worthless.² But though each thus commends his own, the judgment of the philosopher is decidedly the most trustworthy of the three. For the necessities of life constrain the philosopher to have some experience of the pleasures of the other two, while they two are altogether ignorant of his:—moreover, the comparative estimate must be made by reason and intelligent discussion, which is his exclusive prerogative. Therefore, the philosopher is to be taken as the best judge, when he affirms that his pleasures are the greatest, in preference to the other two.³ To establish this same conclusion, Plato even goes a step farther. No pleasures, except those peculiar to the philosopher, are perfectly true and genuine, pure from any alloy or

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 586-587.

² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 581 C-D.

³ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 582-583.

mixture of pain. The pleasures of the ambitious man, and of the money-lover, are untrue, spurious, alloyed with pain and for the most part mere riddances from pain—appearing falsely to be pleasures by contrast with the antecedent pains to which they are consequent. The pleasures of the philosophic life are not preceded by any pains. They are mental pleasures, having in them closer affinity with truth and reality than the corporeal : the matter of knowledge, with which the philosophising mind is filled and satisfied, comes from the everlasting and unchangeable Ideas—and is thus more akin to true essence and reality, than the perishable substances which relieve bodily hunger and thirst.¹

It is by these two lines of reasoning, and especially by the last, that Plato intends to confirm and place beyond dispute the triumph of the just man over the unjust.² He professes to have satisfied the requirement of Glaukon, by proving that the just man is happy by reason of his justice—*quand même*—however he may be esteemed or dealt with either by Gods or men. But even if we grant the truth of his premisses, no such conclusion can be elicited from them. He appears to be successful only because he changes the terminology, and the state of the question. Assume it to be true, that the philosopher, whose pleasures are derived chiefly from the love of knowledge and of intellectual acquisitions, has a better chance of happiness than the ambitious or the money-loving man. This I believe to be true in the main, subject to many interfering causes—though the manner in which Plato here makes it out is much less satisfactory than the handling of the same point by Aristotle after him.³ But when the point is granted, nothing is proved about the just and the unjust man, except in a sense of those terms peculiar to Plato himself.

Nor indeed is Plato's conclusion proved, even in his own sense of the words. He identifies the just man with the philosopher or man of reason—the unjust man with the pursuer of power or wealth. Now, even in this Platonic meaning, the just man or

¹ Plato, Republic, ix. pp. 585-586.
² Plato, Republic, ix. p. 583 B.
 Ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν οὕτω εὖ· ἐφεξῆς ἂν εἶη καὶ δις περὶ τῆς δίκης καὶ τοῦ ἀδικοῦ· τὸ δὲ τρίτον . . . τοῦτ' ἂν εἶη

μῆξιόν τε καὶ κυριώτερον τῶν πτωχῶ-
 των.

³ Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. i. 5, p. 1005 b, 1006 a, x. 6-9, pp. 1176-1179.

philosopher cannot be called happy *quand même*: he requires, as one condition of his happiness, a certain amount of service, forbearance, and estimation, on the part of his fellows. He is not completely self-sufficing, nor can any human being be so.

The confusion, into which Plato has here fallen, arises mainly from his exaggerated application of the analogy between the Commonwealth and the Individual: from his anxiety to find in the individual something like what he notes as justice in the Commonwealth: from his assimilating the mental attributes of each individual, divisible only in logical abstraction,—to the really distinct individual citizens whose association forms the Commonwealth.¹ It is only by a poetical or rhetorical metaphor that you can speak of the several departments of a man's mind, as if they were distinct persons, capable of behaving well or ill towards each other. A single man, considered without any reference to others, cannot be either just or unjust. "The just man" (observes Aristotle, in another line of argument), "requires others, towards whom and with whom he may behave justly."² Even when we talk by metaphor of a man being just towards himself, reference to others is always implied, as a standard with which comparison is taken.

In the main purpose of the Republic, therefore—to prove that the just man is happy in his justice, and the unjust miserable in his injustice, whatever supposition may be made as to consequent esteem or treatment from Gods or men—we cannot pronounce Plato to have succeeded. He himself indeed speaks with triumphant confidence of his own demonstration. Yet we find him at the close of the dialogue admitting that he had undertaken the defence of a position unneces-

Exaggerated parallelism between the Commonwealth and the individual man.

Second argument of Plato to prove the happiness of the just man—He now recalls his previous concession, and assumes that the just

¹ Plato, Republic, i. pp. 361 C, 362 C. οὐ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλήλων κομιδὴ ὄντες δίκαιοι, ἀλλὰ ὅλην ὅτι ἐνὲν τις αὐτοῖς δικαιοσύνη, ἣ αὐτοὺς ἐκείνῃ μὴ τοὶ καὶ ἀλλήλους γε καὶ ἑᾶς οὐκ ἦσαν ἀναδίκαιον, ἀ' ἢ ἐπράξαν ἀ ἐπράξαν, ὡρμησαν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ δίκαια δίκαιῃ ἡμερόχρησι ὄντες, &c.

We find the same sentiment in the Opera et Dies of Hesiod. 276, contrasting human society with animal life:—

ἰχθυοὶ μὲν καὶ θηροὶ καὶ οἰωνοὶ περὶ νοῖς
ἔσθαι ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς·
ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἰδὼκε (Ζεὺς) δίκην, ἣ πολλὴν ἀρίστη γίνεται.

² Aristotel. Ethic. Nikomach. x. 7. ὁ δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς οὓς δικαιοπραγήσει, καὶ μὴ ὅν.

man will
receive just
treatment
and esteem
from others.

sarily difficult. "I conceded to you" (he says) "for argument's sake that the just man should be accounted unjust, by Gods as well as men, and that the unjust man should be accounted just. But this is a concession which I am not called upon to make; for the real fact will be otherwise. I now compare the happiness of each, assuming that each has the reputation and the treatment which he merits from others. Under this supposition, the superior happiness of the just man over the unjust, is still more manifest and undeniable."¹

Plato then proceeds to argue the case upon this hypothesis, which he affirms to be conformable to the reality. The just man will be well-esteemed and well-treated by men: he will also be favoured and protected by the Gods, both in this life and after this life. The unjust man, on the contrary, will be ill-esteemed and ill-treated by men: he will farther be disapproved and punished by the Gods, both while he lives and after his death. Perhaps for a time the just man may seem to be hardly dealt with and miserable—the unjust man to be prosperous and popular—but in the end, all this will be reversed.²

The second line of argument is essentially different from the first. Plato dispatches it very succinctly, in two pages: while in trying to prove the first, and in working out the very peculiar comparison on which his proof rests, he had occupied the larger portion of this very long treatise.

In the first line of argument, justice was recommended as implicated with happiness *per se* or absolutely—*quand même*—to the agent: injustice was discouraged, as implicated with misery. In the second line, justice is recommended by reason of its happy ulterior consequences to the agent: injustice is dissuaded on corresponding grounds, by reason of its miserable ulterior consequences to the agent.

It will be recollected that this second line of argument is the same as that which Glaukon described as adopted by parents and by other monitors, in discourse with pupils. Plato therefore here admits that their exhortations were founded on solid grounds; though he blames them for denying or omitting the

¹ Plato, Republic, x. pp. 612-613.

² Plato, Republic, x. p. 613.

announcement, that just behaviour conferred happiness upon the agent by its own efficacy, apart from all consequences. He regards the happiness attained by the just man, through the consequent treatment by men and Gods, as real indeed,—but as only supplemental and secondary, inferior in value to the happiness involved in the just behaviour *per se*.

In this part of the argument, too, as well as in the former, we are forced to lament the equivocal meaning of the word *justice*: and to recollect the observation of Plato at the close of the first book, that those who do not know what justice is, can never determine what is to be truly predicated of it, and what is not.¹ If by the just man he means the philosopher, and by the unjust man the person who is not a philosopher,—he has himself told us before, that in societies as actually constituted, the philosopher enjoys the minimum of social advantages, and is even condemned to a life of insecurity; while the unphilosophical men (at least a certain variety of them) obtain sympathy, esteem, and promotion.²

Now in this second line of argument, Plato holds a totally different language respecting the way in which the just man is treated by society. He even exaggerates, beyond what can be reasonably expected, the rewards accruing to the just man: who (Plato tells us), when he has become advanced in life and thoroughly known, acquires command in his own city if he chooses it, and has his choice among the citizens for the best matrimonial alliances: while the unjust man ends in failure and ignominy, incurring the hatred of every one and suffering punishment.³ This is noway consistent with Plato's previous description of the position of the philosopher in actual society: yet nevertheless his argument identifies the just man with the philosopher.

Plato appears so anxious to make out a triumphant case in favour of justice and against injustice, that he forgets not only the reality of things, but the main drift of his own previous reasonings. Nothing can stand out more strikingly, throughout this long and eloquent treatise, than the difference between one society and another: the necessary dependence of every one's lot,

Dependence of the happiness of the individual on the society in which he is placed.

¹ Plato, Republic, i. p. 354 B.

² Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 492-494-496-497.

³ Plato, Republic, x. p. 615 D-E.

partly indeed upon his own character, but also most materially upon the society to which he belongs: the impossibility of affirming any thing generally respecting the result of such and such dispositions in the individual, until you know the society of which he is a member, as well as his place therein. Hence arises the motive for Plato's own elaborate construction—a new society upon philosophical principles. This essentially relative point of view pervades the greater part of his premisses, and constitutes the most valuable part of them.

Whether the commonwealth as a whole, assuming it to be once erected, would work as he expects, we will not here enquire. But it is certain that the commonwealth and the individuals are essential correlates of each other; and that the condition of each individual must be criticised in reference to the commonwealth in which he is embraced. Take any member of the Platonic Commonwealth, and place him in any other form of government, at Athens, Syracuse, Sparta, &c.—immediately his condition, both active and passive, is changed. Thus the philosophers, for whom Plato assumes unqualified ascendancy as the cardinal principle in his system, become, when transferred to other systems, divested of influence, hated by the people, and thankful if they can obtain even security. "The philosopher (says Plato) must have a community suited to him and docile to his guidance: in communities such as now exist, he not only has no influence as philosopher, but generally becomes himself corrupted by the contagion and pressure of opinions around him: this is the natural course of events, and it would be wonderful if the fact were otherwise."¹

After thus forcibly insisting upon the necessary correlation between the individual and the society, as well as upon the variability and uncertainty of justice and injustice in different existing societies²—Plato is inconsistent with himself in affirming, as an universal position, that the just man receives the favour and good treatment of society, the unjust man, hatred and

Inconsistency of affirming general positions respecting the happiness of the just man,

➤ ¹ Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 487-488. 489 B, 497 B-C. 492 C: καὶ φήσειν τὰ αὐτὰ τοῖς καλὰ καὶ εἰσχυρὰ εἶναι, καὶ ἐπιτελεῖσθαι ἅπαν ἂν οὖτοι, καὶ ἵσθαι τοιοῦτον; Compare also ix. pp. 592 A, 494 A: τοὺς φιλοσοφούντας ἄρα ἀνάγκη ψέγεσθαι ὑπ' αὐτῶν (τοῦ πλάθους). And vii. p. 517 A.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 479, vi. p. 493 C.

↓ punishment.¹ You cannot decide this until you know in what society the just man is placed. In order to make him comfortable, Plato is obliged to construct an imaginary society suited to him : which would have been unnecessary, if you can affirm that he is sure to be well treated in every society.

→ There is a sense indeed (different from what Plato intended), in which the proposition is both true, and consistent with his own doctrine about the correlation between the individual and the society. When Plato speaks of the just or the unjust man, to whose judgment does he make appeal? To his own judgment? or to which of the numerous other dissentient judgments? For that there were numerous dissentient opinions on this point, Plato himself testifies : a person regarded as just or unjust in one community, would not be so regarded in another. All this ethical and intellectual discord is fully recognised as a fact, by Plato himself : who moreover keenly felt it, when comparing his own judgment with that of the Athenians his countrymen. Such being the ambiguity of the terms, we can affirm nothing respecting the just or the unjust man absolutely and generally—respecting justice or injustice in the abstract : We cannot affirm any thing respecting the happiness or misery of either, except with reference to the sentiments of the community wherein each is placed. Assuming their sentiments to be known, we may pronounce that any individual citizen who is unjust *relatively to them* (i.e., who behaves in a manner which they account unjust), will be punished by their superior force, and rendered miserable : while any one who abstains from such behaviour, and conducts himself in a manner which they account just, will receive from them just dealing, with a certain measure of trust, and esteem : Taken in this relative sense, we may truly say of the unjust man, that he will be unhappy ; because displeasure, hatred, and punitive infliction from his countrymen will be quite sufficient to make him so, without any other causes of unhappiness. Respecting the just man, we can only say that he will be happy, so far as exemption from this cause of misery is concerned : but we cannot

in all societies without distinction.

Qualified sense in which only this can be done.

¹ Plato, Republic, x. p. 613.

make sure that he will be happy on the whole, because happiness is a product to which many different conditions, positive and negative, must concur—while the serious causes of misery are efficacious, each taken singly, in producing their result.

Moreover, in estimating the probable happiness either of the just (especially taking this word *sensu Platonico* as equivalent to *the philosophers*) or the unjust, another element must be included: which an illustrious self-thinking reasoner like Plato ought not to have omitted. Does the internal reason and sentiment of the agent coincide with that of his countrymen, as to what is just and unjust? Is he essentially homogeneous with his countrymen (to use the language of Plato in the *Gorgias*¹), a chip of the same block? Or has he the earnest conviction that the commandments and prohibitions which they enforce upon him, on the plea of preventing injustice, are themselves unjust? Is he (like the philosopher described by Plato among societies actually constituted, or like Sokrates at Athens²) a conscientious dissenter from the orthodox creed—political, ethical, or æsthetical—received among his fellow-citizens generally? Does he (like Sokrates) believe himself to be inculcating useful and excellent lessons, while his countrymen blame and silence him as a corruptor of youth, and as a libeller of the elders?³ Does he, in those actions which he performs either under legal restraint or under peremptory unofficial custom, submit merely to what he regards as *civium ardor prava jubentium*, or as *vultus instantis tyranni*?

This is a question essentially necessary to be answered, when we are called upon to affirm the general principle—
 “That the just man is happy, and that the unjust man is unhappy”. Antipathy and ill-treatment will be the lot of any citizen who challenges opinions which his society cherish as consecrated, or professes such as they dislike. Such was the fate of Sokrates

Comparison of the position of Sokrates at Athens, with that of his accusers.

¹ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 513 B. αὐτοφύωτ ὁμοιοι τῇ πολιτείᾳ, &c.

² Plato, *Republic*, vi. pp. 490-497. Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 521 D.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 522 B. εἰάν τί τις με ἢ νεωτέρους φηὶ διαφθεῖρειν ἀπορρίπτειν ποιοῦντα, ἢ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους μαί.

κατηγορεῖν λέγοντα πικροὺς λόγους ἢ ἰδίᾳ ἢ δημοσίᾳ, οὐτε τὸ ἀληθές ἐξω εἰπεῖν, ὅτι δίκαιος πάντα ταῦτα ἐγὼ λέγω καὶ πράττω τὸ ὑμῖντερον ἐν τούτῳ, ὡς ἄνδρες δίκασται, οὐτε ἄλλο οὐδέν· ὥστε ἴσως, ὅ, τι ἐν τύχῃ, τοῦτο πείσομαι.

himself at Athens. He was indicted as unjust and criminal (*Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης*), while his accusers, Anytus and Melétus, carried away the esteem and sympathy of their fellow-citizens generally, as not simply just men, but zealous champions of justice—as resisting the assailants of morality and religion, of the political constitution, and of parental authority. How vehement was the odium and reprobation which Sokrates incurred from the majority of his fellow-citizens, we are assured by his own Apology¹ before the Dikasta. Now it is to every one a serious and powerful cause of unhappiness, to feel himself the object of such a sentiment. Most men dread it so much, like the Platonic Euthyphron, that they refrain from uttering, or at least are most reserved in communicating, opinions which are accounted heretical among their countrymen or companions.² The resolute and free-spoken Sokrates braved that odium; which, aggravated by particular circumstances, as well as by the character of his own defence, attained at last such a height as to bring about his condemnation to death. That he was sustained in this unthankful task by native force of character, conscientious persuasion, and belief in the approbation of the Gods—is a fact which we should believe, even if he himself had not expressly told us so. But to call him *happy*, would be a misapplication of the term, which no one would agree with Plato in making—least of all the friends of Sokrates in the last months of his life. Besides, if we are to call Sokrates happy on these grounds, his accusers would be still happier: for they had the same conscientious conviction, and the same belief in the approbation of the Gods: while they enjoyed besides the sympathy of their countrymen as champions of religion and morality.

In spite of all the charm and eloquence, therefore, which abounds in the Republic, we are compelled to declare that the Platonic Sokrates has not furnished the solution required from him by Glaukon and Adei-

Imperfect
ethical basis
on which
Plato has

¹ Plato, Apolog. Sokr. pp. 23 A. 37 D.

πολλή μοι ἀνεχθεία γίνεται καὶ πρὸς πολλούς, &c.

² Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. Ἀθηναῖοις γὰρ τοι οὐ σφόδρα μέλει, ἃν τινα δεῖνόν οἰωνται εἶναι, μὴ μόντοι διδασκαλιῶν τῆς αὐτοῦ σοφίας· ὅν δ' ἂν

καὶ ἄλλους οἰωνται ποιεῖν τοιοῦτους, θυμούνται, εἰτ' οὖν φθόνῳ, εἰτε δι' ἄλλο τι.

Euthyphr. Τούτου μὲν πέρι ὅπως ποτὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔχουσιν, οὐ πάντῃ ἐπιθυμῶ περὶ αὐτῶν.

Sokrát. Ἵσως γὰρ σὺ μὲν δοκεῖς σπάνιον σεαυτὸν παρέχειν, καὶ διδάσκειν οὐκ ἐθέλειν τὴν σεαυτοῦ σοφίαν, &c.

conducted the discussion in the Republic. mantus: and that neither the first point (ix. p. 580 D) nor the second point of his conclusion (x. p. 613) is adequately made out. The very grave ethical problem, respecting the connexion between individual just behaviour and individual happiness, is discussed in a manner too exclusively self-regarding, and inconsistent with that reciprocity which Plato himself sets forth as the fundamental, generating, sustaining, principle of human society. If that principle of reciprocity is to be taken as the starting-point, you cannot discuss the behaviour of any individual towards society, considered in reference to his own happiness, without at the same time including the behaviour of society towards him. Now Plato, in the conditions that he expressly prescribes for the discussion,¹ insists on keeping the two apart; and on establishing a positive conclusion about the first, without at all including the second. He rejects peremptorily the doctrine—"That just behaviour is performed for the good of others, apart from the agent". Yet if society be, in the last analysis (as Plato says that it is), an exchange of services, rendered indispensable by the need which every one has of others—the services which each man renders are rendered *for the good of others*, as the services which they render to him are rendered *for his good*. The just dealing of each man is, in the first instance, beneficial to others: in its secondary results, it is for the most part beneficial to himself.² His unjust dealing, in like manner, is, in the first instance, injurious to others: in its secondary results, it is for the most part injurious to himself. Particular acts of injustice may, under certain circumstances, be not injurious, may even be beneficial, to the unjust agent: but they are certain

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367.

² See the instructive chapter on the Moral Sense, in Mr. James Mill's *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, ch. xxiii. vol. ii. p. 280.

"The actions from which men derive advantage have all been classed under four titles—Prudence, Fortitude, Justice, Beneficence. . . . When those names are applied to our own acts, the first two, Prudent and Brave, express acts which are useful to ourselves, in the first instance: the latter two, Just and Beneficent, express acts

which are useful to others, in the first instance. . . . It is further to be remarked, that those acts of ours which are primarily useful to ourselves, are secondarily useful to others; and those which are primarily useful to others, are secondarily useful to ourselves. Thus, it is by our own prudence and fortitude that we are best enabled to do acts of justice and beneficence to others. And it is by acts of justice and beneficence to others, that we best dispose them to do similar acts to us."

to be hurtful to others: were it not so, they would not deserve to be branded as injustice. I am required to pay a debt, for the benefit of my creditor, and for the maintenance of a feeling of security among other creditors—though the payment may impose upon myself severe privation: indirectly, indeed, I am benefited, because the same law which compels me, compels others also to perform their contracts towards me. The law (to use a phrase of Aristotle) guarantees just dealing by and towards each.¹ The Platonic Thrasymachus, therefore, is right in so far as he affirms—That injustice is *Malum Alienum*, and justice *Bonum Alienum*,² meaning that such is the direct and primary characteristic of each. The unjust man is one who does wrong to others, or omits to render to others a service which they have a right to exact, with a view to some undue profit or escape of inconvenience for himself: the just man is one who abstains from wrong to others, and renders to others the full service which they have a right to require, whatever hardship it may impose upon himself. A man is called just or unjust, according to his conduct towards others.

In considering the main thesis of the Republic, we must look upon Plato as preacher—inculcating a belief which he thinks useful to be diffused; rather than as philosopher, announcing general truths of human nature, and laying down a consistent, scientific, theory of Ethics. There are occasions on which even he himself seems to accept this character. "If the fable of Kadmus and the dragon's teeth" (he maintains) "with a great many other stories equally improbable, can be made matters of established faith, surely a doctrine so plausible as mine, about justice and injustice, can be easily taught and accredited."³ To ensure unanimous acquiescence, Plato would constrain all poets to proclaim

Plato in Republic is preacher, inculcating useful beliefs—not philosopher, establishing scientific theory. State of Just and Unjust Man in the Platonic Commonwealth.

¹ Aristot. Polit. iii. 9, 1280, b. 10, ὁ νόμος συνέστη, καὶ καθάπερ εἶπεν Ἀναξάгорων ὁ σοφιστής, ἐγγυητὴς ἄλλοις τῶν δικαίων. Chrysippus also, writing against Plato, maintained that ἀδικία was essentially πρὸς ἑτερον, οὐ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (Plutarch, Stoic. Repugnans. c. 16, p. 1041 D).

² Plato, Republic, ii. p. 367 C. καὶ ὁμολογεῖν Θρασυμάχῳ ὅτι τὸ μὲν δι-

καιον, ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν, ἐνυμέρον τοῦ κρείττονος· τὸ δὲ ἀδικον, αὐτῷ μὲν ἐνυμέρον καὶ λυσitelouν, τῷ δὲ ἥττονι, ἐνυμέρον.

³ See Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 663-664. Good and simple people, in the earlier times (says Plato), believed every thing that was told them. They were more virtuous and just then than they are now (Legg. iii. p. 679 C-E).

and illustrate his thesis—and would prohibit them from uttering anything inconsistent with it.¹ But these or similar official prohibitions may be employed for the upholding of any creed, whatever it be: and have been always employed, more or less, in every society, for the upholding of the prevalent creed. Even in the best society conceivable under the conditions of human life, assuming an ideal commonwealth in which the sentiments of *just* and *unjust* have received the most systematic, beneficent, and rational embodiments, and have become engraven on all the leading minds—even then Plato's first assertion—That the just man is happy *quand même*—could not be admitted without numerous reserves and qualifications. Justice must still be done by each agent, not as a self-inviting process, but as an obligation entailing more or less of sacrifice made by him to the security and comfort of others. Plato's second assertion—That the unjust man is miserable—would be more near the truth; because the ideal commonwealth is assumed to be one in which the governing body has both the disposition and the power to punish injustice—and the discriminating equanimity, or absence of antipathies, which secures them against punishing anything else. The power of society to inflict misery is far more extensive than its power of imparting happiness. But even thus, we have to recollect that the misery of the unjust person arises not from his injustice *per se*, but from consequent treatment at the hands of others.

Thus much for the Platonic or ideal commonwealth. But Comparative happiness when we pass from that hypothesis into the actual world, the case becomes far stronger against the

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ii. pp. 661-662. Illustrated in the rigid and detailed censorship which he imposes on the poets in the Republic, in the second and third books.

In the *Legg.*, however, Plato puts his thesis in a manner less untenable than in the Republic:—"Neither to do wrong to others, nor to suffer wrong from others; this is the happiest condition" (*Legg.* ii. p. 663 A). This is a very different proposition from that which is defended in the Republic; where we are called upon to believe, that the man who acts justly will be happy, whatever may be the conduct of others towards him.

Epikurus laid down, as one of the

doctrines in his *Kύριας Δόξαι* (see *Diog. Laert.* x. 150): Τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον ἐστὶ σύμβολον τοῦ συμφέροντος, εἰς τὸ μὴ βλάπτεν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι. Ὅσα τῶν ζῶων μὴ ἡδύνατο συνθήκας ποιῆσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτεν ἀλλήλα μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, πρὸς ταῦτα οὐθὲν ἐστὶν οὐδὲ δίκαιον οὐδὲ ἀδίκον. Ὅσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰθύνων ὅσα μὴ ἡδύνατο, ἢ μὴ ἐβούλετο, τὰς συνθήκας ποιῆσθαι τὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ βλάπτεν ἀλλήλους μηδὲ βλάπτεσθαι, &c.

Lucretius expresses the same—v. 1020:—

"Tunc et amicitiam coeperunt jungere aventes

"Finitimi inter se nec laedere nec violari," &c.

truth of both Plato's assertions. Of actual societies, even the best have many imperfections—the less good, many attributes worse than imperfections:—“*ob virtutes certissimum exitium*”. The dissenter for the better, is liable to be crucified alongside of the dissenter for the worse: King Nomos will tolerate neither.

Plato as a preacher holds one language: as a philosopher and analyst, another. When he is exhorting youth to justice, or dissuading them from injustice, he thinks himself entitled to depict the lot of the just man in the most fascinating colours, that of the unjust man as the darkest contrast against it,—without any careful observance of the line between truth and fiction: the fiction, if such there be, becomes in his eyes a *pia fraus*, excused or even ennobled by its salutary tendency. But when he drops this practical purpose, and comes to philosophy on the principles of society, he then proclaims explicitly how great is the difference between society as it now stands, and society as it ought to be: how much worse is the condition of the just, how much less bad that of the unjust (in every sense of the words, but especially in the Platonic sense) than a perfect commonwealth would provide. Between the exhortations of Plato the preacher, and the social analysis of Plato the philosopher, there is a practical contradiction, which is all the more inconvenient because he passes backwards and forwards almost unconsciously, from one character to the other. The splendid treatise called the Republic is composed of both, in portions not easy to separate.

The difference between the two functions just mentioned—the preceptor, and the theorizing philosopher—deserves careful attention, especially in regard to Ethics. If I lay down a theory of social philosophy, I am bound to take in all the conditions and circumstances of the problem: to consider the whole position of each individual in society, as an agent affecting the security and comfort of others, and also as a person acted on by others, and having his security and comfort affected by their behaviour: as subject to obligations or duties, in the first of the two characters—and as

two in actual communities. Plato is dissatisfied with it—This is his motive for recasting society on his own principles.

Confusion between the preacher and the philosopher in the Platonic Republic.

Remarks on the contrast between ethical theory and ethical precepts.

enjoying rights (i.e., having others under obligation to him) in the second. This reciprocity of service and need—of obligation and right—is the basis of social theory: its two parts are in indivisible correlation: alike integrant and co-essential. But when a preceptor delivers exhortations on conduct, it is not necessary that he should insist equally on each of the two parts. As a general fact of human nature, it is known that men are disposed *proprio motu* to claim their rights, but not so constantly or equally disposed to perform their obligations: accordingly, the preceptor insists upon this second part of the case, which requires extraneous support and enforcement—leaving untouched the first part, which requires none. But the very reason why the second part needs such support, is, because the performance of the obligation is seldom self-inviting, and often the very reverse: that is, because the Platonic doctrine misrepresents the reality. The preceptor ought not to indulge in such misrepresentation: he may lay stress especially upon one part of the entire social theory, but he ought not to employ fictions which deny the necessary correlation of the other omitted part. Many preceptors have insisted on the performance of obligation, in language which seemed to imply that they considered a man to exist only for the performance of obligation, and to have no rights at all. Plato in another way undermines equally the integrity of the social theory, when he contends, that the performance of obligations alone, without any rights, is delightful *per se*, and suffices to ensure happiness to the performer. Herein we can recognise only a well-intentioned preceptor, narrowing and perverting the social theory for the purpose of edification to his hearers.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

REPUBLIC—REMARKS ON THE PLATONIC
COMMONWEALTH.

IN my last Chapter, I discussed the manner in which Plato had endeavoured to solve the ethical problem urged upon him by Glaukon and Adeimantus. But this is not the entire purpose of the Republic. Plato, drawing the closest parallel between the Commonwealth and the individual, seeks solution of the problem first in the former; because it is there (he says) written in larger and clearer letters. He sketches the picture of a perfect Commonwealth—shows wherein its justice consists—and proves, to his own satisfaction, that it will be happy in and through its justice—*per se*. This picture of a Commonwealth is unquestionably *one* of the main purposes of the dialogue; serving as commencement—or more properly as intermediate stage—to the *Timæus* and *Kritias*. Most critics have treated it as if it were the dominant and almost exclusive purpose. Aristotle, the earliest of all critics, adverts to it in this spirit; numbering Plato or the Platonic Sokrates among those who, not being practical politicians, framed schemes for ideal commonwealths, like Phaleas or Hippodamus. I shall now make some remarks on the political provisions of the Platonic Commonwealth: but first I shall notice the very peculiar manner in which Plato discovers therein the notions of Justice and Injustice.

Double purpose of the Platonic Republic—ethical and political.

The Platonic Sokrates (as I remarked above) lays down as the fundamental, generating, principle of human society, the reciprocity of need and service, essentially belonging to human beings: exchange of services is indispensable, because each man has many wants more

Plato recognises the generating principle of human society—*recd.*

pravity of
need and
service.
Particular
direction
which he
gives to
this prin-
ciple.

than he can himself supply, and thus needs the services of others : while each also can contribute something to supply the wants of others. To this general principle Plato gives a peculiar direction. He apporitions the services among the various citizens ; and he provides that each man shall be specialised for the service to which he is peculiarly adapted, and confined to that alone. No double man¹ is tolerated. How such specialisation is to be applied in detail among the multitude of cultivators and other producers, Plato does not tell us. Each is to have his own employment : we know no more. But in regard to the two highest functions, he gives more information : first, the small cabinet of philosophical Elders,² Chiefs, or Rulers—artists in the craft of governing, who supply professionally that necessity of the Commonwealth, and from whom all orders emanate : next, the body of Guardians, Soldiers, Policemen, who execute the orders of this cabinet, and defend the territory against all enemies. Respecting both of these, Plato carefully prescribes both the education which they are to receive, and the circumstances under which they are to live. They are to be of both sexes intermingled, but to know neither family nor property : they live together in barrack, and with common mess, receiving subsistence and the means of decent comfort, but no more, from the producers : respecting sexual relations and births, I shall say more presently.

The four
cardinal
virtues are
assumed as
constituting
the whole of
Good or Vir-
tue, where
each of
these vir-
tues resides.

When Plato has provided thus much, he treats his city as already planted and brought to consummation. He thinks himself farther entitled to proclaim it as perfectly good, and therefore as including the four constituent elements of Good : that is, as being wise, brave, temperate, just.³ He then looks to find wherein each of these four elements resides : wisdom resides specially in the cabinet of Rulers—courage specially in the Guardians—temperance and justice,

¹ Plato, Rep. iii. p. 397 E.

² The principle laid down in the Protagoras will be remembered—*εἰς ἓκων τέχην πολλοῖς ἰκανὸς ἰδιώταις* (Protag. p. 322 D).

³ Plato, Repub. iv. pp. 427 D—428 A. *φικισμένη μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ' ἔγωγε, ἥδη ἀν*

σοι εἶη, ὦ καὶ Ἀρίστωνος, ἡ πόλις . . .
Οἶμαι ἡμῖν τὴν πόλιν, εἴπερ ὁρθῶς γε
ῥησισται, τέλει εὖτε ἀγαθὴν εἶναι.
Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Ἀἴλον δέ, ὅτι σοφὴ ἔ
στὶ καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ σώφρων καὶ δίκαια.
Ἀἴλον. Οὐκοῦν, ὅ, τι ἀν αὐτῶν εὐρω
μεν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὸ ὑπόλοιπον ἔσται τὸ οὐκ
εὐρήμενον ; ἔκ.

in these two, but in the producing multitude also. The two last virtues are universal in the Commonwealth. Temperance consists in the harmony of opinion between the multitude and the two higher classes as to obedience: the Guardians are as ready to obey as the Chiefs to command: the multitude are also for the most part ready to obey—but should they ever fail in obedience, the Guardians are prepared to lend their constraining force to the authority of the Chiefs. Having thus settled three out of the four elements of Good, which enumeration he assumes to be exhaustive—Plato assumes that what remains must be Justice. This remainder he declares to be—That each of the three portions of the Commonwealth performs its own work and nothing else: and this is Justice. Justice and Temperance are thus common to all the three portions of the Commonwealth: while Wisdom and Prudence belong entirely to the Chiefs, and Courage entirely to the Guardians.

Here, for the first time in Ethical Theory, Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice, are assumed as an exhaustive enumeration of virtues: each distinct from the other three, but all together including the whole of Virtue.¹ Through Cicero and others, these four have come down as the cardinal virtues. From whom Plato derived it, I do not know: not certainly from the historical Sokrates, who resolved the last three into the first.² Nor is it indeed in harmony with Plato's own view: for temperance and justice are substantially coincident, in his explanation of them (since he does not recognise the characteristic feature of Justice, as directly tending to the good of a person other than the agent): and the line, by which he endeavours to part them, is obscure as well as unimportant. Schleiermacher—who admits that the distinction drawn here between Temperance and Justice is altogether forced

First mention of these, as an exhaustive classification, in ethical theory. Plato effaces the distinction between Temperance and Justice.

¹ Plat. Rep. iv. p. 432 B. τὸ δὲ δὴ λοιπὸν εἶδος, δι' ὃ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετὴς μετέχου πόλις, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη; ὁπλον γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο ἔστιν ἡ δικαιοσύνη.

Compare p. 444 D, where he defines Ἀρετὴ—Ἀρετὴ μὲν ἀρα, ὡς δοικεν, ἐνέργειά τί τις ἂν εἴη καὶ κάλλος καὶ σωφία ψυχῆς· κακία δὲ, νόσος τε καὶ μᾶχος καὶ ἀσθένεια.

² Xenoph. Mem. iii. 9, 4-5. σοφίαν δὲ καὶ σωφροσύνην οὐ διώριζεν, &c.

Compare the discussion of σωφροσύνη, iv. 5, 9-11, where Sokrates enforces the practice of it on the ground that it ensured to a man both more pleasures and greater pleasures, of which he would deprive himself if he were foolish enough to be intemperate.

—supposes that Plato took up this quadruple classification, because he found it already established in the common, non-theorising, consciousness.¹ If this be true, the real distinction between Justice (as directly bearing on the rights of another person) and Temperance (as directly concerning only the future happiness of the agent himself), which is one of the most important distinctions in Ethics—must have been already felt, without being formulated, in the common mind: and Plato, by retaining the two words, but effacing the distinction between the two, and giving a new meaning to Justice—took a step in the wrong direction. He himself however tells us, that the definition, here given of Justice, is not his own; but that he had heard it enunciated by many others before him.² What makes this more remarkable is, That the same definition (to do your own business and not to meddle with other people's business) is what we read in the Charmides as delivered respecting Temperance, by Charmides and Kritias:³ delivered by them, and afterwards pulled to pieces in cross-examination by Sokrates. Herein we see farther proof how little distinction Plato drew between Justice and Temperance.

From whomsoever Plato may have derived this ethical classification—Virtue as a whole, distributed into four varieties—1. Prudence or Knowledge—2. Courage or Energy—3. Temperance—4. Justice—we find it here placed in the foreground of his doctrine, respecting both the collective Commonwealth and the

¹ Schleiermacher, Einkl. zum Staat, pp. 25-26. "Dieser Tadel trifft höchstens die Aufstellung jener vier zusammengehörigen Tugenden; welche Platon offenbar genug nur mit richtigem praktischen Sinne aus Ehrfurcht für das Bestehende aufgenommen hat: wie sie denn schon auf dieselbe Weise aus dem gemeinen Gebrauch in die Lehrweise des Sokrates übergegangen sind."

² Plato, *Repub.* iv. p. 433 A. καὶ ὅτι γὰρ τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν, καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλὰκις εἰρήκαμεν. Compare iii. p. 406 E.

³ See *Charmides*, pp. 161-162. Heindorf observes in his note on this

passage:—"A *sophistic* ergo vulgata hæc σωφροσύνης definitio: ad *justitiam* quoque ab eisdem ut videtur, translata. *Republ.* iv. p. 433 (the passage cited in note preceding). Quo pertinent illa *Ciceronis*, *De Officiis*, l. 9. 2. Item ad *prudentiam*, *Aristot.* *Eth. Nicom.* vi. 3, *Philosopho* vero hoc tribuit *Sokrates*, *Gorgias*, p. 526."

The definition given in the *Charmides* appears plainly ascribed to Kritias as its author (p. 162 D). The affirmation that it was "a *sophistic vulgata*," and afterwards transferred by these same to Justice, is made without any authority produced; and is expressed in the language usual with the Platonic commentators, who treat the Sophists as a philosophical sect or school.

individual man.¹ He professes to understand and explain what they are—to reason upon them all with confidence—and to apply them to very important conclusions.

But let us pause for a moment to ask, how these professions harmonise with the dialogues reviewed in my preceding volumes. No reader will have forgotten the doubts and difficulties, exposed by the Sokratic Elenchus throughout the Dialogues of Search: the confessed inability of Sokrates himself to elucidate them, while at the same time his contempt for the false persuasion of knowledge—for those who talk confidently about matters which they can neither explain nor defend—is expressed without reserve. Now, when we turn to the Hippias Major, we find Sokrates declaring, that no man can affirm, and that a man ought to be ashamed to pretend to affirm, what particular matters are beautiful (fine, honourable) or ugly (mean, base), unless he knows and can explain what Beauty is.² A similar declaration appears in the Menon, where Sokrates treats it as absurd to affirm or deny any predicate respecting a Subject, until you have satisfied yourself that you know what the Subject itself is: and where he farther proclaims, that as to Virtue, he does not know what it is, and that he has never yet found any one who *did* know.³ Such ignorance is stated at the end of the dialogue not less emphatically than at the beginning. Again, respecting the four varieties or parts of Virtue. The first of the four, Prudence—(Wisdom—Knowledge)—has been investigated in the Theætétus—one of the most elaborate of all the Platonic dialogues: several different explanations of it are proposed by Theætétus, and each is shown by Sokrates to be untenable; the problem remains unsolved at last. As to Courage and Temperance, we have not been more fortunate. The Lachês and Charmidês exhibit nothing but a fruitless search both for one and for the other. And here the case is more remarkable; because in the Lachês, one of the

All the four are here assumed as certain and determinate, though in former dialogues they appear indeterminate and full of unsolved difficulties.

¹ In some of the Platonic Dialogues these four varieties are not understood as exhausting the sum total of Virtue: $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\gamma\gamma\iota$ is included also; see Lachês, p. 190 D, Protagoras, p. 329 D, Euthyphron, pp. 5-d. Plato does not advert to $\tau\acute{\alpha}\ \delta\omicron\upsilon\lambda\omicron\gamma\gamma\iota$ in the Republic as a sepa-

rate constituent, seemingly because on matters of piety he enjoins direct reference to Apollo and the Delphian oracle (Rep. iv. p. 427 B).

² Plat. Hipp. Maj. pp. 286 D, 304 C.
³ Plato, Menon, pp. 71 B-C, 86 B, 100 B.

several definitions of Courage, tendered to Sokrates and refuted by him, is, the very definition of Courage delivered by him in the Republic as complete and satisfactory : while in the Charmidēs, one of the definitions of Temperance, refuted, and even treated as scarcely intelligible, by Sokrates (τὸ πρᾶττον τὸ ἑαυτοῦ) is the same as that which Sokrates in the Republic relies on as a valid definition of Justice.¹ Lastly, every one who has read the Parmenidēs, will remember the acute objections there urged against the Platonic hypothesis of substantive Ideas, participated in by particulars : of which objections no notice is taken in the Republic, though so much is said therein about these Ideas, in regard to the training of the philosophical Chiefs.

If we revert to these passages (and many others which might be produced) of past dialogues, we shall find no means provided of harmonising them with the Republic. The logical and ethical difficulties still exist : they have never been elucidated : the Republic does not pretend to elucidate them, but overlooks or overleaps them. In composing it, Plato has his mind full of a different point of view, to which he seeks to give full effect. While his spokesman Sokrates was leader of opposition, Plato delighted to arm him with the maximum of negative cross-examining acuteness : but here Sokrates has passed over to the ministerial benches, and has undertaken the difficult task of making out a case in reply to the challenge of Glaukon and Adeimantus. No new leader of opposition is allowed to replace him. The splendid constructive effort of the Republic would have been spoiled, if exposed to such an analytical cross-examination as that which we read in Menon, Lachēs, or Charmidēs.

In remarking upon the Platonic Republic as a political scheme only, we pass from the Platonic point of view to the Aristotelian : that is, to the discussion of Ethics and Politics as separate subjects, though adjoining and partially overlapping each other. Plato conceives

¹ See Lachēs p. 195 A. τὴν τῶν δεινῶν καὶ θαρραλέων ἐπιστήμην, pp. 196 C.—199 A-E—in the cross-examination of Nikias by Sokrates : and the question in the cross-examination of Lachēs (who has defined Cou-

rage to be ἡ φρόνιμος καρτερία) put by Sokrates—ἡ εἰς τὴν φρόνιμον ; compared with Republic, iv. pp. 429 C, 430 B, 433 C. See also Charmidēs, pp. 161 B, 162 B-C, compared with Republic. iv. p. 433 B-D.

the two in intimate union, and even employs violent metaphors to exaggerate the intimacy. Xenophon also conceives them in close conjunction. Aristotle goes farther in separating the two: a great improvement in regard to the speculative dealing with both of them.¹

If, following the example of Aristotle, we criticise the Platonic Republic as a scheme of political constitution, we find that on most points which other theorists handle at considerable length, Plato is intentionally silent. His project is an outline and nothing more. He delineates fully the brain and heart of the great Leveathan, but leaves the rest in very faint outline. He announces explicitly the purpose of all his arrangements, to obtain happiness for the whole city: by which he means, not happiness for the greatest number of individuals, but for the abstract unity called the City, supposed to be capable of happiness or misery, apart from any individuals, many or few, composing it.² Each individual is to do the work for which he is best fitted, contributory to the happiness of the whole—and to do nothing else. Each must be content with such happiness as consists with his own exclusive employment.³

The Chiefs or Rulers are assumed to be both specially qualified and specially trained for the business of governing. Their authority is unlimited: they represent that

apart by Aristotle.

Platonic Commonwealth—only an outline—partially filled up.

Absolute rule of a

¹ The concluding chapter of the *Nicomachean Ethics* contains some striking remarks upon this separation.

² Plato, *Republic*, iv. pp. 420-421.

The objection that the Guardians will have no happiness, is put by Plato into the mouth of Adeimantus, but is denied by Sokrates; who, however, says that even if it were true he could not admit it as applicable, since what he wishes is that the entire commonwealth shall be happy. Aristotle (*Polit.* ii. 5, 1264, 6-15) repeats the objection of Adeimantus, and declares that collective happiness (not enjoyed by some individuals) is impossible.

See the valuable chapter on Ideal Models in *Politics* (vol. ii. ch. xxii. p. 236 seq.) in Sir George Cornewall Lewis's *Treatise on the methods of Observation and Reasoning in Politics*. The different ideal models framed by theorists ancient and modern, Plato

among the number, are there collected, with judicious remarks in comparing and appreciating them.

³ Plato, *Republic*, iv. p. 421 C.

He lays down this minute subdivision and speciality of aptitude in individuals as a fundamental property of human nature. *Repub.* iii. p. 396 B, καὶ ἐπεὶ γε τοῦτων φαίνεται μοι εἰς μικρότερα κατακεκρημέναι ἢ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις, &c.

Compare Xenophon, *Cyropæd.* ii. 1, 21, where the same principle is laid down. Another passage in the same treatise (*Cyropæd.* viii. 2, 5) is also interesting. Xenophon there contrasts the smaller towns, where many trades were combined in the same hand and none of the works well performed, with the larger towns, where there was a minuter subdivision of labour, each man doing one work only, and doing it well.

few philosophers—
Careful and
peculiar
training of
the Guardians.

One Infallible Wise Man, whom Plato frequently appeals to (in the *Politikus*, *Kriton*, *Gorgias*, and other dialogues), but never names. They are a very small number, perhaps only one: the persons naturally qualified being very few, and even they requiring the severest preparatory training. The Guardians, all of them educated up to a considerable point, both obey themselves the orders of these few Chiefs, and enforce obedience upon the productive multitude. Of this last-mentioned multitude, constituting numerically almost the whole city, we hear little or nothing: except that the division of labour is strictly kept up among them, and that neither wealth nor poverty is allowed to grow up.¹ How this is to be accomplished, Plato does not point out: nor does he indicate how the mischievous working (i.e., mischievous, in his point of view, and as he declares it) of the proprietary and the family relations is to be obviated. His scheme tacitly assumes that separate property and family are to subsist among the great mass of the community, but not among the Guardians: he proclaims explicitly, that if the proprietary relations or the family relations were permitted among the Guardians, entire corruption of their character would ensue.² Among the *Demos* or multitude, he postulates nothing except unlimited submission to the orders of the Rulers enforced through the Guardians. The regulative powers of the Rulers are assumed to be of omnipotent efficacy against every cause of mischief, subject only to one condition—That the purity of the golden breed, together with the Platonic training and discipline, are to be maintained among them unimpaired.

Everything in the Platonic Republic turns upon this elaborate training of the superior class: most of all, the Chiefs or Rulers—next, the Soldiers or Guardians. Besides this training, they are required to be placed in circumstances which will prevent them from feeling any private or separate interest of their own, apart from or adverse to that of the multitude. "Every man" (says Plato) "will best love those whose advantage he believes to coincide with his own, and when he is most convinced that "if they do well, he himself will do well also: if not,

¹ Plato, *Republic*, iv. p. 421.

² Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 417.

not."¹ "The Rulers must be wise, powerful, and affectionately solicitous for the city."

These then are the two circumstances which Plato works out: The Education of the Rulers and Guardians: Their position and circumstances in regard to each other and to the remaining multitude. He does not himself prescribe, or at least he prescribes but rarely, what is to be enacted or ordered. He creates the generals and the soldiers; he relies upon the former for ordering, upon the latter for enforcing, aright.

On this point we may usefully compare him with his contemporary Xenophon. He, like Plato, presents himself to mankind as a preceptor or schoolmaster, rather than as a lawgiver. Most Grecian cities (he remarks) left the education of youth in the hands of parents, and permitted adults to choose their own mode of

Comparison of Plato with Xenophon—Cyræpædia—(Economicus.

life, subject only to the necessity of obeying the laws: that is, of abstaining from certain defined offences, and of performing certain defined obligations—under penalties if such obedience were not rendered. From this mode of proceeding Xenophon dissents, and commends the Spartan Lawgiver Lykurgus for departing from it.² To regulate public matters, without regulating the private life of the citizens, appeared to him impossible.³ At Sparta, the citizen was subject to authoritative regulation, from childhood to old age. In the public education, or in the public drill, he was constantly under supervision, going through prescribed exercises. This produced, according to Xenophon, "a city of pre-eminent happiness". He proclaims and follows out the same peculiar principle, in his ideal scheme of society called the Persian laws. He embodies in the *Cyræpædia* the biography of a model chief, trained up from his youth in (what Xenophon calls) the Persian system, and applying the virtues acquired therein to military exploits and to the government of mankind. The Persian polity, in which the hero Cyrus receives his training, is described. Instead of leaving indivi-

¹ Plato, *Republic*, iii. p. 412 D.

Καὶ μὴν τοῦτό γ' ἂν μάλιστα φιλοῖ, ὃ συμβῆναι ἤγοιτο τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ αὐτῷ, καὶ ὅταν μάλιστα ἰκείνουν μὴ εἰς πρῶτον τοῖς οἰσὶναι συμβαίνειν καὶ αὐτῷ εἰς πρῶτον, μὴ δὲ, τοῦναντίον.

Compare v. pp. 463-464.

² Xenophon, *Rep. Lacedæm.* i. 2. Λυκούργος, οὐ μνησάμενος τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτῶν γνοὺς τὰς πλείστας, προέχουσιν εὐδαιμονίᾳ τὴν πατρίδα ἀπέδειξεν.

³ Compare Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 780 A.

duals to their own free will, except as to certain acts or abstinences specifically enjoined, this polity placed every one under a regimental training: which both shaped his character beforehand, so as to make sure that he should have no disposition to commit offences¹—and subjected him to perpetual supervision afterwards, commencing with boyhood and continued to old age, through the four successive stages of boys, youths, mature men, and elders.

This general principle of combining polity with education, is fundamental both with Plato and Xenophon: to a great degree, it is retained also by Aristotle. The lawgiver exercises a spiritual as well as a temporal function. He does not content himself with prohibitions and punishments, but provides for fashioning every man's character to a predetermined model, through systematic discipline begun in childhood and never discontinued. This was the general scheme, realised at Sparta in a certain manner and degree, and idealised both by Plato and Xenophon. The full application of the scheme, however, is restricted, in all the three, to a select body of qualified citizens; who are assumed to exercise dominion or headship over the remaining community.²

Thus far the general conception of Xenophon and Plato is similar: yet there are material differences between them. In Xenophon, the ultimate purpose is, to set forth the personal qualities of Cyrus: to which purpose the description of the general training of the citizens is preparatory, occupying only a small portion of the *Cyropædia*, and serving to explain the system out of which Cyrus sprang. And the character of Cyrus is looked at in reference to the government of mankind. Xenophon had seen

¹ Xenophon, *Cyrop.* i. 2, 2-6. Οἷτοι δὲ δοκοῦσιν οἱ νόμοι ἀρχεῖσθαι τοῦ κοινού ἀγαθού ἐπιμελούμενοι οὐκ εἶθ' ὅθεν περ ἐν ταῖς πλείστας πόλεσιν ἀρχονται. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ πλείστα πόλεις, ἀφείσαι παιδεύειν ὅπως τις εἴθ' ἑαυτοῦ παῖδας καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ὅπως εἴθ' ἑαυτοῦ διαγείν, ἔπειτα προστάττονσιν αὐτοὺς μὴ κλέπτειν. . . . Οἱ δὲ Περσικοὶ νόμοι προλαβόντες ἐπιμέλονται ὅπως τὴν ἀρχὴν μὴ τοιοῦτοι ἔσονται οἱ πολῖται, οἷοι πονηροὶ τινοὶ ἢ αἰσχροῦ ἔργου ἐφίε-

σθαι. 'Επιμέλονται δὲ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ.

² In Xenophon, all Persians are supposed to be legally admissible to the public training; but in practice, none can frequent it constantly except those whose families can maintain them without labour; nor can any be received into the advanced stages, except those who have passed through the lower. Hence none go really through the training except the *Homotimoi*.

governments, of all sorts, resisted and overthrown—despotisms, oligarchies, democracies. His first inference from these facts is, that man is a very difficult animal to govern:—much more difficult than sheep or oxen. But on farther reflection he recognises that the problem is noway insoluble: that a ruler may make sure of ruling mankind with their own consent, and of obtaining hearty obedience—provided that he goes to work in an intelligent manner.¹ Such a ruler is described in Cyrus; who both conquered many distant and unconnected nations,—and governed them, when conquered, skilfully, so as to ensure complete obedience without any active discontent. The abilities and exploits of Cyrus thus step far beyond the range of the systematic Persian discipline, though that discipline is represented as having first formed both his character and that of his immediate companions. He is a despot responsible to no one, but acting with so much sagacity, justice, and benevolence, that his subjects obey him willingly. His military orders are arranged with the utmost prudence and calculation of consequences. He promotes the friends who have gone through the same discipline with himself, to be satraps of the conquered provinces, exacting from them submission, and tribute-collection for himself, together with just dealing towards the subjects. Each satrap is required to maintain his ministers, officers, and soldiers around him under constant personal inspection, with habits of temperance and constant exercise in hunting.² These men and the Persians generally, constitute the privileged class and the military force of the empire:³ the other mass of subjects are not only kept disarmed, but governed as “*gens taillables et corvéables*”. Moreover, besides combining justice and personal activity with generosity and winning manners, Cyrus does not neglect such ceremonial artifices and pomp as may impose on the imagination of spectators.⁴ He keeps up designedly not merely com-

¹ Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 1, 3. ὅτι τις ἐπισταμένως τούτο πράττει.

Compare Xenoph. Economic. c. xxi. where τὸ ἐθέλοντων ἀρχειν is declared to be a superhuman good, while τὸ ἀκόντων τυραννεῖν is reckoned as a curse equivalent to that of Tantalus.

² Xenophon, Cyroped. viii. 6, 1-10.

³ Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 1, 43-45, viii.

6, 13, vii. 5, 79. viii. 5, 24: εἰ δὲ σὺ, ὦ Κύρε, ἐπαρθείς ταῖς παρούσαις τύχαις, ἐπιχειρήσεις καὶ Περσῶν ἀρχειν ἐπὶ πλεονεξίᾳ, ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων, &c.

⁴ Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. i. 40. ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζειν ᾧτις χρῆται αὐτοῦς. Also viii. 3, 1.

petition but mutual jealousy and ill-will among those around him. And he is careful that the most faithful among them shall be placed on his left hand at the banquet, because that side is the most exposed to treachery.¹

What is chiefly present to the mind of Xenophon is, a select fraction of citizens passing their whole lives in a regimental training like that of Lacedæmon: uniformity of habits, exact obedience, the strongest bodily exercise combined with the simplest nutritive diet, perfect command of the physical appetites and necessities, so that no such thing as spitting or blowing the nose is seen.² The grand purpose of the system, as at Sparta,³ is warlike efficiency: war being regarded as the natural state of man. The younger citizens learn the use of the bow and javelin, the older that of the sword and shield. As war requires not merely perfectly trained soldiers, but also the initiative of a superior individual chief, so Xenophon assumes in the chief of these men (like Agesilaus at Sparta) an unrivalled genius for command. The Xenophontic Cyrus is altogether a practical man. We are not told that he learnt anything except in common with the rest. Neither he nor they receive any musical or literary training. The course which they go through is altogether ethical, gymnastical, and military. Their boyhood is passed in learning justice and temperance,⁴ which are made express subjects of teaching by Xenophon and under express masters: Xenophon thus supplies the deficiency so often lamented by the Platonic Sokrates, who remarks that neither at Athens nor elsewhere can he find either teaching or teacher of justice. Cyrus learns justice and temperance along with the rest,⁵ but he does not learn more than the rest: nor does Xenophon perform

Xenophontic genius for command—Practical training—Sokratic principles applied in Persian training.

¹ Xenoph. *Cyrop.* viii. 2, viii. 4, 8.

² Xenoph. *Cyrop.* i. 2, 16, viii. 1, 42, viii. 8, 8. He insists repeatedly upon this point. Compare a curious passage in the *Meditations* of Marcus Antoninus, vi. 30.

³ Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 626. Plutarch, *Lykurg.* 25. Compare *Lykurg.* and *Num.* c. 4.

⁴ Xenophon, *Cyrop.* i. 2, 6-8.

The boys are appointed to adjudicate, under the supervision of the teacher, in disputes which occur among

their fellows. As an instance of this practice, we find the well-known adjudication by young Cyrus, between the great boy and the little boy, in regard to the two coats; and a very instructive illustration it is, of the principle of property (*Cyrop.* i. 3, 17).

⁵ Xenoph. *Cyrop.* i. 3, 16, iii. 3, 35. Cyrus is indeed represented as having taken lessons from a paid teacher in the art *τῆς ἐργασίας*: but these lessons were meagre, comprising nothing beyond τὰ τεχνικά, i. 6, 12-15.

his promise of explaining by what education such extraordinary genius for command is brought about.¹ The superior character of Cyrus is assumed and described, but noway accounted for: indeed his rank and position at the court of Astyages (in which he stands distinguished from the other Persians) present nothing but temptations to indulgence, partially countervailed by wise counsel from his father Kambyseæ. We must therefore consider Cyrus to be a king by nature, like the chief bee in each hive²—an untaught or self-taught genius, in his excellence as general and emperor. He obtains only one adventitious aid peculiar to himself. Being of divine progeny, he receives the special favour and revelations of the Gods, who, in doubtful emergencies, communicate to him by signs, omens, dreams, and sacrifices, what he ought to do and what he ought to leave undone.³ Such privileged communications are represented as indispensable to the success of a leader: for though it was his duty to learn all that could be learnt, yet even after he had done this, so much uncertainty remained behind, that his decisions were little better than a lottery.⁴ The Gods arranged the sequences of events partly in a regular and decypherable manner, so that a man by diligent study might come to understand them: but they reserved many important events for their own free-will, so as not to be intelligible by any amount of human study. Here the wisest man was at fault no less than the most ignorant: nor could he obtain the knowledge of them except by special revelation solicited or obtained. The Gods communicated such peculiar knowledge to their favourites, but not to every one indiscriminately: for they were under no necessity to take care of men towards whom they felt no inclination.⁵ Cyrus was one of the men thus specially privileged: but he was diligent in cultivating

¹ Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 1, 6. ποίε τινα παιδεία παιδευθεὶς τοσοῦτον διήνεγκεν εἰς τὸ ἀρχειν ἀνθρώπων.

² Xenoph. Cyrop. v. 1, 24. The queen-bee is masculine in Xenophon's conception.

³ Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 7, 3, iv. 2, 15, iv. 1, 24. Compare Xenoph. Economic. v. 19-20.

⁴ Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 6, 46. Οὕτως ἡ γε ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οὐδὲ τὸ ἀρίστον αἰετῆσθαι, ἢ εἰ κληροῦνται δ, τι λάχου τοῦτο τις πράττει.

Θεοὶ δὲ δεῖ ὄντες πάντα ἰσασί τὰ τε γυγνημένα καὶ τὰ ὄντα, καὶ ὃ, τι ἐξ ἐκείνου αὐτῶν ἀποβήσεται· καὶ τῶν συμβουλευομένων ἀνθρώπων οἷς ἂν ἰλήψῃ ᾧ σι, προσημαίνουσιν ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ οὐ χρὴ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ πᾶσιν θέλονσι συμβουλευαίνεσθαι, οὐδὲν θαυμάσιον· οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ὥς ἂν μὴ θέλωσιν, ἐπιμαλίσθαι.

Compare i. 6, 6-23, also the Memorab. i. 1, 8, where the same doctrine is ascribed to Sokrates.

⁵ Xenoph. Cyrop. i. 6, 46 ad fin.

the favour of the Gods by constant worship, not merely at times when he stood in need of their revelations, but at other times also: just as in regard to human friends or patrons, assiduous attentions were requisite to keep up their goodwill.¹

When it is desired to realise an ideal improvement of society (says Plato),² the easiest postulate is to assume a despot, young, clever, brave, thoughtful, temperate, and aspiring, belonging to that superhuman breed which reigned under the presidency of Kronus. Such a postulate is assumed by Xenophon in his hero Cyrus. The Xenophontic scheme, though presupposing a collective training, resolves itself ultimately into the will of an individual, enforcing good regulations, and full of tact in dealing with subordinates. What Cyrus is in campaign and empire, Ischomachus (see the *Economica* of Xenophon) is in the household: but everything depends on the life of this distinguished individual. Xenophon leads us at once into practice, laying only a scanty basis of theory.

In Plato's *Republic*, on the contrary, the theory predominates. He does not build upon any individual hero: he constructs a social and educational system, capable of self-perpetuation at least for a considerable time.³ He describes the generating and sustaining principles of his system, but he does not exhibit it in action, by any pseudo-historical narrative: we learn indeed, that he had intended to subjoin such a narrative, in the dialogue called *Kritias*, of which only the commencement was ever written.⁴ He aims at forming a certain type of character, common to all the Guardians: superadding new features

Plato does not build upon an individual hero. Platonic training compared with Xenophontic.

¹ Xenoph. *Cyrop.* i. 6, 2-5.

² Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 700 E, 710-713.

³ Plato pronounces Cyrus to have been a good general and a patriot, but not to have received any right education, and especially to have provided no good education for his children, who in consequence became corrupt and degenerate (*Legg.* iii. 694). Upon this remark some commentators of antiquity founded the supposition of grudge or quarrel between Plato and Xenophon. We have no evidence to prove such a state of unfriendly feeling between the

two, yet it is no way unlikely: and I think it highly probable that the remark just cited from Plato may have had direct reference to the Xenophontic *Cyropædia*. When we read the elaborate intellectual training which Plato prescribes for the rulers in his *Republic*, we may easily understand that, in his view, the Xenophontic Cyrus had received no right education at all. His remark moreover brings to view the defect of all schemes built upon a perfect despot—that they depend upon an individual life.

⁴ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 20-26. Plato, *Kritias*, p. 108.

so as to form a still more exalted type, peculiar to those few Elders selected from among them to exercise the directorial function. He not only lays down the process of training in greater detail than Xenophon, but he also gives explanatory reasons for most of his recommendations.

One prominent difference between the two deserves to be noticed. In the Xenophontic training, the ethical, gymnastic, and military, exigencies are carefully provided for: but the musical and intellectual exigencies are left out. The Xenophontic Persians are not affirmed either to learn letters, or to hear and repeat poetry, or to acquire the knowledge of any musical instrument. Nor does it appear, even in the case of the historical Spartans, that letters made any part of their public training. But the Platonic training includes music and gymnastics as co-ordinate and equally indispensable. Words or intellectual exercises, come in under the head of music.¹ Indeed, in Plato's view, even gymnastics, though bearing immediately on the health and force of the body, have for their ultimate purpose a certain action upon the mind; being essential to the due development of courage, energy, endurance, and self-assertion.² Gymnastics without music produce a hard and savage character, insensible to persuasive agencies, hating discourse or discussion,³ ungraceful as well as stupid. Music without gymnastics generates a susceptible temperament, soft, tender, and yielding to difficulties, with quick but transient impulses. Each of the two, music and gymnastic, is indispensable as a supplement and corrective to the other.

The type of character here contemplated by Plato deserves particular notice, as contrasted with that of Xenophon. It is the Athenian type against the Spartan. Periklēs in his funeral oration, delivered at Athens in the first year of the Peloponnesian war, boasts that the Athenians had already reached a type similar to

Platonic
type of cha-
racter com-
pared with
Xenophon-
tic, is like
the Athe-

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 E.

² Plato, Republic, iii. p. 410 B.
πρὸς τὰ θυμοειδὲς τῆς φύσεως βλέπων
κακίῃ τοιούτων ποιεῖται μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς
ισχυρὴν, οὐχ ὥστε οἱ ἄλλοι ἀθλῆται
βαρύνειν τε καὶ.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. pp. 410-411.

411 D-E: Μισόλογος δὲ, οἶμαι, ὁ τοιοῦ-
τος γίγνεται καὶ ἀμουσος, καὶ πειθοῖ
μὴν διὰ λόγων οὐδὲν ἐπὶ χρῆται, βίη
δὲ καὶ ἀγριότητι ὥστερ' θηρίων, πρὸς
πάντα διαπράττεται, καὶ ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ
καὶ σκαρότητι μετὰ ἀρρυθμίας τε καὶ
ἀχαριστίας ᾗ.

nian compared with the Spartan. this—and that too, without any special individual discipline, legally enforced : that they combined courage, ready energy, and combined action—with developed intelligence, the love of discourse, accessibility to persuasion, and taste for the Beautiful. That which Plato aims at accomplishing in his Guardians, by means of a state-education at once musical and gymnastical—Periklēs declares to have been already realised at Athens without any state-education, through the spontaneous tendencies of individuals called forth and seconded by the general working of the political system.¹ He compliments his countrymen as having accomplished this object without the unnecessary rigour of a positive state-discipline, and without any other restraints than the special injunctions and prohibitions of a known law. It is this absence of state-discipline to which both Xenophon and Plato are opposed. Both of them follow Lykurgus in proclaiming the insufficiency of mere prohibitions ; and in demanding a positive routine of duty to be prescribed by authority, and enforced upon individuals through life. In regard to end, Plato is more in harmony with Periklēs : in regard to means, with Xenophon.

Plato's views respecting special laws and criminal procedure generally are remarkable. He not only manifests that repugnance towards the Dikastery—which is common to Sokrates, Xenophon, Isokrates, and Aristophanes—but he excludes it almost entirely from his system, as being superseded by the constant public discipline of the Guardians.

It is to be remembered that these propositions of Plato have reference, not to an entire and miscellaneous community, but to a select body called the Guardians, required to possess the bodily and mental attributes of soldiers, policemen, and superintendents. The standard of comparison in modern times, for the Lykurgian, Xenophontic or Platonic, training, is to

Profes-
sional sol-
diers are
the proper
modern
standard of
comparison
with the
regulations

¹ Thucyd. ii. 38-39-40.

The comparison between this speech and the third book of Plato's Republic (pp. 401-402-410-411), is very interesting. The words of Periklēs, φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας καὶ φιλοσοφούμεν ἀνὲν μαλακίας, taken

along with the chapter preceding, mark that concurrent development of τὸ φιλόσοφον and τὸ θυμοειδές which Plato provides, and the avoidance of those defects which spring from the separate and exclusive cultivation of either.

be sought in the stringent discipline of professional soldiers; not in the general liberty, subject only to definite restrictions, enjoyed by non-military persons. In regard to soldiers, the Platonic principle is now usually admitted—that it is not sufficient to enact articles of war, defining what a soldier ought to do, and threatening him with punishment in case of infraction—but that, besides this, it is indispensable to exact from him a continued routine of positive performances, under constant professional supervision. Without this preparation, few now expect that soldiers should behave effectively when the moment of action arrives. This is the doctrine applied by Plato and Xenophon to the whole life of the citizen.

Music and Gymnastic are regarded by Plato mainly as they bear upon and influence the emotional character of his citizens. Each of them is the antithesis, and at the same time the supplement, to the other. Gymnastic tends to develop exclusively the courageous and energetic emotions:—anger and the feeling of power—but no others. Whereas music (understood in the Platonic sense) has a far more multifarious and varied agency: it may develop either those, or the gentle and tender emotions, according to circumstances.¹ In the hands of Tyrtæus and Æschylus, it generates vehement and fearless combatants: in the hands of Euripides and other pathetic poets, it produces tender, amatory, effeminate natures, ingenious in talk but impotent for action.²

In the age of Plato, Homer and other poets were extolled as the teachers of mankind, and as themselves possessing universal knowledge. They enjoyed a religious respect, being supposed to speak under divine inspira-

of Plato and Xenophon.

Music and gymnastic—multifarious and varied effects of music.

Great influence of the poets and their works

¹ Plato, Republic, ii. p. 376 B-C. If we examine Plato's tripartite classification of the varieties of soul or mind, as it is given both in the Republic and in the Timæus (1. Reason, in the cranium. 2. Energy, *θυμὴς*, in the thoracic region. 3. Appetite, in the abdominal region)—we shall see that it assigns no place to the gentle, the tender, or the æsthetic emotions. These cannot be properly ranked either with energy (*θυμὴς*) or with appetite (*ἐπιθυμία*). Plato can find no root for

them except in reason or knowledge, from which he presents them as being collateral derivatives—a singular origin. He illustrates his opinion by the equally singular analogy of the dog, who is gentle towards persons whom he *knows*, fierce towards those whom he does not *know*; so that *gentleness* is the product of *knowledge*.

² See the argument between Æschylus and Euripides in the *Rane* of Aristophanes, 1043-1061-1068.

on educa- tion, and to be the privileged reporters or diviners of tion. a forgotten past.¹ They furnished the most interesting portion of that floating mass of traditional narrative respecting Gods, Heroes, and ancestors, which found easy credence both as matter of religion and as matter of history: being in full harmony with the emotional preconceptions, and uncritical curiosity, of the hearers. They furnished likewise exhortation and reproof, rules and maxims, so expressed as to live in the memory—impressive utterance for all the strong feelings of the human bosom. Poetry was for a long time the only form of literature. It was not until the fifth century B.C. that prose compositions either began to be multiplied, or were carried to such perfection as to possess a charm of their own calculated to rival the poets, who had long enjoyed a monopoly as purveyors for æsthetical sentiment and fancy. Rhetors, Sophists, Philosophers, then became their competitors; opening new veins of intellectual activity,² and sharing, to a certain extent, the pædagogic influence of the poets—yet never displacing them from their traditional function of teachers, narrators, and guides to the intelligence, as well as improving ministers to the sentiments, emotions, and imagination, of youth. Indeed, many Sophists and Rhetors presented themselves not as superseding,³ but as expounding and illustrating, the poets. Sokrates also did this occasionally, though not upon system.⁴

¹ Aristoph. *Ranæ*, 1063. *Æschylus* is made to say:—

ἀλλ' ἀποκρύπτειν χρὴ τὸ πονηρὸν τὸν
γε ποιητὴν,
καὶ μὴ παράγειν μηδὲ διδάσκειν τοῖς μὲν
γὰρ παιδαρίοισιν
ἵσθι διδάσκαλος ὅστις φράζει, τοῖσιν δ'
ἥβῃσι ποιηταί.
πάνν δὲ δεῖ χρηστὰ λέγειν ἡμᾶς.

Compare the words of Plato which conclude the *Ranæ*, 1497.

Plato, *Repub.* x. p. 598 D-E. *ἑπειδὴ* τινες ἀκούομεν ὅτι οἱ τοῖ (Homer and the poets) πάσας μὲν τέχνας ἐπιστάτας, πάντα δὲ τὰ θωρακεία τὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν, καὶ τὰ γε θεία, &c. Also Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 810-811; *Ion*, pp. 536 A, 541 B; *Xenoph.* *Memor.* iv. 2, 10; and *Sympos.* iii. 6, where we learn that Niceratus could repeat by heart the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

² Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 810. *ἄλους ποιητὰς ἐκμαθόντας, &c.*

³ It was to gain this facility that Kritias and Alkibiades, as Xenophon tells us, frequented the society of Sokrates, who (as Xenophon also tells us) "handled persons conversing with him just as he pleased" (*Memor.* i. 2, 14-18.)

A speaker in one of the *Orationes* of Lysias (*Orat.* viii. *Κακολογίων*, s. 12) considers this power of arguing a disputed case as one of the manifestations τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν—Καὶ ἐγὼ μὲν φημὶ φιλοσοφοῦντας αὐτοὺς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἀντιλέγειν τὸν ἐναντίον λόγον· οἱ δ' ἄρα οὐκ ἀντίλεγον ἀλλ' ἀντίπαρτον.

Compare the curious oration of Demosthenes against Lakritus, where the speaker imputes to Lakritus this abuse of argumentative power, as having been purchased by him at a large price from the teaching of Isokrates the Sophist, pp. 928-937-938.

⁴ *Xenoph.* *Memorab.* i. 2, 57-60.

It is this educational practice—common to a certain extent among Greeks, but more developed at Athens than elsewhere¹—which Plato has in his mind, when he draws up the outline of a musical education for his youthful Guardians. He does not intend it as a scheme for fostering the highest intellectual powers, or for exalting men into philosophers—which he reserves as an ulterior improvement, to be communicated at a later period of life, and only to a chosen few—the large majority being supposed incapable of appropriating it. His musical training (co-operating with the gymnastical) is intended to form the character of the general body of Guardians: to implant in them from early childhood a peculiar vein of sentiments, habits, emotions and emotional beliefs, ethical esteem and disesteem, love and hatred, &c., to inspire them (in his own phrase) with love of the beautiful or honourable.

It is in this spirit that he deals with the traditional, popular,

¹ The language of Plato is remarkable on this point. *Republic*, ii. p. 376 E. *Τῆς οὖν ἡ παιδείας; ἣ χαλεπὸν εὐρεῖν βέλτιον τῆς οὐδὲ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνον εὐρημένης; ἐστὶ δὲ τὸν ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματι γυμναστική, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική*—and a striking passage in the *Kriton* (p. 50 D), where education in *μουσική* and *γυμναστική* is represented as a positive duty on the part of fathers towards their sons.

About the multifarious and indefinite province of the Muses, comprehending all *παιδεία* and *λόγος*, see Plutarch, *Sympos.* Problem. ix. 14, 2-3, p. 908-909. Also Plutarch, *De Audiendis Poetis*, p. 31 F, about the many diverse interpretations of Homer; especially those by Chrysippus and Kleanthes.

The last half of the eighth Book of Aristotle's *Politica* contains remarkable reflections on the educational effects of music, showing the refined distinctions which philosophical men of that day drew respecting the varieties of melody and rhythm. Aristotle adverts to music as an agency not merely for *παιδεία* but also for *κάθαρσις* (viii. 7, 1341, b. 38); to which last Plato does not advert. Aristotle also notices various animal versions by musical critics upon some of the dicta on musical subjects in the Platonic *Republic* (*καλὸς ἐπιτιμῶσι καὶ τοῦτο*

Σαυπάροι τὸν νεπὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τινος, 1342, b. 23)—perhaps Aristoxenus: also 1342, a. 32. That the established character and habits of music could not be changed without leading to a revolution, ethical and political, in the minds of the citizens—is a principle affirmed by Plato, not as his own, but as having been laid down previously by Damon the celebrated musical instructor (*Repub.* iii. p. 424 C).

The following passage about Luther is remarkable:—

"Après avoir essayé de la théologie, Luther fut décidé par les conseils de ses amis, à embrasser l'étude du droit; qui conduisait alors aux postes les plus lucratifs de l'État et de l'Eglise. Mais il ne semble pas s'y être jamais livré avec goût. Il aimait bien mieux la belle littérature, et surtout la musique. C'était son art de prédilection. Il la cultivait toute sa vie et l'enseignait à ses enfants. Il n'hésite pas à déclarer que la musique lui semble le premier des arts, après la théologie. La musique (dit-il) est l'art des prophètes: c'est le seul qui, comme la théologie, puisse calmer les troubles de l'âme et mettre le diable en fuite. Il touchait du luth, jouait de la flûte." (*Michel, Mémoires de Luther, écrits par lui-même*, pp. 4-5, Paris, 1835.)

He declares war against most of the traditional, and consecrated poetry, as mischievous.

almost consecrated, poetical literature which prevailed around him. He undertakes to revise and recast the whole of it. Repudiating avowedly the purpose of the authors, he sets up a different point of view by which they are to be judged. The contest of principle, into which he now enters, subsisted (he tells us) long before his time: a standing discord between the philosophers and the poets.¹ The poet is an artist² whose aim is to give immediate pleasure and satisfaction: appealing to æsthetical sentiment, feeding imagination and belief, and finding embodiment for emotions, religious or patriotic, which he shares with his hearers: the philosopher is a critic, who lays down authoritatively deeper and more distant ends which he considers that poetry *ought* to serve, judging the poets according as they promote, neglect, or frustrate those ends. Plato declares the end which he requires poetry to serve in the training of his Guardians. It must contribute to form the ethical character which he approves: in so far as it thus contributes, he will tolerate it, but no farther. The charm and interest especially, belonging to beautiful poems, is not only no reason for admitting them, but is rather a reason (in his view) for excluding them.³ The more

¹ Plato, *Republ.* x. p. 607 B. *καλαῖα μὲν τις διαφορά φιλοσοφίᾳ τε καὶ ποιητικῇ, &c.*

² Plato, *Republ.* x. p. 607 A-C. *τὴν ἡδυσμένην Μοῦσαν . . . ἢ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ποιητικὴ καὶ ἢ μίμῃσι, &c.*

Compare also *Leges* ii. p. 655 D seq., about the *μουσικῆς ὁρθότης*.

³ It is interesting to read in the first book of Strabo (pp. 15-19-25-27, &c.) the controversy which he carries on with Eratosthenes, as to the function of poets generally, and as to the purpose of Homer in particular. Eratosthenes considered Homer, and the other poets also, as having composed verses to please and interest, not to teach—*ψυχαγωγίας χάριν, οὐ διδασκαλίας*. Strabo (following the astronomer Hipparchus) controverts this opinion; affirming that poets had been the earliest philosophers and teachers of mankind, and that they must always continue to be the teachers of the multitude, who were unable to profit by history and philosophy. Strabo has the strongest admiration for Homer, not merely as a poet but as a moralis-

ing teacher. While Plato banishes Homer from his commonwealth, on the ground of pernicious ethical influence, Strabo claims for Homer the very opposite merit, and extols him as the best of all popular teachers—*ἡ δὲ ποιητικὴ δημοφιλέστερα καὶ θέατρα πληροῦν δυναμένη· ἡ δὲ δὴ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ὑπερβαλλόντως . . . Ἀτε δὲ πρὸς τὸ παιδευτικὸν εἶδος τοὺς μύθους ἀναφέρειν ὁ ποιητὴς ἐφρόντισε πολλὰ μέρος τάλανθους* (Strabo, i. p. 20). The contradiction between Plato and Strabo is remarkable. Compare the beginning of Horace's *Epistle*, i. 2. In the time of Strabo (more than three centuries after Plato's death) there existed an abundant prose literature on matters of erudition, history, science, philosophy. The work of instruction was thus taken out of the poet's hands; yet Strabo cannot bear to admit this. In the age of Plato the prose literature was comparatively small. Alexandria and its school did not exist: the poets covered a far larger portion of the entire ground of instruction.

As a striking illustration of the con-

beautiful a poem is, the more effectively does it awaken, stimulate, and amplify, the emotional forces of the mind : the stronger is its efficacy in giving empire to pleasure and pain, and in resisting or overpowering the rightful authority of Reason. It thus directly contravenes the purpose of the Platonic education—the formation of characters wherein Reason shall effectively controul all the emotions and desires.¹ Hence he excludes all the varieties of imitative poetry :—that is, narrative, descriptive, or dramatic poetry. He admits only hymns to the Gods and panegyrics upon good citizens :—probably also didactic, gnostic, or hortative, poetry of approved tone. Imitative poetry is declared objectionable farther, not only as it exaggerates the emotions, but on another ground—that it fills the mind with false and unreal representations ; being composed by men who have no real knowledge of their subject, though they pretend to a sort of fallacious omniscience, and talk boldly about every thing.²

Even hymns to the Gods, however, may be composed in many different strains, according to the conception which the poet entertains of their character and attributes. ^{Strict limits imposed by Plato on} The Homeric Hymns which we now possess could not ^{poets.} be acceptable to Plato. While denouncing much of the current theological poetry, he assumes a censorial authority, in his joint character of Lykurgus and Sokrates,³ to dictate what sort of poetical compositions shall be tolerated among his Guardians. He pronounces many of the tales in Homer and Hesiod to be

tinued and unquestioning faith in the ancient legends, we may cite Galen : who, in a medical argument against Erasistratus, cites the cure of the daughters of Proetus by Melampus as an incontestable authentic fact in medical evidence ; putting to shame Erasistratus, who had not attended to it in his reasoning (Galen, *De Atra Bile*, T. v. p. 132, Kühn).

¹ Plato, *Republic*, x. pp. 606-607, iii. p. 387 B.

² Plato, *Republic*, x. pp. 598-599. When Plato attacks the poets so severely on the ground of their departure from truth and reality, and their false representations of human life—the poets might have retorted,

that Plato departed no less from truth and reality in many parts of his *Republic*, and especially in his panegyric upon Justice ; not to mention the various myths which we read in *Republic*, *Phædon*, *Phædrus*, *Politikus*, &c.

Plato's fictions are indeed ethical, intended to serve a pedagogic purpose ; Homer's fictions are æsthetical, addressed to the fancy and emotions.

But it is not fair in Plato, the avowed champion of useful fiction, to censure the poets on the ground of their departing from truth.

³ Plutarch, *Sympos.* *Quest.* viii. 2, 2. p. 719.

Ο Πλάτων, ὅτε δὴ τῷ Σωκράτει τὸν Ἀντιγόνην ἀναμύσῃ, &c.

not merely fictions, but mischievous fictions: not fit to be circulated, even if they had been true.

Plato admits fiction, indeed, along with truth as an instrument for forming the character. Nay, he draws little distinction between the two, as regards particular narratives. But the point upon which he specially insists, is, that all the narratives in circulation, true or false, respecting Gods and Heroes, shall ascribe to them none but qualities ethically estimable and venerable. He condemns Homer and Hesiod as having misrepresented the Gods and Heroes, and as having attributed to them acts inconsistent with their true character, like a painter painting a portrait unlike to the original.¹ He rejects in this manner various tales told in these poems respecting Zeus, Hêrê, Hephæstus—the fraudulent rupture of the treaty between the Greeks and Trojans by Pandarus, at the instigation of Zeus and Athênê—the final battle of the Gods, in the *Iliad*²—the transformations of Proteus and Thetis, and the general declaration in the *Odyssey* that the Gods under the likeness of various strangers visit human cities as inspectors of good and bad behaviour³—the dream sent by Zeus to deceive Agamemnon (in the second book of the *Iliad*), and the charge made by Thetis in *Æschylus* against Apollo, of having deceived her and killed her son Achilles⁴—the violent amorous impulse of Zeus, in the fourteenth book of the *Iliad*—the immoderate laughter among the Gods, when they saw the lame Hephæstus busying himself in the service of the banquet. Plato will not permit the realm of Hades to be described as odious and full of terrors, because the Guardians will thereby learn to fear death.⁵ Nor will he tolerate the Homeric pictures of heroes or semi-divine persons, like Priam or Achilles, plunged in violent sorrow

¹ Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 377 E.

² Plato, *Repub.* ii. pp. 378-379. Plutarch observes about Chrysis—*ὅτι τῷ θεῷ καλὰς μὲν ἐπικλήσεις καὶ φιλανθρώπων ἀεί, ἄγρια δ' ἔργα καὶ βάρβαρα καὶ γαλατικά προστίθουσιν* (*De Stoic. Repugn.* c. 32, p. 1049 B).

³ Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 380 B. Plato in the beginning of his *Sophistês* treats this doctrine of the appearances of the Gods with greater respect. Lucretius argues that the Gods, being in a state

of perfect happiness and exempt from all want, cannot change; *Lucret.* v. 170, compared with Plato, *Rep.* ii. p. 381 B.

⁴ Plato, *Republ.* ii. pp. 380-381-383.

⁵ Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 386 C. Maximus Tyrius (*Diss.* xxiv. c. 6) remarks, that upon the principles here laid down by Plato, much of what occurs in the Platonic dialogues respecting the erotic vehemence and enthusiasm of Sokrates ought to be excluded from education.

for the death of friends and relatives :—since a thoroughly right-minded man, while he regards death as no serious evil to the deceased, is at the same time most self-sufficing in character, and least in need of extraneous sympathy.¹

These and other condemnations are passed by Plato upon the current histories respecting Gods, and respecting heroes the sons or immediate descendants of Gods. He entirely forbids such histories, as suggesting bad examples to his Guardians. He prohibits all poetical composition, except under his own censorial supervision. He lays down, as a general doctrine, that the Gods are good; and he will tolerate no narrative which is not in full harmony with this predetermined type. Without giving any specimens of approved narratives—which he declares to be the business not of the lawgiver, but of the poet—he insists only that all poets shall conform in their compositions to his general standard of orthodoxy.²

Type of character prescribed by Plato, to which all poets must conform, in tales about Gods and Heroes.

Applying such a principle of criticism, Plato had little difficulty in finding portions of the current mythology offensive to his ideal type of goodness. Indeed he might have found many others, yet more offensive to it than some of those which he has selected.³ But the extent of his variance with the current views

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 387 D-E. ὁ ἐπικτὴς ἀνὴρ τῷ ἐπικτεῖ, ὅσπερ καὶ πατέρος ἐστὶν, τὸ τεθνᾶναι οὐ δεινὸν ἡγήσεται . . . Οὐκ ἀρα ὑπὲρ γε ἐκείνου ὥς δεινὸν τι πεπονηθότος ὀδύρου' ἂν . . . Ἀλλὰ μὲν . . . ὁ τοιοῦτος μέλιστα αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάραξ πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ διαφερόντως τῶν ἄλλων ἥκιστα ἑτέρου προσδοκᾷ . . . Ἕκιστ' ἀρα αὐτῷ δεινὸν στερηθῆναι νείας, ἢ ἀδελφῶν, ἢ χρημάτων, ἢ ἄλλου τινος τῶν τοιούτων, &c.

The doctrine of Epicurus, as laid down by Lucretius (lib. 844-920), coincides here with that of Plato :—

Tu quidem ut es leto sopitus, sic
eris ævi
Quod superest, cunctis privatū' dolo-
ribus ægris :
At nos horribilo cinesfactum te propē
busto
Insatiabiliter desebimus, æternum-
que
Nulla dies nobis mœrorem e pectore
demit.
Illud ab hoc igitur querendum est,
quid sit amari

Tantopere, ad somnum si res redit
atque quietem
Our quisquam æterno possit tabes-
cere luctu ?

Plato insists, not less strenuously than Lucretius, upon preserving the minds of his Guardians from the frightful pictures of Hades, which terrify all hearers—φρίττειν δὲ νοεῖσι ὡς ὅλον τε πάντας τοὺς ἀκούοντας (Republic, iii. p. 387 C). Lucret. iii. 87 :

“metus ille foras præcep̄s Acheruntis
agendus
Fanditus, humanam qui vitam turbat
ab imo”.

² Compare also Plato de Legg. x. p. 886 C, xii. p. 941 B.

³ As one example, Plato cites the story in the Iliad, that Achilles cut off his hair as an offering to the deceased Patroklos, after his hair had been consecrated by vow to the river Spercheus (Rep. iii. p. 391). If we look at the Iliad (xxiii. 150), we find that the vow to the Spercheus had been

reveals itself still more emphatically, when he says that the Gods are not to be represented as the cause of evil things to us, but only of good things. Most persons (he says) consider the Gods as causes of all things, evil as well as good: but this is untrue:¹ the Gods dispense only the good things, not the evil; and the good things are few in number compared with the evil. Plato therefore requires the poet to ascribe all good things to the Gods and to no one else; but to find other causes, apart from the Gods, for sufferings and evils. But if the poet chooses to describe sufferings as inflicted by the Gods, he must at the same time represent these sufferings as a healing penalty or real benefit to the sufferers.²

The principle involved in these criticisms of Plato deserves notice, in more than one point of view.

That which he proposes for his commonwealth is hardly less than a new religious creed, retaining merely old names of the Gods and old ceremonies. He intends it to consist of a body of premeditated fictitious stories, prepared by poets under his inspection and controul. He does not set up any pretence of historical truth for these stories, when first promulgated: he claims no traditionary evidence, no divine inspiration, such as were associated more or less with the received legends, in the minds both of those who recited and of those who heard them. He rejects these legends, because

originally made by Peleus, conditionally upon the return of Achilles to his native land. Now Achilles had been already forewarned that he would never return thither, consequently the vow to Spercheius was void, and the execution of it impracticable.

Plato does not disbelieve the legend of Hippolytus; the cruel death of an innocent youth, brought on by the Gods in consequence of the curse of his father Theseus (Legg. xi. p. 931 B).

¹ Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 379 C. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἀνέστη αἰτίας, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίας, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἑλάττω τὰ γὰρ ἅ τὰ κακὰ ἡμῖν. Καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλαν αἰτίαν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἅλ' ἅττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἷα, ἅλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν.

² Plato, *Rep.* ii. p. 380 B. Plutarch,

Consolat. ad Apollonium (107 C, 115 E), citation from Pindar—ἐν παρ' ἱσθλὸν πῆματα σύνδου δαίονταί βροτοῖς Ἀθάνατοι—πολλὰ γὰρ πλείονα τὰ κακά· καὶ τὰ μὲν (sc. ἀγαθὰ) μόγῃς καὶ διὰ πολλῶν φροντίδων κτώμεθα, τὰ δὲ κακά, πάννῃ ῥᾷδι.

In the Sept. cont. Thebas of Æschylus, Eteokles complains of this doctrine as a hardship and unfairness to the chief. If (says he) we defend the city successfully, our success will be ascribed to the Gods; if, on the contrary, we fail, Eteokles alone will be the person blamed for it by all the citizens:—

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ εὖ πράξαιμεν, αἰτία θεοῦ·
Εἰ δ' ἄθρ', ὃ μὴ γένοιτο, συμφορὰ τύχης,
Ἐτεοκλέης ἂν εἰς πολλὴς κατὰ πτόλιν
ἕμνοισ' ὕπ' ἄστων φρομιμῶς πολυῤῥόβους
Οἰώμασιν θ'—(v. 4).

they are inconsistent with his belief and sentiment as to the character of the Gods. Such rejection we can understand:—but he goes a step farther, and directs the coinage of a new body of legends, which have no other title to credence, except that they are to be in harmony with his belief about the general character of the Gods, and that they will produce a salutary ethical effect upon the minds of his Guardians. They are deliberate fictions, the difference between fact and fiction being altogether neglected: they are pious frauds, constructed upon an authoritative type, and intended for an orthodox purpose. The exclusive monopoly of coining and circulating fictions is a privilege which Plato exacts for himself as founder, and for the Rulers, after his commonwealth is founded.¹ All the narrative matter circulating in his community is to be prepared with reference to his views, and stamped at his mint. He considers it not merely a privilege, but a duty of the Rulers, to provide and circulate fictions for the benefit of the community, like physicians administering wholesome medicines.² This is a part of the machinery essential to his purpose. He remarks that it had already been often worked successfully by others, for the establishment of cities present or past. There had been no recent example of it, indeed, nor will he guarantee the practicability of it among his own contemporaries. Yet, unless certain fundamental fictions can be accredited among his citizens, the scheme of his commonwealth must fail. They must be made to believe that they are all earthborn and all brethren; that the earth which they inhabit is also their mother: but that there is this difference among them—the

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iii. p. 389 B; compare ii. p. 383 C.

Dähne (*Darstellung der Jüdisch-Alexandrin. Religions-Philosophie*, i. pp. 48-56) sets forth the motives which determined the new interpretations of the Pentateuch by the Alexandrine Jews, from the translators of the Septuagint down to Philo. In the view of Philo there was a double meaning: the literal meaning, for the vulgar: but also besides this, there was an allegorical, the real and true meaning, discoverable only by sagacious judges. Moses (he said) gave the literal meaning, though not true, *πρὸς τὴν τῶν πολλῶν διδασκαλίαν*. Μανθάνουσιν οὖν πάντες εἰ τοιοῦτοι τὰ ψευδῆ, εἰ δὲ ἀληθεύουσιν, εἰ μὴ δύναται δι-

αληθείας σωφρονίζεισθαι (Philo, *Quest.* in *Genesis*, ap. Dähne, p. 50). Compare also Philo, on the *καρὸν καὶ νόμον τῆς ἀλλαγίας*, Dähne, pp. 60-68.

Herakleitus (*Allegorie Homericae* ed. Mehler, 1851) defends Homer warmly against the censorial condemnation of Plato. Herakleitus contends for an allegorical interpretation, and admits that it is necessary to find one. He inveighs against Plato in violent terms. *Ἐρρίψθω δὲ καὶ Πλάτων ὁ κόλαξ*, &c.

Isokrates (*Orat. Panathen.* s. 22-28) complains much of the obloquy which he incurred, because some opponents alleged that he depreciated the poets, especially Homer and Hesiod.

² Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 389 B, 414 C.

Rulers have gold mingled with their constitution, the other Guardians have silver, the remaining citizens have brass or iron. This bold fiction must be planted as a fundamental dogma, as an article of unquestioned faith, in the minds of all the citizens, in order that they may be animated with the proper sentiments of reverence towards the local soil as their common mother—of universal mutual affection among themselves as brothers—and of deference, on the part of the iron and brazen variety, towards the gold and silver. At least such must be the established creed of all the other citizens except the few Rulers. It ought also to be imparted, if possible, to the Rulers themselves; but *they* might be more difficult to persuade.¹

Plato fully admits the extreme difficulty of procuring a first introduction and establishment for this new article of faith, which nevertheless is indispensable to set his commonwealth afloat. But if it can be once established, there will be no difficulty at all in continuing and perpetuating it.² Even as to the first commencement, difficulty is not to be confounded with impossibility: for the attempt has already been made with success in many different places, though there happens to be no recent instance.

We learn hence to appreciate the estimate which Plato formed of the ethical and religious faith, prevalent in the various societies around him. He regards as fictions the accredited stories respecting Gods and Heroes, which constituted the matter of religious belief among his contemporaries; being familiarised to all through the works of poets, painters, and sculptors, as well as through votive offerings, such as the robe annually worked by the women of Athens for the Goddess Athênê. These fictions he supposes to have originally obtained credence either through the charm of poets and narrators, or through the deliberate coinage

¹ Plato, *Repub.* iii. p. 414 B-C. Τίς ἂν οὐκ ἡμῖν μηχανῇ γένοιτο τῶν ψευδῶν τῶν ἐν δόξει γιγνομένων, ὧν νῦν δεῖ λίσσασθαι, γενναίων τι ἐν ψευδομένους πείσαι, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἄρχοντας, εἰ δὲ μή, τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν; Ποῖον τι; Μηδὲν καινόν, ἀλλὰ θοικιστικόν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἤδη πολλὰ χροῖ γεγονός, ὥς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πεπεικασιν, ἐφ' ἧμῶν δὲ οὐ

γεγονός οὐδ' οἷα εἰ γινόμενον ἂν, πείσαι δὲ συχνὴς πειθοῦς. Compare *De Legg.* pp. 663-664.

² Plato, *Repub.* iii. p. 415 C-D. Τοῦτον οὐκ τὸν μῦθον ὥπως ἂν πεισθῇεν, ἔχεις τιτὰ μηχανῇ; Οὐδαμῶς, ὥπως γὰρ αὐτοὶ οὗτοι; ὥπως μὲν ἂν οἱ τούτων νικῇ καὶ οἱ ἔπειτα οἱ τ' ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι οἱ ὑστερον.

of an authoritative lawgiver; presupposing in the community a vague emotional belief in the Gods—invisible, quasi-human agents, of whom they knew nothing distinct—and an entire ignorance of recorded history, past as well as present. Once received into the general belief, which is much more an act of emotion than of reason, such narratives retain their hold both by positive teaching and by the self-operating transmission of this emotional faith to each new member of the community, as well as by the almost entire absence of criticism: especially in earlier days, when men were less intelligent but more virtuous than they are now (in Plato's time)—when among their other virtues, that of unsuspecting faith stood conspicuous, no one having yet become clever enough to suspect falsehood.¹ This is what Plato assumes as the natural mental condition of society, to which he adapts his improvements. He disapproves of the received fictions, not because they are fictions, but because they tend to produce a mischievous ethical effect, from the acts which they ascribe to the Gods and Heroes. These acts were such, that many of them (he says), even if they had been true, ought never to be promulgated. Plato does not pretend to substitute truth in place of fiction; but to furnish a better class of fictions in place of a worse.² The religion of the Commonwealth, in his view, is to furnish fictions and sanctions to assist the moral and political views of the lawgiver, whose duty it is to employ religion for this purpose.³

We read in a poetical fragment of Kritias (the contemporary

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 679 C-E. ἀγαθοὶ μὲν δὴ διὰ ταῦτα τε ἦσαν καὶ διὰ τὴν λεγομένην εὐθυσίαν· ἃ γὰρ ἔκονον καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ, εὐθὺς οὗτοι ἤκουοντο ἀληθέστατα λέγεσθαι καὶ ἐπιθόοντο· ψεύδεις γὰρ ὑπονοοῖν οὐδεὶς ἤπιστοτο διὰ σοφίαν, ὥσπερ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ νομίζοντες ἔχον κατὰ ταῦτα . . . τῶν νῦν ἀπαιχρότεροι μὲν καὶ ἀμαθέστεροι . . . εὐθὺς τε καὶ ἀνδρείοτεροι καὶ ἄλλα σπουδαιότεροι καὶ ξυμπαντὰ δικαιότεροι.

² Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 663 E.

This carelessness about historical matter of fact, as such—is not uncommon with ancient moralists and rhetoricians. Both of them were apt to treat history not as a series of true matters of fact, exemplifying the laws

of human nature and society, and enlarging our knowledge of them for future inference—but as if it were a branch of fiction, to be handled so as to please our taste or improve our morality. Dionysius of Halikarnassus, blaming Thucydides for the choice of his subject, goes so far as to say "that the Peloponnesian war, a period of ruinous discord in Greece, ought to have been left in oblivion, and never to have passed into history" (Dion. Hal. ad Cn. Pomp. de Præc. Histor. Judic. p. 768 Reiske).

See a note at the beginning of chap. 38 of my "History of Greece".

³ Sext. Empiric. adv. Mathematicos, ix. 54, p. 562. Compare Polybius, vi. 56; Dion. Hal. ii. 13; Strabo, i. p. 19. These three, like Plato, consider the

Views entertained by Kritias and others, that the religious doctrines generally believed had originated with lawgivers, for useful purposes.

of Plato, though somewhat older) an opinion advanced—that even the belief in the existence of the Gods sprang originally from the deliberate promulgation of lawgivers, for useful purposes. The opinion of Plato is not exactly the same, but it is very analogous: for he holds that all which the community believe, respecting the attributes and acts of the Gods, must consist of fictions, and that accordingly it is essential for the lawgiver to determine what the accredited fictions in his own community shall be: he must therefore cause to be invented and circulated such as conduce to the ethical and political results which he himself approves. Private citizens are forbidden to tell falsehood; but the lawgiver is to administer falsehood, on suitable occasions, as a wholesome medicine.¹

Plato lays down his own individual preconception respecting the characters of the Gods, as orthodoxy for his Republic: directing that the poets shall provide new narratives conformable to that type. What is more, he establishes a peremptory censorship to prevent the circulation of any narratives dissenting from it. As to truth or falsehood, all that he himself claims is that his general preconception of the character of the Gods is true, and worthy of their dignity; while those entertained by his contemporaries are false; the particular narratives are alike fictitious in both cases. Fictitious as they are, however, Plato has fair reason for his confident assertion, that if they could once be imprinted on the minds of his citizens, as portions of an established creed, they would maintain themselves for a long time in unimpaired force and credit. He guards them by the artificial protection of a censorship, stricter than any real Grecian city

matters of religious belief to be fictions prescribed by the lawgiver for the purpose of governing those minds which are of too low a character to listen to truth and reason. Strabo states, more clearly than the other two, the employment of *μῦθοι* by the lawgiver for purposes of education and government; he extends this doctrine to *πᾶσα θεολογία ἀρχαία* . . . *πρὸς τοὺς νηπιόφρονας* (p. 19).

¹ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 389 B. *iv*

φάρμακον εἶδει. Compare De Legg. ii. p. 663 D.

Eusebius enumerates this as one of the points of conformity between Plato and the Hebrew records: in which, Eusebius says, you may find numberless similar fictions (*μυθία τοιαῦτα*), such as the statements of God being jealous or angry or affected by other human passions, which are fictions recounted for the benefit of those who require such treatment (Euseb. Præpar. Evan. xii. 31).

exhibited : over and above the self-supporting efficacy, usually sufficient without farther aid, which inheres in every established religious creed.

The points upon which Plato here chiefly takes issue with his countrymen, are—the general character of the Gods—and the extent to which the Gods determine the lot of human beings. He distinctly repudiates as untrue, that which he declares to be the generally received faith : though in other parts of his writings, we find him eulogising the merit of uninquiring faith—of that age of honest simplicity when every one believed what was told him from his childhood, and when no man was yet clever enough to suspect falsehood.¹

Main points of dissent between Plato and his countrymen, in respect to religious doctrine.

The discord on this important point between Plato and the religious faith of his countrymen, deserves notice the rather, because the doctrines in the Republic are all put into the mouth of Sokrates, and are even criticised by Aristotle under the name of Sokrates.² Most people, and among them the historical Sokrates, believed in the universal agency of the Gods.³ No—(affirms Plato) the Gods are good beings, whose nature is inconsistent with the production of evil : we must therefore divide the course of events into two portions, referring the good only to the Gods and the evil to other causes. Moreover—since the evil in the world is not merely considerable, but so considerable as greatly to preponderate over good, we must pronounce that most things are produced by these other

Theology of Plato compared with that of Epikurus—Neither of them satisfied the exigencies of a believing religious mind of that day.

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679 : compare x. p. 887 C, xi. p. 913 C.

So again in the *Timæus* (p. 40 E), he accepts the received genealogy of the Gods, upon the authority of the sons and early descendants of the Gods. These sons must have known their own fathers ; we ought therefore "to follow the law and believe them" (*ἰσχυρόν τε νόμον πιστεύειν*) though they spoke without either probable or demonstrative proof (*ἀδύνατον οὐδὲ θεῶν πατρὶν ἀπιστεῖν, καίπερ ἀνευ τε εἰκότος καὶ ἀναγκαίου ἀποδείξεως λέγουσιν*).

That which Plato here enjoins to be believed is the genealogy of Hesiod and other poets, though he does not

expressly name the poets. Julian in his remark on the passage (*Orat. vii. p. 237*) understands the poets to be meant, and their credibility to be upheld, by Plato—*καὶ ταῦτα ἔτερα δὲ Τιμαίῳ· πιστεύειν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἄξιοι καὶ χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως λεγόμενοι, ὅσα ὑπὲρ τῶν θεῶν φασὶν οἱ ποιηταί*. See Lindau's note on this passage in his edition of the *Timæus*, p. 62.

² Aristotel. *Politic. ii. 1*, &c. Compare the second of the Platonic Epistles, p. 314.

³ *Ζεὺς παλαιός, Περσειεύς, &c.* *Æschyl. Agamem. 1458.* *Xenophon, Memorab. i. 1, 8-9,*

causes (not farther particularised by Plato) and comparatively few things by the Gods. Now Epikurus (and some contemporaries¹ of Plato even before Epikurus) adopted these same premisses as to the preponderance of evil—but drew a different inference. They inferred that the Gods did not interfere at all in the management of the universe. Epikurus conceived the Gods as immortal beings living in eternal tranquillity and happiness; he thought it repugnant to their nature to exchange this state for any other—above all, to exchange it for the task of administering the universe, which would impose upon them endless vexation without any assignable benefit. Lastly, the preponderant evil, visibly manifested in the universe, afforded to his mind a positive proof that it was not administered by them.²

Comparing the two doctrines, we see that Plato, though he did not reject altogether, as Epikurus did, the agency of the Gods in the universe,—restricted it here nevertheless so as to suit the ethical exigencies of his own mind. He thus discarded so large a portion of it, as to place himself, or rather his spokesman Sokrates, in marked hostility with the received religious faith. If Melétus and Anytus lived to read the Platonic Republic (we may add, also the dialogue called Euthyphron), they would probably have felt increased persuasion that their indictment against Sokrates was well-grounded:³ since he stood proclaimed by the most eminent of his companions as an innovator in matters of

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 899 D, 898 C. He intimates that there were no inconsiderable number of persons who then held the doctrine, compare p. 891 B.

² Lucretius, li. 180:

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse creatam

Naturam mundi, quæ tanta 'st prædita culpa—

li. 1093:—

Nam—proh sancta Deum tranquillâ pectora pace,

Quæ placidum degunt ævum, vitamque serenam—

Quis regere immensi summam, quis habere profundi

Indu manu validas potis est moderanter habenas?

Compare v. 167-196, vi. 68.

³ Xenoph. *Memorab.* i. 1. 'Ἀδίκαι Σωκράτης, οὐκ αἶν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοῦς

οὐ νομίζει, ὅτερα δὲ κατὰ δαίμονα εἰσιφέρων· ἀδίκαι δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

This was the form of the indictment against Sokrates. The Republic of Plato certainly shows ground for the first part of it. Sokrates did not introduce new names and persons of Gods, but he preached new views about their characters and agency, and (what probably would cause the greatest offence) he emphatically blames the received views. The Republic of Plato here embodies what we read in the Platonist Maximus Tyrus (ix. 8) as the counter-indictment of Sokrates against the Athenian people — ἡ δὲ Σωκράτους κατὰ Ἀθηναίων γραφή· 'Ἀδίκαι ὁ Ἀθηναίων ἔθνος, οὐκ αἶν Σωκράτης νομίζει θεοῦς οὐ νομίζει, ὅτερα δὲ κατὰ δαίμονα εἰσιφέρων. . . . 'Ἀδίκαι δὲ ὁ ἔθνος καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρων.

religion, and as disbelieving a very large portion of what was commonly received by pious Athenians. With many persons, it was considered a species of sacrilege to disbelieve any narrative which had once been impressed upon them respecting the Gods or the divine agency: the later Pythagoreans laid it down as a canon, that this was never to be done.¹

Now the Gods, as here conceived by Plato conformably to his own ethical exigencies, are representatives of abstract goodness, or of what he considers as such²—but they are nothing else. They have no other human emotions: they are invoked for the purposes of the schoolmaster and the lawgiver, to distribute prizes, and inflict chastisements, on occasions which Plato thinks suitable. But Gods with these restricted functions were hardly less at variance with the current religious belief than the contemplative, theorising, Gods of Aristotle—or the perfectly tranquil and happy Gods of Epikurus. The Gods of the popular faith were not thus specialised types, embodiments of one abstract, ethical, idea. They were concrete personalities, many-sided and many-coloured, endowed with great variety of dispositions and emotions: having sympathies and antipathies, preferences and dislikes, to persons, places, and objects: sensitive on the score of attention paid to themselves, and of offerings tendered by men, jealous of any person who appeared to make light of them, or to put himself upon a footing of in dependence or rivalry: connected with particular men and cities by ties of family and residence.³ They corre-

Plato conceives the Gods according to the exigencies of his own mind—complete discord with those of the popular mind.

¹ Jamblichus, Vit. Pythag. c. 138-143. Adhortatio ad Philosophiam, p. 324, ed. Kiessling. See chap. xxxvii. of my "History of Greece," p. 345, last edit.

² Plato, Republic, ii. p. 379.

In the sixteenth chapter of my "History of Greece" (see p. 504 seq.) I have given many remarks on the ancient Grecian legends, and on the varying views entertained in ancient times respecting them, considered chiefly in reference to the standard of historical belief. I here regard them more as matters of religious belief and emotion.

³ Nowhere is the relation between men and the Gods, and the all-covering

variety of divine agency, in ancient Grecian belief, more instructively illustrated than in the Hippolytus of Euripides. Hippolytus, a youth priding himself on piety and still more upon inexorable continence (1140-1366), is not merely the constant worshipper of the goddess Artemis, but also her companion: she sits with him, hunts with him; he hears her voice and converses with her; he knows her presence by the divine odour, though he does not see her (οὐδ' ὄσσε, οὐκ ὀρύσσει, 1093-1301-87). But he disdains to address a respectful word to Aphrodite, or to yield in any way to her influence, though he continually passes by her statue which

sponded with all the feelings of the believer; with his hopes and fears, his joys and sorrows, his pride or his shame, his love or preference towards some persons or institutions, his hatred and contempt for others. They were sometimes benevolent, sometimes displeased and unpropitious, according to circumstances. They were indeed believed to interfere for the protection of what the believer accounted innocence or merit, and for the avenging of what he called wrong. But this was only one of many occasions on which they interfered. They dispensed alternately evil and good, out of the two caasks mentioned in that Homeric verse¹ which Plato so emphatically censures. Nay, it was as much a necessity of the believer's imagination to impute marked and serious suffering to the envy or jealousy of the Gods, as good fortune and prosperity to their kindness. Such a turn of thought is not less visible in Herodotus, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Lykurgus, &c., than in Homer and the other poets whom Plato rebukes. Moreover it is frequently expressed or implied in the answers or admonitions delivered from oracles.²

stands at his gates; he even speaks of her in disparaging terms (13-101). Aphrodité becomes deeply indignant with him, not because he is devoted to Artemis, but because he neglects and despises herself (20): for the Gods take offence when they are treated with disrespect, just as men do (6-94). His faithful attendant laments this misguided self-sufficiency, and endeavours in vain to reason his master out of it (see the curious dialogue 87-120, also 445). Aphrodité accordingly resolves to punish Hippolytus for this neglect by inspiring Phædra, his step-mother, with an irresistible passion for him: she foresees that this will prove the destruction of Phædra as well as of Hippolytus, but no such consideration can be allowed to counteravail the necessity of punishing her enemies. She accordingly smites Phædra with love-sickness, which, since Phædra will not reveal the cause, the chorus ascribes to the displeasure and visitation of some unknown divinity, Pan, Hekaté, Kybélé, &c. (142-238). The course of this beautiful drama is well known: Aphrodité proves herself a goddess and something more (369): Phædra and Hippolytus both perish; Theseus is struck down with grief and remorse (1402);

while Artemis, who appears at the end to console the dying Hippolytus and reprove Theseus, laments that it was not in her power, according to the established etiquette among the Gods, to interpose for the protection of Hippolytus against the anger of Aphrodité, but promises to avenge him by killing with her unerring arrows some marked favourite of Aphrodité (1337-1421). "Non esse curæ Diis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem."—Tacitus.

¹ Homer. *Iliad* xxiv. 527.

² The opinion is memorable, which Herodotus puts into the mouth of the wisest and best man of his age—Solon. "Ὁ Κροίσος, ἐπιστάμενός με τὸ θεῖον πάντων φθονερὸν τε καὶ ταπεινὸς, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπων πραγμάτων περὶ; (Herod. i. 32). Kroesus was overtaken by a terrible divine judgment because he thought himself the happiest of men (i. 34). The Gods strike at persons of high rank and position: they do not suffer any one except themselves to indulge in self-exaltation (vii. 10). Herodotus ascribes the like sentiment to another man distinguished for prudence—Amasis king of Egypt (iii. 40-44-125). Compare Pausanias, ii. 33, and Æschyl. Pers. 93, Supplikes, 388, Hermann. Herodotus and Pausanias proclaim

When therefore the Platonic Sokrates in this treatise affirms authoritatively,—and affirms without any proof—his restricted version of the agency of the Gods, calling upon his countrymen to reject all that large portion of their religious belief, which rested upon the assumption of a wider agency, as being unworthy of the real attributes of the Gods,—he would confirm, in the minds of ordinary Athenians, the charge of culpable innovation in religion, preferred against him by his accusers. To set up *a priori* a certain type (either Platonic or Epikurean) of what the Gods *must* be, different from what they were commonly believed to be,—and then to disallow, as unworthy and incredible, all that was inconsistent with this type, including a full half of the narratives consecrated in the emotional belief of the public—all this could not but appear as “impious rationalism,” on the part of “the Sophist Sokrates.” It would be not less repugnant to the feelings of ordinary Greeks, and would appear not more conclusive to their reason, than the arguments of rationalising critics upon many narratives of the Old Testament appear to orthodox readers of modern times—when these critics disallow as untrue many acts therein ascribed to God, on the ground that such acts are unworthy of a just and good being.

Though the Platonic Sokrates, repudiating most of the narra-

the envy and jealousy of the Gods more explicitly than other writers. About the usual disposition to regard the jealousy of the Gods as causing misfortunes and suffering, see Thucyd. ii. 54, vii. 77; especially when a man by rash speech or act brings grave misfortune on himself, he is supposed to be under a misleading influence by the Gods, expressed by Herodotus in the remarkable word *θεοβλαβής* (Herodot. i. 127, viii. 137; Xenoph. Hellen. vi. 4, 3; Soph. Oed. Kol. 371). The poverty in which Xenophon found himself when he quitted the Cyreian army, is ascribed by himself, at the suggestion of the prophet Enkleides, to his having omitted to sacrifice to Zeus Meilichius during the whole course of the expedition and retreat. The next day Xenophon offered an ample sacrifice to this God, and good fortune came upon him immediately

afterwards; he captured Asidates the Persian, receiving a large ransom, with an ample booty, and thus enriched himself (Xenoph. Anab. vii. 8, 4-23). Compare about *θεῶν φθόρος*, Pindar, Pyth. x. 30-44; Demosthenes cont. Timokratem, p. 738; Nägelsbach, Die Nach-Homerische Theologie der Griechen, pp. 330-365.

¹ Æschines cont. Timarch. *Σαφάρη τῶν σοφιστῶν*.

Lucretius, l. 60.

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne fortè rearis

Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque

Indugredi sceleris—

Plato, in *Leges*, v. 783 B, recognises the danger of disturbing the established and accredited religious *φῆμαι*, as well as the rites and ceremonies.

Aristophanes connects the idea of immorality with the freethinkers and their wicked misinterpretations.

tives believed respecting Gods and Heroes, as being immoral and suggesting bad examples to the hearers, proposes to construct a body of new fictions in place of them—yet, if we turn to the *Clouds* of Aristophanes, we shall find that the old-fashioned and unphilosophical Athenian took quite the opposite view. He connected immoral conduct with the new teaching, not with the old: he regarded the narratives respecting the Gods as realities of an unrecorded past, not as fictions for the purposes of the training-school: he did not imagine that the conduct of Zeus, in chaining up his father Kronus, was a proper model to be copied by himself or any other man: nay, he denounced all such disposition to copy, and to seek excuse for human misconduct in the example of the Gods, as abuse and profanation introduced by the sophistry of the freethinkers.¹

¹ Aristophan. *Nubes*, 358: λεπτοτάτων Ἀλφειῶν ἱερῶν. 385: γυνάμεις καὶ νῆες ἐξευρίσκων.

1381.—
ὡς ἦδ' αὖ καὶ τοὺς πρᾶγμασιν καὶ δεξιοῖς
ὀμνέειν,
καὶ τῶν καθεστῶτων νόμων ὑπερβροῦναι
δύνασθαι.

394.—
(Ἄδικος Ἀδύος).—
Πῶς δὲ γὰρ δίκης οὐσας, ὃ Ζεὺς
οὐκ ἀδολῶλεν, τὸν πατέρα αὐτοῦ
δήσας;

(Ἄδικ' Ἀδύος) αἰβοῖ, τουτὶ καὶ δὴ
χωρεῖ τὸ κακόν· δότε μοι λεκάνην.

1061.—
μοιχὲς γὰρ ἦν τῆς αἰσχύνης, τὰ δ' ἀντρεῖς
πρὸς αὐτόν,
ὡς οὐδὲν ἡδίστατος· εἰτ' ἐς τὸν Δι' ἔβαινε
νεκρῶν.
κακίους ὡς ἦσαν ἱερῶς ἐστὶ καὶ γυναι-
κῶν.

While Aristophanes introduces the freethinker as justifying unlawful acts by the example of Zeus, Plato (in the dialogue called *Euthyphron*) represents Euthyphron as indicting his father for murder, and justifying himself by the analogy of Zeus; Euthyphron being a very religious man, who believed all the divine matters commonly received, and more besides (p. 6). This exhibits the opposition between the Platonic and the Aristophanic point of view. In the *Eumenides* of Æschylus (632), these Goddesses reproach Zeus with inconsistency, after chaining up his

old father Kronus, in estimating so highly the necessity of avenging Agamemnon's death, as to authorise Orestes to kill *Klytemnestra*.

An extract from Butler's *Analogy*, in reply to the objections offered by Deists against the Old Testament, will serve to illustrate the view which pious Athenians took of those ancient narratives which Plato censures. Butler says: "It is the province of Reason to judge of the morality of the Scripture; i.e. not whether it contains things different from what we should have expected from a wise, just, and good Being, . . . but whether it contains things plainly contradictory to Wisdom, Justice, or Goodness; to what the light of Nature teaches us of God. And I know nothing of this sort objected against Scripture, excepting such objections as are formed upon suppositions which would equally conclude that the constitution of Nature is contradictory to wisdom, justice, or goodness; which most certainly it is not. Indeed, there are some particular precepts in Scripture, given to particular persons, requiring actions which would be immoral and vicious, were it not for such precepts. But it is easy to see that all these are of such a kind, as that the precept changes the whole nature of the case and of the action, and both constitutes and shows that not to be unjust or immoral which, prior to the precept, must have appeared and really been so; which may well be, since none

In his eyes, the religious traditions were part and parcel of the established faith, customs and laws of the state; and Sokrates,

of these precepts are contrary to immutable morality. If it were commanded to cultivate the principles, and act from the spirit, of treachery, ingratitude, cruelty; the command would not alter the nature of the case or of the action, in any of these instances. But it is quite otherwise in precepts which require only the doing an external action; for instance, taking away the property or life of any. For men have no right to either life or property, but what arises solely from the grant of God; when this grant is revoked, they cease to have any right at all in either; and when this revocation is made known, as surely it is possible it may be, it must cease to be unjust to deprive them of either. And though a course of external acts which, without command, would be immoral, must make an immoral habit; yet a few detached commands have no such natural tendency.

"I thought proper to say thus much of the few Scripture precepts which require, not vicious actions, but actions which would have been vicious had it not been for such precepts; because they are sometimes weakly urged as immoral, and great weight is laid upon objections drawn from them. But to me there seems no difficulty at all in these precepts, but what arises from their being offences—i.e. from their being liable to be perverted, as indeed they are, by wicked designing men, to serve the most horrid purposes, and perhaps to mislead the weak and enthusiastic. And objections from this head are not objections against Revelation, but against the whole notion of Religion as a trial, and against the whole constitution of Nature." (Butler's Analogy, Part. ii. ch. 3.)

I do not here propose to examine the soundness of this argument (which has been acutely discussed in a good pamphlet by Miss Hennell—'Essay on the Septic Tendency of Butler's Analogy,' p. 15, John Chapman, 1859). It appeared satisfactory to an able reasoner like Butler: and believers at Athens would have found satisfaction in similar arguments, when the narratives in which they believed were pronounced by Sokrates mischievous and incredible, as imputing to the Gods unworthy acts. For example—Zeus and Athene instigate Pandarus to break the sworn truce between the Greeks and

Trojans: Zeus sends Oneirus, or the Dream-God, to deceive Agamemnon (Plat. Rep. ii. pp. 379-383). Here are acts (the orthodox reasoner would say) which would be immoral if it were not for the special command: but Agamemnon and the Greeks had no right to life or property, much less to any other comforts or advantages, except what arose from the gift of the Gods. Now the Gods, on this particular occasion, thought fit to revoke the right which they had granted, making known such revocation to Pandarus; who, accordingly, in that particular case, committed no injustice in trying to kill Menelaus, and in actually wounding him. The Gods did not give any general command "to cultivate the spirit and act upon the principles" of perjury and faithlessness: they merely licensed the special act of Pandarus—*As it were*—by making known to him that they had revoked the right of the Greeks to have faith observed with them, at that particular moment. When any man argues—"Pandarus was instigated by Zeus to break faith: therefore faithlessness is innocent and authorised: therefore I may break faith"—this is "a perversion by wicked and designing men for a horrid purpose, and can mislead only the weak and enthusiastic".

Farther, If the Gods may by special mandates cause the murder or impoverishment of particular men by other men to be innocent acts, without sanctioning any inference by analogy—much more may the same be said respecting the acts of the Gods among themselves, which Sokrates censures, viz. their quarrels, violent manifestations by word and deed, amorous gusts, hearty laughter, &c. These too are particular acts, not intended to lead to consequences in the way of example. The Gods have not issued any general command. "Be quarrelsome, be violent," &c. If they are quarrelsome themselves on particular occasions, they have a right to be so; just as they have a right to take away any man's life or property whenever they choose: but you are not to follow their example, and none but wicked men will advise you to do so.

To those believers who denounced Sokrates as a freethinker (Plat. Euthyp. p. 6 A) such arguments would probably appear satisfactory. "*Sunt Superis sua*

in discrediting the traditions, set himself up as a thinker above the laws. As to this feature, the Aristophanic Sokrates in the Clouds, and the Platonic Sokrates in the Republic, perfectly agree—however much they differ in other respects.

In reviewing the Platonic Republic, I have thought it necessary to appreciate the theological and pædagogic doctrines, not merely with reference to mankind in the abstract, but also as they appeared to the contemporaries among whom they were promulgated.

Heresies ascribed to Sokrates by his own friends—Unpopularity of his name from this circumstance.

Restrictions imposed by Plato upon musical modes and reciters.

To all the above mentioned restrictions imposed by Plato upon the manifestation of the poet, both as to thoughts, words, and manner of recital—we must add those which he provides for music in its limited sense: the musical modes and instruments, the varieties of rhythm. He allows only the lyre and the harp, with the panspipe for shepherds tending their flocks. He forbids both the flute and all complicated stringed instruments. Interdicting the lugubrious, passionate, soft, and convivial, modes of music, he tolerates none but the Dorian and Phrygian, suitable to a sober, resolute, courageous, frame of mind: to which also all the rhythm and movement of the body is to be adapted.¹ Each particular manifestation of speech, music, poetry, and painting, having a natural affinity with some particular emotional and volitional state—emanating

jure” is a general principle, flexible and wide in its application. Of arguments analogous to those of Butler, really used in ancient times by advocates who defended the poets against censures like those of Plato, we find an illustrative specimen in the Scholia on Sophokles. At the beginning of the *Elektra* (35-50), Orestes comes back with his old attendant or tutor to Argos, bent on avenging the death of his father. He has been stimulated to that enterprise by the Gods (70), having consulted Apollo at Delphi, and having been directed by him to accomplish it not by armed force but by deceptions (*δόλοισι κλέψαι*, 35). Keeping himself concealed, he sends the old attendant into the house of Agisthus, with orders to communicate a false narrative that he (Orestes) is dead, having perished by an accident

in the Pythian chariot-race: and he directs the attendant to certify this falsehood by oath (*ἔγγυλλε δ' ὅρκῳ προστιθείς*, 47). Upon which last words the Scholiast observes as follows:—“We must not take captious exception to the poet, as if he were here exhorting men to perjure themselves. For Orestes is bound to obey the God, who commands him to accomplish the whole by deceit; so that while he appears to be impious by swearing a false oath, he by that very act shows his piety, since he does it in obedience to the God”—*μὴ σμικρολογῶντες τίς ἐπιλάβηται, ὅς τε καλεῖν ὄντως ἐπαρκεῖν τοῦ ποιητοῦ· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν πεῖθεσθαι τῷ θεῷ, τὸ πᾶν δόλῳ πράττειν παρακελευσμένῳ· ὥστε ἐν οἷς δοκεῖ ἐπαρκεῖν δυσσεβεῖν, διὰ τούτων εὐσεβεῖ, πεῖθόμενος τῷ θεῷ.*

¹ Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 399-400.

from it in the mind of the author and suggesting it in other minds—nothing is to be tolerated except what exhibits goodness and temperance of disposition,—grace, proportion, and decency of external form.¹ Artisans are to observe the like rules in their constructions: presenting to the eye nothing but what is symmetrical. The youthful Guardians, brought up among such representations, will have their minds imbued with correct æsthetical sentiment; they will learn even in their youngest years, before they are competent to give reasons, to love what is beautiful and honourable—to hate what is ugly and mean.²

All these enactments and prohibitions have for their purpose the ethical and æsthetical training of the Guardians: to establish and keep up in each individual Guardian, a good state of the emotions, and a proper internal government—that is, a due subordination of energy and appetite to Reason.³ Their bodies will also be trained by a good and healthy scheme of gymnastics, which will at the same time not only impart to them strength but inspire them with courage. The body is here considered, not (like what we read in Phædon and Philébus) as an inconvenient and depraving companion to the mind: but as an indispensable co-operator, only requiring to be duly reined.

All these restrictions intended for the emotional training of the Guardians.

The Guardians, of both sexes, thus educated and disciplined, are intended to pass their whole lives in the discharge of their duties as Guardians; implicitly obeying the orders of the Few Philosophical chiefs, and quartered in barracks under strict regulations. Among these regulations, there are two in particular which have always provoked more surprise and comment than any other features in the commonwealth; first, the prohibition of separate property—next, the prohibition of separate family—including the respective position of the two sexes.

Regulations for the life of the Guardians, especially the prohibition of separate property and family.

The directions of Plato on these two points not only hang

¹ Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 400 D—401 B. ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεως—τῆ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθεὶς ἔσται—προαναγκαστὸν τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ εἰκόνα ἡθεὶς ἐμποιεῖν.

² Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 401-402 A.

³ Plato, *Repub.* x. p. 608 B. περὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτῷ πολιτείας δεδοται—μέγας δ' ἀγὼν, μέγας, οὐχ ὅσος δοκεῖ, τὸ χρηστὸν ἢ κακὸν γενέσθαι.

Purpose of
Plato in
these regu-
lations.

together, but are founded on the same reason and considerations. He is resolved to prevent the growth of any separate interest, affections, or aspirations, in the mind of any individual Guardian. Each Guardian is to perform his military and civil duties to the Commonwealth, and to do nothing else. He must find his happiness in the performance of his duty: no double functions or occupations are tolerated. This principle, important in Plato's view as regards every one, is of supreme importance as applying to the Guardians, in whom resides the whole armed force of the Commonwealth and by whom the orders of the Chiefs or Elders are enforced. If the Guardians aspire to private ends of their own, and employ their force for the attainment of such ends, nothing but oppression and ruin of the remaining community can ensue. A man having land of his own to cultivate, or a wife and family of his own to provide with comforts, may be a good economist, but he will never be a tolerable Guardian.¹ To be competent for this latter function, he must neither covet wealth nor be exposed to the fear of poverty: he must desire neither enjoyments nor power, except what are common to his entire regiment. He must indulge neither private sympathies nor private antipathies: he must be inaccessible to all motives which could lead him to despoil or hurt his fellow-citizens the producers. Accordingly the hopes and fears involved in self-maintenance—the feelings of buyer, seller, donor, or receiver—the ideas of separate property, house, wife, or family—must never be allowed to enter into his mind. The Guardians will receive from the productive part of the community a constant provision, sufficient, but not more than sufficient, for their reasonable maintenance. Their residence will be in public barracks and their meals at a common mess: they must be taught to regard it as a disgrace to meddle in any way with gold and silver.² Men and women will live all together, or distributed in a few fractional companies, but always in companionship, and under perpetual drill; beginning from the earliest years with both sexes. Boys and girls will be placed from the beginning under the same super-

¹ Plato, *Repub.* iv. pp. 421 A—423 D.

² Plato, *Repub.* iii. p. 417 A-B.

³ Plato, *Repub.* iii. pp. 416-417.

intendence; and will receive the same training, as well in gymnastic as in music. The characters of both will be exposed to the same influences and formed in the same mould. Upon the maintenance of such early, equal, and collective training, especially in music, under the orders of the Elders,—Plato declares the stability of the Commonwealth to depend.¹

The purpose being, to form good and competent Guardians the same training which will be best for the boys will also be best for the girls. But is it true that women are competent to the function of Guardians? Is the female nature endued with the same aptitudes for such duties as the male? Men will ridicule the suggestion (says Plato) and will maintain the negative. They will say that there are some functions for which men are more competent, others for which women are more competent than men: and that women are unfit for any such duty as that of Guardians. Plato dissents from this opinion altogether.

Common life, education, drill, collective life, and duties for Guardians of both sexes. Views of Plato respecting the female character and aptitudes.

There is no point on which he speaks in terms of more decided conviction. Men and women (he says) can perform this duty conjointly, just as dogs of both sexes take part in guarding the flock. It is not true that the female, by reason of the characteristic properties of sex—parturition and suckling—is disqualified for out-door occupations and restricted to the interior of the house.² As in the remaining animals generally, so also in the human race. There is no fundamental difference between the two sexes, other than that of the sexual attributes themselves. From that difference no consequences flow, in respect to aptitude for some occupations, inaptitude for others. There are great individual differences between one woman and another, as there are between one man and another: this woman is peculiarly fit for one task, that woman for something else. But speaking of women generally and collectively, there is not a single profession for which they are peculiarly fit, or more fit than men. Men are superior to women in everything; in one occupation as well as in another. Yet among both sexes, there are serious individual differences, so that

¹ Plato, *Repub.* iv. pp. 423-424 D—425 A-C.

² Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 461 D

many women, individually estimated, will be superior to many men: no women will equal the best men, but the best women will equal the second-best men, and will be superior to the men below them.' Accordingly, in order to obtain the best Guardians, selection must be made from both sexes indiscriminately. For ordinary duties, both will be found equally fit: but the heaviest and most difficult duties, those which require the maximum of competence to perform, will usually devolve upon men.²

Those who maintain (continues Plato) that because women are different from men, therefore the occupations of the two ought to be different—argue like vexatious disputants who mistake verbal distinctions for real: who do not enquire what is the formal or specific distinction indicated by a name, or whether it has any essential bearing on the matter under discussion.³ Long-haired men are different from bald-heads: but shall we conclude, that if the former are fit to make shoes, the latter are unfit? Certainly not: for when we inquire into the formal distinction

¹ See this remarkable argument—*Republic*, v. pp. 453-456—*γυναῖκες μέντοι πολλὰ πολλῶν ἀνδρῶν βελτίους εἰς πολλά· τὸ δὲ ὅλον ἔχει ὡς σὺ λέγεις. Οὐδὲν ἔρα ἴσθις ἐπιτήδευμα τῶν πόλιν διοικούντων γυναῖκες διότι γυνή, οὐδ' ἀνδρὸς διότι ἀνὴρ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως διασπαρμέναι αἱ φύσεις ἐν ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ζώοις, καὶ πάντων μὲν μετέχει γυνή ἐπιτηδεύματων κατὰ φύσιν, πάντων δὲ ἀνὴρ· ἐνὶ πᾶσι δὲ δοθέντα τὸν γυνή ἀνδρός (p. 455 D). It would appear (from p. 455 C) that those who maintained the special fitness of women for certain occupations and their special unfitness for others, cited, as examples of occupations in which women surpassed men, weaving and cookery. But Plato denies this emphatically as a matter of fact; pronouncing that women were inferior to men (i.e. the best women to the best men) in weaving and cookery no less than in other things. We should have been glad to know what facts were present to his mind as bearing out such an assertion, and what observations were open to him of weaving as performed by males. In Greece, weaving was the occupation of women very generally, whether exclusively or not we can hardly say; in Phoenicia, during*

the Homeric times, the finest robes are woven by Sidonian women (*Iliad* vi. 239): in Egypt, on the contrary, it was habitually performed by men, and Herodotus enumerates this as one of the points in which the Egyptians differed from other countries (*Herodot.* ii. 35; *Soph.* *Oed. Kol.* 340, with the *Scholia*, and the curious citation contained therein from the *Βαβυλωνικά* of Nymphodorus). The process of weaving was also conducted in a different manner by the Egyptians. Whether Plato had seen finer webs in Egypt than in Greece we cannot say.

² Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 457 A.

³ Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 454 A. *ὅσα τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἶδη διακρίνουμεν τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα δῶκεν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἱριδί, οὐ διαλύει, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. 454 B: ἐπισκοπεύμεθα δὲ οὐδ' ὀφείλου, τί εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἑτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως, καὶ πρὸς τί τεινὸν ὀρίζομεθα τότε, ὅτε τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλῃ φύσει ἄλλα, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ, ἀποδίδωμεν. Xenophon is entirely opposed to Plato on this point. He maintains emphatically the distinct special aptitudes of man and woman. (*Econom.* vii. 20-23; compare Euripid. *Electra*, 74.*

connoted by these words, we find that it has no bearing upon such handicraft processes. So again the formal distinction implied by the terms *male*, *female*, in the human race as in other animals, lies altogether in the functions of sex and procreation.¹ Now this has no essential bearing on the occupations of the adult; nor does it confer on the male fitness for one set of occupations—on the female, fitness for another. Each sex is fit for all, but the male is most fit for all: in each sex there are individuals better and worse, and differing one from another in special aptitudes. Men are competent for the duties of Guardians, only on condition of having gone through a complete musical and gymnastical education. Women are competent also, under the like condition; and are equally capable of profiting by the complete education. Moreover, the chiefs must select for those duties the best natural subjects. The total number of such is very limited: and they must select the best that both sexes afford.²

The strong objections, generally entertained against thus assigning to women equal participation in the education and functions of the Guardians, were enforced by saying—That it was a proceeding contrary to Nature. But Plato not only denies the validity of this argument: he even retorts it upon the objectors, and affirms that the existing separation of functions between the two sexes is contrary to Nature, and that his proposition alone is conformable thereunto.³ He has shown that the specific or formal distinction of the two has no essential bearing on the question, and therefore that no argument can be founded upon it. The specific or formal characteristic, in the case of males, is doubtless superior, taken abstractedly: yet in particular men it is embodied or manifested with various degrees of perfection, from very good to very bad. In the case of females, though inferior abstractedly, it is in its best particular embodiments equal to all except the best males, and superior to all such as are inferior to the best. Accordingly, the

Opponents appealed to Nature as an authority against Plato. He invokes Nature on his own side against them.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 455 C-D.

² Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 456.

³ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 456 C. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀδύνατά γε, οὐδὲ εὐχαιε ὁμοία, εἶναι, γίγνεται.

ἰσομοθετοῦμεν, ἐπειπερ κατὰ φύσιν εἰσθεμεν τὸν νόμον· ἀλλὰ τὰ νῦν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, ὥς

true dictate of Nature is, not merely that females *may be* taken, but that they *ought to be* taken, conjointly with males, under the selection of the Rulers, to fulfil the most important duties in the Commonwealth. The select females must go through the same musical and gymnastic training as the males. He who ridicules them for such bodily exercises, prosecuted with a view to the best objects, does not know what he is laughing at. "For this is the most valuable maxim which is now, or ever has been, proclaimed—What is useful, is honourable. What is hurtful, is base."¹

Plato now proceeds to unfold the relations of the sexes as intended to prevail among the mature Guardians, after all have undergone the public and common training from their earliest infancy. He conceives them as one thousand in total number, composed of both sexes in nearly equal proportion: since they are to be the best individuals of both sexes, the male sex, superior in formal characteristic, will probably furnish rather a greater number than the female. It has already been stated that they are all required to live together in barracks, dining at a common mess-table, with clothing and furniture alike for all. There is no individual property or separate house among them: the collective expense, in a comfortable but moderate way, is defrayed by contributions from the producing class. Separate families are unknown: all the Guardians, male and female, form one family, and one only: the older are fathers and mothers of all the younger, the younger are sons and daughters of all the older: those of the same age are all alike brothers and sisters of each other: those who, besides being of the same age, are within the limits of the nuptial age and of different sexes, are all alike husbands and wives of each other.² It is the principle of the Platonic Commonwealth that the affections implied in these family-words, instead of being confined to one or a few exclu-

¹ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 457 B. Ὁ δὲ γελῶν ἑστὶν ἐπὶ γυμναίᾳ γυναίξιν, τοῦ βελτίστου ἔνεκα γυμναζομένης, ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου σοφίας δρέπων καρπὸν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὡς εἰσικεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελᾷ οὐδ' ὅ, τι πράττει· ἀλλήλοιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λαλέεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἀφελιμον, καλόν—τὸ δὲ βλαβερόν, αἰσχρόν.

² Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 457 C-D. τὰς γυναῖκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάντων πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἰδίᾳ δὲ μηδενὶ μηδεμίαν συνουκεῖν· καὶ τοὺς παῖδας αὐτῶν κοινούς, καὶ μήτε γονεῖα ἐκγονον εἰδέναι τὸν αὐτοῦ μήτε παῖδα γονεῖα.

sively, shall be expanded so as to embrace all of appropriate age.

But Plato does not at all intend that sexual intercourse shall take place between these men and women promiscuously, or at the pleasure of individuals. On the contrary, he expressly denounces and interdicts it.¹ A philosopher who has so much general disdain for individual impulse or choice, was not likely to sanction it in this particular case. Indeed it is the special purpose of his polity to bring impulse absolutely under the controul of reason, or of that which he assumes as such. This purpose is followed out in a remarkable manner as to procreation. What he seeks as lawgiver is, to keep the numbers of the Guardians nearly stationary, with no diminution and scarcely any increase:² and to maintain the breed pure, so that the children born shall be as highly endowed by nature as possible. To these two objects the liberty of sexual intercourse is made subservient. The breeding is regulated like that of noble horses or dogs by an intelligent proprietor: the best animals of both sexes being brought together, and the limits of age fixed beforehand.³ Plato prescribes, as the limits of age, from twenty to forty for females—from thirty to fifty-five for males—when the powers of body and mind are at the maximum in both. All who are younger as well as all who are older, are expressly forbidden to meddle in the procreation *for the city*: this being a public function.⁴ Between the ages above named, couples will be invited to marry in such numbers as the Rulers may consider expedient for ensuring a supply of offspring sufficient and not more than sufficient—having regard to wars, distempers, or any other recent causes of mortality.⁵

Restrictions upon sexual intercourse—Purposes of such restrictions.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 458 E. ἀνάγκη μὴ μίγνεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἄλλο ὁποῦν ποιῆν ὅτε δεῖον ἐν εὐδαιμόνῳ πόλει οὐτ' ἰδούσιν οἱ ἀρχόντες.

² Plato, *Republ.* v. p. 460 A. τὸ δὲ πλεόντων τῶν γάμων ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρχόνσι ποιέσμεν, ἵνα ὡς μέγιστα διασώζωσι τὸν αὐτὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνδρῶν, πρὸς ταύτους τε καὶ πόσους καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποσκοποῦντες, καὶ μῆτε μεγάλη ἦναι ἢ πόλις κατὰ τὸ δεοντέον μῆτε σμικρὰ γίγνηται.

³ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 459.

⁴ This is his phrase, repeated more than once—τίςτιν τῇ πόλει, γεννῆν τῇ πόλει—τὸν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννέσμεν (pp. 460-461).

What Lucan (ll. 387) observes about Cato of Utica, is applicable to the Guardians of the Platonic Republic:—

“Venerisque huius maximus usus Progenies. Urbi pater est, Urbique maritus.”

⁵ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 460 A.

There is no part of the Platonic system in which individual choice is more decidedly eliminated, and the inter-
 Regulations about marriages and family. vention of the Rulers made more constantly paramount, than this respecting the marriages: and Plato declares it to be among the greatest difficulties which they will have to surmount. They will establish festivals, in which they bring together the brides and bridegrooms, with hymns, prayer, and sacrifices, to the Gods: they will determine by lot what couples shall be joined, so as to make up the number settled as appropriate: but they will arrange the sortition themselves so cleverly, that what appears chance to others will be a result to them predetermined. The best men will thus always be assorted with the best women, the inferior with the inferior: but this will appear to every one, except themselves, the result of chance.¹ Any young man (of thirty and upwards) distinguished for bravery or excellence will be allowed to have more than one wife; since it is good not merely to recompense his merit, but also to multiply his breed.²

In the seventh month, or in the tenth month, after the ceremonial day, offspring will be born from these unions. But the children, immediately on being born, will be taken away from their mothers, and confided to nurses in an appropriate lodgment. The mothers will be admitted to suckle them, and wet-nurses will also be provided, as far as necessary: but the period for the mother to suckle will be abridged as much as possible, and all other trouble required for the care of infancy will be undertaken, not by her, but by the nurses. Moreover the greatest precautions will be taken that no mother shall know her own child: which is considered to be practicable, since many children will be born at nearly the same time.³ The children in infancy will be examined by the Rulers and other good judges, who will determine how many of them are sufficiently well constituted to promise fitness for the duties of Guardians. The children of the good and vigorous couples, except in any case of bodily deformity, will be brought up and placed under the public training for Guardians: the unpromising children, and

¹ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 460.

that he is allowed to make a choice.

² Plato, *Repub.* v. pp. 460 B, 468 C.

³ Plato, *Republic*, v. pp. 460 D, 461

In the latter passage it even appears D.

those of the inferior couples, being regarded as not fit subjects for the public training, will be secretly got rid of, or placed among the producing class of the Commonwealth.¹

What Plato here understands by marriage, is a special, solemn, consecrated, coupling for the occasion, with a view to breed for the public. It constitutes no permanent bond between the two persons coupled: who are brought together by the authorities under a delusive sortition, but who may perhaps never be brought together at any future sortition, unless it shall please the same authorities. The case resembles that of a breeding stud of horses and mares, to which Plato compares it: nothing else is wanted but the finest progeny attainable. But this, in Plato's judgment, is the most important of all purposes: his commonwealth cannot maintain itself except under a superior breed of Guardians. Accordingly, he invests his marriages with the greatest possible sanctity. The religious solemnities accompanying them are essential to furnish security for the goodness of the offspring. Any proceeding, either of man or woman, which contravenes the provisions of the rulers on this point, is peremptorily forbidden: and any child, born from unauthorised intercourse without the requisite prayers and sacrifices, is considered as an outcast. Within the limits of the connubial age, all persons of both sexes hold their procreative powers exclusively at the disposition of the lawgiver. But after that age is past, both men and women may indulge in intercourse with whomsoever they please, since they are no longer in condition to procreate for the public. They are subject only to this one condition: not to produce any children, or, if perchance they do, not to bring them up.² There is moreover one restriction upon the personal liberty of intercourse, after the connubial limits of age. No intercourse is permitted between father and daughter, or between mother and son. But how can such restriction be enforced, since no individual paternity or maternity is recognised

Procreative powers of individual Guardians required to be held at the disposal of the rulers for purity of breed.

¹ Compare *Republic*, v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C, with *Timæus*, p. 19 A. In *Timæus*, where the leading doctrines of the *Republic* are briefly recapitulated, Plato directs that the children considered as unworthy shall be secretly distributed among the re-

maining community, i.e. not among the Guardians: in the *Republic* itself, his language, though not clear, seems to imply that they shall be exposed and got rid of.

² Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 461 C.

in the Commonwealth? Plato answers by admitting a collective paternity and maternity. Every child born in the seventh month or in the tenth month after a couple have been solemnly wedded will be considered by them as their son or daughter, and will consider himself as such.¹

Besides all these direct provisions for the purity of the breed of Guardians, which will succeed (so Plato anticipates) in a large majority of cases—the Rulers will keep up an effective supervision of detail, so as to exclude any unworthy exception, and even to admit into the Guardians any youth of very rare and exceptional promise who may be born among the remaining community. For Plato admits that there may be accidental births both ways: brass and iron may by occasional accident give birth to gold or silver—and *vice versa*.

It is in this manner that Plato constitutes his body of Guardians; one thousand adult persons of both sexes,² in nearly equal numbers, together with a small proportion of children—the proportion of these latter must be very small, since the total number is not allowed to increase. His end here is to create an intimate and equal sympathy among them all, like that between all the members of the same bodily organism: to abolish all independent and exclusive sympathies of particular parts: to make the city One and Indivisible—a single organism, instead of many distinct conterminous organisms: to provide that the causes of pleasure and pain shall be the same to all, so that a man shall have no feeling of mine or thine, except in reference to his own body and that of another, which Plato notes as the greatest good—instead of each individual struggling apart for his own objects and rejoicing on occasions when his neighbour sorrows, which Plato regards as the greatest evil.³ All standing causes of disagreement or antipathy among the Guardians are assumed to be thus removed. But if any two hot-

Purpose to create an intimate and equal sympathy among all the Guardians, but to prevent exclusive sympathy of particular members.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 461 D.

² This number of 1000 appears stated by Aristotle (*Politic.* ii. 6, p. 1265, a. 9), and is probably derived from Republic, iv. p. 423 A; though that passage appears scarcely sufficient to prove that Plato meant to declare the number 1000 as peremptory. How-

ever the understanding of Aristotle himself on the point is one material evidence to make us believe that this is the real construction intended by Plato.

³ Plato, *Republic*, v. pp. 462-463-464 D. διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἰδίον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα κοινά. Compare Plato, *Legg.* v. p. 739 C.

headed youths get into a quarrel, they must fight it out on the spot. This will serve as a lesson in gymnastics:—subject however to the interference of any old man as by-stander, whom they as well as all other young men are bound implicitly to obey.¹ Moreover all the miseries, privations, anxiety, and dependence, inseparable from the life of a poor man under the system of private property, will disappear entirely.²

Such are the main features of Plato's Republic, in reference to his Guardians. They afford a memorable example of that philosophical analysis, applied to the circumstances of man and society, which the Greek mind was the first to conceive and follow out. Plato lays down his ends with great distinctness, as well as the means whereby he proposes to attain them. Granting his ends, the means proposed are almost always suitable and appropriate, whether practicable or otherwise.

The Platonic scheme is communism, so far as concerns the Guardians: but not communism in reference to the entire Commonwealth. In this it falls short of his own ideal, and is only a second best: the best of all would be, in his view, a communion that should pervade all persons and all acts and sentiments, effacing altogether the separate self.³ Not venturing to soar so high, he confined his perfect communion to the Guardians. Moreover his communism differs from modern theories in this. They contemplate individual producers and labourers, handing over the produce to be distributed among themselves by official authority; they contemplate also a regulation not merely of distribution, but of reserved capital and productive agency, under the same authority. But the Platonic Guardians are not producers at all. Everything which they consume is found for them. They are in the nature of paid functionaries, exempted from all cares and anxiety of self-maintenance, either present or future. They are all comfortably provided, without hopes of wealth or fear of poverty: moreover they are all equally comfortable, so that no sentiment can grow up among them, arising from comparison of each other's possessions or enjoyments. Among such men and

¹ Plato, Republic, v. pp. 464-466.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 465 C.

³ See Plato, De Legibus, v. p. 739 D.

The Republic is *second best*: that which appears sketched in the treatise De Legibus is *third best*.

women, brought up from infancy as Plato directs, the sentiment of property, with all the multifarious associations derived from it, would be unknown. No man's self-esteem, no man's esteem of others, would turn upon it.

In this respect, the remaining members of the city, apart from the Guardians, and furnishing all the subsistence of the Guardians, are differently circumstanced. They are engaged in different modes of production, each exclusively in one mode. They exchange, buy, and sell, with each other: there exist therefore among them gradations of strength, skill, perseverance, frugality, and good luck—together with the consequent gradations of wealth and poverty. The substance or capital of the Commonwealth is maintained altogether by the portion of it which is extraneous to the Guardians; and among that portion there is no communism. The maintenance of the Guardians is a tax which these men have to pay: but after paying it, they apply or enjoy the rest of their produce as they please, subject to the requirements of the Rulers for public service.¹

Nevertheless we are obliged to divine what Plato means about the condition of the producing classes in his Commonwealth. He himself tells us little or nothing about them; though they must constitute the large numerical majority. And this defect is in him the less excusable, since he reckons them as component members of his Commonwealth; while Aristotle, in his ideal Commonwealth, does not reckon them as component members or citizens, but merely as indispensable adjuncts, in the same manner as slaves. All that we know about the producers in the Platonic Commonwealth is, that each man is to have only one business—that for which he is most fit:—and that all are to be under the administration of the Rulers through the Guardians.

The enlistment of soldiers, apart from civilians, and the holding of them under distinct laws and stricter discipline, is a practice familiar to modern ideas, though as a separate profession has acquired greater de- it had little place among the Greeks of Plato's day. There prevailed also in Egypt² and in parts of East-

¹ Aristotle, in his comments upon the Platonic Republic (Polit. ii. 5, p. 1263, b. 42 seq.), advances arguments just in themselves, in favour of individual property, and against com-

munity of property. But these arguments have little application to the Republic.

² Aristot. Politic. vii. 10. Herodot. ii. 164. Plato alludes (Times.

ern Asia, from time immemorial, a distinction of ^{development} ^{in modern} castes : one caste being soldiers, invested with the ^{times.} defence of the country, and enjoying certain lands by the tenure of such military service : but in other respects, private proprietors like the rest—and receiving no special discipline, training, or education. In Grecian Ideas, military duties were a part, but only a part, of the duties of a citizen. This was the case even at Sparta. Though in practice, the discipline of that city tended in a preponderant degree towards military aptitude, yet the Spartan was still a citizen, not exclusively a soldier.

It was from the Spartan institutions (and the Kretan, in many respects analogous) that the speculative political ^{Spartan institutions—} ^{great im-} ^{pression} ^{which they} ^{produced} ^{upon specu-} ^{lative Greek} ^{minds.} philosophers in Greece usually took the point of departure for their theories. Not only Plato did so, but Xenophon and Aristotle likewise. The most material fact which they saw before them at Sparta was, a public discipline both strict and continued, which directed the movements of the citizens, and guided their thoughts and feelings, from infancy to old age. To this supreme controul the private feelings, both of family and property, though not wholly suppressed, were made to bend : and occasionally in a way quite as remarkable as any restrictions proposed by either Plato or Xenophon.¹ Moreover, the Spartan institutions were of immemorial antiquity ; believed to have been suggested or sanctioned originally by Apollo and the Delphian oracle, as the Kretan institutions were by Zeus.² They had lasted longer than other Hellenic institutions without forcible subversion : they obtained universal notice, admiration, and deference, throughout Greece. It was this conspicuous fact which emboldened the Grecian theorists to postulate for the lawgiver that unbounded controul, over the life and habits of citizens, which we read not merely in the Republic of Plato but in the Cyropædia of Xenophon, and to a great degree even in the Politica of Aristotle. To an objector, who asked them how they could possibly expect that individuals would submit to such

²⁴ A) to the analogy of Egyptian castes.

¹ See Xenophon, Hellenic. vi. 4, 16, the account of what passed at Sparta

after the battle of Leuktra, related also in my "History of Greece," chap. 78, vol. x. p. 253.

² Plato, Legg. i. pp. 632 D, 634 A.

unlimited interference, they would have replied—"Look at Sparta. You see there interference, as constant and rigorous as that which I propose, endured by the citizens not only without resistance, but with a tenacity and long continuance such as is not found among other communities with more lax regulations. The habits and sentiments of the Spartan citizen are fashioned to these institutions. Far from being anxious to shake them off, he accounts them a necessity as well as an honour." This reply would have appeared valid and reasonable, in the fourth century before the Christian era. And it explains—what, after all, is the most surprising circumstance to a modern reader—the extreme boldness of speculation, the ideal omnipotence, assumed by the leading Grecian political theorists: much even by Aristotle, though his aspirations were more limited and practical—far more by Xenophon—most of all by Plato. Any theorist, proceeding avowedly *κατ' εὐχὴν*, considered himself within bounds when he assumed to himself no greater influence than had actually been exercised by Lykurgus.

Assuming such influence, however, he intended to employ it for ends approved by himself: agreeing with Lykurgus in the general principle of forming the citizen's character by public and compulsory discipline, but not agreeing with him in the type of character proper to be aimed at. Xenophon departs least from the Spartan type: Aristotle and Plato greatly more, though in different directions. Each of them applies to a certain extent the process of abstraction and analysis both to the individual and to the community: considering both of them as made up of component elements working simultaneously either in co-operation or conflict. But in Plato the abstraction is carried farthest: the wholeness of the individual Guardian is completely effaced, so that each constitutes a small fraction or wheel of the real Platonic whole—the commonwealth. The fundamental Platonic principle is, that each man shall have one function, and one only: an extreme application of that which political economists call the division of labour. Among these many different functions, one, and doubtless the most difficult as well as important, is that of directing, administering, and defending the community: which is done by the Guardians and

Plans of these speculative minds compared with Spartan—Different types of character contemplated.

Rulers. It is to this one function that all Plato's treatise is devoted: he tells us how such persons are to be trained and circumstanced. What he describes, therefore, is not properly citizens administering their own affairs, but commanders and officers watching over the interests of others: a sort of military *bureaucracy*, with chiefs at its head, directing as well as guarding a multitude beneath them. And what mainly distinguishes the Platonic system, is the extreme abstraction with which this public and official character is conceived: the degree to which the whole man is merged in the performance of his official duties: the entire extinction within him of the old individual Adam—of all private feelings and interests.

Both in Xenophon and in Aristotle, as well as at Sparta, the citizen is subjected to a public compulsory training, severe as well as continuous: but he is still a citizen as well as a functionary. He has private interests as well as public duties:—a separate home, property, wife, and family. Plato, on the contrary, contends that the two are absolutely irreconcilable: that if the Guardian has private anxieties for his own maintenance, private house and lands to manage, private sympathies and antipathies to gratify—he will become unfaithful to his duties as Guardian, and will oppress instead of protecting the people.¹ You must choose between the two (he says): you cannot have the self-caring citizen and the public-minded Guardian in one.²

Plato carries abstraction farther than Xenophon or Aristotle.

Looking to ideal perfection, I think Plato is right. If the Rulers and Guardians have private interests of their own, those interests will corrupt more or less the discharge of their public duties. The evil may be mitigated, by forms of government (representative and other arrangements), which make the continuance of power dependent upon popular estimation of the functionaries: but it cannot be abolished. Neither Xenophon, nor Aristotle, nor the Spartan system, provided any remedy for this difficulty. They scarcely even recognise the difficulty as real. In all the three, the proportion of trained citizens to the rest of the people, would be about the

Anxiety shown by Plato for the good treatment of the Demos, greater than that shown by Xenophon and Aristotle.

¹ Plato, *Republic*, iii. pp. 416-417.

by Nikias in his speech at Athens,

² See the contrary opinion asserted Thucyd. vi. 9.

same (so far as we can judge) as the proportion of the Platonic Guardians to the Demos or rest of the people. But when we look to see what security either of the three systems provide for good behaviour on the part of citizens towards non-citizens, we find no satisfaction; nor do they make it, as Plato does, one prominent object of their public training. Plato shows extreme anxiety for the object: as is proved by his sacrificing, in order to ensure it, all the private sources of pleasure to his Guardians. Aristotle reproaches him with doing this, so as to reduce the happiness of his Guardians to nothing: but Plato, from his own point of view, would not admit the justice of such reproach, since he considers happiness to be derived from, and proportional to, the performance of duty.

This last point must be perpetually kept in mind, in following Plato's reasoning. But though he does not consider himself as sacrificing the happiness of his Guardians to their duty, we must give him credit for anxiety, greater than either Aristotle or Xenophon has shown, to ensure a faithful discharge of duty on the part of the Guardians towards the rest of the people. In Aristotle's theory,¹ the rest of the people are set aside as not members of the Commonwealth, thus counting as a secondary and inferior object in his estimation; while the citizens, who alone are members, are trained to practise virtue for its own sake and for their own happiness. In Plato's theory, the rest of the people are not only proclaimed as members of the Commonwealth,² but are the ultimate and capital objects of all his solicitude. It is in protecting, governing, and administering them, that the lives of the Rulers and Guardians are passed. Though they (the remaining people) receive no public training, yet Plato intends them to reap all the benefit of the laborious training bestowed on the Guardians. This is a larger and more generous conception of the purpose of political institutions, than we find either in Aristotle or in Xenophon.

There is however another objection, which seems grave and

¹ Aristotle, *Politic.* vii. 9, p. 1328, b. 40, p. 1329, a. 25.

² Aristotle, *Politic.* ii. 5, p. 1264, a. 12-26, respecting the Platonic Commonwealth, *καίτοι· σχιζὸν τὸ γὰρ πλῆθος*

τῆς φύλας τὸ τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γίνεσθαι πλῆθος, &c.

Ποιεῖ γὰρ (Plato) τοὺς μὲν φύλακας οἷον φρουροὺς, τοὺς δὲ γεωργοὺς καὶ τοὺς τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, πολίτας.

well founded, advanced by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic. He remarks that it will be not one city, but two cities, with tendencies more or less adverse to each other :¹ that the Guardians, educated under the very peculiar training and placed under the peculiar relations prescribed to them, will form one city—while the remaining people, who have no part either in the one or the other, but are private proprietors with separate families—will form another city. I do not see what reply the Platonic Republic furnishes to this objection. Granting full success to Plato in his endeavours to make the Guardians One among themselves, we find nothing to make them One with the remaining people, nor to make the remaining people One with them.² On the contrary, we observe such an extreme divergence of sentiment, character, pursuit, and education, as to render mutual sympathy very difficult, and to open fatal probabilities of mutual alienation : probabilities hardly less, than if separate proprietary interests had been left to subsist among the Guardians. This is a source of mischief which Plato has not taken into his account. The entire body of Guardians cannot fail to carry in their bosoms a sense of extreme pride in their own training, and a proportionally mean estimate of the untrained multitude alongside of them. The sentiment of the gold and silver men, towards the brass and iron men, will have in it too much of contempt to be consistent with civic fraternity : like the pride of the Twice-Born Hindoo Brahmin, when comparing himself with the lower Hindoo castes : or like that of the Pythagorean brotherhood, who “regarded the brethren as equal to the blessed Gods, but held all the rest to be unworthy of any account”.³ The Spartan training appears to have produced a similar effect upon the minds of the citizens who went through it. And indeed such

Objection urged by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic, that it will be two cities. Spiritual pride of the Guardians—contempt for the Demos.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. II. 5, p. 1264, a. 24. *ἐν μίᾳ γὰρ πόλει δύο πόλεις, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, καὶ ταύτας ὁμογενεῖας ἀλλήλων.*

The most forcible of the objections urged by Aristotle against the Platonic Republic, are those contained in this chapter respecting the relations between the Guardians and the rest of the community.

² The oneness, which Plato pro-

claims as belonging to his whole city, belongs in reality only to the body of Guardians ; of whom he sometimes speaks as if they were the whole city, which however is not his real intention ; see Republic, v. p. 462-468 A.

³ *Τοὺς μὲν ἱεραῖους ἦγεν ἰσους μακάρεσσιν θεοῖσιν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἡγήει' οὐτ' ἐν λόγῳ οὐτ' ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ.*

an effect appears scarcely avoidable, under the circumstances assumed by Plato. He himself is proud of his own ideal training, so as to ascribe to those who receive it a sentiment akin to that of the Olympic victors: while he employs degrading analogies to signify the pursuits and enjoyments of the untrained multitude, who are assimilated to the appetite or lower element in the organism, existing only as a mutinous crew necessary to be kept down.¹ That spiritual pride, coupled with spiritual contempt, should be felt by the Guardians, is the natural result; as it is indeed the essential reimbursement to their feelings, for the life of drill and self-denial which Plato imposes upon them. And how, under such a sentiment, the two constituent elements in his system are to be competent to work out his promised result of mutual happiness, he has not shown.²

In explanation of the foregoing remarks, I will add that Plato fails in his purpose not from the goodness of the training which he provides for his select Few, but from leaving the rest of his people without any train-

¹ Plato, *Republ.* v. 465 D. Aristotle says (in the *Nikom. Ethics*, I. 5) when discussing the various ideas entertained about happiness—Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντὶ ἄνθρωπῳ ὁμοίως φαίνονται βουλεσθῆναι βίαν προαρουμένην. This is much the estimation which the Platonic Guardians would be apt to form respecting the Demos.

² The foregoing remarks are an expansion, and a sequel, of Aristotle's objection against the Platonic Republic—That it is not One City, but two discordant cities in that which is nominally One. I must however add that the same objection may be urged against the Xenophonic constitution of a city; and also, in substance, even against the proposition of Aristotle himself for the same purpose. Xenophon, in his *Cyropædia*, proposes a severe, life-long drill and discipline, like that of the Spartans: from which indeed he does not formally exclude any citizens, but which he announces to be actually attended only by the wealthy, since they alone can afford to attend continuously and habitually, the poorer men being engaged in the cares of maintenance. All the functions of the state, civil and military, are performed exclusively by those who go through the public discipline. We

have here the two cities in One, which Aristotle objects to in Plato; with the consequent loss of civic fraternity between them. And when we look to that which Aristotle himself suggests, we find him evading the objection by a formal sanction of the very mischief upon which the objection is founded. He puts the husbandmen and artisans altogether out of the pale of his city, which is made to include the disciplined citizens or Guardians alone. His city may thus be called One, inasmuch as it admits only homogeneous elements, and throws out all such as are heterogeneous; but he thus avowedly renounces as insoluble the problem which Plato and Xenophon try, though unsuccessfully, to solve. If there be discord and alienation among the constituent members of the Platonic and Xenophonic city—there will subsist the like feelings, in Aristotle's proposition, between the members of the city and the outlying, though indispensable, adjuncts. There will be the same mischief in kind, and probably exaggerated in amount; since the abolition of the very name and idea of fellow-citizen tends to suppress altogether an influence of tutelary character, however insufficient as to its force.

ing—without even so much as would enable them ^{provides no} properly to appreciate superior training in the few ^{training for} the Demos. who obtain it—without any powers of self-defence or self-helpfulness. His fundamental postulate—That every man shall do only one thing—when applied to the Guardians, realises itself in something great and considerable: but when applied to the ordinary pursuits of life, reduces every man to a special machine, unfit for any other purpose than its own. Though it is reasonable that a man should get his living by one trade, and should therefore qualify himself peculiarly and effectively for that trade—it is not reasonable that he should be altogether impotent as to every thing else: nor that his happiness should consist, as Plato declares that it ought, exclusively in the performance of this one service to the commonwealth. In the Platonic Republic, the body of the people are represented not only as without training, but as machines rather than individual men. They exist partly as producers to maintain, partly as governable matter to obey, the Guardians; and to be cared for by them.

Aristotle, when speaking about the citizens of his own ideal commonwealth (his citizens form nearly the same numerical proportion of the whole population, as the Platonic Guardians), tells us—"Since the End for which the entire City exists is One, it is obviously necessary that the education of all the citizens should be one and the same, and that the care of such education should be a public duty—not left in private hands as it is now, for a man to teach his children what he thinks fit. Public exigencies must be provided for by public training. Moreover, we ought not to regard any of the citizens as belonging to himself, but all of them as belonging to the city: for each is a part of the city: and nature prescribes that the care of each part shall be regulated with a view to the care of the whole."¹

The broad principle thus laid down by Aristotle is common to

¹ Aristotel. Politic. viii. 1, p. 1337, a. 21. 'Ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ τέλος τῇ πόλει πέσοι, φανερόν ἐστι καὶ τὴν παιδείαν μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντων, καὶ ταύτης τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ μὴ κατ' ἰδίαν· ὅν τρόπον νῦν ἐκαστος ἐπιμελεῖται τῶν αὐτοῦ τέκνων ἰδίᾳ

τε καὶ μάθησιν ἰδίαν, ἣν ἂν δόξῃ, διδάσκων . . . Ἀλλὰ δὲ οὐδὲ χρὴ νομίζειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦ τινα εἶναι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ πάντας τῆς πόλεως· . . . ἢ δ' ἐπιμέλεια πέφυκεν ἐκάστου μορίου βλέπειν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου ἐπιμέλειαν.

Principle of Aristotle—That every citizen belongs to the city, not to himself—applied by Plato to women.

him with Plato, and lies at the bottom of the schemes of polity imagined by both. Each has his own way of applying it.

Plato clearly perceives that it cannot be applied with consistency and effect, unless women are brought under its application as well as men. And to a great extent, Aristotle holds the same opinion too. While commending the Spartan principle, that the character of the citizen must be formed and upheld by continued public training and discipline—Aristotle blames Lykurgus for leaving the women (that is, a numerical half of the city) without training or discipline; which omission produced (he says) very mischievous effects, especially in corrupting the character of the men. He pronounces this to be a serious fault, making the constitution inconsistent and self-contradictory, and indeed contrary to the intentions of Lykurgus himself; who had tried to bring the women under public discipline as well as the men, but was forced to desist by their strenuous opposition.¹ Such remarks from Aristotle are the more remarkable, since it appears as matter of history, that the maidens at Sparta (though not the married women) did to a great extent go through gymnastic exercises along with the young men.² These exercises,

¹ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 9, p. 1269, b. 12. "Εἰ δ' ἡ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἀνεσις καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως . . . ἴσται ἐν ὅσῃς πολιτείαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ἡμῖν τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. Ὅπερ ἐκεῖ (at Sparta) συμβέβηκεν· ὅλην γὰρ τὴν πόλιν ὁ νομοθέτης εἶναι βουλόμενος καρτερικῆν, κατὰ μὲν τοὺς ἀνδρας φανερός ἐστι τοιοῦτος ὢν, ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν ἐξημέληκεν, &c. . . . Τὰ δὲ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἔχοντα μὴ καλῶς δοκεῖν οὐ μόνον ἀπρεπιδίαν τινα ποιεῖν τῆς πόλεως αὐτῆς καθ' αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ συμβάλλεσθαι τι πρὸς τὴν φιλοχρηματίαν.

Plato has a similar remark, Legg. vi. pp. 780-781.

² Stallbaum (in his note on Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 C, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν παρ' ἡμῶν ἀνεσιν) observes—"Lacernarum licentiam, quum ex aliis institutis patris, tum ex gymnicarum exercitacionum usu repetendam, Plato carpit etiam infra," &c. This is a mistake. Plato does not blame the gymnastic exercises of the Spartan

maidens: the four passages to which Stallbaum refers do not prove his assertion. They even countenance the reverse of that assertion. Plato approves of gymnastic and military exercises for maidens in the Laws, and for all the female Guardians in the Republic.

Stallbaum also refers to Aristotle as disapproving the gymnastic exercises of the Spartan maidens. I cannot think that this is correct. Aristotle does indeed blame the arrangements for women at Sparta, but not, as I understand him, because the women were subjected to gymnastic exercise; his blame is founded on the circumstance that the women were not regulated, but left to do as they pleased, while the men were under the strictest drill. This I conceive to be the meaning of γυναικῶν ἀνεσις. Euripides indeed has a very bitter passage condemning the exercises of the Spartan maidens; but neither Plato nor Aristotle shared this view.

Respecting the Spartan maidens and their exercises, see Xenophon, Republ. Laced. i. 4; Plutarch, Lykurg. c. 14.

though almost a singular exception in Greece, must have appeared to Aristotle very insufficient. What amount or kind of regulation he himself would propose for women, he has not defined. In his own ideal commonwealth, he lays it down as alike essential for men and women to have their bodies trained and exercised so as to be adequate to the active duties of free persons (as contrasted with the harder preparation requisite for the athletic contests, which he disapproves), but he does not go into farther particulars.¹ The regulations which he proposes, too, with reference to marriage generally and to the maintenance of a vigorous breed of citizens, show, that he considered it an important part of the lawgiver's duty to keep up by positive interference the physical condition both of males and females.²

In principle, therefore, Aristotle agrees with Plato,³ as to the propriety of comprehending women as well as men under public training and discipline: but he does not follow out the principle with the same consistency. He maintains the Platonic Commonwealth to be impossible.⁴

If we go through the separate objections which Aristotle advances as justifying his verdict, we shall find them altogether inadequate for the purpose. He shows certain inconveniences and difficulties as belonging to it,—which are by no means all real, but which, even conceding them in full force, would have to be set against the objections admitted by himself to bear against other actual societies before we can determine whether they are sufficiently weighty to render the scheme to which they belong impossible. The Platonic com-

Aristotle declares the Platonic Commonwealth impossible—In what sense this is true.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1335, b. 8. Πανοικίαν μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν πόλιν, πανοικίαν δὲ πόλιν μὴ βίαιος, μηδὲ πρὸς ἑα μόνον, ὥσπερ ἡ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἔστι, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὰς τῶν ἐλευθέρων πράξεις. Ὁμοίως δὲ δεῖ ταῖς ὑπόλοιπαις ἀνδράσι καὶ γυναῖσι. Compare also i. 3, near the end of the first book.

² Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1335, a. 20, b. 16.

³ If we take the sentence from Aristotle's Politics, cited in a note immediately preceding, to the effect that all the citizens belonged to the city, and that each was a part of the

city (viii. 1, p. 1337, a. 28) in conjunction with another passage in the Politics (i. 3, p. 1254, a. 10)—Τό τε γὰρ μέριον, οὐ μόνον ἄλλου ἐστὶ μέρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅλως ἑαυτοῦ—it is difficult to see how he can, consistently with these principles, assign to his citizens any individual self-regarding agency. Plato denies all such to his Guardians, and in so doing he makes deductions consistent with the principles of Aristotle, who lays down his principles too absolutely for the use which he afterwards makes of them.

⁴ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 5, p. 1263, b. 29. φαίνεται δ' εἶναι πάντων ἀδύνατος ὁ βίος.

monwealth, and the Aristotelian commonwealth, are both of them impossible, in my judgment, for the same reason: that all the various communities of mankind exist under established customs, beliefs, and sentiments, in complete discordance with them: and that we cannot understand from whence the force is to come, tending and competent to generate either of these two new systematic projects. Both of them require a simultaneous production of many reciprocally adapted elements: both therefore require an express initiative force, exceptional and belonging to some peculiar crisis—something analogous to Zeus in Krete, and to Apollo at Sparta. This is alike true of both: though the Platonic Republic, departing more widely from received principles and sentiments than the Aristotelian, would of course require a more potent initiative.¹ In the treatises of the two philosophers, each explains and vindicates the principles of his system, without including in the hypothesis any specification of a probable source from whence it was to acquire its first start. Where is the motive, operative, demi-urgic force, ready to translate such an idea into reality?² But if we assume that either of them had once begun, there is no reason why it might not have continued. The causes which

¹ Plato indeed in one place tells us that a single despot, becoming by inspiration or accident a philosopher, and having an obedient city, would accomplish the primary construction of his commonwealth (*Republic*, vi. p. 502 B). That despot (Plato supposes) will send away all the population of his city above ten years old, and will train up the children in the Platonic principles (vii. pp. 540-541).

This is little better than an *εὐχή*, whatever Plato may say to deprecate the charge of uttering *εὐχές*, p. 540 D.

² *Aristotel. Metaphys. A. p. 991, a. 22. Τὴ γὰρ ἰστέν τὸ ἐργαζόμενον, πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον;*

We find Aristotle arguing, in the course of his remarks on the Platonic Republic, that it is useless now to promulgate any such novelties; a long time has elapsed, and such things would already have been found established if they had been good (*Politic. ii. 5, p. 1264, a. 2*). This would have applied (somewhat less in degree, yet

with quite sufficient force) to the ideal commonwealth of Aristotle himself, as well as to that of Plato.

Because such institutions have never yet been established anywhere as those proposed by Plato or Aristotle, you cannot fairly argue that they would not be good, or that they would not stand if established. What you may fairly argue is, that they are not at all likely to be established: no originating force will be forthcoming adequate to the first creation of them. Existing societies have fixed modes of thinking and feeling on social and political matters; each moves in its own groove, and the direction in which it will henceforward move will be a consequence and continuance of the direction in which it is already moving, by virtue of powerful causes now in operation. New originating force is a very rare phenomenon. Overwhelming enemies or physical calamities may destroy what exists, but they will not produce any such innovations as those under discussion.

first brought about the Spartan constitution and discipline must have been very peculiar, though we have no historical account what they were. At any rate they never occurred a second time; for no second Sparta was ever formed, in spite of the admiration inspired by the first. If Sparta had never been actually established, and if Aristotle had read a description of it as a mere project, he would probably have pronounced it impracticable:¹ though when once brought into reality, it proved eminently durable. In like manner, the laws, customs, beliefs, and feelings, prevalent in Egypt,—which astonished so vehemently Herodotus and other observing Greeks—would have been declared to be impossible, if described simply in project: yet, when once established, they were found to last longer without change than those of other nations.

The Platonic project is submitted, however, not to impartial judges comparing different views on matters yet undetermined, but to hearers with a canon of criticism already fixed and anti-Platonic "*animis consuetudine imbutis*". It appears impossible, because it contradicts sentiments conceived as fundamental and consecrated, respecting the sexual and family relations. The supposed impossibility is the mode of expressing strong disapprobation and repugnance: like that which Herodotus describes as manifested by the Greeks on one side and by the Indians on the other—when Darius, having asked each of them at what price they would consent to adopt the practice of the other respecting the mode of treating the bodies of deceased parents, was answered by a loud cry of horror at the mere proposition.² The reasons offered to prove the Platonic project impossible, are principally founded upon the very sentiment above adverted to, and derive all their force from being associated with it. Such is the character of many among the Aristotelian objections.³ The real, and the truly

The real impossibility of the Platonic Commonwealth, arises from the fact that discordant sentiments are already established.

¹ Plato himself makes this very remark in the *Treatise De Legibus* (viii. p. 839 D) in defending the practicability of some of the ordinances therein recommended.

² Herodot. iii. 58. οἱ δὲ, ἀμβώσαντες μέγα, εὐφημέειν μὴ ἐκείνων.

Plato in a remarkable passage of

the *Leges* (l. 638 B), deprecates and complains of this instantaneous condemnation without impartial hearing of argument on both sides.

³ See the arguments urged by Aristotle, *Polit. ii. 4*, p. 1262, a. 25 et seq. His remarks upon the fictions which Plato requires to be impressed on the

forcible, objection consists in the sentiment itself. If that be deeply rooted in the mind, it is decisive. To those who feel thus, the Platonic project would be both intolerable and impossible.

But we must recollect that it is these very sentiments which Plato impugns and declares to be inapplicable to his Guardians: so that an opponent who, not breaking off at once with the cry of horror uttered by the Indians to Darius, begins to discuss the question with him, is bound to forego objections and repugnances springing as corollaries from a basis avowedly denied. Plato has earnest feelings of right and wrong, in regard both to the functions of women and to the sexual intercourse: but his feelings dissent entirely from those of readers generally. That is right, in his opinion, which tends to keep up the excellence of the breed and the proper number of Guardians, as well as to ensure the exact and constant fulfilment of their mission: that is wrong, which tends to defeat or abridge such fulfilment, or to impair the breed, or to multiply the number beyond its proper limit. Of these ends the Rulers are the proper judges, not the individual

belief of his Guardians are extremely just. There are, however, several objections urged by him which turn more upon the Platonic language than upon the Platonic vein of thought, and which, if judged by Plato from his own point of view, would have appeared admissions in his favour rather than objections. In reply to Plato, whose aim it is that all or many of the Guardians shall say *mine* in reference to the same persons or the same things, and not in reference to different persons and different things, Aristotle contends that the word *mine* will not then designate any such strong affection as it does now, when it is special, exclusive, and concentrated on a few persons or things; that each Guardian, having many persons whom he called *brother* and many persons whom he called *father*, would not feel towards them as persons now feel towards brothers and fathers; that the affection by being disseminated would be weakened, and would become nothing more than a "*diluted friendship*"—*φιλία ὑδαρής*. See Aristot.

Politic. ii. 3, p. 1261, b. 22; ii. 4, p. 1262, b. 15.

Plato, if called upon for an answer to this reasoning, would probably have allowed it to be just; but would have said that the "*diluted friendship*" pervading all the Guardians was apt and sufficient for his purpose, as bringing the whole number most nearly into the condition of one organism. Strong exclusive affections, upon whatever founded, between individuals, he wishes to discourage: the hateful or unfriendly sentiments he is bent on rooting out. What he desires to see preponderant, in each Guardian, is a sense of duty to the public: subordinate to that, he approves moderate and kindly affections, embracing all the Guardians; towards the elders as fathers, towards those of the same age as brothers. Aristotle's expression—*φιλία ὑδαρής*—describes such a sentiment fairly enough. See Republic, v. pp. 462-463. It must be conceded, however, that Plato's language is open to Aristotle's objection.

person. All the Guardians are enjoined to leave the sexual power absolutely unexercised until the age of thirty for men, of twenty for women—and then only to exercise it under express sanction and authorisation, according as the Rulers may consider that children are needed to keep up the legitimate number.

Marriage is regarded as holy, and celebrated under solemn rites—all the more because both the ceremony is originated, and the couples selected, by the magistrates, for the most important public purpose: which being fulfilled, the marriage ceases and determines. It is not celebrated with a view to the couple themselves, still less with a view to establish any permanent exclusive attachment between them: which object Plato not only does not contemplate, but positively discountenances: on the same general principle as the Catholic Church forbids marriage to priests: because he believes that it will create within them motives and sentiments inconsistent with the due discharge of their public mission.

It is clear that among such a regiment as that which Plato describes in his Guardians, a sentiment would grow up, respecting the intercourse of the sexes, totally different from that which prevailed elsewhere around him. The Platonic restriction upon that intercourse (until the ulterior limits of age) would be far more severe: but it would be applied with reference to different objects. Instead of being applied to enforce the exclusive consecration of one woman to one man, choosing each other or chosen by fathers, without any limit on the multiplication of children,—and without any attention to the maintenance or deterioration of the breed—it would be directed to the obtaining of the most perfect breed and of the appropriate number, leaving the Guardians, female as well as male, free from all permanent distracting influences to interfere with the discharge of their public duties. In appreciating the details of the Platonic community, we must look at it with reference to this form of sexual morality; which would generate in the Guardians an appreciation of details consistent with itself both as to the women and as to the children. The sentiment of obligation, of right and wrong, respecting the relations of the

Different sentiment which would grow up in the Platonic Commonwealth respecting the sexual relations.

sexes, is everywhere very strong; but it does not everywhere attach to the same acts or objects. The important obligation for a woman never to show her face in public, which is held sacred through so large a portion of the Oriental world, is noway recognised in the Occidental: and in Plato's time, when mankind were more disseminated among small independent communities, the divergence was yet greater than it is now. The Spartans were not induced, by the censures or mockery of persons in other Grecian cities,¹ to suppress the gymnastic exercises practised by their maidens in conjunction with the young men: nor is Plato deterred by the ridicule or blame which others may express, from proclaiming his conviction, that the virtue of his female Guardians is the same as that of the male—consisting in the faithful performance of their duty as Guardians, after going through all the requisite training, gymnastic and musical. And he follows this up by the general declaration, one of the most emphatic in all his writings, "The best thing which is now said or ever has been said, is, that what is profitable is honourable—and what is hurtful, is base."²

What Nature pre-
scribes in
regard to
the rela-
tions of the
two sexes
—Direct
contradic-
tion be-

Plato in truth reduces the distinction between the two sexes to its lowest terms: to the physical difference in regard to procreation—and to the general fact, that the female is every way weaker and inferior to the male; while yet, individually taken, many women are superior to many men, and both sexes are alike improvable by training. He maintains that this similarity of training and function is the real order of Nature, and that

¹ Eurip. Androm. 508.

The criticisms of Xenophon in the first chapter of his treatise, De Laced. Republ., exhibit a point of view on many points analogous to that of Plato respecting the female sex, and differing from that which he puts into the mouth of Ischomachus in his *Oikonomika*. See above, p. 172, note ³. Among the lost treatises of Kleantes, successor of Zeno as Scholar of the Stoic School, one was composed expressly to show "Ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἀνδρὶ καὶ γυναικί." (Diog. Laert. vii. 175.)

² Plato, *Repub.* v. p. 457 A-B. 'Απο-

δοτόν δὲ ταῖς τῶν φυλάκων γυναιξίν, ἐπεὶ αὐτὰν ἀρετὴν ἀντὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀμφοῖ-
σονται, καὶ κοινωνήσουσιν πολλόν τι καὶ
τῆς ἄλλης φυλακῆς τῆς περὶ τὴν πόλιν,
καὶ οὐκ ἄλλα πρακτόν· τούτων δ' αὖ-
τῶν τὰ ἐλαφρότερα ταῖς γυναιξίν ἢ τοῖς
ἀνδράσι δοτόν, διὰ τῆς τοῦ γένους
ἀσθένειας. Ὁ δὲ γέλων ἀνὴρ ἐπὶ γυ-
μναῖς γυναιξί, τοῦ βελτίστου ἔνεκα
γυμναζομένης, ἀτελὴ τοῦ γελίου σο-
φίας ὀρέσων καρπὸν, οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ὥς
τοκεν, ἐφ' ᾧ γελὲ οὐδ' ὅ, τι πράττει.
Κάλλιστα γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο καὶ λέ-
γεται καὶ λεγέσεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν
ωφελίμον, καλόν—τὸ δὲ βλαβε-
ρόν, αἰσχρόν.

the opposite practice, which insists on a separation of life and functions between the sexes, is unnatural :¹ which doctrine he partly enforces by the analogy of the two sexes in other animals.² Aristotle disputes this reasoning altogether : declaring that Nature prescribes a separation of life and functions between the two sexes—that the relation of man to woman is that of superiority and command on one side, inferiority and obedience on the other, like the relation between father and child, master and slave, though with a difference less in degree—that virtue in a man, and virtue in a woman, are quite different, imposing diverse obligations.³ It shows how little stress can be laid on arguments based on the word *Nature*, when we see two such distinguished thinkers completely at issue as to the question, what Nature indicates, in this important case. Each of them decorates by that name the rule which he himself approves ; whether actually realised anywhere, or merely recommended as a reform of something really existing. In this controversy, Aristotle had in his favour the actualities around him, against Plato : but Aristotle himself is far from always recognising experience and practice as authoritative interpreters of the dictates of Nature, as we may see by his own ideal commonwealth.

How strongly Plato was attached to his doctrines about the capacity of women—how unchanged his opinion continued about the mischief of separating the training and functions of the two sexes, and of confining women to indoor occupations, or to what he calls “a life of darkness and fear”⁴—may be seen farther by his Treatise *De Legibus*. Although in that treatise he recedes (perforce and without retracting) from the principles of his Republic, so far as to admit separate properties and families for all his citizens—yet he still continues to enjoin public gymnastic and military training, for women and men alike : and he still

Opinion of Plato respecting the capacities of women, and the training proper for women, is maintained in the *Leges*, as well as in the Republic. Ancient legends

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 456 C. τὰ τὴν παρὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμενα παρὰ φύσιν μᾶλλον, &c. Also p. 466 D.

² Compare a similar appeal to the analogy of animals, as proving the *ἔρως ἀβέβαιον* to be unnatural, Plato,

Legg. viii. p. 836 C.

³ Aristotol. Politic. i. 13, p. 1260, a. 20-30.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 781 C. εἰδυμένον γὰρ δεδαικός καὶ σκοτεινὸν ζῆν, &c.

harmonising with this opinion. opens, to both sexes alike, superintending social functions to a great extent, as well as the privilege of being honoured by public hymns after death, in case of distinguished merit.¹ Respecting military matters, he speaks with peculiar earnestness. That women are perfectly capable of efficient military service, if properly trained, he proves not only by the ancient legends, but also by facts actual and contemporary, the known valour of the Scythian and Sarmatian women. Whatever doubts persons may have hitherto cherished (says Plato), this is now established matter of fact:² the cowardice and impotence of women is not less disgraceful in itself than detrimental to the city, as robbing it of one-half of its possible force.³ He complains bitterly of the repugnance felt even to the discussion of this proposition.⁴ Most undoubtedly, there were ancient legends which tended much to countenance his opinion. The warlike Amazons, daughters of Arès, were among the most formidable forces that had ever appeared on earth; they had shown their power once by invading Attica and bringing such peril on Athens, that it required all the energy of the great Athenian hero Theseus to repel them. We must remember that these stories were not only familiarised to the public eye in conspicuous painting and sculpture, but were also fully believed as

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 795 C, 796 C, 802 A.

² *Plat. Legg.* vii. pp. 804-805-806. 804 E: ἀκούων μὲν γὰρ ὅθι μύθους παλαιούς πεπαισμαι, τὰ δὲ νῦν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, οἷσα ὅτι μυριάδες ἀναριθμητοὶ γυναῖκες εἰσὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν Πόντον, ἐς Λαυροματίδας καλοῦσιν, αἷς οὐχ ἴστων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τόξων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅλων κοινῶν καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἰσὴ προστεταγμένα ἴσως ἀσκέειν. We may doubt whether Plato knew anything of the brave and skilful Artemisia, queen of Halikarnassus, who so greatly distinguished herself in the expedition of Xerxes against Greece (*Herod.* vii. 99, viii. 87), and, indeed, whether he had ever read the history of Herodotus. His argument might have been strengthened by another equally pertinent example, if he could have quoted the original letter addressed by the Emperor Aurlian to the Roman Senate, attesting the courage, vigour, and prudence, of Zenobia,

queen of Palmyra. *Trebellius Pollio, Vitis Triginta Tyrannorum in Histor. August.* p. 198 (*De Zenobia*, xxix. : cap. xxx.): "Audio, Patres Conscripti, mihi obijci, quod non virile munus impleverim, Zenobiam triumphando. Næ, illi qui me reprehendunt, satis laudarent, si scirent qualis illa est mulier, quam prudens in consiliis, quam constans in dispositionibus, quam erga milites gravis, quam larga cum necessitas postulet, quam tristis cum severitas poscat. Possum dicere illius esse quod Odenatus Persas vicit, ac fugato Sapore Ctesiphontem usque pervenit. Possum asserere, tanto apud Orientales et Ægyptiorum populos timori mulier fuisse, ut se non Arabes, non Saraceni, non Armeni, commoverent. Nec ego illi vitam conservassem, nisi eam scissem multum Romanæ Reipublicæ profuisse, cum sibi vel liberis suis Orientis servaret imperium."

³ Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 812-814.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 781 D.

matters of past history.¹ Moreover the Goddess Athênê, patroness of Athens, was the very impersonation of intelligent terror-striking might—constraining and subduing Arês² himself: the Goddess Enô presided over war, no less than the God Arês:³ lastly Artemis, though making war only on wild beasts, was hardly less formidable in her way—indefatigable as well as rapid in her movements—and unerring with her bow, as Athênê was irresistible with her spear. Here were abundant examples in Grecian legend, to embolden Plato in his affirmations respecting the capacity of the female sex for warlike enterprise and laborious endurance.

The two Goddesses, Athênê and Artemis, were among the few altogether insensible to amorous influences and to the inspirations of Aphroditê: who is the object of contemptuous sarcasm on the part of Athênê, and of repulsive antipathy on the part of Artemis.⁴ This may supply an illustration for the Republic of Plato. As far as one can guess what the effect of his institutions would have been, it is probable that the influence of Aphroditê would have been at its minimum among his Guardians of both sexes: as it was presented in the warlike dramas of Æschylus.⁵ There would have been everything to deaden it, with an entire absence of all provocatives. The muscular development, but rough and unadorned bodies, of females—

In a Commonwealth like the Platonic, the influence of Aphroditê would probably have been reduced to a minimum.

Sabina qualis, aut perusta solibus

Pernicis uxor Apuli—(HOR. Epod. II. 41-42).

the indiscriminate companionship, with perfect identity of treatment and manners, between the two sexes from the earliest infancy—the training of both together for the same public duties,

¹ Plutarch, Theseus, c. 37; Æschylus, Eumenid. 682; Isokrates, Panegy. ss. 76-78. How popular a subject the Amazons were for sculptors, we learn from the statement of Pliny (xxxiv. 8, 19) that all the most distinguished sculptors executed Amazons; and that this subject was the only one upon which a direct comparison could be made between them.

² Homer, *Iliad*, xv. 123.

³ Homer, *Iliad*, v. 333-392.

⁴ Homer, Hymn. ad Venerem, 10; *Iliad*, v. 425; Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 1400-1420.

Athênê combined the attributes of φιλοπόλεμος and φιλόσοφος. Plato, *Timæus*, p. 24 D; compare *Kritias*, p. 109 D.

⁵ See Aristophan. *Ranæ*, 1042.

Eurip. *Mê Ai'* οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν τῆς Ἀφροδίτης οὐδὲν σοί.

Æschyl. *Mêdê* γ' ἐπεὶ. Ἀλλ' ἐπὶ σοὶ τοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖσιν πολλὰ πολλοῦ πικρῆται.

the constant occupation of both throughout life in the performance of those duties, under unceasing official supervision—the strict regulation of exercise and diet, together with the monastic censorship on all poetry and literature—the self-restraint, equal and universal, enforced as the characteristic feature and pride of the regiment, and seconded by the jealous espionage of all over all, the more potent because privacy was unknown—such an assemblage of circumstances would do as much as circumstances could do to starve the sexual appetite, to prevent it from becoming the root of emotional or imaginative associations, and to place it under the full controul of the lawgiver for purposes altogether public. Such was probably Plato's intention: since he more generally regards the appetites as enemies to be combated and extirpated so far as practicable—rather than as sources of pleasure, yet liable to accompaniments of pain, requiring to be regulated so as to exclude the latter and retain the former.

The public purposes, with a view to which Plato sought to controul the sexual appetite in his Guardians, were three, as I have already stated. 1. To obtain from each of them individually, faithful performance of the public duties, and observance of the limits, prescribed by his system. 2. To ensure the best and purest breed. 3. To maintain unaltered the same total number, without excess or deficiency.

The first of these three purposes is peculiar to the Platonic system. The two last are not peculiar to it. Aristotle recognises them¹ as ends, no less than Plato, though he does not approve Plato's means for attaining them. In reference to the limitation of number, Aristotle is even more pronounced than Plato. The great evil of over-population forced itself upon these philosophers; living as both of them did among small communities, each with its narrow area hedged in by others—each liable to intestine dispute, sometimes caused, always aggravated, by the presence of large families and numerous poor freemen—and each importing bought slaves as labourers. To obtain for their community the quickest possible

Other purposes of Plato—limitation of number of Guardians—common to Aristotle also.

Law of population expounded by Malthus—Three distinct checks to population—alternative open between preventive and positive.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16.

increase in aggregate wealth and population, was an end which they did not account either desirable or commendable. The stationary state, far from appearing repulsive or discouraging, was what they looked upon as the best arrangement¹ of things. A mixed number of lots of land, indivisible and inalienable, is the first principle of the Platonic community in the treatise *De Legibus*. Not to encourage wealth, but to avert, as far as possible, the evils of poverty and dependence, and to restrain within narrow limits the proportion of the population which suffered those evils—was considered by Plato and Aristotle to be among the gravest problems for the solution of the statesman.² Consistent with these conditions, essential to security and tranquillity, whatever the form of government might be, there was only room for the free population then existing: not always for that (seeing that the proportion of poor citizens was often uncomfortably great), and never for any sensible increase above that. If all the children were born and brought up, that it was possible for adult couples to produce, a fearful aggravation of poverty, with all its accompanying public troubles and sufferings, would have been inevitable.³ Accordingly both Plato (for the Guardians in the *Republic*) and Aristotle agree in opinion that a limit must be fixed upon the number of children which each couple is permitted to introduce. If any objector had argued that each couple, by going through the solemnity of marriage, acquired a natural right to produce as many children as they could, and that others were under a natural obligation to support those children—both philosophers would have denied the plea altogether. But they went even further. They considered procreation as a duty

¹ Compare the view (not unlike though founded on different reasons) of the stationary state taken by Mr. John Stuart Mill, in a valuable chapter of his *Principles of Political Economy*, Book iv. chap. 6. He says (s. 2):—"The best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back by the efforts of others to push themselves forward". This would come near to the views of Plato and Aristotle.

² See a striking passage in Plato, *Legg.* v. pp. 742-743. He speaks of rich men as they are spoken of in some

verses of the Gospels—a very rich man can hardly be a good man. Wealth and poverty are both of them evils, p. 744 D. *Repub.* iv. p. 421.

³ Pheidon the Corinthian, an ancient lawgiver (we do not know when or where), prescribed an unchangeable number both of lots (of land) and of citizens, but the lots were not to be unequal. *Aristot. Politic.* ii. 6, p. 1266, b. 14.

⁴ *Aristot. Politic.* ii. 6, p. 1266, b. 10. Τὸ δ' ἀφείσθαι (τὴν τελευτοειαν ἀδρι-
στον), καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς πλείοσιν πό-
λεσιν, πενίας ἀναγκαῖον αἰτίον γίνεσθαι
τοῖς πολίταις· ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν
ἐμποεῖ καὶ κακοουρίαν. Compare *Ibid.*
ii. 7, p. 1266, b. 8.

hich each citizen owed to the public, in order that the total of citizens might not fall below the proper minimum—yet as a duty which required controul, in order that the total might not rise above the proper maximum.¹ Hence they did not even admit the right of each couple to produce as many children as their private means could support. They thought it necessary to impose a limit on the number of children in every family, binding equally on rich and poor: the number prescribed might be varied from time to time, as circumstances indicated. As the community could not safely admit more than a certain aggregate of births, these philosophers commanded all couples indiscriminately, the rich not excepted, to shape their conduct with a view to that imperative necessity.

Plato in his Republic (as I have already mentioned) assumes for his Archons the privilege of selecting (by a pretended sortition) the couples through whom the legitimate amount of breeding shall be accomplished: in the semi-Platonic commonwealth (De Legibus), he leaves the choice free, but prescribes the limits of age, rendering marriage a peremptory duty between twenty and thirty-five years of age, and adding some emphatic exhortations, though not peremptory enactments, respecting the principles which ought to guide individual choice.² In the same manner too he deals with procreation: recognising the necessity of imposing a limit on individual discretion, yet not naming that limit by law, but leaving it to be enforced according to circumstances by the magistrates: who (he says), by advice, praise, and censure, can apply either effective restraints on procreation, or encouragements if the case requires.³ Aristotle blames this

¹ Aristotel. Politic. vii. 16, p. 1835, b. 28-38. λειτουργεῖν πρὸς τεκνοποιεῖν . . . ἀφείσθαι δεῖ τῆς εἰς τὸ φανερόν γεννήσεως.

Plato, Republic, v. pp. 460-461. τίσταιν τῇ πόλει—γεννῆν τῇ πόλει—τῶν εἰς τὸ κοινὸν γεννήσεων.

² Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 772-773-774. The wording is characteristic of the view taken by these philosophers, and of the extent to which they subordinated individual sentiment to public considerations. κατὰ παρὸς εἰς ἕστω μῦθος γάμου· τὸν γὰρ τῇ πόλει δεῖ θυμφοροῦντα μνηστεύειν γάμον ἕκαστον, ἀλλ' ἢ δῖστον αὐτῷ. φέρεται δὲ πως

πᾶς δὲ κατὰ φύσιν πρὸς τὸν ὁμοίωτατος αὐτῷ, &c. (p. 773 B). In marriage (he says) the natural tendency is that like seeks like; but it is good for the city that like should be coupled to unlike, rich to poor, hasty tempers with sober tempers, &c., in order that the specialties may be blended together and mitigated. He does not pretend to embody this in a written law, but directs the authorities to obtain it as far as they can by exhortation. P. 783 E. Compare the Politikus, p. 811.

³ Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 D. πορίζεσθαι μηχανὴν ὅτι μάλιστα, ὥστε αἱ περτα-

guarantee as insufficient: he feels so strongly the necessity of limiting procreation, that he is not satisfied unless a proper limit be imposed by positive law. Unless such a result be made thoroughly sure (he says), all other measures of lawgivers for equalising properties, or averting poverty and the discontents growing out of it—must fail in effect.¹ Aristotle also lays it down as a part of the duty of the lawgiver to take care that the bodies of the children brought up shall be as good as possible: hence he prescribes the ages proper for marriage, and the age after which no parents are to produce any more children.²

The paramount necessity of limiting the number of children born in each family, here enforced by Plato and Aristotle, rests upon that great social fact which Malthus so instructively expounded at the close of the last century. Malthus, enquiring specially into the law of population, showed upon what conditions the increase of population depends, and what were the causes constantly at work to hold it back—checks to population. He ranged these causes under three different heads, though the two last are multifarious in detail. 1. Moral or prudential restraint—the preventive check. 2. Vice, and 3. Misery—the two positive checks. He farther showed that though the aggregate repressive effect of these three causes is infallible and inevitable, determined by the circumstances of each given society—yet that mankind might exercise an option through which of the three the check should be applied: that the effect of the two last causes was in inverse proportion to that of the first—in other words, that the less there was of pruden-

πισχίλια καὶ τετραράκοιτα οἰκόνους δεῖ μένον ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπισχίσαις γενέσεται, οἷς ἂν εὐρὺς εἴη γένεσις, καὶ τοῦναντίον ἐπιμειλίας καὶ σπουδαὶ πλεόντων γεννημάτων εἶσι, &c.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. II. 6, p. 1264, a. 33; II. 7, p. 1266, b. 10; VII. 16.

Aristotle has not fully considered all that Plato says, when he blames him for inconsistency in proposing to keep properties equal, without taking pains to impose and maintain a constant limit on offspring in families. Ἄριστον δὲ καὶ τὸ τὰς κτήσεις ἰσάζοντα (Plato) τὸ περὶ τὸ πλεόντων τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ κατασκευάζειν, ἀλλ' ἀφείναι τὴν τεκνοποιίαν ἀόριστον, &c. (Aristot. Politic. II. 6, p. 1266, a. fin.)

What Plato really directs is stated in my text and in my note immediately preceding.

² Aristotel. Politic. VII. 16, p. 1334, b. 30. εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρεῖν δεῖ, ὥπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα γίγνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν, &c. He names thirty-seven as the age proper for a man, eighteen for a woman, to marry. At the age of fifty-five a man becomes unfit to procreate for the public, and none of his children are to appear (ἀφείσθαι τῆς αἰς τὸ φανερὸν γεννήσεως, VII. 16, p. 1336, b. 36).

tial restraint limiting the number of births, the more there must be of vice or misery, under some of their thousand forms, to shorten the lives of many of the children born—and *é converso*, the more there was of prudential restraint, the less would be the operation of the other checks tending to shorten life.

Three distinct facts—preventive restraint, vice, and misery—having nothing else in common, are arranged under one general head by Malthus, in consequence of the one single common property which they possess—that of operating as checks to population. To him, that one common property was the most important of all, and the most fit to be singled out as the groundwork of classification, having reference to the subject of his enquiry. But Plato and Aristotle looked at the subject in a different point of view. They had present to their minds the same three facts, and the tendency of the first to avert or abate the second and third: but as they were not investigating the law of population, they had nothing to call their attention to the one common property of the three. They did not regard vice and misery as causes tending to keep down population, but as being in themselves evils; enemies among the worst which the lawgiver had to encounter, in his efforts to establish a good political and social condition—and enemies which he could never successfully encounter, without regulating the number of births. Such regulation they considered as an essential tutelary measure to keep out disastrous poverty. The inverse proportion, between regulated or unregulated number of births on the one hand, and diminution or increase of poverty on the other, was seen as clearly by Aristotle and Plato as by Malthus.

Regulations of Plato and Aristotle as to number of births, and new-born children.

But these two Greek philosophers ordain something yet more remarkable. Having prescribed both the age of marriage and the number of permitted births, so as to ensure both vigorous citizens and a total compatible with the absence of corrupting poverty—they direct what shall be done if the result does not correspond to their orders. Plato in his Republic (as I have already stated) commands that all the children born to his wedded couples shall be immediately consigned to the care of public

nurses—that the offspring of the well-constituted parents shall be brought up, that of the ill-constituted parents not brought up—and that no children born of parents after the legitimate age shall be brought up.¹ Aristotle forbids the exposure of children, wherever the habits of the community are adverse to it: but if after any married couple have had the number of children allowed by law, the wife should again become pregnant, he directs that abortion shall be procured before the commencement of life or sense in the fœtus: after such commencement, he pronounces abortion to be wrong.² On another point Plato and Aristotle agree: both of them command that no child born crippled or deformed shall be brought up:³ a practice actually adopted at Sparta under the Lykurgian institutions, and even carried farther, since no child was allowed to be brought up until it had been inspected and approved by the public nurses.⁴

We here find both these philosophers not merely permitting, but enjoining—and the Spartan legislation, more admired than any in Greece, systematically realizing—practices which modern sentiment repudiates and punishes. Nothing can more strikingly illustrate—what Plato and Aristotle have themselves repeatedly observed⁵—how variable and indeterminate is the *matter* of ethical sentiment, in different ages and communities, while the *form* of ethical sentiment is the same universally: how all men agree subjec-

Such regulations disapproved and forbidden by modern sentiment—Variability of ethical sentiment as to objects approved or disapproved.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* v. pp. 459 D, 460 C, 461 C.

² Aristotel. *Politica*. vii. 16, 10, p. 1336, b. 30. Περὶ δὲ ἀποδόσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γινωσκόμενων, ὅσους νόμος, μηδὲν πεπρωμένον τρέφειν· διὰ δὲ πλεονος τέκνων, ἰὰν ἡ τάξις τῶν ἰδῶν κωλύῃ, μηδὲν ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γινωσκόμενων· ὥρισται γὰρ δὲ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλεονος. ἰὰν δὲ πῶς γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἰσθῆσιν ἰγνάνεσθαι καὶ ζῆναι, ἀποτίθεσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἀμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσον καὶ τὸ μὴ διαρισμένον τῇ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῇ ζῆν ἵσταται. For the text of this passage I have followed Bekker and the Berlin edition. As to the first half of the passage there are some material differences in the text and in the MSS.; some give ἰδῶν instead of ἰδῶν, and ὥρισθαι γὰρ δεῖ

instead of ὥρισται γὰρ δὲ. Compare Plato, *Theaetét.* 149 C.

³ Plato, *Republic*, v. p. 460 C. τὰ δὲ τῶν χειρόνων (τέκνα), καὶ ἰὰν τι τῶν ἰδῶν ἀνάπαιρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδύλῳ κατακρύψουσιν ὡς πρέπει. Aristot. *ut suprà*, ὅσους νόμος, μηδὲν πεπρωμένον τρέφειν, &c.

⁴ Plutarch, *Lykurgus*, c. 16.
⁵ Aristotel. *Politica*. viii. 2, p. 1337, b. 2. Περὶ τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν, οὐδὲν ἴσθιν ὁμολογουμένων· καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐδὲς πάντες τιμῶσιν· ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρουσι καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀσκησιν αὐτῆς.

Ethica Nicomach. i. 8, p. 1094, b. 15. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμον μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ.

tively, in that which they feel—disapprobation and hatred of wrong and vice, approbation and esteem of right and virtue—yet how much they differ objectively, as to the acts or persons which they designate by these names and towards which their feelings are directed. It is with these emotions as with the other emotions of human nature: all men are moved in the same manner, though in different degree, by love and hatred—hope and fear—desire and aversion—sympathy and antipathy—the emotions of the beautiful, the sublime, the ludicrous: but when we compare the objects, acts, or persons, which so move them, we find only a very partial agreement, amidst wide discrepancy and occasionally strong opposition.¹ The present case is one of the strongest opposition. Practices now abhorred as wrong, are here directly commanded by Plato and Aristotle, the two greatest authorities of the Hellenic world: men differing on many points from each other, but agreeing in this: men not only of lofty personal character, but also of first-rate intellectual force, in whom the ideas of virtue and vice had been as much developed by reflection as they ever have been in any mind: lastly, men who are extolled by the commentators as the champions of religion and sound morality, against what are styled the unprincipled cavils of the Sophists.

It is, in my judgment, both curious and interesting to study the manner in which these two illustrious men—Plato and Aristotle—dealt with the problem of population. Grave as that problem is in all times, it was peculiarly grave among the small republics of antiquity. Neither of them were disposed to ignore

Plato and Aristotle required subordination of impulse to reason and

¹ The extraordinary variety and discrepancy of approved and consecrated customs prevalent in different portions of the ancient world, is instructively set forth in the treatise of the Syrian Christian Bardisanes, in the time of the Antonines. A long extract from this treatise is given in Eusebius, *Preparat. Evang.*, vi. 10; it has been also published by Orelli, annexed to his edition (Zurich, 1834) of the argument of Alexander of Aphrodisias, *De Fato*, p. 202. Compare Euseb. *Hist. Eccles.* iv. 30.

Bardisanes is replying to the arguments of astrologers and calculators

of nativities, who asserted the uniform and uncontrollable influence of the heavenly bodies, in given positions, over human conduct. As a proof that mankind are not subject to any such necessity, but have a large sphere of freewill (*αὐτεξουσίαν*), he cites these numerous instances of diverse and contradictory institutions among different societies. Several of the most conspicuous among these differences relate to the institutions concerning sex and family, the conduct and occupations held obligatory in men and women, &c.

Compare Sextus Empiric., *Pyrrhon. Hypotyp.* iii. s. 198 seqq.

or overlook it: nor to impute to other causes the consequences which it produces: nor to treat as indifferent the question, whether poor couples had a greater or less family, to share subsistence already scanty for themselves. Still less were these philosophers disposed to sanction the short-sighted policy of some Hellenic statesmen, who under a mistaken view of increasing the power of the state, proclaimed encouragement and premium simply to the multiplication of male births, without any regard to the comfort and means of families. Both Plato and Aristotle saw plainly, that a married couple, by multiplying their offspring, produced serious effects not merely upon their own happiness but upon that of others besides: up to a certain limit, for good—beyond that limit, for evil. Hence they laid it down, that procreation ought to be a rational and advised act, governed by a forecast of those consequences—not a casual and unforeseen result of present impulse. The same preponderance of reason over impulse as they prescribed in other cases, they endeavoured to enforce in this. They regarded it too, not simply as a branch of prudence, but as a branch of duty; a debt due by each citizen to others and to the commonwealth. It was the main purpose of their elaborate political schemes, to produce a steady habit and course of virtue in all the citizens: and they considered every one as greatly deficient in virtue, who refused to look forward to the consequences of his own procreative acts—thereby contributing to bring upon the state an aggravated measure of poverty, which was the sure parent of discord, sedition, and crime. That the rate of total increase should not be so great as to produce these last-mentioned effects—and that the limit of virtue and prudence should be made operative on all the separate families—was in their judgment one of the most important cares of the lawgiver.

We ought to disengage this general drift and purpose, common both to Plato and Aristotle, on the subject of population, from the various means—partly objectionable, partly impossible to be enforced—whereby they intended to carry the purpose into effect.

I pass from Plato's picture of the entire regiment of Guardians, under the regulations above described—to his description of the special training whereby the few most

duty—they applied this to the procreative impulse, as to others.

Training of the few

select philosophers to act as chiefs. distinguished persons in the regiment (male or female, as the case may be) are to be improved, tested, and exalted to the capacity of philosophers: qualified to act as Rulers or Chiefs.¹ These are the two marked peculiarities of Plato's Republic. The Guardians are admirable as instruments, but have no initiative of their own: we have now to find the chiefs from whom they will receive it. How are philosophers to be formed? None but a chosen Few have the precious gold born with them, empowering them to attain this elevation. To those Few, if properly trained, the privilege and right to exercise command belongs, by Nature. For the rest, obedience is the duty prescribed by Nature.²

I have already given, in Chap. XXXV., a short summary of the peculiar scientific training which Sokrates prescribes for ripening these heroic aspirants into complete philosophers. They pass years of intellectual labour, all by their own spontaneous impulse, over and above the full training of Guardians. They study Arithmetic, Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy, Acoustics, &c., until the age of thirty: they then continue in the exercise of Dialectic, with all the test of question and answer, for five years longer: after which they enter upon the duties of practice and administration, succeeding ultimately to the position of chiefs if found competent. It is assumed that this long course of study, consummated by Dialectic, has operated within them that great mental revolution which Plato calls, turning the eye from the shadows in the cave to the realities of clear daylight: that they will no longer be absorbed in the sensible world or in passing phenomena, but will become familiar with the unchangeable Ideas or Forms of the Intelligible world, knowable only by intellectual intuition. Reason has with them been exalted to its highest power: not only strengthening them to surmount all intellectual difficulties and to deal with the most complicated conjectures of practice—but

¹ Plato, Republic, v. p. 473, vi. p. 508 B. τοὺς ἀκρίβεστάτους φύλακας φιλοσόφους δεῖ καθιστάναι. ἄλλοις μὲν τε ἀπτεσθαι, ἀκολουθεῖν τε τῷ ἡγουμένῳ.

² Plato, Republic, v. p. 474 B. τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει, ἀπτεσθαι τε φιλοσοφίας, ἡγεμονεύειν τ' ἐν πόλει. τοῖς δ' ὅτι σπάνιοι ἂν εἴεν. Also vi. 503, vii. 535. They are to be ἐκ τῶν προκρίτων πρόκριτοι, vii. 537 D.

also ennobling their dispositions, so as to overcome all the disturbing temptations and narrow misguiding prejudices inherent in the unregenerate man. Upon the perfection of character, emotional and intellectual, imparted to these few philosophers, depends the Platonic Commonwealth.

The remarks made by Plato on the effect of this preparatory curriculum, and on the various studies composing it, are highly interesting and instructive—even when they cannot be defended as exact. Much of what he so eloquently enunciates respecting philosophy and the philosophical character, is in fact just and profound, whatever view we may take as to Universals: whether we regard them (like Plato) as the only Real Entia, cognizable by the mental eye, and radically disparate from particulars—or whether we hold them to be only general Concepts, abstracted and generalised more or less exactly from particulars. The remarks made by Plato on the educational effect produced by Arithmetic and the other studies, are valuable and suggestive. Even the discredit which he throws on observations of fact, in Astronomy and Acoustics—the great antithesis between him and modern times—is useful as enabling us to enter into his point of view.¹

Valuable remarks on the effects of these preparatory studies.

But his point of view in the Republic differs materially from that which we read in other dialogues: especially in two ways.

Difference between the Republic and other dialogues—no mention

First, The scientific and long-continued Quadri-
vium, through which Plato here conducts the student

¹ Plato, *Repub.* vii. p. 529 C-D.

The manner in which Plato here depreciates astronomical observation is not easily reconcilable with his doctrine in the *Timæus*. He there tells us that the rotations of the *Nous* (intellective soul) in the interior of the human cranium, are cognate or analogous to those of the comical spheres, but more confused and less perfect: our eyesight being expressly intended for the purpose, that we might contemplate the perfect and unerring rotations of the comical spheres, so as to correct thereby the disturbed rotations in our own brain (*Timæus*, pp. 46-47).

Malebranche shares the feeling of

Plato on the subject of astronomical observation. *Recherche de la Vérité*, liv. iv. ch. vii. vol. ii. p. 219, ed. 1772 (p. 278, ed. 1781).

“Car enfin qu’y a-t-il de grand dans la connoissance des mouvemens des planètes? et n’en savons nous pas assez présentement pour régler nos mois et nos années? Qu’avons nous tant à faire de sçavoir, si Saturne est environné d’un anneau ou d’un grand nombre de petites lunes, et pourquoi prendre parti là-dessus? Pourquoi se glorifier d’avoir prédit la grandeur d’une éclipse, où l’on a peut-être mieux rencontré qu’un autre, parcequ’on a été plus heureux? Il y a des personnes destinées, par l’ordre du Prince, à ob-

of reminiscence, nor of the Elenchus.

to philosophy, is very different from the road to philosophy as indicated elsewhere. Nothing is here said about reminiscence—which in the Menon, Phædon, Phædrus, and elsewhere, stands in the foreground of his theory, as the engine for reviving in the mind Forms or Ideas. With these Forms it had been familiar during a prior state of existence, but they had become buried under the sensible impressions arising from its conjunction with the body. Nor do we find in the Republic any mention of that electric shock of the negative Elenchus, which (in the Theætétus, Sophistês, and several other dialogues) is declared indispensable for stirring up the natural mind not merely from ignorance and torpor, but even from a state positively distempered—the false persuasion of knowledge.

Secondly, following out this last observation, we perceive another discrepancy yet more striking, in the directions given by Plato respecting the study of Dialectic. He prescribes that it shall upon no account be taught to young men: and that it shall come last of all in teaching, only after the full preceding Quadrivium. He censures severely the prevalent practice of applying it to young men, as pregnant with mischief. Young men (he says) brought up in certain opinions inculcated by the lawgiver, as to what is just and honourable, are interrogated on these subjects, and have questions put to them. When asked What is the just and the honourable, they reply in the manner which they have learnt from authority: but this reply, being exposed to farther interrogatories, is shown to be untenable and inconsistent, such as they cannot defend to their own satisfaction. Hence they lose all respect for the established ethical creed, which however stands opposed in their minds to the seductions of immediate enjoyment: yet they acquire no new or better conviction in its place. Instead of following an established law, they thus come to live without any law.¹ Besides, young men when initiated in dialectic debate,

server les astres; contentons nous de leurs observations. . . . Nous devons être pleinement satisfaits sur une matière qui nous touche si peu, lorsqu'ils nous font partie de leurs découvertes."

¹ Plato, Republic, vii. pp. 528 D—529. *ὅταν τὸν οὕτως ἔχοντα ἄλλῳ ἐρωτήματα ἐρηται, τί ἐστὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἀποκρινάμενον ὁ τοῦ νομοθετοῦ ψικον ἐξελεγχῆ δὲ λόγος, καὶ πολλὰ καὶ πολλὰ*

take great delight in the process, as a means of exposing and puzzling the respondent. Copying the skilful interrogators whom they have found themselves unable to answer, they interrogate others in their turn, dispute everything, and pride themselves on exhibiting all the negative force of the Elenchus. Instead of employing dialectic debate for the discovery of truth, they use it merely as a disputatious pastime, and thus bring themselves as well as philosophy into discredit.¹

Accordingly, we must not admit (says Plato) either young men, or men of ordinary untrained minds, to dialectic debate. We must admit none but mature persons, of sedate disposition, properly prepared : who will employ it not for mere disputation, but for the investigation of truth.²

Now the doctrine thus proclaimed, with the grounds upon which it rests—That dialectic debate is unsuitable and prejudicial to young men—distinctly contradict both the principles laid down by himself elsewhere, and the frequent indications of his own dialogues : not to mention the practice of Sokrates as described by Xenophon. In the Platonic Parmenidés, and Theætétus, the season of youth is expressly pronounced to be that in which dialectic exercise is not merely appropriate, but indispensable to the subsequent attainment of truth.³ Moreover, Plato puts into the mouth of Parmenides a specimen intentionally given to represent that dialectic exercise which will be profitable to youth. The specimen is one full of perplexing, though ingenious, subtle-

Contradiction with the spirit of other dialogues—Parmenidés, &c.

ἐλέγχων εἰς δόξαν καταβαλῆ ὡς τοῦτο οὐδὲν μᾶλλον καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν, καὶ περὶ δικαίων ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ ἅ μάλιστα ἦεν ἐν τιμῇ, &c.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* vii. p. 539 B.

² Plato, *Repub.* vii. p. 539 D.

³ Plato, *Parmenidés*, pp. 135 D, 137 B. *Theætét.* 146 A.

Proklus, in his Commentary on the *Parmenidés* (p. 778, Stallbaum), adverts to the passage of the *Republic* here discussed, and endeavours to show that it is not inconsistent with the *Parmenidés*. He states that the exhortation to practise dialectic debate in youth, as the appropriate season, must be understood as specially and exclusively addressed to a youth of the extraordinary mental qualities of Sokrates ; while the passage in the *Re-*

public applies the prohibition only to the general regiment of Guardians. But this justification is noway satisfactory ; for Plato in the *Republic* makes no exception in favour of the most promising Guardians. He lays down the position generally. Again, in the *Parmenidés*, we find the encouragement to dialectic debate addressed not merely to the youthful Sokrates, but to the youthful Aristoteles (p. 137 B). Moreover, we are not to imagine that all the youths who are introduced as respondents in the Platonic dialogues are implied as equal to Sokrates himself, though they are naturally represented as superior and promising subjects. Compare Plato, *Sophistés*, p. 217 E ; *Politikus*, p. 257 E.

ties : ending in establishing, by different trains of reasoning, the affirmative, as well as the negative, of several distinct conclusions. Not only it supplies no new positive certainty, but it appears to render any such consummation more distant and less attainable than ever.¹ It is therefore eminently open to the censure which Plato pronounces, in the passage just cited from his Republic, against dialectic as addressed to young men. The like remark may be made upon the numerous other dialogues (though less extreme in negative subtlety than the *Parmenidés*), wherein the Platonic Sokrates interrogates youths (or interrogates others, in the presence of youths) without any positive result : as in the *Theætétus*, *Charmidés*, *Lysis*, *Alkibiadés*, *Hippias*, &c., to which we may add the conversations of the Xenophontic Sokrates with *Euthydemus* and others.²

In fact, the Platonic Sokrates expressly proclaims himself (in the *Apology* as well as in the other dialogues just named) to be ignorant and incapable of teaching anything. His mission was to expose the ignorance of those, who fancy that they know without really knowing : he taught no one anything, but he cross-examined every one who would submit to it, before all the world, and in a manner especially interesting to young men. Sokrates mentions that these young men not only listened with delight, but tried to imitate him as well as they could, by cross-examining others in the same manner :³ and in mentioning the fact, he expresses neither censure nor regret, but satisfaction in the thought that the chance would be thereby increased, of exposing that false persuasion of knowledge which prevailed so widely everywhere. Now Plato, in the passage just cited from the Republic, blames this contagious spirit of cross-examination on the part of young men, as a vice which proved the mischief of dialectic debate addressed to them at that age. He farther deprecates the disturbance of "those opinions which they have heard from the lawgiver respecting what is just and honourable".

¹ Plato, *Parmenid.* p. 106 ad fin. Ἀληθέστατα.

εἰρήσῃ τοῖσιν τοῦτο τε καὶ ὅτι, ὥς εἰκεν, ἐν εἰς ἔστιν, εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, αὐτὸ τε καὶ τὰλλα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλα πάντα πάντως ἔστι τε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, καὶ φαίνεται τε καὶ οὐ φαίνεται.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* iv. 2.

³ Plato, *Apolog.* Sokrat. c. 10, p. 23 D, c. 22, p. 33 C, c. 27, p. 37 E, c. 30, p. 39 C.

But it is precisely these opinions which, in the *Alkibiadés*, *Menon*, *Protagoras*, and other dialogues, the Platonic Sokrates treats as untaught, if not unteachable :—as having been acquired, no man knew how, without the lessons of any assignable master and without any known period of study :—lastly, as constituting that very illusion of false knowledge without real knowledge, of which Sokrates undertakes to purge the youthful mind, and which must be dispelled before any improvement can be effected in it.¹

We thus see, that the dictum forbidding dialectic debate with youth—cited from the seventh book of the *Republic*, which Plato there puts into the mouth of Sokrates—is decidedly anti-Sokratic ; and anti-Platonic, in so far as Plato represents Sokrates. It belongs indeed to the case of *Melétus* and *Anytus*, in their indictment against Sokrates before the Athenian *dikastery*. It is identical with their charge against him, of corrupting youth, and inducing them to fancy themselves superior to the authority of established customs and opinions heard from their elders.² Now the Platonic Sokrates is here made to declare explicitly, that dialectic debate addressed to youth does really tend to produce this effect :—to render them lawless, immoral, disputatious. And when we find him forbidding all such discourse at an earlier age than thirty years—we remark as a singular coincidence, that this is the exact prohibition which *Kritias* and *Charikles* actually imposed upon Sokrates himself, during the shortlived dominion of the Thirty Oligarchs at Athens.³

The remarks here made upon the effect of Dialectic upon youth coincide with the accusation of *Melétus* against Sokrates.

The matter to which I here advert, illustrates a material distinction between some writings of Plato as compared with others, and between different points of view which his mind took on at different times. In the Platonic *Apology*, we find Sokrates confessing his own ignorance, and proclaiming himself to be isolated

Contrast between the real Sokrates, as a dissenter at Athens, and the Platonic Sokrates,

¹ Plato, *Sophist* p. 230.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 19-49. Compare Aristophanes, *Nubes*, 1042-1262.

³ Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 33-38. Sokrates complains that youthful

students took more delight in disputation than he thought suitable ; nevertheless he declares that youth, and not mature age, is the proper season for such exercises, as well as for Geometry and Astronomy (*Orat.* xii. *Panathen.* s. 29-31, p. 239).

framer and dictator of the Platonic Republic. among an uncongenial public falsely persuaded of their own knowledge. In several other dialogues, he is the same : he cannot teach anything, but can only cross-examine, test, and apply the spur to respondents. But the Republic presents him in a new character. He is no longer a dissenter amidst a community of fixed, inherited, convictions.¹ He is himself on the throne of King Nomos : the infallible authority, temporal as well as spiritual, from whom all public sentiment emanates, and by whom orthodoxy is determined. Hence we now find him passing to the opposite pole ; taking up the orthodox, conservative, point of view, the same as Melétus and Anytus maintained in their accusation against Sokrates at Athens. He now expects every individual to fall into the place, and contract the opinions, prescribed by authority : including among those opinions deliberate ethical and political fictions, such as that about the gold and silver earthborn men. Free-thinking minds, who take views of their own, and enquire into the evidence of these beliefs, become inconvenient and dangerous. Neither the Sokrates of the Platonic Apology, nor his negative Dialectic, could be allowed to exist in the Platonic Republic.

One word more must be said respecting a subject which figures conspicuously in the Republic—the Idea or Form of Good. The chiefs alone (we read) at the end of their long term of study, having ascended gradually from the phenomena of sense to intellectual contemplation and familiarity with the unchangeable Ideas—will come to discern and embrace the highest of all Ideas—the Form of Good :² by the help of which alone, Justice, Temperance, and the other virtues, become useful and profitable.³ If the Archons do not know how and why just and honourable things are good, they will not be fit for their duty.⁴ In regard to Good (Plato tells us) no man is satisfied with mere appearance. Here every man desires and postulates that which is really good : while as to the just and the honourable, many are satisfied with the appearance, without caring for the reality.⁵

Idea of Good
—The Chiefs
alone know
what it is—
If they did
not they
would be un-
fit for their
functions.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* vii. p. 541.

² Plato, *Repub.* vii. pp. 533-534.

³ Plato, *Repub.* vi. p. 506 A.

⁴ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 506 A.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, vi. p. 506 D.

Plato proclaims this Real Good, as distinguished from Apparent Good, to be the paramount and indispensable object of knowledge, without which all other knowledge is useless. It is that which every man divines to exist, yearns for, and does everything with a view to obtain: but which he misses, from not knowing where to seek; missing also along with it that which gives value to other acquisitions.¹ What then is this Real Good—the Noumenon, Idea, or form of Good?

What is the Good? Plato does not know; but he requires the Chiefs to know it. Without this the Republic would be a failure.

This question is put by Glaukon to Sokrates, with much earnestness, in the dialogue of the Republic. But unfortunately it remains unanswered. Plato declines all categorical reply; though the question is one, as he himself emphatically announces, upon which all the positive consequences of his philosophy turn. He conducts us to the chamber wherein this precious and indispensable secret is locked up, but he has no key to open the door. [In describing the condition of other men's minds—that they divine a Real Good—*Αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν* or *Bonum per se*—do everything in order to obtain it, but puzzle themselves in vain to

¹ Plato, Republic, vi. p. 506 A-E. 'Ὁ δὲ δῶκεν μὲν ἀρεὰν ψυχῇ καὶ τοῦτον ἔθηκε πάντα πράττειν, ἀνομαστυομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς τί ποτ' ἐστιν οὐδὲ πιστεῖν χρῆσασθαι μόνιμον, οἷα καὶ περὶ τέλλα, διὰ τοῦτο δὲ ἀποτυγχάνει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰ τι ὀφείλοις ἦν, &c.

² Certainly when we see the way in which Plato deals with the *Idēa ἀγαθόν*, we cannot exempt him from the criticism which he addresses to others, vi. p. 493 E. ὥς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ καλὰ πάντα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ, φθὲν πάντοτε τοῦ φησὶν αὐτῶν λόγον διδόντος οὐ καταγίλαστον;

We may illustrate this procedure of Plato by an Oriental fable, cited in an instructive Dissertation of M. Ernest Renan.

"Aristoteles primum sub Almamuno (818-833, A.D.) arabicè factus est. Somniumque effectum à credulis hominibus: vidisse Almamunum in somno virum aspectu venerabili, solio insidentem: mirantem Almamunum quævisse, quinam ille esset? responsum,

Aristotelem esse. Quo audito, Chalifam ab eo quævisse, Quidnam Bonum esset? respondisse Aristotelem: Quod sapientiores probarent. Quærenti Chaliffa quid hoc esset? Quod lex divina probat—dixisse. Interroganti porro illi, Quid hoc? Quod omnes probarent—respondisse: *neque alii ultra quæstioni respondere voluisse.* Quo somnio permutum Almamunum à Græcorum imperatore veniam petisse, ut libri philosophici in ipsius regno quærerentur: hujusque rei gratiā viros doctos misisse." Ernest Renan, *De Philosophiâ Peripateticâ apud Syros, commentatio Historica*, p. 57; Paris, 1852.

Among the various remarks which might be made upon this curious dream, one is, that Bonum is always determined as having relation to the appreciative apprehension of some mind—the Wise Men, the Divine Mind, the Mind of the general public. Bonum is that which some mind or minds conceive and appreciate as such. The word has no meaning except in relation to some apprehending Subject.

grasp and determine what it is'—he has unconsciously described the condition of his own.)³

¹ Plato, *Republ.* vi. p. 505 E. ἀπομαρτυροῦμένη τι εἶναι, ἀπορροῦσα δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἔχουσα λαβεῖν ἰκανῶς τί ποτ' εἶναι, &c.

The remarks of Aristotle in impugning the Platonic *idea* *ἀγαθού* are very instructive, *Ethic. Nikom.* i. p. 1096-1097; *Ethic. Eudem.* i. p. 1217-1218. He maintains that there exists nothing corresponding to the word; and that

even if it did exist, it would neither be *παρὸν* nor *πτηνὸν ἀθρόον*. Aristotle here looks upon Good as being essentially relative or phenomenal: he understands τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν to mean τὸ ἀγαθὸν τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ (*Eth. Nik.* iii. p. 1113, b. 16-33). But he does not uniformly adhere to this meaning.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

TIMÆUS AND KRITIAS.

THOUGH the Republic of Plato appears as a substantive composition, not including in itself any promise of an intended sequel—yet the Timæus and Kritias are introduced by Plato as constituting a sequel to the Republic. Timæus the Pythagorean philosopher of Lokri, the Athenian Kritias, and Hermokrates, are now introduced, as having been the listeners while Sokrates was recounting his long conversation of ten Books, first with Thrasymachus, next with Glaukon and Adeimantus. The portion of that conversation, which described the theory of a model commonwealth, is recapitulated in its main characteristics: and Sokrates now claims from the two listeners some requital for the treat which he has afforded to them. He desires to see the citizens, whose training he has described at length, and whom he has brought up to the stage of mature capacity—exhibited by some one else as living, acting, and affording some brilliant evidence of courage and military discipline.¹ Kritias undertakes to satisfy his demand, by recounting a glorious achievement of the ancient citizens of Attica, who had once rescued Europe from an inroad of countless and almost irresistible invaders, pouring in from the vast island of Atlantis in the Western Ocean. This exploit is supposed to have been performed nearly 10,000 years before; and though lost out of the memory of the Athenians themselves, to have been commemorated and still preserved in the more ancient records of Sais in Egypt, and handed down through Solon by a family tradition to Kritias. But it is agreed between Kritias and Timæus,² that before the former enters upon his quasi-

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 20 B.² *Timæus*, p. 27 A.

historical or mythical recital about the invasion from Atlantis, the latter shall deliver an expository discourse, upon a subject very different and of far greater magnitude. Unfortunately the narrative promised by Kritias stands before us only as a fragment. There is reason to believe that Plato never completed it.¹ But the discourse assigned to Timæus was finished, and still remains, as a valuable record of ancient philosophy.

For us, modern readers, the Timæus of Plato possesses a species of interest which it did not possess either for the contemporaries of its author, or for the ancient world generally. We read in it a system—at least the sketch of a system—of universal philosophy, the earliest that has come to us in the words of the author himself. Among the many other systems, anterior or simultaneous—those of Thales and the other Ionic philosophers, of Herakleitus, Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedokles, Anaxagoras, Demokritus—not one remains to us as it was promulgated by its original author or supporters. We know all of them only in fragments and through the criticisms of others: fragments always scanty—criticisms generally dissentient, often harsh, sometimes unfair, introduced by the critic to illustrate opposing doctrines of his own. Here, however, the Platonic system is made known to us, not in this fragmentary and half-attested form, but in the full exposition which Plato himself deemed sufficient for it. This is a remarkable peculiarity.

Timæus is extolled by Sokrates as combining the character of a statesman with that of a philosopher: as being of distinguished wealth and family in his native city (the Epizephyrian Lokri), where he had exercised the leading political functions:—and as having attained besides, the highest excellence in science, astronomical as well as physical.² We know from other sources (though Plato omits to tell us so, according to his usual undefined manner of designating contemporaries) that he was of the Pythagorean school. Much of the exposition assigned to him is founded on Pythagorean

¹ Plutarch, Solon, c. 33.
Another discourse appears to have been contemplated by Plato, to be delivered by Hermokrates after Kritias

had concluded (Plato, Timæus, p. 20 A; Kritias, p. 106). But nothing of this was probably ever composed.
² Plato, Timæus, pp. 20 A, 27 A.

principles, though blended by Plato with other doctrines, either his own or borrowed elsewhere. Timæus undertakes to requite Sokrates by giving a discourse respecting "The Nature of the Universe"; beginning at the genesis of the Kosmos, and ending with the constitution of man.¹ This is to serve as an historical or mythical introduction to the Platonic Republic recently described; wherein Sokrates had set forth the education and discipline proper for man when located as an inhabitant of the earth. Neither during the exposition of Timæus, nor after it, does Sokrates make any remark. But the commencement of the Kritias (which is evidently intended as a second part or continuation of the Timæus) contains, first, a prayer from Timæus that the Gods will pardon the defects of his preceding discourse and help him to amend them—next an emphatic commendation bestowed by Sokrates upon the discourse: thus supplying that recognition which is not found in the first part.²

In this Hymn of the Universe (to use a phrase of the rhetor Menander³ respecting the Platonic Timæus) the prose of Plato is quite as much the vehicle of poetical imagination as the hexameters of Hesiod, Empedokles, or Parmenides. The Gods and Goddesses, whom Timæus invokes at the commencement,⁴ supply him with superhuman revelations, like the Muses to Hesiod, or the Goddess of Wisdom to Parmenides. Plato expressly recognises the multiplicity of different statements current, respecting the Gods and the generation of the Universe. He claims no superior credibility for his own. He professes to give us a new doctrine, not less probable than the numerous dissentient opinions already advanced by others, and more acceptable to his own mind. He bids us be content with such a measure of probability, because the limits of our human nature preclude any fuller approach to certainty.⁵ It is important to note the modest pretensions

Poetical imagination displayed by Plato. He pretends to nothing more than probability. Contrast with Sokrates, Isokrates, Xenophon.

¹ Plato, Timæus, p. 27 A. ἰδοὺ γὰρ ἡμῖν Τίμαιον μὲν, ἔντι δαστυρομικωτάτου ἡμῶν, καὶ περὶ φύσεως τοῦ παντὸς εἰδέναι μάλιστα ἔργον πεποιθότατον, πρῶτον λέγειν ἀρχόμενον ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γένεως, τελευταίην δὲ εἰς ἀθρόωντων φύσιν.

² Plato, Kritias, p. 106 B.

³ Menander, De Encomiis, l. 5, p. 39. Compare Karsten, De Empedoclis Vita, p. 72; De Parmenidis Vita, p. 21.

⁴ Plato, Timæus, p. 27 D; Hesiod, Theogon, 32-35-106.

⁵ Plato, Timæus, pp. 39 D, 38 D, 50 C-D, 68 C, 72 D. καὶ ἡμῶν δόξαν—παρὰ τῆς ἀμῆς ψήφου (p. 62 D).

here unreservedly announced by Plato as to the conviction and assent of hearers:—so different from the confidence manifested in the Republic, where he hires a herald to proclaim his conclusion—and from the overbearing dogmatism which we read in his Treatise De Legibus, where he is providing a catechism for the schooling of citizens, rather than proofs to be sifted by opponents. He delivers, respecting matters which he admits to be unfathomable, the theory most in harmony with his own religious and poetical predispositions, which he declares to be as probable as any other yet proclaimed. The Xenophontic Sokrates, who disapproved all speculation respecting the origin and structure of the Kosmos, would probably have granted this equal probability, and equal absence of any satisfactory grounds of preferential belief—both to Plato on one side and to the opposing theorists on the other. And another intelligent contemporary, Isokrates, would probably have considered the Platonic Timæus as one among the same class of unprofitable extravagancies, to which he assigns the theories of Herakleitus, Empedokles, Alkmaeon, Parmenides, and others.¹ Plato himself (in the Sophistês)² characterises the theories of these philosophers as fables recited to an audience of children, with-

In many parts of the dialogue he repeats that he is delivering his own opinion—that he is affirming what is probable. In the Phædon, however, we find that *εἰκότες λόγοι* are set aside as deceptive and dangerous, Phædon, p. 92 D. In the remarkable passage of the Timæus, p. 48 C-D, Plato intimates that he will not in the present discourse attempt to go to the bottom of the subject—*τὴν μὲν περὶ ἀνάγκης εἶπε ἀρχὴν εἶπε ἀρχὰς εἶπε ἐπεὶ δοκεῖ τοῦτον περὶ, τὸ δὲ τὴν οὐ βέλτιον*—but that he will confine himself to *εἰκότες λόγοι*—*τὸ δὲ κατ' ἀρχὰς βῆθ' ἐκφυλάττων, τὴν τῶν εἰκότων λόγων δύναμιν, πειράσομαι μηδεὶς ἥττον εἰκότα, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἐμπροσθεν δὲ ἀρχῆς περὶ ἐκδότων καὶ ἐμπόρων λόγων.*

What these *principia* are, which Plato here keeps in the background, I do not clearly understand. Susemihl (Entwicklung der Plat. Phil. ii. p. 406) and Martin (Études sur le Timée, ii. p. 173, note 56) have both given elucidations of this passage, but neither of them appear to me satisfactory. Simplicius says:—*Ὁ Πλάτων τὴν*

φυσιολογίαν εἰκοτολογίαν ἐλεγεῖν εἶναι, ὃ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης συμμαρτυρεῖ, Schol. Aristot. Phys. 326, a. 25 Brandis.

¹ Isokrates, De Permutatione, Or. xv. a. 287-288-304. *ἡγοῦμαι γὰρ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας περιττολογίας ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς θαυμαστοποιαῖς ταῖς οὐδὲν μὲν ἀφελούσας, οὗτο δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων περιστάσεως γιγνομένης (a. 288).*

τοὺς δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀναγκαίων ἀμειλύντας, τὰς δὲ τῶν καλῶν σοφιστῶν τερατολογίας διαστάντας, φιλοσοφείν φασίν (a. 304).

Compare another passage of Isokrates, the opening of Orat. x. Encomium Helenæ; in which latter passage he seems plainly to notice one of the main ethical doctrines advanced by Plato, though he does not mention Plato's name, nor indeed the name of any living person.

² Plato, Sophist. pp. 242-243. *Μῦθον τινα ἕκαστος φανέναι μοι δεχθῆναι ταῖς αἰσιν ὡς οὖρον ψῆιν· ὃ μὲν ὅτι τρία τὰ ἔντα, πολέμοι δὲ ἀλλήλους ἐνέστε αὐτῶν ἔντα πη, τότε δὲ καὶ φίλα γινόμενα γάμου τε καὶ τέκευς καὶ τροφὰς τῶν ἐγγόνων παρέχεται (p. 243 C-D).*

out any care to ensure a rational comprehension and assent. *They* would probably have made the like criticism upon his *Timæus*. While he treats it as fable to apply to the Gods the human analogy of generation and parentage—they would have considered it only another variety of fable, to apply to them the equally human analogy of constructive fabrication or mixture of ingredients. The language of Xenophon shows that he agreed with his master Sokrates in considering such speculations as not merely unprofitable, but impious.¹ And if the mission from the Gods—constituting Sokrates Cross-Examiner General against the prevailing fancy of knowledge without the reality of knowledge—drove him to court perpetual controversy with the statesmen, poets, and Sophists of Athens; the same mission would have compelled him, on hearing the sweeping affirmations of *Timæus*, to apply the test of his *Elenchus*, and to appear in his well-known character of confessed² but inquisitive ignorance. The Platonic *Timæus* is positively anti-Sokratic. It places us at the opposite or dogmatic pole of Plato's character.³

Timæus begins by laying down the capital distinction between —1. *Ens* or the *Existent*, the eternal and unchangeable, the world of *Ideas* or *Forms*, apprehended only

Fundamental distinction

¹ Xenophon, *Memorab.* l. 1, 11-14. Οὐδεὶς δὲ ποτε Σωκράτους οὐδὲν ἀσεβὲς οὐδὲ ἀνόσιον οὔτε πρᾶττοντος εἶδεν οὔτε λέγοντος ἤκουσεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως ἤπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλείστοι, διαλέγετο, σκοπιῶν ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν κόσμος ἔχει, καί τισιν ἀνέγκας ἱκανοὶ γίγνεται τῶν εὐραίων· ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φροντίζοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα μωραίνοντας ἀπεδείκνυε.

Lucretius, l. 80:—

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forte rearis
Impia te rationis inire elementa,
viamque
Indugredi sceleris, &c.

The above cited passage of Xenophon shows that the term *Kósmos* was in his time a technical word among philosophers, not yet accepted in that meaning by the general public. The aversion to investigation on the *Kósmos*, on the ground of implety, entertained by Sokrates and Xenophon, is expressed by Plato in the *Leges* (vii. 821 A) in the following words of

the principal speaker,—Τὸν μέγιστον θέν καὶ ἄλλοι τὸν κόσμον φαμέν οὔτε σφιν δεῖν οὔτε πολυπραγμαίνειν τὰς αἰτίας ἀρτυνῶντας· οὐ γὰρ οὐδ' ὅσιον εἶναι· τὸ δὲ δοκεῖ πᾶν τοῦτον τοῦναρτίον γιγνόμενον ὁρῶντες ἀν γίγνεσθαι. This last passage is sometimes cited as if the word *φαμέν* expressed the opinion of the principal speaker, or of Plato himself—which is a mistake: *φαμέν* here expresses the opinion which the principal speaker is about to convert.

² See above, vol. i. ch. ix. of the present work, where the Platonic *Apology* is reviewed.

³ "Quocirca *Timæus* non dialecticè disserens inducitur, sed loquitur ut hierophanta, qui mundi arcana aliunde accepta grandi ac magnificè oratione pronunciat; quin etiam quæ experientiae suspicionem superant, mythorum ac symbolorum involucris obteggit, eoque modo quam ea certa sint, legentibus non obscure significat."—Stallbaum, *Prolegg. ad Platon. Timæum*, c. iv. p. 37.

tion between Ens and Pientia. by mental conception or Reason, but the object of infallible cognition. 2. The Generated and Perishable—the sensible, phenomenal, material world—which never really exists, but is always appearing and disappearing; apprehended by sense, yet not capable of becoming the object of cognition, nor of anything better than opinion or conjecture. The Kosmos, being a visible and tangible body, belongs to this last category. Accordingly, it can never be really known: no true or incontestable propositions can be affirmed respecting it: you can arrive at nothing higher than opinion and probability.

Plato seems to have had this conviction, respecting the uncertainty of all affirmations about the sensible world or any portions of it, forcibly present to his mind.

He next proceeds to assume or imply, as postulates, his eternal Ideas or Forms—a coeternal chaotic matter or indeterminate Something—and a Demiurgus or Architect to construct, out of this chaos, after contemplation of the Forms, copies of them as good as were practicable in the world of sense. The exposition begins with these postulates. The Demiurgus found all visible matter, not in a state of rest, but in discordant and irregular motion. He brought it out of disorder into order. Being himself good (says Plato), and desiring to make everything else as good as possible, he transformed this chaos into an orderly Kosmos.¹ He planted in its centre a soul spreading round, so as to pervade all its body—and reason in the soul: so that the Kosmos became animated, rational—a God.

The Demiurgus of Plato is not conceived as a Creator,² but as a Constructor or Artist. He is the God Prometheus, conceived as pre-kosmical, and elevated to the primacy of the Gods: instead of being subordinate to Zeus, as depicted by Æschylus and others. He represents provident intelligence or art, and beneficent purpose, contending with a force superior and

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 29-30.

² "The notion of absolute Creation is unknown to Plato, as it is to all

Grecian and Roman antiquity" (Brandis, *Gesch. der Griech. Röm. Philos.* vol. ii. part 2, p. 806).

irresistible, so as to improve it as far as it will allow itself to be improved.' This pre-existing superior force Plato denominates Necessity—"the erratic, irregular, random causality," subsisting prior to the intervention of the Demiurgus; who can only work upon it by persuasion, but cannot coerce or subdue it.² The genesis of the Kosmos thus results from a combination of intelligent force with the original, primordial Necessity; which was persuaded, and consented, to have its irregular agency regularised up to a certain point, but no farther. Beyond this limit the systematising arrangements of the Demiurgus could not be carried; but all that is good or beautiful in the Kosmos was owing to them.³

We ought here to note the sense in which Plato uses the word Necessity. This word is now usually understood as denoting what is fixed, permanent, unalterable, know-
able beforehand. In the Platonic Timæus it means
the very reverse:—the indeterminate, the inconstant, the anomalous, that which can neither be understood nor predicted. It is Force, Movement, or Change, with the negative attribute of not being regular, or intelligible, or determined by any knowable antecedent or condition—*Vis consili expers*. It coincides, in fact, with that which is meant by *Freewill*, in the modern metaphysical argument between Freewill and Necessity: it is the undeter-

of Necessity. He cannot controul necessity—he only persuades.

Meaning of Necessity in Plato.

¹ The verbs used by Plato to describe the proceedings of the Demiurgus are *ἐντεταταίνετο*, *ἐντίσταντο*, *ἐνεκατέσσετο*, *ἐμχαρήσατο*, and such like.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 47 E—48 A. *ἐπιδέδεικται τὰ διὰ τοῦ δεδμιουργημένα· δεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ δι' ἀνάγκης γιγνόμενα τῷ λόγῳ παραθέσθαι. Μεμνημένη γὰρ οὖν ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις δι' ἀνάγκης τε καὶ τοῦ ἐντοκάσους ἐπιτηδῆ· τοῦ δὲ ἀνάγκης ἀρχόντος τῷ πείθειν αὐτὴν τῶν γιγνομένων τὰ πλείστα ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιστον ἀγειν, ταύτῃ κατὰ ταῦτά τε δι' ἀνάγκης ἡττωμένης ὑπὸ πείθους ἐμφοροῦς, οὕτω κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐντίσταντο τὸδε τὸ πᾶν. Εἰ τις οὖν ἡ γέγονε, κατὰ ταῦτα ὁπῶς ἔρει, μύκτιον καὶ τὸ τῆς πλανημένης εἰδος αἰτίας, ἡ φέρειν πέφυκεν.* Compare p. 56 C: *ὅπῃπερ ἡ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἰαούσα πεισθεῖσά τε φύσις ὑπέκει.* Also pp. 68 E, 75 B, 80 A.

Τέχνη δ' ἀνάγκης ἀσθενεστέρα μακρῶς says Prometheus in *Æschylus* (P. V. 514). He identifies *Ἀνάγκη* with the *Μοῖραι*: and we read in Herodotus (l. 91) of Apollo as trying to persuade the Fates to spare Krcsus, but obtaining for him only a respite of three years—*οὐκ ὁλόν τε τίνετο παραγαγεῖν μοῖρας, ὅσον δὲ ἐνδύωσαν ἄβραι, ἤνυσται καὶ ἱκαρίεσθαι οἱ*. This is the language used by Plato about *Ἀνάγκη* and the Demiurgus. A valuable exposition of the relations believed to subsist between the Gods and *Μοῖραι* is to be found in Naegelsbach, *Homerische Theologie* (chap. iii. pp. 113-131).

³ Plutarch reproduces this theory (Phokion, c. 2, ad fin.) of God governing the Kosmos, not by superior force, but by reason and persuasion—*ἢ καὶ τὸν κόσμον ὁ θεὸς λόγῳται διοικεῖν, οὐ βιαζόμενος, ἀλλὰ πειθοῖ καὶ λόγῳ παράγων τὴν ἀνάγκην*.

mined or self-determining, as contrasted with that which depends upon some given determining conditions, known or knowable. The Platonic Necessity¹ is identical with the primeval Chaos, recognised in the Theogony or Kosmogony of Hesiod. That poet tells us that Chaos was the primordial Something: and that afterwards came Gæa, Eros, Uranus, Nyx, Erebus, &c., who intermarried, males with females, and thus gave birth to numerous divine persons or kosmical agents—each with more or less of definite character and attributes. By these supervening agencies, the primeval Chaos was modified and regulated, to a greater or less extent. The Platonic Timæus starts in the same manner as Hesiod, from an original Chaos. But then he assumes also, as coæval with it, but apart from it, his eternal Forms or Ideas: while, in order to obtain his kosmical agents, he does not have recourse, like Hesiod, to the analogy of intermarriages and births, but employs another analogy equally human and equally borrowed from experience—that of a Demiurgus or constructive professional artist, architect, or carpenter; who works upon the model of these Forms, and introduces regular constructions into the Chaos. The antithesis present to the mind of Plato is that between disorder or absence of order, announced as Necessity,—and order or regularity, represented by the Ideas.² As the mediator between these two primeval opposites, Plato assumes Nous, or Reason, or artistic skill personified in his Demiurgus: whom he calls essentially good—meaning thereby that he is the regularising agent by whom order, method, and symmetry, are copied from the Ideas and partially realised among the intractable data of Necessity. Good is something which Plato in other works often talks about, but never determines: his language implies sometimes that he knows what it is, sometimes that he does not know. But so far as we can understand him, it means order, regularity, symmetry, proportion—by consequence, what

¹ In the Symposium (pp. 196 D, 197 B) we find Eros panegyrised as having amended and mollified the primeval empire of 'Ανάγκη.

The Scholiast on Hesiod, Theogon. 119, gives a curious metaphysical explanation of 'Ερος, mentioned in the Hesiodic text—τὴν ὑπερκαταρμένην φυσικὴν κινητικὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, καθ' ἣν ἐφέρεται ἑκάστος τοῦ

αἰῶνα.

² In the Philæbus, p. 23 C-D, these three are recognised under the terms:

—1. Πόρος. 2. Ἀπειρος. 3. Αἰρία—τῆς συμμείξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλλα τὰ αἰρία.

Compare a curious passage of Plutarch, Symposiacon, viii. 2, p. 719 E, illustrating the Platonic phrase—τὸν θεὸν αἰεὶ γυμμεῖν.

is ascertainable and predictable.¹ I will not say that Plato means this always and exclusively, by Good : but he seems to mean so in the *Timæus*. Evil is the reverse. Good or regularity is associated in his mind exclusively with rational agency. It can be produced, he assumes, only by a reason, or by some personal agent analogous to a reasonable and intelligent man. Whatever is not so produced, must be irregular or bad.

These are the fundamental ideas which Plato expands into a detailed Kosmology. The first application which he makes of them is, to construct the total Kosmos. The total is here the logical Prius, or anterior to the parts in his order of conception. The Kosmos is one vast and comprehensive animal : just as in physiological description, the leading or central idea is, that of the animal organism as a whole, to which each and all the parts are referred. The Kosmos is constructed by the Demiurgus according to the model of the *Αἰὼς* (ῶς,²—(the Form or Idea of Animal—the eternal Generic or Self-Animal,)—which comprehends in itself the subordinate specific Ideas of different sorts of animals. This Generic Idea of Animal comprehended four of such specific Ideas : 1. The celestial race of animals, or Gods, who occupied the heavens. 2. Men. 3. Animals living in air—Birds. 4. Animals living on land or in water.³ In order that the Kosmos might approach near to its model the Self-animal, it was required to contain all these four species. As there was but one Self-Animal, so there could only be one Kosmos.

We see thus, that the primary and dominant idea, in Plato's mind, is, not that of inorganic matter, but that of organised and animated matter—life or soul embodied. With him, biology comes before physics.

The body of the Kosmos was required to be both visible and tangible : it could not be visible without fire : it could not be tangible without something solid, nor solid without earth. But

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 30 A. Compare the *Republic*, vi. p. 506, *Philébus*, pp. 65-66, and the investigation in the *Euthydæmus*, pp. 270-293, which ends in no result.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 30 D.

³ Plat. *Timæus*, pp. 30 E-40 A. ἕτερον

ὄν τοὺς ἑνὸς ἰδέας τῇ ὁ ἑστὶ ῥῶς, οἷα τε ἐνεῖσι καὶ ὄναι, καθορᾷ, τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας διεσώθη δεῖν καὶ τόδε σχεῖν. Εἰσὶ δὲ τέτταρες, μία μὲν οὐρανίου θεῶν γένος, ἄλλη δὲ πτηνῶν καὶ ἀερόπτερον, τρίτη δὲ ἐνὺδρον εἶδος, πτερόν δὲ καὶ χερσαῖον τέταρτον.

Process of demiurgic construction—The total Kosmos comes logically first, constructed on the model of the *Αἰὼς* (ῶς).

two things cannot be well put together by themselves, without a third to serve as a bond of connection : and that is the best bond which makes them One as much as possible. Geometrical proportion best accomplishes this object. But as both Fire and Earth were solids and not planes, no one mean proportional could be found between them. Two mean proportionals were necessary. Hence the Demiurgus interposed air and water, in such manner, that as fire is to air, so is air to water : and as air is to water, so is water to earth.¹ Thus the four elements, composing the body of the Kosmos, were bound together in unity and friendship. Of each of the four, the entire total was used up in the construction : so that there remained nothing of them apart, to hurt the Kosmos from without, nor anything as raw material for a second Kosmos.²

¹ Plato, Tim. pp. 31-32. The comment of Macrobius on this passage (Somn. Scip. I. 6, p. 30) is interesting, if not conclusive. But the language in which Plato lays down this doctrine about mean proportionals is not precise, and has occasioned much difference of opinion among commentators. Between two solids (he says), that is, solid numbers, or numbers generated out of the product of three factors, no one mean proportional can be found. This is not universally true. The different suggestions of critics to clear up this difficulty will be found set forth in the elaborate note of M. Martin (Études sur le Timée, vol. I, note xx. pp. 337-345), who has given what seems a probable explanation. Plato (he supposes) is speaking only of prime numbers and their products. In the language of ancient arithmeticians *linear numbers*, *par excellence* or properly so-called, were the prime numbers, measurable by unity only ; *plane numbers* were the products of two such linear numbers or prime numbers ; *solid numbers* were the products of three such. Understanding solid numbers in this restricted sense, it will be perfectly true that between any two of them you can never find any one solid number or any whole number which shall be a mean proportional, but you can always find two solid numbers which shall be mean proportionals. One mean proportional will never be sufficient. On the contrary, one mean proportional will be sufficient between two plane numbers

(in the restricted sense) when these numbers are squares, though not if they are not squares. It is therefore true, that in the case of two *solid numbers* (so understood) one such mean proportional will never be sufficient, while two can always be found : and that between two *plane numbers* (so understood) one such mean proportional will in certain cases be sufficient and may be found. This is what is present to Plato's mind, though in enunciating it he does not declare the restriction under which alone it is true. M. Boeckh (Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon, p. 17) approves of Martin's explanation. At the same time M. Martin has given no proof that Plato had in his mind the distinction between prime numbers and other numbers, for his references in p. 338 do not prove this point ; moreover, the explanation assumes such very loose expression, that the phrase of M. Cousin in his note (p. 334) is, after all, perfectly just :—"Platon n'a pas songé à donner à sa phrase une rigueur mathématique" ; and the more simple explanation of M. Cousin (though Martin rejects it as unworthy) may perhaps include all that is really intended. "Si deux surfaces peuvent être unies par un seul terme intermédiaire, il faudra deux termes intermédiaires pour unir deux solides : et l'union sera encore plus parfaite si la raison des deux proportions est la même."

² Plat. Timæus, p. 32 E.

The Kosmos was constructed as a perfect sphere, rounded, because that figure both comprehends all other figures, and is, at the same time, the most perfect, and most like to itself.¹ The Demiurgus made it perfectly smooth on the outside, for various reasons.² First, it stood in no need of either eyes or ears, because there was nothing outside to be seen or heard. Next, it did not want organs of respiration, inasmuch as there was no outside air to be breathed :—nor nutritive and excrementary organs, because its own decay supplied it with nourishment, so that it was self-sufficing, being constructed as its own agent and its own patient.³ Moreover the Demiurgus did not furnish it with hands, because there was nothing for it either to grasp or repel—nor with legs, feet, or means of standing, because he assigned to it only one of the seven possible varieties of movement.⁴ He gave to it no other movement except that of rotation in a circle, in one and the same place : which is the sort of movement that belongs most to reason and intelligence, while it is impracticable to all other figures except the spherical.⁵

Body of the Kosmos, perfectly spherical—its rotations.

The Kosmos, one and only-begotten, was thus perfect as to its body, including all existent bodily material,—smooth, even, round, and equidistant from its centre to all points of the circumference.⁶ The Demiurgus put together at the same time its soul or mind ; which

Soul of the Kosmos—its component ingredients—

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 33 B. *κυκλωτέρης αὐτὸ ἐπερνεύσαστο*, &c.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 33 C. *λείον δὲ ἢ κύκλῳ πᾶν ἐξωθεν αὐτὸ ἀπηκριβούτο, πολλῶν χάριν*, &c.

Aristotle also maintains that the sphericity of the Kosmos is so exact that no piece of workmanship can make approach to it. (*De Cælo*, ii. p. 287, b. 15.)

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 33 E. On this point the Platonic *Timæus* is not Pythagorean, but the reverse. The Pythagoreans recognised extraneous to the Kosmos, τὸ ἀπειρον πνεῦμα ὡς τὸ κενόν. The Kosmos was supposed to inhale this vacuum, which penetrating into the interior, formed the separating interstices between its constituent parts (*Aristot. Physic. iv. p. 213, b. 23*).

⁴ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 34 A. *ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν περίοδον ταύτην, ἂν οὐδὲν ποδῶν δέον, ἀκακέως καὶ ἀπουν αὐτὸ ἐγίνετο*.

Plato reckons six varieties of rectilinear motion, neither of which was assigned to the Kosmos—forward, backward, upward, downward, to the right, to the left.

⁵ Plat. *Tim.* p. 34 A. *κίνησιν γὰρ ἀπείραται αὐτῇ τὴν τοῦ σώματος οἰκίαν, τῶν ἑπτα τὴν περὶ τοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν μάλιστα οὖσαν*. This predicate respecting circular motion belongs to Plato and not to Aristotle ; but Aristotle makes out, in his own way, a strong case to show that circular motion must belong to the *Πρώτον σῶμα*, as being the first among all varieties of motion, the most dignified and privileged, the only one which can be for ever uniform and continuous. *Aristot. Physic. ix. p. 265, a. 15 ; De Cælo, i. pp. 269-270, ii. p. 284, a. 10*.

⁶ Plat. *Tim.* p. 31 B. *εἰς ὅδε μονογενὴς οὐρανός, &c.*


stretched from centre to circumference. he planted in the centre and stretched throughout its body in every direction,—so as not only to reach the circumference, but also to enclose and wrap it round externally. The soul, being intended to guide and govern the body, was formed of appropriate ingredients, three distinct ingredients mixed together: 1. The Same—The Identical—The indivisible, and unchangeable essence of Ideas. 2. The Different—The Plural—The divisible essence of bodies or of the elements. 3. A third compound, formed of both these ingredients melted into one.—These three ingredients—Same, Different, Same and Different in one,—were blended together in one compound, to form the soul of the Kosmos: though the Different was found intractable and hard to conciliate.¹ The mixture was divided, and the portions blended together, according to a scale of harmonic numerical proportion complicated and difficult to follow.² The soul of the Kosmos was thus harmonically constituted. Among its constituent elements, the Same, or Identity, is placed in an even and undivided rotation of the outer or sidereal sphere of the Kosmos,—while the Different, or Diversity, is distributed among the rotations, all oblique, of the seven interior or planetary spheres—that is, the five planets, Sun, and Moon. The outer sphere revolved towards the right: the interior spheres in an opposite direction towards the left. The rotatory force of the Same (of the outer Sphere) being not only one and undivided, but connected with and dependent upon the solid revolving axis which traverses the diameter of the Kosmos—is far greater than that of the divided spheres of the Different; which, while striving to revolve in an opposite direction, each by

¹ Plat. Tim. p. 35 A. *Ταὐτὸν—τὸ ἀπείροτον—θάρετον—τὸ μετρίον—ἐπί-
τον ἢ ἀμείωρ οὐσίας εἶδος.*

² Plato, Timæus, pp. 35-36. The pains which were taken by commentators in antiquity to expound and interpret this numerical scale may be seen especially illustrated in Plutarch's Treatise, *De Animæ Procreatione* in Timæo, pp. 1012-1030, and the Epitome which follows it. There were two fundamental *τετρακτῆς* or quaternions, one on a binary, the other on a ternary scale of progression, which were arranged by Krantor (Plutarch,

p. 1027 E) in the form of the letter A. as given in Macrobius (Somn. Scip. l. 6, p. 36). The intervals between these figures

are described by Plato as filled up by intervening harmonic fractions, so as to constitute an harmonic or musical diagram or scale of four octaves and a major sixth. (Boeckh's *Untersuch.* p. 19.) M. Boeckh has expounded this at length in his Dissertation, *Ueber die Bildung der Welt-Seele im Timæos*. Other expositors after him.



a movement of its own—are overpowered and carried along with the outer sphere, though the time of revolution, in the case of each, is more or less modified by its own inherent counter-moving force.¹

In regard to the constitution of the kosmical soul, we must note, that as it is intended to know Same, Different, and Same and Different in one—so it must embody these three ingredients in its own nature: according to the received axiom. Like knows like—Like is known by like.² Thus began, never to end, the rotatory movements of the living Kosmos or great Kosmical God. The invisible soul of the Kosmos, rooted at its centre and stretching from thence so as to pervade and enclose its visible body, circulates and communicates, though without voice or sound, throughout its own entire range, every impression of identity and of difference which it encounters either from essence ideal and indivisible, or from that which is sensible and divisible. Information is thus circulated, about the existing relations between all the separate parts and specialties.³ Reason and Science are propagated by the Circle of the Same: Sense and Opinion, by those of the Different. When these last-mentioned Circles are in right movement, the opinions circulated are true and trustworthy.

With the rotations of the Kosmos, began the course of Time—years, months, days, &c. Anterior to the Kosmos, there was no time: no past, present, and future: no numerable or mensurable motion or change. The Ideas are eternal essences, without fluctuation or change: existing *sub specie aternitatis*, and having only a perpe-

Regular or
measured
Time—be-
gan with
the Kosmos

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 36 C. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἴσην φορὰν ἐπεφύμισεν εἶναι τῆς ταύτης φύσεως, τὴν δ' ἑνός, τῆς θαλάσσης. τὴν μὲν δὲ ταύτου κατὰ πλεονὰν ἐπὶ δεξιὰ περίεργε, τὴν δὲ θαλάσσης κατὰ δέξιμετρον ἐν ἄριστον.

For the meaning of κατὰ πλεονὰν and κατὰ δέξιμετρον, referring to the equator and the ecliptic, see the explanation and diagram in Boeckh, *Untersuchungen*, p. 25, also in the note of Stallbaum. The allusion in Plato to the letter χι is hardly intelligible without both a commentary and a diagram.

² Aristotel. *De Anima*, l. 2, 7, i. 3,

11 (pp. 404, b. 16—406 b. 26), with Trendelenburg's note, pp. 227-253; Stallbaum, not ad *Timæus*, pp. 136-157. See also the interpretation of Plato's opinion by Krantor, as given in Plutarch, *De Animæ Procreatione* in *Timæo*, p. 1012 E. We learn from Plutarch, however, that the passage gave much trouble to commentators.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 36-37. 37 A: λέγει κινουμένη διὰ πάσης ταύτης, ὅση ᾗ ἂν τι ταύτων ᾖ, καὶ ὅπου ἂν ἕτερον, πρὸς δ, τι τε μάλιστα καὶ ὅση καὶ ὅπως καὶ ὅποτε ἐμφαίνει κατὰ τὰ γινόμενά τε πρὸς ἕκαστον ἕκαστα εἶναι καὶ πάσχειν, καὶ πρὸς τὰ κατὰ ταῦτα ἔχοντα αἰ.

tual present, but no past or future.¹ Along with them subsisted only the disorderly, immeasurable, movements of Chaos. The nearest approach which the Demiurgus could make in copying these Ideas, was, by assigning to the Kosmos an eternal and unchanging motion, marked and measured by the varying position of the heavenly bodies. For this purpose, the sun, moon, and planets, were distributed among the various portions of the circle of Different: while the fixed stars were placed in the Circle of the Same, or the outer Circle, revolving in one uniform rotation and in unaltered position in regard to each other. The interval of one day was marked by one revolution of this outer or most rational Circle:² that of one month, by a revolution of the moon: that of one year, by a revolution of the sun. Among all these sidereal and planetary Gods the Earth was the first and oldest. It was packed close round the great axis which traversed the centre of the Kosmos, by the turning of which axis the outer circle of the Kosmos was made to revolve, generating night and day. The Earth regulated the movement of this great kosmical axis, and thus become the determining agent and guarantee of night and day.³

¹ Plato, *Timeus*, pp. 37-38. Lassalle, in his copious and elaborate explanation of the doctrine of Heraclitus (*Die Philosophie Herakleitos des Dunkeln*, Berlin, 1868, vol. II. p. 210, s. 26), represents this doctrine of Plato respecting Time as "durch und durch heraklitisch". To me it seems quite distinct from, or rather the inversion of, that which Lassalle himself sets down as the doctrine of Heraclitus. Plato begins with τὸ αἰώνιον or αἰώνιον, an eternal sameness or duration, without succession, change, generation or destruction,—this passes into perpetual succession or change, with frequent generation and destruction. Heraclitus, on the other hand, recognises for his primary or general law perpetual succession, interchange of contraries, generation and destruction; this passes into a secondary state, in which there is temporary duration and sameness of particulars—the flux being interrupted.

The ideal λόγος or law of Heraclitus is that of unremitting process, flux, revolution, implication of Ens with Non-Ens: the real world is an

imperfect manifestation of this law, because each particular clings to existence, and thereby causes temporary halts in the process. Now Plato's starting point is τὸ αἰώνιον τὸ αἰδιότατον ἔχει τὸ ὅτιον ὅτι: the perishable world of sense and particulars is the world of process, and is so far degenerate from the eternal uniformity of primordial Ens. See Lassalle, pp. 29-292-319.

² Plato, *Timeus*, p. 39 C. ἡ γὰρ μῆς καὶ φρονιμωδέτης κυκλικήν περιόδον. Plato remarks that there was a particular interval of time measured off and designated by the revolution of each of the other planets, but that these intervals were unnoticed and unknown by the greater part of mankind.

³ My explanation of this much controverted sentence differs from that of previous commentators. I have given reasons for adopting it in a separate Dissertation ('Plato and the Rotation of the Earth,' Murray), to which I here refer. In that Dissertation I endeavoured to show cause for dissenting from the inference of M. Boeckh: who contends that Plato

It remained for the Demiurgus,—in order that the Kosmos might become a full copy of its model the Generic Animal or Idea of Animal,—to introduce into it those various species of animals which that Idea contained. He first peopled it with Gods: the eldest and earliest of whom was the Earth, planted in the centre as sentinel over night and day: next the fixed stars, formed for the most part of fire, and annexed to the circle of the Same or the exterior circle, so as to impart to it light and brilliancy. Each star was of spherical figure and had two motions,—one, of uniform rotation peculiar to itself,—the other, an uniform forward movement of translation, being carried along with the great outer circle in its general rotation round the axis of the Kosmos.¹ It is thus that the sidereal orbs, animated beings eternal and divine, remained constantly turning round in the same relative position: while the sun, moon, and planets, belonging to the inner circles of the Different, and trying to revolve by their own effort in the opposite direction to the outer sphere, became irregular in their own velocities and variable in their relative positions.² The complicated movements of these planetary bodies, alternately approaching and receding—together with their occultations and reappearances, full of alarming prognostic as to consequences—cannot be described without having at hand some diagrams or mechanical illustrations to refer to.³

Divine
tenants of
the Kosmos
Primary
and Visible
Gods—
Stars and
Heavenly
Bodies.

cannot have believed in the diurnal rotation of the Earth, because he (Plato) explicitly affirms the diurnal rotation of the outer celestial sphere, or Aplanea. These two facts nullify each other, so that the effect would be the same as if there were no rotation of either. My reply to this argument was, in substance, that though the two facts really are inconsistent—the one excluding the other—yet we cannot safely conclude that Plato must have perceived the inconsistency; the more so as Aristotle certainly did not perceive it. To hold incompatible doctrines without being aware of the incompatibility, is a state of mind sufficiently common even in the present advanced condition of science, which I could illustrate by many curious examples if my space allowed. It must have been much more common

in the age of Plato that it is now.

Batteux observes (Traduction et Remarques sur Ocellus Lucanus, ch. iv. p. 116):—"Il y a un maxime qu'on ne doit jamais perdre de vue en discutant les opinions des Anciens: c'est de ne point leur prêter les conséquences de leurs principes, ni les principes de leurs conséquences".

As a general rule, I subscribe to the soundness of this admonition.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 40.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 40 B. δὲ ἀπλανή των ἀστέρων ὥσα θεῖα ὄντα καὶ αἰδία, &c.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 40 D. τὸ λέγειν ἀνευ διαφύσεως τούτων ἀπὸ τῶν μηχανμάτων μέτατοις ἂν εἴη πόνος. Plato himself here acknowledges the necessity of diagrams: the necessity was hardly less in the preceding part of his exposition.

Such were all the primitive Gods visible and generated¹ by

Secondary
and gene-
rated Gods
—Plato's
dictum re-
specting
them. His
acquies-
cence in
tradition.

the Demiurgus, to preside over and regulate the Kœmos. By them are generated, and from them are descended, the remaining Gods.

Respecting these remaining Gods, however, the Platonic Timæus holds a different language. Instead of speaking in his own name and delivering his own convictions, as he had done about the Demiurgus and the cosmical Gods—with the simple reservation, that such convictions could be proclaimed only as probable and not as demonstratively certain—he now descends to the Sokratic platform of confessed ignorance and incapacity. "The generation of these remaining Gods (he says) is a matter too great for me to understand and declare. I must trust to those who have spoken upon the subject before me—who were, as they themselves said, offspring of the Gods, and must therefore have well known their own fathers. It is impossible to mistrust the sons of the Gods. Their statements indeed are unsupported either by probabilities or by necessary demonstration; but since they here profess to be declaring family traditions, we must obey the law and believe.² Thus then let it stand and be proclaimed, upon their authority,

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 40 D. θεῶν ὁρατῶν καὶ γεννητῶν.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 40 D-E. Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἰπεῖν καὶ γινώσκειν τὴν γένεσιν μείζον ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς, πιστότερον δὲ τοῖς εἰρηκόσιν ἐμπροσθεν, ἐκγόνοις μὲν θεῶν οὖσιν, σαφὲς δὲ τοῦ τοῦ γε αὐτῶν προγόνοῦς εἰδῶσιν· ἀδύνατον οὖν θεῶν πασι πείσσειν, καί περ δύνει τε εἰκότως καὶ ἀναγκαίῳ ἀποδείξαι λέγουσιν, ἀλλ' ὥς οικεῖα φάσκουσιν ἀπαγγέλλειν, ἐπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον. Οὕτως οὖν κατ' ἐκείνους ἡμῖν ἡ γένεσις περὶ τούτων τῶν θεῶν ἔχεται καὶ λεγέσθαι.

So, too, in the Platonic *Epinomis*, attached as an appendix to the *Treatise De Legibus*, we find (p. 984) Plato—after arranging his quintuple scale of elemental animals (fire, æther, air, water, earth), the highest and most divine being the stars or visible Gods, the lowest being man, and the three others intermediate between the two; after having thus laid out the scale,

he leaves to others to determine, *ὅπῃ τις ἐθέλει*, in which place Zeus, Herë, and the other Gods, are to be considered as lodged. He will not contradict any one's feeling on that point; he strongly protests (p. 985 D) against all attempts on the part of the lawgiver to innovate (*καινοτομεῖν*) in contravention of ancient religious tradition—this is what Aristophanes in the *Nubes*, and Meletus before the *Dikasta*, accuse Sokrates of doing—but he denounces harshly all who will not acknowledge with worship and sacrifice the sublime divinity of the Sun, Moon, Stars, and Planets.

The Platonic declaration given here—*ἐπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστευτέον*—is illustrated in the lines of Euripides, *Bacchæ*, 202—

οὐδὲν σοφιστόμεθα τοῖσι δαίμοσιν·
πατέροις παραδοχάς, ἃς θ' ὁμήλειος
χρόνῳ
κατήμεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λό-
γος,
οὐδ' ἂν δι' ἀκρῶν τὸ σοφὸν εἰρηται φρε-
νών.

respecting the generation of the remaining Gods. The offspring of Uranus and Gæa were, Okeanus and Tethys: from whom sprang Phorkys, Kronus, Rhea, and those along with them. Kronus and Rhea had for offspring Zeus, Hérè, and all those who are termed their brethren: from whom too, besides, we hear of other offspring. Thus were generated all the Gods, both those who always conspicuously revolve, and those who show themselves only when they please."¹

The passage above cited serves to illustrate both Plato's own canon of belief, and his position in regard to his countrymen. The question here is, about the Gods of tradition and of the popular faith: with the pater-Remarks
on Plato's
Canon of
Belief.nity and filiation ascribed to them, by Hesiod and the other poets, from whom Greeks of the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. learnt their Theogony.² Plato was a man both competent and willing to strike out a physical theology of his own, but not to follow passively in the track of orthodox tradition. I have stated briefly what he has affirmed about the cosmical Gods (Earth, Stars, Sun, Planets) generated or constructed by the Demiurgus as portions or members of the Kosmos: their bodies, out of fire and other elements,—their souls out of the Forms or abstractions called Identity and Diversity; while the entire Kosmos is put together after the model of the Generic Idea or Form of Animal. All this, combined with supposed purposes, and fancies of arithmetical proportion dictating the proceedings of the Demiurgus, Plato does not hesitate to proclaim on his own authority and as his own belief—though he does not carry it farther than probability.

But while the feeling of spontaneous belief thus readily arises in Plato's mind, following in the wake of his own constructive imagination and ethical or æsthetical sentiment (*συνγινόμεναι*)—it does not so readily cleave to the theological dogmas in actual circulation around him. In the generation of Gods from Uranus and Gæa—which he as well as other Athenian youths must have learnt when they recited Hesiod with their schoolmasters—he can see neither proof nor proba-

¹ Plato, *Time*. p. 41 A. ἐπεὶ δ' καὶ ὅσοι φαίνονται καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἰδῶμεν, οὗν πάντες ὅσοι τε περιπολοῦσι φανερῶς, θεοὶ γένεσιν ἴσχον.

² Herodot. II. 53.

bility : he can find no internal ground for belief.¹ He declares himself incompetent : he will not undertake to affirm any thing upon his own judgment : the mystery is too dark for him to penetrate. Yet on the other hand, though it would be rash to affirm, it would be equally rash to deny. Nearly all around him are believers, at least as well satisfied with their creed as he was with the uncertified affirmations of his own Timæus. He cannot prove them to be wrong, except by appealing to an ethical or æsthetical sentiment which they do not share. Among the Gods said to be descended from Uranus and Gæa, were all those to whom public worship was paid in Greece,—to whom the genealogies of the heroic and sacred families were traced,—and by whom cities as well as individuals believed themselves to be protected in dangers, healed in epidemics, and enlightened on critical emergencies through seasonable revelations and prophecies. Against an established creed thus vouched, it was dangerous to raise any doubts. Moreover Plato could not have forgotten the fate of his master Sokrates ;² who was indicted both for not acknowledging the Gods whom the city acknowledged, and for introducing other new divine matters and persons. There could be no doubt that Plato was guilty on this latter count : prudence therefore rendered it the more incumbent on him to guard against being implicated in the former count also. Here then Plato formally abnegates his own self-judging power, and submits himself to orthodox authority. "It is impossible to doubt what we have learnt from witnesses, who declared themselves to be the offspring of the Gods, and who must of course have known their own family affairs. We must obey the law and believe." In what proportion such submission, of reason to authority, embodied the sincere feeling of Pascal and

¹ The remark made by Condorcet upon Buffon is strikingly applicable to Plato :—"On n'a reproché à M. de Buffon que ses hypothèses. Ce sont aussi des espèces de fables—mais des fables produites par une imagination active qui a besoin de créer, et non par une imagination passive qui cède à des impressions étrangères" (Condorcet, *Eloge de Buffon*, ad fin.)

Αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί, θεοὶ δέ μοι ἐν φρεσὶν οἶκας Παντοίας ἐπέφουσιν—

(Homer, *Odys.* xxii. 347)—the declaration of the bard Phæmius.

² Xenoph. *Memor.* i. l. Ἀδικοῖ Σωκράτης, οὐκ μὲν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς, οὐ νομίζον, ἔτερα δὲ καὶ αὐτὰ δαιμόνια εἰσφέρειν.

The word δαιμόνια may mean matters, or persons, or both together.

Malebranche, or the irony of Bayle and Voltaire, we are unable to determine.¹

Having thus, during one short paragraph, proclaimed his deference, if not his adhesion, to inspired traditions, Plato again resumes the declaration of his own beliefs and his own book of Genesis, without any farther appeal to authority, and without any intimation that he is touching on mysteries too great for his reason. When these Gods, the visible as well as the invisible,² had all been constructed or generated, he (or Timæus) tells us that the Demiurgus addressed them and informed them that they would be of immortal duration—not indeed in their own nature, but through his determination: that to complete the perfection of the newly-begotten Kosmos, there were three other distinct races of animals, all mortal, to be added: that he could not himself undertake the construction of these three, because they would thereby be rendered immortal, but that he confided such construction to them (the Gods): that he would himself supply, for the best of these three new races, an immortal element as guide and superintendent, and that they were to join along with it mortal and bodily accompaniments, to constitute men and animals; thus imitating the power which he had displayed in the generation of themselves.³

Address and order of the Demiurgus to the generated Gods.

After this address (which Plato puts into the first person, in Homeric manner), the Demiurgus compounded together, again and in the same bowl, the remnant of the same elements out of which he had formed the kosmical soul, but in perfection and purity greatly inferior. The total mass thus formed was distributed into souls equal in number to the stars. The Demi-

Preparations for the construction of man. Conjunction of three souls in one body.

¹ M. Martin supposes Plato to speak ironically, or with a prudent reserve, *Études sur le Timée*, ii. p. 146.

What Plato says here about the Gods who bore personal names, and were believed in by the contemporary public—is substantially equivalent to the well-known profession of ignorance enounced by the Sophist Protagoras, introduced by him at the beginning of one of his treatises. *Περὶ δὲ θεῶν οὐτε εἰ εἰσὶν, οὐθ' ὅποιοι τινὲς εἰσιν, δύναμαι λέγειν· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐστὶ τὰ*

κωλύοντά με (Sextus Emp. adv. Mathem. ix. 56): a declaration which, circumspect as it was (see the remark of the allographer Timon in Sextus), drew upon him the displeasure of the Athenians, so that his books were burnt, and himself forced to leave the city.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 41 A.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 41 C. *τρίτεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζώων δημιουργίαν, μεμυνημένοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμετέραν γένεσιν.*

urgus placed each soul in a star of its own, carried it round thus in the kosmical rotation, and explained to it the destiny intended for all. For each alike there was to be an appointed hour of birth, and of conjunction with a body, as well as with two inferior sorts or varieties of soul or mind. From such conjunction would follow, as a necessary consequence, implanted sensibility and motive power, with all its accompaniments of pleasure, pain, desire, fear, anger, and such like. These were the irrational enemies, which the rational and immortal soul would have to controul and subdue, as a condition of just life. If it succeeded in the combat so as to live a good life, it would return after death to the abode of its own peculiar star. But if it failed, it would have a second birth into the inferior nature and body of a female: if, here also, it continued to be evil, it would be transferred after death to the body of some inferior animal. Such transmigration would be farther continued from animal to animal, until the rational soul should acquire thorough controul over the irrational and turbulent. When this was attained, the rational soul would be allowed to return to its original privilege and happiness, residing in its own peculiar star.¹

It was thus that the Demiurgus confided to the recently-generated Gods the task of fabricating both mortal bodies, and mortal souls, to be joined with these immortal souls in their new stage of existence—and of guiding and governing the new mortal animal in the best manner, unless in so far as the latter should be the cause of mischief to himself. The Demiurgus decreed and proclaimed this beforehand, in order (says Plato) that he might not himself be the cause of any of the evil which might ensue² to individual men.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 42 B-D.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 42 D-E. Διαθεσμοθετήσας δὲ πάντα αὐτοῖς ταῦτα, ἵνα τῆς ἑκείνου εἰς κακίας ἐκείνων ἀνάγκης . . . παρίστανε θεοὺς σώματα πλάττειν θηγά, τό τε ἐπιλοκιστον ζῶον ἐν ᾧ ψυχῆς ἀνθρωπίνης δίδον προσγενέσθαι, τοῦτο καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἐκείνουθι ἐκείνοις ἀνθρωποσάνοντι ἄρχειν, καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν δ, τι κάλλιστα καὶ ἀρίστα τὸ θηγάδ διακυβερνῆν ζῶον, δ, τι μὴ κακῶν αὐτὸ δαυτῷ γίγνεται αἰτίον.

We have here the theory, intimated but not expanded by Plato, that man is, by misconduct or folly, the cause of

all the evil suffered on earth. That the Gods are not the cause of any evil, he tells us in *Republ.* II. p. 379. It seems, however, that he did not remain satisfied with the theory of the *Timæus*, because we find a different theory in the treatise *De Legibus* (x. p. 808 E)—two kosmical souls, one good, the other evil.

Moreover, the recital of the *Timæus* itself (besides another express passage in it, pp. 86 D—87 A) plainly contradicts the theory, that man is the cause of his own sufferings and evil. The Demiurgus himself is described as the cause,

Accordingly the Gods, sons of the Demiurgus, entered upon the task, trying to imitate their father. Borrowing from the Kosmos portions of the four elements, with engagement that what was borrowed should one day be paid back, they glued them together, and fastened them by numerous minute invisible pegs into one body. Into this body, always decaying and requiring renovation, they introduced the immortal soul, with its double circular rotations—the Circles of the Same and of the Diverse: embodying it in the cranium, which was made spherical in exterior form like the Kosmos, and admitting within it no other motion but the rotatory. The head, the most divine portion of the human system, was made master; while the body was admitted only as subject and ministerial. The body was endowed with all the six varieties of motive power, forward, backwards—upward, downward—to the right, to the left.¹ The phenomena of nutrition and sen-

Proceedings of the generated Gods—they fabricate the cranium as miniature of the Kosmos with the rational soul rotating within it.

by directing immortal souls to be joined with mortal bodies. The Demiurgus had constructed a beautiful Kosmos, with perfect and regular rotations—with the Gods, sidereal, planetary, and invisible—and with immortal souls distributed throughout the stars and earth, understanding and appreciating the comical rotations. So far all is admirable and faultless. But he is not satisfied with this. He determines to join each of these immortal souls with two mortal souls and with a mortal body. According to Plato's own showing, the immortal soul incurs nothing but corruption, disturbance, and stupidity, by such junction: as Empedokles and Heraclitus had said before (Plut. Solert. Animal. 7, p. 964 E). It is at first deprived of all intelligence (*διάνοια*); from this stupefaction it gradually but partially recovers; yet nothing short of the best possible education and discipline will enable it to contend, and even then imperfectly, against the corruption and incumbrance arising out of its companion body; lastly, if it should contend with every success, the only recompense which awaits it is to be re-transferred to the star from whence it came down. What reason was there for removing the immortal soul from its happy and privileged position, to be degraded by forced companionship with an unworthy body and

two inferior souls? The reason assigned is, that the Demiurgus required the Kosmos to be enlarged into a full and exact copy of the *Ἀνθρώπου* or Generic Animal, which comprehended four subordinate varieties of animals; one of them good (the Gods)—the other three inferior and corrupt, Men, Birds, Fishes. But here, according to Plato's own exposition, it was the Demiurgus himself and his plan that was at fault. What necessity was there to copy the worst parts of the Generic Animal as well as the best? The Kosmos would have been decidedly better, though it might have been less complete, without such unenviable accompaniments. When Plato constructs his own community (Republic and Legg.) he does not knowingly train up defective persons, or prepare the foundation for such, in order that every variety of character may be included. We may add here, that according to Plato himself, *Nous* (Intelligence or reason) belongs not to all human beings, but only to a small fraction of them (Timæus, p. 51 E). Except in these few, the immortal soul is therefore irrecoverably debased by its union with the body.

¹ Plato, Timæus, pp. 43 B, 44 D.

Plato supposes an etymological connection between *αἰσθησις* and *αἴσθησις*, p. 43 C.

sation began. But all these irregular movements, and violent multifarious agitations, checked or disturbed the regular rotations of the immortal soul in the cranium, perverting the arithmetical proportion, and harmony belonging to them. The rotations of the Circles of Same and Diverse were made to convey false and foolish affirmation. The soul became utterly destitute of intelligence, on being first joined to the body, and for some time afterwards.¹ But in the course of time the violence of these disturbing currents abates, so that the rotations of the Circles in the head can take place with more quiet and regularity. The man then becomes more and more intelligent. If subjected to good education and discipline, he will be made gradually sound and whole, free from corruption: but if he neglect this precaution, his life remains a lame one, and he returns back to Hades incomplete and unprofitable.²

The Gods, when they undertook the fabrication of the body, foresaw the inconvenience of allowing the head—with its intelligent rotations, and with the immortal soul enclosed in it—to roll along the ground, unable to get over a height, or out of a hollow.³ Accordingly they mounted it upon a tall body; with arms and legs as instruments of movement, support, and defence. They caused the movements to be generally directed forward and not backward; since front is more honourable and more commanding than rear. For the same reason, they placed the face, with the organs of sense, in the fore part of the head. Within the eyes, they planted that variety of fire which does not burn, but is called light, homogeneous with the light without. We are enabled to see in the daytime, because the light within our eyes pours out through the centre of them, and commingles with the light without. The two, being thus confounded together, transmit movements from every object which they touch, through the eye inward to the soul; and thus bring about the sensation of sight. At night no vision takes place: because the

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 44 B. καὶ διὰ δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τὰ παθήματα σὺν καρ' ἀρχαίς τε ἀνοσις ψυχῇ γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον, ὅταν εἰς σῶμα ἐκδοθῇ διηγνόν.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 44 C.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 44 D-E. ὅν' οὖν μὴ κυλινοῦμενον ἐπὶ γῆς, εὖψα τε καὶ βάθῃ παντοδαπὰ ἔχουσιν, ἄνθρωποι τὰ μὲν υπερβαίνειν, ἐνθεοὶ δὲ ἐκβαίνειν, ὅλην αὐτῶ τοῦτο καὶ εὐνοσίαν ἴδουσιν.

light from the interior of our eyes, even when it still comes out, finds no cognate light in the air without, and thus becomes extinguished in the darkness. All the light within the eye would thus have been lost, if the Gods had not provided a protection: they contrived the eyelids which drop and shut up the interior light within. This light, being prevented from egress, diffuses itself throughout the interior system, and tranquillises the movements within so as to bring on sleep: without dreams, if all the movements are quenched—with dreams, corresponding to the movements which remain if there are any such.¹

Such are the auxiliary causes (continues Plato), often mistaken by others for principal causes, which the Gods employed to bring about sight. In themselves, they have no regularity of action: for nothing can be regular in action without mind and intelligence.² But the most important among all the advantages of sight is, that it enables us to observe and study the rotations of the Kosmos and of the sidereal and planetary bodies. It is the observed rotations of days, months, and years, which impart to us the ideas of time and number, and enable us to investigate the universe. Hence we derive philosophy, the greatest of all blessings. Hence too we learn to apply the celestial rotations as a rule and model to amend the rotations of intelligence in our

Principal advantages of sight and hearing. Observations of the rotation of the Kosmos.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 45. The theory of vision here given by Plato is interesting. A theory, similar in the main, had been propounded by Empedoklés before him. Aristotle. *De Sensu*, p. 437 b.; Theophrast. *De Sensu*, cap. 5-9, p. 88 of Phillipsen's *Yak. Anagorae*. Aristotle himself impugns the theory. It is reported and discussed in Galen, *De Hippocratis et Platonis Dogmat.* vii. 5, 6, p. 619 seqq. ed. Kühn.

The different theories of vision among the ancient philosophers anterior to Aristotle are thus enumerated by E. H. von Baumhauer (*De Sententiis Veterum Philosophorum Græcorum de Visu, Lumine, et Coloribus*, Utrecht, 1843, p. 137):—"De videndi modo tres apud antiquos primarias theorias invenimus: et primam quidem, emanatione lucis ex oculis ad corpora externa,

ejusque reflexu ad oculos (Pythagorei, Alcmaeon): alteram emanationibus e corporibus, quæ per oculos veluti per canales ad animum penetrent (Eleatici, Heraclitus, Gorgias): quam sententiam Anaxagoras et Diogenes Apolloniates eatenus mutarunt, quod dicerent pupillam quasi speculum esse quod imagines acceptas ad animum rejiciat. Tertia theoria, orta è conjunctione duarum priorum, statuebat tam ex oculis quam è corporibus emanationes fieri, et amborum illarum concursu visum effici, quum conformata imago per meatus ad animum perveniat (Empedocles, Protagoras, Plato). Huc sententiæ etiam Democritus annumerari potest; qui eam planè secundum materiam, ut dicunt, exposuit."

The theory of Plato is described in the same treatise, pp. 106-112.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 46 D-E.

own cranium—since the first are regular and unerring, while the second are disorderly and changeful. It was for the like purpose, in view to the promotion of philosophy, that the Gods gave us voice and hearing. Both discourse and musical harmony are essential for this purpose. Harmony and rhythm are presents to us, from the Muses, not, as men now employ them, for unreflecting pleasure and recreation—but for the same purpose of regulating and attuning the disorderly rotations of the soul, and of correcting the ungraceful and unmeasured movements natural to the body.²

At this point of the exposition, the Platonic Timæus breaks off the thread, and takes up a new commencement. Thus far (he says) we have proceeded in explaining the part of Reason or Intelligence in the fabrication of the Kosmos. We must now explain the part of Necessity: for the genesis of the Kosmos results from co-operation of the two. By necessity (as has been said before) Plato means random, indeterminate, chaotic, pre-existent, spontaneity of movement or force: spontaneity (ἡ πλανωμένη αἰτία) upon which Reason works by persuasion up to a certain point, prevailing upon it to submit to some degree of fixity and regularity.³ Timæus had described the body of the Kosmos as being constructed by the Demiurgus out of the four elements; thus assuming fire, air, earth, water, as pre-existent. But he now corrects himself, and tells us that such assumption is unwarranted. We must (he remarks) give a better and fuller explanation of the Kosmos. No one of these four elements is either primordial, or permanently distinct and definite in itself.

The only primordial reality is, an indeterminate, all-recipient *fundamentum*: having no form or determination of its own, but capable of receiving any form or determination from without.

In the second explanation now given by Plato of the Kosmos and its genesis, he assumes this invisible *fundamentum* (which he had not assumed before) as “the mother

¹ Plato, Timæus, pp. 47 B-C, 90 C.
² Plato, Timæus, p. 47 D-E. ἡ δὲ ἀνομία . . . ὁ ἄρχων καὶ Μουσῶν δέδοται· καὶ ῥυθμὸς αὐτῶν . . . ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐκδοθήσεται. Here we see Plato, in the usual Hel-

lenic vein, particularising the functions and attributes of the different Gods and Goddesses.

³ Plato, Timæus, p. 33 A.

or nurse of all generation". He assumes, besides, the eternal Forms or Ideas, to act upon it and to bestow determination or quality. These forms fulfil the office of father: the offspring of the two is—the generated, concrete, visible, objects,¹ imitations of the Forms or Ideas, begotten out of this mother. How the Ideas act upon the *Materia Prima*, Plato cannot well explain: but each Form stamps an imitation or copy of itself upon portions of the common *Fundamentum*.²

Prima—
Forms of
the Ele-
ments—
Place, or
Receptivity.

But do there really exist any such Forms or Ideas—as Fire *per se*, the Generic Fire—Water *per se*, the Generic Water, invisible and intangible?³ Or is this mere unfounded speech? Does there exist nothing really anywhere, beyond the visible objects which we see and touch?⁴

We must assume (says Plato, after a certain brief argument which he himself does not regard as quite complete) the Forms or Ideas of Fire, Air, Water, Earth, as distinct and self-existent, eternal, indestructible, unchangeable—neither visible nor tangible, but apprehended by Reason or Intellect alone—neither receiving anything else from without, nor themselves moving to anything else. Distinct from these—images of these, and bearing the same name—are the sensible objects called Fire, Water, &c.—objects of sense and opinion—always in a state of transition—generated and destroyed, but always generated in some place and destroyed out of some place. There is to be

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 51 A. τὴν τοῦ γεγενῆσθαι ὁρατοῦ καὶ πάντως αἰσθητοῦ μέγεθος καὶ ὁμοειδέειαν.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 50-51. 50 C: τὴν αἰδέσθαι ἐκ τῶν αἰώνων τῶν ἐν τῇ φύσει φασάντων καὶ θαυμασμάτων. 51 A: ἀνδράσιν ἰδέσθαι τι καὶ ἀποφθεῖν, παρὰ τὴν φύσιν, μεταλαμβάνοντες διὰ ἀπορώτατά τε τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ δυσαναστότατον.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 51 C.

⁴ Ueberweg, in a learned Dissertation, *Ueber die Platonische Weltseele* (pp. 52-53), seeks to establish a greater distinction between the *Phædrus*, *Phædon*, and *Timæus*, in respect to the way in which Plato affirms the separate substantiality of Ideas, than the language of the dialogues warrants. He contends that the separate substantiality of the Platonic Ideas is more presumptuously affirmed in the

Timæus than in the *Phædrus*. But this will not be found borne out if we look at *Phædrus*, p. 247, where the affirmation is quite as presumptuous as that in the *Timæus*; correlating too, as it does in the *Timæus*, with *Noûs* as the contemplating subject. Indeed the point may be said to be affirmed more positively in the *Phædrus*, because the *ὑπερουράνιος λόγος* is assigned to the Ideas, while in the *Timæus* all *λόγος* or local existence is denied to them (p. 52 B-C). Sensible objects are presented in the *Phædrus* as faint resemblances of the archetypal Ideas (p. 250 C), just as they are in the *Timæus*: on the other hand, τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν τοῦ νοητοῦ occurs in the *Timæus* (p. 51 A), equivalent to τὸ μετέχειν, which Ueberweg states to be discontinued.

assumed, besides, distinct from the two preceding—as a third *fundamentum*—the place or receptacle in which these images are localised, generated, and nursed up. This place, or formless primitive receptivity, is indestructible, but out of all reach of sense, and difficult to believe in, inasmuch as it is only accessible by a spurious sort of ratiocination.¹

Anterior to the construction of the Kosmos, the Forms or Ideas of the four elements had already begun to act upon this primitive recipient or receptacle, but in a confused and irregular way. Neither of the four could impress itself in a special and definite manner: there were some vestiges of each, but each was incomplete: all were in stir and agitation, yet without any measure or fixed rule. Thick and heavy, however, were tending to separate from thin and light, and each particle thus tending to occupy a place of its own.² In this condition (the primordial moving chaos of the poets and earlier philosophers), things were found by the Demiurgus, when he undertook to construct the Kosmos. There was no ready made Fire, Water, &c. (as Plato had assumed at the opening of the *Timæus*), but an agitated *imbroglio* of all, with the portions tending to separate from each other, and to agglomerate each in a place of its own. The Demiurgus brought these four elements out of confusion into definite bodies and regular movements. He gave to each a body, constructed upon the most beautiful proportions of arithmetic and geometry, as far as this was possible.³

Respecting such proportions, the theory which Plato here lays out is admitted by himself to be a novel one; but it is doubtless borrowed, with more or less modification, from the Pythagoreans. Every solid body is cir-

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 52 B. αὐτὸ δὲ μετ' ἀναισθησίας πάντων λογισμῷ τιμὴ νόθῳ, μόγις πιστόν. 52 B.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 52-53. 53 A: τὰ τέτταρα γένη σειώμενα ὑπὸ τῆς δεξιμότης, κινουμένης αὐτῆς οἷον ὀργάνου σεισμῶν παρίχοτος, τὰ μὲν ἀνομοιότατα πλείστον αὐτὰ ἀφ' αὐτῶν ὀρίζειν, τὰ δ' ὁμοιότατα μάλιστα εἰς ταῦτον ξυνωθεῖν· διὸ δὴ καὶ χώραν ταῦτα ἄλλα ἄλλῃν ἵσχειν, πρὶν καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐξ αὐτῶν διακοσμηθῆν γενέσθαι. 57 C: διέστικε μὲν γὰρ τοῦ γένους ἐκάστου τὰ πλεῖστα κατὰ τόπον

ἴδιον διὰ τὴν τῆς δεξιμότης κίνησιν. 58 C.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 53 B. τὸ δὲ ὅτι δυνατόν ὡς ἀλλοῖστα ἄριστά τε ἐξ οὐκ οὕτως ἔχόντων τὸν θεὸν αὐτὰ εὐριστάνα, παρὰ πάντα ἡμῖν, ὡς αἰεὶ, τοῦτο λεγόμενον ὑπαρχόντι.

This is the hypothesis pervading all the *Timæus*—construction the best and finest which the case admitted. The limitations accompany the assumed purpose throughout.

cumscribed by plane surfaces : every plane surface is composed of triangles : all triangles are generated out of two—the right-angled isosceles triangle—and the right-angled scalene or oblong triangle. Of this oblong there are infinite varieties : but the most beautiful is a right-angled triangle, having the hypotenuse twice as long as the lesser of the two other sides.¹ From this sort of oblong triangle are generated the tetrahedron or pyramid—the octahedron—and the eikosihedron : from the equilateral triangle is generated the cube. The cube, as the most stable and solid, was assigned by the Demiurgus for the fundamental structure of earth : the pyramid for that of fire : the octahedron for that of air : the eikosihedron for that of water. The purpose was that the four should be in continuous geometrical proportion : as Fire to Air, so Air to Water : as Air to Water, so Water to Earth. Lastly, the Dodekahedron was assigned as the basis of structure for the spherical Kosmos itself or universe.² Upon this arrangement each of the three elements—fire, water, air—passes into the other ; being generated from the same radical triangle. But earth does not pass into either of the three (nor either of these into earth), being generated from a different radical triangle. The pyramid, as thin, sharp, and cutting, was assigned to fire

damental
triangles—
regular
solids.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 53-54. 53 C : ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ ὀβελίου.

² That Plato intended, by this elaborate geometrical construction, to arrive at a continuous geometrical proportion between the four elements, he tells us (p. 32 A-B), adding the qualifying words καὶ ὅσον ἢ ἐννεατόν. M. Boeckh, however (*De Platonici Corporis Mundani Fabrica*, pp. viii.-xxvi.), has shown that the geometrical proportion cannot be properly concluded from the premises assumed by Plato :—"Platonis elementorum doctrinam et parum sibi constare, neque omnibus numeris absolutam esse, immo multis incommodis laborare, et divini ingenii laus magis quam disciplinae severitati originem debere fatebimur ; nec profundiorum et abstrusiorum naturæ cognitionem in ea sitam esse suspicabimur—in quem errorem etiam Joh. Keplerus, summi ingenii homo, incidit".

Respecting the Dodekahedron, see Zeller, *Gesch. der Philos.* ii. p. 513.

ed. 2nd. There is some obscurity about it. In the *Epinomis* (p. 981 C) Plato gives the Æther as a fifth element, besides the four commonly known and recited in the *Timæus*. It appears that Philolaus, as well as Xenokrates, conceived the Dodekahedron as the structural form of Æther (*Schol. ad Aristot. Physic.* p. 427, a. 16, Brandis) : and Xenokrates expressly says, that Plato himself recognised it as such. Zeller dissents from this view, and thinks that nothing more is meant than the implication, that the Dodekahedron can have a sphere described round it more readily than any of the other figures named.

Opponents of Plato remarked that he ἀπεμαθηματούργετο τὴν φύσιν, *Schol. ad Aristot. Metaph.* A. 986, b. 23, p. 630, Brandis. Aristotle devotes himself in many places to the refutation of the Platonic doctrine on this point ; see *De Cælo*, iii. 8, 306-307, and elsewhere.

as the quickest and most piercing of the four elements: the cube as most solid and difficult to move, was allotted to earth, the stationary element. Fire was composed of pyramids of different size, yet each too small to be visible by itself, and becoming visible only when grouped together in masses: the earth was composed of cubes of different size, each invisible from smallness: the other elements in like manner, each from its respective solid,¹ in exact proportion and harmony, as far as Necessity could be persuaded to tolerate. All the five regular solids were thus employed in the configuration and structure of the Kosmos.²

Such was the mode of formation of the four so-called elemental bodies.³ Of each of the four, there are diverse species or varieties: and that which distinguishes one variety of the same element from another variety is, that the constituent triangles, though all similar, are of different magnitudes. The diversity of these combinations, though the primary triangles are similar, is infinite: the student of Nature must follow it out, to obtain any probable result.

Plato next enumerates the several varieties of each element—
 fire, water, earth.⁴ He then proceeds to mention the
 Varieties of each element attributes, properties, affections, &c., of each: which
 he characterises as essentially relative to a sentient
 Subject: nothing being absolute except the constituent geometrical figures. You cannot describe these attributes (he says) without assuming (what has not yet been described) the sensi-

¹ Plato, Timæus, p. 56 C. ὁππότε ἡ τῆς Ἀνάγκης ἔκουσα πισθεῖσα τε φύσις ὕπνιεε.

² Plato, Timæus, pp. 55-56.

³ Plato, Timæus, p. 57 C. ὅσα ἀεὶ καὶ πάντα σώματα.

The Platonist Attikus (ap. Eusebium, Præp. Ev. xv. 7) blames Aristotle for dissenting from Plato on this point, and for recognising the celestial matter as a fifth essence distinct from the four elements. Plato (he says) followed both anterior traditions and self-evident sense (τῇ περὶ αὐτὰ ἀναγκῇ) in admitting only the four elements, and in regarding all things as either compounds or varieties of these. But Aristotle, thinking to make parade of superior philosophical sagacity, προσ-

κατηρώμενοι τοῖς φαινόμενοις τέτταροι σώμασι τὴν πέμπτην οὐσίαν, πάντῃ μὲν λαμπρὸς καὶ φιλοδωρὸς τῇ φύσει χρησάμενος, μὴ συνιδὼν δι' ὅτι οὗ νομοθετεῖν δεῖ φυσιολογοῦντα, τὰ δὲ τῆς φύσεως αὐτῆς ἐπιστορεῖν. This last precept is what we are surprised to read in a Platonist of the third century B.C. "When you are philosophising upon Nature, do not lay down the law, but search out the real facts of Nature." It is truly Baconian: it is justly applicable as a caution to Aristotle, against whom Attikus directs it; but it is still more eminently applicable to Plato, against whom he does not direct it.

⁴ Plato, Timæus, p. 57 D.

⁵ Plato, Timæus, pp. 68-61 C.

tive or mortal soul, to which they are relative.¹ Assuming this provisionally, Plato gives account of Hot and Cold, Hard and Soft, Heavy and Light, Rough and Smooth, &c.² Then he describes, first, the sensations of pleasure and pain, common to the whole body—next those of the special senses, sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch.³ These descriptions are very curious and interesting. I am compelled to pass them over by want of space, and shall proceed to the statements respecting the two mortal souls and the containing organism—which belong to a vein more analogous to that of the other Platonic dialogues.

The Demiurgus, after having constructed the entire Kosmos, together with the generated Gods, as well as Necessity would permit—imposed upon these Gods the task of constructing Man: the second best of the four varieties of animals whom he considered it necessary to include in the Kosmos. He furnished to them as a basis an immortal rational soul (diluted remnant

Construction of man—imposed by the Demiurgus upon the secondary Gods. Triple Soul.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 61 C-D. Παῖνον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν αἰσθητὸν δεῖ τοῖς λεγόμενοις (γένεσιν) ἀεὶ· σαφέως δὲ καὶ τῶν περὶ σάρκα γένεσιν, ψυχῆς τε ὅσον θνητὸν, οὕτω διεληλύθαμεν. Τυχάνει δὲ οὕτω ταῦτα χωρὶς τῶν περὶ τὰ παθήματα ὅσα αἰσθητικά, οὐτ' ἰκεῖνα ἄνεν τοῦτον δυνατόν ἵκανῶς λεχθῆναι· τὸ δὲ ἔμεινε σχεδὸν οὐ δυνατόν. Ὑποθετοῦν δὲ πρότερον ἄλλα, τὰ δ' ὅσπερ ἀποσπείροντα ἐπείκειν αἰσθῆναι. Ἵνα οὖν ἔξῃ τὰ παθήματα λέγεται τοῖς γένεσιν, ὅσπερ πρότερον ἦν τὰ περὶ σάρκα καὶ ψυχῆς οὕτω.

² Plato, *Tim.* pp. 62-64 B. Demokritus appears to have held on this point an opinion approaching to that of Plato. See Democ. Frag. ed. Mullach, pp. 204-215: *Aristot. Metaph.* A. p. 986, b. 15, *De Sensu*, a. 62-65; *Sextus Empiric.* adv. Math. vii. 135.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν βαρέως καὶ κοφῆς καὶ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ, ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς—τῶν δ' ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδενὸς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα εἶδη τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἀλλοιομένης. We may remark that Plato includes hardness and softness, the different varieties of resistance, among the secondary or relative qualities of matter; all that he seems to conceive as absolute are extension and figure, the geometrical conception of matter. In the view of most modern philosophers, resistance is considered as the most obviously and

undeniably absolute of all the attributes of matter, as that which serves to prove that matter itself is absolute. Dr. Johnson refuted the doctrine of Berkeley by knocking a stick against the ground; and a similar refutation is adopted in words by Reid and Stewart (see Mill's *System of Logic*, Book vi. ad finem, also Book i. ch. 3, a. 7-8). To me the fact appealed to by Johnson appears an evidence in favour of Berkeley's theory rather than against it. The Resistant (ὁ παρὰ τοῦ προσβολῆν καὶ ἐπαθῆναι τινα, Plato, *Sophist.* p. 246 A) can be understood only as a correlate of something which is resisted: the fact of sense called Resistance is an indivisible fact, involving the implication of the two. In the first instance it is the resistance experienced to our own motions (*A. Bain, The Senses and the Intellect*, p. 91, 3rd ed.), and thus involves the feeling of our own spontaneous muscular energy.

The *Timæus* of Plato is not noticed by Sir W. Hamilton in his very learned and instructive *Dissertation on the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Body* (notes to his edition of Reid's Works, p. 826), though it bears upon his point more than the *Theætétus*, which he mentions.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 65-66 E.

Distribu- from the soul of the Kosmos); with which they were
tion thereof directed to combine two mortal souls and a body.¹
in the body. They executed their task as well as the conditions of the problem
admitted. They were obliged to include in the mortal souls
pleasure and pain, audacity and fear, anger, hope, appetite,
sensation, &c., with all the concomitant mischiefs. By such
uncongenial adjuncts the immortal rational soul was unavoid-
ably defiled. The constructing Gods however took care to
defile it as little as possible.² They reserved the head as a
separate abode for the immortal soul: planting the mortal soul
apart from it in the trunk, and establishing the neck as an
isthmus of separation between the two. Again the mortal soul
was itself not single but double: including two divisions, a
better and a worse. The Gods kept the two parts separate;
placing the better portion in the thoracic cavity nearer to the
head, and the worse portion lower down, in the abdominal
cavity: the two being divided from each other by the dia-
phragm, built across the body as a wall of partition: just as in a
dwelling-house, the apartments of the women are separated
from those of the men. Above the diaphragm and near to the
neck, was planted the energetic, courageous, contentious, soul;
so placed as to receive orders easily from the head, and to aid
the rational soul in keeping under constraint the mutinous soul
of appetite, which was planted below the diaphragm.³ The
immortal soul⁴ was fastened or anchored in the brain, the two
mortal souls in the line of the spinal marrow continuous with
the brain: which line thus formed the thread of connection
between the three. The heart was established as an outer
fortress for the exercise of influence by the immortal soul over
the other two. It was at the same time made the initial point
of the veins,—the fountain from whence the current of blood
proceeded to pass forcibly through the veins round to all parts
of the body. The purpose of this arrangement is, that when
the rational soul denounces some proceeding as wrong (either
on the part of others without, or in the appetitive soul within),

¹ Plato, Timæus, p. 69 C.

² Plato, Tim. p. 69 D. *ἐννεραστή-
μενοι τ' αὐτὰ ἀναγκάσις τὸ θυγόν
γινώσκει ἐνδύσθαι. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δι*

*ορεθόμενοι μαίνεσθαι τὸ θεῖον, ὃ τι μὴ τάχα
ἔστι ἀνάγκη, &c.*

³ Plato, Timæus, pp. 69-70.

⁴ Plato, Timæus, p. 73 B-D.

it may stimulate an ebullition of anger in the heart, and may transmit from thence its exhortations and threats through the many small blood channels to all the sensitive parts of the body : which may thus be rendered obedient everywhere to the orders of our better nature.¹

In such ebullitions of anger, as well as in moments of imminent danger, the heart leaps violently, becoming overheated and distended by excess of fire. The Gods foresaw this, and provided a safeguard against it by placing the lungs close at hand with the wind-pipe and trachea. The lungs were constructed soft and full of internal pores and cavities like a sponge ; without any blood,²—but receiving, instead of blood, both the air inspired through the trachea, and the water swallowed to quench thirst. Being thus always cool, and soft like a cushion, the lungs received and deadened the violent beating and leaping of the heart ; at the same time that they cooled down its excessive heat, and rendered it a more equable minister for the orders of reason.³

The third or lowest soul, of appetite and nutrition, was placed between the diaphragm and the navel. This region of the body was set apart like a manger for containing necessary food : and the appetitive soul was tied up to it like a wild beast ; indispensable indeed for the continuance of the race, yet a troublesome adjunct, and therefore placed afar off, in order that its bellowings might disturb as little as possible the deliberations of the rational soul in the cranium, for the good of the whole. The Gods knew that this appetitive soul would never listen to reason, and that it must be kept under subjection altogether by the influence of phantoms and imagery. They provided an agency for this purpose in the liver, which they placed close upon the abode of the appetitive soul.⁴ They made the liver compact, smooth, and

Functions
of the heart
and lungs.
Thoracic
soul.

Abdominal
Soul—diffi-
culty of con-
trolling it—
functions of
the liver.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 70 B-C.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 70 C. τῇ τοῦ πλεόμενου ἰδίαν ἐνεφύτουν, πρῶτον μὲν μαλακὴν καὶ ἀναιμον, εἴτα σφραγὶς ἐντὺς ἔχουσαν ὅλον σπόγγον κατατετραμήνην.

Aristotle notices this opinion as held by some persons (not naming Plato), but impugns it as erroneous. He

affirms that the lungs have more blood in them than any of the other viscera (*Histor. Animal.* i. 17, p. 496, b. 1-8; *De Respirat.* c. 15, p. 478, a. 13).

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 70.

⁴ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 71 A. εἰδότες δὲ αὐτὸ ὡς λόγον μὲν οὕτω ἐνέχεον ἐμαλλέν, εἴτε πρὶ καὶ μεταλαμβάνου τυνδὲ αὐτῶν αἰσθήσαντες, οὐκ ἐμφορον αὐτῶν.

brilliant, like a mirror reflecting images :—moreover, both sweet and bitter on occasions. The thoughts of the rational soul were thus brought within view of the appetitive soul, in the form of phantoms or images exhibited on the mirror of the liver. When the rational soul is displeased, not only images corresponding to this feeling are impressed, but the bitter properties of the liver are all called forth. It becomes crumpled, discoloured, dark and rough ; the gall bladder is compressed ; the veins carrying the blood are blocked up, and pain as well as sickness arise. On the contrary, when the rational soul is satisfied, so as to send forth mild and complacent inspirations,—all this bitterness of the liver is tranquillised, and all its native sweetness called forth. The whole structure becomes straight and smooth ; and the images impressed upon it are rendered propitious. It is thus through the liver, and by means of these images, that the rational soul maintains its ascendancy over the appetitive soul ; either to terrify and subdue, or to comfort and encourage it.¹

Moreover, the liver was made to serve another purpose. It was selected as the seat of the prophetic agency ; which the Gods considered to be indispensable, as a refuge and aid for the irrational department of man. Though this portion of the soul had no concern with sense or reason, they would not shut it out altogether from some glimpse of truth. The revelations of prophecy were accordingly signified on the liver, for the instruction and within the easy view of the appetitive soul : and chiefly at periods when the functions of the rational soul are suspended—either during sleep, or disease, or fits of temporary ecstasy. For no man in his perfect senses comes under the influence of a genuine prophetic inspiration. Sense and intelligence are often required to interpret prophecies, and to determine what is meant by dreams or signs or prognostics of other kinds : but such revelations are received by men destitute of sense. To receive them, is the business of one class of men : to interpret them, that of another. It is a grave mistake, though often committed, to confound the two. It was in order to furnish prophecy to man, therefore, that

τὸ μάλιν τῶν ἰσοίτο λόγων, ὑπὸ δὲ
εἰδῶν καὶ φαντασμάτων νυκτός τε καὶ
μέθ' ἡμέραν μάλιστα ψυχαγωγῆσονται.

τούτων δὲ θεὸς ἐπιβουλίσας αὐτῇ τὴν τοῦ
ἥπατος ἰδίαν συνίστησεν.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 71 C-D.

the Gods devised both the structure and the place of the liver. During life, the prophetic indications are clearly marked upon it : but after death they become obscure and hard to decipher.¹

The spleen was placed near the liver, corresponding to it on the left side, in order to take off from it any impure or excessive accretions or accumulations, and thus to preserve it clean and pure.²

Such was the distribution of the one immortal and the two mortal souls, and such the purposes by which it was dictated. We cannot indeed (says Plato) proclaim this with full assurance as truth, unless the Gods would confirm our declarations. We must take the risk of affirming what appears to us probable—and we shall proceed with this risk yet further.³ The following is the plan and calculation according to which it was becoming that our remaining bodily frame should be put together.

The Gods foresaw that we should be intemperate in our appetite for food and drink, and that we should thus bring upon ourselves many diseases injurious to life. To mitigate this mischief, they provided us with a great length of intestinal canal, but twisted it round so as to occupy but a small space, in the belly. All the food which we introduce remains thus a long time within us, before it passes away. A greater interval elapses before we need fresh supplies of food. If the food passed away speedily, so that we were constantly obliged to renew it, and were therefore always eating—the human race would be utterly destitute of intelligence and philosophy. They would be beyond the controul of the rational soul.⁴

Bone and flesh come next to be explained. Both of them derive their origin from the spinal marrow : in which Bone—flesh the bonds of life are fastened, and soul is linked with —Marrow. body—the root of the human race. The origin of the spinal marrow itself is special and exceptional. Among the triangles

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 71-72. 71 E: *ἱκανὸν δὲ σημεῖον, ὡς μαντικὴν ἀφροσύνη θεοῦ ἀνθρωπίνῃ δίδωκεν· οὐδαίς γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ἐφάπτεται μαντικῆς ἐνθέου καὶ ἀληθοῦς.*

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 72 D.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 72 D-E. τὸ μὲν ἀληθές, ὡς εἴρηται, θεοῦ ἐμφάσαντος

τότ' ἂν οὕτω μόνως διέσχυριζοίμεθα· τὸ γὰρ μὴν εἰκὲς ἤμῃν εἰρησθαι καὶ νῦν καὶ ἔτι μάλλον ἀνασκοπεύσει διακινδυνεύοντων τὸ φάναι, καὶ κεφάσθαι . . . ἐκ δὲ λογισμοῦ τοιοῦδε ἐνίστασθαι μάλιστα ἂν αὐτὸ πάντων πρότοι.

⁴ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 73 A.

employed in the construction of all the four elements, the Gods singled out the very best of each sort. Those selected were combined harmoniously with each other, and employed in the formation of the spinal marrow, as the universal seed ground (*πανσπερμία*) for all the human race. In this marrow the Gods planted the different sorts of souls; distributing and accommodating the figure of each portion of marrow to the requirements of each different soul. For that portion (called the encephalon, as being contained in the head) which was destined to receive the immortal soul, they employed the spherical figure and none other: for the remaining portion, wherein the mortal soul was to be received, they employed a mixture of the spherical and the oblong. All of it together was called by the same name *marrow*, covered and protected by one continuous bony case, and established as the holding ground to fasten the whole extent of soul with the whole extent of body.¹

Plato next explains the construction of ligaments and flesh—of the mouth, tongue, teeth, and lips: of hair and nails.² These last were produced with a long-sighted providence: for the Gods foresaw that the lower animals would be produced from the degeneration of man, and that to them nails and claws would be absolutely indispensable: accordingly, a sketch or rudiment of nails was introduced into the earliest organisation of man.³ Nutrition being indispensable to man, the Gods produced for this purpose plants (trees, shrubs, herbs, &c.)—with a nature cognate to that of man, but having only the lowest of the three human souls.⁴ They then cut ducts and veins throughout the human body, in directions appropriate for distributing the nutriment everywhere. They provided proper structures (here curiously described) for digestion, inspiration, and expiration.⁵ The constituent triangles within the body, when young and fresh, overpower the triangles, older and weaker, contained in the nutritive matters swallowed, and then appropriate part of them to the support and growth of the body: in old age, the triangles within are themselves overpowered, and the body decays. When the fastenings,

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 73 C-D.

² Plato, *Tim.* pp. 75-76.

³ Plat. *Tim.* p. 76 E. *ὅθεν ἰν ἀνθρώποις*

*ποῖς εἰσὶν ἡγεμονίαις ὑπερτάσασα
τῶν τῶν ὀνύχων γένεσιν.*

⁴ Plat. *Tim.* p. 77 B-C.

⁵ Plat. *Tim.* pp. 78-79.

whereby the triangles in the spinal marrow have been fitted together, are worn out and give way, they let go the fastenings of the soul also. The soul, when thus released in a natural way, flies away with delight. Death in this manner is pleasurable: though it is distressing, when brought on violently, by disease or wounds.¹

Here Plato passes into a general survey of diseases and the proper treatment of them. "As to the source from whence diseases arise (he says) this is a matter evident to every one. They arise from unnatural excess, deficiency, or displacement, of some one or more of the four elements (fire, air, water, earth) which go to compose the body."² If the element in excess be fire, heat and continuous fever are produced: if air, the fever comes on alternate days: if water (a duller element), it is a tertian fever: if earth, it is a quartan—since earth is the dullest and most sluggish of the four.³

General
view of
Diseases
and their
Causes.

Having dwelt at considerable length on the distempers of the body, the Platonic Timæus next examines those of the soul, which proceed from the condition of the body.⁴ The generic expression for all distemper of the soul is, irrationality—unreason—absence of reason or intelligence. Of this there are two sorts—madness and ignorance. Intense pleasures and pains are the gravest cause of madness.⁵ A man under either of these two influences—either grasping at the former, or running away from the latter, out of season—can neither see nor hear any thing rightly. He is at that moment mad and incapable of using his reason. When the flow of sperm round his marrow is overcharged and violent, so as to produce desires with intense throes of uneasiness beforehand and intense pleasure when satisfaction arrives,—his soul is really distempered and irrational, through the ascendancy of his body. Yet such a man is erroneously looked upon in general not as distempered, but as wicked volun-

Diseases
of mind—
wickedness
is a disease
—no man
is volun-
tarily
wicked.

¹ Plat. Tim. p. 81.

² Plat. Tim. p. 81 E. τὸ δὲ τῶν μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα ταῦτα συμβαίνει γινόμενα, τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς νόσον δὲν ἐνίσταται, ὁπλόν σου καὶ διὰ σώματος εἶναι τῆς.

³ Plat. Tim. p. 86 A. τὸ δὲ γῆς, μὲν δὲ ψυχῆς ἀνοίας ἐννοεῖται. τὰ δὲ ἀνοίας γῆρας, τὸ μὲν μακρὰν, τὸ δὲ ἀμαθίαν.

⁴ Plato, Timæus, p. 86 B. Καὶ τὰ

tarily, of his own accord. The truth is, that sexual intemperance is a disorder of the soul arising from an abundant flow of one kind of liquid in the body, combined with thin bones or deficiency in the solida. And nearly all those intemperate habits which are urged as matters of reproach against a man—as if he were bad willingly,—are urged only from the assumption of an erroneous hypothesis. No man is bad willingly, but only from some evil habit of body and from wrong or perverting treatment in youth; which is hostile to his nature, and comes upon him against his own will.¹

Again, not merely by way of pleasures, but by way of pains also, the body operates to entail evil or wickedness on the soul. When acid or salt phlegm—when bitter and bilious humours—come to spread through the body, remaining pent up therein, without being able to escape by exhalation,—the effluvia which ought to have been exhaled from them become confounded with the rotation of the soul, producing in it all manner of distempers. These effluvia attack all the three different seats of the soul, occasioning great diversity of mischiefs according to the part attacked—irascibility, despondency, rashness, cowardice, forgetfulness, stupidity. Such bad constitution of the body serves as the foundation of ulterior mischief. And when there supervene, in addition, bad systems of government and bad social maxims, without any means of correction furnished to youth through good social instruction—it is from these two combined causes, both of them against our own will, that all of us who are wicked become wicked. Parents and teachers are more in fault than children and pupils. We must do our best to arrange the bringing up, the habits, and the instruction, so as to eschew evil and attain good.²

After thus describing the causes of corruption, both in body and mind, Plato adverts to the preservative and corrective agencies applicable to them. Between the one and the other, constant proportion and symmetry must be imperatively maintained. When the one is strong, and the other weak, nothing but mischief can ensue.³ Mind must not be exercised alone, to the

Preservative and healing agencies against disease—well-regulated exercise, of mind and

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 86 C-D.

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 87 A-C.

³ *Plat. Tim.* pp. 87-88 A.

exclusion of body; nor body alone, without mind. ^{body proportionally.} Each must be exercised, so as to maintain adequate reaction and equilibrium against the other.¹ We ought never to let the body be at rest: we must keep up within it a perpetual succession of moderate shocks, so that it may make suitable resistance against foreign causes of movement, internal and external.² The best of all movements is, that which is both in itself and made by itself: analogous to the self-continuing rotation both of the Kosmos and of the rational soul in our cranium.³ Movement in itself, but by an external agent, is less good. The worst of all is, movement neither in itself nor by itself. Among these three sorts of movement, the first is, Gymnastic: the second, propulsion backwards and forwards in a swing, gestation in a carriage: the third is, purgation or medicinal disturbance.⁴ This last is never to be employed, except in extreme emergencies.

We must now indicate the treatment necessary for mind alone, apart from body. It has been already stated, that there are in each of us three souls, or three distinct varieties of soul; each having its own separate place and special movements. Of these three, that which is most exercised must necessarily become the strongest: that which is left unexercised, unmoved, at rest or in indolence,—will become the weakest. ^{Treatment proper for mind alone, apart from body—supremacy of the rational soul must be cultivated.} The object to be aimed at is, that all three shall be exercised in harmony or proportion with each other. Respecting the soul in our head, the grandest and most commanding of the three, we must bear in mind that it is this which the Gods have assigned to each man as his own special Dæmon or presiding Genius. Dwelling as it does in the highest region of the body, it marks us and links us as akin with heaven—as a celestial and not a terrestrial plant, having root in heaven and not in earth. It is this encephalic or head-soul, which, connected with and suspended from the divine soul of the Kosmos, keeps our whole

¹ Plat. Tim. p. 88 C.

² Plat. Tim. p. 88 D-E.

³ Plat. Tim. p. 89 A. τῶν δ' αὖ κινήσεων ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ ὑφ' αὐτοῦ ἀρίστη κίνησις· μέλλουσα γὰρ τῇ διανοητικῇ καὶ τῇ τοῦ παντὸς κινήσει συγγενής· ἡ δ' ὑπ' ἄλλου χεῖρων.

⁴ Plat. Tim. p. 89 A. δευτέρα δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν αἰσθησέων.

Foes, in the *Œconomia Hippocratica* v. Αἰώρα, gives information about these *penetiles gestationes*, upon which the ancient physicians bestowed much attention.

body in its erect attitude. Now if a man neglects this soul, directing all his favour and development towards the two others (the energetic or the appetitive),—all his judgments will infallibly become mortal and transient, and he himself will be degraded into a mortal being, as far as it is possible for man to become so. But if he devotes himself to study and meditation on truth, exercising the encephalic soul more than the other two—he will assuredly, if he seizes truth,¹ have his mind filled with immortal and divine judgments, and will become himself immortal, as far as human nature admits of it. Cultivating as he does systematically the divine element within him, and having his in-dwelling Genius decorated as perfectly as possible, he will be eminently well-inspired or happy.²

The mode of cultivating or developing each soul is the same —to assign to each the nourishment and the movement which is suitable to it. Now the movements which are kindred and congenial to our divine encephalic soul, are—the rotations of the Kosmos and the intellections traversing the Kosmical soul. It is these that we ought to follow and study. By learning and embracing in our minds the rotations and proportions of the Kosmos, we shall assimilate the comprehending subject to the comprehended object, and shall rectify that derangement of our own intracranial rotations, which was entailed upon us by our birth into a body. By such assimilation, we shall attain the perfection of the life allotted to us, both at present and for the future.³

We have thus—says the Platonic Timæus in approaching his conclusion—gone through all those matters which we promised at the beginning, from the first construction of the Kosmos to the genesis of man. We must now devote a few words to the other animals.

We must study and understand the rotations of the Kosmos—this is the way to amend the rotations of the rational soul.

Construction of women, birds, quadrupeds, fishes, &c., all from

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 90 C. *ἀν περ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται.*

² Plato, *Timæus*, p. 90 B-D. *ἔχοντά τε αὐτὸν εὖ μέλα κεκοσμημένον τὸν δαίμονα ἑνόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ, διαφερόντως εὖ-δαίμονα εἶναι.*

It is hardly possible to translate this play upon the word *εὖδαίμων*.

³ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 90 D, 91 C-D. The phrase of Plato in describing the newly introduced mode of procreation—*ὡς εἰς ἀρουραν τὴν μήτραν ἄρματα ὑπὸ σμικρότεροι καὶ ἀδιάκλαστα ζῶα κατασπείραντες*—is remarkable, as it might be applied to the spermatozoa, which nevertheless he cannot have known.

All of these derive their origin from man, by successive degradations. The first transition is from man into woman. Men whose lives had been characterised by cowardice or injustice, were after death and in their second birth born again as women. It was then that the Gods planted in us the sexual impulse, reconstructing the bodily organism with suitable adjustment, on the double pattern, male and female.¹

the degradation of primitive man.

Such was the genesis of women, by a partial transformation and diversification of the male structure.

We next come to birds; who are likewise a degraded birth or formation, derived from one peculiar mode of degeneracy in man: hair being transmuted into feathers and wings. Birds were formed from the harmless, but light, airy, and superficial men; who, though carrying their minds aloft to the study of kosmical phenomena, studied them by visual observation and not by reason, foolishly imagining that they had discovered the way of reaching truth.²

The more brutal land animals proceeded from men totally destitute of philosophy, who neither looked up to the heavens nor cared for celestial objects: from men making no use whatever of the rotations of their encephalic soul, but following exclusively the guidance of the lower soul in the trunk. Through such tastes and occupations, both their heads and their anterior limbs became dragged down to the earth by the force of affinity. Moreover, when the rotations of the encephalic soul, from want of exercise, became slackened and fell into desuetude, the round form of the cranium was lost, and converted into an oblong or some other form. These men thus degenerated into quadrupeds and multipeds: the Gods furnishing a greater number of feet in proportion to the stupidity of each, in order that its approximations to earth might be multiplied. To some of the more stupid, however, the Gods gave no feet nor limbs at all; constraining them to drag the whole length of their bodies along the ground, and to become Reptiles.³

¹ Plat. Tim. p. 91 D. Whoever compares the step of marked degeneration here indicated—in passing from men to women—with that which is affirmed by Plato in the fifth book of the Republic about the character, attri-

butes, and capacities of women, will recognise a material difference between the two.

² Plato, Timæus, p. 91 E.

³ Plato, Timæus, pp. 91-92.

Out of the most stupid and senseless of mankind, by still greater degeneracy, the Gods formed Fishes or Aquatic Animals:—the fourth and lowest genus, after Men, Birds, Land-Animals. This race of beings, from their extreme want of mind, were not considered worthy to live on earth, or to respire thin and pure air. They were condemned to respire nothing but deep and turbid water, many of them, as oysters, and other descriptions of shellfish, being fixed down at the lowest depth or bottom.¹

It is by such transitions (concludes the Platonic Timæus) that the different races of animals passed originally, and still continue to pass, into each other. The interchange is determined by the acquisition or loss of reason or irrationality.²

The vast range of topics, included in this curious exposition, is truly remarkable: Kosmogony or Theogony, First Philosophy, Physics (resting upon Geometry and Arithmetic), Zoology, Physiology, Anatomy, Pathology, Therapeutica, mental as well as physical. Of all these, I have not been able to furnish more than scanty illustrations; but the whole are well worthy of study, as the conjectures of a great and ingenious mind in the existing state of knowledge and belief among the Greeks: and all the more worthy, because they form in many respects a striking contrast with the points of view prevalent in more recent times.

The position and functions of the Demiurgus, in the Timæus, form a peculiar phase in Grecian Philosophy, and even in the doctrine of Plato himself: for the theology and kosmology of the Timæus differ considerably from what we read in the Phædrus, Politikus, Republic, Leges, &c. The Demiurgus is presented in Timæus as a personal agent, pre-kosmical and extra-kosmical: but he appears only as initiating; he begets or fabricates, once for all, a most beautiful

¹ Plato, Timæus, p. 92 B.

² Plato, Timæus, p. 92 B. καὶ κατὰ τοῦ καὶ ἀνοίας ἀπ. πολλῶν καὶ κτήσιν ταῦτα δὴ πάντα τότε καὶ νῦν ἐ. α. μεταβαλλόμενα.

Kosmos (employing all the available material, so that nothing more could afterwards be added). The Kosmos having body and soul, is itself a God, but with many separate Gods resident within it, or attached to it. The Demiurgus then retires, leaving it to be peopled and administered by the Gods thus generated, or by its own soul. His acting and speaking is recounted in the manner of the ancient mythes: and many critics, ancient as well as modern, have supposed that he is intended by Plato only as a mythical personification of the Idea Boni: the construction described being only an ideal process, like the generation of a geometrical figure.¹ Whatever may have been Plato's own intention, in this last sense his hypothesis was interpreted by his immediate successors, Speusippus and Xenokrates, as well as by Eudēmus.² Aristotle in his comments upon Plato takes little notice of the Demiurgus: the hypothesis (of a distinct personal constructive agent) did not fit into his *principia* of the Kosmos, and he probably ranked it among those mythical modes of philosophising which he expressly pronounces to be unworthy of serious criticism.³ Various succeeding philosophers

¹ Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Timæum, p. 47.

Zeller, Platonische Studien, pp. 207-215; also his Gesch. d. Phil. d. Griech. vol. ii. p. 508 seq. ed. 2nd; and Zusemihl, Genetische Entwicklung der Platon. Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 322-340. Ueberweg, Ueber die Platon. Welt-seele, p. 69; Brandis, Gesch. der Griech. Philos. ii. cx. pp. 357-365.

A good note of Ast (Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 363 seq.) illustrates the analogy between the Platonic Timæus and the old Greek cosmogonic poems.

² Respecting Speusippus and Xenokrates, see Aristotel. De Cælo, i. 10, pp. 279-280, with Scholia, 487, b. 37, 488, b. 15, 489, a. 10, Brandis. Respecting Eudēmus, Krantor, Eudorus, and the majority of the Platonic followers, see Plutarch, De Animæ Procreatione in Timæo, 1019 D, 1013 A, 1015 D, 1017 B, 1023 B.

Plutarch reasons against them; but he recognises their interpretation as the predominant one.

See also the view ascribed to Speusippus and the Pythagoreans by Aristotle (Metaphys. A. 1072, a. 1, b. 30).

³ Proklus ad Platon. Tim. ii. pp. 138 E, 328, ed. Schn.: ἡ γὰρ μόνος ὁ

μάλιστα, Πλάτων τῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ προνοήσαντος αἰτίᾳ κατεχρήσατο, φησὶν ὁ θεόφραστος, τοῦτό γε καλῶς αὐτῷ μαρτυρῶν. And another reference to Theophrastus, in Proklus, pp. 117, 417 Schn. Also pp. 118 E-F, 279 Schn.: Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν τὴν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ τάξιν οὐκ οἶδεν . . . ὁ δὲ Πλάτων Ὀρφεὶ συνευρέμενος ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ πρῶτον εἶναι φησὶ τὴν τάξιν, καὶ τὸ πρὸ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον. For further coincidences between the Platonic Timæus and Orpheus (ὁ θεολόγος) see Proklus ad Timæo. pp. 233-235, Schn. The passage of Aristotle respecting those who blended myth and philosophy is remarkable, Metaphys. B. 1000, a. 9-20. Οἱ μὲν οὖν περὶ Ἡσίοδου, καὶ πάντες ὅσοι θεολόγοι, μόνον ἐφρόντισαν τοῦ πᾶσι τοῦ πρὸς αὐτοὺς, ἡμῶν δ' ὀλιγώρησαν . . . Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν μυθικῶς σοφισμένων οὐκ εἶπον μετὰ σκοπότης σκοπεῖν· παρὰ δὲ τῶν δ' ἀποδείκνυται λεγόντων δεῖν συνθέσθαι διερωτῶντας, &c. About those whom Aristotle calls ὁ μὲν μὲντοι (partly myth, partly philosophy), see Metaphys. N. 1001, b. 8.

Compare, on Aristotle's non-recognition of the Platonic Demiurgus, a remarkable note of Prantl, ad Aristot. Physica, viii. p. 524, also p. 478, in

also, especially the Stoics, while they insisted much upon Providence, conceived this as residing in the Kosmos itself, and in the divine intra-kosmical agencies.

But though the idea of a pre-kosmic Demiurgus found little favour among the Grecian schools of philosophy, before the Christian era—it was greatly welcomed among the Hellenising Jews at Alexandria, from Aristobulus (about B. C. 150) down to Philo. It formed the suitable point of conjunction, between Hellenic and Judaic speculation. The marked distinction drawn by Plato between the Demiurgus, and the constructed or generated Kosmos, with its in-dwelling Gods—provided a suitable place for the Supreme God of the Jews, degrading the Pagan Gods in comparison. The Timæus was compared with the book of Genesis, from which it was even affirmed that Plato had copied. He received the denomination of the atticising Moses: Moses writing in Attic Greek.¹ It was thus that the Platonic Timæus became the medium of transition, from the Polytheistic theology which served as philosophy among

Adopted
and wel-
comed by
the Alex-
andrine Jews,
as a parallel
to the
Mosaic
Genesis.

his edition of that treatise, Leipzig, 1864. Welase speaks to the same effect in his translation of the *Physica* of Aristotle, pp. 350-356, Leips. 1829.

Lichtenstädt, in his ingenious work, (*Ueber Platon's Lehren auf dem Gebiete der Natur-Forschung und der Heilkunde*, Leipzig, 1826), ranks several of the characteristic tenets of the Timæus as only mythical: the pre-existent Chaos, the divinity of the entire Kosmos, even the metempsychosis, though it is affirmed most directly,—see pp. 24, 46, 48, 86, &c. How much of all this Plato intended as purely mythical, appears to me impossible to determine. I agree with the opinion of Ueberweg, that Plato did not draw any clear line in his own mind between the mythical and the real (*Ueber die Platon. Weltseele*, pp. 70-71).

¹ The learned work of Gräfer—*Philo und die Jüdisch-Alexandrin. Theosophie*—illustrates well this coalescence of Platonism with the Pentateuch in the minds of the Hellenising Jews at Alexandria. "Aristobulus maintained, 150 years earlier than Philo, that not only the oldest Grecian poets, Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, &c.,

but also the most celebrated thinkers, especially Plato, had acquired all their wisdom from a very old translation of the Pentateuch" (Gräfer, i. p. 308, also ii. 111-118). The first form of Grecian philosophy which found favour among the Alexandrine Jews was the Platonic:—"since a Jew could not fail to be pleased—besides the magnificent style and high moral tone—with a certain likeness between the Oriental Kosmogonies and the Timæus, the favourite treatise of all Theosophists," see p. 72. Compare the same work, pp. 78-80-167-184-314.

Philo calls Sokrates ἀρχὴν παρὰ Μωσὶν καὶ ὑποτάσσῃ τῇ σοφίᾳ ἀναδεδειγμένη: he refers to the terminology of the Platonic Timæus (Gräfer, 308-327-328).

Eusebius (*Præp. Ev.* ix. 6, xi. 10), citing Aristobulus and Numenius, says τί γὰρ ἱερὴ Πλάτων, ἡ Μωσέως ἀρχή; Compare also the same work, xi. 16-25-29, and xiii. 18, where the harmony between Plato and Moses, and the preference of the author for Plato over other Greek philosophers, are earnestly declared.

See also Vacherot, *Histoire Critique de l'École d'Alexandrie*, vol. i. pp. 110-163-319-335.

the early ages of Greece, to the omnipotent Monotheism to which philosophy became subordinated after the Christian era.

Of the vast outline sketched in the *Timæus*, no part illustrates better the point of view of the author, than what is said about human anatomy and physiology. The human body is conceived altogether as subservient to an ethical and æsthetical teleology: it is (like the Praxitelean statue of Eros¹) a work adapted to an archetypal model in Plato's own heart—his emotions, preferences, antipathies.² The leading idea in his mind is, What purposes would be most suitable to the presumed character of the Demiurgus, and to those generated Gods who are assumed to act as his ministers? The purposes which Plato ascribes, both to the one and to the others, emanate from his own feelings: they are such as he would himself have aimed at accomplishing, if he had possessed demiurgic power: just as the *Republic* describes the principles on which he would have constituted a Commonwealth, had he been lawgiver, or Oekist. His inventive fancy depicts the interior structure, both of the great Kosmos and of its little human miniature, in a way corresponding to these sublime purposes. The three souls, each with its appropriate place and functions, form the cardinal principle of the organism:³ the unity of which is maintained by

Physiology of the Platonic *Timæus*—subordinate to Plato's views of ethical teleology. Triple soul—each soul at once material and mental.

¹ Πραξιτέλης δὲ ἐπασχε διακρίβωσεν Ἐρωτα

ἐξ ἰδίας ἑλκων ἀρχέτυπον κραδίης—(Anthologia).

² Plato says (*Tim.* p. 53 E) that in investigating the fundamental configuration of the elements you must search for the most beautiful: these will of course be the true ones. Again, p. 72 E, ἐκ δὲ λόγισμού τοιούτου ἐνίστασθαι μέλεισ' αὐτῶ πάντων πρίστωι. Galen applies an analogous principle of reasoning to explain the structure of apes, whom he pronounces to be a caricature of man. Man having a rational and intelligent soul, Nature has properly attached to it an admirable bodily organism: with equal propriety she has assigned to the ape a ridiculous bodily organism, because he has a ridiculous soul—λέγειεν αὖ ἡ φύσις, γελοίαν τὴν ψυχὴν ζῶν γελοίαν ἐχρὴν δοῦναι σώματος κατασκευήν (*De Usu Partium*, l. c. 12, pp. 80-81, iii.

16, p. 224, xiii. 2, p. 126, xv. 8, p. 252, Kühn).

³ Respecting a view analogous to that of Plato, M. Littre observes, in his *Proleg.* to the Hippocratic treatise *Περὶ Καρδίας* (*Œuvres d'Hippocrate* T. ix. p. 77):—"Deux fois l'auteur s'occupe des fins de la structure (du cœur) et admire avec quelle habileté elles sont atteintes. La première, c'est à propos des valvules sigmoïdes: il est instruit de leur usage, qui est de fermer le cœur du côté de l'artère; et d'ailleurs, son admiration ne se méprend pas, quand il fait remarquer avec quelle exactitude ils accomplissent leur office. Mais elle se méprend quand, se tournant vers les oreillettes, elle loue la main de l'artiste habile qui les a si bien arrangées pour souffler l'air dans le cœur. Ces déceptions de la téléologie sont perpétuelles dans l'histoire de la science; à chaque instant, on s'est extasié devant des structures que

the spinal marrow in continuity with the brain; all the three souls having their roots in different parts of this continuous line. Neither of these three souls is immaterial, in the sense which that word now bears: even the encephalic rational soul—the most exalted in function, and commander of the other two—has its own extension and rotatory motion: as the kosmical soul has also, though yet more exalted in its endowments. All these souls have material properties, and are implicated essentially with other material agents:¹ all are at once material and mental. The encephalic or rational soul has its share in material properties, while the abdominal or appetitive soul also has its share in mental properties: even the liver has for its function to exhibit images impressed by the rational soul, and to serve as the theatre of prophetic representations.²

The Platonic doctrine, of three souls in one organism, derives a peculiar interest from the earnest way in which it is espoused afterwards by Galen. This last author represents Plato as agreeing in main doctrines with Hippokrates. He has composed nine distinct Dissertations or Books, for the purpose of upholding their joint doctrines. But the agreement which he shows between Hippokrates and Plato is very vague, and his own agreement with Plato is rather ethical than physiological. What is the essence of the three souls, and whether they are immortal or not, Galen leaves undecided:³ but that there must be three distinct souls in each human body, and that the supposition of one soul only is an absurdity—he considers Plato to have positively demonstrated.

¹ l'imagination seule appropriait à certaines fonctions. 'Cet optimisme' (dit Condorcet dans son Fragment sur l'Atlantide) 'qui consiste à trouver tout à merveille dans la nature telle qu'on l'invente, à condition d'admirer également sa sagesse, si par malheur on avait découvert qu'elle a suivi d'autres combinaisons; cet optimisme de détail doit être banni de la philosophie, dont le but n'est pas d'admirer, mais de connaître; qui, dans l'étude, cherche la vérité, et non des motifs de reconnaissance.'"

² Proklus could hardly make out that Plato recognised any ψυχὴν ἀθάνατον, ad Tim. II. pp. 220, 94 A.

³ Plat. Tim. p. 71 B-C. The criticism of Aristotle (De Partibus Animal. iv. 2, 676, b. 21) is directed against this doctrine, but without naming Plato. But when Aristotle says Οἱ λέγοντες τὴν φύσιν τῆς χολῆς αἰσθησέως τινος εἶναι σημεῖον, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν, he substitutes the bile in place of the liver. Plato does not connect the bile with the liver. In Aristotle's mind the two are intimately associated.

⁴ Galen, De Foetuum Formatione, p. 701, Kühn. Περί Οὐσίας τῶν φροσικῶν δυνάμεων, p. 763. Περί τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡθῶν, p. 773.

He rejects the doctrine of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Poseidonius, and others, who acknowledged only one soul, lodged in the heart, but with distinct co-existent powers.¹

So far Galen concurs with Plato. But he connects this triplicity of soul with a physiological theory of his own, which he professes to derive from, or at least to hold in common with, Hippokrates and Plato. Galen recognises three ἀρχαί—*principia*, beginnings, originating and governing organs—in the body: the brain, which is the origin of all the nerves, both of sensation and motion: the heart, the origin of the arteries: the liver, the sanguifacient organ, and the origin of the veins which distribute nourishment to all parts of the body. These three are respectively the organs of the rational, the energetic, and the appetitive soul.²

Admiration of Galen for Plato—his agreement with Plato, and his dissonance from Plato—his improved physiology.

The Galenian theory here propounded (which held its place in physiology until Harvey's great discovery of the circulation of

¹ Galen, *De Hipp. et Plat. Dogm.* iii. pp. 337-347, Kühn, vi. pp. 515-516, l. p. 200, iv. p. 263, ix. p. 727.

² Galen, *Hipp. et Plat. Dogm.* viii. pp. 656-657, Kühn. *ἔξ ἂν ὑπεράνωτο ἢ τῶν φλέβων ἀρχὴ τὸ ἦπαρ ὑπάρχει· ὁ πάλιν εἶπτο, καὶ τῆς κοινῆς πρὸς τὰ φύτῃ δυνάμεως ἀρχὴν εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ σπλάγχνον, ἥτινα δύναμις ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμητικὴν ὀνομάζει.* Compare vi. 519-572, vii. 600-601.

The same triplicity of ἀρχαί in the organism had been recognised by Erasistratus, later than Aristotle, though long before Galen. *Καὶ Ἐρασι-στράτος δὲ ὡς ἀρχαί καὶ στοιχεῖα ὅλου σώματος ὑποτιθέμενος τὴν τριπλοκίαν τῶν ἀγγείων, νεύρα, καὶ φλέβας, καὶ ἀρτηρίας* (Galen, T. iv. p. 375, ed. Basil). See Littré, *Introduction aux Œuvres d'Hippocrate*, T. i. p. 203.

Plato does not say, as Galen declares him to say, that the appetitive soul has its primary seat or ἀρχή in the liver. It has its seat between the diaphragm and the navel; the liver is placed in this region as an outlying fort, occupied by the rational soul, and used for the purpose of controuling the rebellious tendencies of the appetitive soul. Chrysippus (ap. Galen, *Hipp. et Plat. Dogm.* iii. p. 238, Kühn) stated Plato's doctrine about the *τρυφερός* ψυχὴ more simply and faithfully than Galen himself. Compare

his words *ib.* viii. p. 651, vi. p. 519. Galen represents Plato as saying that nourishment is furnished by the stomach first to the liver, to be there made into blood and sent round the body through the veins (pp. 576-578). This is Galen's own theory (*De Usu Partium*, iv. p. 268, Kühn), but it is not to be found in Plato. Whoever reads the *Timæus*, pp. 77-78, will see that Plato's theory of the conversion of food into blood, and its transmission as blood through the veins, is altogether different. It is here that he propounds his singular hypothesis—the interior network of air and fire, and the oscillating ebb and flow of these intense agencies in the cavity of the abdomen. The liver has nothing to do with the process.

So again Galen (p. 573) puts upon the words of Plato about the heart—*ἐγγὺς τοῦ περιγεγομένου σφαιροῦς αἵματος*—an interpretation conformable to the Galenian theory, but noway consistent with the statements of the *Timæus* itself. And he treats the comparison of the cranium and the rotations of the brain within, to the rotations of the spherical *Kosmos*—which comparison weighed greatly in Plato's mind—as an illustrative simile without any philosophical value (Galen, H. et P. D. ii. 4, p. 230, Kühn; Plato, *Tim.* pp. 41 B, 90 A).

the blood in the seventeenth century), though proved by fuller investigation to be altogether erroneous as to the liver—and partially erroneous as to the heart—is nevertheless made by its author to rest upon plausible reasons, as well as upon many anatomical facts, and results of experiments on the animal body, by tying or cutting nerves and arteries.¹ Its resemblance with the Platonic theory is altogether superficial: while the Galenian reasoning, so far from resembling the Platonic, stands in striking contrast with it. Anxious as Galen is to extol Plato, his manner of expounding and defending the Platonic thesis is such as to mark the scientific progress realised during the five centuries intervening between the two. Plato himself, in the *Timæus*, displays little interest or curiosity about the facts of physiology: the connecting principles, whereby he explains to himself the mechanism of the organs as known by ordinary experience, are altogether psychological, ethical, teleological. In the praise which Galen, with his very superior knowledge of the human organism, bestows upon the *Timæus*, he unconsciously substitutes a new doctrine of his own, differing materially from that of Plato.

I have no space here to touch on the interesting comparisons which might be made between the physiology and pathology of the *Timæus*—and that which we read in other authors of the same century—Aristotle and the Hippocratic treatises. More than one allusion is made in the *Timæus* to physicians: and Plato cites Hippokrates in other dialogues with respect.² The study and practice of medicine was at that time greatly affected by the current speculations respecting Nature as a whole: accomplished physicians combined both lines of study, implicating kosmical and biological theories:³ and in the Platonic *Timæus*, the former might properly be comprised in

Physiology and pathology of Plato—compared with that of Aristotle and the Hippocratic treatises.

¹ Galen (*Hipp. et Plat. Dogm.* ii. p. 233, Kühn). καίτοι γε ἡμεῖς, ἅπερ ἐπαγγελλόμεθα λόγῳ, ταῦτα ἐπὶ ταῖς τῶν ζώων ἀνατομαῖς ἐπιδείκνυμεν, &c. P. 220: Πόθεν οὖν τοῦτο δειχθήσεται; πόθεν ἄλλοθεν ἢ ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν;

² Plato, *Phædrus*, p. 270; *Protagoras*, p. 311.

³ See a remarkable passage, *Aristotel.* *De Sensu*, 436, a. 21, τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφώτεροις τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες, &c.: also *De Respiratione*, ad finem,

480, b. 21, and *Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαρτυρίας*, l. p. 463, a. 6. τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ χαριέστεροι. Compare Hippokrat. *De Aere, Locis*, &c., c. 2.

M. Littre observes:—

“La science antique, et par conséquent la médecine qui en formait une branche, était essentiellement synthétique. Platon, dans le *Charmide*, dit qu'on ne peut guérir la partie sans le tout. Le philosophe avait pris cette idée à l'enseignement médical qui se

the latter, since the entire Kosmos is regarded as one animated and rational being. Among the sixty treatises in the Hippocratic collection, composed by different authors, there are material differences—sometimes even positive opposition—both of doctrine and spirit. Some of them are the work of practitioners, familiar with the details of sickness and bodily injuries, as well as with the various modes of treatment: others again proceed from pure theorists, following out some speculative dogmas more or less plausible, but usually vague and indeterminate. It is to one of this last class of treatises that Galen chiefly refers, when he dwells upon the agreement between Plato and Hippokrates.¹ This is the point which the Platonic Timæus has in common with both Hippokrates and Aristotle. But on the other hand, Timæus appears entirely wanting in that element of observation, and

donnait de son temps: cet enseignement parlait donc du tout, de l'ensemble; nous en avons la preuve dans le livre même du Prognostic, qui nous montre d'une manière frappante comment la composition des écrits particuliers se subordonne à la conception générale de la science; ce livre, tel qu'Hippocrate l'a composé, ne pouvait se faire qu'à une époque où la médecine conservait encore l'empreinte des doctrines encyclopédiques qui avaient constitué le fond de tout l'enseignement oriental." (Littre, Œuvres D'Hippocrate, T. ii. p. 96. Argument prefixed to the Prognostikon.)

¹ He alludes especially to the Hippocratic treatise *Περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, see De Hipp. et Plat. Dogm. viii. pp. 674-710, ed. Kühn.

In the valuable Hippocratic composition—*Περὶ Ἀρχαίης Ἱγνυαίης*—(vol. i. pp. 670-686, ed. Littre) the author distinguished *ἵγνυαίης*, properly so-called, from *σοφιστικῆς*, who merely laid down general principles about medicine. He enters a protest against the employment, in reference to medicine, of those large and indefinite assumptions which characterised the works of Sophists or physical philosophers such as Empedokles (pp. 670-680, Littre). "Such compositions," he says, "belong less to the medical art than to the art of literary composition"—*ἵγνυαίης δὲ τούτων μὲν ὅσα τινὲς εἰρηται σοφιστῆς ἢ ἱγνυαίης, ἢ γέγραπται περὶ φύσιος, ἥστων νομίζω τῇ ἱγνυαίᾳ τέχνῃ προσέκειναι ἢ τῇ γραφικῇ* (p. 680). Such men cannot (he says) deal with a case of actual

sickness: they ought to speak intelligible language—*γνωστὰ λέγειν τοῖς ἑμπότοις* (p. 672). Again, in the Treatise *De Aere, Locis, et Aquis*, Hippokrates defends himself against the charge of entering upon topics which are *μετεωρολόγια* (vol. ii. p. 14, Littre).

The Platonic Timæus would have been considered by Hippokrates as the work of a *σοφιστής*. It was composed not for professional readers alone, but for the public—*ἐπιστᾶσαι ἐς ὅσον εἰς ἐκείνους*—(Hippokrat. *Περὶ Πιστῶν*, vol. vi. p. 308, Littre).

The Hippocratic treatises afford evidence of an established art, with traditions of tolerably long standing, a considerable medical literature, and even much oral debate on medical subjects—*ἐναντίον ἀκροατῶν* (Hipp. *Περὶ Νόσων*, vol. vi. pp. 140-143-150, Littre). "*Ὅς ἂν περὶ ἱγνυαίης ἐθέλῃ ἐρωτᾶν τε ὁρῶν, καὶ ἐρωτᾶντι ἀποκρίνεσθαι, καὶ ἀντιλέγειν ὁρῶν, ἐνθυμιάσθαι χρὴ ταῦτα* (p. 140) . . . Ταῦτα ἐνθυμιάσθαι διαφυλάσσειν δεῖ ἐν τοῖσι λόγοις . . . ὅ, τι ἂν ἐὰν τις τούτων ἀμαρτάνῃ, ἢ λέγων ἢ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ἀποκρινόμενος, . . . ταῦτα φυλάσσειν χρὴ ἐντιθεσθαι ἐν τῇ ἀντιλογίᾳ (p. 142).

The method, which Sokrates and Plato applied to ethical topics, was thus applied by others to medicine and medical dogmas. How the dogmas of the Platonic Timæus would have fared, if scrutinised with oral interrogations in this spirit, by men even far inferior to Sokrates himself in acuteness—I will not say.

special care about matters of fact, which these two last-mentioned authors very frequently display, even while confusing themselves by much vagueness of dogmatising theory. The Timæus evinces no special study of matters of fact: it contains ingenious and fanciful combinations, dictated chiefly from the ethical and theological point of view, but brought to bear upon such limited amount of knowledge as an accomplished man of Plato's day could hardly fail to acquire without special study. In the extreme importance which it assigns to diet, regimen, and bodily discipline, it agrees generally with Hippocrates: but for the most part, the points of contrast are more notable than those of agreement.

From the glowing terms in which Plato describes the architectonic skill and foresight of those Gods who put together the three souls and the body of man, we should anticipate that the fabric would be perfect, and efficacious for all intended purposes, in spite of interruptions or accidents. But Plato, when he passes from purposes to results, is constrained to draw a far darker picture. He tells us that the mechanism of the human body will work well, only so long as the juncture of the constituent triangles is fresh and tight: after that period of freshness has passed, it begins to fail.¹ But besides this, there exist a formidable catalogue of diseases, attacking both body and mind: the cause of which (Plato says) "is plain to every one": they proceed from excess, or deficiency, or displacement, of some one among the four constituent elements of the human body.² If we enquire why the wise Constructors put together their materials in so faulty a manner, the only reply to be made is, that the counteracting hand of Necessity was too strong for them. In the Hesiodic and other legends respecting anthropogony we find at least a happy commencement, and the deterioration gradually supervening after it. But Plato opens the scene at once with all the suffering reality of the iron age—

Πλείη μὲν γὰρ γαῖα κακῶν, πλείη δὲ θάλασσα·
 Νούσοι δ' ἀνθρώποισιν ἐφ' ἡμέρη ἥδ' ἐπὶ νυκτὶ
 Αἰτόματοι φοιτῶσι—³

¹ Plat. Tim. pp. 81-89 B.

² Plat. Tim. p. 82. δῆλόν σου καὶ παρτί.

³ Compare what Plato says in Republic, ii. p. 379 C, about the prodigious preponderance of κακὰ over ἀγαθὰ in the life of man.

When Plato tells us that most part of the tenants of earth, air, and water—all women, birds, quadrupeds, reptiles, and fishes—are the deteriorated representatives of primitive men, constructed at the beginning with the most provident skill, but debased by degeneracy in various directions—this doctrine (something analogous to the theory of Darwin with its steps inverted) indicates that the original scheme of the Demiurgus, though magnificent in its *ensemble* with reference to the entire Kosmos, was certain from the beginning to fail in its details. For we are told that the introduction of birds, quadrupeds, &c., as among the constituents of the Auto-zoon, was an essential part of the original scheme.¹ The constructing Gods, while forming men upon a pure non-sexual type (such as that invoked by the austere Hippolytus) exempt from the temptations of the most violent appetite,² foresaw that such an angelic type could not maintain itself:—that they would be obliged to reconstruct the whole human organism upon the bi-sexual principle, introducing the comparatively lower type of woman:—and that they must make preparation for the still more degenerate varieties of birds and quadrupeds, into which the corrupt and stupid portion of mankind would sink.³ Plato does indeed tell us, that the primitive non-sexual type had the option of maintaining itself; and that it perished by its own fault alone.⁴ But since we find that not one representative of it has been able to hold his ground:—and since we also read in Plato, that no man is willingly corrupt, but that corruption and stupidity of mind are like fevers and other diseases, under which a man suffers against his own consent⁵:—we see that the option was surrounded with insurmountable difficulties: and that the steady and continued degradation, under which the human race has sunk from its original perfection into the lower endowments of the animal world, can be ascribed only to the impracticability of the original scheme: that

Degeneration of the real tenants of Earth from their primitive type.

¹ Plat. Tim. p. 41 B-C.

² Eurip. Hippol. 615; Medea, 573; Milton, Paradise Lost, x. 888.

χρὴν ἄρ' ἄλλοθεν ποθεν βροτοὺς
παῖδας τεκνοῦσθαι, θῆλυ δ' οὐκ εἶναι
γίνεσθαι.
χοῦτος ἄν οὐκ ἦν οὐδὲν ἀνθρώποις κακόν.

³ Plat. Tim. p. 76 D. ὡς γὰρ ποτε
ἐξ ἀνδρῶν γυναικες καὶ τὰλλα θηρία γινή-
σκοντο, ἤπισταντο οἱ ἐντιστάτες ἡμᾶς,
&c. Compare pp. 90 E, 91.

⁴ Plat. Tim. p. 42.

⁵ Plat. Tim. pp. 86-87.

is, in other words, to the obstacles interposed by implacable Necessity, frustrating the benevolent purposes of the Constructors.

However, all these details, attesting the low and poor actual condition of the tenants of earth, water, and air—and forming so marked a contrast to the magnificent description of the Kosmos as a whole, with the splendid type of men who were established at first alone in its central region—all these are hurried over by Plato, as unwelcome accompaniments which he cannot put out of sight. They have their analogies even in the kosmical agencies: there are destructive kosmical forces, earthquakes, deluges, conflagrations, &c., noticed as occurring periodically, and as causing the almost total extinction of different communities.¹ Though they must not be altogether omitted, he will nevertheless touch them as briefly as possible.² He turns aside from this, the shameful side of the Kosmos, to the sublime conception of it with which he had begun, and which he now builds up again in the following poetical doxology—the concluding words of the Timæus:—

“Let us now declare that the discourse respecting the Universe is brought to its close. This Kosmos, having received its complement of animals, mortal and immortal, has become greatest, best, most beautiful and most perfect: a visible animal comprehending all things visible—a perceivable God the image of the cogitable God: this Uranus, one and only begotten.”³

¹ Plato, Timæus, pp. 22, 23. Legg. iii. 677. Politikus, pp. 272, 273.

² Plat. Tim. p. 90 E. τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα ζωὰ ἢ γέγονεν αὐτὸν, διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνηστέον, ὅ, τι μὴ τις ἀνάγκη μνησθῆναι· οὕτω γὰρ ἐμμετρέτερός τις ἂν αὐτῷ δόξειε περὶ τοὺς τοῦτων λόγους εἶναι.

³ Plat. Tim. p. 92 C. Καὶ δὴ καὶ τέλος περὶ τοῦ παντὸς νῦν ψῆν τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν φῶμεν ἔχειν· θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζωὰ λαβὼν καὶ συμπληρωθεὶς ὁδε ὁ κόσμος, οὕτω ζῶον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεοῦ αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος ἀλλήλοισι τε καὶ τελευτάτος γέγονεν,—εἰς οὐρανὸς ὁδε, μονογενὴς ὢν.

Weh! Weh!
Du hast sie zerstört,
Die schöne Welt,
Mit mächtiger Faust;
Sie stürzt, sie zerfällt!
Ein Halb-Gott hat sie zerschlagen!
Wir tragen
Die Trümmern ins Nichts hinüber,
Und klagen
Ueber die verlorne Schöne!
Mächtiger
Der Erdensöhne,
Früchtiger
Baue sie wieder,
In deinem Busen baue sie auf!

(The response of the Geister-Chor, in Goethe's Faust, after the accumulated imprecations uttered by Faust in his despair.)

KRITIAS.

The dialogue *Kritias* exists only as a fragment, breaking off abruptly in the middle of a sentence. The ancient *Kritias*: a Platonists found it in the same condition, and it fragment probably was never finished. We know, however, the general scheme and purpose for which it was destined.

The proemium to the *Timæus* introduces us to three persons¹:—*Kritias* and *Hermokrates*, along with *Sokrates*. It is to them (as we now learn) that *Sokrates* had on the preceding day recited the *Republic*: a fourth hearer having been present besides, whom *Sokrates* expects to see now, but does not see—and who is said to be absent from illness. In requital for the intellectual treat received from *Sokrates*, *Timæus* delivers the discourse which we have just passed in review: *Kritias* next enters upon his narrative or exposition, now lying before us as a fragment: and *Hermokrates* was intended to follow it up with a fourth discourse, upon some other topic not specified. It appears as if Plato, after having finished the *Republic* as a distinct dialogue, conceived subsequently the idea of making it the basis of a Tetralogy, to be composed as follows: 1. *Timæus*: describing the construction of the divine Kosmos, soul and body—with its tenants divine and human; “the diaphanon ending full in man”—but having its harmony spoiled by the degeneration of man, and the partial substitution of inferior animals. 2. *Republic*: Man in a constituted society, administered

Proemium
to *Timæus*.
Intended
Tetralogy
for the *Re-
public*. The
Kritias was
third piece
in that
Tetralogy.

¹ Pato, *Tim.* p. 17 A. εἰς, δύο, τρεῖς· ὁ δὲ δὴ τέτατος ἦν, ὁ φίλος *Τίμαιος*, τοῦ, τῶν ἄλλων μὲν καταρμόνων, τὰ νῦν δ' ἐσθλαρόνων;

These are the words with which the Platonic *Sokrates* opens this dialogue. Proklus, in his Commentary on the *Timæus* (l. pp. 5-10-14, ed. Schneider), notices a multiplicity of insignificant questions raised by the ancient Platonic critics upon this exordium. The earliest whom he notices is *Praxiphanes*, the friend of *Theophrastus*, who blamed Plato for the absurdity of making *Sokrates* count aloud one, two, three, &c. *Porphyry* replied to him at length.

We see here that the habit of commenting on the Platonic dialogues began in the generation immediately after Plato's death, that is, the generation of *Demetrius Phalereus*.

Whom does Plato intend for the fourth person, unnamed and absent? Upon this point the Platonic critics indulged in a variety of conjectures, suggesting several different persons as intended. Proklus (p. 14, Schn.) remarks upon these critics justly—ὅτι οὕτως ἀξία ζητήσεως ζητούντας, οὐτ' ἀσφαλές τι λέγοντας. But the comments which he proceeds to cite from his master *Syrianus* are not at all more instructive (pp. 15-16, Schn.).

by a few skilful professional Rulers, subject to perfect ethical training, and fortified by the most tutelary habits. 3. *Kritias*: this perfect society, exhibited in energetic action, and under pressure of terrible enemies. 4. *Hermokrates*—subject unknown: perhaps the same society, exhibited under circumstances calculated to try their justice and temperance, rather than their courage. Of this intended tetralogy the first two members alone exist: the third was left unfinished: and the fourth was never commenced. But the Republic appears to me to have been originally a distinct composition. An afterthought of Plato induced him to rank it as second piece in a projected tetralogy.¹

The subject embraced by the *Kritias* is traced back to an unfinished epic poem of Solon, intended by that poet and lawgiver to celebrate a memorable exploit of Athenian antiquity, which he had heard from the priests of the Goddess Neith or Athênê at Sais in Egypt. These priests (Plato tells us) treated the Greeks as children, compared with the venerable antiquity of their own ancestors; they despised the short backward reckoning of the heroic genealogies at Athens or Argos. There were in the temple of Athênê at Sais records of past time for 9000 years back: and among these records was one, of that date, commemorating a glorious exploit, of the Athenians as they then had been, unknown to Solon or any of his countrymen.² The Athens, of 9000 years anterior to

¹ Socher (Ueber Platon's Schriften, pp. 370-371) declares the fragment of the *Kritias* now existing to be spurious and altogether unworthy of Plato. His opinion appears to me unfounded, and has not obtained assent; but his arguments are as good as those upon which other critics reject so many other dialogues. He thinks the *Kritias* an inferior production: therefore it cannot have been composed by Plato. Socher also thinks that the whole allusion, made by Plato in this dialogue to Solon, is a fiction by Plato himself. That the intended epic about Atlantis would have been Plato's own fiction, I do not doubt, but it appears to me that Solon's poems (as they then existed, though fragmentary) must have contained allusions to Egyptian priests with whom he had conversed in Egypt,

and to their abundance of historical anecdote (Plutarch, Solon, c. 26-31). It is not improbable that Solon did leave an unfinished Egyptian poem.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 22-23. The great knowledge of past history (real or supposed) possessed by the Egyptian priests, and the length of their back chronology, alleged by themselves to depend upon records preserved from a period of 17,000 years, are well known from the interesting narrative of Herodotus (ii. 37-43-77-145)—*μνησιν ἀνθρώπων πάντων ἐπισκίοντες* (the priests of Egypt) *ἀλλήματα, λογιώτατοι εἰσι μακροῦ χρόνου ἐκ διαίτηρας ἀφύκτου* (ii. 77) . . . *καὶ τὰυτὰ ἀπρεκέως φασὶν ἐπιστάσθαι, αἰεὶ τε λογιζόμενοι, καὶ αἰεὶ ἀπογράφουσι τὰ ἔθνη* (ii. 145). Herodotus (ii. 143) tells us that the Egyptian priests at Thebes held the same lan-

Solon, had been great, powerful, courageous, admirably governed, and distinguished for every kind of virtue.¹ Athênê, the presiding Goddess both of Athens and of Sais, had bestowed upon the Athenians a salubrious climate, fertile soil, a healthy breed of citizens, and highly endowed intelligence. Under her auspices, they were excellent alike in war and in philosophy.² The separation of professions was fully realised among them, according to the principle laid down in the Republic as the only foundation for a good commonwealth. The military class, composed of both sexes, was quartered in barrack on the akropolis; which was at that time more spacious than it had since become—and which possessed then, in common with the whole surface of Attica, a rich soil covering that rocky bottom to which it had been reduced in the Platonic age, through successive deluges.³ These soldiers, male and female, were maintained by contributions from the remaining community: they lived in perpetual drill, having neither separate property, nor separate families, nor gold nor silver: lastly, their procreation was strictly regulated, and their numbers kept from either increase or diminution.⁴ The husbandmen and the artisans were alike excellent in their respective professions, to which they were exclusively confined:⁵ Hephæstus being the partner of Athênê in joint tutelary presidency, and joint occupation of the central temple on the akropolis. Thus admirably administered, the Athenians were not only powerful at home, but also chiefs or leaders of all the cities comprised under the Hellenic name: chiefs by the voluntary choice and consent of the subordinates. But the old Attic race by whom

guage to the historian Hekateus, as Plato here says that they held to Solon, when he talked about Grecian antiquity in the persons of Phorôneus and Niobê. Hekateus laid before them his own genealogy—a dignified list of sixteen ancestors, beginning from a God—upon which they out-bid him with a counter-genealogy (*ἀντιγενεαλογήσαν*) of 345 chief priests, who had succeeded each other from father to son. Plato appears to have contracted great reverence for this long duration of unchanged regulations in Egypt, and for the fixed, consecrated, customs, with minute subdivision of professional castes and employments: the hymns, psalmody, and music, having con-

tinued without alteration for 10,000 years (*literally* 10,000—οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ εἰκοτὴν μυριάστων, ἀλλ' ὅπως, Plat. Legg. II. p. 656 E).

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 23 C-D.

² Plato, *Tim.* p. 24 D. *ἄτε οὖν φιλοπόλεμοι τε καὶ φιλόσοφοι ἡ θεὸς οὖσα, &c.* Also p. 23 C.

³ Plato, *Krit.* pp. 110 C, 112 B-D.

⁴ Plato, *Krit.* p. 112 D. *πλήθος δὲ διαφυλάττονται δ, τι μάλιστα ταυτὸν ταυτὸν εἶναι πρὸς τὸν αἰ χρόνον ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν, &c.*

⁵ Plato, *Krit.* p. 111 E. *ὅπῃ γεωργῶν μὲν ἀλφειῶν καὶ πραιτόνων αὐτὸ τοῦτο, γῆν δὲ ἀρίστην καὶ ὕδωρ ἀφρονέτατον ἔχοντων, &c.* Also p. 110 C.

these achievements had been performed, belonged to a former geological period: they had perished, nearly all, by violent catastrophe—leaving the actual Athenians as imperfect representatives.

Such was the enviable condition of Athens and Attica, at a period 9400 years before the Christian era. The Platonic Kritias takes pains to assure us that the statement was true, both as to facts and as to dates: that he had heard it himself when a boy of ten years old, from his grandfather Kritias, then ninety years old, whose father Dropides had been the intimate friend of Solon: and that Solon had heard it from the priests at Saïs, who offered to show him the contemporary record of all its details in their temple archives.¹ Kritias now proposes to repeat this narrative to Sokrates, as a fulfilment of the wish expressed by the latter to see the citizens of the Platonic Republic exhibited in full action and movement. For the Athenians of 9000 years before, having been organised on the principles of that Republic, may fairly be taken as representing its citizens. And it will be more satisfactory to Sokrates to hear a recital of real history than a series of imagined exploits.²

Accordingly, Kritias proceeds to describe, in some detail, the formidable invaders against whom these old Athenians had successfully contended: the inhabitants of the vast island Atlantis (larger than Libya and Asia united), which once occupied most of the space now filled by the great ocean westward of Gades and the pillars of Heraklêa. This prodigious island was governed by ten kings of a common ancestry: descending respectively from ten sons (among whom Atlas was first-born and chief) of the God Poseidon by the indigenous Nymph Kleito.³ We read an imposing description of its large population and abundant produce of every kind: grain for man, pasture for animals, elephants being abundant among them:⁴ timber and metals of all varieties: besides which the central city, with its works for defence, and its

¹ Plat. Tim. pp. 23 E, 24 A-D. τὸ δ' ἀκριβὲς περὶ πάντων ἐφεξῆς εἰσαυθὶς κατὰ σχολήν, αὐτὰ τὰ γράμματα λαβόντες διεξίμεν (24 A).

² Plat. Tim. p. 26 D-E.

³ Plat. Krit. pp. 113-114.

⁴ Plat. Krit. p. 114 E.

artificial canals, bridges, and harbour, is depicted as a wonder to behold.¹ The temple of Poseidon was magnificent and of vast dimensions, though in barbaric style.² The harbour, surrounded by a dense and industrious population, was full of trading vessels arriving with merchandise from all quarters.³

The Atlantid kings, besides this great power and prosperity at home, exercised dominion over all Libya as far as Egypt, and over all Europe as far as Tyrrhenia. The corrupting influence of such vast power was at first counteracted by their divine descent and the attributes attached to it: but the divine attributes became more and more adulterated at each successive generation, so that the breed was no longer qualified to contend against corruption. The kings came to be intoxicated with wealth, full of exorbitant ambition and rapacity, reckless of temperance or justice. The measure of their iniquity at length became full; and Zeus was constrained to take notice of it, for the purpose of inflicting the chastisement which the case required.⁴ He summoned a meeting of the Gods, at his own Panoptikon in the centre of the Kosmos and there addressed them.

Corruption and wickedness of the Atlantid people.

At this critical moment the fragment called Kritias breaks off. We do not know what was the plan which Plato (in the true spirit of the ancient epic) was about to put into the mouth of Zeus, for the information of the divine agora. We learn only that Plato intended to recount an invasion of Attica, by an army of Atlantids almost irresistible: and the glorious repulse thereof by Athens and her allies, with very inferior forces. The tale would have borne much resemblance to the Persian invasion of Greece, as recounted by Herodotus: but Plato, while employing the same religious agencies which that historian puts in the foreground, would probably have invested them with a more ethical character, and would have arranged the narrative so as to illustrate the triumph of philosophical Reason and disciplined Energy, over gigantic, impetuous, and reckless Strength. He would have described in detail the heroic valour and endurance

Conjectures as to what the Platonic Kritias would have been—an ethical epic in prose.

¹ Plat. Krit. p. 115 D. *εἰς ἀκρωτήρ*
μεγέθεισι κάλλεσι τε ἔργων ἰδεῖν, &c.

² Plat. Krit. p. 116 D-E.

³ Plat. Krit. p. 117 E.

⁴ Plat. Krit. p. 121.

of the trained Athenian Soldiers, women as well as men : and he would have embodied the superior Reason of the philosophical Chiefs not merely in prudent orders given to subordinates, but also in wise discourses¹ and deliberations such as we read in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon. We should have had an edifying epic in prose, if Plato had completed his project. Unfortunately we know only two small fractions of it : first the introductory prologue (which I have already noticed)—lastly, the concluding catastrophe. The conclusion was, that both the victors and the vanquished disappeared altogether, and became extinct. Terrific earthquakes, and not less terrific deluges, shook and over-spread the earth. The whole military caste of Attica were, in one day and night, swallowed up into the bowels of the earth (the same release as Zeus granted to the just *Amphiaræus*)² and no more heard of : while not only the population of *Atlantis*, but that entire island itself, was submerged beneath the ocean. The subsidence of this vast island has rendered navigation impossible ; there is nothing in the Atlantic Ocean but shallow water and mud.³

The epic of Plato would thus have concluded with an appalling catastrophe of physical agencies or divine prodigies (such as that which we read at the close of the *Æschylean Prometheus*), under which both the contending parties perished. These gigantic outbursts of kosmical forces, along with the other facts, Plato affirms to have been recorded in the archives of the Egyptian priests. He wishes us to believe that the whole transaction is historical. As to particular narratives, the line between truth and fiction was obscurely drawn in his mind.

Another remark here deserving of notice is, That in this epic of the *Kritias*, Plato introduces the violent and destructive kosmical agencies (earthquakes, deluges, and the like) as frequently

¹ Plat. Tim. p. 19 C-E. κατὰ τε τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις διερμηνεύσεις (19 C).

² Apollodorus, iii. 6, 6 ; Pausanias, ix. 8, 2.

³ Plat. Tim. p. 25 C-D. σεισμῶν ἔκλεισιν καὶ κατακλυσμῶν γενομένων, μίας ἡμέρας καὶ νυκτὸς χαλεπῆς ἐπείλ-

θούσης . . . ἀπορον καὶ ἀδιερεύνητον γέγονε τὸ ἐκεῖ πῆλκος, &c.

Respecting the shallow and muddy water of the Atlantic and its un-navigable character, as believed in the age of Plato, see a long note in my 'History of Greece' (ch. xviii. vol. iii. p. 381).

⁴ *Æschyl. Prom.* 1086.

occurring, and as one cause of the periodical destruction of many races or communities. It is in this way that the Egyptian priest is made to explain to Solon the reason why no long-continued past records were preserved in Attica, or anywhere else, except in Egypt.¹ This last-mentioned country was exempt from such calamities: but in other countries, the thread of tradition was frequently broken, because the whole race (except a few) were periodically destroyed by deluges or conflagrations, leaving only a few survivors miserably poor, without arts or letters. The affirmation of these frequent destructions stands in marked contradiction with the chief thesis announced at the beginning of the *Timæus*—*vis.*, the beauty and perfection of the Kosmos.

¹ Plato, *Tim.* pp. 22 C-D, 23 B-C.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

LEGES AND EPINOMIS.

THE Dialogue, entitled *Leges—De Legibus—The Laws*—distributed into twelve books, besides its Appendix the *Epinomis*, and longer than any other of the Platonic compositions—is presented to us as held in Krete during a walk from the town of Knossus to the temple of Zeus under Mount Ida—between three elderly persons: Megillus, a Spartan—Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus—and an Athenian who bears no name, but serves as the principal expositor and conductor. That this dialogue was composed by Plato after the *Republic*, we know from the express deposition of Aristotle: that it was the work of Plato's old age—probably the last which he ever composed, and perhaps not completely finished at his death—is what we learn from the scanty amount of external evidence accessible to us. The internal evidence, as far as it goes, tends to bear out the same conclusion, and to show that it was written during the last seven years of his life, when he was more than seventy years of age.¹

Leges, the longest of Plato's works—Persons of the dialogue.

¹ The allusions of Aristotle to Plato as the author of the *Laws*, after the *Republic*, occur in *Politica*, ii. b. 1264, b. 26, 1267, b. 5, 1271, b. 1, 1274, b. 9. According to Diogenes Laertius (v. 22) Aristotle had composed separate works *Tὰ ἐκ Νόμων Πλάτωνος γ'—Τὰ ἐκ τῆς Πολιτείας β'.*

Plutarch (*De Isid. et Osir.* p. 370 E) ascribes the composition of the *Laws* to Plato's old age. In the *Προλεγόμενα εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφίαν*, it is said that the treatise was left unfinished at his death, and completed afterwards by his disciple the Opuntian Philippus (Hermann's Edition of Plato's

Works, vol. vi. p. 218).—*Diog. Laert.* iii. 37.

See the learned *Prolegomena* of Stallbaum, who collects all the information on this subject, and who gives his own judgment (p. lxxxi.) respecting the tone of senility pervading the *Leges*, in terms which deserve the more attention as coming from so unqualified an admirer of Plato:—"Totum Legum opus necesse quid senile refert, ut profecto etiam hanc ob causam a senes scriptum, esse longè verissimum videatur." The allusion in the *Laws* (l. p. 638 B) to the conquest of the Epizephyrian Lokrians by the

All critics have remarked the many and important differences between the Republic and the Laws. And it seems certain, that during the interval which separates the two, Plato's point of view must have undergone a considerable change. We know from himself that he intended the *Kritias* as a sequel to the *Timæus* and Republic: a portion of the *Kritias* still exists—as we have just seen—but it breaks off abruptly, and there is no ground for believing that it was ever completed. We know farther from himself that he projected an ulterior dialogue or exposition, assigned to Hermokrates, as sequel to the *Kritias*: both being destined to exhibit in actual working and manifestation, the political scheme, of which the Republic had described the constituent elements.¹ While the *Kritias* was prematurely arrested in its progress towards maturity, the Hermokrates probably was never born. Yet we know certainly that both the one and the other were conceived by Plato, as parts of one comprehensive project, afterwards abandoned. Nay, the *Kritias* was so abruptly abandoned, that it terminates with an unfinished sentence: as I have stated in the last chapter.

Abandonment of Plato's philosophical projects prior to the *Leges*.

To what extent such change of project was brought about by external circumstances in Plato's life, we cannot with certainty determine. But we know that there really occurred circumstances, well calculated to produce a material change in his intellectual character and point of view. His personal adventures and experience, after his sixty-first year, and after the death of the elder Dionysius (B.C. 367), were of an eventful and melancholy character. Among them were included

Untoward circumstances of Plato's later life—His altered tone in regard to philosophy.

Syracusans, which occurred in 356 B.C., is pointed out by Boeckh as showing that the composition was posterior to that date (Boeckh, ad Platon. *Minos*, pp. 72-73).

It is remarkable that Aristotle, in canvassing the opinions delivered by the Ἀθηναῖος ἄνθρωπος in the Laws, cites them as the opinions of Sokrates (*Politic.* ii. 1295, b. 11), who, however, does not appear at all in the dialogue. Either this is a lapse of memory on the part of Aristotle; or else (which I think very possible) the Laws were originally composed with Sokrates as

the expositor introduced, the change of name being subsequently made from a feeling of impropriety in transporting Sokrates to Krete, and from the dogmatizing anti-dialectic tone which pervades the lectures ascribed to him. Some Platonic expositors regarded the Athenian Stranger in *Leges* as Plato himself (*Diog. Laert.* iii. 52; *Schol.* ad *Legg.* 1). Diogenes himself calls him a πλάσμα ἀνθρώπων.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 20-27. Plato, *Kritias*, p. 108.

his two visits to the younger Dionysius at Syracuse; together with the earnest sympathy and counsel which he bestowed on his friend Dion; whose chequered career terminated, after an interval of brilliant promise, in disappointment, disgrace, and violent death. Plato not only suffered much distress, but incurred more or less of censure, from the share which he had taken, or was at least supposed to have taken, in the tragedy. His own letters remain to attest the fact.¹ Considering the numerous enemies which philosophy has had at all times, we may be sure that such enemies would be furnished with abundant materials for invidious remark — by the entire failure of Plato himself at Syracuse — as well as by the disgraceful proceedings first of Dion, next, of his assassin Kallippus: both of them pupils, and the former a favourite pupil, of Plato in the Academy. The prospect, which accident had opened, of exalting philosophy into active influence over mankind, had been closed in a way no less mournful than dishonourable. Plato must have felt this keenly enough, even apart from the taunts of opponents. We might naturally expect that his latest written compositions would be coloured by such a temper of mind: that he would contract, if not an alienation from philosophy, at least a comparative mistrust of any practical good to come from it: and that if his senile fancy still continued to throw out any schemes of social construction, they would be made to rest upon other foundations, eliminating or reducing to a

¹ See especially the interesting and valuable *Epistola vii.* of Plato; also the life of Dion by Plutarch.

The reader will find a full account of Plato's proceedings in Sicily, and of the adventures of Dion, in chap. 84 of my 'History of Greece'.

The passage of Plato in *Legg. iv.* 709-710 (alluding to the concurrence and co-operation of a youthful despot, sober-minded and moderate, but not exalted up to the level of philosophy, with a competent lawgiver for the purpose of constructing a civic community, furnished with the best laws) is supposed by K. F. Hermann (*System der Platon. Philos.* p. 69) and by Zeller (*Phil. d. Griech.* vol. ii. p. 310, ed. 2nd.) to allude to the hopes which Plato cherished when he undertook his first visit to the younger Dionysius at Syra-

cuse. See *Epistol. vii.* pp. 327 C, 330 A-B, 334 C; *Epistol. ii.* 311 B.

Such allusion is sufficiently probable. Yet we must remember that the Magnetic community, described by Plato in the *Treatise De Legibus*, does not derive its origin from any established despot or prince, but from a general resolution supposed to have been taken by the Kretan cities, and from a Decemviral executive Board of Knossian citizens nominated by them. Kleinias, as a chief member of this Board, solicits the suggestion of laws from the Athenian elder (*Legg. iii.* p. 702 C). This is more analogous to Plato's subsequent counsel, after his attempt to guide the younger Dionysius had failed. See *Epistol. vii.* p. 337 C-E.

minimum that ascendancy of the philosophical mind, which he had once held to be omnipotent and indispensable.

Comparing the Laws with the earlier compositions of Plato, the difference between them will be found to correspond pretty nearly with the change thus indicated in his point of view. If we turn to the Republic, we find Plato dividing the intelligible world (τὸ νοητὸν) into two sections: the higher, that of pure and absolute Ideas, with which philosophy and dialectics deal—the lower, that of Ideas not quite pure, but implicated more or less with sensible illustration, to which the mathematician applies himself: the chief use of the lower section is said to consist in its serving as preparation for a comprehension of the higher.¹ But in the Laws, this higher or dialectical section—the last finish or crowning result of the teaching process, is left out; while even the lower or mathematical section is wrapped up with theology. Moreover, the teaching provided in the Laws, for the ruling Elders, is presented as something new, which Plato has much difficulty both in devising and in explaining: we must therefore understand him to distinguish it pointedly from the teaching which he had before provided for the Elders in the Republic.² Again, literary occupation is now kept down rather than encouraged: Plato is more afraid lest his citizens should have too much of it than too little.³ As for the Sokratic Elenchus, it is not merely not commended, but it is even proscribed and denounced by implication, since free speech and criticism generally is barred out by the rigorous Platonic censorship. On the other hand, the ethical sentiment in the Leges, with its terms designating the varieties of virtue, is much the same as in other Platonic compositions: the political and social doctrine also, though different in some material points, is yet very analogous on several others. But these

General
comparisons
of Leges
with Plato's
earlier
works.

¹ See the passages, Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B–819 A. Plato, Republic, vi. pp. 510–511. τὰ δὲ τοῦ νοητοῦ οὐκ εἰδὴ τοῦ νοητοῦ. vii. p. 534 E: ὥστερ' ὅπου αὐτὸ τοῖς μαθηματικῶν ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικῇ ἀμείνων κείσθαι.

² Plat. Legg. p. 906 D, xii. pp. 908 C–E, 909 A. Compare vii. p. 818 E. In p. 906 D, the study of astronomy is enforced on the ground

that it is one of the strongest evidence of natural theology: in p. 818 C, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy are advocated as studies, because, without having gone through them, a man cannot become a God, a Demon, or a Hero, competent to exercise effective care over mankind. This is altogether different from the Republic.

³ Plat. Legg. vii. pp. 811 B, 819 A.

ethical and political doctrines appear in the *Laws* much more merged in dogmatic theology than in other dialogues. This theology is of Pythagorean character—implicated directly and intimately with astronomy—and indirectly with arithmetic and geometry also. We have here an astronomical religion, or a religious astronomy, by whichever of the two names it may be called. Right belief on astronomy is orthodoxy and virtue: erroneous belief on astronomy is heretical and criminal.

In the *Timæus*, Plato recommended the study of astronomy, in order that the rotations of man's soul in his cranium, which were from the beginning disturbed and irregular, might become regularised, and assimilated by continued contemplation to the perfect uniformity of the celestial and cosmical movements.¹ In the *Leges*, he recommends astronomy to be studied, because without it we fall into blasphemous errors respecting the cosmical movements, and because such cosmical errors are among the three varieties of heresy, to one or other of which the commission of all crimes against society may be traced.² Hence we find Plato, in the city here described, consecrating his astronomical views as a part of the state-religion, and prohibiting dissent from them under the most stringent penalties. In the general spirit of the *Treatise de Legibus*, Plato approximates to Xenophon and the Spartan model. He keeps his eye fixed on the perpetual coercive discipline of the average citizen. This discipline, prescribed in all its details by the lawgiver, includes a modicum of literary teaching equal to all; small in quantity, and rigorously sifted as to quality, through the censorial sieve. The intellectual and speculative genius of the community, which other Platonic dialogues bring into the foreground, has disappeared from the *Treatise de Legibus*. We find here no youths pregnant with undisclosed original thought, which Sokrates assists them in bringing forth: such as *Thesêtetus*, *Charmides*, *Kleinias*, and others—pictures among the most interesting which the ancient world presents, and lending peculiar charm to the earlier dialogues. Not only no provision is made for them, but severe precautions are taken against them. Even in the *Republic*, Plato had banished poets, or had at least forbidden them to follow the

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 47 B-C.

² Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 821 D, 822 C; x. pp. 885 B, 886 E.

free inspirations of the Muse, and had subjected them to censorial controul. But such controul was presumed to be exercised by highly trained speculative and philosophical minds, for the perpetual succession of whom express provision was made. In the Treatise De Legibus, such speculative minds are no longer admitted. Philosophy is interdicted or put in chains as well as poetry. An orthodox religious creed is exalted into exclusive ascendancy. All crime or immorality is ascribed to a departure from this creed.¹ The early communities (Plato tells us²), who were simple and ignorant, destitute of arts and letters, but who at the same time believed implicitly all that they heard from their seniors respecting Gods and men, and adopted the dicta of their seniors respecting good and evil, without enquiry or suspicion—were decidedly superior to his contemporaries in all the departments of virtue—justice, temperance, and courage. This antithesis, between virtue and religious faith on the one side, and arts and letters with an inquisitive spirit on the other, presenting the latter as a depraving influence, antagonistic to the former—is analogous to the Bacchæ of Euripides—the work of that poet's old age³—and analogous also to the Nubes of Aristophanes, wherein the literary and philosophical teaching of Sokrates is represented as withdrawing youth from the received religious creed, and as leading them by consequence to the commission of fraud and crime.⁴

The submergence and discredit of letters and philosophy, which pervades the Dialogue De Legibus, is farther indicated by the personages introduced as conversing. In all the other Platonic dialogues, the scene is laid at Athens, and the speakers are educated citizens of Athens; sometimes visitors, equally or better educated, from other Grecian cities. Generally, they are

Scene of the
Leges, not
in Athens,
but in
Kreta. Per-
sons Kre-
tan and
Spartan.

¹ Plato, Legg. x. p. 885 B.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 679. Compare p. 699 D.

³ Lobeck, Aglaophamus, p. 622. "Superest fabula (Euripidis), Bacchæ, dithyrambi quam tragediæ similior, totaque ita comparata, ut contra illius temporis Rationalistas scripta videatur; qua et Bacchicarum religionum sanctimonia commendatur . . . et rerum divinarum disceptatio ab eruditorum

judiciis ad populi transfertur suffragia:—

σοφῶν δ' ἀνεχε παραίδη φέρειν τε
περισσὴν παρὰ φωνῶν·
τὸ πλεῖστον δ' ἐν τῷ φανέστερον
ἐνόμευσεν χρηταί τε, τὸδε τοὶ λεγοίμεν.
[λέγοιμ' ἄν, Matthiæ] (427).

Compare vv. 200-203 of the same drama.

⁴ Aristophan. Nubes, 116-875, &c.

comparatively illiterate. either adults who have already acquired some intellectual eminence, or youths anxious to acquire it. Nikias and Laches, Melesias and Lysimachus (in the *Lachés*), are among the leaders (past or present) of the Athenian public assembly. Anytus (in the *Menon*) is a man not so much ignorant of letters as despising letters.¹ Moreover Sokrates himself formally disclaims positive knowledge, professing to be only a searcher for truth along with the rest.² But the scene of the *Laws* is laid in Krete, not at Athens: the three speakers are not merely all old men, but frequently allude to their old age. One of them only is an Athenian, to whom the positive and expository duty is assigned: the other two are Megillus, a Spartan, and Kleinias, a Kretan of Knossus. Now both Sparta, and the communities of Krete, were among the most unlettered portions of the Hellenic name. They were not only strangers to that impulse of rhetoric, dialectic, and philosophical speculation which, having its chief domicile at Athens, had become diffused more or less over a large portion of Greece since the Persian war — but they were sparingly conversant even with that old poetical culture, epic and lyric, which belonged to the age of Solon and the Seven Wise Men. The public training of youth at Sparta, equal for all the citizens, included nothing of letters and music, which in other cities were considered to be the characteristics of an educated Greek:³ though probably individual Spartans, more or fewer, acquired these accomplishments for themselves. Gymnastics, with a slight admixture of simple chronic music and a still slighter admixture of poetry and letters, formed the characteristic culture of Sparta and Krete.⁴ In the *Leges*, Plato not only notes the fact, but treats it as indicating a

¹ Tacitus, *Dialog. de Orator.* c. 2. "Aper, communi eruditione imbutus, contemnebat potius literas quam nesciebat."

Nikias is said to have made his son Nikératus learn by heart the entire *Iliad* and *Odyssey* of Homer; at least this is the statement of Nikératus himself in the *Symposium* of Xenophon (iii. 5).

² This profession appears even in the *Gorgias* (p. 508 A) and in the *Republic* (v. p. 450 D).

³ See Xenophon, *Republ. Laced.* c. 2.

2. Compare the description given by Xenophon in the *Cyropædia* (i. 2, 6) of the public training of Persian youth, which passage bears striking analogy to his description of the Spartan training. The public διδασκαλοὶ are not mentioned as teaching γράμματα, which belong to Athens and other cities, but as teaching justice, temperance, self-command, obedience, bodily endurance, the use of the bow and the javelin, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 673 E.

better social condition, compared with Athens and other Greeks—that both Spartans and Kretans were alike unacquainted with the old epic or theological poems (Hesiod, Orpheus, &c.), and with the modern philosophical speculations.¹

Not simply on this negative ground, but on another positive ground also, Sparta and Krète were well suited to furnish listeners for the Laws.² Their gymnastic discipline and military drill, especially the Spartan, were stricter and more continuous than anywhere else in Greece: including toilsome fatigue, endurance of pain, heat, and cold, and frequent conflicts with and without arms between different factions of citizens. The individual and the family were more thoroughly merged in the community: the citizens were trained for war, interdicted from industry, and forbidden to go abroad without permission: attendance on the public mess-table was compulsory on all citizens: the training of youth was uniform, under official authority: the two systems were instituted, both of them, by divine authority—the Spartan by Apollo, the Kretan by Zeus—Lykurgus and Minos, semi-divine persons, being the respective instruments and mediators. In neither of them was any public criticism tolerated upon the laws and institutions (this is a point capital in Plato's view³). No voice was allowed among the young men except that of constant eulogy, extolling the system as not merely excellent but of divine origin, and resenting all contradiction: none but an old man was permitted to suggest doubts, and he only in private whisper to the Archon, when no young

Gymnastic training, military drill, and public mess, in Krète and Sparta.

¹ Plato, Legg. x. p. 896 B-C. εἰς τὴν ψῆψιν ἐν γραμμασί λόγοι κείμενοι, οἱ παρ' ὑμῖν οὐκ εἰσὶ δὲ ἀρετὴν πολιτείας, ὅς ἐστι μαθήσειν, οἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς μέτροις, οἱ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις περὶ θεῶν, οἱ μὲν παλαιότεροι, ὅς γέγονεν ἡ πρώτη φύσις οὐράνου τῶν τε ἄλλων, προϊόντες δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς οὐ πολλὰ θεογονίαν διεξέρχονται, γινόμενοι τε ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμιλῶντες. Ἄ τοις ἀκούουσιν εἰ μὲν εἰς ἄλλο τι καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, οὐ βέβαιον ἐπιτιμῆν παλαιούς οδοῖ, &c.

² Ephorus, ap. Strabo, x. 480; Xenophon, Repub. Lac. c. 4-6; Isokrates, Busiris, Orat. xi. s. 19; Aristot. Politic. ii. capp. 9 and 10, pp. 1270-1271, and

viii. 9, p. 1338, b. 15; also chap. vi. of the second part of my 'History of Greece,' with the references there given.

³ Plato, Legg. i. p. 634 D-E. ὑμῖν μὲν γάρ, εἴτερ καὶ μετρίως κατεσκευάσται τὰ τῶν νόμων, εἴς τῶν καλλίστων ἂν εἴη νόμων μὴ ζητεῖν τῶν νόμων μηδὲνα εἶναι νοῖα καλῶς αὐτῶν ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἔχει, μηδ' ἐλ φωνῇ καὶ ἔξ ἑνὸς στόματος πάντας συμφωνεῖν ὡς πάντα καλῶς κείται θέστων θεῶν, καὶ τὰν τῆς ἄλλης λέγειν, μὴ ἀνέχεσθαι τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀκούοντες, &c.

Compare Demosthen. adv. Leptin. p. 489, where a similar affirmation is made respecting Sparta.

man was near. Both in Sparta and Krete the public authorities stood forward as the conspicuous, positive, constant, agents; enforcing upon each individual a known type of character and habits. There was thus an intelligible purpose, political and social, as contrasted with other neighbouring societies, in which no special purpose revealed itself.¹ Both Sparta and Krete, moreover, had continued in the main unchanged from a time immemorial. In this, as in numerous other points, the two systems were cognate and similar.²

Comparing the Platonic Leges with the Platonic Republic the difference between them will be illustrated by the theory laid down in the Politikus. We read therein,³ that the process of governing mankind well is an art, depending upon scientific principles; like the art of the physician, the general, the steersman: that it aims at the attainment of a given End, the well-being of the governed—and that none except the scientific or artistic

Difference between Leges and Republic, illustrated by reference to the Politikus.

¹ These other cities are what Plato calls αἱ τῶν εἰσὶ πολιτευομένων πολιτεῖαι (Legg. i. p. 635 E), and what Aristotle calls πόλεις καὶ ἄλλα καίματα, Polit. vii. 1324, b. 5.

² Plato, Legg. i. p. 634, iii. pp. 601 E, 606 A, iii. p. 683. Krete and Sparta, ἀλλοφῶι νόμοι.

K. F. Hermann (in his instructive Dissertation, De Vestigiis Institutum veterum imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis) represents Sparta and Krete as types of customs and institutions which had once been general in Greece, but had been discontinued in the other Grecian cities. "Hoc imprimis in Lacedæmoniorum et Cretenſium res publicas cadit, quæ quum et antiquissimæ Græciæ indolem fidelissimè servasse videntur, et moribus ac disciplinâ publicâ optimè fundatæ essent, non mirum est eas Græco philosopho adeo placuisse ut earum formam et libros de Civitate et Legibus quasi pro fundamento subijceret" (p. 19, compare pp. 13-15-23) . . . "unde (sc. a legitimis Græcarum civitatum principiis) licet plurimi temporum decursu descivissent atque in alia omnia abissent, nihil tamen Plato proposuit, nisi quod optimus quisque in Græciâ semper existerat ac persecutus erat" (p. 15). I think this view is not correct, though

it is adopted more or less by various critics. Sparta and Krete are not specimens (in my judgment) of what all or most Grecian cities once had been—nor of pure Dorism, as K. O. Müller affirms. On the contrary I believe them to have been very peculiar, Sparta especially. So far they resembled all early Greeks, that neither literature nor luxury had grown up among them. But neither the Syssitia nor the disciplina publica had ever subsisted among other Greeks: and these were the two characteristic features of Krete and Sparta, more especially of the latter. They were the two features which arrested Plato's attention, and upon which he brought his constructive imagination to bear; constructing upon one principle in his Republic, and upon a different principle in his Dialogue de Legibus. While he copies these two main features from Sparta, he borrows many or most of his special laws from Athens; but the ends, with reference to which he puts these elements together, are his own. K. F. Hermann, in his anxiety to rescue Plato from the charge of rashness ("temerario ingenii lusu," p. 18), understates Plato's originality.

³ See above, vol. iii. ch. xxx. p. 273, seq.

Ruler know either the end or the means of attaining it : that such rulers are the rarest of all artists, never more than one or a very few, combining philosophical aptitude with philosophical training : but that when they are found, society ought to trust and obey their directions without any fixed law : that no peremptory law can be made to fit all contingencies, and that their art is the only law which they ought to follow in each particular conjuncture. If no such persons can be found, good government is an impossibility : but the next best thing to be done is, to establish fixed laws, as good as you can, and to ensure that they shall be obeyed by every one. Now the Platonic Republic aims at realising the first of these two ideal projects : everything in it turns upon the discretionary orders of the philosophical King or Oligarchy, and even the elaborate training of the Guardians serves only to make them perfect instruments for the execution of those orders. But the Platonic *Leges* or *Treatise on Laws* corresponds only to the second or less ambitious project—a tolerable imitation of the first and best.¹ Instead of philosophical rulers, one or a few invested with discretionary power, we have a scheme of political constitution—an alternation of powers temporary and responsible, an apportionment of functions and duties—a variety of laws enacted, with magistrates and dikasteries provided to apply them. Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, appears as adviser and as persuader ; but the laws must be such as the body of citizens can be persuaded to adopt. There is moreover a scheme of education embodied in the laws : the individual citizen is placed under dominion at once spiritual and temporal : but the infallibility resides in the laws, and authority is exercised over him only by periodical magistrates who enforce them and determine in their name. It is the Laws which govern—not philosophical Artists of King-Craft.

The three first books of the *Leges* are occupied with general preliminary discussions on the ends at which laws and political institutions ought to aim—on the means which they ought to employ—and on the ethical effects of various institutions in moulding the character of the citizens. “For private citizens” (the Athenian says), “it is enough to say, in reply to the

Large proportion of preliminary discussions and didactic exhortation in the *Leges*.

¹ Plato, *Politikus*, pp. 293 C—297 C.

criticism of strangers, This is the law or custom with us. But what I propose to examine is, the wisdom of the lawgiver from whom the law proceeds."¹ At the end of book three, Kleinias announces that the Kretans are about to found a new colony on a deserted site at one end of the island, and that they have confided to a committee of ten Knossians (himself among the number), the task of establishing a constitution and laws for the colony. He invites the Athenian to advise and co-operate with this committee. In the fourth book, we enter upon the special conditions of this colonial project, to which the constitution and laws must conform. It is not until the fifth book that the Athenian speaker begins to declare what constitutional provisions, and what legal enactments, he recommends. His recommendations are continued throughout all the remaining Treatise—from the fifth book, to the twelfth or last. They are however largely interspersed with persuasive addresses, expositions, homilies, and comminations, sometimes of extreme prolixity and vehemence,² on various topics of ethics and religion: which indeed occupy a much larger space than the laws themselves.

The Athenian speaker avails himself of the privilege of old age to criticise the Spartan and Kretan institutions more freely than is approved by his two companions; who feel bound to uphold against all dissentients the divine origin of their respective polities.³ On enquiring from them what is the purpose of their peculiar institutions—the Syssitia or public mess-table—the gymnastic discipline—the military drill—he is informed by both, that the purpose is to ensure habits of courage, strength, and skill, with a view to superiority in war over foreign enemies: war being, in their judgment, the usual and natural condition of the different communities into which mankind are distributed.⁴ Such is the test according to

Scope of the discussion laid down by the Athenian speaker—The Spartan institutions are framed only for war—This is narrow and erroneous.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 637 C-D. πᾶς γὰρ ἀποπειρόμενος ἐρεῖ θαυμάζοντι ξένην, τὴν παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀφίειλαν ὁρῶντι. Μὴ θαυμάζει, ὡς ξένη· νόμος ἐστ' ἡμῖν οὗτος, ἵσως δ' ὕμιν περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἑτέρος· ἡμῖν δ' ἐστὶ νῦν οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἄλλων ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν νομοθετῶν αὐτῶν κακίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς.

² This is what Plato alludes to in the *Politikus* (p. 304 A) as "rhetoric

enlisted in the service of the Ruler,"—δοτὴ βασιλικῇ κοινωνοῦσα, ῥητορεία ἐνγυδιακυβερνή τις ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράξεις.

³ Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 630 D, ii. p. 667 A.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 625-626. ἴσον τῆς εὐ πολιτευομένης πόλεως, &c. (p. 626 B).

which they determine the good constitution of a city. But the Athenian—proclaiming as the scope of his enquiry,¹ What is it which is *right or wrong by nature, in laws?*—will not admit the test as thus laid down. War against foreign enemies (i.e. enemies foreign to the city-community) is only one among many varieties of war. There exist other varieties besides:—war among the citizens of the same town—among the constituent villages of the same city-community—among the brethren of the same family—among the constituent elements of the same individual man.² Though these varieties of war or discord are of frequent occurrence, they are not the less evils, inconsistent with that *ideal* of the Best which a wise lawgiver will seek to approach.³ Whenever any of them occur, he ought to ensure to the good and wise elements victory over the evil and stupid. But his *ideal* should be, to obviate the occurrence of war altogether—to adjust harmoniously the relation between the better and worse elements, disposing the latter towards a willing subordination and co-operation with the former.⁴ Though courage in war is one indispensable virtue, it stands only fourth on the list—wisdom, justice, and temperance, being before it. *Your aim is to inculcate not virtue, but only one part of virtue.*⁵ Many mercenary soldiers, possessing courage in perfection, are unjust, foolish, and worthless in all other respects.⁶

If you wish (says the Athenian to Kleinias) to make out a

¹ Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 C. ὁπόθεν ἔστι τε καὶ ἀμαρτίας περὶ νόμων, ἥτις ποτ' ἐστὶ φύσει. Also 630 E.

Compare the inquiry in the Kratylus respecting naming, wherein consists the ὁπόθεν φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων. See above, vol. iii. ch. xxxi. p. 235, seq.

² Plato, Legg. i. p. 628.

³ Plato, Legg. i. p. 628 D.

⁴ Plato, Legg. i. p. 627 E. ὅς ἐσ' τοὺς μὲν χειροτέρας ἀρχεῖν, τοὺς χεῖρον δ' ἰσχύειν ἢν ἀρχοῦσθαι ἰσχυρὰς ποιήσῃ.

The *ideal* which Plato here sets forth coincides mainly with that which Xenophon adopts as his theme both in the Cyropaedia and in the Oeconomicus (see the beginning of the former and the close of the latter) τὸ ἐθέλοντων ἀρχεῖν.

⁵ Aristotle cites and approves this criticism of Plato, ἐν τοῖς Νόμοις,

Politic. ii. 9, p. 1271, b. 1. Compare vii. 14, 1333, b. 15.

⁶ Plato, Legg. i. p. 630 A. The doctrine—that courage is possessed by many persons who have no other virtue—which is here assigned by Plato to his leading speaker the Athenian, appears in the Protagoras as advocated by Protagoras and impugned by Sokrates (p. 349 D-E). But the arguments whereby Sokrates impugns it are (according to Stallbaum) known by Plato himself to be mere captious tricks (laquei dialectici—captiosae et argutae conclusiones, ad sophistam ludendum et perturbandum comparata) employed only for the purpose of puzzling and turning into ridicule an eminent Sophist. (See Stallbaum, not. ad Protag. p. 349 E. and Pref. ad Protag. p. 28.) I have already remarked elsewhere, that I think this supposition alike gratuitous and improbable.

Principles on which the institutions of a state ought to be defended—You must show that its ethical purpose and working is good.

plenary defence and advocacy of the Kretan system, you ought to do it in the following way :

Our laws deserve the celebrity which they have acquired in Greece, because they make us happy, and provide us with all kinds of good things : both with such as are divine and with such as are human. The divine are, Wisdom or Prudence, Justice, Temperance, Courage : the human are, Health, Beauty, Strength, Activity, Wealth. The human depend upon the divine, are certain to follow them, and are not to be obtained without them. All the regulations and precepts of the lawgiver are directed to the attainment and protection of these ends—to establish among the citizens a moral tone of praise and blame favourable to that purpose. He seeks to inculcate on the citizens a body of sentiment, as to what is honourable and not honourable—such as may guide their pleasures and pains, their desires and aversions—and such as may keep their minds right amidst all the disaster (disease, war, poverty, &c.) as well as the prosperity of life. He next regulates the properties, the acquisitions, and the expenditure of the citizens, together with their relations to each other on these heads, upon principles of justice enforced by suitable penalties. Lastly, he appoints magistrates of approved wisdom and right judgment to enforce the regulations. The cementing authority is thus wisdom, following out purposes of temperance and justice, not of ambition or love of money.

Such is the course of exposition (says the Athenian) which ought to be adopted. Now tell me—In what manner are the objects here defined ensured by the institutions of Apollo and Zeus at Sparta and Krete ? You two ought to show me : for I myself cannot discern it.¹

This passage is of some value, because it gives us, thus early in the Treatise, a brief summary of that which Plato desiderates in the two systems here noted—and of that which he intends to supply in his own. We see that he looks upon a political constitution and laws as merely secondary and instrumental : that he postu-

Religious and ethical character postulated by Plato for a community.

¹ Plato, Legg. i. p. 632.

lates as the primary and fundamental fabric, a given religious and ethical character implanted in the citizens: that the law-giver, in his view, combines the spiritual and temporal authority, making the latter subordinate to the former, and determining not merely what laws the citizens shall obey, but how they shall distribute their approval and aversion—religious, ethical, and æsthetical. It is the lawgiver alone who is responsible and who is open to praise or censure: for to the people, of each different community and different system, established custom is always a valid authority.¹

We Spartans (says Megillus) implant courage in our citizens not merely by our public mess-table and gymnastic, but also by inuring them to support pain and hardship. We cause them to suffer severe pain in the gymnopædia, in pugilistic contests, and other ways: we put them to hardships and privations in the Kryptia and in hunting. We thus accustom them to endurance. Moreover, we strictly forbid all indulgences such as drunkenness. Nothing of the kind is seen at Sparta, not even at the festival of Dionysus; nothing like the drinking which I have seen at Athens, and still more at Tarentum.²

How is it (says the Athenian) that you deal so differently with pains and pleasures? To make your citizens firm against pain, you expose them designedly to severe pains: if they were kept free from pains, you would have no confidence in their firmness against painful actualities, when any such shall occur. But in regard to pleasures, you are content with simple prohibition. You provide no means for strengthen-

Endurance of pain enforced as a part of the public discipline at Sparta.

Why are not the citizens tested in like manner, in regard to resistance against the seductions of pleasure?

¹ Plato, Legg. i. p. 637 D.

² Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633 B—637 A.

Plato puts into the mouth of the Athenian a remark that in some other cities (not Sparta or Kretan) these *ovociva* or public mess-tables had been found to lead to intestine sedition and disturbance (p. 636 B). He instances the cases of the Boeotians, the Milesians, and the Thurians. It is much to be lamented that we cannot assign the particular events and conjunctures here adverted to. The Spartan and Kretan *Symitia* were daily, compulsory, and universal among

the citizens, besides the strictness of the regulations: under such conditions they were peculiar to these two places, as far as our knowledge goes: the *Symitia* in Southern Italy (noticed by Aristotle, Polit. vii. 10, p. 1329 b.) are not known and seemingly unimportant. The *Symitia* in Boeotia, &c., may probably have been occasional or periodical banquets among members of the same tribe, deme, club, or *θίαιος*—and voluntary besides, neither prescribed nor regulated by law. Such meetings might very probably give occasion to disturbances under particular circumstances.

ing your citizens against the temptations of pleasure. Are you satisfied that their courage (or self-command) shall be lame or one-sided—good against pains, but not good against pleasures? In determining about laws, the whole enquiry turns upon pleasures and pains, both in the city and in individual dispositions. These are the two natural fountains, from which he who draws such draughts as is proper, obtains happiness : while every one who draws unwisely and out of season, will fail of obtaining happiness.¹

Besides, as to drunkenness, we must not be too hasty in condemnation of it. We must not pronounce generally respecting any institution without examining the circumstances, persons, regulations, &c., attending it. Such hasty praise and censure is very misleading. Many other nations act upon the opposite practice. But I (says Plato) shall not pretend to decide the point by witnesses and authority. I shall adopt another course of investigation, and shall show you, in this particular case, a specimen of the way in which all such institutions ought to be criticised and appreciated.²

Drunkenness forbidden at Sparta, and blamed by the Spartan converser. The Athenian proceeds to inquire how far such unqualified prohibition is justifiable.

Plato here digresses³ from his main purpose to examine the question of drunkenness. He will not allow it to be set aside absolutely and offhand, by a self-justifying ethical sentiment, without reason assigned, defence tendered, accompanying precautions discussed. Upon this, as upon the social functions proper for the female sex, he is a dissenter from the common view. He selects the subject as a case for exhibiting the proper method of criticism respecting social institutions ; not without some consciousness that the discussion, if looked at in itself (like the examples of scientific classification or diseresis in the Sophistês and Politikus), would appear unduly prolonged.⁴

¹ Plato, Legg. i. pp. 633-634 A. καλὴν τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

² Plato, Legg. i. p. 636 D-E.

³ Plato, Legg. i. p. 638 D-E. Τρόπον δὲ ἄλλον, ὃν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται δεῖν, ἐθέλω λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου, τῆς μέθης, περὶ ὧν ἐμὲν ἀνὰ δυνάμει σὴν περὶ πάντων τούτων ἐρῶν μίθοσιν ὑμῖν δηλοῦν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ μυρία ἐπὶ μυρίοις ἔσθην περὶ

αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦντα ὑμῖν πόλεσι δεῖν τῇ λόγῳ διαμάχαισιν ἄν.

Here Plato (as in the Sophistês, Politikus, and elsewhere) announces that the special inquiry is intended to illustrate a general method.

⁴ He himself notes it as a digression, III. p. 682 E.

⁵ Plato, Legg. i. pp. 643 A, 645 D. Compare the Politikus, pp. 264 A—266 C-E.

To illustrate his peculiar views¹ on the subject of drunkenness, we may refer to the picture of Sokrates which he presents in the *Symposion*, more especially in the latter half of that dialogue, after the appearance of Alkibiades. In this dialogue the occasion is supposed to be festive and joyous. Eros is in the ascendant, and is made the subject of a panegyric by each of the guests in succession. Sokrates partakes in the temper of the society, proclaiming himself to be ignorant of all other matters except those relating to Love.² In all the Platonic writings there is hardly anything more striking than the panegyric upon Eros there pronounced by Sokrates, blending the idea of love with that of philosophical dialectics, and refining the erotic impulse into an enthusiastic aspiration for that generation of new contemplative power, by the colloquial intercourse of two minds reciprocally stimulating each other, which brings them at last into a clear view of the objects of the ideal or intelligible world. Until the appearance of Alkibiades, little wine is swallowed, and the guests are perfectly sober. But Alkibiades, being intoxicated when he first comes in, becomes at once the prominent character of the piece. He is represented as directing the large wine-cooler to be filled with wine (about four pints), first swallowing the whole himself then ordering it to be filled again for Sokrates, who does the like : Alkibiades observing, "Whatever quantity of wine you prescribe to Sokrates, he will drink it without becoming drunk".³ Alkibiades then, instead of panegyrising Eros, undertakes to pronounce a panegyric on Sokrates : proclaiming that nothing shall be said but what is true, and being relieved from all reserve by his drunken condition.⁴ In this panegyric he describes emphatically the playful irony of Sokrates, and the magical influence exercised by his conversation over young men. But though Sokrates thus acquired irresistible ascendancy over others, himself (Alkibiades) included, no one else acquired the least hold over Sokrates. His will and character,

Description of Sokrates in the *Symposion*—his self-command under abundant potations.

¹ Aristotle especially notes this as one among the peculiarities of Plato (*Politic.* ii. 9, 20).

² Plato, *Symp.* p. 177 D. *ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν φημι ἄλλο ἐπιστάσθαι ἢ τὰ ἐρω-*

τιὰ, &c. 196 D : *ἔφην εἶναι δευτὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά.*

³ Plato, *Symp.* pp. 213-214.

⁴ Plato, *Symp.* pp. 214-215-217 E.

under a playful exterior, were self-sufficing and self-determining ; independent of influences from without, to such a degree as was almost insulting to any one who sought either to captivate or oblige him.¹ The self-command of Sokrates was unshaken either by seduction on one side, or by pain and hardship on the other. He faced danger with a courage never surpassed ; he endured hunger, fatigue, the extremities of heat and cold, in a manner such as none of his comrades in the army could parallel.² He was indifferent to the gratifications of love, even when they were presented to him in a manner the most irresistible to Grecian imagination ; while at festive banquets, though he did not drink of his own accord, yet if the society imposed obligation to do so, he outdid all in respect to quantity of wine. No one ever saw Sokrates intoxicated.³ Such is the tenor of the panegyric pronounced by Alkibiades upon Sokrates. A general drinking-bout closes the Symposion, in which Sokrates swallows large draughts of wine along with the rest, but persists all the while in his dialectic cross-examination, with unabated clearness of head. One by one the guests drop asleep, and at daybreak Sokrates alone is left awake. He rises and departs, goes forthwith to the Lykeum, and there passes the whole day in his usual colloquial occupation, without being at all affected by the potations of the preceding night.⁴

Sokrates—
an ideal of
self-com-
mand, both
as to pain
and as to
pleasure.

I have thus cited the Symposion to illustrate Plato's view of the ideal of character. The self-command of Sokrates is tested both by pain and by pleasure. He resists both of them alike and equally : under the one as well as under the other, his reason works with unimpaired efficacy, and his deliberate purposes are pursued with unclouded serenity. This is not because he keeps out of the way of temptation and seduction : on the contrary, he is frequently exposed to situations of a tempting character, and is always found superior to them.

¹ Plato, *Symp.* pp. 219 C. *τῆς Σωκράτους ὑπερβολῆς*. Compare 222 A.

² Plato, *Symp.* p. 220.

³ Plato, *Symp.* p. 220 A.

What has been here briefly recapitulated will be found in my twenty-sixth chapter, vol. iii. pp. 20-21, seq.

⁴ Plato, *Sympos.* p. 223. Compare what Plato puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the *Protagoras* (p. 347 D) : well educated men will carry on a dialectic debate with intelligence and propriety, "though they may drink ever so much wine,"—*καὶ πᾶσι πολὺν οἶνον πίνοσιν*.

Now Plato's purpose is, to impart to his citizens the character which he here ascribes to Sokrates, and to make them capable of maintaining unimpaired the controul of reason against the disturbances both of pain and pleasure. He remarks that the Spartan training kept in check the first of these two enemies, but not the second. He thinks that the citizen ought to be put through a regulated system of trials for measuring and testing his competence to contend with pleasure, as the Spartans provided in regard to pain. The Dionysiac festivals¹ afforded occasions of applying these trials of pleasure, just as the Gymnopædia at Sparta were made to furnish deliberate inflictions of pain. But the Dionysiac banquets ought to be conducted under the superintendence of a discreet president, himself perfectly sober throughout the whole ceremony. All the guests would drink largely of wine, and each would show how far and how long he could resist its disturbing tendencies. As there was competition among the youths at the Gymnopædia, to show how much pain each could endure without flinching—honour being shown to those who endured most, and most successfully—so there would be competition at the Dionysia to prove how much wine each could bear without having his reason and modesty upset. The sober president would decide as judge. Each man's self-command, as against seductive influences, would be strengthened by a repetition of such trials, while proof would be afforded how far each man could be counted on.²

Trials for testing the self-controul of the citizen, under the influence of wine. Dionysiac banquets, under a sober president.

This is one mode in which the unmeasured potations (common throughout the Grecian cities, with the exception of Sparta and Krete) might under proper regulation be rendered useful for civic training. But there is another mode also, connected with the general musical and gymnastical training of the city. Plato will not allow Dionysus—and wine, the special gift of that God to mankind—to be censured as absolutely mischievous.³

The gifts of Dionysus may, by precautions, be rendered useful—Desultory manner of Plato.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 650 A, 637 A. 413, where the same general doctrine is enforced.

² Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 647 D-E—649 D. Compare the *Republic*, iii. pp. 412.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 672 A.

In developing this second topic, he is led into a general theory of ethical and æsthetical education for his city. This happens frequently enough in the desultory manner of the Platonic dialogues. We are sometimes conducted from an incidental and outlying corollary, without warning and through a side door, into the central theory from which it ramifies. The practice is noway favourable to facility of comprehension, but it flows naturally from the unsystematic and spontaneous sequence of the dialogue.

Education of youth consists mainly in giving proper direction to their pleasures and pains—their love and their hatred. Young persons are capable only of emotions, well or ill directed: in this consists their virtue or vice. At that age they cannot bear serious teaching: they are incapable of acquiring reason, or true, firm opinions, which constitute the perfection of the mature man; indeed, if a man acquires these even when old, he may be looked on as fortunate.¹ The young can only have their emotions cultivated so as to conform to reason: they may thus be made to love what reason, personified in and enforced by the law-giver, enjoins—and to hate what reason forbids—but without knowing wherefore. Unfortunately the hard realities of life are perpetually giving a wrong turn to the emotions. To counteract and correct this, the influence of the Muses, of Apollo, and of Dionysus, are indispensable: together with the periodical festivals of which these Deities are respectively presidents and auxiliaries. Their influence is exercised through the choric ceremony—music, singing, dancing, blended together. Every young man is spontaneously disposed to constant indeterminate movement and exercise of various kinds—running, jumping, speaking, &c. This belongs to man in common with the young of other animals:

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ii. pp. 653-659 D-E. παιδεία μὲν ἐστὶ ἡ παιδῶν ὁλκή τε καὶ ἀγωγή πρὸς τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου λόγον ὁρθὸν εἰρημένον καὶ τοῖς ἐπικειστέτοις καὶ πρὸςβυτάτοις δι' ἐμπειρίαν ἐνδεδογμένον, ὡς ὅπως ὁρθός ἐστιν· ἐν' οὗν ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ παιδὸς μὴ ἐναντία χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι ἰθὺς ἡταιρ τῷ νόμῳ καὶ τοῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου πεπεισμένοις, ἀλλὰ ἐνέπη-

ται χαίρουσά τε καὶ λυπουμένη τοῖς αὐτοῖς τοῖς οἷσπερ ὁ γέρον, τούτων ἕνεκα, ἃς ψῆδς καλούμεν, ὅπως μὲν ἐπιδεῖν ταῖς ψυχαῖς αὐτὰς νῦν γιγνέσθαι, πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην ἢν λέγομεν ἐνέμωσαν ἐσπουδασμέναι, διὰ δὲ τὸ σπουδῆν μὴ δύνασθαι φέρειν τὰς τῶν νέων ψυχὰς παιδαί τε καὶ ψῆδς καλεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν, &c.

but what is peculiar to man exclusively is, the sense of rhythm and harmony, as well as of the contrary, in these movements and sounds. Such rhythm and harmony, in song and dance united, is expressed by the chorus at the festivals, in which the Muses and Apollo take part along with the assembled youth. Here we find the only way of properly schooling the emotions.¹ The unschooled man is he who has not gone through a good choric practice; which will require that the matter which he sings shall be good and honourable, while the movements of his frame and the tones of his voice must be rhythmical and graceful. Such choric practice must be universal among the citizens, distributed into three classes: youths, mature men, elders.²

But what is the good and honourable—or the bad and dishonourable? We must be able to settle this point:—otherwise we cannot know how far the chorus complies with the conditions above-named. Suppose a brave man and a coward in the face of danger: the gestures and speech of the former will be strikingly different from those of the latter. So with other virtues and vices. Now the manifestations, bodily and mental, of the virtuous man, are beautiful and honourable: those of the vicious man, are ugly and base. These are the *really beautiful*,—the same universally, or what ought to be beautiful to all: this is the standard of rectitude in music. But they do not always *appear* beautiful to all. There is great diversity in the tastes and sentiments of different persons: what appears to one man agreeable and pleasurable, appears to another disgusting or indifferent.³ Such diversity is either in the natural disposition, or in the habits acquired. A man's pleasure depends upon the former, his judgment of approbation on the latter. If both his nature and his acquired habits coincide with the standard of rectitude, he will both delight in what is really beautiful, and will approve it as beautiful. But if his nature be in discordance with the standard, while his habits coincide with that standard—he will approve of what is honour-

Music and dancing—imitation of the voice and movements of brave and virtuous men. Youth must be taught to take delight in this.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ii. pp. 654-660 A.

² This triple distribution of classes for choric instruction and practice is borrowed from Spartan customs, Plu-

tarch, *Lykurgus*, 21; Schol. ad *Legg.* p. 633 A.

³ Plato, *Legg.* p. 656 B.

able, but he will take no delight in it: he will delight in what is base, but will at the same time disapprove it as base. He will however be ashamed to proclaim his delight before persons whom he respects, and will never indulge himself in the delightful music except when he is alone.¹

To take delight in gestures or songs which are manifestations of bad qualities, produces the same kind of mischievous effect upon the spectator as association with bad men in real life. His character becomes assimilated to the qualities in the manifestations of which he delights, although he may be ashamed to commend them. This is a grievous corruption, arising from bad musical and choric exhibitions, which the lawgiver must take care to prevent. He must not allow poets to exhibit what they may prefer or may think to be beautiful. He must follow the practice of Egypt, where both the music and the pictorial type has been determined by the Gods or by divine lawgivers from immemorial antiquity, according to the standard of natural rectitude—and where the government allows neither poet nor painter to innovate or depart from this consecrated type.² Accordingly, Egyptian compositions of the present day are exactly like what they were ten thousand years ago: neither more nor less beautiful. The lawgiver must follow this example, and fix the type of his musical and choric exhibitions; forbidding all innovation introduced on the plea of greater satisfaction either to the poet or to the audience. In the festivals where there is competition among poets, the prize must not be awarded by the pleasure of the auditors, whose acclamations tend only to corrupt and pervert the poets. The auditors ought to hear nothing but what is better than their own characters, in order that their tastes may thus be exalted. The prize must be awarded according to the preference of a few elders—or better still, of one single elder—eminent for excellent training and virtue. This judge ought not to follow the taste of the auditors, but to consider himself as their teacher and improver.³

Such is the exposition given by the Athenian speaker, re-

¹ Plato, *Legg.* pp. 656-656.

² Plato, *Legg.* ii. pp. 656-657.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ii. pp. 659 A, 663 A.

specting the characteristic function, and proper regulating principles, of choric training (poems learnt, music and dancing) for the youth. The Spartan and Kretan cordially concur with him: especially with that provision which fixes and consecrates the old established type, forbidding all novelties and spontaneous inspiration of the poets. They claim this compulsory orthodoxy, tolerating no dissent from the ancient and consecrated canon of music and orchestric, as the special feature of their two states; as distinguishing Sparta and Krete from other Hellenic cities, which were invaded with impunity by novel compositions of every variety.¹

The Spartan and Kretan agree with the Athenian, That poets must be kept under a strict censorship. But they do not agree as to what the poets are required to conform to.

The Athenian is thus in full agreement with his two companions, on the general principle of subjecting the poets to an inflexible censorship. But the agreement disappears, when he comes to specify the dogmas which the poets are required to inculcate in their hymns. While complimenting his two friends upon their enforcement of an exclusive canon, he proceeds to assume that of course there can be but ONE canon;—that there is no doubt what the dogmas contained in it are to be. He then unfolds briefly the Platonic ethical creed. "You Spartans and Kretans (he says)² of course constrain your poets to proclaim that the just and temperate man is happy, whether he be tall, strong, and rich—or short, feeble, and poor: and that the bad man is wretched and lives in suffering, though he be richer than Midas, and possessor besides of every other advantage in life. Most men appreciate falsely good and evil things. They esteem as good things, health, beauty, strength, perfect sight and hearing, power, long life, immortality: they account the contrary to be bad things. But you and I take a different view.³ We agree in proclaiming, that all these so-called good things are good only to the just man. To the unjust man, we affirm that health, strength, perfection of senses, power, long life, &c., are not good, but exceedingly bad. This, I presume, is the doctrine which

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 C-D.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 660 E.

³ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 B. ὑμεῖς δὲ καὶ ἐγὼ πονεῖν τάδε λέγομεν, ὡς ταῦτα

ἐσὶν ἔμπειρα δικαίους μόνον καὶ δίκαιους ἀνδράσιν ἀρίστα κτήματα, ἀδίκους δὲ κακίστα ἔμπειρα, ἀρκετά μὴ ἐπὶ ὕψους.

you compel your poets to proclaim, and no other—in suitable rhythm and harmony.¹ You agree with me in this, do you not?"

"We agree with you (replies Kleinias) on some of your affirmations, but we disagree with you wholly on others."

"What? (says the Athenian.) Do you disagree with me when I affirm, that a man healthy, rich, strong, powerful, fearless, long-lived, exempt from all the things commonly reputed to be evils, but at the same time unjust and exorbitant—when I say that such a man is not happy, but miserable?"

"We do disagree with you when you affirm this," answers the Kretan.

"But will you not admit that such a man lives basely or dishonourably?"

"Basely or dishonourably.—Yes, we grant it."

"What then—do you not grant farther, that he lives badly, disagreeably, disadvantageously, to himself?"

"No. We cannot possibly grant you that,"—replies Kleinias.

"Then (says the Athenian) you and I are in marked opposition.² For to me what I have affirmed appears as necessary as the existence of Krete is indisputable. If I were lawgiver, I should force the poets and all the citizens to proclaim it with one voice: and I should punish most severely every one³ who affirmed that there could be any wicked men who lived agreeably—or that there could be any course advantageous or profitable, which was not at the same time the most just. These and other matters equally at variance with the opinions received among Kretans, Spartans, and mankind generally—I should persuade my citizens to declare unanimously.—For let us assume for a moment your opinion, and let us ask any lawgiver or any

Ethical
creed laid
down by
the Athe-
nian—Poets
required to
conform
to it.

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 661 C. Ταῦτα δὲ λέγειν οἷμαι τοὺς παρ' ὑμῖν ποιητὰς πείσσειν καὶ ἀναγκάσειν, &c.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 A-B. ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἴσως ἀν' ἐγγυχωρήσαιντο, τό γε αἰσχυρὸς (ζῆν); Κλεινίας. Πάνν μὲν οὖν. Ἀθηναῖος. Τί δέ; τὸ καὶ κακὸς; Κλειν. Οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τοῦθ' ὁμοίως. Ἀθην. Τί δέ; τὸ καὶ ἀπὸς καὶ μὴ συμφορόντως αὐτῶ; Κλειν. Καὶ πῶς ἂν ταῦτά γ' ἔτι ἐγγυχωρήμην; Ἀθην.

Ὅπως; εἰ θεὸς ἡμῖν ὡς δοκεν, ἃ φίλοι, δοίη τις συμφωνίαν, ὡς νῦν γε σχεδὸν ἀπόδομεν ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Ἐμοὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται ταῦτα οὕτως ἀνεγκλίαι, ὡς οὐδὲ Κρήτη νῆσος σαφῶς.

³ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B-C. Σμικρὰν τε ὀλίγον μεγίστην ἐπιτελείην ἂν, εἰ τις ἐν τῇ χώρῃ φθγγέταιτο ὡς εἰσὶ τινας ἀνθρώπων ποτε πονηροὶ μὲν, ἡδὲως δὲ ζῶντες, &c.

father advising his son.—You say that the just course of life is one thing, and that the agreeable course is another: I ask you which of the two is the happiest? If you say that the agreeable course is the happiest, what do you mean by always exhorting me to be just? Do you wish me not to be happy?¹ If on the contrary you tell me that the just course of life is happier than the agreeable, I put another question—What is this Good and Beautiful which the lawgiver extols as superior to pleasure, and in which the just man's happiness consists? What good *can* he possess, apart from pleasure?² He obtains praise and honour:—Is *that* good, but disagreeable—and would the contrary, infamy, be agreeable? A life in which a man neither does wrong to others nor receives wrong from others,—is *that* disagreeable, though good and honourable—and would the contrary life be agreeable, but dishonourable? You will not affirm that it is.³

“Surely then, my doctrine—which regards the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the honourable, as indissolubly connected,—has at least a certain force of persuasion, if it has nothing more, towards inducing men to live a just and holy life: so that the lawgiver would be both base and wanting to his own purposes, if he did not proclaim it as a truth. For no one will be willingly persuaded to do anything which does not carry with it in its consequences more pleasure than pain.⁴ There is indeed confusion in every man's vision, when he looks at these consequences in distant outline: but it is the duty of the lawgiver to clear up such confusion, and to teach his citizens in the best way he can, by habits, encouraging praises, discourses, &c., how they ought to judge amidst these deceptive outlines. Injustice, when looked at thus in prospect, seems to the unjust man pleasurable, while justice seems to him thoroughly disagreeable. On the contrary, to the just man, the appearance is exactly contrary: to him justice seems pleasurable, injustice repulsive. Now which

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D-E.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 E. εἰ δ' αὖ τὸν δικαιοτάτον εὐδαιμονίστατον ἀποφαίνοιτο βίαν εἶναι, ζῆτοί τε καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν οἰμαι, τί ποτ' ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς κρείττον ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλὸν ὁ νόμος ἔδωκεν ἐπαινεῖ; τί γὰρ δὴ δικαίῳ χωρίζεσθαι ἡδονῆς ἀγαθὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο;

³ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 A.

⁴ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 B. Οὐκοῦν δ' μὴ μὴ χωρίζων λόγος ἦδύ τε καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ καλόν, πῶς αὖτε γ', εἰ μὴδὲν ἕτερον, πρὸς τὸ τινα εἶναι ζῆν τὸν δίκαιον καὶ δίκαιον βίαν· ὥστε νομοθέτῃ γε αἰσχιστος λόγος καὶ ἡναντιώτατος, ὅτι ἂν μὴ ᾗ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχειν· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἔκων εἶλοιο παύεσθαι πράττειν τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ τὸ χαίρειν τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι πλέον ἔσται.

of these two judgments shall we pronounce to be the truth? That of the just man. The verdict of the better soul is unquestionably more trustworthy than that of the worse. We must therefore admit it to be a truth, that the unjust life is not merely viler and more dishonourable, but also in truth more disagreeable, than the just life."¹

Such is the course of proof which Plato's Athenian speaker considers sufficient to establish this ethical doctrine. But he proceeds to carry the reasoning a step farther, as follows :—

The Spartan and Kretan do not agree with him.

"Nay, even if this were not a true position—as I have just shown it to be—any lawgiver even of moderate worth, if ever he ventured to tell a falsehood to youth for useful purposes, could proclaim no falsehood more useful than this, nor more efficacious towards making them disposed to practise justice willingly, without compulsory force."²

"Truth is honourable (observes the Kretan) and durable. You will not find it easy to make them believe what you propose."

"Why, it was found easy (replies the Athenian) to make men believe the mythe respecting Kadmus and the armed men who sprang out of the earth after the sowing of the dragon's teeth—and many other mythes equally incredible. Such examples show conclusively that the lawgiver can implant in youthful minds any beliefs which he tries to implant. He need therefore look to nothing, except to determine what are those beliefs which, if implanted, would be most beneficial to the city. Having determined this, he will employ all his machinery to make all his citizens proclaim these beliefs constantly, with one voice, and without contradiction, in all hymns, stories, and discourses."³

"This brings me to my own proposition. My three Choruses (youthful, mature, elderly) will be required to sing perpetually to the tender minds of children all the honourable and good

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 C-D.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D-E. Νομοθέτης δέ, οὐ τι καὶ συμκρὸν ὄφελος, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦτο ἦν οὕτως ἔχον, ὥς καὶ νῦν αὐτὸ πρῶχ' ὁ λόγος ἔχειν, εἴπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο ἐτόλμησεν ἂν ἐπ' ἀγαθῶ ψεύδεσθαι

πρὸς τοὺς νέους, ἔστιν δ, τι τοῦτου ψεύδους λυσιτελίστερον ἂν ἐφένεσσε ποτε, καὶ δυνάμενον μάλλον ποιεῖν μὴ βίβ' ἀλλ' ἐκόντας πάντα τὰ δίκαια;

³ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 A.

doctrines which I shall prescribe in detail. But the sum and substance of them will be—The best life has been declared by the Gods to be also the most pleasurable, and it is the most pleasurable.¹ The whole city—man, boy, freeman, slave, male, female—will be always singing this doctrine to itself in choric songs, diversified by the poets in such manner as to keep up the interest and satisfaction of the singers.”²

Here, then, we have the general doctrine, ethical and social, which is to be maintained in exclusive possession of the voice, ear, and mind, of the Platonic citizens. The imitative movements of the tripartite Chorus must be kept in perfect accordance with it:³ for all music is imitative, and care must be taken to imitate the right things in a right manner. To ensure such accordance, magistrates must be specially chosen as censors over both poets and singers. But this, in Plato's view, is not enough. He requires, besides, that the choristers should themselves understand both what they ought to imitate, and how it should be imitated. Such understanding cannot be expected from the Chorus of youths—nor even from that of mature men. But it may be expected, and it must be required, in the chorus of Elders: which will thus set an example to the other two, of strict adherence to the rectitude of the musical standard.⁴ The purity of the Platonic musical training depends mainly upon the constant and efficacious choric activity of the old citizens.

But how is such activity to be obtained? Old men will not only find it repugnant to their natural dispositions, but will even be ashamed to exhibit themselves in choric music and dance before the younger citizens.

It is here that Plato invokes the aid of wine-drinking and intoxication. The stimulus of wine, drunk by the old men at the Dionysiac banquets, will revive in

Chorus of Elders are required to set an example in keeping up the purity of the music prescribed.

The Elders require the

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 664 B.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 665 C.

It will be understood that here, as elsewhere, I give the substance of Plato's reasoning, without binding myself to the translation of the particular words.

³ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 668 A. ὁμοῦν

μουσικῇ γε πάντες φάμεν εἰσαγωγικὴν τε εἶναι καὶ μνηστικὴν;

⁴ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 670 B-D; vi. p. 764 C; vii. p. 812 B.

Aristotle directs that the elders shall be relieved from active participation in choric duties, and confined to the function of judging or criticising (Politic. viii. 6, 1340, b. 38).

stimulus of wine, in order to go through the choric duties with spirit. them a temporary fit of something like juvenile activity, and will supply an antidote to inconvenient diffidence.¹ Under such partial excitement, they will stand forward freely to discharge their parts in the choric exhibitions; which, as performed by them, will be always in full conformity with the canon of musical rectitude, and will prevent it from becoming corrupted or relaxed by the younger choristers. To ensure however that the excitement shall not overpass due limits, Plato prescribes that the president of the banquet shall be a grave person drinking no wine at all. The commendation or reproof of such a president will sustain the reason and self-command of the guests, at the pitch compatible with full execution of their choric duty.² Plato interdicts wine altogether to youths, until 18 years of age—allows it only in small quantities until the age of 40—but permits and even encourages elders above 40 to partake of the full inspiration of the Dionysiac banquets.³

This manner of regarding intoxication must probably have occurred to Plato at a time later than the composition of the Republic, wherein we find it differently handled.⁴ It deserves attention as an illustration, both of his boldness in following out his own ethical views, in spite of the consciousness⁵ that they would appear

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 B-C. τρι-
κοντον τῆς τοῦ γήραος ἀσθενέστερος ἰδω-
ρῆσται (διδόντες) τὸν οἶνον, φάρμακον,
ὥστε ἀνὰ ἡμέρας . . . πρῶτον μὲν δὴ
διατεθεὶς οὕτως ἕκαστος ὅρ' οὐκ ἐν θέλει
προθυμώτερόν γε, ἔπινει αἰσχυρόμενος . . .
φθεῖν.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 671.

³ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 A.

⁴ In the Republic (iii. p. 398 E) Plato pronounced intoxication (μέθη) to be most unbecoming for his Guardians. He places it in the same class of defects as indolence and effeminacy. He also repudiates those varieties of musical harmony called *Ionic* and *Lydian*, because they were languid, effeminate, symposiac, or suitable for a drinking society (μαλακαὶ τε καὶ συμποσιακαὶ, χαλαραί). Various musical critics of the day (τῶν περὶ τὴν μουσικὴν κριταί) —we learn this curious fact from Aristotle, *Polit.* viii. 7, near the end) impugned this opinion of Plato. They

affirmed that drunkenness was exciting and stimulating, —not relaxing nor favourable to languor and heaviness: that the effeminate musical modes were not congenial to drunkenness. When we read the *Treatise De Legibus*, we observe that Plato altered his opinion respecting μέθη, and had come round to agree with these musical critics. He treats μέθη as exciting and stimulating, not relaxing and indolent; he even applies it as a positive stimulus to wind up the Elders. Moreover, instead of repudiating it absolutely, he defends its usefulness under proper regulations. Perhaps the change of his opinion may have been partly owing to these very criticisms.

⁵ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 666 B. Old Philokleon, in the *Vespe* of Aristophanes (1320 seq.), under the influence of wine and jovial excitement, is a pregnant subject for comic humour.

strange to others—and of the prominent function which he assigns to old men in this dialogue *De Legibus*. He condemns intoxication decidedly, when considered simply as a mode of enjoyment, and left to the taste of the company without any president or regulation. But with most moralists such condemnation is an unreflecting and undistinguishing sentiment. Against this Plato enters his protest. He considers that intoxication, if properly regulated, may be made conducive to valuable ends, ethical and social. Without it the old men cannot be wound up to the pitch of choric activity; without such activity, constant and unfaltering, the rectitude of the choric system has no adequate security against corruption: without such security, the emotional training of the citizens generally will degenerate. Furthermore, Plato takes occasion from drunkenness to lay down a general doctrine respecting pleasures. Men must be trained to self-command against pleasures, as they are against pains, not by keeping out of the way of temptation, but by regulated exposure to temptations, with motives at hand to help them in the task of resistance. Both these views are original and suggestive, like so many others in the Platonic writings: tending to rescue Ethics from that tissue of rhetorical and emotional commonplace in which it so frequently appears;—and to keep present before those who handle it, those ideas of an end to be attained, and of discrimination as to means—which are essential to its pretensions as a science.

But the general ethical discussion—which Plato tells us¹ that he introduces to establish premisses for his enactment respecting drunkenness—is of greater importance than the enactment itself. He prescribes imperatively the doctrine and matter which alone is to be tolerated in his choric hymns or heard in his city. I have given an abstract (p. 292-297) of the doctrine here laid down and the reasonings connected therewith, because they admit of being placed in instructive comparison with his manner of treating the same subject in other dialogues.

General
ethical doc-
trine held
by Plato in
Leges.

What is the relation between Pleasure, Good, and Happiness?

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 664 D.

Pleasure—
Good—
Happiness
—What is
the relation
between
them?

Pain, Evil, Unhappiness? Do the names in the first triplet mean substantially the same thing, only looked at in different aspects and under different conditions? Or do they mean three distinct things, separable and occurring the one without the other? This important question was much debated, and answered in many different ways, by Grecian philosophers from the time of Sokrates downward—and by Roman philosophers after them. Plato handles it not merely in the dialogue now before us, but in several others—differently too in each: in Protagoras, Gorgias, Republic, Philêbus, &c.¹

Here, in the Dialogue De Legibus (by incidental allusion, too, in some of the Epistles), we have the latest form in which these doctrines about Pleasure, Happiness, Good—and their respective contraries—found expression in Plato's compositions. Much of the doctrines is the same—yet with some material variation. It is here reasserted, by the Athenian, that the just and temperate man is happy, and that the unjust man is miserable, whatever may befall him: moreover that good things (such as health, strength, sight, hearing, &c.) are good only to the just man, evil to the unjust—while the contrary (such as sickness, weakness, blindness) are good things to the unjust, evil only to the just. To this position both the Spartan and the Kretan distinctly refuse their assent: and Plato himself admits that mankind in general would agree with them in such refusal.² He vindicates his own opinion by a new argument which had not before appeared. "The just man himself" (he urges), "one who has been fully trained in just dispositions, will feel it to be as I say: the unjust man will feel the contrary. But the just man is much more trustworthy than the unjust: therefore we must believe what he says to be the truth."³ Appeal is here made, not to the Wise Man or Artist, but to the just man: whose sentence is invested with a self-justifying authority, wherein Plato looks for his *aliquid inconcussum*. Now it is for philosophy, or for the true Artist, that this pre-eminence

Comparison
of the doc-
trine laid
down in
Leges.

¹ See above, vol. II. ch. xxiv. pp. 353.

² Plato, Legg. II. p. 662 C.

³ Plato, Legg. II. p. 663 C.

is claimed in the Republic,¹ where Sokrates declares, that each of the three souls combined in the individual man (the rational or philosophical, in the head—the passionate or ambitious, between the neck and the diaphragm—and the appetitive, below the diaphragm) has its special pleasures; that each prefers its own; but that the judgment of the philosophical man must be regarded as paramount over the other two.² Comparing this demonstration in the Republic with the unsupported inference here noted in the *Leges*—we perceive the contrast of the oracular and ethical character of the latter, with the intellectual and dialectic character of the former.

Again, here in the *Leges*, the Athenian puts it to his two companions, Whether the unjust man, assuming him to possess every imaginable endowment and advantage in life, will not live, nevertheless, both dishonourably and miserably? They admit that he will live dishonourably: they deny that he will live miserably.³ The Athenian replies by reasserting emphatically his own opinion, without any attempt to prove it. Now in the *Gorgias*, the same issue is raised between Sokrates and Polus: Sokrates refutes his opponent by a dialectic argument, showing that if the first of the two doctrines (the living dishonourably—*αἰσχρῶς*) be granted, the second (the living miserably—*κακῶς*) cannot be consistently denied.⁴ The dialectic of Sokrates is indeed more ingenious than conclusive: but still it is dialectic—and thus stands contrasted with the oracular emphasis which is substituted for it in *Leges*.

Farthermore, the distinction between Pleasure and Good, in the language of the Athenian speaker in the *Leges*, approximates more nearly to the doctrine of Sokrates in the *Protagoras*, than to his doctrine in the *Gorgias*, *Philébus*, and *Republic*. The Athenian proclaims that he is dealing with men, and not with Gods, and that he must therefore recognise the nature of man, with its fundamental characteristics: that no man will willingly do anything from which he does not

Doctrine in *Leges* about Pleasure and Good—approximates more nearly to the *Protagoras* than to *Gorgias* and *Philébus*.

¹ Plato, *Repub.* ix. pp. 580 E—583 A.

² Plato, *Repub.* ix. p. 583 A. Ἀνάγκη δὲ ὁ φιλόσοφος τε καὶ ὁ φιλόλογος ἵπταιται, ἀληθέστατα εἶναι . . . κύριος

γούν ἑαυτέτης ὡς ἑαυταὶ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ὁ φρόνιμος.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 662 A.

⁴ Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 474 C, 478 E.

anticipate more pleasure than pain : that every man desires the maximum of pleasure and the minimum of pain, and desires nothing else : that there neither is nor can be any Good, apart from Pleasure or superior to Pleasure : that to insist upon a man being just, if you believe that he will obtain more pleasure or less pain from an unjust mode of life, is absurd and inconsistent : that the doctrine which declares the life of pleasure and the life of justice to lead in two distinct paths, is a heresy deserving not only censure but punishment.¹ Plato here enunciates, as distinctly as Epikurus did after him, that Pleasures and Pains must be regulated (here regulated by the lawgiver), so that each man may attain the maximum of the former with the minimum of the latter : and that Good, apart from maximum of pleasure or minimum of pain accruing to the agent himself,² cannot be made consistent with the nature or aspirations of man.

There is another point too in which the Athenian speaker here recedes from the lofty pretensions of Sokrates in the Republic and the Gorgias. In the second Book of the Republic, we saw Glaukon and Adeimantus challenge Sokrates to prove that justice, apart from all its natural consequences, will suffice *per se* to make the just man happy ;³ *per se*, that is, even though all the society misconceive his character, and render no justice to him, but heap upon him nothing except obloquy and persecution. If (Glaukon urges) you can only recommend justice when taken in conjunc-

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. pp. 662 C-D-E, 663 B.

In v. pp. 732 E to 734, the Athenian speaker delivers τὰ ἀνθρώπινα of the general preface or proem to his Laws, after having previously delivered τὰ θεῖα (v. pp. 727-732).

Τὰ θεῖα. These are precepts respecting piety to the Gods, and behaviour to parents, strangers, suppliants ; and respecting the duty of rendering due honour, first to the mind, next to the body—of maintaining both the one and the other in a sound and honourable condition. Repeated exhortation is given to obey the enactments whereby the lawgiver regulates pleasures and pains : the precepts are also enforced by insisting on the suffering which will accrue to the agent if they be neglected.

We also read (what is said also in Gorgias) that the δίκην κακούργου μέγιστον is τὸ ἀποκρίσθαι κακὸς ἀνθρώπου (p. 723 E).

Τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, which follow τὰ θεῖα, indicate the essential conditions of human character which limit and determine the application of such precepts to man. To love pleasure—to hate pain—are the paramount and indefeasible attributes of man ; but they admit of being regulated, and they ought to be regulated by wisdom—the μετρητικὴ τέχνη—insisted on by Sokrates in the Protagoras (p. 356 E). Compare Legg. i. p. 636 E, ii. p. 653 A.

² It is among the tests of a well-disciplined army (according to Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 6, 26) ὅτι οἱ δὲ σωθεῖσθαι αὐτοὺς ἴδεν εἰς τοῦ ἀνείκελ.

³ Plato, Republic, ii. pp. 359-367.

tion with the requiting esteem and reciprocating justice from others towards the just agent, this is no recommendation of justice at all. Your argument implies a tacit admission, that it will be better still if he can pass himself off as just in the opinion of others, without really being just himself: and you must be understood as recommending to him this latter course—if he can do it successfully. Sokrates accepts the challenge, and professes to demonstrate the thesis tendered to him: which is in substance the cardinal dogma afterwards espoused by the Stoics. I have endeavoured to show (in a former chapter¹), that his demonstration is altogether unsuccessful: and when we turn to the Treatise *De Legibus*, we shall see that the Athenian speaker recedes from the doctrine altogether: confining himself to the defence of justice *with* its requiting and reciprocating consequences, not *without* them. The just man, as the Athenian speaker conceives him, is one who performs his obligations towards others, and towards whom others perform their obligations also: he is one who obtains from others that just dealing and that esteem which is his due: and when so conceived, his existence is one of pleasure and happiness.² This is, in substance, the Epikurean doctrine substituted for the Stoic. It is that which Glaukon and Adeimantus in the Republic deprecate as unworthy disparagement of justice; and which they adjure Sokrates, by his attachment to justice, to stand up and repel.³ Now even this, the Epikurean doctrine, is true only with certain qualifications: since there are various other conditions essential to happiness, over and above the ethical conditions. Still it is not so utterly at variance with the truth as the doctrine which Sokrates undertakes to prove, but never does prove, in the Republic.

The last point which I shall here remark in this portion of the Treatise *De Legibus* is, the sort of mistrust manifested by Plato of the completeness of his own proof. Notwithstanding the vehement phrases in which the Athenian speaker proclaims his internal persuasion of the truth of his doctrine, while acknowledging at the same time that not only his two companions, but

Plato here mistrusts the goodness of his own proof. He falls back upon useful fiction.

¹ See above, chap. xxviii. p. 150, seq.

² Plato, *Legg.* ii. p. 663 A.

³ Plato, *Republ.* ii. p. 368 B. ἄ-δοικα γὰρ μὴ οὐδ' ὅστιον ἢ παραγινόμενον δικαιοσύνην κακῆς ἀπορρομῆς μὴ βοηθεῖν.

most other persons also, took the opposite view¹—he finds it convenient to reinforce the demonstration of the expositor by the omnipotent infallibility of the lawgiver. He descends from the region of established truth to that of useful fiction. “Even if the doctrine (that the pleasurable, the just, the good, and the honourable, are indissoluble) were not true, the lawgiver ought to adopt it as an useful fiction for youth, effective towards inducing them to behave justly without compulsion. The lawgiver can obtain belief for any fiction which he pleases to circulate, as may be seen by the implicit belief obtained for the Theban mythe about the dragon’s teeth, and a thousand other mythes equally difficult of credence. He must proclaim the doctrine as an imperative article of faith; carefully providing that it shall be perpetually recited, by one and all his citizens, in the public hymns, narratives, and discourses, without any voice being heard to call it in question.”²

Here is a second attempt on the part of Plato, in addition to that which we have seen in the Republic,³ to employ deliberate ethical fiction as a means of governing his citizens: first to implant and accredit it—next to prescribe its incessant iteration by all the citizens in the choric ceremonies—lastly to consecrate it, and to forbid all questioners or opponents: all application of the Socratic Elenchus to test it. In this treatise he speaks of the task as easier to the lawgiver than he had described it to be in his Republic: in which latter we found him regarding a new article of faith as difficult to implant, but as easy to uphold if once it be implanted; while in the Treatise De Legibus both processes are treated as alike achievable and certain. The conception of dogmatic omnipotence had become stronger in Plato’s mind during the interval between the two treatises. Intending to postulate for himself the complete regulation not merely of the

¹ Plato, Legg. ii. p. 662 B.

² Plato, Legg. ii. p. 663 D. *ἐν ἀγαθῷ ψεύδεσθαι πρὸς τοὺς νέους, &c.* Also 664 A. So, in the *Bacchæ* of Euripides (332), the two old men, Kadmus and Teiresias, after vainly attempting to inculcate upon Pentheus the belief in and the worship of Dionysus, at last appeal to his prudence, and admonish him of the danger of unbelief:—

καὶ μὴ γὰρ εἶναι ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὡς σὺ φησὶ,
παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω, καὶ καταφύεσθω
καλῶς
ὡς ἴσται, Σαμὴλη θ’ ἵνα δοῇ θεὸν τακτεῖν,
ἥμιν τε τιμὴ πᾶντι τῷ γένει προσῆ.
ὅπως τὸν Ἀκταίωνος ἄθλιον μῦθον;
... ὁ μὴ παθεῖ σὺν.

³ Plato, Republic, iii. p. 414; v. p. 450 D.

actions, but also of the thoughts and feelings of his citizens—intending moreover to exclude free or insubordinate intellects—he naturally looks upon all as docile recipients of any faith which he thinks it right to preach. When he appeals, however, as proofs of the facility of his plan, to the analogy of the numerous mythes received with implicit faith throughout the world around him—we see how low an estimate he formed of the process whereby beliefs are generated in the human mind, and of their evidentiary value as certifying the truth of what is believed. People believed what was told them at first by some imposing authority, and transmitted the belief to their successors, even without the extraneous support of inquisitorial restrictions such as the Platonic lawgiver throws round the Magnêtic community in the *Leges*. It is in reference to such self-supporting beliefs that Sokrates stands forth, in the earlier Platonic compositions, as an enquirer into the reasons on which they rested—a task useful as well as unpleasant to those whom he questioned—attracting unpopularity as well as reputation to himself. Plato had then keenly felt the inestimable value of this Elenchus or examining function personified in his master; but in the *Treatise De Legibus* the master has no place, and the function is severely proscribed. Plato has come round to the dogmatic pole, extolling the virtue of passive recipient minds who have no other sentiment than that which the lawgiver issues to them. Yet while he postulates in his own city the infallible authority of the lawgiver, and enforces it by penalties, as final and all-sufficient to determine the ethical beliefs of all the Platonic citizens—we shall find in a subsequent book of this *Treatise* that he denounces and punishes those who generalise this very postulate; and who declare the various ethical beliefs, actually existing in communities of men, to have been planted each by some human authority—not to have sprung from any unseen oracle called Nature.¹

Such is the ethical doctrine which Plato proclaims in the *Leges*, and which he directs to be sung by each Chorus among the three (boys, men, elders), with appropriate music and dancing. It is on the constancy, strictness,

Importance
of music and
chorus as an
engine of

¹ Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 890-890.

teaching for Plato. Views of Xenophon and Aristotle compared. and sameness of these choric and musical influences, that he relies for the emotional training of youth. If the musical training be either intermitted or allowed to vary from the orthodox canon—if the theatrical exhibitions be regulated by the taste of the general audience, and not by the judgment of a few discerning censors—the worst consequences will arise: the character of the citizens will degenerate, and the institutions of his city will have no foundation to rest upon.¹ The important effects of music, as an instrument in the hands of the lawgiver for regulating the emotions of the citizens, and especially for inspiring a given emotional character to youth—are among the characteristic features of Plato's point of view, common to both the Republic and the Laws. There is little trace of this point of view either in Xenophon or in Isokrates; but Aristotle embraces it to a considerable extent. It grew out of the practice and tradition of the Grecian cities, in most of which the literary teaching of youth was imparted by making them read, learn, recite, or chaunt the works of various poets; while the use of the lyre was also taught, together with regulated movements in the dance. The powerful ethical effect of musical teaching (even when confined to the simplest choric psalmody and dance), enforced by perpetual drill both of boys and men, upon the unlettered Arcadians—may be seen recognised even by a practical politician like Polybius,² who considers it indispensable for the softening of violent and sanguinary tempers: the diversity of the effect, according to the different modes of

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iv. p. 424 C-D; *Legg.* iii. pp. 760-701.

² Polybius, iv. pp. 20-21, about the rude Arcadians of Kynetha. He ascribes to this simple choric practice the same effect which Ovid ascribes to "ingenue artes," or elegant literature generally:—

Ingenus didicisse fideliter artes
Emollit mores, nec sinit esse ferus.

See the remarkable contention between Æschylus and Euripides in Aristophan. *Ban.* 876 seq., about the function and comparative excellence of poets (also *Nubes*, 955). Aristophanes, comparing Æschylus with Euripides, denounces music as having degenerated, and poetry as having been

corrupted, at Athens. So far he agrees with Plato; but he ascribes this corruption in a great degree to the conversation of Euripides with Sokrates (*Ranæ*, 1487); and here Plato would not have gone along with him—at least not when Plato composed his earlier dialogues—though the *ἦθος* of the *Treatise De Legibus* is in harmony with this sentiment. Polybius cites, with some displeasure, the remark of the historian Ephorus, who asserted that musical teaching was introduced among men for purposes of cheating and mystification—in' ἀνάγκη καὶ γοητεία παρασκευάσαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ' αὖτως ἀρχαῖοντα λόγον αὐτῆς δέψας (*iv.* 20). Polybius considers this an unbecoming criticism.

music employed, is noted by Aristotle,¹ and was indeed matter of common repute. Plato, as lawgiver, postulates poetry and music of his own dictation. He relies upon constant supplies of this wholesome nutriment, for generating in the youth such emotional dispositions and habits as will be in harmony, both with the doctrines which he preaches, and with the laws which he intends to impose upon them as adults. Here (as in Republic and Timæus) he proclaims that the perfection of character consists in willing obedience or harmonious adjustment of the pleasures and pains, the desires and aversions, to the paramount authority of reason or wisdom—or to the rational conviction of each individual as to what is good and honourable. If, instead of obedience and harmony, there be discord—if the individual, though rationally convinced that a proceeding is just and honourable, nevertheless hates it—or if, while convinced that a proceeding is unjust and dishonourable, he nevertheless loves it—such discord is the worst state of stupidity or mental incompetence.² We must recollect that (according to the postulate of Treatise De Legibus) the rational convictions of each individual, respecting what is just and honourable, are assumed to be accepted implicitly from the lawgiver, and never called in question by any one. There exists therefore only one individual reason in the community—that of the lawgiver, or Plato himself.

Besides all the ethical prefatory matter, above noticed, Plato gives us also some historical and social prefatory matter, not essential to his constructive scheme (which after all takes its start partly from theoretical principles laid down by himself, partly from a supposed opportunity of applying those principles in the foundation of a new colony), but tending to illustrate the growth of political society, and the abuses into which it naturally tends to lapse. There existed in his time a great variety of distinct communities : some in the

Historical retrospect as to the growth of cities—Frequent destruction of established communities, with only a small remnant left.

¹ Aristotle, *Polit.* viii. c. 4-5-7, p. 1340, a. 10, 1341, a. 15, 1342, a. 30. We see by these chapters how much the subject was discussed in his day.

The ethical and emotional effects conveyed by the sense of hearing, and distinguishing it from the other senses, are noticed in the *Problemata* of Aristotle, xix. 27-29, pp. 919-920.

² Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 699 A. ἡ με- γίστη ἀμαθία . . . ὅταν τις τι δόξῃ καλὸν ἢ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, μὴ φιλεῖ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ μισεῖ, τὸ δὲ ποιεῖν καὶ εἰδέναι δοκοῦν εἶναι φιλεῖ τε καὶ ἀσπαζέσθαι· ταῦτα τὴν διαφωνίαν λύσκει τε καὶ ἡδονῇ πρὸς τὴν κατὰ λόγον δόξαν, ἀμαθίαν φησὶ εἶναι τὴν ἐσχάτην. Compare p. 683 A.

simplest, most patriarchal, Cyclopiian condition, nothing more than families—some highly advanced in civilization, with its accompanying good and evil—some in each intermediate stage between these two extremes.—The human race (Plato supposes) has perhaps had no beginning, and will have no end. At any rate it has existed from an indefinite antiquity, subject to periodical crises, destructive kosmical outbursts, deluges, epidemic distempers, &c.¹ A deluge, when it occurs, sweeps away all the existing communities with their property, arts, instruments, &c., leaving only a small remnant, who, finding shelter on the top of some high mountain not covered with water, preserve only their lives. Society, he thinks, has gone through a countless number of these cycles.² At the end of each, when the deluge recedes, each associated remnant has to begin its development anew, from the rudest and poorest condition. Each little family or sept exists at first separately, with a patriarch whom all implicitly obey, and peculiar customs of its own. Several of these septs gradually coalesce together into one community, choosing one or a few lawgivers to adjust and modify their respective customs into harmonious order, and submitting implicitly to the authority of such chosen few.³ By successive coalitions of this kind, operated in a vast length of time,⁴ large cities are gradually formed on the plain and on the seaboard. Property and public force is again accumulated; together with letters, arts, and all the muniments of life.

Such is the idea which Plato here puts forth of the natural genesis and development of human society. Having
 Historical or legendary retrospect—
 The Trojan war—The return of the Herakleids.
 thus arrived at the formation of considerable cities with powerful military armaments, he carries us into the midst of Hellenic legend—the Trojan War, the hostile reception which the victorious heroes found on their return to Greece after the siege, the Return of the Herakleids to Peloponnesus, and the establishment of the three Herakleid brethren, Témenus, Kresphontês, Aristodêmus, as kings of Argos, Messênê, and Sparta. The triple Herakleid

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iii. pp. 677-678, vi. p. 783 A. γένεσιν, &c.

² Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 681 C-D.

³ Plato, *Legg.* p. 680 A: τοῖς ἐν τοῦ-
 τῃ τῇ μέλει τῆς περιόδου γε-

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 683 A. ἐν χρό-
 νου τινὸς μήκεσιν ἀπλότοις.

kingdom was originally founded (he affirms) as a mode of uniting and consolidating the force of Hellas against the Asiatics, who were eager to avenge the capture of Troy. It received strong promises of permanence, both from prophets and from the Delphian oracle.¹ But these hopes were frustrated by misconduct on the part of the kings of Argos and Messenê: who, being youths destitute of presiding reason, and without external checks, obeyed the impulse of unmeasured ambition, oppressed their subjects, and broke down their own power.

To conduct a political community well is difficult; for there are inherent causes of discord and sedition which can only be neutralised in their effects, but can never be eradicated. Among the foremost of these inherent causes, Plato numbers the many distinct and conflicting titles to obedience which are found among mankind, all co-existent and co-ordinate. There are seven such titles, all founded in the nature of man and the essential conditions of society:²—1. Parents over children. 2. Men of high birth and breed (such as the Herakleids at Sparta) over men of low birth. 3. Old over young. 4. Masters over slaves. 5. The stronger man over the weaker. 6. The wiser man over the man destitute of wisdom. 7. The fortunate man, who enjoys the favour of the Gods (one case of this is indicated by drawing of the best lot), over the less fortunate man (who draws an inferior lot).

Difficulties of government—Conflicts about command—Seven distinct titles to command exist among mankind, all equally natural, and liable to conflict.

Of these seven titles to command, coexisting, distinct, and conflicting with each other, Plato pronounces the sixth—that of superior reason and wisdom—to be the greatest, preferable to all the rest, in his judgment: though he admits the fifth—that of superior force—to be the most extensively prevalent in the actual world.³

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 685-686.

² Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 690 A-D. ἀξιώματα τοῦ τε ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, &c. . . . "Ὅσα ἴσθι πρὸς ἀρχοντας ἀξιώματα καὶ ὅτι πεφυκότα πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἐναντίως.

³ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 690 C.

This enumeration by Plato of seven distinct and conflicting ἀξιώματα τοῦ ἀρχεῖν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, deserves notice in many ways. All the seven are natural:

nature is considered as including multifarious and conflicting titles (compare Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. 6, 21), and therefore as not furnishing in itself any justification or ground of preference for one above the rest. The ἀξίωμα of superior force is just as natural as the ἀξίωμα of superior wisdom, though Plato himself pronounces the latter to be the greatest; that is—greatest, not φύσει but νόμῳ καὶ τέχνῃ.

Plato thinks it imprudent to found the government of society upon any one of these seven titles singly and separately. He requires that each one of them shall be checked and modified by the conjoint operation of others. Messênê and Argos were depraved and ruined by the single principle: while Sparta was preserved and exalted by a mixture of different elements. The kings of Argos and Messênê, irrational youths with nothing to restrain them (except oaths, which they despised), employed their power to abuse and mischief. Such was the consequence of trusting to the exclusive title of high breed, embodied in one individual person. But Apollo and Lykurgus provided better for Sparta. They softened regal insolence by establishing the double line of co-ordinate kings: they introduced the title of old age, along with that of high breed, by founding the Senate of twenty-eight elders: they farther introduced the title of sortition, or something near it, by nominating the annual Ephors. The mixed government of Sparta was thus made to work for good, while the unmixed systems of Argos and Messênê both went wrong.¹ Both the two latter states were in perpetual war with Sparta, so as to frustrate that purpose—union against Asiatics—with a view to which the triple Herakleid kingdom was originally erected in Peloponnesus. Had each of these three kingdoms been temperately and

according to his own rational and deliberate estimation. Plato is not uniform in this view, for he uses elsewhere the phrases *φύσει* and *κατὰ φύσιν* as if they specially and exclusively belonged to that which he approves, and furnished a justification for it (see Legg. x. pp. 889-890, besides the Republic and the Gorgias). Again the lot, or the process of sortition, is here described as carrying with it both the preference of the Gods and the principles of justice (*τὸ δικαιοσύνην εἶναι φέρει*). The Gods determine upon whom the lot should fall—compare Homer, *Iliad*, vii. 179. This is a remarkable view of the lot, and represents a feeling much diffused among the ancient democracies.

The relation of master and slave counts, in Plato's view, among the natural relations, with its consequent

rights and obligations.

The force of *ἐννυχία*, as a title to command, is illustrated in the speech addressed by Alkibiades to the Athenian assembly. Thucyd. vi. 16-17: he allows it even in his competitor Nikias—*ἀλλ' ὥς ἂν γε ἐνὶ ἀσπίδι μὲν αὐτῆς καὶ ὁ Νικίας ἐννυχίᾳ δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἀποχρήσασθε τῇ καρδίᾳ ἡμῶν ἀφελῆς*. Compare also the language of Nikias himself in his own last speech under the extreme distress of the Athenian army in Sicily, Thucyd. vii. 77.

In the *Politikus* (p. 298 and elsewhere) Plato admits no *ἀξίωμα τοῦ δοχεῖν* as genuine or justifiable, except Science, Art, superior wisdom, in one or a few Artists of governing; the same in Republic, v. p. 474 C, respecting what he there calls *φιλοσοφία*.

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 691-692.

moderately governed, like Sparta, so as to maintain unimpaired the projected triple union—the Persian invasions of Greece by Darius and Xerxes would never have taken place.¹

Such is the way in which Plato casts the legendary event, called the Return of the Herakleids, into accordance with a political theory of his own. That event, in his view, afforded the means of uniting Hellas internally, and of presenting such a defensive combination as would have deterred all invasions from Asia, if only the proper principles of legislation and government had been understood and applied. The lesson to be derived from this failure is, that we ought not to concentrate great authority in one hand; and that we ought to blend together several principles of authority, instead of resorting to the exclusive action of one alone.² This lesson deserves attention, as a portion of political theory; but I feel convinced that neither Herodotus nor Thucydides would have

Plato casts Hellenic legend into accordance with his own political theories.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 692 C-D.

² Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 693 A. *ὅς ἀρα οὐδὲ μὲν δῆλας ἀρχὴς οὐδ' ἐπὶ ἀντι-
ποσθενεῖται.* Compare pp. 685-686.

Plato here affirms not only that Messenê and Argos were and had been constantly at war with Sparta, but that they were so at the time of the Persian invasion of Greece—and that Messenê thus hindered the Spartans from assisting the Athenians at Marathon, pp. 692 E, 698 E. His statement that Argos was at least neutral, if not treacherous and philo-Persian, during the invasion of Xerxes, is coincident with Herodotus; but not so his statement that the Lacedæmonians were kept back by the war against Messenê. Indeed at that time the Messenians had no separate domicile or independent station in Peloponnesus. They had been conquered by Sparta long before, and their descendants in the same territory were Helots (Thucyd. i. 101). It is true that there always existed struggling remnants of expatriated Messenians, who maintained the name, and whom Athens protected and favoured during the Peloponnesian war; but there was no independent Messenian government in Peloponnesus until the foundation of the city of Messenê by Epaminondas in 369 B.C., two years after the battle of Leuktra: there had never been any city

of that name in Peloponnesus before.

Now Plato wrote his *Treatise De Legibus* after the foundation of this city of Messenê and the re-establishment of an independent Messenian community in Peloponnesus. The new city was peopled partly by returning Messenian exiles, partly by enfranchised Helots. It is probable enough that both these classes might be disposed to disguise (as far as they could) the past period of servitude—and to represent the Messenian name and community as never having been wholly effaced in the neighbourhood of Ithomê, though always struggling against an oppressive neighbour. Traditions of this tenor would become current, and Plato has adopted one of them in his historical sketch.

If we look back to what Plato says about the Kretan prophet Epimenides, we shall see that here too he must have followed erroneous traditions. He makes Epimenides contemporary with the invasion of Greece by Darius, instead of contemporary with the Kylonian sacrilege (B.C. 612). When a prophet had got reputation, a great many new prophecies were fathered upon him (as upon Bakis and Musæus) with very little care about chronological consistency. Plato may well have been misled by one of these fictions (*Legg.* i. p. 642, iii. p. 677).

concurrent in Plato's historical views. Neither of them would have admitted the disunion between Sparta, Argos, and Messenæ as a main cause of the Persian invasion of Greece.

A lesson—analogue, though not exactly the same—is derived by Plato from the comparison of the Persian with the Athenian government. Persia presents an excess of despotism: Athens an excess of liberty. There are two distinct primordial forms of government—*mother-polities*, Plato calls them—out of which all existing governments may be said to have been generated or diversified. One of these is monarchy, of which the Persians manifest the extreme: the other is democracy, of which Athens manifests the extreme. Both extremes are mischievous. The wise law-giver must blend and combine the two together in proper proportion. Without such combination, he cannot attain good government, with its three indispensable constituents—freedom, intelligence or temperance, and mutual attachment among the citizens.¹

The Persians, according to Plato, at the time when they made their conquests under Cyrus, were not despotically governed, but enjoyed a fair measure of freedom under a brave and patriotic military chief, who kept the people together in mutual attachment. But Cyrus, though a great military chief, had neither received a good training himself, nor knew how to secure it for his own sons.² He left them to be educated by the women in the harem,

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 693 B-C. Aristotle (*Politic.* ii. 6, pp. 1266-1266) alludes to this portion of Plato's doctrine, and approves what is said about the combination of diverse political elements; but he does not approve the doctrine which declares the two "mother-forms" of government to be extreme despotism or extreme democracy. He says that these two are either no governments at all, or the very worst of governments. Plato gives the same opinion about them, yet he thinks it convenient to make them the starting-points of his theory. The objection made by Aristotle appears to be dictated by a sentiment which often influences his theories—Τὸ τέλειον πρότερον ἐστὶ τῇ

φύσει τοῦ ἀτελεῖος. The perfect is prior in order of nature to the imperfect. He does not choose to take his theoretical point of departure from the worst or most imperfect.

² Plato, *Legg.* p. 694 C. Μαρτυροῦμαι περὶ γε Κύρου τὰ μὲν ἅλα αὐτὸν στρατηγὸν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φιλόπολιν, παιδείας δὲ ὁρθῆς οὐχ ἔχθαι τὸ παρόντων.

I think it very probable that these words are intended to record Plato's dissent from the Κύρου παιδεία of Xenophon. Aulus Gellius (xiv. 3) had read that Xenophon composed the *Cyropaedia* in opposition to the two first books of the Platonic Republic, and that between Xenophon and Plato there existed a grudge (*simultas*) or

where they were brought up with unmeasured indulgence, acquiring nothing but habits of insolence and caprice. Kambyases became a despot; and after committing great enormities, was ultimately deprived of empire by Smerdis and the Medians. Darius, not a born prince, but an usurper, renovated the Persian empire, and ruled it with as much ability and moderation as Cyrus. But he made the same mistake as Cyrus, in educating his sons in the harem. His son Xerxes became thoroughly corrupted, and ruled despotically. The same has been the case with all the successive kings, all brought up as destined for the sceptre, and morally ruined by a wretched education. The Persian government has been nothing but a despotism ever since Darius.¹ All freedom of action or speech has been extinguished, and the mutual attachment among the subjects exists no more.²

While the Persian government thus exhibits despotism in excess, that of Athens exhibits the contrary mischief—liberty in excess. This has been the growth of the time subsequent to the Persian invasion. At the time when that invasion occurred, the government of Athens was an ancient constitution with a quadruple scale of property, according to which scale political privilege and title to office were graduated: while the citizens generally were then far more reverential to authority, and obedient to the laws, than they are now. Moreover, the invasion itself, being dangerous and terrific in the extreme, was enough to make them obedient and united among themselves, for their own personal safety.³ But after the invasion had been repelled, the government became altered. The people acquired a great increase of political power, assumed habits of independence and

Changes for the worse in government of Athens, after the Persian invasion of Greece.

rivalry; so also Athenæus, xi. p. 504. It is possible that this may have been the case, but no evidence is produced to prove it. Both of them selected Sokrates as the subject of their descriptions; in so far there may have been a literary competition between them: and various critics seem to have presumed that there could not be *emulation* without *similitudo*. Each of them composed a Symposium for the purpose of exhibiting Sokrates in his joyous moments. The differences be-

tween the two handlings are interesting to notice; but the evidences which some authors produce, to show that Xenophon in his Symposium alluded to the Symposium of Plato, are altogether uncertain. See the Preface of Schneider to his edition of the Xenophontic Symposium, and his extract from Cornarius.

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 694-695.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 697 D.

³ Plato, Legg. iii. pp. 696-699.

self-judgment, and became less reverential both to the magistrates and to the laws.

The first department in which this change was wrought at Athens was the department of music : from whence it gradually extended itself to the general habits of the people. Before the invasion, Music had been distributed, according to ancient practice and under the sanction of ancient authority, under four fixed categories—Hymns, Dirgees, Pæans, Dithyramba.¹ The ancient canons in regard to each were strictly enforced : the musical exhibitions were superintended, and the prizes adjudged by a few highly-trained elders : while the general body of citizens listened in respectful silence, without uttering a word of acclamation, or even conceiving themselves competent to judge what they heard. Any manifestations on their part were punished by blows from the sticks of the attendants.² But this docile submission of the Athenians to authority became gradually overthrown, after the repulse of the Persians, first in the theatre, next throughout all social and political life. The originators of this corruption were the poets : men indeed of poetical genius, but ignorant of the ethical purpose which their compositions ought to aim at, as well as of the rightful canons by which they ought to be guided and limited. These poets, looking to the pleasure of the audience as their true and only standard, exhibited pieces in which all the old musical distinctions were confounded together—hymns with dirgees, the pæan with the dithyramb, and the flute with the harp. To such irregular rhythm and melody, words equally irregular were adapted. The poet submitted his compositions to the assembled audience, appealing to them as competent judges, and practically declaring them to be such. The audience responded to the appeal. Acclamation in the theatre was substituted for silence ;

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 B. ὕμνοι—*θρήνοι*—*παιᾶνες*—*διθύραμβος*.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 700 C. τὸ δὲ κύριον τούτων γινώσκειν τε καὶ ἄμα γινώσκειν δικάζει, ζυμοῦν τε αὖ τὸν μὴ παιδόμενον, οὐ σύριγξ ἦν οὐδὲ τινας ἄουσσαι βῆαι πλάθους, καὶ θάπερ τὰ νῦν, οὐδ' αὖ πρότοι ἱππαίρους ἀποδιδόντες, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν γενομένοις περὶ παλαιοῖν δεδογμένων ἀκούειν ἢ αὐτοῖς μετὰ σιγῆς διὰ

τέλους, πασι δὲ καὶ παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τοῖς πλείοσι δὴλην βλάβου κοσμοῦσθαι ἢ νοθεύειν τε ἐπὶ γινέσθαι.

The testimony here given by Plato respecting the practice of his own time is curious and deserves notice : respecting the practice of the times anterior to the Persian invasion he could have had no means of accurate knowledge.

and the judgment of the people became paramount instead of that pronounced by the enlightened few according to antecedent custom. Hence the people—having once shaken off the reverence for authority, and learnt to exercise their own judgment, in the theatre¹—began speedily to do the same on other matters also. They fancied themselves wise enough to decide everything for themselves, and contracted a shameless disregard for the opinion of better and wiser men. An excessive measure of freedom was established, tending in its ultimate consequences to an anarchical or Titanic nature: indifferent to magistrates, laws, parents, elders, covenants, oaths, and the Gods themselves.²

The opinion here expressed by Plato—that the political constitution of Athens was too democratical, and that the changes (effected by Perikles and others during the half century succeeding the Persian invasion) whereby it had been rendered more democratical, were mischievous—was held by him in common with a respectable and intelligent minority at Athens. That minority had full opportunity of expressing their disapprobation—as we may see by the language of Plato himself; though he commends the Spartans for not allowing any such opportunity to

Danger of changes in the national music—declared by Damon, the musical teacher.

¹ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 A. οὐδὲ γὰρ μὲν γὰρ ἐν μουσικῇ ἢ πάσῃ εἰς πάντα σοφία δοξα καὶ παρανομία, ἐννοήσονται δὲ ἐλευθερία.

² Plato, Legg. iii. p. 701 B. Ἐφεξῆς δὲ ταύτῃ τῇ ἐλευθερίᾳ ἢ τοῦ μὴ θάλασσαν τοῖς ἀρχαῖσι δουλεύειν γίγνεται.

The phrase here employed by Plato affirms inferential tendencies—not facts realised. How much of the tendencies had passed into reality at Athens, he leaves to the imagination of his readers to supply. It is curious to contrast the faithless and lawless character of Athens, here insinuated by Plato—with the oration of Demosthenes *adv. Leptinem* (delivered B.C. 335, near upon the time when the Platonic *Leges* were composed), where the main argument which the orator brings to bear upon the *Dikasts*, emphatically and repeatedly, to induce them to reject the proposition of *Leptines*, is—τὸ τῆς πόλεως ἕως ἀφενδῆς καὶ χρηστόν, οὐ τὸ λυσιστελέστατον πρὸς ἀργύριον σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ καλὸν πράξει (p. 461) . . . οὐδ' ὁ πλείστος λόγος ἔμοιγε περὶ τῆς

ἀρετῆς εἶναι, ἀλλ' ὅτι τοῦ πολεμίου ἕως εἰσάγειν τὸν νόμον, καὶ τοιοῦτον δὲ ὅτ' παντ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἕως ὁ δῆμος διδῶναι εἶναι, also pp. 500-507, and indeed throughout nearly the whole oration. So also in the other discourses, not only of Demosthenes but of the other orators also—good faith, public and private, and respectful obedience to the laws, are constantly invoked as primary and imperative necessities.

Indeed, in order to find a contradiction to the picture here presented by Plato, of Athenian tendencies since the Persian war, we need not go farther than Plato himself. We have only to read the *Menexenus*, wherein he professes to describe and panegyrisæ the achievements of Athens during that very period which he paints in such gloomy colours in the *Leges*—the period succeeding the Persian invasion. Who is to believe that the people, upon whose virtue he pronounces these encomiums, had thrown off all reverence for good faith, obligation, and social authority? As for the Titanic φύσις, to which Plato re-

dissenters at Sparta, and expressly prohibits any open expression of dissent in his own community. But his assertion, that the deterioration at Athens was introduced and originated by an innovation in the established canon of music and poetry—is more peculiarly his own. The general doctrine of the powerful revolutionising effect wrought by changes in the national music, towards subverting the political constitution, was adopted by him from the distinguished musical teacher Damon,¹ the contemporary and companion of Perikles. The fear of such danger to the national institutions is said to have operated on the authorities at Sparta, when they forbade the musical innovations of the poet Timotheus, and destroyed the four new strings which he had just added to the established seven strings of his lyre.²

Of this general doctrine, however, Plato makes a particular application in the passage now before us, which he would have found few Athenians, either oligarchical or democratical, to ratify. What he really condemns is, the tragic and comic poetical representations at Athens, which began to acquire importance only after the Persian war, and continued to increase in importance for the next half century. The greatest revolution which Grecian music and poetry ever underwent was that whereby Attic tragedy and comedy were first constituted:—built up by distinguished poets from combination and enlargement of the simpler pre-existent forms—out of the dithyrambic and phallic choruses.³ The first who imparted to tragedy its grand development and its special novelty of character was Æschylus—a combatant at Marathon as well as one of the greatest among ancient poets: after him, Sophokles carried improvement still further. It is them that Plato probably means, when he speaks of the authors of this

presents the Athenians as approximating, the analogy is principally to be found in the person of the Titan Prometheus, with his philanthropic disposition (see Plato, *Menexenus*, pp. 243 E, 244 E), and the beneficent suggestions which he imparted to mankind in the way of science and art (*Æschyl. Prom. 440-507—Πάσαι τέχναι βροταίων ἐκ Προμηθέως*).

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iv. p. 424 D.

² Cicero, *De Legib.* ii. 15; Pausanias, *l.* 12.

Cicero agrees with Plato as to the mischievous tendency of changes in the national music.

³ Aristotle, *Poetic.* c. 4, p. 1449 a.

The ethical repugnance expressed by Plato against the many-sided and deceptive spirit of tragic and comic compositions, is also expressed in the censure said to have been pronounced by Solon against Thespis, when the latter first produced his dramas (*Plutarch, Solon, 29; Diog. Laert. i. 69*).

revolution as men of true poetical genius, but ignorant of the lawful purpose of the Muse—as authors who did not recognise any rightful canon of music, nor any end to be aimed at beyond the emotional satisfaction of a miscellaneous audience. The abundance of dramatic poetry existing in Plato's time must have been prodigious (a few choice specimens only have descended to us):—while its variety of ingredients and its popularity outshone those four ancient and simple manifestations, which alone he will tolerate as legitimate. He censures the innovations of *Æschylus* and *Sophokles* as a deplorable triumph of popular preference over rectitude of standard and purpose. He tacitly assumes—that *Aristotle* certainly does not believe, and what, so far as I can see, there is no ground for believing—that the earlier audience were passive, showing no marks of favour or disfavour: and that the earlier poets had higher aims, adapting their compositions to the judgment of a wise few, and careless about giving satisfaction to the general audience. This would be the practice in the Platonic city, but it never was the practice at Athens. We may surely presume that *Æschylus* stood distinguished from his predecessors not by desiring popularity more, but by greater success in attaining it: and that he attained it partly from his superior genius, partly from increasing splendour in the means of exhibition at Athens. The simpler early compositions had been adapted to the taste of the audience who heard them, and gave satisfaction for the time; until the loftier genius of *Æschylus* and the other great constructive dramatists was manifested.

However Plato—while he tolerates no poetry except in so far as it produces ethical correction or regulation of the emotions, and blames as hurtful the poet who simply touches or kindles emotion—is in a peculiar manner averse to dramatic poetry, with its diversity of assumed characters and its obligation of giving speech to different points of view. His aversion had been exhibited before, both in the *Republic* and in the *Gorgias*:¹ but it reappears here in the *Treatise De*

This aversion peculiar to himself, not shared either by oligarchical politicians, or by other philosophers.

¹ *Plato, Republ.* iii. pp. 395-396, x. p. 605 B; *Gorgias*, p. 502 B; *Legg.* iv. p. 719 B.

Aristotle takes a view of tragedy quite opposed to that of *Plato*: he

considers it as calculated to purge or purify the emotions of fear, compassion, &c. (*Aristot. Poet.* c. 13. Compare *Politic.* viii. 7, 9). Unfortunately the *Poetica* exist only as a fragment, so

Legibus, with this aggravating feature—that the revolution in music and poetry is represented as generating cause of a deteriorated character and an ultra-democratical polity of Athens. This (as I have before remarked) is a sentiment peculiar to Plato. For undoubtedly, oligarchical politicians (such as Thucydides, Nikias, Kritias), who agreed with him in dialiking the democracy, would never have thought of ascribing what they disliked to such a cause as alteration in the Athenian music and poetry. They would much more have agreed with Aristotle,¹ when he attributes the important change both in the character and polity of the Athenian people after the Persian invasion, to the events of that invasion itself—to the heroic and universal efforts made by the citizens, on shipboard as well as on land, against the invading host—and to the necessity for continuing those efforts by organising the confederacy of Delos. Hence arose a new spirit of self-reliance and enterprise—or rather an intensification of what had already begun after the expulsion of Hippias and the reform by Kleisthenes—which rendered the previous constitutional forms too narrow to give satisfaction.² The creation of new and grander forms of poetry may fairly be looked upon as one symptom of this energetic general outburst: but it is in no way a primary or causal fact, as Plato wishes us to believe. Nor can Plato himself have supposed it to be so, at the time when he composed his *Menexenus*: wherein the events of the post-Xerxian period are presented in a light very different from that in which he viewed them when he wrote his *Leges*—presented with glowing commendations on his countrymen.

The long ethical prefatory matter³ which we have gone through, includes these among other doctrines—1. Doctrines of Plato in this prefatory matter. That the life of justice, and the life of pleasure, are essentially coincident. 2. That Reason, as declared by the lawgiver, ought to controul all our passions and emotions.

that his doctrine about *καθαρσις* is only declared and not fully developed.

Rousseau (in his *Lettre à d'Alembert Sur les Spectacles*, p. 33 seq.) impugns this doctrine of Aristotle, and condemns theatrical representations, partly with arguments similar to those of Plato, partly with others of his own.

¹ Aristotel. *Politic.* v. 4, p. 1304, a. 20; ii. 12, p. 1274, a. 12; viii. 6, 1340, a. 30.

² Herodot. v. 78.

³ What Aristotle calls *τοῖς ἡθικοῖς λόγοις*, in reference to the Republic of Plato (Aristotel. *Politic.* ii. 36, p. 1264, b. 39).

3. That intoxication, under certain conditions, is an useful stimulus to elderly men. 4. That the political constitution of society ought not to be founded upon one single principle of authority, but upon a combination of several. 5. That the extreme of liberty, and the extreme of despotism, are both bad.¹

Of these five positions, the two first are coincident with the doctrines of the Republic: the third is not coincident with them, but indirectly in opposition to them: the fourth and fifth put Plato on a standing point quite different from that of the Republic, and different also from that of the Xenophontic Cyropædia. In the Cyropædia, all government is strictly personal: the subjects both obey willingly, and are rendered comfortable because of the supreme and manifold excellence of one person—their chief, Cyrus—in every department of practical administration, civil as well as military. In the Platonic Republic, the government is also personal: to this extent—that Plato provides neither political checks, nor magistrates, nor laws, nor judicature: but aims only at the [perfect training of the Guardians, and the still more elaborate and philosophical training of those few chief or elder Guardians, who are to direct the rest. He demands only a succession of these philosophers, corresponding to the regal Artist sketched in the *Politikus*: and he leaves all ulterior directions to them. Upon their perfect dispositions and competence, all the weal or woe of the community depends. All is personal government; but it is lodged in the hands of a few philosophers, assumed to be super-excellent, like the one chief in the Xenophontic Cyropædia. When however we come to the *Leges*, we find that Plato ceases to presume upon such supreme personal excellence. He drops it as something beyond the limit of human attainment, and as fit only for the golden or Saturnian age.² He declares that power, without adequate restraints, is a privilege with which no man can be trusted.³ Nevertheless the magistrates must be vested with sufficient power: since excess of liberty is equally dangerous. To steer between these two rocks,⁴ you

Compared with those of the Republic and of the Xenophontic Cyropædia.

¹ Compare on this point Plato's *Epistol. viii.* pp. 354-355, where this same view is enforced.

² Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 713-714.

³ Plato, *Legg.* iii. p. 687 E—iv. p. 713 B, ix. p. 875 C.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 710-711.

want not only a good despot but a sagacious lawgiver. It is he who must construct a constitutional system, having regard to the various natural foundations of authority in the minds of the citizens. He must provide fixed laws, magistrates, and a competent judicature: moreover, both the magistrates and the judicature must be servants of the law, and nothing beyond.¹ The lawgiver must frame his laws with single-minded view, not to the happiness of any separate section of the city, but to that of the whole. He must look to the virtue of the whole, in its most comprehensive sense, and to all good things, ranked in their triple subordination and their comparative value—that is, First, the good things belonging to the mind—Secondly, Those belonging to the body—Thirdly, Wealth and External acquisitions.

We now enter upon this constructive effort of Plato's old age. That a political constitution with fixed laws (he makes the Athenian say) and with magistrates acting merely as servants of the laws, is the only salvation for a city and its people—this is a truth which every man sees most distinctly in his old age, though when younger he was very dull in discerning it.² Probably enough what we here read represents the change in Plato's own mind: the acquisition of a new point of view, which was not present to him when he composed his Republic and his Politikus.

Here the exposition assumes a definite shape. The Kretan Kleinias apprises his Athenian companion, that the Knossians with other Kretans are about to establish a new colony on an unsettled point in Krete; and that himself with nine others are named commissioners for framing and applying the necessary regulations. He invites the co-operation of the Athenian:³ who accordingly sets himself to the task of suggesting such laws and

¹ Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 C-D. τοὺς δ' ἀρχοντας λεγόμενους νῦν ὑπηρέτας τοῖς νόμοις ἐκάλεσα, οὗ τι καινοτομίας ἀνομάτων ἔνεκα, ἀλλ', &c. It appears as if this phrase, calling "magistrates the servants or ministers of the law," was likely to be regarded as a harsh and novel metaphor.

² Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 707 B, 714 B;

iii. p. 697 A.

³ Plato, Legg. iv. p. 715 E. Νέος μὲν γὰρ ὢν τὰς δεινότητος τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀμβλύνεται αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ὀφθ, γίγναι δὲ δεύρατα.

Compare vii. pp. 819 D—821 D, for marks of Plato's old age and newly acquired opinions.

⁴ Plato, Legg. iii. p. 702 C.

measures as are best calculated to secure the march of the new Magnetic settlement towards the great objects defined in the preceding programme.

The new city is to be about nine English miles from the sea. The land round it is rough, poor, and without any timber for shipbuilding; but it is capable of producing all supplies absolutely indispensable, so that little need will be felt of importation from abroad. The Athenian wishes that the site were farther from the sea. Yet he considers the general conditions to be tolerably good; inasmuch as the city need not become commercial and maritime, and cannot have the means of acquiring much gold and silver—which is among the greatest evils that can befall a city, since it corrupts justice and goodness in the citizens. The settlers are all Greeks, from various towns of Krete and Peloponnesus. This (remarks the Athenian) is on the whole better than if they came from one single city. Though it may introduce some additional chance of discord, it will nevertheless render them more open-minded and persuadable for the reception of new institutions.²

The colonists being supposed to be assembled in their new domicile and ready for settlement, Plato, or his Athenian spokesman, addresses to them a solemn exhortation, inculcating piety towards the Gods, celestial and subterranean, as well as to the Dæmons and Heroes—and also reverence to parents.³ He then intimates that, though he does not intend to consult the settlers on the acceptance or rejection of laws, but assumes to himself the power of prescribing such laws as he thinks best for them—he nevertheless will not content himself with promulgating his mandates in a naked and peremptory way. He will preface each law with a proëm or prologue (i.e. a string of preliminary recommendations): in order to predispose their minds favourably, and to obtain from them a willing obedience.⁴ He will employ not command only, but persuasion along with or antecedent to command: as the physician treats his patients when they are freemen, not as he sends his slaves to treat

The Athenian declares that he will not merely promulgate peremptory laws, but will recommend them to the citizens by prologues or hortatory discourses.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* iv. p. 706.

² Plato, *Legg.* iv. p. 708.

³ Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 716-718.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* iv. pp. 718-719-723.

slave-patients, with a simple compulsory order.¹ To begin with an introductory proëm or prelude, prior to the announcement of the positive law, is (he says) the natural course of proceeding. It is essential to all artistic vocal performances: it is carefully studied and practised both by the rhetor and the musician.² Yet in spite of this analogy, no lawgiver has ever yet been found to prefix proëms to his laws: every one has contented himself with issuing peremptory commands.³ Here then Plato undertakes to set the example of prefixing such prefatory introductions. The nature of the case would prescribe that every law, every speech, every song, should have its suitable proëm: but such prolixity would be impolitic. A discretion must be entrusted to the lawgiver, as it is to the orator and the musician. Proëms or prologues must be confined to the great and important laws.⁴

Accordingly, from hence to the end of the Treatise De Legg., Plato proceeds upon the principle here laid down. He either prefixes a prologue to each of his laws—or blends the law with its proëm—or gives what may be called a proëm without a law, that is a string of hortatory or comminatory precepts. There are various points (he says) on which the lawgiver cannot propose any distinct and peremptory enactment, but must confine himself to emphatic censure⁵ and declaration of opinion, with threats of displeasure on the part of the Gods: the rather as he cannot hope to accomplish his public objects, without the largest interference with private habits—nor without bringing his regulations to bear upon individual life, where positive law can hardly reach.⁶ The Platonic prologues are sometimes expositions of the reasons of the law—i. e. of the

¹ Plato, Legg. iv. p. 720. This is a curious indication respecting the medical profession and practice at Athens.

² Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722 D—723 D. τῷ τε ῥήτορι καὶ τῷ μελῳδῷ καὶ τῷ νομοθέτῃ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐκαστοτὲ ἐπιτετέον.

³ Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B-E.

The προοίμια δημηγορικὰ of Demosthenes are well known.

⁴ Plato, Legg. iv. p. 723 C-D. About τὰ τῶν νόμων προοίμια, compare what Plato says about his communica-

tions with the younger Dionysius, shortly after his (Plato's) second arrival at Syracuse, Plato, Epistol. iii. p. 316 A.

⁵ Cicero (De Legg. ii. 6) professes to follow Plato in this practice of prefixing proëms to his Laws. He calls the proëm an encomium upon the law, which in most cases it is—"ut priusquam ipsam legem recitem, de ejus legis laude dicam".

⁶ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 780 A.

dangers which it is intended to ward off, or the advantages to be secured by it. But far more frequently, they are morsels of rhetoric—lectures, discourses, or homilies—addressed to the emotions and not to the reason, insisting on the ethical and religious point of view, and destined to operate with persuasive or intimidating effect upon an uninstructed multitude.¹

It seems that Plato took credit to himself for what he thought a beneficial innovation, in thus blending persuasive exhortation with compulsory command. His assurance, that no Grecian lawgiver had ever done so before, is doubtless trustworthy:² though we may remark that the confusion of the two has been the general rule with Oriental lawgivers—the Hindoos, the Jews, the Mahomedan Arabs, &c. But with him the innovation serves a farther purpose. He makes it the means of turning rhetoric to account; and of enlisting in his service, as lawgiver, not only all the rhetoric but all the poetry, in his community. His Athenian speaker is so well satisfied with these prologues, that he considers them to possess the charm of a poetical work, and suspects them to have been dictated by inspiration from the Gods.³ He pronounces them the best and most suitable compositions for the teaching of youth, and therefore prescribes that teachers shall cause the youth to recite and learn them, instead of the poetical and rhetorical works usually employed. He farther enjoins that his prologues shall serve as type and canon whereby all other poetical and rhetorical compositions shall be tried. If there be any compositions in full harmony and analogy with this type, the teachers shall be compelled to learn them by heart, and teach them to pupils. Any teacher refusing to do so shall be dismissed.⁴ Nor shall any poet be allowed to

Great value set by Plato himself upon these prologues. They are to serve as type for all poets—No one is allowed to contradict them.

¹ Plato, Legg. iv. p. 722 B. πρὸς τοὺς δὲ οὐδὲς εἶκε διαρρηθῆναι πώποτε τῶν νομοθετῶν, ὥς ἐξόν δυοῖν χρήσθαι πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας, πειθοὶ καὶ βίῃ, καθ' ὅσον οἷόν τε ἐπὶ τὸν ἀνείρον παιδείας ὄχλον τῷ ἐτήρῃ χρώνται μόνον.

² The testimony of Plato shows that the προοίμια τῆς νομοθεσίας ascribed to Zaleucus and Charondas (Diodor. xii. 12-20) are composed by authors later than his time, and probably in imitation of his προοίμια: which indeed is probable enough on other grounds.

See Heyne, Opuscula, vol. ii. Prolus i. vl. De Zaleuci et Charondæ Legibus.

Cicero read the poems ascribed to Zaleucus and Charondas as genuine (Legg. ii. 6); so did Diodorus, xii. 17-20; Stobæus, Serm. xlii.

³ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C. οὐκ ἄνεν τινὸς ἐπιμνησῆς θεῶν, ἰδοὺς δ' οὖν μοι παντάπασι ποιήσει τιτὶ προσομοίως εἰρησθαι.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 D-E.

compose and publish works containing sentiments contradictory to the declaration of the lawgiver.¹

As a contrast to this view of Plato in his later years, it is interesting to turn to that which he entertained in an earlier part of his life, in the *Gorgias* and the *Phædrus*, respecting rhetoric. In the former dialogue, Gorgias is recognised as a master of the art of persuasion, especially as addressed to a numerous audience, and respecting ethical questions, What is just, and what is unjust? Sokrates, on the contrary, pointedly distinguishes persuasion from teaching—discredits simple persuasion, without teaching, as merely deceptive—and contends that rhetorical discourse addressed to a multitude, upon such topics, can never convey any teaching.² But in the *Leges* we find that the art of persuasion has risen greatly in Plato's estimation. Whether it be a true art, or a mere unartistic knack, he now recognises its efficacy in modifying the dispositions of the uninstructed multitude, and announces himself to be the first lawgiver who will employ it systematically for that purpose. He combines the seductions of the rhetor with the unpalatable severities of the lawgiver: the two distinct functions of Gorgias and his brother the physician Herodikos, when Gorgias accompanied his brother to visit suffering patients, and succeeded by force of rhetoric in overcoming their repugnance to the cutting and burning indispensable for cure.³ Again, in the *Phædrus*, Plato treats the art of persuasion, when applied at once to a mixed assemblage of persons, either by writing or discourse, as worthless and unavailing.⁴ He affirms that it makes no durable impression on the internal mind of the individuals: the same discourse will never suit all. Individuals differ materially in their cast of mind; moreover, they differ in opinion upon ethical topics (just and unjust) more than upon any other. Some men are open to persuasion by topics which will have no effect on others. Accordingly, you must go through a laborious discrimination: first, you must discriminate generally the various classes of minds and the various classes of discourse

Contrast of
Leges with
Gorgias and
Phædrus.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* p. 811 E.

² Plato, *Gorgias*, pp. 464-466.

³ Plato, *Gorgias*, p. 466 B.

⁴ Plato, *Phædrus*, pp. 273 A, 271-272-273 E—276 E—276 A—277 C.

—next, you must know to which classes of minds the individuals of the multitude before you belong. You must then address to each mind the mode of persuasion specially adapted to it. The dialectic philosopher is the only one who possesses the true art of persuasion. Such was Plato's point of view in the *Phædrus*. I need hardly point out how completely it is dropped in his *Leges*: wherein he pours persuasion into the ears of an indiscriminate multitude, through the common channel of a rhetorical lecture, considering it of such impressive efficacy as to justify the supposition of inspiration from the Gods.¹

After this unusual length of preliminaries, Plato enters on the positive regulation of his colony. As to the worship of the Gods, he directs little or nothing of his own authority. The colony must follow the advice of the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, and Ammon—together with any consecrated traditions, epiphanies, or inspirations from the Gods belonging to the spot—as to the Gods who shall be publicly worshipped, and the suitable temples and rites. Only he directs that to each portion of the territory set apart for civil purposes, some God, Dæmon, or Hero, shall be specially assigned as Patron,²

Regulations for the new colony—About religious worship, the oracles of Delphi and Dodona are to be consulted.

¹ Zeller, in his '*Platonische Studien*' (pp. 66-72-88, &c.), insists much on the rhetorical declamatory prolixity visible throughout the *Treatise De Legibus*, as quite at variance with the manner of Plato in his earlier and better dialogues, and even as specimens of what Plato there notes as the rhetorical or sophistical manner. He expresses his surprise that the Athenian should be made to ascribe such discourses to the inspiration of the Gods (p. 107). Zeller enumerates these and many other dissimilarities in the *Treatise De Legibus*, as compared with other Platonic dialogues, as premisses to sustain his conclusion that the treatise is not by Plato. In my judgment they do not bear out that conclusion (which indeed Zeller has since renounced in his subsequent work); but they are not the less real and notable, marking the change in Plato's own mind.

How poor an opinion had Plato of the efficacy of the *σοφιστικὸν εἶδος λόγου* at the time when he composed the *Sophistês* (p. 230 A)! What a su-

perabundance of such discourse does he deliver in the *Treatise De Legibus*, taking especial pride in the peculiarity!

² Plato, *Legg.* v. p. 738 C-D. *ἐναι δὲ ἑτάλλοις ἐκάστων τῶν μέρων κατὰ χρόνους γινόμενοι τοῦτε προσηχθίσταται . . . μετὰ θεῶν.*

That such "ordained seasons" for meetings and sacrifices should be punctually attended to—was a matter of great moment, on religious no less than on civil grounds. It was with a view to that object principally that each Grecian city arranged its calendar and its system of intercalation. Plato himself states this (vil. p. 809 D).

Sir George Lewis, in his *Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients*, adverts to the passage of Plato here cited, and gives a very instructive picture of the state of the Hellenic world as to Calendar and computation of time (see p. 19; also the greater part of chapter I. of his valuable work). The object of all the cities was to adjust lunar time with

with a chapel and precinct wherein all meetings of the citizens of the district shall be held, whether for religious ceremonies, or for recreation, or for political duties.

Plato requires for his community a fixed and peremptory total of 5040 citizens, never to be increased, and never to be diminished: a total sufficient, in his judgment, to defend the territory against invaders, and to lend aid on occasion to an oppressed neighbour. He distributes the whole territory into 5040 lots of land, each of equal value, assigning one lot to each citizen. Each lot is assumed to be sufficient for the maintenance of a family of sober habits, and no more. The total number (5040) is selected because of the great variety of divisors by which it may be divided without remainder.¹

Perpetuity of number of citizens, and of lots of land, one to each, inalienable and indivisible.

solar time by convenient intercalations, but hardly any two cities agreed in the method of doing so. Different schemes of intercalation and periods (tristêric, octastêric, enneastêric) were either adopted by civic authority or suggested by private astronomers, such as Kleostratus and Meton. The practical dissonance and confusion was great, and the theoretical dissatisfaction also.

Now in this dialogue *De Legibus*, Plato recognises both the importance of the object and the problem to be solved, yet he suggests no means of his own for solving it. He makes no arrangement for the calendar of his new Magnetic city. I confess that this is to me a matter of some surprise. To combine an exertion of authority with an effort of arithmetical calculation, is in his vein; and the exactness of observances as respects the Gods, in harmony with the religious tone of the treatise, depended on some tolerable solution of the problem.

We may perhaps presume that Plato refused to deal with the problem because he considered it as mathematically insoluble. Days, months, and years are not exactly commensurable with each other. In the *Timæus* (p. 36 C) Plato declares that the rotation of the Circle of the Same, or the outermost sidereal sphere, upon which the succession of day and night depends, is according to the side of a parallelogram (*κατὰ πᾶρῶν*)—while the rotations of the Moon and Sun (two of the seven branches composing

the Circle of the Different) are according to the diagonal thereof (*κατὰ διαγώνου*): now the side and the diagonal represented the type of incommensurable magnitudes among the ancient reasoners. It would appear also that he considers the rotations of the Moon and Sun to be incommensurable with each other, both of them being members included in the Circle of the Different.

Since an exact mathematical solution was thus unattainable, Plato may probably have despised a merely approximative solution, sufficient for practical convenience—to which last object he generally pays little attention. He might also fancy that even the attempt to meddle with the problem betokened that confusion of the incommensurable with the commensurable, which he denounces in this very treatise (vii. pp. 819-820).

¹ Plato, *Legg.* v. pp. 737-738, vi. p. 771 C.

Aristotle declares this total of 5040 to be extravagantly great, inasmuch as it would require an amount of territory beyond the scale which can be reckoned upon for a Grecian city, to maintain so many unproductive persons, including not merely the 5040 adult citizens, but also their wives, children, and personal attendants, none of whom would take part in any productive industry (*Politic.* ii. 6, p. 1265, b. 16).

The remark here cited indicates the small numerical scale upon which the calculations of a Greek politician were

We thus see that Plato, in laying down his fundamental principle (*ἀπόθεσιν*), recognises separate individual property and separate family among his citizens: both of which had been strenuously condemned and strictly excluded, in respect to the Guardians of his Republic. But he admits the principle only with the proviso that there shall be a peremptory limit to number of citizens, to individual wealth, and to individual poverty: moreover, even with this proviso, he admits it only as a second-best, because mankind will not accept, and are not sufficiently exalted to work out, what is in itself the best. He reasserts the principle of the Republic, that separate property and separate family are both essentially mischievous: that all individuality, either of interest or sympathy or sentiment, ought to be extinguished as far as possible.¹ Though constrained against his will to renounce this object, he will still approximate to it as near as he can in his second-best. Moreover, he may possibly, at some future time (D.V.), propose a third-best. When once departure from the genuine standard is allowed, the departure may be made in many different ways.

This declaration deserves notice as attesting the undiminished adhesion of Plato to the main doctrines of his Republic. The point here noted is one main difference of principle between the *Treatise De Legibus* and the *Republic*: the enactment of written fundamental laws with prologues serving as homilies to be preached to the citizens, is another. Both of them are differences of principle: each gives rise to many subordinate differences or corollaries.²

framed. But we can hardly be surprised at it, seeing that the new city is intended for the Island of Krete, where none even of the existing cities were considerable. Moreover Aristotle had probably present to his mind the analogy of Sparta. The Spartan citizens were in a situation more analogous to the 5040 than any other Grecian residents. But the Spartan citizens could not have been near so numerous as 5040 at that time: not even one-fifth of it—Aristotle tells us, *Politic.* ii 9, 1270, a. 31. Aristotle goes on to remark on the definition given by Plato of the size and value of each lot of land sufficient for the

citizen and his family to live *αὐτάρκεις*: it ought to be (says Aristotle) *αὐτάρκεις καὶ ἀνευθερίων*. These are the two modes of excellence, and the only two, which a man can display in the use of his property (1265, a. 35). But this change would only aggravate the difficulty as to the total area of land required for the 5040. Compare the remark of Aristotle on the scheme of Hippodamus, *Politic.* ii 8, 1268, a. 42.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* v. pp. 739-740; vii. p. 807 B.

² Plato, *Legg.* v. p. 739 E. *ἄν εἰς τὴν ἡμετέραν ἐκτεταγμένησαν, ὥστε τὴν ἀνθρώπων πρὸς ἀδελφείαν* καὶ

Plato re-asserts his adherence to the principle of the Republic, though the repugnance of others hinders him from realising it.

Each citizen proprietor shall hold his lot of land, not as his own, but as part and parcel of the entire territory, which, taken as a whole, is Goddess and Mistress—conjunctly with all the local Gods and Heroes—of the body of citizens generally. No citizen shall either sell or otherwise alienate his lot, nor divide it, nor trench upon its integrity. The total number of lots, the integrity of each lot, and the total number of citizens, shall all remain consecrated in perpetuity, without increase or diminution. Each citizen in dying shall leave one son as successor to his lot: if he has more than one, he may choose which of them he will prefer. The successor so chosen shall maintain the perpetuity of worship of the Gods, reverential rites to the family and deceased ancestors, and obligations towards the city.¹ If the citizen has other sons, they will be adopted into the families of other citizens who happen to be childless: if he has daughters, he will give them out in marriage,

ἡ μία δευτέρως· τρίτην δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα, τὰν θεῶν ὁδὸν διαπεραννύμεθα. Upon this passage K. F. Hermann observes: —“Hinc enim est quam ordine tertiam appellat Plato, quæ Aristoteli (Polit. iv. 1, 2) ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία dicitur: quod tamen nolum ita accipi, ut à nonnullis factum est, ut hanc quoque olim singulari scripto persecuturum fuisse philosophum credamus, quasi tribus exemplis absolvi rerum publicarum formas censuisset; innumeræ enim pro singularium nationum et urbium fortunæ esse possunt,” &c. (De Vestigiis Instit. Vet. imprimis Attic. per Plat. de Legg. libros Indag. p. 16).

That Plato did intend to compose a third work upon an analogous subject appears to me clear from the words,—but it does not at all follow that he thought that three varieties would exhaust all possibility. Upon this point I dissent from Hermann, and also upon his interpretation of Aristotle's phrase ἡ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως πολιτεία. Aristotle distinguishes three distinct varieties of end which the political constructor may propose to himself:—1. τὴν πολιτείαν τὴν ἀπλῶς ἀρίστην, τὴν μέλειστα κατ' εὐχὴν. 2. Τὴν ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστην. 3. Τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἀρίστην. Now K. F. Hermann here maintains, and Boeckh had already maintained before him (ad Platonis Minorem et de Legibus, pp.

66-67), that the city sketched in Plato's treatise De Legibus coincides with No. 2 in Aristotle's enumeration, and that the projected τρίτην in Plato coincides with No. 2—τὴν ἐξ ὑποθέσεως. I differ from them here. There is no ground for presuming that what Plato puts third must also be put by Aristotle third. I think that the Platonic city De Legibus corresponds to No. 3 in Aristotle and not to No. 2. It is a city ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, not ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἀρίστη. Plato borrows little or nothing from τὰ ὑποκείμενα, and almost everything from his own ὑπόθεσις or assumed principle, which in this case is the fixed number of the citizens as well as of the lots of land, the imposition of a limit on each man's proprietary acquisitions, and the recognition of separate family establishments subject to these limits. This is the ὑπόθεσις of Plato's second city, to which all his regulations of detail are accommodated: it is substituted by him (unwillingly, because of the repugnance of others) in place of the ὑπόθεσις of his first city or the Republic, which ὑπόθεσις is perfect communism among the φύλακες, without either separate property or separate family. This last is Plato's ἀπλῶς ἀρίστη.

¹ Plato, Legg. v. p. 740 A-B.

but without any dowry. Such family relations will be watched over by a special board of magistrates: with this peremptory condition, that they shall on no account permit either the number of citizen proprietors, or the number of separate lots, to depart from the consecrated 5040.¹ Each citizen's name, and each lot of land, will be registered on tablets of cypress wood. These registers will be preserved in the temples, in order that the magistrates may be able to prevent fraud.²

The city, with its appropriate accessories, shall be placed as nearly as possible in the middle of the territory. The akropolis, sacred to Hestia and Athênê, will be taken as a centre from whence twelve radiating lines will be drawn to the extremity of the territory, so as to distribute the whole area into twelve sections, not all equal in magnitude, but equalised in value by diminishing the area in proportion to superior goodness of land. The total number of citizens will be distributed also in twelve sections, of 420 each (⁴²⁰), among whom the lots of land contained in each twelfth will be apportioned. This duodecimal division, the fundamental canon of Plato's municipal arrangements, is a sanctified present from the Gods, in harmony with the months and with the kosmical revolutions.³ Each twelfth, land and citizens together, will be con-

Position of the city and akropolis—Distribution of the territory and citizens into twelve equal sections or tribes.

¹ Plato, Legg. v. pp. 740 D—742 C. Aristotle remarks that in order to attain the object which Plato here proclaims, restriction ought to be imposed on *καταβολαί*. No citizen ought to be allowed to beget more than a certain number of children. He observes that this last-mentioned restriction, if imposed alone and without any others, would do more than all the rest to maintain the permanent 5040 lots, and that without this no other restrictions could be efficacious (Polit. ii. 6, 1265, a. 37, 1266, b. 9).

Plato concurs in this opinion, though he trusts to prudence and the admonition of elders for bringing about this indispensable limitation of births in a family, without legal prohibition. I have already touched upon this matter in my review of Plato's Republic. See above—chap. xxxvii. p. 198 seq.

The *νόμος θεσπίζων* of Philolaus at Thebes, regulating *τῶν ναυτορρίων*

with a view to keep the lots of land unchanged, are only known by the brief allusion of Aristotle, Polit. ii. 12, 1274, b. 4.

² Plato, Legg. v. p. 741 C. *καταγραφὰς μετρίων, &c.*

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 771 B. Plato here reckons the different numerical divisions adopted in different cities as being all both natural and consecrated, but he considers his own as the most fortunate and right. He insists much upon the importance of symmetrical distribution, with definite numerical ratio, in all the departments of life: in the various civil subdivisions of the Tribe, such as Phratries, Dêmes, Villages—in the arrangements of the citizens for military service, *τάξεις καὶ ἀγυαί*—in the coins, weights and measures—in the modulations of the voice, and in the direction of movements either rectilinear or rotatory. (Whoever looks at Aristophanes, Aves,

stituted a Tribe, and will be consecrated to some God (determined by lot) whose name it will bear, and at whose altar two monthly festivals will be celebrated : one for the tribe, the other for the entire city. The tribes are peremptorily equal in respect to number of citizens ; but care shall also be taken to make them as nearly equal as possible in respect to registered property : that is, in respect to property other than land, which each citizen brings with him to the settlement, and which will all be recorded (as well as the land) in the public registers.¹ The lot of land assigned to each citizen will include a portion near the centre, and a portion near the circumference : the most central portion being coupled with the most outlying, and so on in order. Each citizen will thus have two separate residences :² one nearer to the city, the other more distant from it.

Plato would be glad if he were able to establish among all the citizens, equality not merely of landed property, but of all other property besides. This, however, he recognises his inability to exact. The colonists will bring with them movable property—some more, some less : and inequality must be tolerated up to a certain limit. Each citizen is allowed to possess movable property as far as four times the value of his lot of land, but no more. The maximum of wealth possessed by any citizen will thus be equal to five times the value of his lot of land : the minimum of the poorest citizen will be the lot of land itself, which cannot, under the worst circumstances, be alienated or diminished. If any citizen shall in any way acquire property above the maximum here named, he is directed to make

Movable property—inequality therein reluctantly allowed as far as four to one, but no farther.

1010 seq., will see all such regularity and symmetry derided in the person of Meton.) Nay, he enjoins that all the vessels made for common use shall be exact fractions or exact multiples of each other. This will make it necessary for all the citizens to learn elementary arithmetic, which Plato considers to be of essential value, not only for practical use but as a stimulus to the dormant intelligence. On this point he notes the Egyptians and Phenicians as standing higher than the Greeks (vil. p. 818), but as applying their superior arithmetical knowledge only to a mean and disgraceful thirst for wealth. Against this last

defect Plato reckons upon guarding his citizens by other precautions, while he encourages in them the learning of arithmetic (Legg. v. p. 747). Plato here speaks of the Egyptians and Phenicians, much as the Jews have been spoken of in later times. And it is curious that he seems to consider their peculiarities of character as referable to their local domicile. He maintains that one place is intrinsically different from another in respect to producing good and bad characters ; some places are even privileged by
θεία ἐπιτροπὴ καὶ δαιμόνων ἡγήσεις, &c.

¹ Plato, Legg. v. p. 745.

² Plato, Legg. v. p. 745, vi. p. 771 D.

it over to the city and to the Gods. In case of disobedience, he may be indicted before the Nomophylakes; and if found guilty, shall be disgraced, excluded from his share of public distributions, and condemned to pay twice as much—half being assigned as recompense to the prosecutor.¹ The public register kept by the magistrates, in which is enrolled all the property of every kind belonging to each citizen, will enable them to enforce this regulation, and will be farther useful in all individual suits respecting money.

In the public census of the city, the citizens will be distributed into four classes, according to their different scales of property. The richest will be four minæ: the other three will be, three minæ, two, and one mina, respectively. Direct taxation will be assessed upon them according to the difference of wealth: to which also a certain reference will be had in the apportionment of magistracies, and in the regulation of the voting privilege.²

Census of the citizens—four classes, with graduated scale of property. No citizen to possess gold or silver. No loans or interest. No debts enforced by law.

By this determination of a maximum and minimum, coupled with a certain admitted preference to wealth in the assignment of political power, Plato considers that he has guarded against the intestine dissensions and other evils likely to arise from inequality of property. He accounts great poverty to be a serious cause of evil; yet he is very far from looking upon wealth as a cause of good. On the contrary, he proclaims that great wealth is absolutely incompatible either with great virtue or great happiness.³ Accordingly, while he aims at preserving every individual citizen from poverty, he at the same time disclaims all purpose of making his community either richer or more powerful.⁴ He forbids every private citizen to possess gold and silver. The magistrates must hold a certain stock of it in reserve, in case of public dealing with foreign cities: but they will provide for the daily wants of the community by a special cheap currency, having no value beyond the limits of the territory.⁵ Moreover, Plato prohibits all loans on interest. He refuses to enforce by law the

¹ Plato, Legg. v. pp. 744-745, vi. p. 754 E.

² Plato, Legg. v. p. 744 B, vi. p. 754 E.

³ Plato, Legg. v. pp. 742 E, 743 A, 744 E.

⁴ Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 D.

⁵ Plato, Legg. v. p. 742 A.

restoration even of a deposit. He interdicts all dowry or marriage portion with daughters.¹

How is the Platonic colony to be first set on its march, and by whom are its first magistrates to be named? By the inhabitants of Knóssus, its mother city—replies Plato. The Knossians will appoint a provisional Board of two hundred : half from their own citizens, half from the elders and most respected men among the colonists themselves.² This Board will choose the first Nomophylakes, consisting of thirty-seven persons, half Knossians, half colonists. These Nomophylakes are intended as a Council of State, and will be elected by the citizens in the following way, when the colony is once in full march :—All the citizens who perform or have performed military service, either as hoplites or cavalry, will be electors. They will vote by tablets laid upon the altar, and inscribed with the name both of the voter himself and of the person whom he prefers. First, three hundred persons will be chosen by the majority of votes according to this process. Next, out of these three hundred, one hundred will be chosen by a second process of the same kind. Lastly, out of these one hundred, thirty-seven will be chosen by a third similar process, but with increased solemnity : these thirty-seven will constitute the Board of Nomophylakes, or Guardians of the Laws.³ No person shall be eligible for Guardian until he has attained the age of fifty. When elected, he shall continue to serve until he is seventy, and no longer : so that if elected at sixty, he will have ten years of service.⁴ The duties of this Board will be to see that all the laws are faithfully executed : in which function they will have superintendence over all special magistrates and officers.

For the office of General and Minister of War, three persons shall be chosen by show of hands of the military citizens. It shall be the duty of the Nomophylakes to propose three names for this office : but other citizens may also propose different names, and the show of hands will decide. The three Generals, when chosen, shall propose twelve names as Taxi-

¹ Plato, *Legg.* v. p. 742 C.

² Plato, *Legg.* vi. pp. 752 D, 754 C.

³ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 753 C-D.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 755 A.

archs, one for each tribe : other names may also be proposed, and the show of hands of each tribe will determine.¹

A Council shall be annually chosen, consisting of 360 members, ninety from each of the four proprietary scales in the Census. The mode of electing this Council is highly complicated. First, Plato provides that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the first (or richest) class, and as many out of the second class, by universal suffrage, every citizen being compelled to give his vote : then that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the third class, by universal suffrage, but under this condition, that the three richest classes are compelled to vote, while the fourth class may abstain from voting, if they please : next, that 360 Councillors shall be chosen out of the fourth class, still by universal suffrage, but with liberty to the third and fourth classes to abstain from voting, while the first and second classes are compelled to vote. Out of the four batches, of 360 names from each class, 180 names from each class are to be chosen by universal suffrage compulsory on all. This last list of 180 names is to be reduced, by drawing lots, to 90 from each class, or 360 in all : who constitute the Council for the year.²

Here the evident purpose of Plato is to obtain in the last result a greater number of votes from the rich than from the poor, without absolutely disfranchising the poor. Where the persons to be voted for are all of the richer classes, there the poor are compelled to come and vote as well as the rich : where the persons to be voted for are all of the poorer class, there the rich are compelled to vote, while the poor are allowed to stay away. He seems to look on the vote, not as a privilege which citizens will wish to exercise, but as a duty which they must be compelled by fine to discharge. This is (as Aristotle calls it) an oligarchical provision. It exhibits Plato's

Character of the electoral scheme—Plato's views about wealth—he caters partly for the oligarchical sentiment, partly for the democratical.

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 755 E.

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 756. Compare Aristot. Politic. ii. 6, p. 1266, a. 14.

The passage of Plato is not perspicuous. It appears to me to have been misunderstood by some commentators, who suppose that only 90 *βουλευται* are to be chosen out of each

census in the original voting (see Schneider's Comment. on the passage of Aristotle above alluded to, p. 96). The number originally chosen from each class must be 360, because it is directed, in the final process, to be reduced first (by election) to 180 from each class, and next (by sortition) to 90 from each class.

mode of attaining the end stated by Livy as proposed in the Servian constitution at Rome, and the end contemplated (without being announced) by the framers of most other political constitutions recorded in history—" *Gradus facti, ut neque exclusus quisquam suffragio videretur, et vis omnis penes primores civitatis esset*".¹ Plato defends it by distinguishing two sorts of equality : one complete and undistinguishing, in which all the citizens are put upon a level : the other in which the good and able citizen is distinguished from the bad and incapable citizen, so that he acquires power and honour in proportion to his superior merit.² This second sort of equality Plato approves, pronouncing it to be political justice. But such defence tacitly assumes that superiority in wealth, as between the four classes of his census, is to count as evidence of, or as an equivalent for, superior merit : an assumption doubtless received by many Grecian politicians, and admitted in the general opinion of Greece—but altogether at variance with the declared judgment of Plato himself as to the effect of wealth upon the character of the wealthy man. The poorest citizen in the Platonic community must have his lot of land, which Plato considers sufficient for a sober-minded family : the richest citizen can possess only five times as much : and all receive the same public instruction. Here, therefore, there can be no presumption of superior merit in the richer citizen as compared with the poorer, whatever might be said about the case as it stood in actual Grecian communities. We see that Plato in this case forgets his own peculiar mode of thought, and accommodates himself to received distinctions, without reflecting that the principles of *his* own political system rendered such distinctions inapplicable. He bows to the oligarchical sentiment of his contemporaries, by his preferential encouragement to the votes of the rich : he bows to the democratical sentiment, when he consents to employ to a small extent the principle of the lot.³

¹ Livy l. 43.

Aristotle characterises these regulations of the Platonic community as oligarchical, and remarks that this is in contradiction to the principle with which Plato set out—that it ought to be a compound of monarchy and democracy. Aristotle understands this last principle somewhat differently from what Plato seems to have in-

tended (Polit. ii. 6, 1286, a. 10).

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 757 A-B.

Compare a like distinction drawn between two sorts of *ισότης* in Isokrates, Areiopagitic. Orat. vii. s. 23-24; also Aristotel. Politic.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 757 E. *ὅδ τε τοῦ κλίρον ἰσὴν ἀνάγκη προσχρήσασθαι, δυσκολίας τῶν πολλῶν ἔνεκα, &c.*

Of the annually-chosen Council, one twelfth part only (or thirty Councillors) will be in constant session in the city: each of their sessions lasting for one month, and the total thus covering the year. The remaining eleven twelfths will be attending to their private affairs, except when special necessities arise. The Council will have the general superintendence of the city, and controul over all meetings of the citizens.¹ Provision is made for three magistrates called Astynomi, to regulate the streets, roads, public buildings, water-courses, &c.: and for five Agoranomi, to watch over the public market with its appertaining temples and fountains, and to take cognisance of disputes or offences occurring therein. None but citizens of the two richest classes of the census are eligible as Astynomi or Agoranomi: first, twice the number required are chosen by public show of hands—next, half of the number so chosen are drawn off by lot. In regard to the show of hands, Plato again decrees, that all citizens of the two richer classes shall be compelled to take part in it, under fine: all citizens of the two poorer classes may take part if they choose, but are not compelled.² By this provision, as before, Plato baits for the oligarchical sentiment: by the partial use of the lot, for the democratical.

Meetings of council—
other
magistrates
—Agora-
nomi—
Astynomi,
&c.

The defence of the territory is entrusted to the Agronomi, five persons selected from each of the twelve tribes, making sixty in all; and assisted by sixty other junior subordinates, selected by the five Agronomi (those of each tribe choosing twelve) from their respective tribes. Each of these companies of seventeen will be charged with the care of one of the twelve territorial districts, as may be determined by lot. Each will then pass by monthly change from one district to another, so as to make the entire circuit of the twelve districts in one year, going round in an easterly direction or to the right: each will then make the same circuit backward, during a second year, in a westerly direction or to the left.³ Their term of service will be two years

Defence of
the territory
—rural
police—
Agronomi,
&c.

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 758 C-D.

² Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 763-764.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 760 D. τοὺς
τῶν χωρῶν τόπων μεταλλάττοντας ἀεί

τῶν ἐξῆς τόπων ἐκάστου μὲν δὲ ἡγεῖσθαι
τοὺς φρουράρχους ἐπὶ δεξιᾷ κύκλῳ· τὸ
δ' ἐπιδεξία γιγνέσθαι τὸ πρὸς ἑω.

In reference to omens and auguries

in all, during which all of them will have become familiarly acquainted with every portion of the territory. A public mess will be provided for these companies, and each man among them will be held to strict continuity of service. Their duties will be, not merely to keep each district in a condition of defence against a foreign enemy, but also to improve its internal condition: to facilitate the outflow of water where there is too much, and to retard it where there is too little: to maintain, in the precincts sacred to the Gods, reservoirs of spring-water, partly as ornament, partly also as warm baths (for the heating of which large stocks of dry wood must be collected)—to benefit the old, the sick, and the overworked husbandman.¹ Farthermore, these Agronomi will adjudicate upon disputes and offences among the rural population, both slave and free. If they abuse their trust, they will be accountable, first to the assembled citizens of the district, next to the public tribunals in the city.

Plato considers that these Agronomi will go through hard work during their two years of service, inasmuch as they will have no slaves, and will have to do everything for themselves: though in the performance of any public work, they are empowered to put in requisition both men and cattle from the neighbourhood.² He pronounces it to be a salutary discipline for the young men, whom he admonishes that an apprenticeship in obedience is indispensable to qualify them for command, and that exact obedience to the laws and magistrates will be their best title to posts of authority when older.³ Moreover, he insists on the necessity that all citizens should become minutely acquainted with the whole territory: towards which purpose he encourages young men in the exercise of hunting. He compares (indirectly) his movable guard of Agronomi to the Lacedæmonian Krypti, who maintained the police of Laconia, and kept watch over the

the Greek spectator looked towards the north, so that he had the east on his right hand.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 761 A-D.

Agreeable and refreshing combinations of springs with shady trees near the precincts of the Gods were frequent. See Xenophon, *Hellen.* v. 3, 19.

The thermal waters were also generally connected with some precinct of Hēraklēs or Asklēpius.

In some temples it was forbidden to use this adjoining water except for sacred rites, *Thucyd.* iv. 97.

² Plato, *Legg.* vi. pp. 760 E—763 A.

³ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 762 E.

Helots:¹ though they are also the parallel of the youthful Peripoli at Athens, who were employed as Guards for two years round various parts of Attica.

Besides Astynomi and Agoranomi, Plato provides priests for the care of the sacred buildings in the city, and for the service of the Gods. In choosing these priests, as in choosing the other magistrates, election and sortition are to be combined: to satisfy at once the oligarchical and the democratical sentiment. The lot will be peculiarly suitable in a case where priests are to be chosen—because the God may be expected to guide it in a manner agreeable to himself.² Plato himself however is not confident on this point, for he enjoins additional precautions: the person chosen must be sixty years old at least, free from all bodily defect, of legitimate birth, and of a family untainted by previous crime. Plato prescribes farther, that laws or canons respecting matters of divine concern shall be obtained from the Delphian oracle: and that certain Exēgētæ shall be named as authorised interpreters of these canons, as long as they live.³ Treasurers or stewards shall also be chosen, out of the two richer classes of the census, to administer the landed property and produce belonging to the various temples.⁴

Priests—
Exēgētæ—
Property
belonging
to temples.

In the execution of the duties imposed upon them, the Agoranomi and Astynomi are empowered to fine an offender to the extent of one mina (one hundred drachmæ), each of them separately—and when both sit together, to the extent of two minæ.⁵

Music and Gymnastic.—For each of these, two magisterial

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 763 A-B. εἰς τις ἀκροπόδες εἰς ἀγορὰς εἰδ' ὅ, τι καλὸν χαίρει, &c. He notes the hardships endured by these Κουρτοὶ in their Κουρτεία, l. p. 683 C.

The phrase seems however to indicate that Plato did not much like to call his Agronomi by the name of Κουρτοὶ. The duties performed by the Lacedæmonian Κουρτοὶ against the Helots were of the harshest character. See chap. vi. p. 509 of my 'History of Greece'. Schömann, Antiq. Juris Publ. Græc. iv. 1-4, p. 111, v. 1, 21, p. 100.

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 749 D.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 759 E.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 760 A.

⁵ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 764 B.

Here, as in other provisions, Plato copies the practice at Athens, where each individual magistrate was empowered to impose a fine of definite amount (δραχμῶν ἢ τετραβήλων), though we do not know what that amount was. The Proedri could impose a fine as high as one mina, the Senate as high as five minæ (Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 34).

Superintendence of Music and Gymnastic Educational function.

functions must be constituted: one to superintend the teaching and training—the other, to preside over the matches and distribution of prizes. In regard to the musical matches, one President must be appointed for the monodic single-headed exhibitions, another for the choric exhibitions. The President of the former must be not less than thirty years of age. The President of the latter must be not less than forty years of age. In order to appoint a fit person, the Nomophylakes shall constrain all the citizens whom they believe to be conversant with monodic or choric matters, to assemble and agree on a preliminary list of ten candidates, who shall undergo a Dokimasy or examination, upon the single point of skill and competency, and no other. If they all pass, recourse shall be had to lot, and the one who draws the first lot shall be President for the year. In regard to the gymnastic matches, of men as well as of horses, the citizens of the three richest classes shall be constrained to come together (those of the fourth class may come, or stay away, as they please), and to fix upon twenty suitable persons; who shall undergo the Dokimasy, and out of whom three shall be selected by lot as Presidents of gymnastic contests for the year.¹

We observe that in the nomination of Presidents for the musical and gymnastic contests, Plato adopts the same double-faced machinery as before—To please the oligarchical sentiment by treating the votes of the rich as indispensable, the votes of the poor as indifferent—To please the democratical sentiment by a partial application of the lot. But in regard to the President of musical and gymnastic education or training, he prescribes a very different manner of choice. He declares this to be the most important function in the city. Upon the way in which the Minister of Education discharges his functions, the ultimate character of the citizens will mainly turn. Accordingly, this magistrate must be a man of fifty years of age, father of legitimate children—and, if possible, of daughters as well as sons. He must also be one of the thirty-seven Nomophylakes. He will be selected, not by the votes of the citizens generally, but by

Grave duties of the Minister of Education—precautions in electing him.

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 764-765.

the votes of all the magistrates (except the annual Councillors and the Prytanes): such votes being deposited secretly in the temple of Apollo. The person who obtains the most of these secret votes will be submitted to a farther Dokimasy by all the voting magistrates (except the Nomophylakes themselves), and will, if approved, be constituted President of musical and gymnastic education for five years.¹

From the magisterial authority in his city, Plato now passes to the judicial or dikastic. He remarks that no peremptory line of separation can be drawn between the two. Every magistrate exercises judicial functions on some matters: every dikast, on the days when he sits, decides magisterially.² He then proceeds to distinguish (as the Attic forum did) between two sorts of causes:—Private, disputes between man and man, where the persons complaining of being wronged are one or a few individuals—Public, where the party wronged or alleged to be wronged is the state.³

In regard to the private causes, he institutes Tribe-Dikasteries, taken by lot out of the citizens of each tribe, and applied without notice to each particular cause as it comes on, so that no one can know beforehand in what cause he is to adjudicate, nor can any one be solicited or bribed.⁴ He institutes farthermore a superior court of appeal, formed every year by the various Boards of Magistrates, each choosing out of its own body the most esteemed member, subject to approval by an ensuing Dokimasy.⁵ When one citizen believes himself to be wronged by another, he must first submit the complaint to arbitration by neighbours and common friends. If this arbitration fails to prove satisfactory, he must next bring the complaint before the Tribe-Dikastery. Should their decision prove unsatisfactory, the case may be brought (seemingly by either of the parties) before the supe-

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 765-766.

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 A.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 B.

This was the main distinction adopted in the Attic law. 1. Complaint, founded upon injury alleged to be done to the interest of some individual—*ἀγὼν ἰδίου*, *δίcky ἰδία*, *δίcky* in the narrow sense. 2. Complaint,

founded upon injury alleged to be done towards some interest not strictly individual—*ἀγὼν δημόσιος*, *δίcky δημοσία*, *γραφή* (Meier und Schömann, der Attische Prozess, p. 162).

⁴ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 B.

⁵ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767-C-D. γινέσθω κούρον ἀπασι τοῖς τὸ τρίτον ἀμφισβητούσιν ἰδιώταις πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

rior court of appeal, whose decision will be final. Plato directs that this superior Court shall hold its sittings publicly, in presence of all the Magistrates and all the Councillors, as well as of any other citizen who may choose to attend. The members of the Court are to give their votes openly.¹ Should they be suspected of injustice or corruption, they may be impeached before the Nomophylakes; who, if convinced of their guilt, shall compel them to make good the wrong done, and shall impose penalties besides, if the case requires.²

In regard to Public Causes, Plato makes unusual concession to a feeling much prevalent in Greece, and especially potent at Athens. Where the wrong done is to the public, he recognises that the citizens generally will not submit to be excluded from the personal cognizance of it: the citizen excluded from that privilege feels as if he had no share in the city.³ If one citizen accuses another of treason, or peculation, or other wrong towards the public, the accusation shall be originated at first, and decided at last, before the general body of citizens. But after having been originated before this general assembly, the charge must be submitted to an intermediate stage of examination, before three of the principal Boards of Magistrates; who shall sift the allegations of the accuser, as well as the defence of the accused. These commissioners (we must presume) will make a report on the case, which report will be brought before the general assembly; who will then adjudicate upon it finally, and condemn or acquit as they think right.⁴

This proposition deserves notice. Plato proclaims his disapprobation of the numerous Dikasteries in Athens, wherein the Dikasts sat, heard, and voted—perhaps with applause or murmurs, but with no searching

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 767 A-D, 768 B. Compare xii. p. 96d.

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 767 E.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 B. ὁ γὰρ ἀκούωντος ὡς ἰσονόμος τοῦ συνδικάζοντος, ἀγείρας τὸ παρῶν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτρος εἶναι. This is a remarkable indication about the tone of

Grecian feeling from a very adverse witness.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 A. τὴν δὲ βέβαιον ἐν ταῖς μεγίσταις ἀρχαῖς ἐπιτελεῖται.

Here the word βέβαιον is used in a much more extended sense than usual, so as to include the whole process of judicial enquiry.

questions of their own—leaving the whole speech to the parties and their witnesses. To decide justly (he says), the judicial authority must not remain silent, but must speak more than the parties, and must undertake the substantial conduct of the inquiry. No numerous assembly—nor even any few, unless they be intelligent—are competent to such a duty: nor even an intelligent few, without much time and patience.¹ To secure such an inquiry on these public causes—as far as is possible consistent with the necessity of leaving the final decision to the general assembly—is the object of Plato's last-mentioned proposition. It is one of the most judicious propositions in his whole scheme.

date inquiry and report by a special Commissioner.

Plato has now constituted the magistrates and the judicial machinery. It is time to specify the laws which they are to obey and to enforce.²

Plato considers the Nomophylakes (together with another board called the Nocturnal Council, to be hereafter described) as the permanent representatives of himself: destined to ensure that the grand ethical purpose of the lawgiver shall be constantly kept in view, and to supply what may have been left wanting in the original programme.³ Especially at the first beginning, provision will be found wanting in many details, which the Nomophylakes will take care to supply. In respect to the choric festivals, which are of so much importance for the training and intercourse of young men and maidens, the lawgiver must trust to the Choric Superintendents and the Nomophylakes for regulating, by their experience, much which he cannot foresee. But an experience of ten years will enable them to make all the modifications and additions required; and after that period they shall fix and consecrate in perpetuity the ceremonies as they then stand, forbidding all farther change. Neither in that nor in any other arrangement shall any sub-

What laws the magistrates are to enforce—Many details must be left to the Nomophylakes.

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 766 E.

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 768 E.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 770 C-E.

sequent change be allowed, except on the unanimous requisition of all the magistrates, all the people, and all the oracles of the Gods.¹

The choric festivals, in which the youths and maidens will take part, both of them naked as far as a sober modesty will allow, present occasions for mutual acquaintance between them, which serves as foundation for marriage.² At the age of twenty-five a young man is permitted to marry; and before the age of thirty-five he is required to marry, under penalty of fine and disgrace, if he does not.³ Plato introduces here a discourse, in the form of a prologue to his marriage law, wherein he impresses on young men the general principles according to which they ought to choose their wives. The received sentiment, which disposes a rich youth to choose his wife from a rich family, is (in Plato's view) altogether wrong. Rich husbands ought to assort themselves with poor wives; and in general the characters of husband and wife ought to be opposite rather than similar, in order that the offspring may not inherit the defects of either.⁴ The religious ceremonies antecedent to marriage are to be regulated by the *Exêgêtæ*. A costly marriage feast—and, above all, drunkenness at that feast—are emphatically forbidden. Any offspring begotten when the parent is in this disorderly and insane condition,⁵ will probably be vitiated from the beginning. Out of the two residences which every citizen's lot will comprise, one must be allotted to the son when the son marries.⁶

Plato now enters upon his laws respecting property; and first of all upon the most critical variety of property; *Laws about slavery.* Slaves to be well fed, and never treated with that in human beings, or slavery. This he declares to be a subject full of difficulty. There is much difference of opinion on the subject. Some speak of

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 772 C-D.

² Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 772 A. γυναικὶς καὶ γυναικὶς μὴ χρεὶν αἰδοῦν σφόδρα καὶ ἀκούων, &c.

³ Plato, *Legg.* vi. pp. 772 E, 774 A.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 773 C-D.

Compare the *Politikus*, pp. 310-311, where the necessity is insisted on of coupling in marriage two persons of opposite dispositions—τὸ ἀνδρείον καὶ

with τὸ κόσμιον καὶ ἥθος. There is a natural inclination (Plato says) for the ἀνδρείοι to intermarry with each other, and for the κόσμοι to do the like: but the lawgiver must contend against this. If this be permitted, each of the breeds will degenerate through excess of its own peculiarity.

⁵ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 775.

⁶ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 776 A.

slaves as deserving trust and good treatment, in proof of which various anecdotes of exemplary fidelity on their part are cited: others again regard them as incorrigibly debased, fit for nothing better than the whip and spur, like cattle. Then moreover the modified form of slavery, such as that of the Helots in Laconia, and the Penestæ in Thessaly, has been found full of danger and embarrassment, though the Spartans themselves are well satisfied with it.¹ (It will be recollected that the Helots and Penestæ were not slaves bought and imported from abroad, as the slaves in Attica were, but conquered Hellenic communities who had been degraded from freedom into slavery, and from the condition of independent proprietorship into that of tributary tenants or serfs; but with the right to remain permanently on their lands, without ever being sold for exportation.) This form of slavery (where the slaves are of the same race and language, with reciprocal bonds of sympathy towards each other) Plato denounces as especially dangerous. Care must be taken that there shall be among the slaves as little fellowship of language and feelings as possible; but they must be well fed: moreover everything like cruelty and insolence in dealing with them must be avoided, even more carefully than in dealing with freemen. This he prescribes partly for the protection of the slave himself, but still more for the interest of the master: whose intrinsic virtue, or want of virtue, will be best tested by his behaviour as a master. The slaves must be punished judicially, when they deserve it. But the master must never exhort or admonish them, as he would address himself to a freeman: he must never say a word to them, except to give an order: above all, he must abstain from all banter and joking, either with male or female slaves.² Many foolish masters indulge in such behaviour, which em-

cruelty or
insolence.
The master
must not
converse
with them

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 777. He alludes also to the enslavement of the indigenous population called the Mariandyni, by the Grecian colonists of Herakleia on the southern coast of the Euxine; and to the disturbances and disorders which had occurred through movements of the slaves in Southern Italy. Probably this last may be connected with that revolt

whereby the Bruttians became enfranchised; but we can make out nothing definite from Plato's language.

² Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 777 D-E. καλέ-
ζειν γε μὴν ἐν δίκῃ δούλους ἀεὶ, καὶ μὴ
νοῦθεύοντας ὡς ἐλευθέρους θρύπτεισθαι
ποιεῖν. Τὴν δὲ οἰκετοῦ πρόβλεψιν χρὴ
σχεδὸν ἐπιταῖν πᾶσαν γίγνεσθαι, μὴ
προσκαίροντας μηδ' αὖ μηδ' αὖ οἰκταίς,
μητ' οὖν θηλείαις μητ' ἄρρεσιν.

boldens the slaves to give themselves airs, and renders the task of governing them almost impracticable.¹

As to the construction of the city, Plato prescribes that its external contour shall be of circular form, encircling the summit of an eminence, with the agora near the centre. The temples of the Gods shall be planted around the agora, and the buildings for gymnasia and schooling, for theatrical representation, for magistral, administrative, and judicial business, near at hand. Plato follows the example of Sparta in prohibiting any special outer wall for the fortification of the city, which he treats as an indication of weakness and timidity: nevertheless he suggests that the houses constituting the city may be erected on such a plan, and in such connection, as to be equivalent to a fortification.² When once the city is erected, the *Astynomi* or *Ædiles* are to be charged with the duty of maintaining its integrity and cleanliness.

Plato next proceeds to regulate the mode of life proper for all his new-married couples. He proclaims broadly that large interference with private and individual life is unavoidable; and that no great public reform can be accomplished without it.³ He points out that this

¹ Aristotle (*Polit.* vii. p. 1330, a. 27; *Econom.* i. p. 1344, b. 18) agrees with Plato as to the danger of having slaves who speak the same language and are of the same tribes, with common lineage and sympathies. He disapproves of anything which tends to impart spirit and independence to the slave's character; and he takes occasion from hence to deduce some objections against various arrangements of the Platonic Republic (*Polit.* ii. p. 1284, a. 35). These are precautions—*πρὸς τὸ μὴ εὐεργετήσθαι*. But Aristotle dissents from Plato on another point—where Plato enjoins that the master shall not exhort or admonish his slave, but shall address to him no word except the word of command (*Aristot. Polit.* i. p. 1280, b. 5). Aristotle says that there is a certain special and inferior kind of *ἀρετή* which the slave can possess and ought to possess; that this ought to be communicated to him by the admonition and exhortation of the master; and that the master ought to admonish his slaves even more than he admonishes his children. The slave

requires a certain *ψυχὴν ἀρετὴν*, so that he may not be hindered from his duty by *ἀκολασία* or *δουλία*: but it is an *ἀρετὴ μικρά*: the courage required for the slave is *ὑπηγετική*, that for the master *ἀρχική* (*ib.* p. 1280, a. 23-35). This measure of virtue the master must impart to the slave by exhortation, over and above the orders which he gives as to the performance of work. It would appear, however, that in Aristotle's time there were various persons who denied that there was any *ἀρετὴ* belonging to a slave—*παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς* (p. 1259, b. 23). Upon this last theory is founded the injunction of Plato which Aristotle here controverts.

What Aristotle says about slaves in the fifth chapter of the first book of his *Economica*, is superior to what he says in the *Politica*, and superior to anything which we read in the Platonic *Treatise De Legibus*.

² Plato, *Legg.* vi. pp. 778-779.

³ Plato, *Legg.* vi. p. 780 A, vii. p. 790 A.

principle was nowhere sufficiently admitted : not even at Sparta, where it was carried farther than anywhere else. Even the Spartans and Kretans adopted the public mess-table only for males, and not for females.¹ In Plato's view, it is essential for both. He would greatly prefer (as announced already in his Republic) that it should be one and the same for both—males and females taking their meals together.

The newly-married couples are enjoined to bestow their best attention upon the production of handsome and well-constituted children : this being their primary duty to the city for ten years after their marriage. Their conduct will be watched by a Board of Matrons, chosen for the purpose by the Nomophylakes, and assembling every day in the temple of Eileithuia. In case of any dispute, or unfaithful or unseemly conduct, these Matrons will visit them to admonish or threaten, if they see reason. Should such interference fail of effect, the Matrons will apprise the Nomophylakes, who will on their parts admonish and censure, and will at last denounce the delinquents, if still refractory, to the public authority. The delinquents will then be disgraced, and debarred from the public ceremonies, unless they can clear themselves by indicting and convicting their accusers before the public tribunal.²

The age of marriage is fixed at from thirty to thirty-five for males, from sixteen to twenty for females. The first ten years after marriage are considered as appropriated to the production of children *for the city*, and are subject to the strict supervision above mentioned. If any couple have no offspring for ten years, the marriage shall be dissolved by authority. After ten years the supervision is suspended, and the couple are left to themselves. If either of them shall commit an infidelity with another person still under the decennial restriction, the party so offending is liable to the same penalty as if he were still himself also under it.³ But if the person with whom infidelity is committed be not under that restriction, no penalty will be incurred beyond a certain general

take the best care about good procreation for the city.

Board of superintending matrons.

Age fixed for marriage. During the first ten years the couple are under obligation to procreate for the city — Restrictions during these ten years.

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 781 A.

² Plato, Legg. vi. p. 784.

³ Plato, Legg. vi. pp. 784-785.

discredit, as compared with others whose conduct is blameless, and who will receive greater honour. However, Plato advises that nothing shall be said in the law respecting the conduct of married couples after the period of decennial restriction has elapsed, unless there be some grave scandal to call attention to the subject.¹

Plato now proceeds to treat about the children just born. The principle of separate family being admitted in the Treatise De Legibus, he refrains from promulgating any peremptory laws on this subject, because it is impossible for the lawgiver or the magistrate to enter into each private house, and to enforce obedience on such minute and numerous details: while it would be discreditable for him to command what he could not enforce, and it would moreover accustom citizens to disobey the law with impunity. Still, however, Plato² thinks it useful to deliver some general advice, which he hopes that fathers and mothers will spontaneously follow. He begins with the infant as soon as born, and even before birth. The mother during pregnancy is admonished to take regular exercise; the infant when born must be carried about constantly in the nurse's arms. The invigorating effects of such gestation are illustrated by the practice of Athenian cock-fighters, who cause the cocks while under training to be carried about under the arms of attendants in long walks.³ Besides that the nurses (slaves) must be strong women, there must also be more than one to each infant, in order that he may be sufficiently carried about. He must be kept in swaddling-clothes for the first two years, and must not be allowed to walk until he is three years of age.⁴ The perpetual movement and dandling, in the arms of the nurse, produces a good effect not only on the health and bodily force of the infant, but also upon his emotions.⁵ The infant ought to be

How infants are to be brought up—Nurses—Perpetual regulated movements—useful for toning down violent emotions.

¹ Plato, Legg. vi. p. 785 A. καὶ βαρύνουσιν μὲν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πλείων ἀνομοθέτητα σιγῇ καίσθω, ἀκούοντων δὲ νομοθετήματα ταύτην πρᾶξισθω, &c.

² Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 788-790 A.

³ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 789.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 789 E, 790 A.

⁵ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 790 C-D. λέ-

βαμεν ταῖνον τοῦτο εἶναι στοιχείον ἐπ' ἀμφοτέρω σώματι τε καὶ ψυχῇ τῶν πᾶν νέων, ὅσοι τιθήνησιν καὶ κρηταῖς, γιγνομένην ὅτι μάλιστα διὰ πάσης νεότητος τε καὶ φήρας, ὡς ἴσθι εὐμενέστεροι ἀπασιν μὲν, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, τι νεωτάτοις, καὶ οἰκίαις, εἰ δυνατόν ἦν, εἶναι ἀεὶ πλεόντας· οὗν δ' ὡς ἐγγύτατα τοῦτον κομῶν δεῖ περὶ τὰ νεογενῆ παῖδων θρήνηματα.

kept (if it were possible) in movement as constant and unceasing as if he were on shipboard. Nurses know this by experience, when they lull to sleep an insomniac child, not by holding him still, but by swinging him about in their arms, and by singing a ditty. So likewise the insane and furious emotions inspired by Dionysus (also by Zeus, by the mother of the Gods, &c.) are appeased by the regulated movement, dance and music, solemnly performed at the ceremonial worship of the God who excited the emotions. These are different varieties of fear and perturbation: they are morbid internal movements, which we overpower and heal by muscular and rhythmical movements impressed from without, with appropriate music and religious solemnities.¹

To guard the child, during the first three years of his life, against disturbing fears, or at least to teach him to conquer them when they may spring up, is to lay the best foundation of a fearless character for the future.² By extreme indulgence he would be rendered wayward: by extreme harshness his spirit would be broken.³ A middle course ought to be pursued, guarding him against pains as far as may be, yet at the same time keeping pleasures out of his reach, especially the stronger pleasures: thus shall we form in him a gentle and propitious disposition, such as that which we ascribe to the Gods.⁴

The comparison made here by Plato between the effect produced by these various religious ceremonies upon the mind of the votary, and that produced by the dandling of the nurse upon the perturbed child in her arms, is remarkable. In both, the evil is the same—unfounded and irrational fear—an emotional disturbance within: in both, the remedy is the same—regulated muscular movement

Choric and orchestric movements: their effect in discharging strong emotions.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 790 E—791 A. *δειμαίνειν* ὅτι τὸν ταῦτ' ἀμφοτέρω τὰ πάθη, καὶ ὅτι δαίματα δι' ἑξὺν φαύλην τῆς ψυχῆς τινά. ὅταν οὖν ἔξωθεν τις προσφέρῃ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις πάθεσι σισμὸν, ἢ τὸν ἔξωθεν κρατὶ κίνησις προσφερομένη τὴν ἑντὸς φοβερὰν οὖσαν καὶ μακρὰν κίνησιν, κρατήσασα δὲ γαλήνην ἡσυχίαν τε ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαίνεται ἀεργασμένη τῆς περὶ τὰ τῆς καρδίας χαλεπῆς γυρομένης ἀέδωνων πύθμενος.

About the effect of the movement, bustle, noise, and solemn exhibitions, &c., of a Grecian festival, in appeasing the over-wrought internal excitement

of those who took part in it, see Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 689.

Compare Euripid. *Hippolyt.* 141, where the Chorus addresses the love-sick Phædra:—

οὐ τὰρ ἔνθεος, ὦ κόυρα,
εἰτ' ἐκ Παρθ' εἰδ' Ἑκάτης,
ἢ στυμνὸν Κορυσάδων,
ἢ μητρὸς ὀρεῖας φοιτῆς.

Also Eurip. *Medea*, 1172 about Παρθ' ὀργῆς.

² Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 791 C.

³ Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 791 D.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 792 C-D.

and excitement from without: more gentle in the case of the infant, more violent in the case of the adult. Emotion is a complex fact, physical as well as mental; and the physical aspect and basis of it (known to Aristotle¹ as well as to Plato) is here brought to view. To speak the language of modern science (with which their views here harmonise, in spite of their imperfect acquaintance with human anatomy), if the energies of the nervous system are overwrought within, they may be diverted into a new channel by bodily movements at once strenuous and measured, and may thus be discharged in a way tranquillising to the emotions. This is Plato's theory about the healing effects of the choric and orchêstic religious ceremonies of his day. The God was believed first to produce the distressing excitement within—then to suggest and enjoin (even to share in) the ceremonial movements for the purpose of relieving it. The votary is brought back from the condition of comparative madness to that of sober reason.² Strong emotion of any kind is, in Plato's view, a state of distemper. The observances here prescribed respecting wise regulation of the emotions, especially in young children, are considered by Plato as not being laws in the proper and positive sense, but as the unwritten customs, habits, rules, discipline, &c., upon which all positive laws repose and depend. Though they appear to go into excessive and petty details, yet unless they be well understood and efficaciously realised, the laws enacted will fail to attain their purpose.³

Pursuant to this view of the essential dependence of *leges* upon *mores*, Plato continues his directions about the training of boys and girls. From the age of three to six, the child must be supplied with amusements, under a gentle but sufficient controul. The children of both sexes will meet daily at the various temples near at hand, with discreet matrons to preside over them, and will find amusement for each other. At six years of age the boys and girls will be separated, and will be consigned to different male and female tutors. The boys shall

¹ Aristot. De Anima, i. 1.

² Plato, Legg. vii. p. 791 B. κατ'εργάσατο ἀντὶ μακρόν ἡμῖν διαθήσων ἕξεις ἐμψρονας ἔχειν.

Servius observes (Not. ad Virgil. Bucol. v. 73):—"Sanè, ut in religionibus saltaretur, hæc ratio est, quod

nullam majores nostri partem corporis esse voluerunt, quæ non sentiret religionem. Nam cantus ad animam, saltatio ad mobilitatem pertinet corporis."

³ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 793 C.D.

learn riding, military exercise, and the use of the various weapons of war. The girls shall learn these very same things also, if it be possible. Plato is most anxious that they should learn, but he fears that the feelings of the community will not tolerate the practice.¹ All the teaching will be conducted under the superintendence of teachers, female as well as male: competent individuals, of both sexes, being appointed to the functions of command without distinction.² The children will be taught to use their left hands as effectively as their right.³ Wrestling shall be taught up to a certain point, to improve the strength and flexibility of the limbs; but elaborate wrestling and pugilism is disapproved. Imitative dancing, choric movements, and procession, shall also be taught, but always in arms, to familiarise the youth with military details.⁴

Plato now enters upon the musical and literary teaching proper for the youthful portion of his community. Poetry, music, and dancing, as connected with the service and propitiation of the Gods, are in the first instance recreative and amusing; but they also involve serious consequences.⁵ It is most important to the community that these exercises should not only be well arranged, but that when arranged they should be fixed by authority, so as to prevent all innovations or deviations by individual taste. Plato here repeats, with emphasis, his commendation of the Egyptian practice to consecrate all the songs, dances, and festive ceremonies, and to tolerate no others whatever.⁶

Musical and literary teaching for youth—Poetry, songs, music, dances, must all be fixed by authority and never changed—Mischief done by poets aiming to please.

Change is in itself a most serious evil, and change in one department provokes an appetite for change in all. Plato forbids all innovation, even in matters of detail, such as the shape of vessels or articles of furniture.⁷ He allows no poet to circulate any ode except such as is in full harmony with the declaration of the lawgiver respecting good and evil. All the old poems must be sifted and weeded. All new hymns and prayers to the Gods, even before they are shown to a single individual, must be

¹ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 794 B-D.

² Plato, Legg. vii. p. 796 D. ἀποδο-
ναι τε καὶ ἀποδοῦναι. Also p. 806 E.

³ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 794-796, 804 D.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 796 C-D.

⁵ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 803 C-E.

⁶ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 799.

⁷ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 797.

examined by Censors above fifty years of age, in order that it may be seen whether the poet knows what he ought to praise or blame, and what he ought to pray for. In general, the poets do not know what is good and what is evil. By mistaken prayers—especially for wealth, which the lawgiver discountenances as prejudicial—they may bring down great mischief upon the city.¹ Different songs must be composed for the two sexes: songs of a bold and martial character for males—of a sober and quiet character for females.² But the poet must on no account cultivate “the sweet Muse,” or make it his direct aim to produce emotions delightful to the audience. The sound and useful music will always in the end become agreeable, provided the pupils hear it from their earliest childhood, and hear nothing else.³ Plato censures the tragic representations exhibited in the Grecian cities (at Athens, more than anywhere else) as being unseemly, and even impious, because, close to the altar where sacrifice was offered to the Gods, choric and dramatic performances of the most touching and pathetic character were exhibited. The poet who gained the prize was he who touched most deeply the tender emotions of the audience, and caused the greatest flow of tears among them. Now, in the opinion of Plato, the exhibition of so much human misery, and the communication of so much sorrowful sympathy, was most unsuitable to the festival day, and offensive to the Gods. It was tolerable only on the inauspicious days of the year, and when exhibited by hired Karian mourners such as those who wailed loudly at funerals. The music at the festivals ought to have no emotional character, except that of gentle, kindly, auspicious cheerfulness.⁴

At ten years old, the boys and girls (who have hitherto been Boys and exercised in recitation, singing, dancing, &c.) are to girls to learn letters learn their letters, or reading and writing. They will

¹ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 800 A, 801 B, 802 B.

² Plato, Legg. vii. p. 802 D-E.

³ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 802 C. *καὶ μὴ παρατιθεμένης τῆς γλυκείας Μούσης.*

⁴ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 800 B-E. 801 A: *εὐφροσύνη, καὶ ὅτι καὶ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γένος εὐφροσύνη ἡμῖν πάντη πάντως ὑπαρχέτω.*

This is a remarkable declaration of Plato, condemning the tragic re-

presentations at Athens. Compare Gorgias, p. 501; Republic, x. p. 806: also about the effect on the spectators, Ion, p. 535 E.

The idea of *εὐφροσύνη* is more negative than positive; it is often shown by silence. The *εὐφροσύνη* (Soph. Phil. 10), or *βλασφροσύνη*, as Plato calls it, are the positive act or ill-omened manifestation. Plato, Phædon, p. 117: *ἐν εὐφροσύνῃ καὶ τῇ τελευτῇ.*

continue this process until thirteen years old. They will learn the use of the lyre, for three years. The same period and duration is fixed for all of them, not depending at all upon the judgment or preference of the parents.¹ It is sufficient if they learn to read and write tolerably, without aiming to do it either quickly or very well. The boys will be marched to school at daybreak every morning, under the care of a tutor, who is chosen by the magistrate for the purpose of keeping them under constant supervision and discipline.² The masters for teaching will be special persons paid for the duty, usually foreigners.³ They will be allowed to teach nothing except the laws and homilies of the lawgiver, together with any selections from existing poets which may be in full harmony with these.⁴ Plato here proclaims how highly he is himself delighted with his own string of homilies: which are not merely exhortations useful to be heard, but also have the charm of poetry, and have been aided by inspirations from the Gods.⁵ As for the poets themselves, whether serious or comic, whose works were commonly employed in teaching, being committed wholly or partially to memory—Plato repudiates them as embodying a large proportion of mischievous doctrine which his pupils ought never to hear. Much reading, or much learning, he discountenances as dangerous to youths.⁶

and the lyre, from ten to thirteen years of age Masters will teach the laws and homilies of the lawgiver, and licensed extracts from the poets.

The teaching of the harp and of music (occupying the three years from thirteen to sixteen, after the three preceding years of teaching letters) will not be suffered to extend to any elaborate or complicated combinations. The melody will be simple: the measure grave and dignified. The imitative movement or dancing will exhibit only the gestures and demeanour suitable to the virtuous

The teaching is to be simple, and common to both sexes.

¹ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 810 A.

² Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 808 C, 809 B.

³ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 804 D, 813 E.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 E. Any new poet who wishes to exhibit must submit his compositions to the Censors.

P. 817 C-D.

⁵ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 811 C-D. οὐκ ἔστιν τινὲς ἐπιτροπίας θεῶν . . . μέλα φεσθῆναι. Stallbaum in his note (p. 337)

treats this as said in jest (*facile dicit*). To me it seems sober earnest, and quite in character with the didactic solemnity of the whole treatise. Plato himself would have been astonished (I think) at the note of his commentator.

⁶ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 810-811. κινδυνὸν φημι εἶναι φέρονται τοῖς παῖσι τὴν πολυμαθίαν (811 B). Compare p. 819 A.

man in the various situations of life, whether warlike or pacific:¹ the subject-matter of the songs or hymns will be regulated (as above described) by censorial authority. The practice will be consecrated and unchangeable, under the supervision of a magistrate for education.²

All this teaching is imparted to the youth of both sexes: to boys, by male teachers—to girls, by female teachers, both of them paid. The training in gymnastic and military exercises and in arms, is also common to girls and boys.³ Plato deems it disgraceful that the females shall be brought up timorous and helpless—unable to aid in defending the city when it is menaced, and even unmanning the male citizens by demonstrations of terror.⁴

We next come to arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy. Plato directs that all his citizens shall learn the rudiments of these sciences—not for the reason urged by most persons, because of the necessities of practical life (which reason he discards as extravagantly silly, though his master Sokrates was among those who urged it)—but because these are endowments belonging to the divine nature, and because without them no man can become a God, Dæmon, or Hero, capable of watching over mankind.⁵ In Egypt elementary arithmetic and geometry were extensively taught to boys—but very little in Greece:⁶ though he intimates that both in Egypt, and in the Phenician towns, they were

¹ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 812 C-D. Still Plato allows the exhibition, under certain conditions, of low, comic, ludicrous dances; yet not by any freemen or citizens, but by slaves and hired persons of mean character. He even considers it necessary that the citizens should see such low exhibitions occasionally, in order to appreciate by contrast the excellence of their own dignified exhibitions. Of two opposites you cannot know the one unless you also learn to know the other—ένεν γάρ γε λοίων τὰ σπουδαία καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τὰ ἐναντία μαθεῖν μὴν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μὴλλαι τις φρόνιμος ἴσασθαι, ποιεῖν δὲ οὐκ ἐν ἐναντίον ἀμφοτέρω, &c. (p. 816 E).

² Plato, Legg. vii. p. 818 A.

³ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 818 C-E, 814-815. πολεμικὴ ὄρχησις—εἰρηνικὴ ἢ ἀπόλεμος ὄρχησις.

⁴ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 814 B. See Æschylus, Sept. adv. Thebas, 172-220.

⁵ Plato, Legg. vii. p. 818 B-C. οὗτος πάντως τῶν λόγων εὐθέσιματός ἐστι μακρὸς. In interpreting this curious passage we must remember that regularity, symmetry, exact numerical proportion, &c., are the primary characteristics of the divine agents in Plato's view: of Uranus and the Stars, as the first of them, compare Æschyl. Prometh. 460.

⁶ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 818 E, 819 B-D. μαχύνθη . . . ὑπὲρ ἀνδρῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων. Compare Legg. v. p. 747 C, and Republic, iv. p. 436 A.

Respecting the distinction between θεοί, δαίμονες, ἥρωες, see Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 104-115.

turned only to purposes of traffic, and were joined with sordid dispositions which a good lawgiver ought to correct by other provisions. In the Platonic city, both arithmetic and geometry will be taught, so far as to guard the youth against absurd blunders about measurement, and against confusion of incommensurable lines and spaces with commensurable. Such blunders are now often made by Greeks.¹ By a good method, the teaching of these sciences may be made attractive and interesting; so that no force will be required to compel youth to learn.

¹ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 819 E, 820 A-C.

² Plato, Legg. vii. p. 820 D. *μετὰ παιδείας ἅμα μαθησόμενα ὠφελήσονται.*

I transcribe here the curious passage which we read a little before.

Plat. Legg. vii. p. 819 A-C. *Τοσάδε τοῖνυν ἕκαστα χρὴ φάναι μαθησέμεν δεῖν τοὺς ἐλευθέρους, ὅσα καὶ πᾶσι πολλοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ παιδῶν ὄχλος ἅμα γράμμασι μαθήσεται. Πρώτον μὲν γὰρ περὶ λογισμοῦ ἀτεχνῶς παῖσιν ἐξερμημένα μαθήματα, μετὰ παιδείας τε καὶ ἡθικῆς μαθήσεται· μῆλων γὰρ τῶν τινῶν διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων πηλοσὶν ἅμα καὶ ἐλάττωσιν, ἀρμολύγων ἀριθμῶν τῶν αὐτῶν . . . καὶ δὴ καὶ παύσας, φύλας ἅμα χρυσοῦ καὶ χαλκοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ τοιούτων τινῶν ἄλλων κερανύσας, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὅλας πῶς διαβιδόντες, ὅπου εἰπον, εἰς παιδῶν ἐναρμόττοντες τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ ἀριθμῶν χρήσεις, ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς μαθησάμεντας εἰς τὰς τῶν στρατοῦσιν τάξεις καὶ ἀγωγὰς καὶ στρατείας καὶ εἰς οἰκονομίας αὐτῶν· καὶ πάντας χρησιμωτέρους αὐτοῦς αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐργασιοτέρους μᾶλλον τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπεργάζονται.*

The information here given is valuable respecting the extensive teaching of elementary arithmetic as well as of letters among Egyptian boys, far more extensive than among Hellenic boys. The priests especially, in Egypt a numerous order, taught these matters to their own sons (Diodor. i. 81), probably to other boys also. The information is valuable too in another point of view, as respects the method of teaching arithmetic to boys; not by abstract numbers, nor by simple effort of memory in the repetition of a multiplication-table, but by concrete examples and illustrations exhibited to sense in familiar objects. The importance of this concrete method, both in facilitating comprehension and in interesting the youthful learner, are

strongly insisted on by Plato, as they have been also by some of the ablest modern teachers of elementary arithmetic: see Professor Leslie's Philosophy of Arithmetic, and Mr. Horace Grant's Arithmetic for Young Children and Second Stage of Arithmetic. The following passage from a work of Sir John Herschel (Review of Whewell's History of Inductive Sciences, in the Quarterly Review, June, 1841) bears a striking and curious analogy to the sentences above transcribed from Plato:—"Number we cannot help regarding as an abstraction, and consequently its general properties or its axioms to be of necessity inductively concluded from the consideration of particular cases. And surely this is the way in which children do acquire their knowledge of number, and in which they learn its axioms. The apples and the marbles are put in requisition (μῶν διανομαὶ καὶ στεφάνων, Plato), and through the multitude of gingerbread nuts their ideas acquire clearness, precision, and generality."

I borrow the above references from Mr. John Stuart Mill, System of Logic, Book ii. ch. vi. p. 336, ed. 1. They are annexed as a note to the valuable chapters of his work on Demonstration and Necessary Truths, in which he shows that the truth so-called, both in Geometry and Arithmetic, rest upon inductive evidence.

"The fundamental truths of the Science of Number all rest upon the evidence of sense: they are proved by showing to our eyes and to our fingers that any given number of objects, ten balls for example, may by separation and re-arrangement exhibit to our senses all the different sets of numbers, the sum of which is equal to ten. All the improved methods of teaching arithmetic to children proceed upon a knowledge of this fact. All who wish

Astronomy must also be taught up to a certain point, in order that the youth may imbibe correct belief respecting those great Divinities—Hēlios, Selēnē, and the Planets—or may at any rate be protected from the danger of unconsciously advancing false affirmations about them, discreditable to their dignity. The general public consider it impious to study the Kosmos and the celestial bodies, with a view to detect the causes of what occurs:¹ while at the same time they assert that the movements of Hēlios and Selēnē are irregular, and they call the planets Wanderers. Regular action is (in Plato's view) the characteristic mark of what is good and perfect: irregularity is the foremost of all defects, and cannot without blasphemy be imputed to any of the celestial bodies. Moreover, many persons also assert untruly, that among the celestial bodies the one which is really the slowest mover, moves the fastest—and that the one which is really the fastest mover, moves the slowest. How foolish would it appear (continues Plato) if they made the like mistake about the Olympic runners, and if they selected the defeated competitor, instead of the victor, to be crowned and celebrated in panegyrical odes! How offensive is such falsehood, when applied to the great Gods in the heavens! Each of them has in reality one uniform circular movement, though they appear to have many and variable movements. Our youth must be taught enough of astronomy to guard against such heresies. The study of astronomy up to this point, far from being impious, is indispensable as a safeguard against impiety.² Plato intimates that these

to carry the child's mind along with them in learning arithmetic—all who (as Dr. Biber in his remarkable *Letters on Education* expresses it) wish to teach numbers and not mere ciphers—now teach it through the evidence of the senses, in the manner we have described" (p. 335).

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 821 A. We must observe that the Athenian (who here represents Plato himself) does not give this repugnance to astronomical study as his own feeling, but, on the contrary, as a prejudice from which he dissents. There is no ground, therefore, so far as this passage is concerned,

for the charge of contradiction advanced by Velleius against Plato in *Cicero De Nat. Deor.* l. 12, 30.

² *Plat. Legg.* vii. pp. 821 B—822 C. καταφυνδόμεθα νῦν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, Ἑλλήνες πάντες μεγάλων θεῶν, Ἡλίου τε ἑμᾶ καὶ Σελήνης (821 B) . . . περὶ θεῶν τῶν κατ' οὐρανὸν τοὺς γε ἡμετέροισι πολῖτας τε καὶ τοὺς νέους τὸ μᾶχρ' αὐτοῦ του μαθεῖν περὶ πάντων τούτων, μᾶχρ' αὐτοῦ μὴ βλασφημεῖν περὶ αὐτά, εὐφραμεῖν δὲ αἰεὶ θύοντας τε καὶ ἐν εὐχαῖς εὐχομένους εὐσεβεῖς (821 C-D). The five Planets were distinguished and named, and their periods to a certain extent understood, by Plato; but by many per-

astronomical truths were of recent acquisition, even to himself.¹

In regard to hunting, Plato thinks that it is a subject on which positive laws are unsuitable or insufficient, and he therefore gives certain general directions which take of the nature both of advice and of law. The good citizen (he says) is one who not only obeys the positive

Hunting—
how far per-
mitted or
advised.

sons in his day the word Planet was understood more generally as comprehending all the celestial bodies, sun and moon among them—(except fixed stars) therefore comets also—*τα αἰὲρ τῶν ἀστέρων περιπατοῦντα*. Xenoph. Memor. iv. 7, 5, where an opinion is ascribed to Sokrates quite opposed to that which Plato here expresses. See Schaumbach, *Geschichte der Astronomie*, pp. 212-477.

¹ Plato, Legg. vii. pp. 819 D, 821 E. This portion of the *Leges* is obscure, and would be hardly-intelligible if it were not illustrated by a passage in the *Timæus* (p. 88). Even with such help it is difficult, and has been understood differently by different interpreters. Proklos (in *Timæum*, pp. 262-263) and Martin (*Études sur le Timée*, ii. note 36, p. 84) interpret it as alluding to the spiral line (*ὀλίσκος*) described by each planet (Sun and Moon are each counted as planets) round the Earth, arising from the combination of the force of the revolving sidereal sphere or *Aplanas*, carrying all the planets round along with it from East to West, with the counter-movement (contrary but obliquely contrary) inherent in each planet. The spiral movement of each planet, resulting from combination of these two distinct forces, is a regular movement governed by law; though to an observer who does not understand the law, the movements appear irregular. Compare *Derkyllides ap. Theon Smyrn.* c. 41, f. 27, p. 230, ed. Martin.

The point here discussed forms one of the items of controversy between Gruppe and Boeckh, in the recent discussion about Plato's astronomical views. Gruppe, *Die Kosmischen Systeme der Griechen*, pp. 157-168; Boeckh, *Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon*, pp. 45-57.

Gruppe has an ingenious argument to show that the novelty (*καινότης*) which Plato had in his mind, but was

afraid to declare openly because of existing prejudices, was the heliocentric or Copernican system, which he believes to have been Plato's discovery. Boeckh refutes Gruppe's reasoning; and refutes it, in my judgment, completely. He sustains the interpretation given by Proklos and Martin.

Boeckh also illustrates (pp. 35-38-49-54), in a manner more satisfactory than Gruppe, the dicta of Plato about the comparative velocity of the Planets (Sun and Moon counted among them).

Plato declares the Moon to be the quickest mover among the planets, and Saturn to be the slowest. On the contrary Demokritos pronounced the Moon to be the slowest mover of all; slower than the Sun, because the Sun was farther from the Earth and nearer to the outermost or sidereal sphere. It was the rotation of this last-mentioned sphere (according to Demokritos) which carried round along with it the Sun, the Moon, and all the planets: the bodies near to it were more forcibly acted upon by its rotation, and carried round more rapidly, than the bodies distant from it—hence the Moon was the least rapid mover of all (Lucretius, v. 615-635). See Sir George Lewis's *Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients*, ch. ii. pp. 139-140).

It appears to me probable that Plato, in the severe remarks which he makes on persons who falsely affirmed the quickest mover in the heavens to be the slowest, had in view these doctrines of Demokritos. Plato never once mentions Demokritos by name (See Mullach, *Fragment. Demokrit.* p. 25); but he is very sparing in mentioning by name any contemporaries. It illustrates the difference between the manner of Aristotle and Plato, that Aristotle frequently names Demokritos—seventy-eight times according to Mullach (p. 107)—even in the works which we possess.

laws prescribed by the lawgiver, but who also conforms his conduct to the general cast of the lawgiver's opinions: practising what is commended therein, abstaining from what is blamed.¹ Plato commends one mode of hunting—the chase after quadrupeds: yet only with horses, dogs, javelins, &c., wherein both courage and bodily strength are improved—but not with nets or snares, where no such result is produced. He blames other modes—such as fishing and bird-snaring (especially by night). He blames still more emphatically theft and piracy, which he regards also as various modes of hunting.²

What principally deserves notice here is, the large general idea which Plato conceives to himself under the term Hunting, and the number of diverse particulars comprehended therein. 1. Hunting of quadrupeds; either with dogs and javelins openly, or with snares, by stratagem. 2. Hunting of birds, in the air. 3. Hunting of fishes, in the water. 4. Hunting after the property of other men, in the city or country. 5. Hunting after men as slaves, or after other valuables, by means of piratical vessels. 6. Hunting of public enemies, by one army against an opposite one. 7. Hunting of men to conciliate their friendship or affection, sometimes by fair means, sometimes by foul.³

That all these processes—which Plato here includes as so many varieties of hunting—present to the mind, when they are compared, a common point of analogy, is not to be denied. The number of different comparisons which the mind can make between phenomena, is almost unlimited. Analogies may be followed from one to another, until at last, after successive steps, the analogy between the first and the last becomes faint or im-

¹ Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 823 E.

² Plato, *Legg.* vii. pp. 823-824.

³ Plato, *Legg.* vii. p. 823. *Θήρα γὰρ παντοῦ τι πρῶτον ἐστὶν, περιελημμένων νόμῳ σφιδόν ἐνὶ . . . πολλὰ δὲ ἢ κατὰ φίλων θηρεύουσα* (823 B) . . . *σφρος ἀνδρῶν κατὰ θάλατταν κλειψίας ἐν γῆρι καὶ πόλει* (823 E). Compare the *Epinomis*, p. 975 C.

So also in the *Sophists* (pp. 221-222) Plato analyses and distributes the general idea of *θηρευτική*: including under it, as one variety, the hunting

after men by violent means (*τὴν βίαιον θήραν, τὴν ληστοικὴν, ἀνδραποδοτικὴν, τυραννικὴν, καὶ ξυμπασαν τὴν πολεμικὴν*)—and as another variety, the hunting after men by persuasive or seductive means (*τὴν παιδαγωγικὴν, ἱρωικὴν, κολακικὴν*). In the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon also (ii. 3, 29-33), Socrates expands this same idea—*τὴν θήραν ἀνδρῶν—τὰ τῶν φίλων θηρευτικά, &c.* Compare also the conversation between Socrates and Theodotus (iii. 11, 8-15)—*θηρώμενος*, ib. i. 2, 24—and Plato *Protag.* init.

perceptible. Yet the same word, transferred successively from the first to the last, conceals this faintness of analogy and keeps them all before the mind as one. To us, this extension of the word *hunting* to particular cases dissimilar in so many respects, appears more as poetical metaphor: to intelligent Greeks of the Sokratic school, it seemed a serious comparison: and to Plato, with his theory of Ideas, it ought to have presented a Real Idea or permanent One, which alone remained constant amidst an indefinite multitude of fugitive, shadowy, and deceptive, particulars. But though this is the consistent corollary, from Plato's theory of Ideas, he does not so state it in the *Treatise De Legibus*, and probably he did not so conceive it. Critics have already observed that in this *Treatise* scarce any mention is made of the theory of Ideas. Plato had passed into other points of view: yet he neither formally renounces the points of view which we find in anterior dialogues, nor takes the trouble of reconciling them with the thoughts of the later dialogues. Whether there exists any Real, Abstract, Idea of Hunting, apart from the particular acts and varieties of hunting—is a question which he does not touch upon. Yet this is the main feature of the Platonic philosophy, and the main doctrine most frequently impugned by Aristotle as Platonic.

Although, in regard to the religious worship of his community, the oracle of Delphi is asked to prescribe what sacrifices are to be offered, and to what Gods—yet the lawgiver will determine the number of such sacrifices and festivals, as well as the times and seasons.¹ Each day in the year, sacrifice will be offered by one of the magistrates to some God or Dæmon. Once in every month, there will be a solemn sacrifice and festival, with matches of music and gymnastica, offered by each tribe to its eponymous God. The offerings to the celestial Gods will be kept distinct from the offerings to the subterranean Gods. Among these last, Pluto will be especially worshipped during the twelfth month of the year. The festivals will be adjusted to the seasons, and there will on proper occasions be festivals for women separately and exclusively.²

Number of religious sacrifices to be determined by lawgiver.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 828.

² Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 828.

Once a month certainly—and more than once, if the magistrates command—on occasion of one of these festivals, all the citizen population are ordered to attend in military muster—men, women and children. They will be brought together in such divisions and detachments as the magistrate shall direct. They will here go through gymnastic and military exercises. They will also have fights, with warlike weapons not likely to inflict mortal wounds, yet involving sufficient danger to test their bravery and endurance: one against one, two against two, ten against ten.¹ The victors will receive honorary wreaths, and public encomium in appropriate songs. Both men and women will take part alike in these exercises and contests, and in the composition of the odes to celebrate the victors.²

Such monthly musters, over and above the constant daily gymnastics of the youthful population, are indispensable as preliminary training; without which the citizens cannot fight with efficiency and success, in the event of a real foreign enemy invading the territory.³ No athlete ever feels himself qualified to contend at the public games without the most laborious special training beforehand. Yet Plato expresses apprehension that his proposal of regular musters for warlike exercises with sham-battles, will appear ridiculous. He states that nothing of the kind existed in any Grecian city, by reason of two great corruptions:—First, the general love of riches and money-getting: Secondly, the bad governments everywhere existing, whether democracy, oligarchy, or despotism—each of which was in reality a faction or party-government, i.e., government by one part over another unwilling part.⁴

Plato prescribes that the gymnastic training in his community shall be such as to have a constant reference to war; and that elaborate bodily excellence, for the purpose

¹ Plat. Legg. viii. p. 833 E.

² Plat. Legg. viii. p. 839 B-E. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ λίγω σπαρταίᾳ τε περὶ καὶ τῆς ἐν ποικίλοις παθήσας γυναικί τε καὶ ἀνδράσιν ὁμοίως γίγνεσθαι δεῖν. 830 E: χρωμένους ὑποκρινόμενοι βίβασιν.

³ Plat. Legg. viii. p. 830.

⁴ Plat. Legg. viii. pp. 831-832.

I read with surprise the declaration

of Plato, that no such military training exercises existed anywhere in Greece. How is this to be reconciled with the statements of Xenophon in his Treatise on the Republic of the Lacedæmonians, wherein he expressly calls the Spartans τεχνίτας τῶν πολεμικῶν—or even with the statement of Plato himself about Sparta in the first book of this Treatise De Legibus? Compare Thucyd. v. 60.

simply of obtaining prizes at the public games, shall be discouraged. There will be foot-races, for men, for boys, and for young women up to twenty years of age—the men always running in full panoply.¹ Horse-racing is permitted, but chariot-racing is discountenanced.² There will also be practice with the bow and with other weapons of light warfare, in which the young women are encouraged to take part—yet not constrained, in deference to prevalent sentiment.³

In regard to sexual intercourse, Plato recognises that the difficulty of regulating it according to the wisdom of the lawgiver is greater in his city than in any actual city, because of the more free and public life of the women. Neither Krete nor Sparta furnish a good example to follow on this point.⁴ He thinks however that by causing one doctrine on the subject to be continually preached, and by preventing any other from being even mentioned, the lawgiver may be able so to consecrate this doctrine as to procure for it pretty universal obedience. The lawgiver may thus be able to suppress pæderasty altogether, and to restrict generally the sexual intercourse to that of persons legally married—or to enforce at least the restriction, that the exceptional cases of sexual intercourse departing from these conditions shall be covered with the veil of secrecy.⁵ The constant bodily exercises prescribed in the Platonic community will tend to diminish the influence of such appetites in the citizens: while the example of the distinguished prize combatants at the Olympic games, in whose long-continued training strict continence was practised, shows that even more than what Plato anticipates can be obtained, under the stimulus of sufficient motive.⁶

What is here proposed respecting the sexual appetite finds no approbation from Kleinias, since the customs in Krete were altogether different. But the Syssitia, or public mess-table for the citizens, are welcomed readily both by the Kretan and the Spartan. The Syssitia existed both in Krete and at Sparta; but

reference to
war, not to
athletic
prizes.

Regulation
of sexual
intercourse.
Syssitia or
public mess.

¹ Plat. Legg. viii. p. 833 B-C.

² Plat. Legg. viii. p. 834 B.

³ Plat. Legg. viii. p. 834 C-D.

⁴ Plat. Legg. viii. p. 836 B.

⁵ Plato, Legg. viii. p. 841.

⁶ Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 840 A, 841 A.

Compare the remarks which I have made above in this volume (p. 197) respecting the small probable influence of Aphrodite in the Platonic Republic. A like remark may be made, though not so emphatically, respecting the Platonic community in the *Leges*.

were regulated on very different principles in one and in the other. Plato declines to discuss this difference, pronouncing it to be unimportant. But Aristotle informs us what it was; and shows that material consequences turned upon it, in reference to the citizenship at Sparta.¹

Plato enters now upon the economical and proprietary rules proper for his community. As there will be neither gold and silver nor foreign commerce, he is dispensed from the necessity of making laws about shipments, retailing, interest, mine-digging, collectors of taxes, &c. The persons under his charge will be husbandmen, shepherds, bee-keepers, &c., with those who work under them, and with the artisans who supply implements to them.² The first and most important of all regulations is, the law of Zeus Horius or Terminalis—Not to disturb or transgress the boundary marks between different properties. Upon this depends the maintenance of those unalterable *fundi* or lots, which is the cardinal principle of the Platonic community. Severe penalties, religious as well as civil, are prescribed for offenders against this rule.³ Each proprietor is directed to have proper regard to the convenience of neighbours, and above all to abstain from annoying or damaging them, especially in regard to the transit, or retention, or distribution, of water. To intercept the supply, or corrupt the quality of water, is a high crime.⁴ Regulations are made about the carrying of the harvest, both of grain and fruit. Disputes arising upon these points are to be decided by the magistrates, up to the sum of three minæ: above that sum, by the public Dikasteria. Many rules of detail will require to be made by the magistrates themselves with a view to fulfil the purposes of the lawgiver. So soon as the magistrates think that enough of these regulations have been introduced, they will consecrate the system as it stands, rendering it perpetual and unalterable.⁵

¹ Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 842 B; Aristot. *Polit.* ii. 9-10, p. 1271, a. 26, 1272, a. 12. The statement of Aristotle, about the manner in which the cost of the Kretan *Symetia* was provided, while substantially agreeing with Ephorus (ap. Strabo. x. p. 480), does not exactly coincide with the account given by Dosiadas of the Kretans in Lyktus (ap. Athenæum, iv. p. 145). Compare Hoeckh, *Kreta*, vol. iii. pp. 134-138.

² Plato, *Legg.* viii. pp. 842 D, 846 D.

³ Plato, *Legg.* viii. pp. 842-843.

⁴ Plat. *Legg.* viii. pp. 844 A, 845 E.

⁵ Plat. *Legg.* viii. p. 846 A-D.

Next, Plato passes to the Demiurgi or Artisans. These are all non-citizens or metics: for it is a peremptory law, that no citizen shall be an artisan in any branch. Nor is any artisan permitted to carry on two crafts or trades at once.¹ If any article be imperatively required from abroad, either for implements of war or for religious purposes, the magistrates shall cause it to be imported. But there shall be no retailing, nor reselling with profit, of any article.²

Regulations
about arti-
sans—Dis-
tribution of
the annual
landed
produce.

The distribution of the produce of land shall be made on a principle approaching to that which prevails in Krete.³ The total produce raised will be distributed into twelve portions, each equivalent to one month's consumption. Each twelfth portion will then be divided into equal thirds. Two of these thirds will be consumed by the citizens, their families, their slaves, and their agricultural animals: the other third will be sold in the market for the consumption of artisans and strangers, who alone are permitted to buy it, all citizens being forbidden to do so. Each citizen will make the apportionment of his own two-thirds among freemen and slaves: a measured quantity shall then be given to each of the working animals.⁴ On the first of each month, the sale of barley and wheat will be made in the market-place, and every artisan or stranger will then purchase enough for his monthly consumption: the like on the twelfth of each month, for wine and other liquids—and on the twentieth of each month, for animals and animal products, such as wool and hides. Firewood may be purchased daily by any stranger or artisan, from the proprietors on whose lands the trees grow, and may be resold by him to other artisans: other articles can only be sold at the monthly market-days. The Agoranomi, or regulators of the market, will preside on those days, and will fix the spots on which the different goods shall be exposed for sale. They will also take account of the quantity which each man has for sale, fixing a certain price for each article. They will then adjust the entries of each man's property in the public registers according to these new transactions. But if the actual purchases

¹ Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 846 D-E.

² Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 847.

³ Plato, *Legg.* viii. p. 847 E. ἐγγίς τῆς τοῦ Κρητικῶν νόμου.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* viii. pp. 847-848.

and sales be made at any rate different from what is thus fixed, the Agoranomi will modify their entries in the register according to the actual rate, either in plus or in minus. These entries of individual property in the public register will be made both for citizens and resident strangers alike.¹

It shall be open to any one who chooses, to come and reside in the city as a stranger or artisan to exercise his craft, without payment of any fee, simply on condition of good conduct; and of being enrolled with his property in the register. But he shall not acquire any fixed settlement. After twenty years, he must depart and take away his property. When he departs, the entries belonging to his name, in the proprietary register, shall be cancelled. If he has a son, the son may also exercise the same art and reside as a metic in the city for twenty years, but no longer; beginning from the age of fifteen. Any metic who may render special service to the city, may have his term prolonged, the magistrates and the citizens consenting.²

Plato now passes to the criminal code of his community: the determination of offences, penalties, and penal judicature. Serious and capital offences will be judged by the thirty-seven Nomophylakes, in conjunction with a Board of Select Dikasta, composed of the best among the magistrates of the preceding year.³ They will hear first the pleading of the accuser, next that of the accused: they will then proceed, in the order of seniority, to put questions to both these persons, sifting the matter of charge. Plato requires them to be active in this examination, and to get at the facts by mental effort of their own. They will take notes of the examination, then seal up the tablet, and deposit it upon the altar of Hestia. On the morrow they will reassemble and repeat their examination, hearing witnesses and calling for information respecting the affair. On the third day, again the like: after which they will deliver their verdict on the altar of

¹ Plato, Legg. viii. pp. 849-850. These regulations are given both briefly and obscurely.

² Plato, Legg. viii. p. 860.

³ Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 855-856. This judicial Board is mentioned also in

xi. pp. 926 D, 928 B, 933 B, under the title of τὸ τῶν ἐκρίτων δικαστήριον—τὸ τῶν ἐλεγκτῶν δικαστήριον. It forms the parallel to the Areiopagus at Athens. See K. F. Hermann, *De Vestigiis Institut. Attic.*, &c., pp. 45-46, &c.

Hestia. Upon this altar two urns will be placed, for condemnation and acquittal: each Dikast will deposit his pebble in one or other of these, openly before the accuser and accused, and before the assembled citizens.¹

Conformably to the general sentiment announced still more distinctly in the Republic, Plato speaks here also of penal legislation as if it were hardly required. He regards it as almost an insult to assume that any of his citizens can grow up capable of committing grave crimes, when they have been subjected to such a training, discipline, and government as he institutes. Still human nature is perverse: we must provide for the occurrence of some exceptional criminals among our citizens, even after all our precautionary supervision: besides, over and above the citizens, we have metics and slaves to watch over.²

The first and gravest of all crimes is Sacrilege: pillage or destruction of places or objects consecrated to the Gods. Next comes high treason: either betrayal of the city to foreign enemies, or overthrow of the established laws and government. Persons charged with these crimes shall be tried before the Select Dikasts, or High Court above constituted. If found guilty, they shall be punished either capitally or by such other sentence as the court may award. But no sentence either of complete disfranchisement or of perpetual banishment can be passed against any citizen, because every one of the 5040 lots of land must always remain occupied.³ Nor can any citizen be fined to any greater extent than what he possesses over and above his lot of land. He may be imprisoned, or flogged, or exposed in the pillory, or put to do

Sacrilege,
the gravest
of all crimes.
High Treason.

¹ Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 855-856. Compare the procedure before the Areiopagus at Athens, as described by Schömann, Antiq. Juris Publ. Græc. Part v. s. 63, p. 292. It does not appear that the Areiopagites at Athens were in the practice of exercising any such ἀνέκριστος of the parties before them, as Plato enjoins upon his ἐλεγκτοὶ δικάστοι: though it was competent to the Dikasts at Athens to put questions if they chose. Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, p. 718.

² Plato, Legg. ix. p. 853 C-D-E.

³ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 855 C.

Compare the penalties inflicted by Plato with those which were inflicted

in Attic procedure. Meier und Schömann, Der Attische Prozess, pp. 739-740 seq. There is considerable difference between the two, arising to a great degree out of Plato's peculiar institution about the unalterable number of lots of land (5040) and of citizen families—as well as out of his fixation of maximum and minimum of property. Flogging or beating is prescribed by Plato, but had no place at Athens: ἀτιμία was a frequent punishment at Athens: Plato's substitute for it seems to be the pillory—τιμὰς ἀμρόφους ὄρας. Fine was frequent at Athens as a punishment: Plato is obliged to employ it sparingly.

penance in some sacred precinct. But his punishment shall noway extend to his children, unless persons of the same family shall be condemned to death for three successive generations. Should this occur, the family shall be held as tainted. Their lot of land shall be considered vacant, and assigned to some deserving young man of another citizen family.¹

Theft.—Plato next adverts to theft, and prescribes that the punishment for a convicted thief shall be one and the same in all cases—to compensate the party robbed to the extent of double the value of the property, or to be imprisoned until he does so.² But upon a question being raised, how far one and the same *pœna dupli*, neither more nor less, can be properly applied to all cases of theft, we are carried (according to the usual unsystematic manner of the Platonic dialogue) into a general discussion on the principles of penal legislation. We are reminded that the Platonic lawgiver looks beyond the narrow and defective objects to which all other lawgivers have hitherto unwisely confined themselves.³ He is under no pressing necessity to legislate at once: he can afford time for preliminary discussion and exposition: he desires to instruct his citizens respecting right and wrong, as well as to constrain their acts by penalty.⁴ As he is better qualified than the poets to enlighten them about the just and honourable, so the principles which he lays down ought to have more weight than the verses of Homer or Tyrtaeus.⁵ In regard to Justice and Injustice generally, there are points on which Plato differs from the public, and also points on which the public are at variance with themselves. For example, every one is unanimous in affirming that whatever is just is also beautiful or honourable. But if this be true, then not only what is justly done, but also what is justly suffered, is beautiful or honourable. Now the penalty of death, inflicted on the sacrilegious person, is justly

¹ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 856 D.

² Plato, Legg. ix. p. 857 A. xii. p. 941. The Solonian Law at Athens provided, that if a man was sued for theft under the *ἰδία δική κλοῆς*, he should be condemned to the *pœna dupli* and to a certain *προστίμημα* besides (Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. 733-736). But it seems that the thief

might be indicted by a *γραφή*, and then the punishment might be heavier. See Aulus Gellius, xi. 18, and chap. xi. of my 'History of Greece,' p. 189.

³ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 857 C. *τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν νόμων δέσιν οὐδὲν πρότερον πᾶσι γέγονεν ὁρθῶς διαπεραιωμένα, &c.*

⁴ Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 857 E, 858 A.

⁵ Plato, Legg. ix. pp. 858-859.

inflicted. It must therefore be beautiful or honourable: yet every one agrees in declaring it to be shocking and infamous. Here there is an inconsistency or contradiction in the opinions of the public themselves.¹

But Plato differs from the public on another point also. He affirms all wicked or unjust men to be unwillingly wicked or unjust: he affirms that no man does injustice willingly.² How is he to carry out this maxim in his laws? He cannot make any distinction (as all existing cities make it) in the penalties prescribed for voluntary injustice, and for involuntary injustice; for he does not recognise the former as real.³ He must explain upon what foundation his dissent from the public rests. He discriminates between *Damnum* and *Injuria*—between Damage or Hurt, and Injustice. When damage is done, it is sometimes done voluntarily—sometimes, and quite as often, involuntarily. The public call this latter by the name of involuntary injustice; but in Plato's view it is no injustice at all. Injustice is essentially distinct from damage: it depends on the temper, purpose, or disposition of the agent, not on the result as affecting the patient. A man may be unjust when he is conferring benefit upon another, as well as when he is doing hurt to another. Whether the result be beneficial or hurtful, the action will be right or wrong, and the agent just or unjust, according to the condition of his own mind in doing it.⁴

All unjust men are unjust involuntarily—No such thing as voluntary injustice. Injustice depends upon the temper of the agent—Distinction between damage and injury.

The real distinction therefore (according to Plato) is not between voluntary and involuntary injustice, but between voluntary and involuntary damage. Voluntary damage is injustice, but it is not voluntary injustice. The unjust agent, so far forth as unjust, acts involuntarily: he is under the perverting influ-

Damage may be voluntary or involuntary—Injustice is shown often by

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 859-860.
The same argument is employed by Sokrates in the *Gorgias*, p. 476 E.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 860 D-E.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 861 E. ἡ δὲ κατὰ πάσας τὰς πόλεις ὑπὸ νομοθετῶν πάντων τῶν πάντοτε γινομένων ὡς δὲ

εἰδὴ τῶν ἀδικημάτων ὅσα, τὰ μὲν ἐκούσια, τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ταῦτα καὶ νομοθετεῖται.

The eighth chapter, fifth Book, of Aristotle's *Nikomachean Ethics*, discusses this question more instructively than Plato.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 861-862.

conferring corrupt profit upon another—Purpose of punishment, to heal the distemper of the criminal.

ence of mental distemper. He must be compelled to make good the damage which he has done, or to offer such requital as may satisfy the feelings of the person damaged: and he must besides be subjected to such treatment as will heal the distemper of his mind, so that he will not be disposed to do farther voluntary damage in future. And he ought to be subjected to this treatment equally, whether his mental distemper (injustice) has shown itself in doing wilful damage to another, or in conferring corrupt profit on another—in taking away another man's property, or in giving away his own property wrongfully.¹ The healing treatment may be different in different cases: discourses addressed, or works imposed—pleasures or pains, honour or disgrace, fine or otherwise. But in all cases the purpose is one and the same—to heal the distemper of his mind, and to make him hate injustice. If he be found incurable, he must be put to death. It is a gain for himself to die, and a still greater gain for society that he should die, since his execution will serve as a warning to others.²

Of misguided or erroneous proceeding there are in the human mind three producing causes, acting separately or conjointly:—1. The painful stimulus—Anger, Envy, Hatred, or Fear. 2. The seductive stimulus, of Pleasure or Desire. 3. Ignorance. Ignorance is twofold:—1. Ignorance pure and simple. 2. Ignorance combined with the false persuasion of knowledge. This last again is exhibited under two distinguishable cases:—1. When combined with power; and in this case it produces grave and enormous crimes. 2. When found in weak persons, children or old men, in which case it produces nothing worse than slight and venial offences, giving little trouble to the lawgiver.³

Now the unjust man (Plato tells us) is he in whose mind

¹ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 863 B. οὐτ' εἰ τις τῆ διδωσί τι τῶν ὄντων οὐτ' εἰ τοῖναντίον ἀφαιρείται, δίκαιον ἀπλῶς ἢ ἀδικον χρή τὸ τοιοῦτον οὕτω λέγειν, ἀλλ' εἰδὼν ὅθι καὶ δικαίῳ τρόπῳ χροῦμαι τις ὠφελεῖ τινα τι καὶ βλάπτῃ, τοῦτο ἐστὶ τῆ νομοθέτη θεατεῖον, καὶ

πρὸς δύο ταῦτα δὴ βλεπτεῖον, πρὸς τὴ ἀδικίαν καὶ βλαβήν.

² Plato, Legg. ix. p. 863 C-E.

³ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 863 C. Τρίτον μὲν ἄγνοίαν λέγων ἂν τις τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἰτίαν οὐκ ἂν ψεύδοιτο.

either one or other of the two first causes are paramount, and not controuled by Reason: either Hatred, Anger, Fear—or else Appetite and the Desire of Pleasure. What he does under either of these two stimuli is unjust, whether he damages any one else or not. But if neither of these two stimuli be prevalent in his mind—if, on the contrary, both of them are subordinated to the opinion which he entertains about what is good and right—then everything which he does is just, even though he falls into error. If in this state of mind he hurts any one else, it will be simply *hurt*, not injustice. Those persons are incorrect who speak of it as injustice, but as involuntary injustice. The proceedings of such a man may be misguided or erroneous, but they will never be unjust.¹

The unjust man is under the influence either of the first or second of these causes, without controul of Reason. If he acts under controul of Reason, though the Reason be bad, he is not unjust.

All these three causes may realise themselves in act under three varieties of circumstances: 1. By open and violent deeds. 2. By secret, deceitful, premeditated contrivance. 3. By a combination of both the two. Our laws must make provision for all the three.²

Such is the theory here advanced by Plato to reconcile his views and recommendations in the *Leges* with a doctrine which he had propounded and insisted upon elsewhere:—That no man commits injustice voluntarily—That all injustice is involuntary, arising from ignorance—That every one would be just, if he only knew wherein justice consists—That knowledge, when it exists in the mind, will exercise controul and preponderance over the passions and appetites.³

Reasoning of Plato to save his doctrine. That no man commits injustice voluntarily.

The distinction whereby Plato here proposes to save all inconsistency, is a distinction between misconduct or misguided actions (*ἀμαρτήματα*, or *ἀμαρτανόμενα*), and unjust actions (*ἀδίκηματα*). The last of these categories is comprised by him

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 864 A. τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀρίστου δόξαν, ὅτι περ ἐν ἴσασθαι τοῦτο ἡγήσονται πᾶσι εἴτε ἰδιῶται πινει, ἐάν αὐτὴ κρατούσα ἐν ψυχῇ διακομῇ πάντα ἄνδρα, καὶ σφάλῃται τι, δίκαιοι μὲν πάν εἶναι τὸ ταύτῃ πράχθην καὶ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρχῆς γυγόμενον

ἐπὶ σκοπὸν ἐκείνων, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν ἀναστὰς ἀνθρώπων βίον ἀρίστον.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 864 C.

³ Compare *Legg.* v. p. 781 C; *Timæus*, p. 86 D; *Republic*, ix. p. 589 C; *Protagoras*, pp. 345 D—352 D.

in the first, as one species or variety thereof. That is, all *ἀδικήματα* are *ἀμαρτήματα*: but all *ἀμαρτήματα* are not *ἀδικήματα*. He reckons three distinct causes of *ἀμαρτήματα*: two belonging to the emotional department of mind; one to the intellectual. Those *ἀμαρτήματα* which arise from either of the two first causes are also *ἀδικήματα*: those which arise from the third are not *ἀδικήματα*.

This is the distinction which Plato here draws, with a view to save consistency in his own doctrine—at least as far as I can understand it, for the reasoning is not clear. It proceeds upon a restricted definition, peculiar to himself, of the word *injustice*—a restriction, however, which coincides in part with that which he gives of Justice in the Republic,¹ where he treats Justice as consisting in the controul exercised over Passion and Appetite (the emotional department) by Reason (the intellectual): each of the three departments of the soul or each of the three separate souls, keeping in its own place, and discharging its own appropriate functions. Every act which a man does under the influence of persuasion or opinion of the best, is held by Plato to be *just*—whatever his persuasion may be—whether it be true or false.² If he be sincerely persuaded that he is acting for the best, he cannot commit injustice.

Injustice being thus restricted to mean the separate and unregulated action of emotional impulse—and such unregulated action being, as a general fact, a cause of misery to the agent—Plato's view is, that no man is voluntarily unjust: for no man wishes to be miserable. Every man wishes to be happy: therefore every man wishes to be just: because some controul of impulse by reason is absolutely essential to happiness. When once such controul is established, a man becomes just: he no longer commits injustice. But he may still commit misconduct, and very gross misconduct: moreover, this misconduct will be, or may be, voluntary. For though the rational soul be now preponderant and controuling over the emotional (which controul constitutes *justice*), yet the

Peculiar definition of Injustice. A man may do great voluntary hurt to others, and yet not be unjust, provided he does it under the influence of Reason, and not of Appetite.

¹ Plato, *Republ.* iv. pp. 443-444.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 863 C, 864 A.

rational soul itself may be imperfectly informed (ignorance simple); or may not only be ignorant, but preoccupied besides with false persuasions and prejudices. Under such circumstances the just man may commit misconduct, and do serious hurt to others. What he does may be done voluntarily, in full coincidence with his own will: for the will postulates only the controul of reason over emotion, and here that condition is fulfilled, the fault lying with the controuling reason itself.

Plato's reasoning here (obscure and difficult to follow) is intended to show that there can be no voluntary *injustice*, but that there is much both of voluntary *misconduct*, and voluntary *mischief*. His purpose as law-giver is to prevent or remedy not only (what he calls) *injustice*, but also misconduct and mischief. As a remedy for mischief done, he prescribes that the agent thereof shall make full compensation to the sufferer. As an antidote to injustice, he applies his educational discipline as well as his penal and remuneratory treatment, to the emotions, with a view to subdue some and develop others.¹ As a corrective to misconduct in all its branches, he assumes to himself as law-giver a spiritual power, applied to the improvement of the rational or intellectual man: prescribing what doctrines and beliefs shall be accredited in his city, tolerating no others, and forbidding all contradiction, or dissident individuality of judgment.² He thus ensures that every man's individual reason shall be in harmony with the infallible reason.

Plato's purpose in the Laws is to prevent or remedy not only *injustice* but *misconduct*.

¹ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 862 C-D.

² K. F. Hermann, in his valuable Dissertation, De Vestigiis Institutum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonem de Legibus libros indagandis, Marburg, 1836, p. 55, says:—"Philosophi (Platonis) manum novatricem in his tantum agnosco, quæ de exilii tempore pro diversis criminum fontibus diverso arguitur; qui quum omnino omnino, nisi fallor, primus in hoc ipso Legum Opere veterem usque receptam criminum divisionem in voluntaria et invita reprehenderit, eaque secundum tres animi partes trifariam distribuerit, ita hic quoque mediam inter imprudentiam et dolum malum iracundiam inseruit, quæ quis motus eadem vel exemplo committeret vel etiam posterius animum suum sanguine expleret."

I do not conceive Plato's reasoning exactly in the same way as Hermann. Plato denies only the reality of *ἀνομία ἀδικήματα*: he considers all *ἀδικήματα* as essentially *ἀνομία*. But he does not deny *ἀνομία ἀμαρτήματα* (which is the large genus comprehending *ἀδικήματα* as one species): he recognises both *ἀμαρτήματα ἰσχύοντα* and *ἀμαρτήματα ἀνομία*. And he considers the *ἀμαρτήματα* arising from *θυμὸς* to be midway between the two. But he also recognises *ἀμαρτήματα* as springing from the three different sources in the human mind. The two positions are not incompatible; though the whole discussion is obscured by the perplexing distinction between *ἀμαρτήματα* and *ἀδικήματα*.

The peculiar sense in which Plato uses the words justice and injustice is perplexing throughout this discussion. The words, as he uses them, coincide only in part with the ordinary meaning. They comprehend more in one direction, and less in another.

Plato now proceeds to promulgate laws in respect to homicide, wounds, beating, &c.

Homicide, however involuntary and unintentional, taints the person by whose hands it is committed. He must undergo purification, partly by such expiatory ceremonies as the *Exêgêtæ* may appoint, partly by a temporary exile from the places habitually frequented by the person slain : who even after death (according to the doctrine of an ancient fable, which Plato here ratifies¹), if he saw the homicidal agent among his prior haunts, while the occurrence was yet recent, would be himself disturbed, and would communicate tormenting disturbance to the agent. This latter accordingly is commanded to leave the territory for a year, and to refrain from visiting any of the sacred precincts until he has been purified. If he obeys, the relatives of the person slain shall forgive him ; and he shall, after his year's exile, return to his ordinary abode and citizenship. But if he evades obedience, these relatives shall indict him for the act, and he shall incur double penalties. Should the nearest relative, under these circumstances, neglect to indict, he may himself be indicted by any one who chooses, and shall be condemned to an exile of five years.²

Plato provides distinct modes of proceeding for this same act of involuntary homicide, under varieties of persons and circumstances—citizens, metics, strangers, slaves, &c. He especially lays it down that physicians, if a patient dies under their hands, they being unwilling—shall be held innocent, and shall not need purification.³

After involuntary homicide, Plato passes to the case of homicide committed under violent passion or provocation ; which he ranks as intermediate between the involuntary and the voluntary—

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 865 A-D—866 B. Compare Antiphon. *Accus. Cæd.* p. 116, and Lobeck, *Aglaophamus*, p. 301. The old law of Draco is given in substance in Demosthen. *adv. Leptin.* p.

506. '*Ἀνεπιαντιμός*, compulsory year of exile. K. F. Hermann, *Griechische Privat-Alterthümer*, s. 61, not. 22.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 866.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 865 B.

approaching the one or the other, according to circumstances :¹ according as it is done instantaneously, or with more or less of interval and premeditation. If the act be committed instantaneously, the homicide shall undergo two years' exile : if after time for deliberation, the time of exile must be extended to three years.² But if the slain person before his death shall have expressed forgiveness, the case shall be dealt with as one of involuntary homicide.³ Special enactments are made for the case of a slave killed by a citizen, a citizen killed by a slave, a son killed by his father, a wife by her husband, &c., under the influence of passion or strong provocation. Homicide in self-defence against a previous aggressor is allowed universally.⁴

Thirdly, Plato passes to the case of homicide voluntary, the extreme of injustice, committed under the influence of pleasure, appetite, envy, jealousy, ambition, fear of divulgation of dangerous secrets, &c.—homicide premeditated and unjust. Among all these causes, the chief and most frequent is love of wealth ; which gets possession of most men, in consequence of the untrue and preposterous admiration of wealth imbibed in their youth from the current talk and literature. The next in frequency is the competition of ambitious men for power or rank.⁵ Whoever has committed homicide upon a fellow-citizen, under these circumstances, shall be interdicted from all the temples and other public places, and shall be indicted by the nearest relatives of the deceased. If found guilty, he shall be put to death : if he leave the country to evade trial, he must be banished in perpetuity. The nearest relative is bound to indict, otherwise he draws down upon himself the taint, and may himself be indicted. Certain sacrifices and religious ceremonies will be required in such cases, to accompany the legal procedure. These, together with the names of the Gods proper to invoke, will be prescribed by the Nomophylakes, in conjunction with the prophets and the *Exêgêtæ*, or religious interpreters.⁶ The *Dikasts* before whom such trials will take place are the Nomophylakes, together with some select persons from the magistrates of the past year : the same as in the

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 806 E. *θυμῇ καὶ ὄντι προηλασθέντες λόγους ἢ καὶ ἐπιμοῖς ἔργους . . . μεταξύ του τοῦ τε ἀκούσιου καὶ ἀκούσιον.*

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 807 D.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 809 D.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 808-809 C.

⁵ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 870.

⁶ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 871.

case of sacrilege and treason.¹ The like procedure and penalty will be employed against any one who has contrived the death of another, not with his own hands, but by suborning some third person: except that this contriver may be buried within the limits of the territory, while the man whose hands are stained with blood cannot be buried therein.²

For the cases of homicide between kinsmen or relatives, Plato provides a form of procedure still more solemn, and a still graver measure of punishment. He also declares suicide to leave a taint upon the country, which requires to be purified as the *Exêgêtæ* may prescribe: unless the act has been committed under extreme pain or extreme disgrace. The person who has killed himself must be buried apart without honour, not in the regular family burying places.³ The most cruel mode of death is directed to be inflicted upon a slave who has voluntarily slain, or procured to be slain, a freeman. If a slave be put to death without any fault of his own, but only from apprehension of secrets which he may divulge, the person who kills him shall be subjected to the same trial and sentence as if he had killed a citizen.⁴ If any animal, or even any lifeless object, has caused the death of a man, the surviving relatives must prosecute, and the animal or the object must be taken away from the country.⁵

Justifiable Homicide.—Some special cases are named in which homicide he who voluntarily kills another, is nevertheless perfectly untainted. A housebreaker caught in act may thus be rightfully slain: so also a clothes-stealer, a ravisher, a person who attacks the life of any man's father, mother, or children.⁶

Wounds.—Next to homicide, Plato deals with wounds inflicted: introducing his enactments by a preface on the wounds. general necessity of obedience to law.⁷ Whosoever, having intended to kill another (except in the special cases wherein homicide is justifiable), inflicts a wound which proves

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 871 D.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 872 A.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 873.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 872 D.

⁵ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 873 E. He makes exception of the cases in which

death of a man is caused by thunder or some such other misale from the Gods—πλὴν ὅσα κεραυνὸς ἢ τι παρὰ θεοῦ τοιοῦτον βίβλος ἰδύ.

⁶ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 874 C.

⁷ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 875.

not mortal, is as criminal as if he had killed him. Nevertheless he is not required to suffer so severe a punishment, inasmuch as an auspicious Dæmon and Fortune have interposed to ward off the worst results of his criminal purpose. He must make full compensation to the sufferer, and then be exiled in perpetuity.¹ The Dikastery will decide how much compensation he shall furnish. In general, Plato trusts much to the discretion of the Dikastery, under the great diversity of the cases of wounds inflicted. He would not have allowed so much discretion to the numerous and turbulent Dikasteries of Athens: but he regards his select Dikastery as perfectly trustworthy.² Peculiar provision is made for cases in which the person inflicting the wound is kinsman or relative of the sufferer—also for homicide under the same circumstances. Plato also directs how to supply the vacancy which perpetual banishment will occasion in the occupation of one among the 5040 citizen-lots.³ If one man wounds another in a fit of passion, he must pay simple, double, or triple, compensation according as the Dikasts may award: he must farther do all the military duty which would have been incumbent on the wounded man, should the latter be disabled.⁴ But if the person inflicting the wound be a slave and the wounded man a freeman, the slave shall be handed over to the wounded freeman to deal with as he pleases. If the master of the slave will not give him up, he must himself make compensation for the wound, unless he can prove before the Dikastery that the case is one of collusion between the wounded freeman and the slave; in which case the wounded freeman will become liable to the charge of unlawfully suborning away the slave from his master.⁵

Beating.—The laws of Plato on the subject of beating are more peculiar. They are mainly founded in reverence for *Infliction of* age. One who strikes a person twenty years older *blows* than himself, is severely punished: but if he strikes a person of the same age with himself, that person must defend himself as he can with his own hands—no punishment being provided.⁶ For

¹ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 877 A.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 876 A.

³ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 877.

g. ix. p. 878 C.

⁵ Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 879 A.

⁶ Plato, *Legg.* ix. pp. 879-880.

The person who struck first blow was guilty of *aisia*, Demosth. *adv. Euerget.* and *Mnesibul.* pp. 1141-1161.

him who strikes his father or mother, the heaviest penalty, excommunication and perpetual banishment, is provided.¹ If a slave strike a freeman, he shall be punished with as many blows as the person stricken directs, nevertheless in such manner as not to diminish his value to his master.²

Throughout all this Treatise De Legibus, in regard both to civil and criminal enactments, Plato has borrowed largely from Attic laws and procedure. But in regard to homicide and wounds, he has borrowed more largely than in any other department. Both the general character, and the particular details, of his provisions respecting homicide, are in close harmony with ancient Athenian sentiment, and with the embodiments of that sentiment by the lawgivers Drako and Solon. At Athens, though the judicial procedure generally, as well as the political constitution, underwent great modification between the time of Solon and that of Demosthenes, yet the procedure in the case of homicide remained without any material change. It was of a sanctified character, depending mainly upon ancient religious tradition. The person charged with homicide was not tried before the general body of Dikasts, drawn by lot, but before special ancient tribunals and in certain consecrated places, according to the circumstances under which the act of homicide was charged. The principal object contemplated, was to protect the city and its public buildings against the injurious consequences arising from the presence of a tainted man—and to mollify the posthumous wrath of the person slain. This view of the Attic procedure³ against homicide is copied by the Platonic. Plato keeps prominently in view the religious

¹ Plato, Legg. ix. p. 881.

² Plato, Legg. p. 882 A.

³ The oration of Demosthenes against Aristokrates treats copiously of this subject, pp. 627-646. εἰπεὶν τῆς τοῦ παθόντος παρτίδος, δίκαιον εἶναι—δοῦναι τῇ παθόντι ἑστῇ μετὰ, τοῦτον εἰπεὶ τὸν δεδρακότα, πρῶτον μὲν τῆς παρτίδος (632-633).

The first of Matthiæ's Dissertations, De Judiciis Atheniensium (Miscellanea Philologica, vol. i. pp. 145-176), collects the information on these matters: and K. F. Hermann (De Vestigiis

Institutorum Veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis De Legibus Libros indagandis, Marburg, 1836) gives a detailed comparison of Plato's directions with what we know about the Attic Law:—"Ipsas homicidiorum religiones (Plato) ex antiquissimo jure patrio in suum ita transtulit, ut nihil opportunius ad illustranda illius vestigia inveniri posse videatur" (p. 49). . . . "quæ omnia Solonis Draconisve in legibus ferè ad verbum eadem inveniuntur" (p. 50). The same about τρεῖς μέρη ἐκ πρῶτος, pp. 68-69.

bearing and consequences of such an act; he touches comparatively little upon its consequences in causing distress and diminishing the security of life. He copies the Attic law both in the justifications which he admits for homicide, and in the sentence of banishment which he passes against both animals and inanimate objects to whom any man owes his death. He goes beyond the Attic law in the solemnity and emphasis of his details about homicide among members of the same family and relatives: as well as in the severe punishment which he imposes upon the surviving relatives of the person slain, if they should neglect their obligation of indicting.¹ Throughout all this chapter, Plato not only follows the Attic law, but overpasses it, in dealing with homicide as a portion of the *Jus Sacrum* rather than of the *Jus Civile*.

In respect to the offence of beating, he does not follow the Attic law, when he permits it between citizens of the same age, and throws the beaten person upon his powers of self-defence. This is Spartan, not Athenian. It is also Spartan when he makes the criminality, in giving blows, to turn upon the want of reverence for age: upon the circumstance, that the person beaten is twenty years older than the beater.²

From these various crimes—sacrilege or plunder of holy places, theft, homicide, wounding, beating—Plato passes in the tenth book to insult or outrage (*ὕβρις*). These outrages (he considers) are essentially the acts of wild young men. Outrage may be offered towards five different subjects. 1. Public temples. 2. Private chapels and sepulchres. 3. Parents. 4. The magistrates, in their dignity or their possessions. 5. Private citizens, in respect of their civic rights and dignity.³ The tenth book is devoted entirely to the two first-mentioned heads, or to impiety and its alleged sources: the others come elsewhere, not in any definite order.⁴

Impiety or outrage offered to divine things or places.

¹ K. F. Hermann, *De Vestigiis*, ut supra, p. 54. Compare Demosthenes *adv. Theokrin.* p. 1331.

² Plato, *Legg.* ix. p. 879 C. He admits the same provision as to blows between *ἡλικας* into his Republic (v. p. 464 E).

Compare, about Sparta, Xenophon, *Rep. Laced.* iv. 5; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*

v. 27; Pausanias, iii. 14; Dionys. Halikarnass. *Arch. Rom.* xx. 2. *Δεκε- δαιμόνιοι ὅτι τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις ἐπ' ἑρπε- σιν τοῖς ἀκοσμοῦντας τῶν πολιτῶν ἐν ὅτῃ δὲ τινὲ τῶν δημοσίων τόπων ταῖς βακτηρίαις παύει.*

³ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 934-935.

⁴ Treatment of parents comes xi. pp. 930-931.

Plato declares that all impiety, either in word or deed, springs from one of three heretical doctrines. 1. The heretic does not believe in the Gods at all. 2. He believes the Gods to exist, but believes also that they do not interest themselves about human affairs; or at least that they interfere only to a small extent. 3. He believes that they exist, and that they direct every thing; but that it is perfectly practicable to appease their displeasure, and to conciliate their favour, by means of prayer and sacrifice.¹

All impiety arises from one or other of three heresies. 1. No belief in the Gods. 2. Belief that the Gods interfere very little. 3. Belief that they may be appeased by prayer and sacrifice.

Punishment for these three heretical beliefs, with or without overt act.

If a person displays impiety, either by word or deed, in either of these three ways, he shall be denounced to the archons by any citizen who becomes acquainted with the fact. The archons, on pain of taking the impiety on themselves, shall assemble the dikastery, and put the person accused on trial. If found guilty, he shall be put in chains and confined

in one or other of the public prisons. These public prisons are three in number: one in the market-place, for ordinary offenders: a second, called the House of Correction (*σφρονιστήριον*), attached to the building in which the Supreme Board of Magistrates hold their nocturnal sittings: a third, known by some designation of solemn penalty, in the centre of the territory, but in some savage and desolate spot.²

Suppose the heretic, under either one of the three heads, to be found guilty of heresy pure and simple—but that his conduct has been just, temperate, unexceptionable, and his social dispositions steadily manifested, esteeming the society of just men, and shunning that of the unjust.³ There is still danger that by open speech or scoffing he should shake the orthodox belief of others: he must therefore be chained in the house of Correction for a term not less than five years. During this

Heretic, whose conduct has been virtuous and faultless, to be imprisoned for five years, perhaps more.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 885.

² Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 908. δεσμεύει μὲν οὖν ὑπαρχόντων πᾶσι· δεσμευτήριον δὲ ὄντων ἐν τῇ πόλει πρῶν, &c.

Imprisonment included chains round the prisoner's legs. Sokrates was put in chains during his thirty days' confinement, arising from the voyage of the Theoric ship to Delos (*Plat.*

Phædon, p. 60 B).

³ Plato, *Legg.* p. 908 B-E. ὁ γὰρ ἄν, μὴ ρομφόρῃ θεοὺς εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, ἥδ' οὐ φέροι προσηλγήται δικαίον, μισοῦντί τε γίγνεται τοὺς κακοὺς, καὶ τῷ δυσχεραίνειν τὴν ἀδικίαν οὐτε τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις προσέειναι πράττειν, τοὺς τε μὴ δικαίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων φεύγουσι, καὶ τοὺς δικαίους στέργουσιν, &c.

term no citizen whatever shall be admitted to see him, except the members of the Nocturnal Council of Magistrates. These men will constantly commune with him, administering exhortations for the safety of his soul and for his improvement. If at the expiration of the five years, he appears to be cured of his heresy and restored to a proper state of mind, he shall be set at liberty, and allowed to live with other proper-minded persons. But if no such cure be operated, and if he shall be found guilty a second time of the same offence, he shall suffer the penalty of death.¹

Again—the heretic may be found guilty, not of heresy pure and simple in one of its three varieties, but of heresy manifesting itself in bad conduct and with aggravating circumstances. He may conceal his real opinion, and acquire the reputation of the best dispositions, employing that reputation to overreach others, and combining dissolute purposes with superior acuteness and intelligence: he may practise stratagems to succeed as a despot, a public orator, a general, or a sophist: he may take up, and will more frequently take up, the profession of a prophet or religious ritualist or sorcerer, professing to invoke the dead or to command the aid of the Gods by prayer and sacrifice. He may thus try to bring ruin upon citizens, families, and cities.² A heretic of this description (says Plato) deserves death not once or twice only, but several times over, if it were possible.³ If found guilty he must be kept in chains for life in the central penal prison—not allowed to see any freemen—not visited by any one, except the slave who brings to him his daily rations. When he dies, his body must be cast out of the territory without burial: and any freeman who may assist in burying it, shall himself incur the penalty of impiety. From the day that the heretic is imprisoned, he shall be considered as civilly dead; his children being placed under wardship as orphans.⁴

Heretic with bad conduct—punishment to be inflicted.

As a still farther assurance for reaching and punishing these

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 900 A. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ μηδεὶς τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτοῖς ἄλλος συγγινώσθω, πλὴν οἱ τοῦ νυκτερινοῦ βουλῶνος κοινωνοῦντες, ἐπὶ ρουθεσίᾳ τε καὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς σωτηρίᾳ ἀμιλουντες.

² Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 908-909.

³ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 908 E. ὅν τὸ μὲν εἰρωτικὸν οὐχ ἰσὺς οὐδὲ δυοῖν ἄξια θαράτουν ἀμαρτάνον, &c.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 900 C.

No private worship or religious rites allowed. Every citizen must worship at the public temples.

dangerous heretics, Plato enacts—No one shall erect any temple or altar, no one shall establish any separate worship or sacrifice, in his own private precincts. No one shall propitiate the Gods by secret prayer and sacrifice of his own. When a man thinks fit to offer prayer and sacrifice, he must do it at the public temples, through and along with recognised priests and priestesses. If a man keep in his house any sacred object to which he offers sacrifice, the archons shall require him to bring it into the public temples, and shall punish him until he does so. But if he be found guilty of sacrificing either at home or in the public temples, after the commission of any act which the Dikastery may consider grave impiety—he shall be condemned to death.¹

Uncertain and mischievous action of the religious sentiment upon individuals, if not controlled by public authority.

In justifying this stringent enactment, Plato not only proclaims that the proper establishment of temples and worship can only be dictated by a man of the highest intelligence, but he also complains of the violent and irregular working of the religious feeling in the minds of individuals. Many men (he says) when sick, or in danger and troubles of what kind soever, or when alarmed by dreams or by spectres seen in their waking hours, or when calling to mind and recounting similar narratives respecting the past, or when again experiencing unexpected good fortune—many men under such circumstances, and all women, are accustomed to give a religious colour to the situation, and to seek relief by vows, sacrifices, and altars to the Gods. Hence the private houses and villages become full of such foundations and proceedings.² Such religious sentiments and fears, springing up spontaneously in the minds of individuals, are considered by Plato to require strict repression. He will allow no religious worship or manifestation, except that which is public and officially authorised.

¹ Plato, Legg. x. pp. 909-910.

² Plato, Legg. x. p. 909 E—910 A. *ἴθως τε γυναῖκες τε δὴ διαφερόντως πάσαις καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσιν πάντῃ καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ ἀπορούσιν, ὅμη τις ἂν ἀνορή, . . . καθιερούν τε τὸ παρὸν δέσιν, καὶ θυσίας εὐχεσθαι καὶ ἰδρύσθαι ὑπερχρυσθα θεοῖς, &c.*

If, however, we turn back to v. p.

738 C, we shall see that Plato ratifies these *καθιερώσεις*, when they have once got footing, and rejects only the new ones. The rites, worship, and sacrifices, in his city, are assumed to have been determined by local or oracular inspiration (v. p. 738 B): the orthodox creed is set out by himself.

Such is the Act of Uniformity promulgated by Plato for his new community of the Magnètes, and such the terrible sanctions by which it is enforced. The lawgiver is the supreme and exclusive authority, spiritual as well as temporal, on matters religious as well as on matters secular. No dissenters from the orthodoxy prescribed by him are admitted. Those who believe more than he does, and those who believe less, however blameless their conduct, are condemned alike to pass through a long solitary imprisonment to execution. Not only the speculations of enquiring individual reason, but also the spontaneous inspirations of religious disquietude or terror, are suppressed and punished.¹

Intolerant spirit of Plato's legislation respecting uniformity of belief.

We seem to be under a legislation imbued with the persecuting spirit and self-satisfied infallibility of mediæval Catholicism and the Inquisition. The dissenter is a criminal, and among the worst of criminals, even if he do nothing more than proclaim his opinions.² How striking is the contradiction

¹ Plato himself is here the Νόμος; Πάσις, which the Delphian oracle, in its responses, sanctioned as the proper rule for individual citizens, Xenophon, Memor. iv. 3, 16. Compare iv. 6, 2, and i. 3, 1; Lysias, Or. xxx. 21-23. Θύειν τὰ πατρία—θύειν τὰ ἐκ τῶν κύρ-βευ, is ἐὸν θεία.

See K. F. Hermann, Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, sect. 10; Nägelsbach, Nach-Homerische Theologie, pp. 201-204.

Cicero also enacts, in his Treatise De Legibus (ll. 8-10):—"Separatim nemo habessit Deos: neve novos, sed ne advenas, nisi publicè adscitos, privatim colunto." Compare Livy, xxxix. 16, about the Roman prohibitions of *sacra externa*. But Cicero does not propose to inflict such severe penalties as Plato.

² Milton, in his Areopagitica, or Argument for Unlicensed Printing (vol. i. p. 149, Birch's edition of Milton's Prose Works), has some strenuous protestations against the rigour of the Platonic censorship in this tenth Book. In the year 1480 Hermolaus Barbarus wrote to George Merula as follows:—"Plato, in Institutione De Legibus, inter prima commemorat, in omni republica prescribi caverique oportere, ne cui liceat, quæ composuerit, aut privatim ostendere, aut in usum publicum edere,

antequam ea constituti super id iudices viderint, nec damnarint. Utinam hodieque haberetur hæc lex: neque enim tam multi scriberent, neque tam pauci bonas litteras discerent. Nunc et copîa malorum librorum offunditur, et omnis eminentissimis autoribus, plebeis et minutulos connectamur. Et, quod calamitosissimum est, periti juxta imperitiquæ de studiis impunè ac promiscuè judicant" (Politiani Opera, 1563, p. 197).

I transcribe the above passage from an interesting article upon Book-Censors, in Beckmann's History of Inventions (Ed. 1817, vol. iii. p. 98 seq.), where numerous examples are cited of the prohibition, combustion, or licensing of books by authority, from the burning of the work of Protagoras by decree of the Athenian assembly, down to modern times; illustrating the tendency of different sects and creeds, in proportion as they acquired power, to silence all open contradiction. The Christian Arnobius, at a time when his creed was under disfavour by the Emperors, protests against this practice, in a liberal and comprehensive phrase which would have much offended Plato (at the time when he wrote the *Leges*) and Hermolaus:—"Allos audio musitare indignanter et dicere:—Oportere statui per Senatum, aboleantur ut hæc scripta quibus

between this spirit and that in which Plato depicts the Sokrates of the Phædon, the Apology, and the Gorgias! How fully does Sokrates in the Phædon¹ recognise and respect the individual reason of his two friends, though dissenting from

Christiana religio comprobetur et vetustatis opprimatur auctoritas. . . . Nam interciperi scripta, et publicatam velles submergere lectionem, non est Deos defendere, sed veritatis testificationem timere" (Arnob. adv. Gentes, iii. p. 104. Also iv. p. 152).

"We are told by Eusebius (Beckmann, ed. 1817, vol. iii. p. 96; Bohn's ed., vol. ii. p. 514) that Diocletian caused the sacred Scriptures to be burnt. After the spreading of the Christian religion, the clergy exercised against books that were either unfavourable or disagreeable to them, the same severity which they had censured in the heathens as foolish and prejudicial to their own cause. Thus were the writings of Arius condemned to the flames at the Council of Nice; and Constantine threatened with the punishment of death those who should conceal them. The clergy assembled at the Council of Ephesus requested the Emperor Theodosius II. to cause the works of Nestorius to be burnt; and this desire was complied with. The writings of Eutyches shared the like fate at the Council of Chalcedon: and it would not be difficult to collect examples of the same kind from each of the following centuries."

Dr. Vaughan observes, in criticising the virtuous character and sincere persecuting spirit of Sir Thomas More:—"If there be just to punish as a crime, it is the opinion which makes it to be a virtue not to tolerate opinion." (Revolutions in English History, vol. ii. p. 178.)

I find the following striking anecdote in the transactions of the Académie Royale de Belgique, 1802; Bulletins, 2me Sér., tom. xiii. p. 667 seq.; Vie et Travaux de Nicolas Cleynaerts par M. Thonissen. Cleynaerts (or Cienardus) was a learned Belgian (born 1495—died 1543), professor both at Louvain and at Salamanca, and author of *Grammaticæ Institutiones*, both of the Greek and the Hebrew languages. He acquired, under prodigious difficulties and disadvantages, a knowledge of the Arabic language; and he employed great efforts to organise a course of regular

instruction in that language at Louvain, with a view to the formation of missionaries who would combat the doctrines of Islam.

At Grenada, in Spain (1538), "Cienardus ne réussit pas mieux à arracher aux bûchers de l'inquisition les manuscrits et les livres" (Moorish and Arabic books which had been seized after the conquest of Grenada by the Spaniards) "qu'elle avait entassés dans sa succursale de Grenada. Ce fut en vain que Cleynaerts, faisant valoir le but éminemment chrétien qu'il voulait atteindre, prodigua les démarches et les prières, pour se faire remettre ces papiers plus nécessaires à lui qu'à Vulcain'. . . . L' inexorable inquisition refusa de lâcher sa proie. Un savant théologien, Jean-Martin Siliceus, précepteur de Philippe II., fit cependant entendre à notre compatriote, que ses vœux pourraient être exaucés, s'il consentait à fonder son école, non à Louvain, mais à Grenada, où une multitude de néophytes faisaient semblant de professer le Christianisme, tout en conservant les préceptes de Mahomet au fond du cœur. Mais le linguiste Belge lui fit cette réponse, doublement remarquable à cause du pays et de l'époque où elle fut émise: 'C'est en Brabant, et nullement en Espagne, que je poserais les fondements de mon œuvre. Je cherche des compagnons d'armes pour lutter là où la lutte peut être loyale et franche. Les habitants du royaume de Grenade n'oseraient pas me répondre, puisque la terreur de l'inquisition les force à se dire chrétiens. Le combat est impossible, là où personne n'ose assumer le rôle de l'ennemi'—." Galen calls for a strict censorship, even over medical books—ad Julianum—Vol. xviii. p. 247 Kühn.

¹ Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 29. Gorgias, p. 472 A.B: καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ οὐδ' ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι σοὶ πάντες συμφέρονται ταῦτα Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ ξένοι. . . . Ἀλλὰ ἵγ' οὐ σοὶ εἰς τὸ οὐκ ὀμολογῶ.

Compare also p. 482 B of the same dialogue, where Sokrates declares his anxiety to maintain consistency with himself, and his indifference to other authority.

his own! How emphatically does he proclaim, in the *Apology* and *Gorgias*, not merely his own individual dissent from his fellow-citizens, but also his resolution to avow and maintain it against one and all, until he should hear such reasons as convinced him that it was untrue! How earnestly does he declare (in the *Apology*) that he has received from the Delphian God a mission to cross-examine the people of Athens, and that he will obey the God in preference to them:¹ thus claiming to himself that special religious privilege which his accuser *Melétus* imputes to him as a crime, and which Plato, in his *Magnétic colony*, also treats as a crime, interdicting it under the severest penalties! During the interval of forty-five years (probably) between the trial of *Sokrates* and the composition of the *Leges*, Plato had passed from sympathy with the free-spoken dissenter to an opposite feeling—hatred of all dissent, and an unsparing employment of penalties for upholding orthodoxy. I have already remarked on the *Republic*, and I here remark it again—if *Melétus* lived long enough to read the *Leges*, he would have found his own accusation of *Sokrates* amply warranted by the enactments and doctrines of the most distinguished *Sokratic Companion*.²

It is true that the orthodoxy which Plato promulgates, and forbids to be impugned, in the *Magnétic community*, is an orthodoxy of his own, different from that which was recognised at Athens; but this only makes the case more remarkable, and shows the deep root of intolerance in the human bosom—esteemed as it frequently is, by a sincere man, among the foremost of his own virtues. Plato marks out three varieties

The persons denounced by Plato as heretics, and punished as such, would have included a majority of

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 29 D. *πιστομαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ἢ ὑμῖν.* Comp. pp. 30 A, 31 D, 33 C.

² The indictment of *Melétus* against *Sokrates* ran thus—'Ἀδίκει Σωκράτης, οὐκ μὲν ἢ πόλις νομίζει θεούς, οὐ νομίζων, ἔτερά δὲ καὶ αἰνόμενα εἰσάγου-μενος· ἄδικει δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθεῖ-ραι· τίμημα, θάνατος (*Diog. Laert.* II. 40; *Xenoph. Memor.* I. 1). The charge as to introduction of *καὶ αἰνόμενα* was certainly well founded against *Sokrates* (compare Plato, *Republic*, VI. p. 496 C). Whoever was

guilty of promulgating *καὶ αἰνόμενα* in the Platonic city *De Legibus*, would have perished miserably long before he reached the age of 70; which *Sokrates* attained at Athens.

Compare my 'History of Greece,' ch. xxviii.

I have in one passage greatly understated the amount of severity which Plato employs against heretics. I there affirm that he banishes them: whereas the truth is, that he imprisons them, and ultimately, unless they recant, puts them to death.

the Grecian of heresy, punishable by long imprisonment, and world. subsequent death in case of obstinate persistence.

Now under one or other of the three varieties, a large majority of actual Greeks would have been included. The first variety—those who did not believe the Gods to exist—was doubtless confined to a small minority of reflecting men; though this minority (according to Plato¹), not contemptible even in number, was distinguished in respect to intellectual accomplishments. The second variety—that of those who believed the Gods to exist, but believed them to produce some results only, not all—was more numerous. And the third variety—that of those who believed them to be capable of being appeased or won over by prayer and sacrifice—was the most numerous of all. Plato himself informs us² that this last doctrine was proclaimed by the most eminent poets, rhetors,

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 896 E. *ἐμπελ-
λοι.* Also pp. 883 E, 891 B.

Fabricius tells us that Plato himself has been considered and designated as an atheist, by various critics:—"Alii Platonem atheis, alii Spinoze præcursoribus, adnumerarunt. Utriusque criminis reum eum fecit Nic. Henr. Gundling. . . At alii benè defenderunt philosophum ab illo crimine." (*Bibliothec. Græc.* tom. iii. pp. 60, not. 22, ed. Hærlæ.)

This illustrates the loose manner in which the epithet *ἀθεος* has been applied in philosophical and theological controversies: a practice forcibly exposed in the following acute note of Wyttenbach.

Wyttenbach, *Præf. ad Plutarch. De Superstit.* vol. vi. pars ii. p. 906. "Nam quæ est superstitio? quæ *ἀθεότης*? quæ harum species? qui gradus? His demum explicitis et inter se comparatis intelligi poterit, quæ *ἀθεότης* species cui superstitionis speciei, qui gradus hujus cui gradui illius, anteferri aut postponi debeat. Ac primum in ipsis illis de quibus agitur rebus definiendis magna est difficultas. Quamquam *atheum* quidem definire non difficile videtur; quippe quo ipso nomine significetur is qui *nullum esse deum putet*. Atqui hæc etiam definitio non intelligatur, nisi antea declaretur quid sit id quod *Dei* vocabulo significemus—omnino quæ sit definitio *Dei*. Jam nemo ignorat quantopere in notione ac de-

finitione *Dei* dissentiant non modo universi populi, sed et singuli homines: nec solum vulgus, sed et sapientes: ita quidem, ut quo plures partes sint, ex quibus hæc notio constituitur, eo minus in ea consentiant. Sed fac esse qui eam paucissimis complectatur proprietatibus, ut dicat *Deum esse mentem æternam, omnium rerum creatricem et gubernatricem*. Erunt qui eum parum, erunt qui nimium, dixisse putent: neutri se atheos volent, utrique et hunc et se invicem atheos dicent. . . Ita se res habet. Quotidè jactatur tralattium illud, *verus Deus*: quo suam quisque de Deo notionem significat, sæpe illam ineptam et summi nominis majestate indignam. Et bene nobiscum ageretur, si non nisi ab indocto vulgo jactaretur. Nunc philosophi, certe qui se philosophos haberi volunt, item crepant. Disputant de *vero Deo*, nec ab ejus definitione proficiunt, quasi vero hæc nemini ignota sit. . . . Pervulgata illa *veri Dei* appellatio nobis venit a consuetudine Ecclesiæ, cujus diversæ quondam sectæ notionem *Dei* diverso modo informantes, ejus ignorationem et *ἀθεότητα* non modo profanas, sed invicem aliis sectis exprobrare solebant. Hæc de notione *atheæ*: quæ profecto, nisi constitutâ notione *Dei*, constitui ipsa nequit."

² Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 886 D. *ὅν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες τε καὶ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα τῶν λεγομένων ἀρίστην εἶναι ποιητῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων καὶ μύστων καὶ ἱερίων καὶ ἄλλων μυριάκις μυρίων, &c.*

prophets, and priests, as well as by thousands and tens of thousands besides. That prayer and sacrifice were means of appeasing the displeasure or unfavourable dispositions of the Gods—was the general belief of the Grecian world, from the Homeric times downwards. The oracles or individual prophets were constantly entreated to inform petitioners, what was the nature or amount of expiatory ceremony which would prove sufficient for any specific case; but that there was *some* sort of expiatory ceremony which would avail, was questioned by few sincere believers.¹ All these would have been ranked as heretics by Plato. If the Magnétic community had become a reality, the solitary cells of the Platonic Inquisition might have been found to include Anaxagoras, and most of the Ionic philosophers, under the first head of heresy; Aristotle and Epikurus under the second; Herodotus and Nikias under the third. Indeed most of the 5040 Magnétic colonists must have adjusted anew their canon of orthodoxy in order to satisfy the exigence of the Platonic Censors.

To these severe laws and penalties against heretics, Plato prefixes a Proëm or Prologue of considerable length, commenting upon and refuting their doctrines. In the earlier part of this dialogue he had taken credit to himself for having been the first to introduce his legal mandates by a prefatory harangue, intended to persuade and conciliate the persons upon whom the mandate was imposed, and to procure cheerful obedience.² For such a purpose the Proëm in the tenth Book would be badly calculated. But Plato here introduces it with a different view:³ partly to demonstrate a kosmical and theological theory, partly to excite alarm and repugnance in the heretics whom he marks out and condemns. How many among them might be convinced by Plato's reasonings, I do not know; but the large majority of them could not fail to be offended and exasperated by the tone of his Proëm or prefatory discourse. Confessing his in-

Proëm or
prefatory
discourse
Plato, for
these severe
laws against
heretics.

¹ See the sections 23 and 24 of the *Lehrbuch* of K. F. Hermann, *Über die Gottesdienstlichen Alterthümer der Griechen*: Herodot. vi. 91; Thucyd. i. 124.—Respecting Plato's aversion for Anaxagoras—and the physical philosophers—see Legg. x. 888 E. xii. 967

A., with Stallbaum's notes.

² Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 722-723. 723 A: *ἵνα γὰρ εὐμενὲς καὶ διὰ τὴν εὐμενίαν εὐμαθέστερον τὴν ἐπιταγὴν, ὃ δὲ ἔστιν ὁ νόμος, δεξιᾷ ᾧ τὸν νόμον ὁ νομοθέτης λέγει, &c.*

³ Plato, Legg. x. p. 887 A.

ability to maintain completely the calmness and dignity of philosophical discussion, he addresses them partly with passionate asperity, partly with the arrogant condescension of a schoolmaster lecturing indocile pupils. He describes them now as hateful and unprincipled men—now as presumptuous youths daring to form opinions before they are competent, and labouring under a distemper of reason;¹ and this too, although he intimates that the first-named variety of heresy was adopted by most of the physical philosophers; and the third variety by many of the best poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests.² Such unusual vehemence is justified by Plato on the ground of a virtuous indignation against the impugnors of orthodox belief. We learn from the Platonic and Xenophontic Apologies, that Melētus and Anytus, when they accused Sokrates of impiety before the Dikastery, indulged in the same invective, announced the same justification, and felt the same confidence that they were righteous champions of the national faith, against an impious and guilty assailant.

Among the three varieties of heresy, Plato considers the third to be the worst. He accounts it a greater crime to believe in indulgent and persuadable Gods, than not to believe in any Gods at all.³ Respecting the entire unbelievers, he acknowledges that a certain proportion are so from intellectual, not from moral, default: and that there are, among them, persons of blameless life and disposition.⁴ It must be re-

membered that the foremost of these unbelievers, and the most obnoxious to Plato, were the physical astronomers: those who did not agree with him in recognising the Sun, Moon, and Stars as animated and divine Beings—those who studied their movements as if they were mechanical agents. Plato gives a brief summary of various cosmogonic doctrines professed by these heretics, who did not recognise (he says) either God, or reason, or art, in the cosmogonic process; but ascribed to nature, chance, and necessity, the genesis of celestial and terrestrial sub-

¹ Plato, Legg. x. pp. 887 B-E, 888 B, 891 B, 900 B, 907 A-C. *καὶ μὴ εἰρηναῖα γέ πως σφοδρότερον (οἱ λόγοι) διὰ φιλονεικίαν τῶν κακῶν ἀνθρώπων—προθυμία μὲν δὲ διὰ τὰυτὰ νεω-*

τέρας εἶναι αὐτῶν γέγονεν.

² Plato, Legg. x. pp. 891 D, 895 D.

³ Plato, Legg. x. pp. 907 A, 908 B.

⁴ Plato, Legg. x. pp. 896 A, 908 B.

stances, which were afterwards modified by human art and reason. Among these matters regulated by human art and reason, were included (these men said) the beliefs of each society respecting the Gods and religion, respecting political and social arrangements, respecting the just and the beautiful: though there were (they admitted) certain things beautiful by nature, yet not those which the lawgiver declared to be such. Lastly, these persons affirmed (Plato tells us) that the course of life naturally right was, for each man to seize all the wealth, and all the power over others, which his strength enabled him to secure, without any regard to the requirements of the law. And by such teaching they corrupted the minds of youth.¹

Who these teachers were, whom Plato groups together as if they taught the same doctrine, we do not know. Having no memorials from themselves, we cannot fully trust the description of their teaching given by an opponent: especially when we reflect, that it coincides substantially with the accusation which Melétus and Anytus urged against Sokrates before the

Heretics censured by Plato—Sokrates censured before the Athenian Dikasta.

Athenian Dikastery—*viz.*: that he was irreligious, and that he corrupted youth by teaching them to despise both the laws and their senior relatives—of which corruption Kritias and Alkibiades were cited as examples. Such allegations, when advanced against Sokrates, are noted both by Plato and Xenophon as the stock-topics, always ready at hand for those who wished to depreciate philosophers.²

In so far as these heretics affirmed that right as opposed to wrong, just as opposed to unjust, true belief as opposed to false respecting the Gods, were determined by the lawgiver and not by any other authority—Plato has little pretence for blaming them: because he himself claims such authority explicitly in his Magnétic community, and punishes severely not merely those who disobey his laws in act, but those who contradict his dogmas in speech or argument. Before he proclaims his intended

¹ Plato, Legg. x. pp. 889-890.

² Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23. τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφούντων πρόχειρα ταῦτα λέγουσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέωρα καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεοῦ μὴ νομίζειν καὶ τὸν ἥτις λόγον κρείττεον ποιεῖν. Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. See generally the

first two chapters of the Memorabilia, where Xenophon intimates that Sokrates was accused of training youth to a life of lawless and unprincipled ambition and selfishness, and especially of having trained Kritias and Alkibiades.

punishments in a penal law, he addresses the heretics in a proöm or prefatory discourse intended to persuade or win them over : a discourse which was the more indispensable, since their doctrines (he tells us) were disseminated everywhere.¹ If he seriously intended to persuade real dissentients, his attempt is certainly a failure : for the premisses on which he reasons are such as would not have been granted by them—nor indeed by many who agreed in the conclusion which he was himself trying to prove.

The theory here given by Plato, represents the state of his own convictions at the time when the *Leges* were composed. It is a theory of kosmology of universal genesis : different in many respects from what he propounds in the *Timæus*, since it comprises no mention of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus—nor of the eternal Ideas—nor of the primordial chaotic movements called Necessity—while it contains (what we do not find in the *Timæus*) the allegation of a twofold or multiple soul pervading the universe—the good soul (one or more), being co-existent and co-eternal with others (one or more), that are bad.²

The fundamental principle which he lays down (in this tenth Book *De Legibus*) is—That soul or mind is older, prior, and more powerful, than body. Soul is the principle of self-movement, activity, spontaneous change. Body cannot originate any movement or change by itself. It is simply passive, receiving movement from soul, and transmitting movement onward. The movement or change which we witness in the universe could never have begun at first, except through the originating spontaneity of soul.

None of the four elements—earth, water, air, or fire—is endowed with any self-moving power.³ As soul is older and more powerful than body, so the attributes of soul are older and more powerful than those of body : that is, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, love, hatred, volition, deliberation, reason, reflection, judgment true or false—are older and more powerful than heat, cold, heaviness, lightness, hardness, softness, whiteness, sweetness, &c.⁴

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 890 D, 891 A.

² Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 896 E.

³ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 894 D, 896 B.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 896 A, 897 A. The *κίνησις* of soul are *πρωτογενεῖς*—those of body are *δευτερογενεῖς*.

The attributes and changes of body are all secondary effects, brought about, determined, modified, or suspended, by the prior and primitive attributes and changes of soul. In all things that are moved there dwells a determining soul: which is thus the cause of all effects however contrary—good and bad, just and unjust, honourable and base. But it is one variety of soul which works to good, another variety which works to evil.¹ The good variety of soul works under the guidance of *Noûs* or Reason—the bad variety works irrationally.² Now which of the two (asks Plato) directs the movements of the celestial sphere, the Sun, Moon, and Stars? Certainly, the good soul, and not the bad. This is proved by the nature and character of their movements: which movements are rotatory in a circle, and exactly uniform and equable. Now among all the ten different sorts of motion or change, rotatory motion in a circle is the one which is most akin

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 896 E. $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ δὲ διαικονοῦσα καὶ διοικονοῦσα ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς κτήρεσι κινουμένη.

As an illustration or comment on this portion of Plato *De Legibus*, Lord Monboddo's *Ancient Metaphysics* are instructive. See vol. i. pp. 2-7-9-25. He adopts the distinction between Mind and Body made both in the tenth Book *De Legg.*, and in the *Epinomia*. He considers that Body and Mind are mixed together in each part of nature; and in the material world never separated: that motion is perpetual; and "Where there is motion, there must be there something that moves. What is moved, I call body; what moves, I call mind."

"Under mind, in this definition, I include:—1. The rational and intellectual; 2. The animal life; 3. That principle in the vegetable, by which it is nourished, grows, and produces its like, and which therefore is commonly called the *vegetable life*; and 4. That *motive principle* which I understand to be in all bodies, even such as are thought to be inanimate. This is the distinction between *body* and *mind* made by Plato in his tenth Book of *Laws*" (pp. 8-9).

"The Greek word $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ denotes the three first kinds I have mentioned, which are not expressed by any one word that I know in English; for the word *mind*, that I have used to express them, denotes in common use

only the rational mind or soul, as it is otherwise called. The fourth kind that I have mentioned, viz., the *motive principle* in all bodies, is not commonly in Greek called $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$. But Aristotle, in a passage which I shall afterwards quote, says that it is $\sigma\upsilon\sigma\tau\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$ (p. 8, note).

"As to the principle of motion or moving principle, which Aristotle supposes to be in all bodies, it is what he calls *nature* (p. 9). . . . He makes Nature also to be the principle of rest in bodies; by which I suppose he means, that those bodies which he calls *heavy*, that is, which move towards the centre of the earth, would rest if they were there" (p. 9, note).

"From the account here given of motion, it is evident that by it the whole business of nature, above, below, and round about us, is carried on. . . . To those who hold that mind is the first of things, and principal in the universe, it will not appear surprising that I have made *moving*, or *producing motion*, an essential attribute of mind" (p. 25).

In the same Treatise—which exhibits very careful study both of Plato and of Aristotle—Lord Monboddo analyses the ten varieties of motion here recognised by Plato, and shows that Plato's account is confused and unsatisfactory. *Ancient Metaphysics*, vol. i. pp. 23-250-252.

² Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 897 B.

or congenial to Reason.¹ The motion of Reason, and the motion of the stars, is alike rotatory, and the same, and unchangeable—in the same place, round the same centre, and returning into itself. The bad soul, acting without reason, produces only irregular movements, intermittent, and accompanied by constant change of place.² Though it is the good variety of soul which produces the celestial rotation, yet there are many distinct and separate souls, all of this same variety, which concur to the production of the result. The Sun, the Moon, and each of the Stars, has a distinct soul inherent in itself or peculiar to its own body.³ Each of these souls, invested in the celestial substance and in each of the visible celestial bodies, is a God : and thus all things are full of Gods.⁴

In this argument—which Plato tells us that no man will be insane enough to dispute,⁵ and which he proclaims to be a triumphant refutation of the unbelievers—we find, instead of the extra-kosmical Demiurgus and the pre-kosmical Chaos or necessity (the doctrine of the Platonic *Timæus* ⁶), two opposing primordial forces both intra-kosmical : the good soul and the bad soul, there being a multiplicity of each. Though Plato here proclaims his conclusion with an unqualified confidence which contrasts greatly with the modest reserve often expressed in his *Timæus*—yet the conclusion is rather disproved than proved by his own premisses. It cannot be true that all things are full of Gods, since there are two varieties of soul existing and acting, the bad as well as the good : and Plato calls the celestial bodies Gods, as endowed with and moved by good and rational souls. Aristotle in his theory draws a marked distinction between the regularity and perfection of the celestial region, and the irregularity and imperfection of the terrestrial and sublunary : Plato's premisses as here laid out would have called upon him to do the same, and to designate the

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 897 E–898 A. ἢ προσέοικε κινήσει τοὺς τῶν δέκα ἐκείνων κινήσεων τὴν εἰκόνα λάβωμεν· τούτοις δὲ τοῖς κινήσεσιν τὴν ἐν ἐνὶ φερομένην ἀεὶ περὶ γὰρ τι μέσον ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, τῶν ἐντόρων οὐσῶν [αἰ. οὐσαν] μίμημά τι κύκλων, εἶναι τε αὐτὴν τῇ τοῦ τοῦ περιόδου πάντως ὡς δυνατόν οικειοτάτην τε καὶ ὁμοίαν.

² Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 898 B-C.

³ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 898 D.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 899 B. εἰδ' ὅστις ἀκολογεῖ ταῦτα, ὑπομένει μὴ θεῶν εἶναι πλῆθος πάντα ;

⁵ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 899 C οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως παραφροσύνῃ οὐδεὶς.

⁶ Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 48 A, 69 A-B.

Kosmos as the theatre of counteracting agencies, partly divine, partly not divine. So he terms it indeed in the *Timæus*.¹

There is another feature, common both to the *Timæus* and the *Leges*, which deserves attention as illustrating Plato's point of view. It is the reverential sentiment with which he regards uniform rotatory movement in the same place. This he pronounces to be the perfect, regular, movement appertaining and congenial to Reason and the good variety of soul. Because the celestial bodies move thus and only thus, he declares them to be Gods. It is this circular rotation which continues with perfect and unchangeable regularity in the celestial sphere of the Kosmos, and also, though imperfect and perturbed, in the spherical cranium of man.² Aristotle in his theory maintains unabated the reverence for this mode of motion, as the perfection of reason and regularity. The feeling here noted exercised a powerful and long-continued influence over the course of astronomical speculations.

Reverence
of Plato for
uniform
circular
rotation.

Having demonstrated to his own full satisfaction, from the regularity of the celestial rotations, that the heavenly bodies are wise and good Gods, and that all things are full of Gods—Plato applies this conclusion to refute the second class of heretics—those who did not believe that the Gods directed all human affairs, the small things as well as the great ;³ that is, the lot of each individual person

Argument
of Plato to
confute the
second class
of heretics.

¹ Plato, *Timæus*, p. 48 A.

The remarks of Zeller, in the second edition of his work, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (vol. II. p. 634 seq.), upon this portion of the *Treatise De Legibus*, are very acute and instructive. He exposes the fallacy of the attempt made by various critics to explain away the Manichean doctrine declared in this treatise, and to reconcile the *Leges* with the *Timæus*. The subject is handled in a manner superior to the *Platonische Studien* of the same author (wherein the *Leges* are pronounced to be spurious, while in the *History of Philosophy* Zeller retracts this opinion), though in that work also there is much instruction.—Stallbaum's copious notes on these passages (pp. 188-189-196-207-213 of his edition of *Leges*), while admitting the discrepancy between *Leges* and *Timæus*, furnish what he thinks a

satisfactory explanation. One portion of his explanation is, that Plato here accommodates himself "*ad capturn hominum vulgarem* (p. 189) . . . *ad capturn civium communem accommodatè et populari ratione explicari*" (p. 207). I dissent from this as a matter of fact. I think that the heretics of the second and third class coincide rather with the "*capturn vulgaris*". So Plato himself intimates.

² Plato, *Timæus*, pp. 44 B, 47 C.

³ The language of Plato sometimes implies, that the opponents whom he is controverting disbelieve altogether the intervention of the Gods in human affairs, pp. 899 E, 900 A, 885 B. But the main stress of his argument is directed against those who, admitting the intervention of the Gods in great things, deny it in small, pp. 900 D, 901 A-B-C-D, 902 A-B.

as well as that of the species or of its component aggregates. He himself affirms that they direct all things. It is inconsistent with their attributes of perfect intelligence, power, and goodness (he maintains) that they should leave anything, either small or great, without regulation. All good human administrators, generals, physicians, pilots, &c., regulate all things, small and great, in their respective provinces: the Gods cannot be inferior to them, and must be held to do the same. They regulate everything with a view to the happiness of the whole, in which each man has his share and interest; and each man has his special controuling Deity watching over his minutest proceedings, whether the individual sees it or not.¹ Soul, both in its good variety and its bad variety, is essentially in change from one state to another, and passes from time to time out of one body into another. In the perpetual conflict between the good and the bad variety of soul, according as each man's soul inclines to the better or to the worse, the Gods or Fate exalt it to a higher region or degrade it to a lower. By this means the Gods do the best they can to ensure triumph to virtue, and defeat to vice, in the entire Kosmos. This reference to the entire Kosmos is overlooked by the heretics who deny the all-pervading management of the Gods.²

Plato gives here an outburst of religious eloquence which might prove impressive when addressed to fellow-believers—but which, if employed for the avowed purpose of convincing dissentients, would fail of its purpose, as involving assumptions to which they would not subscribe. As to the actual realities of human life, past as well as present, Plato himself always gives a very melancholy picture of them. “The heaven is full of good things, and also full of things opposite to good: but mostly of things not good.”³ More-

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 902-908 B-C.

² This argument is set forth from p. 903 B to 905 B. It is obscure and difficult to follow.

³ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 906 A. ὅπερ δὲ γὰρ συνεχωρήκαμεν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς εἶναι μὴ τὸν οὐρανὸν πολλῶν μεστὸν ἀγαθῶν, εἶναι δὲ καὶ τὸν ἐναντίον, πλείονων δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέγεθος, φανερὸν, ἀθάνατος ἴστωρ ὁ τοιαύτη καὶ φύλακός θάυμαστός ἐσθλὸν. Ast in his note affirms that

after μὴ is understood ἀγαθῶν. Stallbaum thinks, though with some hesitation, that ἐναντίον is understood after μὴ. I agree with Ast.

Compare *hil.* pp. 676-677, where Plato states that in the earlier history of the human race, a countless number of different societies (μυρίαὶ ἐνὶ μυρίαις) have all successively grown up and successively perished, with extinction of all their comforts and civilization.

over, when we turn back to the Republic, we find Plato therein expressly blaming a doctrine very similar to what he declares true here in the *Leges*—as a dangerous heresy, although extensively believed, from the time of Homer downward. “Since God is good” (Plato had there affirmed¹) “he cannot be the cause of all things, as most men pronounce him to be. He is the cause of a few things, but of most things he is not the cause: for the good things in our lot are much fewer than the evil. We must ascribe all the good things to him, but for the evil things we must seek some other cause, and not God.” The confessed imperfection of the actual result² was one of the main circumstances urged by those heretics, who denied that all-pervading administration of the Gods which Plato in the *Leges* affirms.³ If he undertook to convince them at all, he would have done well to state and answer more fully their arguments, and to clear up the apparent inconsistencies in his own creed.

A similar criticism may be made still more forcibly, upon the demonstration whereby he professes to refute the third and most culpable class of heretics—“Those who believe that the Gods exercise an universal agency, but that they can be persuaded by prayer and conciliated by sacrifice”. Here he was treading on dangerous ground: for he was himself a heretic, by his own confession, if compared with Grecian belief generally. Not merely the ordinary public, but the most esteemed and religious persons among the public⁴—poets, rhetors, prophets, and priests—believed the doctrine which he here so vehemently condemns. Moreover it was the received doctrine of the city⁵—that is, it was assumed as the basis of the official and authorised religious manifestations:

¹ Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 379 C. Οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ θεός, ἐπειδὴ ἀγαθός, πάντων ἂν εἴη αἰτίας, ὥς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· ἀλλ' ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἰτίας, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολλὰ γὰρ ἐλάττω τὰγαθὰ τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν· καὶ τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν οὐδένα ἄλλον αἰτιατόν, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἅλλα ἅπαντα ζητεῖν δεῖ τὰ αἰτία, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν. See a striking passage in Arnobius, *adv. Gentes*, ii. 48.

² Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 903 A-B. Περὶ ὧν τὸν νεανίας τοὺς λόγους . . . ἂν ἐν καὶ τὸ σόν, & σχετίαι, μέρων εἰς τὸ πᾶν ἐντείνειν βλέπων αἰεὶ.

³ Lucretius, v. 197:—

Nequaquam nobis divinitus esse paratam
Naturam mundi: tantâ stat prædita culpa.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* x. p. 895 D; *Republic*, ii. pp. 364-365-366.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 366 A-B. ἀλλ' ὠφελήσουσιν ἀγνίζοντες αἱ τελευταὶ καὶ οἱ λύσεις θεοί, ὥς αἱ μύσσαι πόλεις λέγουσι καὶ οἱ θεῶν παῖδες, ποιηταὶ καὶ προφῆται τῶν θεῶν γενόμενοι, οἱ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχουν ἀμύδουσαι.

and the law of the city was recognised by the Delphian oracle¹ as the proper standard of reference for individual enquirers who came there to ask for information on matters of doubtful religious propriety. In the received Grecian conception of religious worship, prayer and sacrifice were correlative and inseparable: sacrifice was the gift of man to the Gods, accompanying the prayer for gifts from the Gods to man, and accounted necessary to render the prayer efficacious.² The priest was the professional person competent and necessary to give advice as to the details: but as a general principle, it was considered disrespectful to ask favours from the Gods without tendering to them some present, suitable to the means of the petitioner.

Plato himself states this view explicitly in his *Politikua*.³ Moreover, when a man desired information from the Gods on any contemplated project or on any grave matter of doubt, he sought it by means of sacrifice.⁴ Such sacrifice was a debt to the God: and if it remained unpaid, his displeasure was incurred.⁵ The motive for sacrificing to the Gods was thus, not simply to ensure the granting of prayers, but to pay a debt: and thus either to prevent or to appease the wrath of the Gods. The religious practice of Greece rested upon the received belief that the Gods were not merely pleased with presents, but exacted them as a mark of respect, and were angry if they were not offered: yet that being angry, their wrath might be appeased by acceptable presents and supplications.⁶ To learn what proceedings of this kind were suitable, a man went to consult the oracle, the priests, or the *Exêgêtæ*: in cases wherein he believed

¹ Xenophon, *Memor.* i. 3, 1, iv. 3, 16; Cicero, *Legg.* ii. 18.

² See Nägelsbach, *Nach-Homerische Theologie*, Part 5, 1, p. 194 seq., where this doctrine is set forth and largely illustrated.

In approaching a king, a satrap, or any other person of exalted position above the level of ordinary men, it was the custom to come with a present. Thucyd. ii. 97; Xenoph. *Anab.* vii. 3, 26; Xenoph. *Hellen.* fil. 1, 10-12.

The great person, to whom the presents were made, usually requited them magnificently.

³ Plato, *Politikua*, p. 290 D. *καὶ μὴ*

καὶ τὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀδ' ἔγχεος, ὡς τὸ νόμισμα φησι, παρὰ μὲν ἡμῶν δωρεὰς θεοῖς διὰ θυσίων ἐπισημένον εἶναι κατὰ νόον ἡμετέροις δωρεῖσθαι, παρὰ δὲ ἡμετέρων ἡμῖν εὐχαῖς ἐκῆτον ἔχοντων αἰτήσασθαι. Compare Euthyphron, p. 14.

⁴ Xenophon, *Anab.* vii. 6, 44; Euripid. *Ion.* 234.

⁵ Plato, *Republic*, i. p. 831 B. Compare also Phædon, p. 118, the last words spoken by Sokrates before his decease—*ὁφειλομένην Ἀσκληπιοῦ ἀλεκτρίονα· ἀλλ' ἀπόδετε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσατε.*

⁶ See Nägelsbach, *Nach-Homerische Theologie*, pp. 211-213.

that he had incurred the displeasure of the Gods by any wrong or omission.¹

Now it is against this latter sentiment—that which recognised the Gods as placable or forgiving²—that Plato declares war as the worst of all heresies. He admits indeed, implicitly, that the Gods are influenced by prayer and sacrifice; since he directs both the one and the other to be constantly offered up, by the citizens of his Magnêtic city, in this very Treatise. He even implies that the Gods are too facile and compliant: for in his second *Alkibiadês*, Sokrates is made to remark that it was dangerous for an ignorant man to pray for specific advantages, because he might very probably bring ruin upon himself by having his prayers granted—

Incongruities of Plato's own doctrine.

"Evertère domos totas, optantibus ipais,
Di faciles."

Farthermore Plato does not scruple to notice³ it as a real proceeding of the Gods, that they executed the prayer or curse of Theseus, by bringing a cruel death upon the blameless youth Hippolytus; which Theseus himself is the first to deplore when he becomes acquainted with the true facts. That the Gods should inflict punishment on a person who did not deserve it, Plato accounts not unworthy of their dignity: but that they should remit punishment in any case where he conceives it to have been deserved, he repudiates with indignation. Though accessible and easily influenced by prayer and sacrifice from other persons, they are deaf and inexorable to those who have incurred their displeasure by wrong-doing.⁴ The prayer so offered is called by Plato a treacherous cajolery, the sacrifice a guilty bribe, to purchase their indulgence.⁵ Since, in human affairs, no good magistrate, general, physician, pilot, &c., will allow himself to be persuaded by prayers or presents to betray

¹ See, as one example among a thousand, the proceeding of the Spartan government, Thucyd. i. 134; also ii. 48-64.

² The common sentiment is expressed in a verse of Euripides—*τίνα δει μακάρων ἐκθυσαμένους Εὐρεῖν μάχων ἀνάνευαν*—(Fragm. Ino 156);

compare Eurip. Hippol. 1323.

³ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 931 C. ἀπαῖος γὰρ γονεὺς ἀγνοοῖς ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος ἀλούς, δίκαιότατα. Also iii. p. 687 D.

⁴ Plato, Legg. iv. pp. 716-717.

⁵ Plato, Legg. x. p. 906 B. *θυσίας λώγων*.

his trust: much less can we suppose (he argues) the Gods to be capable of such betrayal.¹

The general doctrine, upon which Plato here lays so much stress, and the dissent from which he pronounces to be a capital offence—that the Gods, though persuadable by every one else, were thoroughly unforgiving, deaf to any prayer or sacrifice from one who had done wrong—is a doctrine from which Sokrates² himself dissented; and to which few of Plato's contemporaries, perhaps hardly even himself, consistently adhered. The argument, upon which Plato rests for convincing all these numerous dissentients, is derived from his conception of the character and functions of the Gods. But this, though satisfactory to himself, would not have been granted by his opponents. The Gods were conceived by Herodotus as jealous, meddling, intolerant of human happiness beyond a narrow limit, and keeping all human calculations in a state of uncertainty:³ in this latter attribute Sokrates also agreed. He affirmed that the Gods kept all the important results essentially unpredictable by human study, reserving them for special revelations by way of prophecy to those whom they preferred. These were privileged and exclusive communications to favoured individuals, among whom Sokrates was one:⁴ and Plato, though not made a recipient of the same favour as Sokrates, declares his own full belief in the reality of such special revelations from the Gods, to particular persons and at particular places.⁵ Ari-

¹ Plato, *Legg.* x. pp. 906-907.

² Xenophon, *Memorab.* ii. 2, 14. *Σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, ἀν' σωφρονίης, τοὺς μὲν θεοὺς παραιτήσῃ συγγνωμονάς σοι εἶναι, εἰ τι παρημέληκας τῆς μητρὸς, μή σε καὶ οὗτοι νομίσαντες ἀχάριστον εἶναι οὐκ ἐθέλωσιν εὖ ποιεῖν.*

At the same time, Sokrates maintains that the Gods accepted sacrifices from good men with greater favour than sacrifices from bad men. Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 3, 3.

³ Herodotus, i. 32, iii. 40.

⁴ Xenoph. *Mem.* i. 1, 8-9. *τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ, οἷς ἂν ὤσιν ἱλαφ, σημαίνειν.* Also i. 3, 4, iv. 3, 12; *Cyropæd.* i. 6, 5-23-46. *θεοὶ αἰεὶ ὄντες πάντα ἴσασι . . . καὶ τῶν συμβουλευομένων ἀνθρώπων οἷς ἂν ἱλαφ ὤσιν, προσσημαίνουσιν ἃ τε χρὴ ποιεῖν καὶ ἃ οὐ χρὴ. Εἰ δὲ μὴ πάντων ἰθίλωσι συμβουλευεῖν, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν.*

οὐ γὰρ ἀνάγκη αὐτοῖς εἶναι, ἂν ἂν μὴ θέλωσιν, ἐπιμελείσθαι (*Cyrop.* i. 6, 46).

Solon. *Frag.* v. 53, ed. Gaisf. :—

Ἄλλον μάντεν ἴδμεν ἀναξ' ἐκέρχοντες Ἀπόλλων· Ἔγνων δ' ἀνὲρ κακὸν τέλοθεν ἐρχόμενον.

See the curious narrative in Herodotus ix. 94 seq. about the prophetic gifts bestowed on Euenius. The same narrative attests the full belief prevalent respecting both the displeasure of the Gods and their placability on the proper expiation being made. It conflicts signally in every respect with the canon of orthodoxy set up by Plato.

⁵ Plato, *Legg.* v. pp. 736 C, 747 E, vii. p. 811 D; *Republic*, vi. pp. 496 C, 499 C.

stotle, on the other hand, pronounces action and construction, especially action in details, to be petty and unworthy of the Gods; whom he regards as employed in perpetual contemplation and theorising, as the only occupation worthy to characterise their blessed immortality.¹ Epikurus and his numerous followers, though not agreeing with Aristotle in regarding the Gods as occupied in intellectual contemplation, agreed with him fully in considering the existence of the Gods as too dignified and enviable to be disturbed by the vexation of meddling with human affairs, or to take on the anxieties of regard for one man, displeasure towards another.

The orthodox religious belief, which Plato imposes upon his 5040 Magnêtic citizens under the severest penalties, would thus be found inconsistent with the general belief, not merely of ordinary Greeks, but also of the various lettered and philosophical individuals who thought for themselves. Most of these latter would have passed, under one of the three heads of Platonic heresy, into the Platonic prison for five years, and from thence either to recantation or death. The arguments which Plato considered so irresistible, that none but silly youths could be deaf to them—did not appear conclusive to Aristotle and other intelligent contemporaries. Plato makes up his own mind, what proceedings he thinks worthy and unworthy of the Gods, and then proclaims with confidence as a matter of indisputable fact, that they act conformably. But neither Herodotus, nor Aristotle, would have granted his premisses: they conceived the attributes and character of the Gods differently from him, and differently from each other. And if we turn to the *Kratylus* of Plato, we find Sokrates there declaring, that men knew nothing about the Gods: that speculations about the Gods were in reality speculations about the opinions of men respecting the Gods.²

Great opposition which Plato's doctrine would have encountered in Greece.

¹ Aristotle, *Ethic. Nikom.* x. 8, p. 1178, b. 21. ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότατι διαφέρονσα, θεωρητικῇ ἀντίσται.

² Plato, *Kratylus*, pp. 400-401. Περὶ θεῶν οὐδὲν ἴσμεν, οὔτε περὶ αὐτῶν, οὔτε περὶ τῶν ἀνομάτων, ἅττα ποτὶ αὐτοὶ πάντοτε καλοῦσι (400 D) . . . σκοπῶμεν

ὥσπερ προειπόντες τοῖς θεοῖς ὅτι περὶ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν ἡμεῖς σκεψόμεθα, οὐ γὰρ ἐξισύμεν οἱ οἱ τ' ἐν εἶναι σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἥτινά ποτε δόξαν ἔχοντες ἐτίθεντο αὐτοῖς τὰ ἀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἀναμίσχτρον (401 A). Compare also *Kratyl.* p. 425 B.

Such opinions were local, traditional, and dissentient, among the numerous distinct cities and tribes which divided the inhabited earth between them in Plato's time.¹ Each of these claimed a local infallibility, principally as to religious rites and customs, indirectly also as to dogmas and creed: and Plato's Magnétic community, if it had come into existence, would have added one to the number of distinct varieties. To this general sentiment, deeply rooted in the emotions and unused to the scrutiny of reason, the philosophers were always more or less odious, as dissenters, enquirers, and critics, each on his own ground.²

At Athens the sentiment manifested itself occasionally in severe decrees and judicial sentences against obnoxious free-thinkers, especially in the case of Sokrates. If the Athenians had carried out consistently and systematically the principle involved in their sentence against Sokrates, philosophy must have been banished from Athens.³ The school of Plato could never have been maintained. But the principle of intolerance was usually left dormant at Athens: philosophical debate continued active and unshackled, so that the school of Plato subsisted in the city without interruption for nearly forty years until his death. We might have expected that the philosophers, to whose security toleration of free dissent and debate was essential, would have upheld it as a general principle against the public. But here we find the most eminent among them, at the close of a long life, not only disallowing all liberty of philosophising to others, and assuming to himself the exclusive right of dictating the belief, as well as the conduct, of his imaginary citizens—but also enforcing this exclusive principle with an amount of systematic rigour, which I do not believe to have been equalled in any actual Grecian city. This is a memorable fact in the history of Grecian philosophy. The

¹ Plato, *Politikus*, p. 262 D. γίνεσθαι ἀνέμποις ὁδοῖς καὶ ἀνέμποις καὶ ἀνέμφοις πρὸς ἄλληλα. Herodot. iii. 39.

² Plato, *Euthyphron*, p. 8.

³ See the *Apologies* both of Plato and Xenophon. In one of the rheto-

rical discourses cited by Aristotle, on the subject of the trial of Sokrates (seemingly that by the Rhetor Theodectes), the point is put thus:—Μὴ ἄρεα δὲ κρίνειν, οὐ περὶ Σωκράτους, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐπιτηδεύματος, εἰ ἤρα φιλοσοφῆν (Aristot. *Rhetor.* ii. 1399, a. 8, b. 10).

Stoic Kleanthes, in the century after Plato's death, declared that the Samian astronomer Aristarchus ought to be indicted for impiety, because he had publicly advocated the doctrine of the Earth's rotation round the Sun. Kleanthes and Plato thus stand out as known examples, among Grecian philosophers before the Christian era, of that intolerance which would apply legal penalties against individual dissenters and competitors.¹

The eleventh Book of the Treatise *De Legibus*, and the larger portion of the twelfth, are devoted to a string of civil and political regulations for the Magnétic community. Each regulation is ushered in with an expository prologue, often with severe reproof towards persons committing the various forbidden acts. There is little of systematic order in the enumeration of subjects. In general we may remark that neither here nor elsewhere in the Treatise is there any proof, that Plato—though doubtless he had visited Italy, Sicily, and Egypt, perhaps other countries—had taken much pains to acquaint himself with the practice of human life, or that he had studied and compared the working of different institutions in different communities. His experience seems all derived from Athenian law and practice: the criticisms and modifications which he applies to it flow from his own sentiment and theory: from his religious or ethical likings or dislikings. He sets up a type of character which he desires to enforce among his citizens, and which he guards against adulteration by very stringent interference. The displeasure of the Gods is constantly appealed to, as a justification for the penalties which he proposed: sometimes even the current mythes are invoked as authority, though in other places Plato so greatly disparages them.²

Various modes of acquiring property are first forbidden as illegitimate. The maxim³—"That which you have not put down, do not take up"—is rigorously enforced: Modes of acquiring

Farther civil and political regulations for the Magnétic community. No evidence that Plato had studied the working of different institutions in practice.

¹ The Platonist and astronomer Derkyllides afterwards (about 100-120 A.D.) declares those who affirm the doctrine, that the earth moves and that the stars are stationary, to be accursed and impious—*οὗτοι δὲ τὰ κυρία ὀρίσασθαι, τὰ δὲ δαιμόνια φέροναι καὶ ἱερὰ κυριεύειν, ὡς κατὰ τὰς τῆς μαρτυρίας*

ὑποθέσειν, ἀνομιαν ποιῆσαι. (Theon Smyrnenus, *De Astronomiâ*, ch. 41, p. 328, fol. 26, ed. Martin.)

² Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 913 D.

³ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 913 C. *Ἄ μὴ κερύειν, μὴ ἀνείλῃ.* This does not include, however, what has been deposited by a man's father or grandfather.

property—
legitimate
and illegiti-
mate.

any man who finds a buried treasure is prohibited from touching it, though he find it by accident and though the person who buried it be unknown. If a man violates this law, every one, freeman or slave, is invited and commanded to inform against him. Should he be found guilty, a special message must be sent to the Delphian oracle, to ask what is to be done both with the treasure and with the offender. So again, an article of property left on the highway is declared to be under protection of the Goddess or Dæmon of the Highway: whoever finds and takes it, if he be a slave, shall be severely flogged by any freeman above thirty years of age who meets him: if he be a freeman, he shall be disgraced and shall pay, besides, ten times its value to the person who left it.¹ These are average specimens of Plato's point of view and manner of handling offences respecting property.

The general constitution of Plato's community restricts within comparatively narrow limits the occasions of proprietary dispute. His 5040 lots of land are all marked out, unchangeable, and indivisible, each possessed by one citizen. No man is allowed to acquire or possess movable property to a greater value than four times the lot of land: every article of property possessed by every man is registered by the magistrates. Disputes as to ownership, if they arise, are settled by reference to this register. If the disputed article be not registered, the possessor is bound to produce the seller or donor from whom he received it. All purchases and sales are required to take place in the public market before the Agoranomi: and all for ready-money, or by immediate interchange and delivery. If a man chooses to deliver his property, without receiving the consideration, or in any private place, he does so at his own risk: he has no legal claim against the receiver.² So likewise respecting

¹ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914. Seemingly, if any man found a treasure buried in the ground, or a purse lying on the road without an owner, he was not considered by most persons dishonest if he appropriated it; to do so was looked upon as an admissible piece of good luck. See Theophrastus, *περί Μερψμοιρίας*. From Plato's language we gather that the finder

sometimes went to consult the prophets what he should do, p. 913 B — μήτε τοῖς λεγομένοις μάντεσιν ἀνεκρινώσασαι: his phrase is not very respectful towards the prophets.

² Plato, Legg. xi. p. 914 D.

³ The same principle is laid down by Plato, Republic, viii. p. 556 A, and was also laid down by Charondas (Theophrast. ap. Stobæum Serm. xlv.

the Eranoi or Associations for mutual Succour and Benefit. Plato gives no legal remedy to a contributor or complainant respecting any matter arising out of these associations. He requires that every man shall contribute at his own risk : and trust for requital to the honesty or equity of his fellow-contributors.¹

A remark must here be made upon Plato's refusal to allow any legal redress in such matters as sale on credit, or payments for the purpose of mutual succour and relief. Such refusal appears to contradict his general manner of proceeding : for his usual practice is, to estimate offences not according to the mischief which they inflict, but according to the degree of wickedness or impiety which he supposes them to imply in the doer.

Plato's principles of legislation, not consistent—comparison of them with the Attic law about Eranoi.

Now the contributor to an association for mutual succour, who, after paying his contributions for the aid of his associates, finds that they refuse to contribute to his aid when the hour of his necessity arrives—suffers not only heavy calamity but grievous disappointment : which implies very bad dispositions on the part of those who, not being themselves distressed, nevertheless refuse. Of such dispositions Plato takes no notice in the present case. He does not expatiate (as he does in many other cases far more trifling and disputable) upon the displeasure of the Gods when they see a man who has been benefited in distress by his neighbour's contributions, refusing all requital at the time of that neighbour's need. Plato indeed treats it as a private affair between friends. You do a service to your friend, and you must take your chance whether he will do you a service in return : you must not ask for legal redress, if he refuses : what you have contributed was a present voluntarily given, not a loan lent to be repaid. This is an intelligible point of view, but it excludes those ethical and sentimental considerations which Plato usually delights in enforcing.² His ethics here show themselves by leading him to

21, p. 204). Aristotle alludes to some Grecian cities in which it was the established law. K. F. Hermann, *Privat-Alterthümer der Griechen*, s. 71, n. 10.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 915 D-E.

² In Xenophon's ideal legislation, or rather education of the Persian youth, in the *Cyropædia*, he introduces legal trial and punishment for in-

gratitude generally (*Cyropæd.* i. 2, 7). The Attic judicature took cognizance of neglect or bad conduct towards parents, which Xenophon ranks as a sort of ingratitude—but not of ingratitude towards any one else (*Xenoph. Memor.* ii. 2, 13). There is an interesting discussion in Seneca (*De Beneficiis*, iii. 6-18) about the propriety of treating ingratitude as a legal offence.

turn aside from that which takes the form of a pecuniary contract. It was in this form that the Eranoi or Mutual Assurance Associations were regarded by Attic judicature: that is, they seem to have been considered as a sort of imperfect obligation, which the Dikastery would enforce against any citizen whose circumstances were tolerably prosperous, but not against one in bad circumstances. Such Eranic actions before the Attic Dikastery were among those that enjoyed the privilege of speedy adjudication (*ἐμμηνοὶ δίκαι*).¹

As to property in slaves, Plato allows any owner to lay hold of a fugitive slave belonging either to himself or to any friend. If a third party reclaims the slave as being not rightfully in servitude, he must provide three competent sureties, and the slave will then be set free until legal trial can be had. Moreover, Plato enacts, respecting one who has been a slave, but has been manumitted, that such freedman (*ἀπελεύθερος*), if he omits to pay "proper attention" to his manumitter, may be laid hold of by the latter and re-enslaved. Proper attention consists in: 1. Going three times per month to the house of his former master, to tender service in all lawful ways. 2. Not contracting marriage without consulting his former master. 3. Not acquiring so much wealth as to become richer than his former master: if he should do so, the latter may appropriate all that is above the limit. The freedman, when liberated, does not become a citizen, but is only a non-citizen or metic. He is therefore subject to the same necessity as all other metics — of departing from the territory after a residence of twenty years,² and of never acquiring more wealth than is possessed by the second class of citizens enrolled in the Schedule.

The duties imposed by Plato on the freedman towards his

¹ Respecting the *ἐμμηνοὶ δίκαι* at Athens, see Heraldu, *Animadversiones* in Salmasium, vi. 1, p. 407 seq.; Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, p. 540 seq.; K. F. Hermann, *Staats Alterth.* a. 146, not. 9.

The word *ἐπαύρι* meant very different things—a picnic banquet, a club for festive meetings kept up by subscription with a common purse, a contribution made to relieve a friend in

distress, carrying obligation on the receiver to requite it if the donor fell into equal distress. This last sense is the prevalent one in the Attic orators, and is brought out well in the passage of Theophrastus—*Περὶ Μεμνημοσύνης*. Probably the Attic *ἐμμηνοὶ δίκαι* took cognisance of complaints arising out of *ἐπαύρι* in all its senses.

² Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 915 A-B.

former master—involving a formal recognition at least of the prior dependence, and some positive duties besides—are deserving of remark, as we know so little of the condition or treatment of this class of persons in antiquity.

Regulations are made to provide for the case where a slave, sold by his master, is found to be distempered or mad, or to have committed a murder. If the sale has been made to a physician or a gymnast, Plato holds that these persons ought to judge for themselves about the bodily condition of the slave bought: he therefore grants them no redress. But if the buyer be a non-professional man, he may within one month restore the distempered slave (or within one year, if the distemper be the *Morbus Sacer*), and may cause a jury of physicians to examine the case. Should they decide the distemper of the slave to be undoubted, the seller must take him back: repaying the full price, if he be a private man—double the price, if he be a professional man, who ought to have known, and perhaps did know, the real condition of the slave sold.

Provisions in case a slave is sold, having a distemper upon him.

In regard to Retail Selling, and to frauds committed either in sale or in barter, Plato provides or enjoins strict regulations. The profession of the retailer, and the function of money as auxiliary to it, he pronounces to be useful and almost indispensable to society, for the purpose of rendering different articles of value commensurable with each other, and of ensuring a distribution suitable to the requirements of individuals. This could not be done without retailers, merchants, hired agents, &c.¹ But though retailing is thus useful, if properly conducted, it slides easily and almost naturally into cheating, lying, extortion, &c., from the love of money inherent in most men. Such abuses must be restrained: at any rate they must not be allowed to corrupt the best part of the community. Accordingly, none of the 5040 citizens will be allowed either to practise retailing, or to exercise any hired function, except under his own senior relatives, and of a dignified character. The discrimination of what is dignified and not

Retailers. Strict regulations about them. No citizen can be a retailer.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 916 B-C. the Republic, ii. p. 371. It indicates
² Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 918 B. The just and penetrating social observation, taken in reference to Plato's age.

dignified must be made according to the liking or antipathy of a court of honour, composed of such citizens as have obtained prizes for virtue.¹ None must be permitted to sell by retail except metics or non-citizens: and these must be kept under strict watch by the Nomophylakes, who, after enquiring into the details of each article, will fix its price at such sum as will afford to the dealer a moderate profit.²

If there be any fraud committed by the seller (which is nearly akin to retailing),³ Plato prescribes severe penalty. The seller must never name two prices for his article during the same day. He must declare his price: and if no one will give it, he must withdraw the article for the day.⁴ He is not allowed to praise his own articles, or to take any oath respecting them. If he shall take any oath, any citizen above thirty years of age shall be held bound to thrash him, and may do so with impunity: such citizen, if he neglect to thrash the swearer, will himself be amenable to censure for betraying the laws. If the seller shall sell a spurious or fraudulent article, the magistrates must be informed of it by any one cognizant. The informer, if a slave or a metic, shall be rewarded by having the article made over to him. If he be a citizen, he will receive the article, but is bound to consecrate it to the Gods who preside over the market: if being cognizant he omits to inform, he shall be proclaimed a wicked man, for defrauding the Gods of that to which they are entitled. The magistrates, on receiving information, will not only deprive the seller of the spurious article, but will cause him to be flogged by the herald in the market-place—one stripe for every drachma contained in the price demanded. The herald will publicly proclaim the reason why the flogging is given. Besides this, the magistrates will collect and write up in the market-place both

¹ Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 918-919. 919 E: τὸ δ' ἐλευθερικὸν καὶ ἀνελεύθερον ἀκριβὲς μὲν οὐ βέβαιον νομοθετεῖν, κρινέσθω γὰρ μὴν ὑπὸ τῶν τὰ ἀριστεία εὐλαβέτων τῶν ἐκείνων μίσει τε καὶ ἀσπασμῶ.

² Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 B-C.

³ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 920 C. τῆς καθ' ἡλείας πύρι, ξυγγενούς τούτῳ (καπηλείᾳ) πράγματος, &c.

Plato is more rigorous on these matters than the Attic law. See K. F. Hermann, Griech. Privat-Alterthümer, s. 62.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 917 B-C. I do not quite see how this is to be reconciled with Plato's direction that the prices of articles sold shall be fixed by the magistrates; but both of the two are here found.

regulations of detail for the sellers, and information to put buyers on their guard.¹

Compare this enactment in Plato with the manner in which the Attic law would have dealt with the like offence.

The defrauded buyer would have brought his action before the Dikastery against the fraudulent seller, who, if found guilty, would have been condemned in damages to make good the wrong: perhaps fined besides. The penalties inflicted by the usual course of law at Athens were fine, disfranchisement, civil disability of one kind or other, banishment, confiscation of property: occasionally imprisonment—sometimes, though rarely, death by the cup of hemlock in prison.² Except in very rare cases, an accused person might retire into banishment if he chose, and might thus escape any penalty worse than banishment and confiscation of property. But corporal punishment was never inflicted by the law at Athens. The people, especially the poorer citizens, were very sensitive on this point,³ regarding it as one great line of distinction between the freeman and the slave. At Sparta, on the contrary, corporal chastisement was largely employed as a penalty: moreover the use of the fist in private contentions, by the younger citizens, was encouraged rather than forbidden.⁴

Comparison with the lighter punishment inflicted by Attic law.

Plato follows the analogy of Sparta in preference to that of Athens. Here, as elsewhere, he employs corporal punishment abundantly as a penalty. Here, as elsewhere, he not only prescribes that it shall be inflicted by a public agent under the supervision of magistrates, but also directs it to be administered, against certain offenders, by private unofficial citizens. I believe that this feature of his system would have been more repugnant than any other, to the feelings of all classes of Athenian citizens—to all the different types of character represented by Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Isokrates, Demosthenes, and Sokrates. Abstinence from manual violence was characteristic of Athenian manners. Whatever licence might be allowed to the tongue, it was at least a substitute for the aggressive employment of the arm and hand.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 917 B-D.

² See Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, B. iv. chap. 13, 740.

³ See Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2, 53.

⁴ Xenophon, *Hellen.* iii. 3, 11: *De Republ. Laced.* ii. 8, iv. 6, ix. 5; Aristophanes, *Aves*, 1013.

Athens exhibited marked respect for the sanctity of the person against blows—much equality of dealing between man and man—much tolerance, public as well as private, of individual diversity in taste and character—much keenness of intellectual and oral competition, liable to degenerate into unfair stratagem in political, forensic, professional, and commercial life, as well as in rhetorical, dialectical, and philosophical exercises. All these elements, not excepting even the first, were distasteful to Plato. But those who copy the disparaging judgment which he pronounces against Athenian manners, ought in fairness to take account of the point of view from which that judgment is delivered. To a philosopher whose ideal is depicted in the two treatises *De Republica* and *De Legibus*, Athenian society would appear repulsive enough. We learn from these two treatises what it was that a great speculative politician of the day desired to establish as a substitute.

Plato next goes on to make regulations about orphans and guardians, and in general for cases arising out of the death of a citizen. The first question presenting itself naturally is, How far is the citizen to be allowed to direct by testament the disposition of his family and property? What restriction is to be placed upon his power of making a valid will? Many persons (Plato says) affirmed that it was unjust to impose any restriction: that the dying man had a right to make such dispositions as he chose, for his property and family after his death. Against this view Plato enters his decided protest. Each man—and still more each man's property—belongs not to himself, but to his family and to the city: besides which, an old man's judgment is constantly liable to be perverted by decline of faculties, disease, or the cajoleries of those around him.¹ Accordingly Plato grants only a limited liberty of testation. Here, as elsewhere, he adopts the main provisions of the Attic law, with such modifications as were required by the fundamental principles of his Magnetic city: especially by the fixed total of 5040 lots or *fundi*, each untransferable and indivisible. The lot, together with the plant or

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 923 B.

It is to be observed that Plato does not make any allusion to these misleading influences operating upon an

aged man, when he talks about the curse of a father against his son being constantly executed by the Gods: xi. p. 931 B.

stock for cultivating it,¹ must descend entire to one son : but the father, if he has more than one son, may determine by will to which of them it shall descend. If there be any one among the sons whom another citizen (being childless) is disposed to adopt, such adoption can only take place with the father's consent. But if the father gives his consent, he cannot bequeath his own lot to the son so adopted, because two lots cannot be united in the same possessor. Whatever property the father possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances, he may distribute by will among his other sons, in any proportion he pleases. If he dies, leaving no sons, but only daughters, he may select which of them he pleases ; and may appoint by will some suitable husband, of a citizen family, to marry her and inherit his lot. If a citizen (being childless) has adopted a son out of any other family, he must bequeath to that son the whole of his property, except one-tenth part of what he possesses over and above his lot and its appurtenances : this tenth he may bequeath to any one whom he chooses.²

If the father dies intestate, leaving only daughters, the nearest relative who has no lot of his own shall marry one of the daughters, and succeed to the lot. The nearest is the brother of the deceased ; next, the brother of the deceased's wife (paternal and maternal uncles of the maiden) ; next, their sons ; next, the parental and maternal uncle of the deceased father, and their sons. If all these relatives be wanting, the magistrates will provide a suitable husband, in order that the lot of land may not remain unoccupied.³ If a citizen die both intestate and childless, two of his nearest unmarried relatives, male and female, shall intermarry and succeed to his property : reckoning in the order of kinship above mentioned.⁴ In thus imposing marriage as a legal obligation upon persons in a certain degree of kinship, Plato is aware that there will be individual cases of great hardship and of repugnance almost

¹ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 923 D. εὐλὴ τοῦ πατρὸς κλῆρον καὶ τῆς περὶ τὸν κλῆρον κατασκευῆς εὐλῆς.

² Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 923-924. The language of Plato seems to imply that this childless citizen would not be likely to make any will, but that having

adopted a son, the son so adopted would hardly be satisfied unless he inherited the whole.

³ Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 924-925.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 925 C-D. These provisions appear to me not very clear.

insurmountable. He treats this as unavoidable: providing however that there shall be a select judicial Board of Appeal, before which persons who feel aggrieved by the law may bring their complaints, and submit their grounds for dispensation.¹

These provisions deserve notice as showing how largely Plato coincides with the prevalent Attic sentiment respecting family and relationship. He does not award the slightest preference to primogeniture, among brothers: he grants to agnates a preference over cognates: he regards it as a public misfortune that any house shall be left empty, so as to cause interruption of the sacred rites of the family: lastly, he ensures that the family, in default of lineal male heirs, shall be continued by inter-marriage with the nearest relatives—and he especially approves the marriage of an heiress with her paternal or maternal uncle. On these points Plato is in full harmony with his countrymen, though he dissents widely from modern sentiment.

Respecting tutelage of orphans, he makes careful provision against abuse, as the Attic law also did: he tries also to meet the cases of family discord, where father and son are in bitter wrath against each other. A father may formally renounce his son, but not without previously obtaining the concurrence of a *conseil de famille*: if the father has become imbecile with age, and wastes his substance, the son may institute a suit as for lunacy, but not without the permission of the Nomophylakes.² Respecting disagreement between married couples, ten of the Nomophylakes, together with ten women chosen as supervisors of marriages, are constituted a Board of reference,³ to obtain a reconciliation, if it be possible: but if this be impossible, then to divorce the couple, and unite each with some more suitable partner. The lawgiver must keep in view, as far as he can, to obtain from each married couple a sufficiency of children—

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 926 B-D. He directs also (p. 925 A) that the Dikasts shall determine the fit season when these young persons become marriageable by examining their naked bodies: that is, the males quite naked, the females half naked. A direction seemingly copied from Athenian practice,

and illustrating curiously the language of Philokleon in Aristophanes, *Vesp.* 598. See K. F. Hermann, *Vestig. Juris Domesticum ap. Platonem cum Græciæ Institutis Comparata*, p. 27.

² Plato, *Legg.* xi. pp. 928-929.

³ Plato, *Legg.* xi. pp. 929-930.

Plato's
general
coincidence
with Attic
law and its
sentiment.

Tutelage of
Orphans—
Disagree-
ment of
Married
Couples—
Divorce.

that is, one male and one female child from each, whereby the total of 5040 lots may be kept up.¹ If a husband loses his wife before he has these two children, the law requires him to marry another wife: but if he becomes a widower, having already the sufficiency of children, he is advised not to marry a second wife (who will become stepmother), though not prohibited from doing so, if he chooses. So also, if a woman becomes a widow, not having the sufficient number of children, she must be compelled to marry again: if she already has the sufficient number, she is directed to remain in the house, and to bring them up. In case she is still young, and her health requires a husband, her relatives will apply to the Female Supervisors of Marriage, and will make such arrangements as may seem advisable.²

Against neglect of aged parents by their children, Plato both denounces the most stringent legal penalties, and delivers the most emphatic reproofs: commending Neglect of
parents. with full faith the ancient traditional narratives, that the curse of an offended parent against his sons was always executed by the Gods, as in the cases of Œdipus, Theseus, Amyn-tor, &c.³ In the event of lunacy, he directs that the lunatic shall be kept in private custody by his relatives, who will be fined if they neglect the duty.⁴

Hurt or damage, not deadly, done by one man to another.—Plato enumerates two different modes of inflicting damage:—

1. By drugs (applied externally or internally), magic, or sorcery.
2. By theft or force.⁵

As to the first mode, if the drug be administered by a physician, he must be put to death: if by one not a physician, the Dikasts will determine the nature of his punishment. And in the case of magical arts, or incantations, if the person who resorts to them be a prophet, or an inspector of prodigies, he must be put to death: another person doing the same will be punished at the discretion of the Dikasts. Here we see that the prophet

Poison—
Magic—In-
cantations
—Severe
punish-
ment.

¹ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 D. *παῖδων
ὅτι ἰκανόντες ἀκριβὲς ἄρῃν καὶ θήλειαν
ἴστω τῷ νόμῳ.*

² Plato, Legg. xi. p. 930 C.

³ Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 931-932.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 934 D.

⁵ Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 932 E—933 E.
Both these come under the general
head *ὅσα τις ἄλλος ἄλλον πημαίνει*.

is ranked as a professional person (the like appears in Homer) along with the physician,¹—who must know what he is about, while another person perhaps may not know. But Plato's own opinion respecting magical incantations is delivered with singular reserve. He will neither avouch them nor reject them. He intimates that a man can hardly find out what is true on the subject; and even if he could, it would be harder still to convince others. Most men are in serious alarm when they see waxen statuettes hung at their doors or at their family tombs; and it is useless to attempt to tranquillise them by reminding them that they have no certain evidence on the subject.² Here we see how Plato discourages the received legends and the current faith, when he believes them to be hurtful—as contrasted with his vehemence in upholding them when he thinks them useful: as in the case of the paternal curse, and the judgments of the Gods. The question of their truth is made to depend on their usefulness.³ The Gods are made to act exactly as he thinks they ought to act. They are not merely invoked, but positively counted on, as executioners of Plato's ethical sentences.

Respecting the second mode of damage—by theft or violence—

Punishment
is inflicted
with a view
to future
prevention
or amend-
ment.

Plato's law forms a striking contrast to that which has been just set forth. The person who inflicts damage must repay it, or make full compensation for it, to the sufferer: small, if the damage be small—great, if it be great. Besides this, the guilty person must undergo some farther punishment with a view to correction or reformation. This will be smaller, if he be young and seduced by the persuasion of others; but it must be graver, if he be self-impelled by his own

¹ Plato, Legg. xi. p. 938 C. *ὡς πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐπιχειροῦντα φαρμάκων οὐκ αἰδῶτα τί ὄρεῖ, τὰ τε κατὰ σώματα, εἰς μὴ τυγχάνῃ ἐπιστήμων ἂν ἱατρικῆς, τὰ τε εἰς περὶ τὰ μαγανεύματα, εἰς μὴ μάντις ἢ τερατοσκόπος ὢν τυγχάνῃ.*

Homer, Odyss. xvii. 383:—

... τῶν οἱ δημοεργοὶ ἔασσι,
μάντιν, ἢ ἰήτρα κακῶν, ἢ τέλονται
δοῦρην,
ἢ καὶ θέσιν αἰδῶν, &c.

² Plato, Legg. xi. p. 938 B. *ἂν ποτε*

ἰδῶσι πον κήρυκα μνήματα πτελεσμένα. Compare Theokritus, Idyll. ii. 28-50.

See the remarkable narrative of the death of Germanicus in Syria, supposed to have been brought about by the magical artifices wrought under the auspices of Piso (Tacitus, Ann. ii. 69).

³ Cicero, Legg. ii. 7, 16. "Utiles autem esse has opiniones, quis negat, cum intelligat, quam multa firmentur jurejurando," &c.

desires, fears, wrath, jealousy, &c. Understand, however (adds Plato), that such ulterior punishment is not imposed on account of the past misdeed—for the past cannot be recalled or undone—but on account of the future: to ensure that he shall afterwards hate wrong-doing, and that those who see him punished shall hate it also. The *Dikasts* must follow out in detail the general principle here laid down.¹

This passage proclaims distinctly an important principle in regard to the infliction of legal penalties: which principle, if kept in mind, might have lead Plato to alter or omit a large portion of the *Leges*.

Respecting *words of abuse, or revilement, or insulting derision*.—These are altogether forbidden. If used in any temple, market, or public and frequented place, the magistrate presiding must punish the offender forthwith, as he thinks fit: if elsewhere, any citizen by-stander, being older than the offender, is authorised and required to thrash him.² No writer of comedy is allowed to ridicule or libel any citizen. Penalty for abusive words—for libellous comedy. Mendicity forbidden.

Mendicity is strictly prohibited. Every mendicant must be sent away at once, in order that the territory may be rid of such a creature.³ Every man, who has passed an honest life, will be sure to have made friends who will protect him against the extremity of want.

The rules provided by Plato about witnesses in judicial trials and indictments for perjury, are pretty much the same as those prevalent at Athens: with some peculiarities. Thus he permits a free woman to bear witness, and to address the court in support of a party interested, provided she be above forty years of age. Moreover, she may institute a suit, if she have no husband: but not if she be married.⁴ A slave or a child may bear witness at a trial for Regulations about witnesses on judicial trials.

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. pp. 933-934. Compare Plato, *Protagor.* p. 324 B.

² Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 935 C-D. The Attic law expressly forbade the utterance of abusive words against any individual in an office or public place upon any pretence (*Lysias*, Or. ix. *Pro Milite*, a. 6-9). *Demosthenes* (contra *Konon*, p. 1263) speaks of *καταγορία* or

καταγορία as in itself trifling, but as forbidden by the law, lest it should lead to violence and blows.

³ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 936 C. *ὅπως δὲ χάρις τοῦ τοιοῦτου ζῶντος καθαρὰ γίγνηται τὸ παράπαν.*

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 937 A-B.

It appears that women were not admitted as witnesses before the Athe-

murder ; provided security be given that they will remain in the city to await an indictment for perjury, if presented against them.

Among Plato's prohibitions, we are not surprised to find one directed emphatically against forensic eloquence, and against those who professed to teach it. Every thing beneficial to man (says he) has its accompanying poison and corruption. Justice is a noble thing, the great civilising agent in human affairs : to aid any one in obtaining justice, is of course a noble thing also. But these benefits are grossly abused by men, who pretend to possess an art, whereby every one may be sure of judicial victory, either as principal or as auxiliary, whether his cause be just or unjust :— and who offer to teach this art to all who pay a stipulated price. Whether this be (as they pretend) a real art, or a mere artificial knack—it would be a disgrace to our city, and must be severely punished. Whoever gives show of trying to pervert the force of justice in the minds of the *Dikasts*, or indulges in unseasonable and frequent litigation, or even lends his aid to other litigants—may be indicted by any citizen as guilty of abuse of justice, either as principal or auxiliary. He shall be tried before the Court of Select Judges : who, if they find him guilty, will decide whether he has committed the offence from love of money, or from love of contention and ambitious objects. If from love of contention, he shall be interdicted, for such time as the Court may determine, from instituting any suit at law on his own account as well as from aiding in any suit instituted by others.' If from love of money, the citizen found guilty shall be capitally punished, the non-citizen shall be banished in perpetuity. Moreover the citizen convicted of committing this offence even from love of

nian *Dikasteries*. Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, pp. 667-668. The testimony of slaves was received after they had been tortured ; which was considered as a guarantee for truth, required in regard to them, but not required in regard to a free-man. The torture is not mentioned in this Platonic treatise. Plato treats a male as young up to the age of thirty (compare Xenoph. *Memor.* l. 2, 35), a female as young up to the age of forty (pp. 932 B-C, 961 E).

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xi. p. 938 B. τιμῶν

αὐτῶν τὸ δικαστήριον δοῦν καὶ χρῶσθαι τὸν τοιοῦτον μὲν δὲ λαχεῖν δίκην μὲν ἐνδεχόμεναι. I cannot understand why Stallbaum, in his very useful notes on the *Leges*, observes upon this passage (p. 330) :—"λαγχάνειν δίκην de causidicis accipiendum, qui causam aliquam pro aliis in foro agendam ac defendendam suscipiunt". This is the explanation belonging to ἐνδεχόμεναι : λαχεῖν δίκην is the well known phrase for a plaintiff or a prosecutor as principal.

contention, if it be a second conviction for the offence, shall be put to death also.¹

The vague and undefined character of this offence, for which Plato denounces capital punishment, shows how much his penal laws are discharges of ethical antipathy and hostility against types of character conceived by himself—rather than measures intended for application, in which he had weighed beforehand the practical difficulties of singling out and striking the right individual. On this matter the Athenian public had the same ethical antipathy as himself; and Melétus took full advantage of it, when he brought his accusation against Sokrates. We know both from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, and from the Nubes of Aristophanes—that Sokrates was rendered odious to the Athenian people and Dikasts, partly as heterodox and irreligious, but partly also as one who taught the art of using speech so as to make the worse appear the better reason. Both Aristophanes and Melétus would have sympathised warmly with the Platonic law. If there had been any Solonian law to the same effect, which Melétus could have quoted in his accusatory speech, his case against Sokrates would have been materially strengthened. Especially, he would have had the express sanction of law for his proposition of death as the penalty: a proposition to which the Athenian Dikasts would not have consented, had they not been affronted and driven to it by the singular demeanour of Sokrates himself when before them. It would be irrelevant here to say that Sokrates was not guilty of what was imputed to him: that he never came before the Dikastery until the time of his trial—and that he did not teach “the art of words”. If he did not teach it, he was at least believed to teach it, not merely by Aristophanes and by the Athenian Dikasts, but also by intelligent men like Kritias and Charikles,² who knew him perfectly well: while the example of Antiphon shows that a man might be most acute and efficacious as a forensic adviser, without coming in person before the Dikastery.³ What the defence really makes us feel is, the indefinite

Many of Plato's laws are discharges of ethical antipathy. The antipathy of Melétus against Sokrates was of the same character.

¹ Plato, Legg. xi. pp. 937 E, 938 C.

² Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 31 seq.

³ Thucyd. viii. 68.

nature of the charge : which is neither provable nor disprovable, and which is characterised, both by Xenophon and in the Platonic Apology, as one of the standing calumnies against all philosophising men.¹ Here, in the Platonic Leges, this same unprovable offence is adopted and made capital : the Select Platonic Dikasts being directed to ascertain, not only whether a man has really committed it, but whether he has been impelled to commit it by love of money, or by love of victory and personal consequence.

The twelfth and last Book of the Treatise *De Legibus* deals with various cases of obligation, not towards individuals, but towards the public or the city. Abuse of trust in the character of a public envoy is declared punishable. This offence (familiar to us at Athens through the two harangues of Demosthenes and Æschines) is invested by Plato with a religious colouring, as desecrating the missions and commands of Hermès and Zeus.² Wrongful appropriation of the public money by a citizen is also made capital. The penalty is to be inflicted equally whether the sum appropriated be large or small : in either case the guilt is equal, and the evidence of wicked disposition the same, for one who has gone through the public education and training.³ This is quite different from Plato's principle of dealing with theft or wrongful abstraction of property from private persons : in which case, the sentence of Plato was, that the amount of damage done, small or great, should be made good by the offender, and that a certain ulterior penalty should be inflicted sufficient to deter him as well as others from a repetition.

Provision is farther made for punishing any omission of military service either by males or females, or any discreditable abandon-

¹ Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 23.

Such was the colloquial power of Sokrates, in the portrait drawn by Xenophon (*Mem.* i. 2, 14), "that he handled all who conversed with him just as he pleased—τοῖς δὲ διαλεγόμενοις αὐτῷ πᾶσι χρόμαρον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὖ καὶ βούλοιο. Kritias and Alkibiades (Xenophon tells us) sought his society for the purpose of strengthening their own oratorical powers as political men, and of becoming κρείττονα τῶν συγγηγρομένων (i. 2, 16).

Looked at from the point of view of opponents, this would be described as the proceeding of one who himself both could pervert, and did pervert, justice—and who taught others to pervert it also. This was the picture of Sokrates which the accusers presented to the Athenian Dikastery : as we may see by the language of Sokrates himself at the beginning of the Platonic Apology.

² Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 941 A.

³ Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 941 : compare xi. p. 934 A.

ment of arms.¹ The orders of the military commander must be implicitly and exactly obeyed. The actions of all must be orderly, uniform, and simultaneous. Nothing can be more mischievous than that each should act for himself, separately and apart from others. This is confessedly true as to war; but it is no less essential as to the proceedings in peace.² Suppression of individuality, and conversion of life into a perpetual, all-per-vading, drill and discipline—is a favourite aspiration always present to Plato.

A Board of Elders is constituted by Plato, as auditors of the proceedings of all Magistrates after their term of office.³ The mode of choosing these Elders, as well as their duties, liabilities, privileges, and honours, both during life and after death, are prescribed with the utmost solemnity.

Plato forbids the parties in any judicial suit from swearing : they will present their case to the court, but not upon oath. No judicial oath is allowed to be taken by any one who has a pecuniary interest in the matter on hand. The *Dikasts*—the judges in all public com-petitions—the *Electors* before they elect to a public trust—are all to be sworn : but neither the parties to

Oaths.
Dikasts,
Judges,
Electors, are
to be sworn ;
but no par-
ties to a suit,
or interested
witnesses,

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 944. It is curious to compare this passage of Plato with the two orations of *Lysias* κατὰ Θεομνήστον A and B (*Oratt.* x. xi.). Plato enjoins upon all accusers the greatest caution and precision in the terms used to indicate what they intended to charge upon the accused. To call a man *ρίψας τις* is a more aggravated offensive designation than to call him *ἀποβολῆς ὄντων*, which latter term is more general, and may possibly be applied to those who have lost their arms under the pressure of irresistible necessity, without any disgrace. On the other hand, we read in *Lysias*, that the offence which was punishable under the Attic law was *ὄντων ἀποβολῆς*, and that to assert falsely respecting any citizen, τὰ ὅσα ἀποβέβηκεν, was an *ἀνόρητον* or for-bidden phrase, which exposed the speaker to a fine of 500 drachms (sect. 1-12). But to assert respecting any man that he was *ρίψας τις* was not expressly *ἀνόρητον* (compare *Lysias* cont. *Agorat.*, Or. xiii. ss. 87-89), and

the speaker might argue (successfully or not) that he had said nothing *ἀνόρητον*, and was not guilty of legal *κατηγορία*.—There is another phrase in this section of Plato to which I would call attention. He enumerates the excusable cases of losing arms as follows—*ὄντοισι κατὰ κρημνῶν ριπίσιντες ἀπώλεσαν ὅπλα ἢ κατὰ θέλωνται* (p. 944 A). Now the cases of soldiers being thrown down cliffs are, I believe, unknown until the Phokian prisoners were so dealt with in the Sacred War, as sacrilegious offenders against Apollo and the Delphian temple. Hence we may probably infer that this was composed after the Sacred War began, B.C. 356. See *Diodorus* and my 'Hist. of Greece,' chap. 87, p. 350 seq.

² Plato, *Legg.* xii. pp. 942 B-945. *ὅτι τε λόγῳ τὸ χωρὶς τι τῶν ἄλλων πράττειν διδάξαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἰδεῖται μῆτε γυγνώσκειν μὴτ' ἐπιστάσθαι τὸ παρῆναι, ἀλλ' ἄβρόν ἔει καὶ ἅμα καὶ κοῖνον τὸν βίον ὁ, τι μάλιστα πᾶσι πάντων γίγνεσθαι.*

³ Plato, *Legg.* xii. pp. 946-948.

can be
sworn.

any cause, nor (seemingly) the witnesses. If oaths were taken on both sides, one or other of the parties must be perjured : and Plato considers it dreadful, that they should go on living with each other afterwards in the same city. In aforetime Rhadamanthus (he tells us) used to settle all disputes simply, by administering an oath to the parties : for in his time no one would take a false oath : men were then not only pious, but even sons or descendants of the Gods. But now (in the Platonic days) impiety has gained ground, and men's oaths are no longer to be trusted, where anything is to be gained by perjury.¹

Regulations about admission of strangers, and foreign travel of citizens. Strict regulations are provided, as to exit from the Platonic city, and ingress into it. Plato fears contamination to his citizens from converse with the outer world. He would introduce the peremptory Spartan Xenelasy, if he were not afraid of the obloquy attending it. He strictly defines the conditions on which the foreigner will be allowed to come in, or the citizen to go out. No citizen is allowed to go out before he is forty years of age.² Envoys must be sent on public missions ; and sacred legations (theories) must be despatched to the four great Hellenic festivals—Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, and Isthmian. But private citizens are not permitted to visit even these great festivals at their own pleasure. The envoys sent must be chosen and trustworthy men : moreover, on returning, they will assure their youthful fellow-citizens, that the home institutions are better than anything that can be seen abroad.³

Special travellers, between the ages of fifty and sixty, will also be permitted to go abroad, and will bring back reports to the Magistrates of what they have observed. Strangers are admitted into the city or its neighbourhood, under strict supervision ; partly as observers, partly as traders, for the limited amount of traffic which the lawgiver tolerates.⁴ Thus scanty is the worship which Plato will allow his Magnêtes to pay to Zeus Xenius.⁵ He seems however to take credit for it as liberal dealing.

¹ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 948-949.

² Plato, Legg. xii. p. 950.

³ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 951.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 952-953.

⁵ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 963 D-E. Τοῖς δὲ τοῖς νόμοις ἐπιτρέψαι τε καὶ χρῆναι πάντας ξένους τε καὶ ξένας καὶ τοὺς οὐτὴν ἀνέμειναι, τιμωρίας ξένων Δία,

Plato proceeds with various enactments respecting suretyship—time of prescription for ownership—keeping men away by force either from giving testimony in court or from contending at the public matches—receiving of stolen goods—private war or alliance on the part of any individual citizen, without the consent of the city—receipt of bribes by functionaries—return and registration of each citizen's property—dedications and offerings to the Gods.¹ No systematic order or classification can be traced in the successive subjects.

Suretyship
—Length of
prescription
for owner-
ship, &c.

In respect to judiciary matters, he repeats (what had before been directed) his constitution of three stages of tribunals. First, Arbitrators, chosen by both parties in the dispute. From their decision, either party may appeal to the Tribe-Dikasteries, composed of all the citizens of the Tribe or Dême: or at least, composed of a jury taken from these. After this, there is a final appeal to the Select Dikastery, chosen among all the Magistrates for the time being.² Plato leaves to his successors the regulations of details, respecting the mode of impannelling and the procedure of these Juries.

Judicial
trial—three
stages. 1.
Arbitrators.
2. Tribe-
Dikasteries.
3. Select
Dikastery.

Lastly come the regulations respecting funerals—the cost, ceremonies, religious proceedings, mode of showing sorrow and reverence, &c.³ These are given in considerable detail, and with much solemnity of religious exhortation.

Funerals—
proceedings
prescribed—
expense
limited.

We have now reached the close. The city has received its full political and civil outfit: as much legal regulation as it is competent for the lawgiver to provide at the beginning. One guarantee alone is wanting. Some security must be provided for the continuance and

Conserva-
tive organ to
keep up the
original
scheme of
the law.

μή βρώμασι καὶ θύμασι τὰς ξενηλασίας
ποιουμένους, καθάπερ ποιοῦσι νῦν θρέμ-
ματα Νείλου, μηδὲ κτηνύμασιν ἀγρίοις.
Stallbaum says in his note (p. 384):—
“μή βρώμασι καὶ θύμασι—peregrinos
non expellentes cœnis et sacrificiis, h.
e. eorum usu iis interdictentes”. This
surely is not the right explanation.
Plato means to say that the Egyptian
habits as to eating and sacrifice were

intolerably repulsive to a foreigner.
We may see this from κτηνύμασι, which
follows. The peculiarities of Egypt,
which Herodotus merely remarks upon
with astonishment, may well have
given offence to the fastidious and
dictatorial spirit of Plato.

¹ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 954-956.

² Plato, Legg. xii. p. 956.

³ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 957-958.

giver.
Nocturnal
Council for
this purpose
—how con-
stituted.

durability of the enactments.¹ We must have a special conservative organ, watching over and keeping up the scheme of the original lawgiver. For this function, Plato constitutes a Board, which, from its rule of always beginning its sittings before daybreak, he calls the Nocturnal council. It will comprise ten of the oldest Nomophylakes : all those who have obtained prizes for good conduct or orderly discipline : all those who have been authorised to go abroad, and have been approved on their return. Each of these members will introduce into the Synod one young man of thirty years of age, chosen by himself, but approved by the others. The members will thus be partly old, partly young.

This Nocturnal council is intended as the conservative organ of the Platonic city. It is, in the city, what the soul and head are in an animal. The soul includes Reason : the head includes the two most perfect senses—Sight and Hearing. The fusion, in one, of Reason with these two senses ensures the preservation of the animal.² In the Nocturnal council, the old members represent Reason, the young members represent the two superior senses, serving as instruments and means of communication between Reason and the outer world. The Nocturnal council, embracing the agency of both, maintains thereby the life and continuity of the city.⁴

It is the special duty of this council, to serve as a perpetual embodiment of the original lawgiver, and to comprehend as well as to realise the main purpose for which the city was put together. The councillors must keep constantly in view this grand political end, as the pilot keeps in view safe termination of the voyage—as the military commander keeps in view victory, and the physician, recovery of health. Should the physician or the pilot either not know his end, or not know the conditions under which it may be attained—his labour will be in vain. So, if there does not exist in the city an authority understanding the great political end and the means (either by laws or human agents) of accomplishing it, the city will be a failure. Hence the indis-

¹ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 960 C-D. Compare Plato, Republ. vi. p. 497 D : ὅτι δέησσι τι εἶναι ἐκείναι ἐν τῇ πόλει, λόγον ἔχον τῆς πολιτείας τὸν αὐτὸν ὅντιν καὶ σὺ δὲ νομοθέτης ἔχων τοὺς

νόμους ἐπίσθης.

² Plato, Legg. xii. p. 961 A-B.

³ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 961 D.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 964 D—965 A.

pensible necessity of the Nocturnal council, with members properly taught and organised.¹

The great political end must be one, and not many. All the arrows aimed by the central Conservative organ must be aimed at one and the same point.² This is the chief excellence of a well-constituted conservative authority. Existing cities err all of them in one of two ways. Either they aim at one single End, but that End bad or wrong: or they aim at a variety of Ends without giving exclusive attention to any one. Survey existing cities: you will find that in one, the great purpose, and the main feature of what passes for justice, is, that some party or faction shall obtain or keep political power, whether its members be better or worse than their fellow-citizens: in a second city, it is wealth—in a third, freedom of individuals—in a fourth, freedom combined with power over foreigners. Some cities, again, considering themselves wiser than the rest, strive for all these objects at once or for a variety of others, without exclusive attention to any one.³ Amidst such divergence and error in regard to the main end, we cannot wonder that all cities fail in attaining it.

This Council must keep steadily in view the one great end of the city—Mistakes made by existing cities about the right end.

The One End proposed by *our* city is, the virtue of its citizens. But virtue is fourfold, or includes four varieties—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice. Our End is and must be One. The medical Reason has its One End, Good Health:⁴ the strategic Reason has its One End—Victory: What is that One End (analogous to these) which the political Reason aims at? It must be that in which the four cardinal virtues—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—are One, or

The one end of the city is the virtue of its citizens—that property which is common to the four varieties of Virtue—Reason,

¹ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 902 B. δὲ εἰς αὐτὴν τὴν γινώσκοντα ἐν αὐτῇ (the city) πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο δ' λέγομεν, τὸν σκοπόν, ὅστις ποτὶ δὲ πολιτικῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τυγχάνει, ἔπειτα ὅτινα τρόπον δεῖ μετασχεῖν τοῦτον καὶ τίς αὐτῷ καλῶς ἢ μὴ συμβουλευσέτω τῶν νόμων αὐτῶν πρῶτον, ἔπειτα ἀνθρώπων.

² Plato, Legg. xii. p. 902 D. δεῖ δὲ τοῦτον (the nocturnal synod) . . . εὖσαν ἀρετὴν ἔχειν, ἥς ἀρχὴ τὸ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι πρὸς πολλὰ στοχασόμενον, ἀλλ' εἰς ἓν βλέποντα πρὸς τοῦτο δεῖ τὰ πάντα οἶον

βίην εἶναι.

³ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 902 D-E. Compare Aristot. Eth. Nikom. x. 1180, a. 28.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 903 A-B. τοῦν γὰρ δὴ κυβερνητικὸν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικὸν καὶ στρατηγικὸν εἰσόμεν εἰς τὸ ἐν ἑκείνῳ οἱ δεῖ βλέπειν, τὸν δὲ πολιτικὸν διὰρχοντες ἐνταῦθ' ἱστέον τὸν . . . Ὁ θαυμάσιος, σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖ σκοπεῖς; τί ποτ' ἐκείνῳ ὅστις τὸ ἐν, δὲ δὴ σαφῶς δὲ μὲν ἱατρικὸς τοῦτ' ἔχει πρόβλεψιν, σὺ δ' ὅν δὲ διαφύκει, ὡς φαίης ἂν, πάντων τῶν ἐμφάνων, οὐχ ἕως εἰπεῖν;

Courage,
Temper-
ance, Jus-
tice.

coincide : that common property, possessed by all and by each, which makes them to be virtue, and constitutes the essential meaning of the name, Virtue. We must know the four as four, that is, the points of difference between them : but it is yet more important to know them as One—to discern the point of essential coincidence and union between them.¹

To understand thoroughly this unity of virtue, so as to act upon it themselves, to explain it to others and to embody it in all their orders—is the grand requisite for the supreme Guardians of our city—the Nocturnal council. We cannot trust such a function in the hands of poets, or of visiting discourses who announce themselves as competent to instruct youth. It cannot be confided to any less authority than the chosen men—the head and senses—of our city, properly and specially trained to exercise it.² Upon this depends the entire success or failure of our results. Our guardians must be taught to see that one Idea which pervades the Multiple and the Diverse :³ to keep it steadily before their own eyes, and to explain and illustrate it in discourse to others. They must contemplate the point of coincidence and unity between Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice : as well as between the many different things called Beautiful, and the many different things called Good.⁴ They must declare whether the name Virtue, common to all the four, means something One—or a Whole or Aggregate—or both together.⁵ If they cannot explain to us whether Virtue is Manifold or Fourfold, or in what manner it is One—they are unfit for their task, and our city will prove a failure. To know the truth about these important matters—to be competent to explain and defend it to others—to follow it out in practice, and to apply it in discriminating what is well done

¹ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 963 E—964 A.

² Plato, Legg. xii. p. 964 D.

³ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 965 C. τὸ πρὸς μίαν ἰδέαν ἐκ τῶν πολλῶν καὶ ἀνομοίων δυνατόν ἐστιν βλέπειν.

⁴ Plato, Legg. xii. pp. 965 D, 966 A-B.

⁵ Plato, Legg. xii. p. 965 D. πρὶν ἢ

ἰκανῶς εἰπωμεν τί ποτὶ ἐστίν, εἰς ὃ βλαπτόν, εἴτε ὡς ἐν, εἴτε ὡς δυν, εἴτε ἀμφοτέρω, εἴτε ἑνὶ ποτὶ πέφυκεν· ἢ τοῦτον διαφυσγόντος ἡμᾶς οἰομεθα ποτὶ ἡμῖν ἰκανῶς εἶναι τὰ πρὸς ἀρετῆν, περὶ ἧς οὐτ' εἰ πολλὰ ἐστ', οὐτ' εἰ τέτταρα, οὐδ' εἰς ἐν, δυνατόι φράζειν ἰσχύμεθα;

and what is ill done—these are the imperative and indispensable duties of our Guardians.¹

Furthermore it is also essential that they should adopt an orthodox religious creed, and should be competent to explain and defend it. The citizens generally must believe without scrutiny such dogmas as the lawgiver enjoins; but the Guardians must master the proofs of them.² The proofs upon which, in Plato's view, all true piety rests, are two³ (he here repeats them): —1. Mind or soul is older than Body—antecedent to Body as a moving power—and invested with power to impel, direct, and controul Body. 2. When we contemplate the celestial rotation, we perceive such extreme exactness and regularity in the movement of the stars (each one of the vast multitude maintaining its relative position in the midst of prodigious velocity of movement) that we cannot explain it except by supposing a Reason or Intelligence pervading and guiding them all. Many astronomers have ascribed this regular movement to an inherent Necessity, and have hereby drawn upon science reproaches from poets and others, as if it were irreligious. But these astronomers (Plato affirms) were quite mistaken in excluding Mind and Reason from the celestial bodies, and in pronouncing the stars to be bodies without mind, like earth or stones. Necessity cannot account for their exact and regular movements: no other supposition is admissible except the constant volition of mind in-dwelling in each, impelling and guiding them towards exact goodness of result. Astronomy well understood is, in Plato's view, the foundation of true piety. It is only the erroneous astronomical doctrines which are open to the current imputations of irreligion.⁴

These are the capital religious or kosmical dogmas which the members of the Nocturnal Council must embrace and expound to others, together with the mathematical and musical teaching suitable to illustrate them. Application must be made of these

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 966 B.

² Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 966 D.

³ Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 967 E.

⁴ Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 967 A-D.
διαφορίαι βουλήσεως ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν.

μὲν . . . μή ποτ' ἐν ἀφύχῃ ὅττα οὕτως
εἰς ἀρίθειαν θαυμαστοῖς λογισμοῖς ἐν
ἐχρήτο, νοῦν μὴ κεκτημένα . . . τὸν τε
εἰρημῶν ἐν τοῖς ἀστροῖς νοῦν τῶν
ἄλλων.

dogmas to improve the laws and customs of the city, and the dispositions of the citizens.¹

When this Nocturnal Council, with its members properly trained and qualified, shall be established in the akropolis—symbolising the conjunction of Reason with the head or with the two knowledge-giving senses—the Magnetic City may securely be entrusted to it, with certainty of an admirable result.²

EPINOMIS.

Here closes the dialogue called *Leges*: somewhat prematurely, since the peculiar training indispensable for these Nocturnal Counsellors has not yet been declared. The short dialogue called *Epinomis* supplies this defect. It purports to be a second day's conversation between the same trio.

Leges close, without describing the education proper for the Nocturnal Counsellors. *Epinomis*—supplying this defect.

The Athenian declares his plan of education—Arithmetic, Geometry, Astronomy.

The Athenian—adverting to the circumstances of human life generally, as full of toil and suffering, with few and transient moments of happiness—remarks that none except the wise have any chance of happiness; and that few can understand what real wisdom is, though every one presumes that there must be something of the kind discoverable.³ He first enumerates what it is *not*. It is not any of the useful arts—husbandry, house-building, metallurgy, weaving, pottery, hunting, &c.: nor is it prophecy, or the understanding of omens: nor any of the elegant arts—music, poetry, painting: nor the art of war, or navigation, or medicine, or forensic eloquence: nor does it consist in the natural endowments of quick wit and good memory.⁴ True wisdom is something different from all these. It consists in arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, leading to a full comprehension of the regular movements of the Kosmos—combined with a correct religious creed as to the divine attributes of the Kosmos and its planetary bodies which are all pervaded and kept in harmonious rotation

¹ Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 967 E.

² Plato, *Legg.* xii. p. 969 B.

³ Plato, *Epinom.* pp. 973-974.

⁴ Plato, *Epinom.* pp. 975-976.

by divine, in-dwelling, soul or mind.¹ It is the God Uranus (or Olympus, or Kosmos), with the visible Gods included therein, who furnishes to us not only the gifts of the seasons and the growth of food, but also varied intelligence, especially the knowledge of number, without which no other knowledge would be attainable.² Number and proportion are essential conditions of every variety of art. The regular succession of night and day, and the regularly changing phases of the moon—the comparison of months with the year—first taught us to count, and to observe the proportions of numbers to each other.³

The Athenian now enters upon the directly theological point of view, and re-asserts the three articles of orthodoxy which he had laid down in the tenth book of *Leges*: together with the other point of faith also—That Soul or Mind is older than body: soul is active and ruling—body, passive and subject. An animal is a compound of both. There are five elementary bodies—fire, air, æther, water, earth⁴—which the kosmical soul moulded, in varying proportions, so as to form different animals and plants. Man, animals, and plants were moulded chiefly of earth, yet with some intermixture of the other elements: the stars were moulded chiefly from fire, having the most beautiful bodies, endowed with divine and happy souls, and immortal, or very long-lived.⁵ Next to the stars were moulded the Dæmons, out of æther, and inhabitants of that element: after them, the animals inhabiting air, and Nymphs inhabiting water. These three occupy intermediate place between the stars above and man below.⁶ They serve as media of communication between man and the Gods: and also for the diffusion of thought and intelligence among all parts of the Kosmos.⁷ The Gods of

Theological
view of
Astronomy
—Divine
Kosmos—
Soul more
ancient and
more sove-
reign than
Body.

¹ Plato, *Epinom.* pp. 976-977.

² Plato, *Epinom.* pp. 977-978.

³ Plato, *Epinom.* pp. 978-979.

Plato, *Epinom.* pp. 980-981. We know, from a curious statement of Xenokrates (see *Fragm.* of his work *Περὶ τοῦ ἡλικιωτέρου βίου*, cited by Simplicius, ad *Aristot. Physic.* p. 427, a. 17, Schol. Brandis), that this quintuple elementary scale was a doctrine of Plato. But it is not the doctrine of the *Timæus*. The assertion of Xenokrates (good evidence) warrants us in

believing that Plato altered his views after the composition of *Timæus*, and that his latest opinions are represented in the *Epinomis*. Zeller indeed thinks that the dodekahedron in the *Timæus* might be construed as a fifth element, but this is scarcely tenable. Zeller, *Philos. der Griechen*, vol. ii. p. 513, ed. 2nd.

⁵ Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 981-982.

⁶ Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 983-984.

⁷ Plat. *Epinom.* pp. 984-985.

the ordinary faith—Zeus, Hērē, and others—must be left to each person's disposition, if he be inclined to worship them: but the great visible Kosmos, and the sidereal Gods, must be solemnly exalted and sanctified, with prayer and the holiest rites.¹ Those astronomers who ignore this divine nature, and profess to explain their movements by physical or mechanical forces, are guilty of grave impiety. The regularity of their movements is a proof of their divine nature, not a proof of the contrary, as some misguided persons affirm.²

Next, the Athenian intimates that the Greeks have obtained their astronomical knowledge, in the first instance, from Egypt and Assyria, but have much improved upon what they learnt (p. 987): that the Greeks at first were acquainted only with the three *φορὰι*—the outer or sidereal sphere (*Ἀπλανής*), the Sun, and the Moon—but unacquainted with the other five or planetary *φορὰι*, which they first learned from these foreigners, though not the names of the planets (p. 986): that all these eight were alike divine, fraternal agents, partakers in the same rational nature, and making up altogether the divine *Κόσμος*: that those who did not recognise all the eight as divine, consummately rational, and revolving with perfectly uniform movement, were guilty of impiety (p. 985 E): that these kosmical, divine, rational agents taught to mankind arithmetic and the art of numeration (p. 963 B): that soul, or plastic, demiurgic, cognitive force (p. 981 C), was an older and more powerful agent in the universe than body—but that there were two varieties of soul, a good and bad, of which the good variety was the stronger: the good variety of soul produced all the good movements, the bad variety produced all the bad movements (p. 988 D, E): that in studying astronomy, a man submitted himself to the teaching of this good soul and these divine agents, from whom alone he could learn true wisdom and piety (pp. 989 B—990 A): that this study, however, must be conducted not with a view to know the times of rising and setting of different stars (like Hesiod) but to be able to understand and follow the eight *περιφορὰς* (p. 990 B).

¹ Plat. Epinom. pp. 984 D—985 D.

² Plat. Epinom. pp. 982 D, 983 C.

To understand these—especially the five planetary and difficult *μεροφάσις*—arithmetic must also be taught, not in the concrete, but in the abstract (p. 990 C, D), to understand how much the real nature of things is determined by the generative powers and combination of Odd and Even Number. Next, geometry also must be studied, so as to compare numbers with plane and solid figures, and thus to determine proportions between two numbers which are not directly commensurable. The varieties of proportion, which are marvellously combined, must be understood—first arithmetical and geometrical proportions, the arithmetical proportion increasing by equal addition ($1 + 1 = 2$), or the point into a line—then the geometrical proportion by way of multiplication ($2 \times 2 = 4$; $4 \times 2 = 8$), or the line raised into a surface, and the surface raised into a cube. Moreover there are two other varieties of proportion (*τὸ ἡμιδιπλόν* or sesquialterum, and *τὸ ἐνίτριπτον* or sesquitertium) both of which occur in the numbers between the ratio of 6 to 12 (i.e. 9 is *τὸ ἡμιδιπλόν* of 6, or $9 = 6 + \frac{3}{2}$; again 8 is, *τὸ ἐνίτριπτον* of 6, or $8 = 6 + \frac{2}{3}$). This last is *harmonic proportion*, when there are three terms, of which the third is as much greater than the middle, as the middle is greater than the first ($3 : 4 : 6$)—six is greater than four by one-third of six, while four is greater than three by one-third of three (p. 991 A).

Study of
arithmetic
and geometry :
varieties of
proportion.

Lastly, having thus come to comprehend the general forms of things, we must bring under them properly the visible individuals in nature ; and in this process interrogation and cross-examination must be applied (p. 991 C). We must learn to note the accurate regularity with which time brings all things to maturity, and we shall find reason to believe that all things are full of Gods (p. 991 D). We shall come to perceive that there is one law of proportion pervading every geometrical figure, every numerical series, every harmonic combination, and all the celestial rotations: one and the same bond of union among all (p. 991 E). These sciences, whether difficult or easy, must be learnt: for without them no happy nature will be ever planted in our cities (p. 992 A). The man who learns all this will be the truly wise and happy man, both in this life and after it ; only a few men can possibly arrive at such happi-

When the
general
forms of
things have
thus been
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under them.

ness (p. 992 C). But it is these chosen few who, when they become Elders, will compose our Nocturnal Council, and maintain unimpaired the perpetual purity of the Platonic City.

Such then is the answer given by the *Epinomis*, to the question left unanswered in the *Leges*. However unsatisfactory it may appear, to those who look for nothing but what is admirable in Plato—I believe it to represent the latest views of his old age, when dialectic had given place in his mind to the joint ascendancy of theological sentiment and Pythagorean arithmetic.¹

Question as to education of the Nocturnal Council is answered in the *Epinomis*.

¹ In connection with the treatise called *Epinomis*, the question arises, What were the modifications which Plato's astronomical doctrines underwent during the latter years of his life? In what respect did they come to differ from what we read in the *Platonic Timæus*, where a geocentric system is proclaimed: whether we suppose (as Boeckh and others do) that the Earth is represented as stationary at the centre—or (as I suppose) that the Earth is represented as fastened to the centre of the kosmical axis, and revolving with it. The *Epinomis* delivers a geocentric system also.

Now it is upon this very point that Plato's opinions are said to have changed towards the close of his life. He came to repent that he had assigned to the Earth the central place in the system; and to conceive that place as belonging properly to something else, some other better (or more powerful) body. This is a curious statement, made in two separate passages by Plutarch, and in one of the two passages with reference to Theophrastus as his witness (Plutarch, *Vit. Numæ*, c. 11; *Platonic. Quest.* 8, p. 1006 C).

Boeckh (*Untersuchungen über das Kosmische System des Platon*, pp. 144-149) and Martin (*Études sur le Timée*, ii. 91) discredit the statement ascribed by Plutarch to Theophrastus. But I see no sufficient ground for such discredit. Sir George Lewis remarks very truly (*Historical Survey of the Astronomy of the Ancients*, p. 143):—"The testimony of Theophrastus, the disciple of Aristotle, and nearly his contemporary, has great weight on this point. The ground of the opinion alludes to the Pythagorean doctrine mentioned by Aristotle, that the centre is the most dignified place, and that

the earth is not the first in dignity among the heavenly bodies. It has no reference to observed phenomena, and is not founded on inductive scientific arguments. . . . The doctrine as to the superior dignity of the central place, and of the impropriety of assigning the most dignified station to the earth, was of Pythagorean origin and was probably combined with the Philolaic cosmology."

This remark of Sir George Lewis deserves attention, not merely from the proper value which he assigns to the testimony of Theophrastus, but because he confines himself to the exact matter which Theophrastus affirmed; viz., that Plato in his old age came to repent of his own cosmical views on one particular point and on one special ground. Theophrastus does not tell us what it was that Plato supposed to be in the centre, after he had become convinced that it was too dignified a place for the earth. Plato may have come to adopt the positive opinion of Philolaus (that of a central fire) as well as the negative opinion (that the Earth was not the central body). But we cannot affirm that he *did* adopt either this positive opinion or any other positive opinion upon that point. I take Theophrastus to have affirmed exactly what Plutarch makes him affirm, and no more: that Plato came to repent of having assigned to the earth the central place which did not befit it, and to account the centre the fit place "for some other body better than the Earth," yet without defining what that other body was. If Theophrastus had named what the other body was, surely Plutarch would never have suppressed the specific designation to make room for the vague *ἑτέριον τι πλεονεχόν*.

There is thus, in my judgment,

Assuming that the magistrates of the Nocturnal Council have gone through the course of education prescribed in the *Epinomis*, and have proved themselves unimpeachable on the score of orthodoxy—will they be able to solve the main problem which he has imposed upon them at the close of the *Leges*? There, as elsewhere, he proclaims a problem as indispensable to be solved, but does not himself furnish any solution. What is the common property, or point of similarity between Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice—by reason of which each is termed Virtue? What are the characteristic points of difference, by reason of which Virtue sometimes receives one of these names, sometimes another?

Problem which the Nocturnal Council are required to solve, What is the common property of Prudence, Courage, Temperance, Justice, by reason of which each is called Virtue?

The proper way of answering this question has been much debated, from Plato's day down to the present. It is one of the fundamental problems of Ethical Philosophy.

The only common property is that all of them are essential to the maintenance of society, and tend to promote human

The subjective matter of fact, implied by every one who designates an act or a person as virtuous, is an approving or admiring sentiment which each man knows in his own bosom. But Plato assumes that

ground for believing that Plato in his old age (after the publication of the *Treatise De Legibus*) came to distrust the geocentric dogma which he had previously supported; but we do not know whether he adopted any other dogma in place of it. The geocentric doctrine passed to the *Epinomis* as a continuation of the *Treatise De Legibus*. The phrase which Plutarch cites from Theophrastus deserves notice—*Θεόφραστος δὲ καὶ προσιστορεῖ τῇ Πλάτωνα περὶ οὐρανὸν γινώσκοντα μεταμελῆσαι, ὡς οὐ προσέκειντο ἀποδέχασθαι τῇ γὰρ τὴν αἰσθητὴν γῆναι τοῦ παντός. Plato repented.* Whoever reads the *Treatise De Legibus* (especially Books vii. and x.) will see that Plato at that period of his life considered astronomical errors as not merely errors, but heresies offensive to the Gods; and that he denounced those who supported such errors as impious. If Plato came afterwards to alter his astronomical views, he would repent of his own previous views as of a heresy. He came to believe that he

had rated the dignity of the Earth too high; and we can see how this change of view may have been occasioned. Earth was looked upon by him, as well as by many others, in two distinct points of view. 1. As a comical body, divine, and including *τοὺς ἡρώεις θεούς*. 2. As one of the four elements, along with water, air, and fire; in which sense it was strung together with *λίθοι*, and had degrading ideas associated with it (Plato, *Apol. Sokr.* p. 26 D). These two meanings, not merely distinct but even opposed to each other, occur in the very same sentence of *De Legibus*, x. p. 886 D. The elemental sense of Earth was brought prominently forward by those reasoners whom Plato refutes in Book x.: and the effect of such reasonings upon him was, that though he still regarded Earth as a Deity, he no longer continued to regard Earth as worthy of the comical post of honour. At that age, however, he might well consider himself excused from broaching any new positive theory.

security and happiness. there is, besides this, an objective connotation : a common object or property to which such sentiment refers. What is that common object? I see no other except that which is indicated by the principle of Utility : I mean that principle which points out Happiness and Unhappiness, not merely of the agent himself, but also of others affected or liable to be affected by his behaviour, as the standard to which these denominations refer. Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, all tend to prevention and mitigation of unhappiness, and to increase of happiness, as well for the agent himself as for the society surrounding him. The opposite qualities—Timidity, Imprudence, Intemperance, Injustice—tend with equal certainty either to increase positively the unhappiness of the agent and of society, or to remove the means for warding it off or abating it. Indeed there is a certain minimum of all the four—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—without which or below which neither society could hold together, nor the life of the individual agent himself could be continued.

Here then is one answer at least to the question of Plato. Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—all of them mental attributes of rational voluntary agents—have also the common property of being, in a certain minimum degree, absolutely essential to the life of the agent and the maintenance of society—and of being, above that degree, tutelary against the suffering, and beneficial to the happiness, of both. This tutelary or beneficent tendency is the common objective property signified by the general term *Virtue*; and is implicated with the subjective property before mentioned—the sentiment of approbation. The four opposite qualities are designated by the general term *Vice* or *Defect*, connoting both maleficent tendency and the sentiment of disapprobation.

This proposition will be farther confirmed, if we look at all the four qualities—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—in another point of view. Taking them in their reference to *Virtue*, each of them belongs to *Virtue* as a part to the whole,¹ not as one species

¹ Compare Plato, Legg. i. p. 629 B, —δικαιοσύνη και σωφροσύνη και φρόνη- where he describes τὴν ἑμπεσαν ἀρετὴν σις εἰς ταῦτον ἔλθουσα μετ' ἀνδρείας :

contradistinguished from and excluding other species. The same person may have, and ought to have, a certain measure of all: he will not be called virtuous unless he has a measure of all. Excellence in any one will not compensate for the entire absence of the others.

particular acts instigated by each, there is always a tacit reason to the hurt or benefit in the special case.

A just and temperate man will not be accounted virtuous, if (to use an Aristotelian simile) he be so extravagantly timid as to fear every insect that flits by, or the noise of a mouse.¹ All probability of beneficent results from his agency is effaced by this capital defect: and it is the probability of such results which constitute his title to be called virtuous.

When we speak of the four as qualities or attributes of men (as Plato does in this treatise, while considering the proper type of character which the lawgiver should aim at forming) we speak of them in the abstract—that is, making abstraction of particular circumstances, and regarding only what is common to most men in most situations. But in the realities of life these particulars are always present: there is a series of individual agents and patients, acts and sufferings, each surrounded by its own distinct circumstances and situation. Now in each of these situations an agent is held responsible for the consequences of his acts, when they are such as he knows and foresees, or might by reasonable care know and foresee. An officer who (like Charles XII. at Bender) marches up without necessity at the head of a corporal's guard to attack a powerful hostile army of good soldiers, exhibits the maximum of courage: but his act, far from being commended as virtue, must be blamed as rashness, or pitied as folly. If a friend has deposited in my care a sword or other deadly weapon (to repeat the very case put by Sokrates²), justice requires me to give it back to him when he asks for it. Yet if, at the time when he asks, he be insane, and exhibits plain indications of being about to employ it for murderous purposes, my just restoration of it will not be commended as an act of virtue. When we look at

also pp. 680 C-E, 681 A, where he considers all these as *μέγιστα ἀρετῆς*, but *ἀρετῆς* as the first of the four and *ἀρετῆς* as the last.

See also iii. pp. 688 B, 696 C-D, iv. p. 706 D.

¹ Aristot. *Ethic. Nikomach.* vii. 6,

p. 1148, a. 8; *Politic.* vii. 1, p. 1323, a. 29. καὶ ψευδὴς μὲν . . . δόξαι τὰς ἀπαρτιομένας μιν.

² Plato, *Republic*, i. p. 351 C; Xenoph. *Memor.* iv. 2, 17; Cicero, *De Officiis*, iii. 25.

these four qualities—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice—not in the abstract, but in reference to particular acts, agents, and situations—we find that before a just or courageous act can be considered to deserve the name of Virtue, there is always a tacit supposition, that no considerable hurt to innocent persons is likely or predictable from it in the particular case. The sentiment of approbation, implied in the name Virtue, will not go along with the act, if in the particular case it produce a certain amount of predictable mischief. This is another property common to all the four attributes of mind—Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice:—and forming one of the conditions under which they become entitled to the denomination of Virtue.

In the first books of the *Leges*, Plato¹ puts forward Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, as the parts or sorts of Virtue: telling us that the natural rectitude of laws consists in promoting, not any one of the four separately, but all the four together in their due subordination. He classifies good things (*Bona* or *Expetenda*) in a triple scale of value.² First, and best of all, come the mental attributes—which he calls divine—Prudence or Intelligence, Temperance, Justice, and Courage: Second, or second best, come the attributes of body—health, strength, beauty, activity, manual dexterity: Third, or last, come the extraneous advantages, Wealth, Power, Family-Position, &c. It is the duty of the lawgiver to employ his utmost care to ensure to his citizens the first description of *Bona* (the mental attributes)—upon which (Plato says) the second and third description depend, so that if the first are ensured, the second and third will be certain to follow: while if the lawgiver, neglecting the first, aims at the second and third exclusively or principally, he will miss all three.³ Here we see, that while Plato assigns the

¹ Plato, *Legg.* i. pp. 627 D, 631 A-C.

² Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 631 B-D, iii. p. 697 B. This tripartite classification of *Bona* differs altogether from the tripartite classification of *Bona* given at the commencement of the second book of the *Republic*. But it agrees with that, the "*tria genera Bonorum*," distinguished by Aristotle in the first Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (p. 1098, b. 12), among which *τὰ περὶ ψυχῆν* were *κυριώτατα καὶ μάλιστα*

ἀγαθὰ. This recognition of "*tria genera Bonorum*" is sometimes quoted as an opinion characteristic of the Peripatetics; but Aristotle himself declares it to be ancient and acknowledged, and we certainly have it here in Plato.

³ Plato, *Legg.* i. p. 631 C. *ἡγοῦμαι δ' ἐκ τῶν θείων ὁδοῦν, καὶ εἰς μὲν δόχματα τις τὰ μέγιστα πόλις, κτάραι καὶ τὰ ἐλάττωνα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, στέρεται ἀμφοῖν.* The same doctrine is declared by

highest scale of value to the mental attributes, he justifies such preference by assuring us that they are the essential producing causes of the other sorts of Bona. His assurance is even given in terms more unqualified than the realities of life will bear out.

When Plato therefore proclaims it as the great desideratum for his Supreme Council, that they shall understand the common relation of the four great mental attributes (Courage, Prudence, Temperance, Justice) to each other as well as to the comprehensive whole, Virtue—he fastens their attention on the only common property which the four can be found to possess: i.e. that they are mental attributes required in every one for the security and comfort of himself and of society. To ward off or mitigate the suffering, and to improve the comfort of society, is thus inculcated as the main and constant end for them to keep in view. It is their prescribed task, to preserve and carry forward that which he as lawgiver had announced as his purpose in the beginning of the *Leges*.

In thus directing the attention of the Council to the common property of the four virtues, Plato enforces upon them the necessity of looking to the security and happiness of their community as the paramount end.

In thus taking leave of Plato, at the close of his longest, latest, and most affirmative composition, it is satisfactory to be able to express unqualified sympathy with this main purpose which, as departing lawgiver, he directs his successors to promote. But to these salutary directions, unfortunately, he has attached others noway connected with them except by common feelings of reverence in his own mind—and far less deserving of sympathy. He requires that his own religious belief shall be erected into a peremptory orthodoxy, and that heretics shall be put down by the severest penalties. Now a citizen might be perfectly just, temperate, brave, and prudent—and yet dissent altogether from the Platonic creed. For such a citizen—the counterpart of Sokrates at Athens—no existence would be possible in the Platonic community.

But he enjoins also other objectionable ends.

We must farther remark that, even when Plato's ends are

Sokrates in the Platonic Apology, pp. 29-30. λέγων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ δημοσίου (30 B). ἀρετὴ γίγνεται, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἀρετῆς χρήματα

Intolerance
of Plato—
Comparison
of the
Platonic
community
with
Athens.

unexceptionable, the amount of interference which he employs to accomplish them is often extravagant. As a Constructor, he carries the sentiment of his own infallibility—which in a certain measure every lawgiver must assume—to an extreme worthy only of the kings of the Saturnian age:¹ manifesting the very minimum of tolerance for that enquiring individual reason of which his own negative dialogues remain as immortal master-pieces. We trace this intolerance through all the dialogue *Leges*. Even when he condescends to advise and persuade, he speaks rather in the tone of an encyclical censor, than of one who has before him a reasonable opponent to be convinced. The separate laws proposed by Plato are interesting to read, as illustrating antiquity: but most of them are founded on existing Athenian law. Where they depart from it, they depart as often for the worse as for the better—so far as I can pretend to judge. And in spite of all the indisputable defects, political and judicial, of that glorious city, where Plato was born and passed most of his days—it was, in my judgment, preferable to his Magnætic city, as to all the great objects of security, comfort, recreation, and enjoyment. Athens was preferable, even for the ordinary citizen: but for the men of free, inquisitive, self-thinking, minds—the dissentient minority, who lived upon that open speech of which Athenian orators and poets boasted—it was a condition of existence: since the Platonic censorship would have tolerated neither their doctrines nor their persons.

¹ Plato, *Politicus*, pp. 271 E, 275 A-C.

APPENDIX.

SINCE the commencement of the present century, with its increased critical study of Plato, different and opposite opinions have been maintained by various authors respecting the genuineness or spuriousness of the *Treatise De Legibus*. Schleiermacher (*Platons Werke*, I. i. p. 51) admitted it as a genuine work of Plato, but ranked it among the *Nebenwerke*, or outlying dialogues: i.e., as a work that did not form an item or stepping-stone in the main Platonic philosophical series (which Schleiermacher attempts to lay out according to a system of internal sequence and gradual development), but was composed separately, in general analogy with the later or more constructive portion of that series. On the other hand, Ast (*Platons Leben und Schriften*, pp. 376-392) distinctly maintains that the *Treatise De Legibus* is not the composition of Plato, but of one of his scholars and contemporaries, perhaps Xenokrates or the Opuntian Philippus. Ast supports this opinion by many internal grounds, derived from a comparison of the treatise with other Platonic dialogues.

Zeller (in his *Platonische Studien*, Tübingen, 1839, pp. 1-144) discussed the same question in a more copious and elaborate manner, and declared himself decidedly in favour of Ast's opinion—that the *Treatise De Legibus* was not the work of Plato, but of one among his immediate scholars. But in his *History of Grecian Philosophy* (vol. ii. pp. 348-615-641, second edition), Zeller departs from this judgment, and pronounces the *Treatise* to be a genuine work of Plato—the last form of his philosophy, modified in various ways.

Again, Suckow (in his work, *Die wissenschaftliche und künstlerische Form der Platonischen Schriften*, Berlin, 1855, I. pp. 111-118 seq.) advocates Zeller's first opinion—that the *Treatise De Legibus* is not the work of Plato.

Lastly, Stallbaum, in the *Prolegomena* prefixed to his edition of the *Treatise*, strenuously vindicates its Platonic authorship. This is also the opinion of Boeckh and K. F. Hermann; and was, moreover, the opinion of all critics (I believe) anterior to Ast.

To me, I confess, it appears that the Treatise De Legibus is among the best authenticated works of the Platonic collection. I do not know what better positive proof can be tendered than the affirmation of Aristotle in his Politics—distinct and unqualified, mentioning both the name of the author and the title of the work, noting also the relation in which it stood to the Republic, both as a later composition of the same author, and as discrepant on some points of doctrine, analogous on others. This in itself is the strongest *primâ facie* evidence, not to be rebutted, except by some counter-testimony, or by some internal mark of chronological impossibility: moreover, it coincides with the consentient belief of all the known ancient authors later than Aristotle—such as Zeno the Stoic, who composed a treatise in seven books—*Πρὸς τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους* (Diog. Laert. vii. 36), Persæus, the Alexandrine critics, Cicero, Plutarch, &c. (Stallbaum, Prolegg. p. xliv.) Aristophanes Grammaticus classified both *Leges* and *Epinomis* as Plato's works. The arguments produced in Zeller's *Platonische Studien*, to show that Aristotle may have been mistaken in his assertion, are of little or no force. Nor will it be material to the present question, even if we concede to Zeller and Suckow another point which they contend for—that the remarks of Aristotle upon Plato's opinions are often inaccurate at least, if not unfair. For here Aristotle is produced in court only as a witness to authenticity.

Among the points raised by Suckow, there is indeed one, which if it were made out, would greatly invalidate, if not counterbalance, the testimony of Aristotle. Suckow construes the passage in the Oration of Isokrates ad Philippum (p. 84, § 14)—*ὁμοίως οἱ τοιοῦτοι τῶν λόγων ἄνθρωποι τυγχάνουσιν ὄντες τοῖς νόμοις καὶ ταῖς πολιτείαις ταῖς ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν γεγραμμέναις*—as if it alluded to the Platonic Republic, and to the Treatise De Legibus; but as if it implied, at the same time, that the two treatises were not composed by the same author, but by different authors, indicated by the plural *σοφιστῶν*. If this were the true meaning of Isokrates, we should then have Aristotle distinctly contradicted by another respectable contemporary witness, which would of course much impair the value of his testimony.

But Stallbaum (p. lii.) disputes altogether the meaning ascribed by Suckow to the words of Isokrates, and contends that the plural *σοφιστῶν* noway justifies the hypothesis of a double authorship. So far, I think, he is decidedly right: and this clears away the only one item of counter-testimony which has yet been alleged against Aristotle as a witness. Stallbaum, indeed, goes a step farther. He contends that the passage above cited from Isokrates is an evidence on his side,

and against Suckow: that Isokrates alludes to Plato as author of both *Republic* and *Leges*, and thus becomes available as a second contemporary witness, confirming the testimony of Aristotle. This is less certain; yet perhaps supposable. We may imagine that Isokrates, when he composed the passage, had in his mind Plato pre-eminently—then recently dead at a great age, and the most illustrious of all the Sophists who had written upon political theory. The vague and undefined language in which Isokrates speaks, however, sets forth, by contrast, the great evidentiary value of Aristotle's affirmation, which is distinct and specific in the highest degree, declaring Plato to be the author of *Leges*.

To contradict this affirmation—an external guarantee of unusual force—Zeller produces a case of internal incredibility. The *Legg*, cannot be the work of Plato (he argues) because of the numerous disparities and marked inferiority of style, handling, and doctrine, which are very frequently un-Platonic, and not seldom anti-Platonic. Whoever will read the *Platonische Studien*, will see that Zeller has made out a strong case of this sort, set forth with remarkable ability and ingenuity. Indeed, the strength of the case, as to internal discrepancy, is fully admitted by his opponent Stallbaum, who says in general terms (*Prolegg.* vol. ii. p. v.)—"Argumentatio quidem ac disserendi ratio, quæ in *Legibus* regnat, ubi considerata fuerit paullo accuratius, dubitare nemo sanè poterit, quin multa propria ac peculiaria habere judicanda sit, quæ ab aliorum librorum Platoniorum usu et consuetudine longissimè recedant". He then proceeds to enumerate in detail many serious points of discrepancy. See the second part (ch. xv.) of his *Prolegomena*, prefixed to Book v. *Legg.*, and in *Prolegg.* to his edition of 1859, pp. lv.-lix. But in spite of such undeniable force of internal improbability, Stallbaum still maintains that the *Treatise* is really the work of Plato. Of course, he does not admit that the whole of the internal evidence is nothing but discrepancy. He points out also much that is homogeneous and Platonic.

I agree with his conclusion (which is also the subsequent conclusion of Zeller) respecting the authorship of *Legg*. To me the testimony of Aristotle appears conclusive. But when I perceive how strong are the grounds for doubt, so long as we discuss the question on grounds of internal evidence simply (that is, by comparison with other Platonic dialogues)—while yet such doubts are over-ruled, by our fortunately possessing incontestable authenticating evidence *ab extra*—an inference suggests itself to me, of which Platonic critics seem for the most part unconscious. I mean the great fallibility of reasonings founded simply on internal evidence, for the purpose of disproving authenticity, where

we have no external evidence, contemporary or nearly contemporary, to controul them. In this condition are the large majority of the dialogues. I do not affirm that such reasonings are *never* to be trusted; but I consider them eminently fallible. To compare together the various dialogues, indeed, and to number as well as to weigh the various instances of analogy and discrepancy between them, is a process always instructive. It is among the direct tasks and obligations of the critic. But when, after detecting discrepancies, more or less grave and numerous, he proceeds to conclude, that the dialogue in which they occur cannot have been composed by Plato, he steps upon ground full of hypothesis and uncertainty. Who is to fix the limit of admissible divergence between the various compositions of a man like Plato? Who can determine what changes may have taken place in Plato's opinions, or point of view, or intellectual powers—during a long literary life of more than fifty years, which we know only in mere outline? Considering that Plato systematically lays aside his own personal identity, and speaks only under the assumed names of different expositors, opponents, and respondents—which of us can claim to possess a full and exhaustive catalogue of all the diverse phases of Platonism, so as to make sure that some unexpected variety has no legitimate title to be ranked among them?

For my part, I confess that these questions appear to me full of doubt and difficulty. I am often surprised at the confidence with which critics, upon the faith of internal evidence purely and simply, pronounce various dialogues of the Platonic collection to be spurious. A lesson of diffidence may be learnt from the *Leges*: which, if internal evidence alone were accessible, would stand among the questionable items of the Platonic catalogue—while it now takes rank among the most unquestionable, from the complete external certificate which has been fortunately preserved to us.

Stallbaum, who maintains the authenticity of the Platonic *Leges*, disallows altogether that of the *Epinomia*. In his long and learned *Prolegg.* (vol. iii. p. 441-470), he has gone over the whole case, and stated at length his reasons for this opinion. I confess that his reasons do not satisfy me. If, on the faith of those reasons, I rejected the *Epinomia*, I should also on the grounds stated by Ast and Zeller reject the *Leges*. The reasons against the *Leges* are of the same character and tenor as those against the *Epinomia*, and scarce at all less weighty. Respecting both of them, it may be shown that they are greatly inferior in excellence to the *Republic* and the other master-pieces of the Platonic genius, and that they contain points of doctrine and reasoning different from what we read in other Platonic works.

But when, from these premisses, I am called upon to admit that they are not the works of Plato, I cannot assent either about the one or the other. I have already observed that I expect to find among his genuine compositions, some inferior in merit, others dissentient in doctrine—especially in compositions admitted to belong to his oldest age. All critics from Aristophanes down to Tennemann, have admitted the *Epinomis* as genuine: and when Stallbaum contends that Diogenes mentions doubts on the point entertained even in antiquity—I think he is not warranted by the words of that author, iii. 37: *ἔτι οἱ τε φασὶν εἶναι Φιλίππου ὁ Ὀπουντίος τοὺς Νόμους αὐτοῦ (Πλάτωνος) μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ· τοῦτον δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐκνομίδα φασὶν εἶναι*. I do not think we can infer from these words anything more than this—that “Philippus transcribed the *Epinomis* also out of the waxen tablet as he had transcribed the *Leges*”. The persons (whosoever they were—*ἔτι οἱ*) to whom Diogenes refers, considered Philippus as in part the author of the *Νόμοι*; because he had first transcribed them in a legible form from the rough original, and might possibly have introduced changes of his own in the transcription. If they had meant to distinguish what he did in respect to the *Leges*, from what he did in respect to the *Epinomis*: if they had meant to assert that he transcribed the *Leges*, but that he composed the *Epinomis* as an original addition of his own; I think they would have employed, not the conjunction *καὶ*, but some word indicating contrast and antithesis.

But even if we concede that the persons here alluded to by Diogenes did really believe, that the *Epinomis* was the original composition of Philippus and not of Plato—we must remember that all the critics of antiquity known to us believed the contrary—that it was the genuine work of Plato. In particular, Aristophanes Grammaticus acknowledges it as such; enrolling it in one trilogy with the *Minos* and the *Leges*. The testimony of Aristophanes, and the records of the Alexandrine Library in his time, greatly outweigh the suspicions of the unknown critics alluded to by Diogenes; even if we admit that those critics did really conceive the *Epinomis* as an actual composition of Philippus.

THE END.

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